Iii . Reconstruction Against the Background of Economic Cooperation and Trade Liberalization in Western Europe 1945/47–53
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149 III . RECONSTRUCTION AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN WESTERN EUROPE 1945/47–53 1 . GENERAL INTRODUCTION: THE FIRST STEPS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION – THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS In April 1945, the collapse of Nazi hegemony in Europe became evident. The penetration of the Soviet Army into Eastern and Central Europe1 followed, and consequently the Central and the Eastern parts of Europe were lost as they came under communist and Soviet rule.2 On September 19, 1946, Winston S. Churchill, in his Zurich speech in the cathedral courtyard of the university, proposed “the creation of the United States of Europe”3 – although without the United Kingdom. “Unite yourselves” but not “Let us unite” was the motto of the great world warrior who was actually not a great European,4 particularly as his historical contributions up to now lay more within the context of the destruction and division of Europe than in the recon- struction and unification of the continent.5 As far as the reconstruction work was concerned, the Cold Warrior was in the opposition. He did not fully recognize in time that Great Britain now was an instrument of the United States of America’s 1 Jost DÜLFFER, Jalta, 4. Februar 1945. Der Zweite Weltkrieg und die Entstehung der bipolaren Welt (20 Tage im 20. Jahrhundert), München 1998, 178–200; on this chapter see the documents 14 to 27 in the appendix “Documents”. 2 Norman M. NAIMARK, Stalin and Europe in the Postwar Period, 1945–53: Issues and Problems, in: Journal of Modern History. Zeitschrift für moderne europäische Geschichte. Revue d’histoire européenne contemporaine 2 (2004), 1, 28–56. 3 Winston CHURCHILL, Für ein vereintes Europa unter deutscher und französischer Führung, Züricher Rede, September 19, 1946, in: Hagen SCHULZE – Ina Ulrike PAUL (Hrsg.), Europäische Geschichte. Quellen und Materialien, München 1994, 398–400. 4 Klaus LARRES, Integrating Europe or Ending the Cold War? Churchill’s Post-War Foreign Policy, in: Journal of European Integration History 2 (1996), 1, 15–49. 5 Winston S. CHURCHILL, Aufzeichnungen zur europäischen Geschichte, München 1964; IDEM, Der Zweite Weltkrieg. Mit einem Epilog über die Nachkriegsjahre, Bern 1989; Jörg FRIEDRICH, Der Brand. Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940–1945 (Spiegel Edition 45), Hamburg 2002, 354–359. 150 III. Reconstruction Europe policy, nor could he further exclude himself from Europe and therefore also fall nearly hopelessly behind with respect to the integration of Western Europe. For many Europeans, however, Churchill’s Zurich proposal was a glimmer of hope, a gesture, and an impulse towards a “rapprochement” between France and Germany. This axis that was so necessary for further development would, how- ever, also have eventually come about even without his speech because there was no alternative and because in the face of Anglo-American decision-making and dominance, it was received by both sides of the Rhine as necessary. On March 12, 1947, the containment doctrine presented by the US President Harry S. Truman was tantamount to a kind of declaration of the Cold War on the Soviet Union. It fueled the East-West confrontation in Europe in the first decade after the war,6 and as a further consequence, the Marshall Plan, named after the US Secretary of State George C. Marshall, contributed to an economic restruc- turing of Western Europe which, at the same time, led to a political split of the continent.7 His announcement was also a response to the economic disintegration crisis and thus to Western Europe’s threatening political crisis of existence.8 1947 June 5: Drawing of US Secretary of State George C. Marshall, who gave the speech at Harvard: “Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine – but against hunger, desperation and chaos.” The British historian Mark Gilbert does not reject the “realist” theory that inte- gration was a clear and objective cost-benefit calculation, but he also attaches im- portance to the history of ideas and the long-term value debate in Europe in which he sees something more than windy rhetoric. He sees the solution of the “German 6 Wilfried LOTH, Die Teilung der Welt. Geschichte des Kalten Krieges 1941–1955 (dtv- Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts), München 2000, 343–351: 352–389. 7 Walter HEERING, Der Marshall-Plan und die ökonomische Spaltung Europas, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 22–23/97 (May 23, 1997), 30–38; Benn STEIL, The Marshall Plan. Dawn of the Cold War, New York 2018. 8 See document 15 in the appendix “Documents”. 