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Bridgewater Review

Volume 2 | Issue 2 Article 6

Mar-1984 The .SU . in and the Michael J. Kryzanek Bridgewater State College, [email protected]

Recommended Citation Kryzanek, Michael J. (1984). The .SU . in Central America and the Caribbean. Bridgewater Review, 2(2), 4-8. Available at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/br_rev/vol2/iss2/6

This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, . ,...----fThe U.S. in Central America1-----, and the Caribbean

UNITED STATES Regaining our Sphere -Bcrmud..l(U.K..) A11.ANTIC of Influence

by Michael J. Kryzanek

C~nlral ,Am~nra alld Ih~ Caribb~all

T he revolution in Central America has Presidents, starting with Theodore created animosity with a communist regime not only helped most learn Roosevelt, have felt an obligation to one hundred miles from our shores. The where EI Salvador and are intervene whenever economic and political debates not withstanding, the fact remains situated on the map, but, more importantly, circumstances in this warranted that developed a Soviet it has placed before them two opposing action. Not surprisingly, American satellite in our traditional sphere of influence interpretations of what is actually going on corporations targeted the area as ripe for and thereby singlehandedly transformed in that part of the . By the Reagan investment and profit making; tourists the geopolitical forces in the Central Administration, the American public is told streamed down to the beacr1€s and casinos American-Caribbean region. For the first that the fighting in this region is a result of thinking of these as mere time a revolution with definite anti­ communist expansionism. The Salvadoran extensions of American soil; and American overtones led by an avowed rebels, in concert with the and and diplomatic strategists felt little communist succeeded in our "backyard." the Cubans, are seeking to spread their hesitation in recommending the sending of Not surprisingly, the history of U.S.­ influence and establish Marxist satellite troops or civilian advisors to secure the Cuban relations since 1959 has been states. Those who disagree with the Reagan peace or straighten out the finances of our marked by a series of attempts to topple the position claim that the outbreak of neighbors in a manner reminiscent of a Castro government and reassert our revolution stems from social and economic landlord taking care of his property. complete domination in the hemisphere. inequality. After decades of elite rule For a good portion of the twentieth Almost immediately upon Castro's maintained through corrupt, repressive and century the maintained revolutionary victory, the United States unlawful means, peasants and the urban without significant challenge its hold on the responded with sugar embargoes, poor are taking up weapons to bring an end Central American-Caribbean sphere of diplomatic slights and harsh words. Later on to the injustice. influence. But a series of events starting with the American public would find out about Although these two approaches to the the in 1959 weakened our our clandestine efforts to "destabilize" the conflict in Central America both evolve hold on the region, and helped contribute to Castro regime through assassination, from defensible positions, the American the unrest in places like EI Salvador and sabotage and the infamous public should be aware that the turmoil in Nicaragua. invasion. this region can be examined from a third But despite these efforts, Castro held on perspective. The revolutions in Nicaragua and in some respects even flourished. With and EI Salvador have also occurred because The Breakup 0/ the considerable Soviet aid (now estimated at United States influence is declining in this Central American-Caribbean over three billion dollars a year), a strategic area; and as a result, our ability to Sphere 0/ Influence supportive population and some wise social contain the fighting and direct the future programs aimed at eradicating disease and development of these countries is Castro's Geopolitical Revolution illiteracy, Castro managed to hold up to the diminishing. world an alternative to United States Since the turn of the century, the nation­ 's revolution of 1959 and its and . Within a states that rim the Caribbean have become subsequent drift into Marxism has been the matter of a few years, the United States and part of our sphere of influence. The topic of endless analysis. Debates still rage the American way were being challenged by direction and development of these nations over whether the United States should have an upstart revolutionary. What is perhaps has been closely linked to, if not controlled, acted more forcefully to bring the Castro even more significant is that Castro's by decisions made in Washington. regime down or whether we needlessly triumph was well received throughout Latin 4 with alternative 1965 to put down an urban . Since sources of capi­ the Johnson Administration was able to tal for develop­ stop the fighting and diminish the influence ment projects. of the leftist rebels in the new government Moreover, the that was formed, Washington was pleased huge bills incur­ with the "nosecond Cuba" policy. Itseemed by these coun­ that we could stop rev'olution and regain our tries when OPEC control over this region through swift increased oil prices military intervention. Castro would perhaps forced them to be just an aberration. diversify their But the followed, and we economies by seek­ learned to our dismay that not all ing assistance from interventions end in success. We also lost a a number of sources good deal of our enthusiasm for interfering so as not to be­ in the internal matters of another , come too depend- no matter how threatened an ally was by 190~, communist aggression. The memory of The Big Stick in the Caribbean Rogers in New York Herold, c. ent on the United courtesy New York Sun, Inc. States. domestic opposition to the war and the America. After years of United States The OPEC oil price escalation also had an costs, human and monetary, of fighting a control and domination, the Latins finally emotional impact on United States relations guerrilla war made Presidents could look to someone who was successful in its sphere of influence and served to and reluctant to play in breaking the American hold on this further lessen our ability to dominate the policemen to the world. region. economics of this region. Facing enormous Even though the Vietnam War ended, the As the Cuban revolution enjoys its 25th debts as a result of payments for oil, the revolutionary aspirations of people in the countries of Central America and the anniversary, the excitement and aura that it 1 less-developed countries remained active. once created has disappeared. There is Caribbean sought greater access to United This time the revolution was in Nicaragua, much to criticize about the industrial and States markets and more advantageous where a guerilla army called the Sandinistas agricultural failures, the political prisoners terms of . The response from the was pitted against the repressive, but pro­ and the dependence on the . United States, which also had severe U.S. Government of Anastosio Somoza. The development problems inside Cuba, balance of payments problems, was either When the Sandinista rebels showed however, do not diminish the fact that to deny access or to pass protective remarkable ability to sustain their war Castro's revolution not only changed life in legislation that increased trade barriers. and later achieve significant victories over that country, but also radically altered the The reaction to these steps by the United U.S. trained government troops, our face of hemispheric power relations. States was unusually hostile and was country was once again thrust into a Castro's revolution served notice that expressed in terms that signaled a new dilemma over the proper response to a America was no longer unchallenged in the found independence and a determination on leftist challenge in our sphere of influence. geographic region closest to its border. the part of these countries never to permit The United States could exert its economic, their future to depend on American military and propaganda power to keep goodwill. As a result, the leaders of many ... OPEC and the til Rise of Competition Central American and Caribbean nations ci)

