Belgium's Dilemma

Belgium’s Dilemma History of Warfare

Editors

Kelly DeVries (Loyola University Maryland) John France (University of Wales, Swansea) Michael S. Neiberg (United States Army War College, Pennsylvania) Frederick Schneid (High Point University, North Carolina)

VOLUME 96

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/hw Belgium’s Dilemma

The Formation of the Belgian Defense Policy, 1932-1940

Jonathan A. Epstein

LEIDEN | BOSTON Cover illustration: Minister of National Defense Albert Devèze (in civilian clothing) observing anti-tank training in 1935. Collection of the Royal Army Museum, Brussels.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Epstein, Jonathan A. Belgium’s dilemma : the formation of the Belgian defense policy, 1932-1940 / by Jonathan A. Epstein. pages cm. -- (History of warfare, ISSN 1385-7827 ; volume 96) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-25467-1 (hardback : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-26973-6 (e-book) 1. Belgium--Military policy--History--20th century. 2. Belgium--Defenses--History--20th century. 3. Neutral- ity, Armed--Belgium--History--20th century. 4. Belgium. Arm?e--History--20th century. I. Title.

UA680.E77 2014 355’.033549309043--dc23

2014001348

Figures 17 and 18 from West Point Military History Series: Atlas for the Second World War – Europe and the Mediterranean by Thomas E. Greiss, Series Editor, Square One Publishers, Inc. © 2002. Reprinted by permission. Brill has made all reasonable efforts to trace all copyright holders. In case these efforts have not been successful the publisher welcomes communications from copyright holders, so that the appropriate acknowledgements can be made in future editions, and to settle other permission matters. This publication has been typeset in the multilingual ‘Brill’ typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, ipa, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1385-7827 isbn 978-90-04-25467-1 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-26973-6 (e-book)

Copyright 2014 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Global Oriental and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper. chapter title v

I would like to dedicate this book to the Belgian army, which fought valiantly for its country in 1940!

⸪

Acknowledgements ix List of Figures xi

Introduction 1 1 Belgium and World War I 12 The Size of the Army Before World War I 13 The Language Issue to World War I 13 Deployment Controversies before World War I 19 The Belgian Army in World War I 22 The German Occupation of Belgium 25 Belgium and the Peace Settlement 31 2 Belgium Looks for Allies 39 3 Belgian Defense Policy to the Great Depression 51 The Main Actors in Defense Policy 51 The Reduction of the Belgian Army 55 Plans for Defense Against a Threatening Germany 58 General Galet 61 The Language Issue between 1918 and 1932 64 The Depression and the Belgian Military 67 4 The Devèze Years 70 The Chasseurs ardennais 77 The Budget Controversy 79 Raoul van Overstraeten 82 Devèze v. Nuyten 84 Franco-Belgian Staff Talks 89 The Motorization of the Cavalry Corps 93 The Debates over Coverage and Service Time 103 The Reoccupation of the Rhineland 110 5 The 1936 Mixed Commission 122 The Language Issue from the Mixed Commission to the War 152 Other Commissions 162 6 ‘Independence’ and its Origins 165 7 The Belgian Army to May 10, 1940 190 The Development and Assessment of the Belgian Military 191 Fortifications from 1938 to 1940 194 Defense Against Aircraft 199 The Sudeten Crisis and the Pied de Paix Renforcé 200 viii contents

New Mobilization Plans 208 8 Belgium to May 10, 1940 210 Diplomacy 210 Belgium and the Netherlands 217 Mobilization 220 Belgian Military Intelligence and Alerts 226 9 The ‘Eighteen-Days’ Campaign’ 236 Conclusion 264

Bibliography 274 Index 282 Acknowledgements

I would like to thank many people, starting with my wonderful advisors, Pro- fessors Kathy Williams and David Gordon, without whose support and guid- ance my dissertation – the basis of this book--would never have been started, let alone finished. I would like to thank the rest of my dissertation committee, Professors Dennis Showalter, Robert Seltzer, and Richard Powers for their interest in my work and their donation of time. I am particularly grateful to Professors Williams and Showalter for flying across the country to attend my defense. I would like to thank the archivists and their staffs who opened their collections to me and who all went above and beyond the call of duty to help make my work a success. These include Richard Boijen, Pierre Lierneux, Roger Vranken, and the staff of the Centre de Documentation Historique of the Musée Royal de l’Armée et d’Histoire Militaire; Gustaaf Janssens of the Archives of the Royal Palace; Françoise Peemans, Didier Amaury, and the staff of the Archives du Ministère Belge des Affaires Étrangères; and Katleen Van Acker and the staff of the Service Générale de Renseignements-Securitè-Section/Archive. I am also very grateful to Kristin Liekens of the Central Library of Defense for her gener- osity and dedication in repeatedly copying and shipping me documents free of charge. I appreciate Dr. Joost Vaesen’s sharing his conference paper with me. I would like to thank Professors Luc de Vos of the École royal militaire and Eugenia Kiesling of the United States Military Academy for meeting with me and giving me advice. Professor Kiesling’s Arming Against Hitler inspired me to write this book. I would like to thank Bob Rowen and Dr. David Munns for reading some of this work and giving me helpful feedback. I would like to thank my wonderful editors at Brill, Julian Deahl, who sought this manuscript out, Marcella Mulder, and Wouter Bok. I am also greatly indebted to my indexer, Christine Retz. I also appreciate the advice of the anonymous readers for Brill. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my family and friends for supporting me during my studies, my dissertation work, and my manuscript writing. Without them I would never have finished this. Naturally, all errors are mine alone.

Jonathan A. Epstein x contents chapter title xi List of Figures

Figure Caption

1 “Map of Belgium, showing cities mentioned in text and Dutch-French language division,” Carl Strikwerda, A House Divided: Catholics, Socialists, and Flemish Nationalists in Nineteenth-Century Belgium (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), p. ix 3 2 Lieutenant-General Émile Galet. Collection of the Royal Army Museum, Brussels 61 3 Minister of National Defense Albert Devèze. Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels 71 4 Lieutenant-General Prudent Nuyten. Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels 73 5 Map showing the rival defensive conceptions, Galet’s and Nuyten’s and Devèze’s. Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 41 74 6 Colonel Raoul van Overstraeten (as a major-general). Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels 83 7 Lieutenant-General Adolphe Cumont. Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels 90 8 Lieutenant-General van Strydonck de Burkel inspecting T-13s. Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels 97 9 Lieutenant-General Édouard Van den Bergen (as a major-general). Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels 103 10 Albert Devèze’s provisional battalion scheme. Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels, MRA-BAFM 5496 (185-14a-7095) after #518 127 11 General Van den Bergen’s provisional battalion scheme. Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels, MRA-BAFM 5496 (185-14a-7095) after #519 128 12 (L-R) LTG Denis, King Léopold III, LTG Van den Bergen, MG Deffontaine, MG van Overstraeten in April, 1938. Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels 192 13 Belgian soldiers during the P.P.R. Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels 203 14 Map P.P.R. 1938, sous-farde Attachés Militaires-Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A) 204 15 Major-General Oscar Michiels (as a lieutenant-general). Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels 231 16 Military review in Brussels, April 8, 1940. T-15s shown. RMA EST/I 950 #5. Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels 232 xii list of figures

17 “Northwestern France, 1940-Campaign in the West, 1940 (Situation 16 May and Operations Since 10 May)”. Maps from West Point Military History Series: Atlas for the Second World War – Europe and the Mediterranean by Thomas E. Greiss, Series Editor, Square One Publishers, Inc. Copyright 2002. Reprinted by permission 245 18 “Northwestern France, 1940-Campaign in the West, 1940 (Situation 21 May and Operations Since 16 May)”. Maps from West Point Military History Series: Atlas for the Second World War – Europe and the Mediterranean by Thomas E. Greiss, Series Editor, Square One Publishers, Inc. Copyright 2002. Reprinted by permission 250 IntroductionIntroduction 1 Introduction

At 4 a.m. on May 28, 1940, the Belgian army ceased its hopeless resistance against the German Wehrmacht. King Leopold III, the commander-in-chief of the Belgian forces which had been caught up in the disaster that befell the Allied First Army Group, had been forced to seek a cease-fire the previous day with the Belgian forces exhausted and out of reserves and the Allied army group cut off from the rest of the French forces and apparently destined for destruction.1 The Belgians, and their king, Leopold III, are often made the scapegoats for the failure of the Allies in May-June 1940. This began immediately with an official statement by French Premier Paul Reynaud, which was followed by an about-face by Winston Churchill, who had first praised Belgian resistance. The Belgian government-in-exile, which had opposed Leopold’s decision to seek an armistice, publically condemned him. For many then, as now, Belgium’s main fault was to refuse permission to the Allies to enter before a German invasion.2 These ‘legends’ have filtered down into the historiography, in, for example, Martin Alexander’s otherwise estimable biography of French generalissimo Maurice Gamelin while Brian Bond’s defense of the Belgians and Alistair Horne’s agreement with him are relegated to a footnote.3 In two of the major popular works in English on the 1940 campaign and the Second World War more generally, important writers repeat these calumnies. Alistair Horne condemns Belgian ‘independence,’ savaging the Belgian declaration of neutrality, condemning King Leopold III, “who did not inherit the full measure of [Albert’s] wisdom and moral courage” and comparing his hope that such a policy could keep Belgium out of war with “the optimism of the imprudent little pigs.” He repeats the false allegation that the French failed to continue the Maginot Line to the English Channel to spare Belgian feelings while in fact, as we will see later, the Belgians were anxious that the work should be completed. This French decision deprived both the Belgians and the

1 Major-General F.F.O. Michiels, “Summary of the Operations of the Belgian Army in May 1940” in The Belgian Campaign and the Surrender of the Belgian Army, May 10-28, 1940 (NY: Belgian American Educational Foundation, Inc., 1940), pp. 56-57. 2 Compare, for example, Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France (NY: Hill and Wang, 2000) or Martin S. Alexander, The Republic in Danger: General Maurice Gamelin and the Politics of French Defence, 1933-1940 (Cambridge UK: Cambridge UP, 2002); Paul Reynaud quoted in Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle: France 1940 (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 621; Winston Churchill quoted op. cit., p. 621, n7. 3 Horne, p. 621, n. 7.