1. General Introduction 151 question” as a fulcrum of the successful integration and unification movement, seeking a balance between American initiatives – the European Recovery Pro- gram (ERP) and the Organization of European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) – and British proposals for closer intergovernmental cooperation, because that resolution enabled a gradual and painful, but also lasting, transformation of for- mer belligerents into partner states.9 After the announcement of the ERP by Marshall on June 5, 1947, which stood against the background of the containment strategy of Truman against Soviet communism, the purely intergovernmental OEEC was formed on April 16, 1948 in order to take over the coordination, distribution, and control of the Marshall Plan as well as the liberalization of trade and payment transactions among the seventeen Western European states.10 With the OEEC, the first Western European institution was established.11 1948: Symbol of the Europe Congress of The Hague The OEEC did not provide for a relinquishing of sovereignty, nor was it a Paneu- ropean organization. It constituted a decisive prejudice for the continued domi- nance of national governments in matters of Western European integration and the economic division of Europe.12 With the embargo policy via the Coordinating Committee for East West Trade Policy and then on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) founded in Paris on November 22, 1949 and beginning its efforts on 9 Mark GILBERT, Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 46 (2008), 3, 641–662; Hans-Jürgen SCHRÖDER, Marshallplan, amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik und europäische Integration 1947–1950, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 18/87 (May 23, 1987), 3–17. 10 Richard T. GRIFFITHS – Wendy ASBEEK BRUSSE, Exploring the OEEC’s Past: The Potentials and Sources, in: Richard T. GRIFFITHS (Ed.), Explorations in OEEC History, Paris 1997, 15–32; Richard T. GRIFFITHS, An Act of Creative Leadership, in: IDEM (Ed.) Explorations, 235–256; Werner BÜHRER, Westdeutschland in der OEEC. Eingliederung, Krise, Bewährung 1947–1961, München 1997. 11 Dieter KRÜGER, Sicherheit durch Integration? Die wirtschaftliche und politische Zusammenarbeit Westeuropas 1947 bis 1957–58 (Entstehung und Probleme des Atlantischen Bündnisses bis 1956, hrsg. v. Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt 6), München 2003. 12 HEERING, Der Marshall-Plan, 30–38. 152 III. Reconstruction January 1, 1950 against the Soviet Union, the OEEC was also a participant in the Cold War and a sponsor of Paneuropean disintegration. Its partners were Aus- tria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the three Western zones of Germany that would later become the Federal Republic, while Yugoslavia, Canada, and the United States were merely associated. The British economy historian Alan S. Milward heretically designated the beginnings of Western European integration as the “Rescue of the European Nation-State”.13 Within this context, the OEEC was also an aid to the realization of the Western European program14 for renationalization. The Council of Europe, the next European institution, was founded on May 5, 1949. It lagged far behind the expectations of the European idealists and constitu- tionalists, who had hoped for a constitutional assembly. With its Consultative As- sembly, the Council of Europe (Conseil d’Europe) with headquarters in Strasbourg had only an advisory capacity without the power to make political decisions.15 The signing of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda- mental Freedoms (ECHR) on November 4, 1950 was obligatory for all members.16 13 Alan S. MILWARD, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–1951, London 1984, Berkeley – Los Angeles 1986 (reprint 1992); IDEM, The European Rescue of the Nation State, London 1992. 14 Karl W. DEUTSCH, Towards Western European Integration: An Interim Assessment, in: Journal of International Affairs Vol. XVI (1962), 1, 89–101; see also Ingfrid SCHÜTZ- MÜLLER, „Europa“ – in der österreichischen Nachkriegspolitik 1945–1956, phil. Diss. Universität Wien. 15 Otto MASCHKE, 30 Jahre Europarat – Rückblick und Perspektiven, in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 19 (1979), 3, 157–173; Franz KARASEK, Der Europarat – seine Rolle, seine Möglichkeiten, in: Europäische Rundschau 13 (1985), 2, 23–34. Wolf D. GRUNER, « Les Europe des Européens ». The Perceptions of Europe in the Debates of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe 1949–1951, in: Marie-Thérèse BITSCH – Wilfried LOTH – Raymond POIDEVIN (Eds.), Institutions Européennes et Identités Européennes (Organisation Internationale et Relations Internationales 89), Bruxelles 1998, 89–121; Kiran Klaus PATEL – Oriane CALLIGARO, The tr ue “EURESCO?” The Council of Europe, transnational networking and the