became more aggressive in their trade talks -"U While Castro successfully defied the til with the United States and intensified their political superiority of the United States in ai efforts to open up their economies to new =0 its sphere of influence, the changing world o sources of trade, aid and investment. The o economy lessened American business and 3 days of one-sided, paternalistic commercial -"u financial dominance in this region. With the o and financial relations with the United ...J onset of the world recession in the 1970s States were over. '" and the rise in influence of the OPEC oil d'" cartel, the United States began to recognize The Sandinistas that it faced stiff competition from a number and the of countries that previously had been "No Second Cuba" inactive in Central America and the Theory Caribbean. Countries like Japan, West Germany, , South , and One of the major policy positions taken along with some of the emerging by the United States Government after the Latin American economies like Brazil and Cuban revolution was that this country challenged the long standing United would never permit "another Cuba." States domination of trade and investment Presumably a "second Cuba" would begin in the region. the process of falling dominoes in Latin Even though the United States remained America and create a threat to our national the primary trade, aid and investment security. partner with the countries of Central Under President Lyndon Johnson the America and the Caribbean, the influx of United States exercised its power to foreign competition cut into its trade prevent a "second Cuba" when it sent percentages and provided these countries 23,000 troops to the in Castro playing 5 Somoza in office and thereby retain the viability of the "nosecond Instances of use of Cuba" doctrine, or it could refuse to become entangled in the Central America and the internal guerrilla war to uphold the government of one of 's most repressive and corrupt dictators. 11101 - (Slata of ) - Novambar 20 - December 4 To protect American property on the Isthmus and to keep transit lines In an earlier era the choice would have been an easy one, as the open dUring serious revolutionary disturbances. United States sent out its fleet and a contingent of Marines. But in 1102 - Colombia (Slate of Panama) - Seplember 17 - November 18 the late 1970s, on the heels of our Vietnam debacle, the Carter To place armed guards on all trains crossing ttle Isthmus and to keep tne railroad line open. Administration revealed the internal conflicts that come with the 11103 • - March 231030 or 31 knowledge that time and circumstances have changed the way the To protect the American consulate and the steamship wnarf at Puerto U. S. views itself and its sphere of influence. A combination of Cortez during a period of revolutionary activity. 1103·14 - Panama public hostility to Somoza, Congressional opposition to further To protect American interests and lives during and following the intervention, criticism from Latin American nations, and a revolut1on for independence from Colombia over construction of the Isthmian . With brief intermissions, United States Marines were President who was reluctant to exercise American might created a stationed o~ the Isthmus from November 4, 1903 to January 21, 1914, to policy marked by apprehension, vacillation, contradiction and guard Amencan interests. 11104 • Dominican Republic - January 2 10 February 17 half-hearted support for both sides. Even though the Nicaraguan To protect American interests in Puerto Plata and Sosua and revolution was following a course somewhat similar to the Cuban Domingo City during revolutonary fighting. 1804 • Panama· November 1710 24 revolution, the Carter Administration was both unable and To protect American lives and property at Aneon at the time of a unwilling to take steps that would firmly reestablish our control of threatened insurrection. this vital country. 1l108-08 - Cuba - September 190610 January 1909 Intervention to restore order, protect foreigners. and establiSh a stable By refusing to intervene to stop the Sandinistas, the United government after serious revolutionary activity. 1107 - Honduras - March 1810 June 8 States not only negated its "no second Cuba" pledge, but more To protect American interests during a war between Honduras and importantly it acknowledged that the circumstances once Nicaragua: troops were stationed for a few days or weeks in Trujillo. Celba. Puerto Cortez. San Pedro. Laguna and Choloma. conducive to an aggressive maintenance of our sphere of influence 1810 • Nicaragua· February 22 had changed dramatically. To some, this was an example of what During a civil war, to get information of conditions at Corinto: May 19 to September 4, to protect American interests at . came to be called the "Vietnam syndrome," but to others it was 1811 • Honduras· January 26 and some weeks thereafter rather another sign that we could no longer control the destiny of To protect American lives and interests during a civil war in Honduras. neighboring countries as we had in the past. Whatever the reason, 1812 • Panama Troops. on request of both political parties, supervised elections outside the revolution in Nicaragua further adjusted the geopolitics of the the Canal Zone. region and set the stage for EI Salvador and a new U. S. President 1812 - Cuba· June 5 to August 5 who approached our status in Central America and the Caribbean To protect American interests on the Province of Ortente, and in . 