French of the benefits of ‘independence’ by keeping the incentive for Germany to go through Belgium and by depriving the Allies of strong fortifications on the Franco-Belgian border. More recently, in his latest popular work on World War II, Max Hastings spends much of his first chapter, revealingly called “Poland Betrayed,” condemning the Anglo-French (especially French) cynical use of Poland but makes nary a comment on how the French planned to use Belgium. Indeed, he too condemns the Belgians, noting “Allied deployments were critically hampered by Belgian neutrality … ” although he does sympa- thize with their king, who “declined to offer Germany a pretext for invasion by admitting Anglo-French troops meanwhile.” 4 The criticism of the Belgians begins with the controversial decision in 1936 of Leopold III and his government to repudiate military ties with France. This policy of ‘independence’, similar to neutrality, has been accused of equating France and Germany. This was true only on the surface. In fact, it was a policy aimed at defending Belgium from Germany by giving the government the support it needed to build up the Belgian military and by keeping the fractious Belgian population, mainly divided between the Francophobe Flemish and the Francophile Walloons, united in the face of any new trials. Nobody in the Belgian government or in the higher ranks of the Belgian army really believed the French were the main threat to the country. What they were only too pain- fully aware of was that they lacked the Parliamentary votes for a military improvement bill if the country was seen as following in the French wake because the Flemish and Socialists refused to vote ‘yea’ if there was a chance of the army being drawn into a French adventure. The aim of the 1936 military bill was to create an army strong enough to deter the enemy (presumably the Ger- mans) from attacking because of the enemy’s fear of adding the Belgian forces to its foes. The bill would have failed if the Belgian government was perceived as being too pro-French. The failure of the military bill would not have helped the Belgian forces at all and it would not have done the Allies any good either because they would have had to rely on a much weaker Belgian military. The irony is that Belgium was never truly ‘independent’; it was always caught between the Flemish and the Walloons, the Germans and the French, and ‘defense in depth’ versus ‘defense at the frontier’ (or ‘integral defense of the territory’). By looking at these binaries, and at how the Belgian military and political establishment tried to navigate them, one can achieve a greater understanding of the formation of Belgian defense policy specifically and

4 Horne, To Lose a Battle, pp. 75, 84; Max Hastings, Inferno: The World at War, 1939-1945 (NY: Knopf, 2011), p. 26. Introduction 3

THE NETHERLANDS NORTH SEA Antwerp Brugge Antwerp Ghent Mechelen East Flanders West Flanders Leuven Limburg Brussels Brabant GERMANY Liège Halnaut Verviers Charleroi Liège Namur FRANCE Luxemburg DUTCH Language line FRENCH LUXEMBURG 0 40 Kilometers 0 25 Miles

Figure 1 “Map of Belgium, showing cities mentioned in text and Dutch-French language division,” Carl Strikwerda, A House Divided: Catholics, Socialists, and Flemish Nationalists in Nineteenth-Century Belgium (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), p. ix. of the formation of defense policy in a Parliamentary democracy more gen erally. Belgium is divided roughly between the Dutch-speaking Flemish in the north and the French-speaking Walloons in the south, although since World War I there is also an important German minority in the east. This division played a determining role in the formation of interwar Belgian defense policy. Belgium is also bordered on two sides by major powers: Germany in the east and France in the south. This middle position was also one of the pivotal factors in Belgian plans for self-defense. Finally, and affected by the two previous factors, Belgian soldiers and politicians were divided between rival conceptions of ‘defense in depth’ (i.e. several lines of defense stretching inland) against ‘defense at the frontier’ (i.e. a single line of defense aimed at stopping a German invasion at the border. Geography has not been kind to Belgium. It is a flat piece of land with no natural defenses except, arguably, the Ardennes forest. There are several important rivers flowing north-south; going from east to west, they are the Meuse, Dyle, Scheldt, and these would loom large in interwar Belgian defense thinking. 4 Introduction

Belgium, trapped as it is between its two much larger neighbors, had long been in the forefront of French military thinking because the French and Bel- gians were much more integrated before 1936 and the French saw Belgium as a battleground as well as an ally. French thinking is important to understand their reaction to ‘independence’ as well as their scapegoating of the Belgians in 1940 and later. Not only is Belgium astride the traditional invasion route between Germany and France, but it could protect northern France from a German invasion. A 1920 treaty tied the French and Belgian militaries together, at least with respect to a potential German attack on Allied forces occupying the Rhineland in Germany. A 1923 French commission noted that France’s northern border is impossible to easily defend and thus the valuable lands of northern France would be at an invader’s mercy. The commission concluded “an efficacious protection is only possible in advancing into Belgium, where our shortest and best lines of defense are found.” This opinion was echoed in 1926 by the commission that established the Maginot Line and was shared even by such bitter rivals as Marshals Foch and Pétain. The Belgian and French staffs cooperated closely and well at this time and French plans, until a shift in emphasis to the defensive in 1929, counted on an advance through Belgium into Germany.5 Despite this shift to a defensive posture, the French never abandoned their plan to advance into Belgium. Although defensive plans were “not really coor- dinated,” the French would move in because, as a 1932 French General Staff document noted,

Belgium, by its geographic situation, constitutes the glacis of our northern region. Besides, it considers France as its natural ally. In case of Ger- man aggression, it will very probably request our support and its forces would cover, at the same time as Belgian territory, the meeting of the French armies destined to fight at their side … .6

In fact, the Belgian decision ensured that the Belgian army eventually allied with France was much larger and better equipped than it would have been otherwise and, in the event, the French and British were able to enter Belgium with time to install themselves on the main line of resistance in coordination with the Belgians. After 1936, even French Generalissimo Gamelin saw a silver

5 Bruno Chaix, En Mai 1940, Fallait-il Entrer en Belgique: Décisions stratégiques et plans opéra- tionnels de la campagne de France (Paris: Economica, 2000), pp. 17-19. Italics in the original. 6 1932 memoire of the 3rd Bureau of the General Staff quoted in Chaix, En Mai 1940, p. 34. Introduction 5 lining in the Belgian proclamation of ‘independence’ because it freed the French from having to protect Belgium, which would be fought on in any case.7 Those who condemn the Belgians are assuming that if only the Allies had been allowed to enter Belgium preemptively, they would have defeated the Germans. This overlooks the facts that the Allies, thanks to secret cooperation with the Belgians, were able to establish themselves on the planned main line of defense along the Dyle Line, that the fatal breakthrough occurred to the south of the Allies who had moved into Belgium, around Sedan in France, where the French had had plenty of time to fortify themselves, and that neither the French nor the British particularly distinguished themselves in counterattacks. Nor, as we will see later, were the Allies ready to fight in late 1939. One could even imagine the Allies reaching the Albert Canal before a German invasion and finding themselves beaten to Dunkirk by the Germans, as indeed almost happened. The works on the 1914-1940 period can be roughly divided into books that deal with one or two of the already-mentioned binaries, but none address all three, which is why my own work is so important. Books on the politics of interwar Belgium include some new and important works, such as a two-volume work by a leading Belgian historian, Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, a volume of the Nouvelle Histoire de Belgique dealing with the subject, and Carl-Henrik Höjer’s classic monograph. There are also some useful biographies and memoirs, such as Henri Haag’s biography of Belgian statesman Charles de Broqueville. On the subject of the interwar Belgian economy is Robin L. Hogg’s Structural rigidities and policy inertia in inter-war Belgium.8 The year 1936 is a watershed year in Belgian history because it saw the arrival on the scene of radical parties that shook up the Belgian domestic political system and because it saw the official Belgian repudiation of military ties to France and the adoption of the new policy of ‘independence.’ Jean Vanwelken- huyzen weighs in with 1936: Leopold, Degrelle, van Zeeland et les autres … while both Giovanni F. DiMuro and Martin Conway have written biographies of Léon Degrelle. David Owen Kieft’s classic Belgium’s Return to Neutrality gives a solid

7 Gamelin, quoted in Chaix, En Mai 1940, p. 65. 8 Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1933-1937. 2 vols (Brussels: Racine, 2007); Emmanuel Gerard, La Démocratie rêvee, bride et bafoué, Nouvelle Histoire de Belgique 1918- 1939 (Nivelles, BE: Le Cri, 2010); Carl-Henrik Höjer, Le régime parlementaire belge de 1918 à 1940 (Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells, 1946); Henri Haag, Le Comte Charles de Broqueville, Ministre d’État, et les lutes pour le pouvoir (1910-1940), 6th series (Louvain: Université de Louvain, Collège Érasme, 1990); Robin L. Hogg, Structural rigidities and policy inertia in inter-war Belgium, Verhandlingen van de Koniniklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België 48: 118 (Brussels: AWLsK, 1986). 6 Introduction explanation of the events and thinking behind that crucial event although it, too, is old and missing recent studies from Belgium. There is a biography of frequent Prime Minister Hubert Pierlot by Thierry Grosbois.9 Books that deal with the geographic binary – the Belgian attempt to chart a safe course between France and Germany – include several books about the Versailles Treaty. Rune Johansson’s Small State in Boundary Conflict: Belgium and the Belgian-German Border 1914-1919 analyzes that specific issue and how it developed in Belgium, and Sally Marks’s Innocent Abroad: Belgium at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 gives an excellent analysis of the Belgian goals and the attempts and failures to achieve them. In contrast to Mr. Johansson’s narrow focus on the Belgian-German border, Dr. Marks also has a very useful examination of the Belgian search for security and the claims against the Netherlands, claims based on the improvements the new territories would give to Belgian defense abilities. In addition, Jane K. Miller’s Belgian Foreign Policy between Two Wars includes a helpful overview of interwar Belgian politics. Another useful work is Jonathan E. Helmreich’s Belgium and Europe: A Study in Small Power Diplomacy. There is also Rik Coolsaet’s La Politique Extérieure de la Bel- gique, which is only a part of a much larger work in Dutch, but which does touch on interwar Belgian foreign policy. Two of the most important men in Belgian foreign policy: the Belgian Foreign Ministry’s director-general of policy, Pierre van Zuylen, Belgian foreign minister and Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak have written their memoirs while there is also a good biography in French of the latter.10

9 Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, 1936: Leopold, Degrelle, van Zeeland et les autres … , (Brussels: Racine, 2004); Martin Conway, Collaboration in Belgium: Léon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement (New Haven: Yale UP, 1993); Thierry Grosbois, Pierlot, 1930-1950 (Brussels: Racine, 2007); Michel Dumoulin, Spaak. 2nd ed. (Brussels: Racine, 1999). Giovanni F. DiMuro, Léon Degrelle et l’aventure Rexiste, Series Voix d’l’Histoire (Brussels: Luc Pire, 2005); David Owen Kieft, Belgium’s Return to Neutrality: An Essay in the Frustrations of Small-Power Diplomacy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972). 10 Rune Johansson, Small State in Boundary Conflict: Belgium and the Belgian-German Bor- der 1914-1919. Lund Studies in International History 24 (Lund, Sweden: Lund UP, 1988); Sally Marks, Innocent Abroad: Belgium at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1981); Jane Kathryn Miller, Belgian Foreign Policy Between the Wars 1919-1940 (NY: Bookman, 1951); Jonathan E. Helmreich, Belgium and Europe: A Study in Small Power Diplomacy. Issues in contemporary Politics: Historical and Theoretical Per- spectives #3. (The Hague: Mouton, 1976); Rik Coolsaet, La Politique Extérieure de la Bel- gique: Au Coeur de l’Europe, Le Poids d’une Petite Puissance. Translated from the Dutch by Serge Govaert (Brussels: De Boeck Université, 2002); Roger Keyes, Outrageous Fortune: The Tragedy of Leopold III of the Belgians, 1901-1941 (London: Secker and Warburg, 1984); Paul- Henri Spaak, The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European 1936-1966, translated from Introduction 7

