EXTENSIONS of REMARKS June 1, 1983 EXTENSIONS of REMARKS CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY at See the Same Distortions and Deceptions

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EXTENSIONS of REMARKS June 1, 1983 EXTENSIONS of REMARKS CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY at See the Same Distortions and Deceptions 14242 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS June 1, 1983 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY AT see the same distortions and deceptions. I these countries, while the campesinos-the THE CROSSROADS see the same phony white papers. I see the peasant farmers-have lived in dire poverty same effort to brand all opposition to gov­ subject to brutal official terror. Unless pov­ ernments we support as Marxist-inspired. I erty is eradicated, unless genuine land HON. DAVID E. BONIOR see the same tendency to misinterpret what reform is carried out, unless human rights OF MICHIGAN is essentially an internal struggle as solely are respected, Central America will remain a IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES the consequence of outside agitation. I see region in revolutionary ferment. Wednesday, June 1, 1983 the same inclination to rely on military so­ The folly of our current policy is that it lutions when negotiated solutions are the will be perceived in the region as only the e Mr. BONIOR of Michigan. Mr. only lasting answer. I see the same efforts latest example of "Yankee imperialism"­ Speaker, last week, we all read with to blame the critics rather than the flawed the gunboat diplomacy that has often char­ deep sorrow of the death of a U.S. policy they criticize. I see the divisiveness of acterized our Central American policy. It military advisor in El Salvador. Even the Vietnam years re-emerging. needs to be emphasized that current Cen­ as we mourn this tragic event, and We must avoid this outcome. The cross­ tral American sensitivities about United extend our sympathy to the officer's roads we have now reached in our Central States policy are not without historical American policy is a crossroads for our foundation. It was 1855 that an American, family, we cannot help but be alarmed nation. William Walker, took a private army to by the larger implications and by the THE WRONG DIAGNOSIS AND THE WRONG Nicaragua, and proceeded to declare himself determination of the Reagan adminis­ PRESCRIPTION emperor. It was in 1912 that a large contin­ tration to send more military advisers My quarrel with the Administration's gent of U.S. military forces went to Nicara­ to the region. We cannot help but ask Central American policy is not with its gua to protect U.S. interests and ended up where this policy is leading. And we goals. I shar~ the President's concern that staying 21 years, leaving the first Anastasio cannot help but be reminded of the Central American countries not be taken Somoza as our surrogate in Managua. still fresh wounds this Nation suffered over by Marxist regimes. None of us wants Somoza and his two sons ruled the land for in Vietnam. to see the countries of Central America forty-three years, with the latest Somoza The parallels between our policy in become bases for the projection of Cuban or dictator finally being ousted by the Sandi­ Soviet power in our hemisphere. What is at nista revolution in 1978. Indochina and the folly of our current issue, however, is the means by which the It should come as no surprise, given the involvement in Central America have President is trying to achieve those goals. I history of our involvement, that the Nicara­ been carefully documented by my col­ believe our current policy is counter-produc­ guan people mistrust our intentions and do league from Michigan, HowARD tive. It will achieve a result exactly opposite not believe our policy statements. They, like WoLPE, in a recent speech in his home from that which is intended. As the House other Latin Americans, do not forget that in district. I would like to insert this Select Committee on Intelligence recently 1954 the CIA participated in overthrowing speech in the RECORD with the hope concluded in its :report on the covert assist­ the Jacobo Arbenz regime in Guatamala that other Members of Congress will ance program in Nicaragua: and that, in 1971, the CIA conspired to de­ "If ever there was a formula for U.S. stabilize the elected Chilean government of take the time to read it, and to listen policy failure in Central America, it would . President Salvador Allende. to the concerns of their constituents involve two elements: <1 > acts that could be THE REAGAN APPROACH on this issue. Last week, a Washington characterized as U.S. interventionism in Post poll reported that a majority of Insensitive to this historical record, and to Nicaragua, and <2> an alliance with the fol­ Central American perceptions, the Adminis­ Americans believe there is a great lowers of Somoza. Both characterizations tration has responded to instability