1812·25 • Nicaragua· August to in a far different manner. To protect American interests during an attempted revolution. A small force serving as a legation guard and 8S 8 promoter of peace and govern· mentai stability. remained until August 5, 1925. and the 1813 • Mexico· September 5 to 7 A few marines landed at Cloris Estero to Bid in evacuating American Attempt at Regaining Our Sphere of Influence citizens and others from the Yaqui Valley, made dangerous for foreigners by civil strife. . When Ronald Reagan came into office in January of 1981, he 1814 - Haili - January 29 to February 9. February 20 to 21, 19 made it clear that his Administration would seek to reestablish a To protect American nationals in a time of dangerous unrest 1914 - Dominican Republic - June and July. respected United States presence in the Central American­ During 8 revolutionary movement. United States naval forces by gunfire stopped the bombardment of Puerto Plata, and by threat of force Caribbean region. Using his strongly anti-communist beliefs as a maintained City as a neutral zone. springboard for action, Reagan sought to meet head on what he 1814-17 - Me.ico The undeclared Mexican-American hostilities follOWing the felt was Marxist revolution at our doorstep. Unlike Jimmy Carter affair and Villa's raids included capture of Vera Cruz and later PerShing's who abhorred Somoza's human rights violations, Ronald Reagan expedition into . 1915-34 - - July 28. 1915 to AU9ust 15. 1934 emphasized combating and protecting our southern To maintain order during a period of Chronic and tnreatened InsurrectIon border from revolution. 1916-24 - Dominican Republic - May 1916 to September 1924 To achieve his aim, Reagan reminded the American people that to maintain order during a penod of ChrOniC tnreatened InsurrectIOn. Central America was within our sphere of influence and therefore had to be protected from internal instability and external expansionism. The President renamed this region the to help accent its importance and proximity to the United 1982, but it was not until August, 1983 that the trade and tax States and reintroduced the to suggest that failure sections of the bill were voted out, only to have the Congress limit to shore up pro-U.S. governments in this region could eventually the tax incentives to conventions and cruise ship deductions and lead to a series of crumbling governments, ending with Mexico. place a number of protective stipulations on the entry of certain goods into the United States. Despite the delay and the The message came through clearly u the United States must reassert its ability to control the future of this region, because the restrictions, the CBI remains a key part of the Reagan policy to decline of our influence has created a significant threat to the expand our influence in the Caribbean Basin. nation's security. While the CBI was working its way through the Congress, the The means to achieve this reassertion of American power were Reagan Administration was embarking on its most controversial presented in the form of a two-pronged program that linked capital policy initiative n of further communist expansion in formation with containment. In 1981, the Administration unveiled our sphere of influence. The policy of containment was used by its Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which sought to use this country in after II as a means of preventing agreements and healthy doses of foreign aid as a means of drawing the further advance of Soviet communism. In the Reagan view, the countries of the region closer to the United States, while also containment could once again be employed as a way of preventing encouraging American businesses through favorable tax the spread of revolutionary activity in Central America. To incentives to regain our competitive advantage. The foreign aid implement the policy of containment, the Reagan Administration began pumping millions of dollars of economic and military component of the CBI -- $350 million u was passed by Congress in 6 u.s. Armed Forces in But despite the strong popular support for the Caribbean - 1901-1983 invasion in the United States, President Reagan has become more aware that in places like and Nicaragua regaining the initiative from the Marxists may not be as quick and easy as on a 1917-22 - Cuba To protect Amencan Interests dUring an Insurrection and subsequent Caribbean island with 100,000 citizens and a militia of a few unsellied conditions. Most of Ihe U. s. armed forces lett Cuba by August 1919, but two companies remained at Camaguey until February 1922. thousand. Already public opinion has shown disfavor with Reagan's Central American policy. Many in Congress are 1111-11 - Mexico After withdrawal of Ine PerShing expedition, our troops entered Mexico in bothered by the overt signs of war and the co~ert machinations of pursuit of bandIts at least three times in 1918 and six in 1919. In August 1918 American and Mexican troops fought at Nogales. the CIA, and our neighbors in Latin America are fearful that U. S. 1111-20 - Panama involvement in the Salvadoran revolution may expand the fighting For police duty according to treaty stipulations, at Chirique, during to all of Central America. To those with vivid memories of the election dIsturbances and sebs8quent unrest. Vietnam War era, the answer is not containment but negotiation 1111 - Honduras - September 8 to 12 A landing force was sent ashore to maintain order in a neutral zone during with the rebels, and with their supporters in Nicaragua and Cuba. an attempted revolution. For its part, the Reagan Administration seems cautious about 1120 - - Apfll 9 to 27 To protect the Amencan Legation and other American Interests, such entering into negotiations with the rebels and their supporters and as the cable station. during a period of fl9htlng between Unionists and the Government of Guatemala. more interested in winning a victory. Although the Administration