There is also a fascinating and important Belgian-French collaboration looking at the two countries’ relations between 1936 and 1940 and an article on their military relations by General Émile Wanty. As for the relations between Belgium and the Allies before World War II hit Belgium, Brian Bond has written Britain, France, and Belgium, which focuses on the 1939-1940 period but also includes earlier developments. It devotes a lot of space to the issue of Belgian policy and diplomacy and treats the Belgians sympathetically but is nevertheless mainly from the British perspective. From the French perspective is Martin S. Alexander’s biography of Generalissimo Maurice Gamelin, The Republic in danger: General Maurice Gamelin and the politics of French defence, 1933-1940, which tends to blame the Belgians for French failings and ignores the fundamental cynicism of French policy towards Belgium. For the later 1930s, there are J. Wullus-Rudiger’s Les origines internationals du drame Belge de 1940 and Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen’s Neutralité armée.11 King Leopold III himself had his memoirs published posthumously, while there are three major works on Leopold and the ‘Royal Question’ that would convulse Belgium after the war: Michel Dumoulin, Mark Van den Wijngaert, and Vincent Dujardin’s Leopold III, Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch’s Léopold III de l’an 40 à l’effacement and Jean Stengers’s Léopold III et le gouvernement: Les deux politiques belges de 1940.12 As for the military binary, the role of the Belgian military is often given short shrift in histories of the campaigns in the West in 1914 and 1940, the latter being particularly paradoxical when one considers how Belgium is made a scapegoat. The three major works on Belgium during World War I focus on the Ger- man atrocities, their historiography and denial, and their foreshadowing of World War II war crimes rather than on Belgian policy: John Horne and Alan

Combats Inachevés by Ray Steding, et al. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Michel Dumoulin, Spaak. 2nd ed. (Brussels: Racine, 1999). 11 Pierre Renouvin, Jacques Willequet, et al., Les Relations Militaires Franco-Belges de mars 1936 au 10 mai 1940, Travaux d’un colloque d’historiens belges et français (Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1968); E. Wanty, “Les relations militaires franco-belges, 1936-Octobre 1939.” Revue d’histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale 31 (Juil- let 1958); Brian Bond, Britain, France, and Belgium 1939-40, 2nd ed. (London: Brassey’s, 1990). 12 Leopold III, Pour l’Histoire: Sur quelques episodes de mon règne (Brussels: Racine, 2001); Michel Dumoulin, Mark Van den Wijngaert, and Vincent Dujardin. Leopold III, Questions à l’histoire (Brussels?: Editions Complexe, 2001); J. Gerard-Libois and José Gotovitch, Léo- pold III de l’an 40 à l’effacement. 2nd ed. Brussels: Politique & Histoire, 1991; Jean Stengers, Léopold III et le gouvernement: Les deux politiques belges de 1940. Aux origines de la question royale. (Paris-Gembloux: Duculot, 1980). 8 Introduction

Kramer’s German Atrocities 1914, A History of Denial; Jeff Lipkes’s Rehearsals: The German Army in Belgium, August, 1914; and Larry Zuckerman’s The Rape of Belgium: The Untold Story of World War I. On the other hand, LTG Galet’s account of King Albert’s actions during World War I has been republished in English translation. Not surprisingly, things are much better when it comes to the French-language sources. There are excellent books on the Belgians in World War I, such as Henri Pirenne’s classic, if somewhat dated, La Belgique et la guerre mondiale and Sophie de Schaepdrijver’s La Belgique et la première guerre mondiale. There is also Marie-Rose Thieleman’s work on King Albert during the conflict.13 Jonathan E. Helmreich has written an excellent article drawing on the reports of the American military attaché to Belgium to describe the US view on the Belgian army during the period of ‘independence’ while readers of French are blessed with the many works of Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen on Belgian policy and the Belgian military. There are also the important contributions, both as author and as editor, of Francis Balace. There is a very useful unpublished monograph on Belgian defense policy between 1920 and 1936 by A. Servais and available at the archives of the Musée Royale de l’Armée and another by Guy Dumortier examining the later period of 1936-1940 and also available at the MRA. I am indebted to an article by Joost Vaesen on the economic aspects of policy. Noted Belgian historian Robert Devleeshouwer wrote an important article on Belgian territorial demands after World War I. There are three important works on the interwar Belgian military written by Belgian soldiers (in order of publication): Albert Crahay’s L’Armée belge entre les deux guerres, the Belgian Centre for Historical Documentation of Defense (SGRS-S/A)’s Histoire de l’Armée Belge de 1830 à nos Jours, vol. II, de 1920 à nos jours and Émile Wanty’s

13 See John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven: Yale UP, 2001), Jeff Lipkes, Rehearsals: The German Army in Belgium, August 1914 (Leuven:Leuven UP, 2007), and Larry Zuckerman, The Rape of Belgium: The Untold Story of World War I (New York: NYU, 2004); Lieutenant-General Galet, Albert King of the Belgians in World War I: His Military Activities and Experiences Set Down With His Approval, Ernest Swinton, trans. (1931, reprint Boston: Houghton Mifflin, ND). There is one brief work in the Osprey “Men-at-Arms” series on the Belgians during World War I, R. Pawly and P. Lier- neux, The Belgian Army in World War I, P. Courcelle, ill, Men at Arms #452 (Oxford: Osprey, 2009). H. Pirenne, La Belgique et la Guerre Mondiale, “Histoire Économique et Sociale de la Guerre Mondiale (serie Belge), (Paris: France UP, ND); Sophie De Schaepdrijver, La Bel- gique et la Première Guerre mondiale. 3rd Ed. Documents pour l’Histoire des Francopho- nies #4 (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2006); Marie-Rose Thielemans, Albert Ier: Carnets et Correspondence de Guerre 1914-1918 (Paris: Duclot, 1991); Wullus-Rudiger, En Marge de la Politique Belge 1914-1956 (Brussels: Berger-Levrault, 1957). Introduction 9

Le Milieu Militaire Belge de 1914 à nos Jours.14 Leopold’s military advisor and eminence gris, Lieutenant General Raoul van Overstraeten, has written two vol- umes of memoirs, Albert I-Léopold III: Vingt ans de politique militaire belge and Au Service de la belgique: Dans l’étau while Albert Crahay and Jo Gérard have written his biography.15 Just as with World War I, there are few works in English dealing mainly with the Belgians in World War II. Alistair Horne’s classic To Lose a Battle remains one of the most important books on the ‘Blitzkrieg’, while Ernest R. May’s Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France and Karl-Heinz Frieser’s The Blitz- krieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West are the best of the more recent popular works. None of them devote so much as a chapter to the Belgians, nor do they use Belgian archives as this present work does. When the Belgians rate their own books, the books concentrate on the fall of the fortress of Eben- Emael, which is then given far too much significance in the overall picture of the Allied collapse. There is an official Belgian version of the campaign and an interesting book published in America during the war, entitled The Belgian Campaign and the Surrender of the Belgian Army, May 10-28, 1940, clearly

14 Jonathan E. Helmreich, “An American Perception of Belgian Military Preparedness, 1937- 1940,” Belgische tijdschrift voor militaire gesschiedenis/Revue belge d’histoire militaire XXV:5 (Maart/Mars 1984); Servais, A. “L’evolution de la politique militaire belge de 1920 à 1940” 2de Licence, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1974; Captain Guy Dumortier, “Doctrine et Plans Defensifs Pour une Politique d’Independence et de Neutralité Armée: Étude de leur Evolution au Sein du Haut Commandement Belge d’Octobre 1936 au 10 Mai 1940” (dissertation, École de Guerre, 1974); Joost Vaesen, “Preparing for the invasion: between passéisme and modernization? Belgian military policy and the issue of neutrality, 1926- 1940.” Presented to Small Powers in the Age of Total War: 1900-1940. Breda, NL, 2008; Robert Devleeshouwer, “L’opinion publique et les revendications territoriales belges à fin de la Première Guerre mondiale. 1918-1919,” in Sur l’histoire et le present: Liber amicorum (Brussels: EPO 1999); J. Wullus-Rudiger, Les origines internationals du drame belge de 1940 (Brussels: Vanderlinden, 1950; Vanwelkenhuyzen, Neutralité Armée: La politique militaire belge pendant la “drôle de guerre Coll. “Notre Passé,” (Brussels: La Renaissance Du Livre, 1979)Albert Crahay, L’Armée belge entre les deux guerres (Brussels?: Louis Musin, 1978); Centre de Documentation Historique des Forces Armées, Histoire de l’armée Belge de 1830 à nos jours, vol. II, De 1920 à nos Jours (Bruxelles: Editions Centre de Documentation His- torique des Forces Armées, 1988) [henceforth “Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A)”]; Général Émile Wanty, Le Milieu Militaire Belge de 1914 à nos Jours, vol. 1 (Brussels: Musée Royal de l’Armée et d’Histoire Militaire, 1999). 15 Raoul van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III: Vingt ans de politique militaire belge, 1920-1940 (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, ND; Raoul van Overstraeten, Au Service de la Belgique: Dans l’étau (Paris: Plon, 1960); A. Crahay and Jo Gérard. Le general Van Overstraeten: “Vice-roi” en 1940 (Braine-l’Alleud, Belgium: J.M. Collet, ND. 10 Introduction written to defend Belgium from accusations of betraying the Allies but nevertheless useful.16 There are several major books in French on the year 1940. One of the most invaluable resources is de Fabribeckers’s La Campagne de l’Armee Belge en 1940 and the Belgian Armed Forces’ Center for Historical Documentation’s history of the Belgian military includes a day-by-day account of the “18-Days Cam- paign”. Peter Taghon’s Mai 1940 has brief commentary but many interesting photographs. There are also many unit histories, such as Major General Cham- pion’s La Guerre du Sanglier des côteaux frontaliers aux rives de la Lys about the elite Chasseurs ardennais. Gerard-Libois and Gotovitch cover the entire year from neutrality through the conflict to the occupation and a 1990 colloquium on 1940 has yielded many useful articles. Luc de Vos has written a book on Bel- gium’s involvement in the entire war. An interesting work from the French perspective is Bruno Chaix’s En Mai 1940, Fallait-il Entrer en Belgique: Décisions stratégiques et plans opérationnels de la campagne de France. There also some useful and well-written articles by Eric Simon in the Bulletins d’information of the Centre Liègeois d’histoire et d’archeologie militaires.17 Historian Martin Conway sees three levels of “the crisis of the viability of the Belgian nation-state as is developed over the second half of the twentieth century” and dates its onset to the interwar period. More and more people