in Cen­ danger that the United States will can now be made." tral America by spending hundreds of Inil­ become too entangled in internal Cen­ Let me explain in more detail why I be­ lions of dollars to train and equip military tral American problems. As Congress­ lieve the President has made the wrong di­ forces to combat communist insurgencies man WoLPE argues, and as recent news agnosis in Central America and why his and the Nicaraguan Sandinista government. remedy is likely only to deepen the regional In El Salvador alone the Administration has stories so painfully confirm, U.S. crisis. policy in Central America is at a cross­ spent over $700 million in military and eco­ roads. THE CAUSES OF UNREST nomic aid. Current requests for more assist­ Part of the problem is that the Reagan ance, if approved, would bring the total of The article follows: Administration has misunderstood the ' Reagan Administration aid to El Salvador to CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY AT THE causes of revolution in Central America. over $1 billion. CROSSROADS President Reagan, in his speech to the Con­ This means that for every one of the esti­ I am happy to have this opportunity to gress on April 27 and on other occasions, mated 7,000 guerrillas opposing the Govern­ meet with you tonight and share some of has emphasized external factors-Soviet ment of El Salvador we will be spending my thoughts about the current debate over and Cuban support for leftist revolutionar­ 140,000 hard-earned American tax dollars. American policy in Central America. Let me ies-as the main concern of the United And where are we today after all the say from the outset that I am more alarmed States in the region. He sees Central Amer­ money we have spent? Sadly we are prob­ with our Central American policy and the ica almost exclusively as part of a global ably farther from, rather than closer to, any divisive impact the debate on this policy is East-West struggle. He perceives the prob­ solution. El Salvador itself is polarized into having in our country than I have been with lem in El Salvador, in particular, as a classic rival political camps. Fighting goes on .anY issue since the Vietnam war. case of externally based communist subver­ throughout the country. The American Am­ In the past two weeks my colleagues on sion, which must be combatted at any cost bassador in San Salvador told the Washing­ the Foreign Affairs Committee and I have with heavy Inilitary assistance. ton Post in a recent interview that the war spent many long hours considering the Tragically, the President and his foreign between the Salvadoran government troops questions of future aid to El Salvador and policy advisors have consistently failed to and the guerrillas will be "protracted." the Administration's covert assistance to comprehend the political significance of the Clearly we are talking about years, not the anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua. We enormous poverty and the rampant injus­ weeks or months. have listened to Administration witnesses, tice that has afflicted Central America, or And who are the Salvadorans we are sup­ received highly classified CIA briefings and the counter-productive nature of United porting? The army we are backing is erratic discussed the issues extensively among our­ States policy responses. For decades Central at best, criminal at its worst. Since 1979 El selves. Very frankly, I have a keen sense of America has been run for the most part by Salvador has seen over 30,000 civilian deja vu. An all-too-familiar pattern is U.S.-supported dictators and right-wing deaths-the majority of them murders com­ emerging, and I fear we are about to make Inilitary regimes. The wealthy elites have mitted by right-wing death squads and gov­ the same mistakes we made in Vietnam. I controlled the land and the resources of ernment security forces using American- e This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by the Member on the floor. Jun~ 1, 1983 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS 14243 supplied arms. Last week the Salvadoran A NEW APPROACH would be cut off if the Salvadoran govern­ Catholic Church announced that 364 people The main result of the Administration's ment did not begin unconditional negotia­ had been killed between May 6 and May 12. policy for the past two years has been grow­ tions within ninety days of the enactment During the month of April the number of ing divisions within Central America and of the foreign aid authorization. The resolu­ politically motivated killings by leftists within our own country. President Reagan tion also laid down two new requirements: guerrillas, right-wing death squads and gov­ has justified his policy on the grounds that the Congress would have to vote to affirma­ ernment soldiers averaged more than 250 if we do not stop subversion in El Salvador tively approve future aid to El Salvador, and per week.
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