1921 - Panama-Costa R,ca is reluctant to state it publicly, a victory in El Salvador means more American naval squadrons demonstrated In April on both Sides of the than just a defeat of the insurgents; it also would serve as a clear Isthmus to prevent war between the two countries over a boundary dispute. sign of United States resurgence in Central America and our 1124 - February 28 to March 31. September 10 to 15 willingness to follow a course of action that combats the spread of To protect American lives and interests during election hostilities. a foreign ideology in our traditional sphere of influence. It is this 1125 - Honduras - Apfll 29 to 21 To protect foreigners at La Celba during a political upheaval. concern with reestablishing our preeminence in Central America that has made winning in El Salvador of critical importance. El 1125 - Panama - October 12 to 23 Strikes and rent riots led to the landing of about SIX hundred American Salvador has become more than just a communist-inspired troops to keep order and protect Amencan interests. guerilla war; it is now a test of our ability to maintain control in a 1126-33 • Nlcara9ua· May 7 to June 5. 1926: AU9usr 27. 1926 to January 3. 1933 Tne coup d'etat of General Cnamorro aroused reVOlUtionary activities region that we view as vital to our national interest. leading to tne landing of Amencan mannes to protect tne Interests of tne U.S United States forces came and went. but seem not to nave lett tne country entirely until January 3. 1933. Tnelr work Included activity against tne outlaw leader Sandlno In 1928. Limits on Reagan Policy 1133 - Cuba DUring a revolution ag8lnst PreSident Gerardo MaChado naval forces in Central America demonstrated but no landing was made.