16 Karl-Heinz Frieser with John T. Greenwood, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005, James E. Mrazek, The Fall of Eben Emael, The Daring Airborne Assault that Sealed the Fate of France: May 1940 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1970) and Simon Dunstan, Fort Eben Emael: The Key to Hitler’s Victory in the West, Hugh Johnson, ill., Fortress Series (Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2005); Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Belgium: The Official Account of what happened 1939. (London: Evans Brothers, 1941); Belgian American Educational Foundation, Inc., The Belgian Campaign and the Sur- render of the Belgian Army, May 10-28, 1940 (New York: Belgian American Educational Foundation, 1940). 17 de Fabribeckers, La Campagne de l’armée belge en 1940, 2nd ed., (Bruxelles: Rossel, ND); Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), see above for complete citation; Peter Taghon, Mai 1940, 2nd ed. (Brussels: Racine, 2000); Géneal Major e.r. Lucien Champion, 1940 La Guerre du Sanglier: des côteaux frontaliers aux rives de la Lys (Braine-le-Alleud, Belgium: J.M. Col- let, 1977); J. Gerard-Libois and José Gotovitch, L’An 40: La Belgique occupée (Brussels: Crisp, ND); Francis Balace, ed. 1940: Belgique: Une Societé en Crise, Un Pays en Guerre, Actes du Colloque Tenu à Bruxelles du 22 au 26 Octobre 1990 (Brussels: NCWOII, 1993); Luc De Vos, La Belgique et la Seconde Guerre Mondiale (Brussels: Racine, 2004); Eric Simon, “Coup d’oeil sur la campagne de Mai 1940 (Partie II),” Centre Liègeois d’histoire et d’archeologie militaires, Bulletin d’information IX:7 (Juillet-Sept. 2005); Eric Simon, “Neutralité Armée: 1936-1940, LA DEFENSE FACE A LA FRANCE,” Centre Liègeois d’histoire et d’archeologie militaires, Bulletin d’information VII: 2-7 (Avril-Juin 1998-Juillet-Septembre 1999). Introduction 11 identified themselves as Flemings or Walloons rather than Belgians. They therefore also saw fatal flaws in the original governmental organization of the nation. Finally, the traditional Belgian “political culture of power-sharing and compromise which had united the principle social and political actors … since the end of the nineteenth century” has practically disappeared.18 The study of interwar Belgian defense policy also presents a vital lens for viewing the current (2012) problems in Belgium, which could end with the formation of states for the Flemings and Walloons and the end of Belgium. At the time of writing (May, 2012) Belgium has just overcome a prolonged governmental crisis where the linguistic wings of the political parties were unable to overcome their rivalries and form a government. Many people have seen in this a harbinger of the breakup of Belgium into two independent states.

18 Martin Conway, “Belgium’s Mid-Twentieth Century Crisis: Crisis of a Nation-State,” Revue Belge d’Histoire Contemporaine XXXV (2005, 4), 575-576. 12 Chapter 1

Chapter 1 Belgium and World War I

In order to fully understand the formation of Belgian defense policy between the World Wars, it is necessary to be familiar with the formation of policy before World War I and with World War I, which so scarred Belgium and Bel- gians that their later policies were aimed above all else at keeping Belgium out of any future wars. Belgian defense policy before World War I had to deal with many of the same issues that would affect it during the interwar period, notably size, language concerns, deployment plans, and conflicts between royal and ministerial authority. This shows that the problems were inherent in Bel- gium’s position and not just tied to a particular time. During the war itself, the Belgians played an important part in the defeat of the Central Powers, especially Germany, although Germany worked towards the fragmentation of Bel- gium. This first chapter looks at the issues with which pre-war Belgian defense policymakers had to deal, which foreshadowed the issues that would bedevil interwar policymakers, starting with the desired size of the military. It then goes into a discussion of the language issue. Because of its importance throughout Belgian history to this day, the chapter gives a brief history of the issue and attempts to deal with it in the military before the war. It also addresses the controversy among the military and civilian policymakers over where to deploy the army on the eve of World War I. During the war, Belgian heroism arguably saved the Entente Powers from defeat, but at the cost of casualties and German occupation of most of the country. German behavior, in the forms of atrocities and a brutal occupation, determined Belgians to avoid a repeat, and it was this care that was the primary concern of the founders of Belgian defense policy in the interwar period. German behavior is thus examined in the chapter. The linguistic issue was exacerbated during the war as the Germans attempted to split off the Flemings from the Walloons and as many Flemish soldiers resented being given orders by Francophone officers, even if the stories about Flemish soldiers dying because they did not understand the orders seem to be canards.1 These Flemish soldiers formed the ‘Frontist’ movement that would be a nucleus of the Flemish movement in the interwar period. These issues, and the attempts by the Belgian leaders to address them, are a focus of this chapter. The chapter ends with an examination of Belgian attempts to increase national security

1 See below, p. 36.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004269736_003 Belgium And World War I 13 after the war, especially through reparations – leading to the Belgo-French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 – and the acquisition of new territory from the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Germany.

The Size of the Army Before World War I

One of the first issues the Belgians had to face, just as it would be faced again in 1936, was the size of the military. Foreshadowing the arguments made in 1936, the justification for the increase in size of the army was to dissuade either the French or the Germans from seeing Belgium as an easy road. Charles de Broqueville, the Belgian prime minister, was responsible for potentially doubling the size of the army before World War I by winning obligatory military service for all able-bodied men in 1913 in the light of the government’s desire to expand the army to 340,000 men with 150,000 men in the field army, 130,000 in the fortress army, and 60,000 in the reserves. The field army needed to build two new corps, for a total of five, to be ready for a simultaneous invasion. How- ever, the law was not passed without controversy. Just as the Flemish would resist military spending before World War II, the Catholic Party, and especially its Flemish members, opposed military spending before World War I. The function of the army, just as twenty-six years later, would be to be strong enough to dissuade any over-aggressive neighbor from using Belgian territory.2

The Language Issue to World War I

The language issue was as contentious before World War I as before World War II, and the Belgian army had always taken its role as ‘melting pot’ very seriously. The importance of this issue both at the time and still to this day merits a thor- ough discussion of its history. Belgium was, as it still is, divided into two main linguistic/cultural groups, the Flemish, whose language is essentially Dutch, and the Walloons. French, spoken by the Walloons, was the dominant language and the Walloons did not discourage Flemings from learning French. Anybody making any kind of policy in Belgium had to contend with the ‘Flemish Question.’3

2 Pawly and Lierneux, pp. 3-4; Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1933-1937, 1: 45, n. 2; Haag, 1: 126-937; de Schaepdrijver, p. 47. 3 Richard Boijen, “The Army as Melting Pot of the Nation?” Cahiers d’Histoire du Temps Présent 3 (Novembre 1997), 390. 14 Chapter 1

The ‘Flemish’ issue (depending on one’s point of view), long antedates the foundation of the Belgian state. The linguistic frontier follows the stop-line of the Frankish hordes and runs roughly from Maastricht in Holland to Dunkirk in France. During the Middle Ages, the Flemish towns, such as Brugge (Bruges), Ieper (Ypres), and Ghent were very prosperous and were able to protect their independence from the French at the 1302 ‘Battle of the Spurs’ near Courtrai, in which the French knights lost so much loot that a pile of their spurs gave the battle its name.4 However, at the end of the fourteenth century, Flanders went to the Franco- phone Burgundians. This resulted in French replacing Flemish as the language of administration and of the judiciary. After Belgium passed to Austria as the Austrian Netherlands, French, the language of prestige and culture despite the Flemish cultural heritage of some of the great painters of all times, including the Bruegels and Peter Paul Rubens, was imposed on the Flemish by the Fran- cophone Flemish bourgeoisie, who taught their own children in French. Natu- rally the French annexation of Belgium in 1795 did not help the situation, nor did the period of Dutch rule after the Napoleonic Wars help because even the Flemings considered the Dutch to be foreign interlopers.5 With the Belgian revolution of 1830, French reassumed its dominant position. The Belgian revolutionaries were Francophones who were inspired by the French example and who hated Dutch as the language of occupation and of the officers thereof. Although their desire was to create a distinctively Belgian culture to unify the new nation, their choice of French as the vehicle of this culture worked against that goal as they rejected the Flemish call to synthesize Germanic and Romance traditions. The new constitution provided that “[t]he use of languages in Belgium is optional. This matter may be regulated only by law and only for acts of public authority and judicial proceedings.” Although this seems to guarantee linguistic equality, most public officials and judges came from the Francophone sectors of society and they chose to use French even in Flanders. There was so little public education in Flemish that 49% of conscripts from East Flanders were illiterate in 1848 compared to only 11% from Francophone Luxembourg! Only French speakers had access to secondary and higher education while there were no completely Flemish-speaking universities. The provincial governments and even some Flemish municipal councils operated in the Gallic tongue while Flemings who went to court were

4 The New Columbia Encyclopedia, sv. ‘Battle of the Spurs’. 5 Jonathan A. Epstein, “’In Flanders – Flemish:’ Language and Nationalism in Flanders” (Paper for Professor Struve, December 22, 1997), p. 4; Dr. R.E.M. Irving, quoted in Ibid., p. 4; Shepard B. Clough, cited in Ibid.; Ibid.; Ibid., p. 6; Irving, cited in Ibid., p. 7. Belgium And World War I 15 dealt with in a language with which they were not familiar. The Francophones looked down on Flemish. A Flemish partisan, Philip Blommaert, pointed out that Flemish Dutch had a long history, with a Flemish hagiography of Saint Servatius dating to before 1200 ce (By way of comparison, Chaucer’s Canter- bury Tales came out only in 1387). All this was despite the fact that a majority of Belgians spoke Flemish; according to the 1846 census 2,471,000 Belgians claimed Flemish as their primary language compared to 1,827,000 who claimed French.6 The Flemish published their first grievances in 1840 when they demanded that all government business involving Flanders be transacted in Flemish. There was some success as the petition gained the support of some Catholics, including clergymen, and the Antwerp and East Flanders provincial governments allowed Dutch alongside French in their proceedings. Els Witte and her co-authors observe that increasing democracy helped the Flemish cause. In 1848 the pro-Flemish ‘progressive’ middle classes benefited from an expansion of voting rights giving them more power. Catholics and Liberals were united because they both wanted to use Dutch in all aspects of daily and cultural life. These classes found that they were losing out on social and economic opportunities because they did not speak French. Walloon civil servants were even brought in to take jobs in Flanders. In 1856, Flemish activists compared the ‘Fransquillons’ to plantation slaves. The Parliament, under Catholic Prime Min- ister Pierre de Decker, who had “Flemish sympathies,” formed a commission to look into the Flemish complaints and, in 1859, recommended that trade schools offer Flemish and that Flemish be taught as a foreign language in preparatory schools and in the Ghent University to allow people in the professions to work in Flanders. It also condemned the French language’s monopoly over the government, army, and police, claiming that this violated the constitution. The commission recommended that Flanders become bilingual with both languages being official and with Flemings given the choice of which language to use. It also backed Flemish as a language and not just a dialect. This report became the manifesto of the Flemish movement. In the wake of the report, Dutch speakers won the right to use Flemish with state officials wherever Flemings were a majority, the rights for Flemish speakers to be accommodated in the courts, and the inauguration of bilingual secondary education for Dutch speakers.7

6 Els Witte and Harry Velthoven, Language and Politics: The Situation in Belgium in an Historical Perspective, Balans #12 (Brussels: VUB Press, 1999), p. 65. 7 Jonathan Epstein, “In Flanders – Flemish: Language and Nationalism in Flanders,” Paper, City University of New York-Graduate School and University Center, 1997, p. 6; Witte and Velthoven, pp. 45, 69, 70; Bernard A. Cook, Belgium: A History, Studies in Modern European History, vol. 50 (NY: Peter Lang, 2002), p. 81; Epstein, p. 6; Cook, p. 83. 16 Chapter 1

The de Decker government fell in October 1857 and he was replaced by Charles Rogier as prime minister and by a Liberal government. Rogier was uninterested in the language issue. He junked the Parliamentary report and replaced it with one supporting the status quo. Flemish attempts to get a language law on notary acts failed and an amendment to allow prospective university students to take their entrance examinations in Flemish was rejected. Added to these was the continuing phenomenon of carpetbagging Walloons coming in to fill government positions in Flanders. Government support for the French Second Empire led to increasing disaffection among the Flemish.8 The heart of the Flemish movement was Antwerp, where the middle classes had remained Dutch-speaking and supported the Flamingant demands. How- ever, the growing Catholic-Liberal rift split the Flamingant movement, with both parties developing pro-Flemish wings (not always to the delight of the Francophone party leaders). The Liberals blamed the poor education of the Flemish on the Church and supported secular education while the Catholics, among whom were many Ultramontanists, claimed that the Flemish were defined by “language and religion.” The Liberal Flamingants had greater success than their Catholic counterparts because both Liberalism and Flamingan- tism thrived in the cities. The Flemish movement did score some successes as more of its supporters entered the Parliament and the government began to concern itself with the Flemish vote. In 1873 Dutch was allowed in criminal law and from 1878 Dutch was used in Flemish administration. Five years after that, a law was passed requiring some high school classes be taught in Flemish in Flanders.9 Among the main engines driving change was the ‘second industrial revolution,’ which pushed north from Wallonia by 1880. Although the workers were Flemish (considered more docile than the organized Walloons), the money came from Wallonia and Brussels and did nothing for Flemish control over their resources. However, many medium and small businesses were started by Flemings who rose to lead the community, turning against the Francophone middle class, forming a new one using Catholic class principles. They also brought more government interest to their section, helping the Flamingants.10 Along with the economic change came socio-political change. Universal male suffrage (although with plural votes) was established in 1893 and increased Flemish political power because the Flemish vote now had to be wooed and the Flemish wings of the parties gained in importance. The Flemings were now

8 Kossman, p. 702; Witte et al., p. 70. 9 Witte, et al., pp. 70-71 10 Ibid., pp. 96-97. Belgium And World War I 17 more self-aware and saw the economic benefits of using Dutch in government business. In addition, there was a growing realization that all sectors of Flem- ish society should speak the same language. Membership in pro-Flemish groups increased, as did the circulation of Dutch newspapers while more Flemings were reading Flemish literature and students became more bellicose. However, there was no one overarching Flemish organization; Flamingants were spread through all political parties and increasingly acted through pressure groups. Their goal remained limited: bilingualism in Flanders. Almost nobody wanted to split up the country. The Flamingants scored some successes, getting Dutch language courses into the state universities and approval for the use of Dutch in the appeals courts in Brussels and Liège, as well as in the Belgian army criminal justice system.11 These victories did not please the Flamingants much because they were vaguely worded and indifferently implemented. Disappointment over these flaws combined with “social economic progress” in Flanders to push the Flem- ish movement in a new direction. About 1895, two university professors, Julius McLeod and August Vermeylen, and the economist Lodewijk de Raet, developed ‘cultural’ Flamingantism. They argued that language discrimination was only one reason the Flemish were behind. The Flemings had to change themselves, had to develop a Flemish cultural elite and a powerful Flemish industrial middle class that could wrest control from the Francophones and make Flanders the dominant part of Belgium. This required better education. The ‘cultural’ Flamingants demanded that vocational and university education and, especially, Ghent University be made exclusively Dutch-speaking. Before this, Flamingants had not dared to demand that Dutch should be the language of university instruction although the Dutch had produced five Nobel Prize winners in the natural sciences and the Francophone Belgians had produced none. There was a lot of resistance to these demands, especially on the part of the Francophone higher clergy and higher bourgeoisie. This resistance delayed for three years the proposed bill to make Dutch an official language in Belgium, which was finally passed in 1898.12 In 1909 the first form of general conscription was introduced into the Bel- gian army. Before that, men conscripted could hire substitutes. This meant the burden of military service fell disproportionately on the poorest (i.e. Flemish) sectors of society and the Flemings were met with scorn by the Francophone cadres. After 1909 all sectors of society were exposed to the ‘Flemish Question’

11 Witte et al., pp. 86, 96-97. 12 Witte et al., pp. 97-98; Kossmann, The Low Countries, 1780-1940, Oxford History of Modern Europe. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978)pp. 405-406; Witte et al., p. 98. 18 Chapter 1 in the army. In 1911, bowing to the inevitable, a bill was tabled in Parliament but it did not make it through before the Germans rudely interrupted the discussion. In 1914, a law on mandatory education provided that primary education must be in the mother tongue. This law did not make it into Brussels. Walloons feared the loss of their civil service jobs in Brussels or Flanders if the locals could use their own language. Their fears were not groundless. A Walloon movement emerged as Francophone liberal intellectuals demanded a federal- ist system to defend against a Flemish political predominance that was already putting Catholic conservatives in Parliament over left-wing Walloons. The movement allied with the Socialists to oppose bilingualism and the require- ment that civil servants in Flanders speak Flemish. The issue was reaching full boil.13 In 1914, there was still no Flemish-speaking university and Belgian army officers were not required to speak Flemish fluently. By contrast, officers in the Austro-Hungarian common army had to be conversant in any language spoken by more than 20% of the soldiers in their regiment.14 The Walloon Assembly, representing the Walloons, was divided on the question of language use in the army, with some arguing soldiers should be put in units according to place of origin and others advocating “free choice of language.” Francophile and leading Walloon Émile Jennissen, one of the former, went so far as to call for using Walloon regiments to defend the Dutch and Ger- man borders while using Flemish regiments to watch the French. The latter complained the former would lead to the “Flamandization of the army” and the abandonment of French speakers in Flanders. When de Broqueville proposed the new military law, Flemish nationalists introduced amendments aiming to “diminish the place of French to the profit of Flemish and push a veritable division of the army into Walloon regiments and Flemish regiments.” One amendment would have required all NCOs and above to be bilingual while another would have created language-based regiments with Walloon NCOs being able to speak Flemish. As passed, article 1 of the new law called for officers to have some facility with the other language and another article mandated candidates for the École militaire (the Belgian West Point) and NCOs being bilingual. Many Walloons considered this a step towards the administrative separation of Belgium although a minority of Walloons, including Léon

13 Witte and Van Velthoven, pp. 79, 98; Cook, p. 82; Witte et al., pp. 98-99. 14 Witte and Velthoven, p. 21. Belgium And World War I 19

Hennebicq, placed only a “secondary importance” on the language issue, arguing that in moments of crisis military orders would be understood.15

Deployment Controversies before World War I

The debate over the proper deployment of the army foreshadowed the Minis- ter Devèze-General Nuyten clash of the early 1930s as General Ryckel, a favorite of minister de Broqueville, wanted to mass the army on the threatened frontier, which would later be called ‘the integral defense of the frontier,’ while chief of staff de Ceuninck wanted to assemble the army in the center of the country. Ryckel’s plan would protect more of the country if one knew the aggressor beforehand while de Ceuninck’s idea would guard against being taken by surprise and offered greater flexibility. Just as twenty-six years later, Walloon partisans condemned Belgian defense plans as the abandonment of Wallonia. Léon Hennebicq, the chair of the National Defense Comission of the Walloon Assembly, which served as something of a Walloon Parliament advocating for Walloon causes at the Parliamentary and governmental level, was skeptical that the Belgian army could stop a many-times larger German force and condemned the plan to base the defense of the nation on a national redoubt around the important but Flemish port of Antwerp, which would privilege Flanders over the French-speaking region. In an argument that foreshadowed the 1930s debate over ‘coverage’ (‘couverture’), Hennebicq, who feared the relatively immobile Belgian army would be cut off and surrounded by the Germans, called for a regionally recruited army that alone could rapidly assure the frontier and hold for the two days necessary for the Allies to arrive and the field army to mobilize. In order for this to work, the army on the frontier must be professional and well-armed. While the government planned to deploy a whole covering division at Bourg-Léopold between Antwerp and Liège, Hen- nebicq and the Walloon Assembly called for a stronger defense of the east bank of the Meuse with the emplacement of a ‘camp of concentration’ – a caserne with cyclists, cavalry, machine guns, and light artillery – at Bastogne. de Ceuninck, in an eerie similiarity with the later fate of General Nuyten in 1934, would eventually be forced out after sending a nasty letter to a member of Parliament, who read the letter aloud to the Parliament. He was eventually

15 Encyclopédie du Mouvement wallon (Charleroi: Institut Jules Destrée, 2000), s.v. “Politique Militaire Belge avant 1914”; Ligue Wallonne de Liège, quoted in Ibid., s.v. “Politique Mili- taire Belge avant 1914”; Ibid., s.v. “Hennebicq, Léon” 20 Chapter 1 replaced by General de Selliers de Moranville, who was charged with getting Ryckel to finish his plan of campaign.16 On July 27, 1914, the Belgian army was partially mobilized. The next day, Minister de Broqueville recalled militiamen on “brief leave” and on July 29th, de Broqueville put the army on the footing of ‘Pied de Paix Renforcée’ (‘Rein- forced Peace Footing’), calling up three classes, giving Belgium about as many soldiers as Germany or France had on its borders. By the 30th, partial mobilization was functioning and de Broqueville dissuaded Albert from leaping to full mobilization. However, in response to the king’s question about the plan of concentration, General Selliers, the chief of staff, had to admit that, without telling anyone, he and General Ryckel had abandoned planning it. Only a “hastily edited skeleton” lacking any details was immediately available and it called for concentrating in the middle of the country – contradicting Ryckel, previous chief of staff General Jungbluth, and Captain Galet, the king’s most trusted military advisors! On July 31, the government and King Albert called for full mobilization and de Broqueville proposed it to the council. Meanwhile, Ger- many was declaring ‘danger of war.’17 The basic plan, like that adopted before World War II, called for the Belgian army to resist until the guarantors could come and help. The field army would mass behind river barriers and conduct a ‘mobile defense’ while the fortress army would hold the belts of fortifications around Liège, Namur, and Antwerp. 18 On August 2, the day after the Germans had taken over Luxembourg without fighting, German ambassador von Below handed a note to the Belgian foreign minister alleging that the French were planning to cross Belgium to attack Germany and stating that the Germans, in self-defense, would have to enter Belgium. If Belgium was reasonable and did not resist, the Germans would leave as soon as possible and make good any damage. If, on the other hand, Belgium chose to do something regrettable and resist, especially by holding the fortifications on the Meuse River, Germany would consider Belgium an enemy. The government was given only twelve hours to respond. De Broqueville was asked whether the army was ready. It was. Historian Marie- Rose Thielemans notes that Albert’s decision to resist was based on Belgium’s international obligations and on the assumption that the war would be quick