1151·80 • The Caflbbean Although President Reagan is following a path designed to 2d Marine Ground Task Force was deployed to protect U S. nationals strengthen our position in Central America, it is important to point dU(lng the Cuban cnSls out thatthe attainment of his objective may be complicated by new 1182 - Cuba PreSident Kennedy instituted a "quarrantlne" on the Shipment of offenSive forces at work in the region and at home_ One of the most recent miSSiles to Cuba from the Soviet Union He also warned the Soviet Union developments in the is that the United tnat Ine launching of any missile from Cuba against any nation In the would bnng about US nuclear retaliation on the States faces a more unified and vocal Latin American community Soviet Union A negotiated settlement was achieved In a few days. of nations. Whereas in the past the United States "handled" an 1965 • Domlmcan RepublIC Intervention to protect lives and property dUring a Dominican revolt More uprising or a debt collection fracas by itself and cared little for the troops were sent as tne U S. feared the revolutionary torces were coming views of its neighbors, today the United States cannot ignore the increasingly under Communist control fact that there are other influential actors in this revolutionary 1980 to Pr•••nt . EI Salvador United States military adVisors sent to Instruct government troops In antl­ drama. Countries like Mexico, Colombia, and Panama guernlla tactics that form what is termed the are unwilling to 1982 to Present· Honduras United States MIlitary advisors sent to tram government troops. take a backseat in this crisis_ They have lobbied hard to force a