16 Haag, 1: 160-162; Encyclopédie du Mouvement wallon s.v.v. ”Assemblée wallonne” “Politique Militaire Belge avant 1914” 17 Haag, 1: 190-197. 18 Haag, 1: 197-210; Pawly and Lierneux, p. 6. Belgium And World War I 21 and not that damaging. She suggests he probably regretted his decision rather quickly. 19 Just as later in 1940, an important part of the Belgian plans called for demolitions to slow any invader and in fact the German ultimatum of 1914 explicitly urged the Belgians not to do any such acts. General Leman, commanding Liège, blew up railroad tunnels and bridges across the Meuse on August 3 while, after receiving a telegram from the Kaiser urging Albert to obey the ultimatum, Albert ordered destructions to delay the Germans. Other demolitions also contributed to the Germans concentrating in Germany or Luxembourg rather than in Belgium, having trouble reinforcing their right wing, and affected the outcome of the Battle of the Marne.20 Very importantly for the denouement of 1940, Albert set an example that his son Leopold would follow in the next war: he took personal command of the army. General Galet points out that Albert was the only head of state in World War I to assume personal command of his army and live with his soldiers, although this ignores Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, who took personal command of the Russian army and lived at his headquarters. In fact, both monarchs were convinced of their right to command the army although they exercised that command differently, Leopold accepting ministerial involvement during mobilization and keeping the government informed while his father did not inform the minister of war of his actions in the early part of the war. Albert insisted article 68 of the constitution gave him the right to field command of the army while de Broqueville argued that article 64 required ministerial countersignature of the king’s acts. The argument would resurface in 1940. An illustration of the relationship between Albert and his war minister occurred at Antwerp on September 6, 1914, when Albert, de Broqueville, Generals Jung- bluth and Hanoteau, Captain Galet, and Ingenbleek created a Higher War Council, which was a cover for getting rid of the military governor of Antwerp, General Selliers, and General Ryckel, all of whom were “reassigned, in reality disgraced.” The position of Chief of Staff was left open while a partisan of de Broqueville, COL Wielemans, became under-chief. Galet remained Albert’s ‘eminence grise’ and the king retained supreme command. De Broqueville’s biographer Henri Haag argues “It was a palace revolution or, as de Broqueville said, a ‘shake-up. ’” Haag interprets the event as a conflict between perceived

19 Pawly and Lierneux, p. 7; Haag, 1: 204-210; Thielemans, p. 167. 20 Galet, pp. 58-60; Commandant Luc Vangansbeke, “Resist and Bite! The story of the Belgian Ardennes Rifles (Unpublished paper courtesy of the Museum of the Chasseurs ardennais), pp. 8-10. 22 Chapter 1 rights: the king’s to command the army and de Broqueville’s to require ministerial countersignature for the king’s actions.21

The Belgian Army in World War I

After the German invasion, the plan to send the army to the Meuse was abandoned and it stayed on the Gette River, as Selliers wanted, with the exceptions of the army divisions (ADs, equivalent to other countries’ “corps”) at Liège and Namur. Liège was quickly outflanked by two German cavalry divisions which had to withdraw because they could not cross the Meuse. The Germans vastly outnumbered the Belgians and expected a quick surrender. General Leman, despite knowing Liège could not hold out, refused to give in and the fortifications drove back the German waves, causing such losses that several divisions had to leave the line. The Germans brought overwhelming force, driving the Belgian forces guarding the areas between the forts into retreat. The fortresses continued to fight, the last surrendering only on August 17. Not only did the defenders of the Liège forts and their commander become national heroes and symbols of Belgium’s determination to resist, the delay they imposed on the Germans allowed the French to complete their mobilization and may have cost the Germans the war in the West.22 Between August 15 and 19, there were bitter debates at Belgian headquarters over withdrawing to the national redoubt at Antwerp. Albert had good intelligence that the Germans were planning to attack in central Belgium while the French military mission insisted the Germans lacked the strength and called the Belgians cowards for planning a retreat while the Allied forces were marching to link up with them. The Belgians began their withdrawal on August 18 and Brussels fell two days later while Namur was besieged and its garrison forced on August 23 to withdraw into France and thence back to Antwerp. 23 The Antwerp redoubt was not as impregnable as the Belgians hoped and the war minister’s men started discussing a retreat from Antwerp on September 29. On the 7th, with the Germans threatening the line of retreat and crossing the Scheldt, Colonel Wielemans, counting on de Broqueville’s support, but without informing Albert, ordered the retreat of the army to the Ghent- Terneuzen Canal. Galet found out the next day but was unable to stop the move. Antwerp fell on October 10 and the army began a difficult retreat to the

21 Galet, p. 60; Haag, 2: 864; 2: 848-850, 1: 248-250, 2: 858. 22 Haag, 1: 200-201; Pawly and Lierneux, pp. 9-10. 23 Haag, 1: 242-244; Pawly and Lierneux, p. 11. Belgium And World War I 23

Yser River. Thirty thousand Belgian troops fled to the Netherlands where they were interned and another thirty thousand were captured. The retreat was well-prepared and the eventual resistance on the Yser would have been impossible without the munitions and supplies saved from Antwerp. 24 One of the big controversies regarding the Belgians in Antwerp, and one which inevitably led to comparisons with his son accepting a capitulation in 1940, is whether Albert was prepared to accept a separate peace in 1914. The story goes that Albert was ready to give up but was dissuaded by a combination of de Broqueville, the queen, and Ingenbleek. This contrasts with the behavior of his son in 1940, who was not dissuaded. Most historians, however, seem to give the story little credence.25 The Belgians who arrived at the Yser position on October 15 were in a terrible state and unable to launch an attack as desired by the French. Even Galet liked the Yser position because it was good for defense, still on Belgian soil, close to the sea, and, as Henri Haag notes, had the advantage over the Antwerp redoubt of sparing Belgium’s “rich cities” from being on the front lines. The Germans wasted no time in attacking the new positions while the Belgians counterattacked and there was a dogfight for nine days until the Germans “ran out of steam,” sparing the exhausted and disheartened Belgian soldiers.26 The flooding of the Yser was one of the most dramatic tactics of World War I. Armies in Flanders had used controlled flooding for centuries and the Flem- ish lowlands were lands regained from sea and swamp with an extensive irriga- tion and drainage system. The Belgians would have only to open some sluices in Nieuport and then close them again before the tide went out. This was done on October 27. The German offensive, which had resumed, was stopped and the stunned Germans pulled back.27 The front would remain static for over three years, with the Belgians holding a long front with no strategic reserves and thus unable to pull any entire division out of the line for a rest. Moreover, the Belgian army of the end of 1914 was barely holding on. There were only 52,000 of the original field army of 117,500, with a deficit of 2,000 officers, a severe lack of ammunition, exhausted artillery, and tired men in ragged uniforms. The Belgians and Germans were separated

24 Haag, 1: 254; Pawly and Lierneux, pp. 13-14; de Schaepdrijver, pp. 95-97; Haag, 1: 259-264, 268-272; de Schaepdrijver, p. 98; Haag, 1: 279. 25 Haag, 2: 847, 867-896. 26 Pawly and Lierneux, pp. 15-16, de Schaepdrijver, pp. 98-99; Haag, 1: 278-279; Pawly and Lierneux, pp. 14-19. 27 Pawly and Lierneux, p. 19; de Schaepdrijver, p. 101. 24 Chapter 1 by the water, with some additional flooding in March 1918. Service on that front was extremely unpleasant and unhealthy.28 The Belgian army was reorganized in January 1918, abolishing the brigade headquarters within the divisions, with ‘army divisions’ constituted by two infantry divisions. The army as a whole now numbered 170,000 enlisted and 5,700 officers. It would become involved in the bitter fighting started by the last-ditch German offensives of spring 1918. Although the main German effort, code-named ‘Michael,’ was aimed further south, the Germans also planned an attack, ‘Georgette,’ in Flanders, scheduled for April 9 and aiming for the ports of Calais and Dunkirk, outflanking the Allies in that region. On April 14, the Belgians found themselves fighting to prevent a German encirclement of Ypres, defended by the British to the right of the Belgians. The Germans launched an attack on the Belgians on April 17 and after initial success, found themselves stalled in bitter hand-to-hand fighting. Despite the Germans breaking into the Belgian support trenches, they were hit by Belgian artillery and driven back by Belgian infantry, losing 800 prisoners. The German offensives across the Allied front ran out of steam and in September, the Allies went over to the offensive. Because the Belgian constitution barred foreigners from commanding the Bel- gian army, King Albert was appointed to command the Flanders Army Group, consisting as well of French and British units. Ten Belgian infantry divisions attacked on the night of September 27-28 and rapidly broke through the Ger- man lines, flowed over the German artillery batteries, and pushed the front back as far as eleven miles, with an average of four miles across the front. The Belgians captured 6,000 prisoners and 150 guns on that one day. They continued to push back the Germans until October 2, when there was a twelve-day pause. The second phase of the offensive, also involving the French, began on October 14 and ended on October 30, with another offensive on the Lys River lasting until November 3, as the Belgians advanced towards the Scheldt River and reached Ghent, where the front line would stay until the German armistice of November 11. The Belgians suffered grievously in these last offensives, losing more than 1/5 of the effectives (1/3 of all Belgian casualties of the war out of a total of 44,000) between October 4 and November 11.29

28 De Schaepdrijver, pp. 101, 171-173; Pawly and Lierneux, p. 23; Henri Haag blames the situation on the military having squandered soldiers for political reasons, especially in order to show loyalty to its protectors, Haag, 1: 292; Pawly and Lierneux, pp. 23, 33-34. 29 Pawly and Lierneux, pp. 34-38. Belgium And World War I 25

The German Occupation of Belgium

German atrocities began on August 4, 1914, the very first day of the invasion. German troops, angered at Belgian resistance in the town of Visé, including the destruction of the bridge over the Meuse River above Liège, accused the Bel- gians of being ‘francs tireurs’, civilian snipers outlawed by the laws of war, and started burning houses, shooting into windows, and shooting or bayoneting Belgian civilians, seven of whom died. This was not an isolated incident and by August 8 there had been twenty-one separate incidents in which ten or more Belgian civilians were murdered, for a total of about 850. Historian Jeff Lipkes notes this targeting of civilians and widespread flight was without precedent for the previous two hundred and fifty years.30 The most egregious and the most internationally known German atrocity was the destruction of the world-famous university town of Louvain, sixteen miles east of Brussels. It was known for its Gothic architecture, its beer, lace, and church ornaments. It also housed Belgium’s most important university with a 300-year-old library housing 230,000 books of which 800 were irreplace- able ancient works. The Germans entered the town on August 19 after the local Belgian Civic Guard had, in accordance with instructions, disbanded and sent its weapons to Antwerp. German forces marched through without hindrance but took important locals hostage just in case. On August 25 the Germans were shaken by the Belgian sally out of Antwerp coming as close as six miles to Lou- vain. German forces left the town to support their comrades and when they came back the shooting started. Perhaps started by nervous sentries, it spread to the whole city, particularly to the ‘fashionable quarter.’ German soldiers were shooting and killing each other in error while they torched any houses they suspected of hiding Belgian francs tireurs. The fire spread to the university library and little bits of manuscripts floated on the breeze. The fires lasted another three days while shooting and looting continued off and on. The real cause of the atrocity seems to have been “anxiety aroused by military events.”31 The German occupation had three phases. At first, the Germans intended only a ‘temporary’ occupation leading to a quick victory. After a few months, in the absence of that victory, the Germans started planning for a permanent occupation. Finally, in early 1917 in the face of the Allies rejecting a December 1916 peace overture, the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, and a break with the United States, the Germans resolved to destroy Belgium by splitting it in half and keeping the Belgians in the dark all alone, banning tele-

30 Zuckerman, pp. 22-23; Horne and Kramer, p. 13; Lipkes, p. 13. 31 Zuckerman, pp. 22-23; Cook, p. 102; Zuckerman, pp. 29-36; Horne and Kramer, pp. 42, 54. 26 Chapter 1 phonic or telegraphic communication, allowing only the strictly censored mail service. By 1918 half of Belgium’s cattle had died and Belgium, previously the sixth most-industrialized nation in the world, never recovered her position.32 As the war went on, the Germans increasingly played the ‘Flemish card,’ seeking to divide the Belgians according to race/language and to favor the Ger- manic Flemish. The pro-Flemish ‘Flamingants’ were at first repelled by the occupiers but soon the Germans were not only returning Flemish to official documents but also giving it preeminence over French, although still under German. This policy, dating from October 1914, shows the increasing awareness of the German administration of the Flemish Question. The tactic was also aimed at calming their rear areas by winning over the Flemish, who were assumed to support the Germans, who, after all, were fighting for ‘Germandom’ and thus implicitly for the Flemish. That same month, young Flemish intellectuals founded ‘Young Flanders’ in Ghent, prepared to collaborate with the Ger- mans to further Flemish interests. They demanded Flemish be used in Flemish schools, separation from Wallonia, and backing from the occupiers. 33 The Flamignants could be roughly broken down into two camps. The majority were ‘Passivists,’ who believed that the ‘Flemish Question’ was an internal Belgian issue which could only be solved within an independent Belgium, while the minority, the ‘Activists,’ tied themselves to Germany, hoping a Ger- man victory would lead to an independent Flanders. The most radical hoped for a Flemish kingdom within the German confederation. Others would settle for home rule either within or without Belgium.34 On January 7, 1917, forty-six Activists met in Brussels and decided to demand Flemish independence. That February, a small group of Activists, protected by German police, voted to create the Council of Flanders, the Raad van Vlaan- deren (quickly dubbed by the Flemish the Verraad van Vlaanderen – the “Betrayal of Flanders”), which would gain the support of the German occupiers. Most initially wanted Flemish autonomy or a Swiss-style federalism; all opposed the unitary state while few wanted an independent Flanders. The next month the Germans “administratively separated” Flanders and Wallonia, thus for the first time making the linguistic frontier a political frontier, imposed without consideration for the feelings of the people. The policy was only meant to last during the war, with the peace negotiators resolving the final status of Flanders and Wallonia. Some Flamingants demanded independence and the

32 Pirenne, pp. 207-209; Cook, p. 102, 106-107; Zuckerman, p. 1. 33 Pirenne, pp. 211-212; Shepard B. Clough, A History of the Flemish Movement in Belgium: A Study in Nationalism (NY: Richard R. Smith, 1930), p. 188. 34 Ibid., p. 224. Belgium And World War I 27

Germans created a commission to look into it. After some debate, the Council of Flanders declared its independence on December 22, 1917. The Germans suppressed the declaration, substituting ‘autonomy’ for ‘independence’ but not really even granting that. In 1918, there were rigged elections to a second Council of Flanders, which demanded an end to the pre-war situation in Bel- gium, elimination of the word ‘Belgium,’ real Flemish independence, and “the settlement of the ‘Flemish Question’ with German aid.”35 Nevertheless, most Belgians resented this attempt to destroy a Belgian nationality. In fact, the Germans could initially find so few willing Walloons that most new functionaries were Germans! Henri Pirenne, a leading Belgian historian, declares: “It was not, properly speaking, a political opposition but a social and national reaction emanating from the depths of the people.” In fact, the Brussels Appeals Court had the president and one other member of the Council of Flanders arrested! The Germans reacted with force, leading the judiciary to go on strike, to be replaced by Germans.36 The Germans tried to win over the Walloons by emphasizing the permanence of the separation, by condemning the Entente, and by trying to create a Walloon activism based on ‘superiority’ over the Flemings.37 It is important to note the dissatisfaction, or even anger, of many Flamin- gants in the military. This anger stemmed from multiple causes: Flamingan- tisme was virtually equated with pro-German sentiment by the pro-French Belgian press and the Francophone unilingualism of the army despite a clear majority of Flemish-speaking soldiers. However, the omnipresent accusation that Flemish soldiers died because they did not understand orders given in French, is false. Most of the soldiers had been trained in France and had enough cognizance of the language to understand rudimentary and important communications. Sergeants could translate orders given in French and some “well-intentioned”officers could at least speak some patois. This was insuffi- cient to Flemish nationalists who resented their language “treated as a dialect.” In addition, educated Flemings could be passed over for promotion based on a lack of knowledge of French but not vice versa. After the war, Flamingants complained that one could “become general without knowing Flemish but not even corporal without French.” At the same time, the low level of education in Flanders meant that most Flemings were disqualified from more technical postings such as the engineers or artillery and therefore served in the infantry,

35 Clough, pp. 197-200; Pirenne, pp. 227-232; Clough, pp. 203-204, 211. 36 Pirenne, 232-235; 242, 250-254, 257. Clough argues, contra Pirenne, that the Council of Flanders did want an independent Flanders. Clough, p. 200. 37 Ibid., pp. 234-235. 28 Chapter 1 suffering large losses and contributing to the disproportionate losses of the Flemings vis-à-vis the Walloons.38 Due to the accident of geography that put French-speaking Wallonia closer than Flanders to Germany, the German invasion of August 1914 quickly overran all of Wallonia, leaving only a small slice of Flanders under Belgian control. The result of this was to preclude the recruitment of fresh Walloon soldiers, leading to a situation in which many Flemish soldiers were commanded by Francophone officers lacking any real knowledge of their language. Calls to rectify this were considered violations of military discipline. The Activist movement spread to the army in 1916 “in reaction to the linguistic discrimination on the Ijzer [Yser front]” where it was called the ‘Frontist’ movement. Bel- gian historian Harry Van Velthoven argues that this “confrontation” was almost unavoidable because of the condescending view of the Francophone commanders of their Flemish soldiers and the suspicion the former had of pro- Flemish intellectuals. The Frontists demanded an autonomous unilingual Flanders. They were not necessarily Germanophiles and would accept German help only where it would facilitate that goal.39 One hundred and thirty-six Frontists defected during 1918 and provided important information to the Germans. Others, in the face of the German offensives of 1918, refused to fight unless their demands were met. They hoped to drive Belgium out of the war and into a separate peace with Germany should the latter engage to restore Belgian independence and territorial integrity. A message from a Frontist to the collaborationist Council of Flanders urged the latter swiftly to capture the Belgian army of which the Activists would form the future framework. In February 1918, King Albert I wrote about his concern regarding the increasing militancy of the Frontists but recognized their com- bative value and assessed that promising them some redress after the war would resolve the problem.40 The same month, recognizing the dangers posed by the declaration of Flem- ish independence by the Council of Flanders and the necessity of keeping the Flemish soldiers in the line, the king presided over a meeting of the Council of Ministers. Two suggestions were adopted without debate: allowing Flemish

38 de Schaepdrijver, pp. 173, 185-187; Frederik Deflo, De literaire oorlog. De Vlaamse prozaliter- atuur over de Eerste Wereldoorlog,p. 75, quoted in Ibid., p. 187. 39 Witte, et al., pp. 102-103; Witte and Van Velthoven, pp. 118-119 (chapter written by Van Velthoven); The Catechism of the Flemish Movement, quoted in Wullus-Rudiger, En marge, pp. 142-143. 40 Crahay, p. 29; General van Overstraeten, quoted in Ibid., p. 28; Witte et al., p. 103; Crahay, 29; Witte, p. 103; Wullus-Rudiger, En marge, pp. 144, 116; Quoted in Crahay, p. 28. Belgium And World War I 29

Circles of Intellectual Conference to be held in the army and giving certain journals more privileges. The debate over the third suggestion foreshadowed the arguments used on both sides of the ‘Flemish Question’ throughout the interwar period. The King himself called for the creation of Flemish regiments and backed the suggestion of the Flemish Catholic minister Helleputte that there should be military training in Flemish. Albert observed that since most soldiers were Flemish, if the Belgian army were to use one language, it should be Flemish. Henri Carton de Wiart, a Francophone Brussels Catholic minister and later prime minister in a ‘Sacred Union’ government, responded that the creation of Flemish regiments would split the country. He also pointed to practical difficulties such as the fact that the proportion of Flemish to Walloon officers did not match that of Flemish to Walloon soldiers. Lieutenant General de Ceuninck, the minister of national defense, gave the percentage of Flemish- speaking infantrymen as 80%. General de Ceuninck also pointed out that relations between Flemish and Walloon comrades were good. He warned that there would not be enough Flemish officers to staff Flemish regiments. It was necessary to keep the unity of command and he was concerned that Flemish soldiers might refuse to obey orders given in French. Besides, some technical terms borrowed from the French army could not be translated into Dutch. Émile Vandervelde,41 the president of the Belgian Socialist party pointed out that he had heard no complaints about the language issue from the soldiers he met. Prime minister de Broqueville, a Francophone Catholic, called for a declaration that must meet some Flemish demands. He noted that things had changed since 1830 and the interaction between the government and the people must also change.42 However, a new law governing languages in the army could not be introduced during the war although Flemish and Walloon units should be formed to show “our goodwill.” In any case, the Flemish wanted to keep national unity. The King returned to practical issues, such as enlisting new officers and maintaining regional recruitment, which had been tested in battle and proved to generate loyalty between soldiers. For his part, Albert (reluctantly?) accepted universal male suffrage and some Flemish demands such as a Flemish university, but would not divide the army or the country, as Belgian unity was one of