1913 - Greneda negotiated settl€ment and have shown the Reagan Administration United States military forces invade Grenada that they can serve as effective intermediaries with the rebels. Moreover, these countries have stated categorically that they will Adapted from US. library of Congo Foretgri AffaIrs ON. Committee Print, 94th Congo lst seSS. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print Off. 1975, p. 58·66. not tolerate a land war in this region, especially one that involves United States troops. It is this unity of purpose and forceful assistance to pro-U.S. countries. in the region; more civilian and presentation of concerns that has reminded the President that to military advisors were sent to train the armies of El Salvador and act in Central America without recognizing the impact on the Honduras; sophisticated radar and tracking equipment was used region would be foolhardy and counterproductive. to pinpoint the transfer of weapons from Cuba and Nicaragua to What is potentially more complicating and serious than the new the rebels; and an occasional resort to old-fashioned gunboat found influence of the Latin American nations is that the Central diplomacy served to remind the rebels and their supporters that American crisis has begun to be viewed in terms of an East-West the United States was serious about stopping the spread of confrontation. Even though Khrushchev took his missiles out of communist influence in the area. Cuba in 1962, Russian designs on the Caribbean Basin have not The epitome of Reagan's containment policy can be seen in the diminished. In fact, recent analysis confirms that Central America October, 1983 invasion of the tiny island of Grenada. With the and the Caribbean have seen a marked increase in the Soviet assassination of Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop (who presence in the last ten years. Soviet trade representatives, arms was beginning to moderate his socialist revolution and move merchants, cultural exchanges, KGB agents, navy flotillas, closer to the United States) by doctrinaire Marxists with ties to fleets and diplomats can be found throughout the region. Cuba and the Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration wasted The Soviet presence may indeed serve to support President little time in sending the troops to restore a pro-United States gov­ Reagan's claims of communist expanionism at our doorstep, but it ernment. Although eighteen U. S. soldiers were lost and scores also complicates a solution to the crisis and heightens the danger wounded, the Grenadian invasion was judged a stunning success. of a superpower showdown. What was a relatively small and 7 localized conflict could evolve into regional successful foreign policy-making are so mission to insure that friendly governments competition between the United States and numerous that national leaders must be remain in power in Central America and the Soviet Union for control of the extremely strong-willed or courageous to that hostile movements are unable to Caribbean Basin. With Cuba supplying propose and carry out a particular course of spread their influence. President Reagan Soviet arms to the Salvadoran rebels, action. firmly believes in the domino theory and the Russian Mig-21's rumored to be heading for Already, President Reagan's efforts to possibility that our southern border could Nicaragua and a Soviet base near regain influence in Central America point up be jeopardized by left-wing revolution completion in Grenada before U.S. troops the limits of foreign policy-making in our traveling northward from El Salvador. The arrived, the Reagan Administration has democracy. The spending of additional dollars, the guns, the advisors, the aircraft enough examples of Soviet designs on this millions of dollars on the CIA's covert war in carriers, and the tough talk stem from a real region to justify our involvement. Honduras has met with a hostile reception fear that we are on the defensive in our Unfortunately this competition can develop from Congress, the ravages of w~r in sphere of influence and may not be doing a life of its own and build to proportions Central America are captured on film and enough to regain the initiative. Grenada where the war in El Salvador becomes compete with the President as he seeks may be the first step in a long process of secondary to the confrontation between the support for further involvement, and a host regaining complete control of our sphere of two superpowers. of human rights organizations place influence. The key to avoiding a U.S.-Soviet unrelenting pressure on the White House to The Reagan analysis of our decline in the confrontation in Central America is Cuba. curtail its support of rightist military officers, Caribbean Basin may be exaggerated, since Since taking office, the Reagan even though these· officers are firm many Administration critics do not see a Administration has spoken harshly toward adherents to the objectives of the Reagan revolution in Mexico, or a United States en­ the regime of Fidel Castro and has been Administration. circled by the communists. And yet, this unwilling to normalize relations with So far, Mr. Reagan has met his critics American President has embarked on a Havana. The Grenada invasion where U.S. head on and taken this country further into mission to establish our power position as it troops killed twenty-four Cubans and cap­ the Central American revolution. But what was prior to 1959. As to the success of the tured hundreds of others has done nothing the President must remember (as Lyndon Reagan mission, only time will tell. The to bring these two enemies together. In fact, Johnson and Richard Nixon found out to President's actions may strengthen our hold the inclination of the Reagan Administration their dismay) is that there is a point beyond on the Caribbean Basin or they may alienate at present seems to be to meet the Cuban which a president's will and communicative our neighbors and encourage the expansionist efforts head on even though skills cannot easily overcome the labyrinth revolutionary left to dig in deeper. The only there are dangers in such a policy. It is of opposition to a particular foreign policy certainty about the Reagan mission is that it important for the President to remember decision. In modern day American politics, comes at a time when the forces of change that such a policy position could easily spur foreign policy formation and implementa­ can be found everywhere. Not only has our the Russians to become directly involved in tion must derive from consensus rather sphere of influence changed, but so have the the Caribbean Basin in order to insure that than from the determination of the White internal political conditions in the United Castro and his revolutionary allies will not House. If Mr. Reagan is to succeed in States necessary to assure a successful be intimidated by the United States. reestablishing United States preeminence in mission. The future of United States policy Finally, when one speaks of the complex the Caribbean Basin, he will have to do so by in its sphere of influence thus depends on nature of public policy formation and convincing the numerous constituencies in how well we adjust to the new geopolitics of implementation in Central America, the this country that it is in our national interest the region and on whether we are able to impact of domestic politics cannot be to engage in activities that bring us muster the same vigor as our President as ignored. A great deal has changed in the perilously close to a Vietnam-like he sets out on this mission. United States since Theodore Roosevelt commitment. "took" the or Woodrow Wilson sent General Pershing across the A Look At The Future 0/ Mexican border to capture Pancho Villa. Our Sphere 0/ Influence Today, foreign policy development is conducted in an atmosphere of Americans do not admit defeat easily nor Congressional oversight, extensive media accept the view that our power in the world coverage, interest group pressure and arena is declining. And yet, it is essential for forceful public opinion. every major nation to periodically assess its Much has been made by President standing in the world or in a particular Reagan of our unwillingness since Vietnam region of that world and make some to utilize this country's strength to achieve judgements on the proper course to follow. foreign policy objectives. But this so-called There is no question that our position in unwillingness on the part of past presidehts the Central American-Caribbean sphere of stems not so much from a Vietnam backlash influence has changed since the early 1960s. as from a recognition that it is now more We should not be surprised by the difficult to initiate and carry through to competition, the revolution, the , and our inability to control our Michael J. Kryzanek is an associate professor completion a specific foreign policy, of Political Science. He received his PhD. from especially one which calls for some form of neighbors for our own interests. After the University of Massachusetts and has military involvement. Today, a president nearly a century of dominance, a decline in conducted research on the Dominican Republic who seeks to take aggressive action in order influence was inevitable. and other Caribbean nations. His book on the to combat communism or maintain our Dominican Republic (co-authored with Howard But what is surprising is the vigor that the Wiarda) was published in 1982. He is currently influence must contend with legal restraints, current Administration brings to its attempt .working on a book on U.S.-Latin American popular demonstrations, partisan politics at regaining our position in this sphere. The relations to be published by Praeger in 1985. and a sceptical citizenry. The roadblocks to Reagan Administration is clearly on a 8