41 Minister of state in 1914, minister of procurement in 1916, noted for being a European Socialist and serving in the government. Also one of the dominant figures in interwar Belgian politics. Janet Polansky, The Democratic Socialism of Émile Vandervelde: Between Reform and Revolution (Oxford: Berg, 1995), p. 114. 42 CONSEIL DES MINISTRES, séance du vendredi 1er février, 1918, quoted in Wullus-Rudiger, En Marge, pp. 367-375; 72; Mr. de Broqueville to Ibid., p. 372. 30 Chapter 1 his highest goals. In the end, they agreed to write a declaration and, in their departments, re-study the problem.43 After the war, Flemish Activists were penalized and Passivists, those who did not collaborate with the Germans, returned to their agitation, believing they could get satisfaction without changing the structure of the state. Bel- gium jailed or interned hundreds of Activists and suspected Activists. Many were tried while an approximately equal number simply languished in jail without trial. Civil servants and the like perceived as having been too coopera- tive with the Germans were fired. Thirty-nine Activists were sentenced to death although none of the sentences were carried out. E.H. Kossmann observes that the indiscriminacy and harshness of the penalties, such as denying access to university to those who attended the Ghent University, shows that the regime was more interested in punishing Flemings than in “justice.”44 Perhaps the most famous case was that of Doctor August Borms. He was arrested as an Activist and sentenced to death, although this sentence was commuted. After spending ten years in jail, an Antwerp member of Parliament died, requiring a by-election to replace him. The Flemish Front Party put Borms up as a candidate although as a felon Borms could not serve in the Parliament. Borms won the election with 83,000 votes against 44,000 for the Liberal candidate and 53,000 abstentions. This incident, expressing Flemish frustration against the slow pace of Flemish equalization and the desire to amnesty Flem- ish Activists, would lead the Francophones to reassess their situation.45 The Passivists acted mainly through the Flemish wing of the Catholic Party, although they had to give on some points to satisfy the Francophone members of the party. At the same time, Belgian electoral reform providing for one man one vote increased the power of the Flemish population and led to the creation of a specifically Flemish nationalist party, the “Flemish Front Party,” composed of leftist “anti-militarist” Flemish veterans and Activists, to press for Flemish demands. The Frontists denied the existence of a Belgian ‘nation.’ Some even denied the existence of a Flemish nation, arguing instead that the Flemings were part of a larger Dutch-speaking nation. They hated the Francophone elites and wanted social justice. Their anti-militarism represented more a revulsion against the conditions in the trenches during the war than an ideological aversion to violence itself.46

43 De Broqueville to Ibid., p. 373; Thielemans, p. 168. 44 Kossmann, p. 634; Clough, pp. 222-223; Kossmann, Ibid. 45 H.J. Elias cited in Ibid.; Ibid., pp. 646-647. 46 Clough, pp. 223-224; Witte et al. pp. 125-126; Kossmann, pp. 638-639; Crahay, p. 29; Koss- mann, Ibid. Belgium And World War I 31

The Francophone bourgeoisie and intellectuals, opponents of federalism, saw the recent war as the triumph of “Latin civilization over the Germanic hordes.” They drew from the experiences of the German creation of a collaborationist Flemish university in Ghent and of the Activist treason the lesson that the answer to Belgium’s problems was even more emphasis on Franco- phone culture. There was certainly no rush to grant the Flemings their university.47

Belgium and the Peace Settlement

It has been persuasively argued that the roots of the Second World War stem from the settlement of the First World War. Belgium in late 1918 had a victorious army liberating a devastated country. In Belgium, the wounds of 1914 were still gaping and the worry about an act two, fed by the memories of German misbehavior, especially the unprovoked German invasion and atrocities, the starvation and deportations, as well as the heroism of the Belgian soldiers at Liège and the Yser, hindered a return to normalcy. There was a veritable “religion of war” that kept the experiences alive for the next generation. In fact leading Belgian historian Robert Devleeshouwer notes that the Belgian leaders conscienciously “wanted to keep themselves from erring a second time through lack of foresight, modesty, or incompetence.” Indeed, people blamed the retreat to the Yser on the loss in 1839 of Dutch Limburg and Luxembourg. As opposed to the French, the German invasion and occupation had been suffered by the vast majority of the population and had a most important part in the Belgian psyche. Belgium’s immediate concerns were getting the money to pay for the massive reconstruction the nation, looted by the Germans for four years and then devastated by the retreating German Army, needed and making sure such a tragedy could never happen to Belgium again. The first was resolved, although not to the entire satisfaction of the Belgians, who had been given, by both sides, to expect a great deal more.48 Things came to a head in January 1923 after the Germans had declared themselves unable to pay their reparations, in particular, the coal they owed to France. France demanded full payment and harsh punishments while Britain proposed a four-year moratorium on payments and a reduction of Germany’s

47 Witte et al., p. 106. 48 Jean-Jacques Becker and Serge Berstein, cited in Horne and Kramer, p. 356; Tixhon and van Ypersele, pp. 83-84; Devleeshouwer, p. 195; Horne and Kramer, p. 358, p. ix; Johansson, p. 134. 32 Chapter 1 obligations. Part of the British plan was the abolition of Belgium’s priority in receiving German reparations. Not surprisingly, this was opposed by the Bel- gians, who sided with the French, as did the Italians. The Germans were declared in default on January 9 and on January 11, the French and Belgian armies, supported by Italian engineers, occupied the Ruhr Basin, the heart of German industry. Belgium was pressured into the action by the fear of alienating itself from France and to avoid being economically isolated with the French to the south and east (in the Ruhr) and the still unfriendly Dutch to the north, still controlling the mouth of the Scheldt leading to Antwerp. The Belgian Socialists opposed the attack and their leader, Émile Vandervelde, resigned from the cabinet, but even they demanded Belgian priority and full reparations. The debate was only over how these were to be obtained.49 What are important are the negative consequences of the Belgian action. It drew international condemnation. This invasion finally killed any chance of Belgium’s reaching a military agreement with Britain. Historian of France Gor- don Wright argues that the Ruhr occupation was a pyrrhic victory at best for France not only because it cost more to recover the reparations than they were worth but also because the French, who were divided on the whole idea, were thereafter unwilling to pursue an independent foreign policy against the views of the other nations. As the Belgian ambassador to Paris, Baron de Gaiffier de Herstroy,50 informed Paul Hymans in October 1933, France was unwilling to act alone to prevent Germany from rearming in defiance of the Versailles Treaty; it would alienate London and Rome, which considered France a threat to peace and to a danger of a new war. The French could have successfully acted alone up to the German remilitarization of the Rhineland but they needed British

49 Miller, pp. 118-123; Witte, et al., pp. 131-132. 50 Baron Edmond Ferdinand Félix de Gaiffier was born on May 30, 1866 and named legation attaché in 1887. The next year, he started service in Berlin. He was promoted to legation secretary 2nd class the same year and was transferred to Lisbon in 1890. He was promoted to legation secretary 1st class in 1891 and went to Madrid in 1893, returning to Lisbon the next year. Also in 1894 he went to the embassy in Vienna. In 1896 he was named legation counselor and went to the central administration. In 1902 he went to the Peking embassy and became minister resident there in 1904. Three years later he went to Cairo and two years later he transferred to Bucharest. In 1912 he was named Director General of Political Affairs at the Department. In 1916 he became extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary in France and three years later he was named extraordinary ambassador in Paris. He continued serving in Paris until May 31, 1935. He died there less than three months later. He was awarded Grand Cross of the Order of Leopold II, the Civic Cross, first class, and the Grand Cross of the Order of the Crown. Archives of the Belgian Ministry of For- eign Affairs. Belgium And World War I 33 validation. Sadly, the British leaders let the world down. Sir Roger Keyes, son of the British admiral and hero of World War I who served as liaison to Kings Albert and Leopold, notes that British pacifism and appeasement in the mid- 1930s led to Leopold’s increasing conviction that war was coming and that Brit- ish and French interest in upholding Locarno and protecting Belgium was waning.51 In September 1918, the Belgians delivered a note to the Allies urging modifi- cations of the 1839 treaties in the name of guaranteeing increased security. The Belgians understood this increased security as based on territorial revisions that would boost the country militarily and economically. From Holland, Bel- gium tried to get the land it had lost in 1839: Flemish Zeeland and Dutch Lim- burg. Possession of the former would give Belgium the south bank of the very important Scheldt River and about half of its channel. These would solve a number of difficulties and give the Belgians complete contol over the Ghent- Terneuzen canal. Possession of the latter would similarly ease Belgium’s economic and military situation. The General Staff was calling for acquiring these lands, and part of the Rhineland, as early as December 1914. In addition, Bel- gium hoped to create a canal to the Rhine across the prospective new territory. The Belgian military squelched anti-annexationist propaganda in the army but allowed the pro-annexationists to propagandize. An undated, but probably wartime, note to the Belgian legation in London discussed Belgium’s obtaining the above-mentioned lands and declared that “these increases wisely considered and skillfully administered would not constitute a canker in the flank of the fatherland.” Unfortunately, as historian Sally Marks notes, as reasonable as the demands were from the Belgian perspective, there was no way they were going to get them. Lead Belgian negotiator Paul Hymans observed that the Scheldt River separated Flemish Zeeland from the rest of the Netherlands which in any case ignored the region. In fact, Flemish Zeeland was much more tied in to Belgium than to its mother country although the population would prefer to stay in the Netherlands. The Belgians tried harder to get Limburg, the part of the Netherlands that dangles between Belgium and Germany. Dutch possession of this strip severely hampered Belgian defense because it prevented the Belgians from basing their defense on the line of the Meuse River. At the same time, it was far from clear that the Dutch would be willing or able

51 Witte, et al., 131-132; Miller, 122-123; Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times from the Enlightenment to the Present, 5th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), p. 335; de Gaiffier to Hymans, Paris, October 20, 1933 in Documents Diplomatiques Belges 1920-1940: La Politique de sécurité extérieure, Tome III: Période 1931-1936, eds. Ch. De Visscher and F. Van Langen- hove (Brussels: Palais des Académies, 1964) [henceforth: DDB III], p. 206; Keyes, p. 49. 34 Chapter 1 to defend it. The Belgian military, absorbing the lessons of the recent war, and looking for better defenses and protection for Liège, particularly wanted the territory.52 Before Paul Hymans submitted Belgium’s territorial demands to the Powers in Paris, the Belgian General Staff had presented a memorandum about a new border. The General Staff saw two alternatives, the ‘green line’ and the ‘black line’ (so named for the colors drawn on the maps), both based on the idea that Belgium would succeed in getting Limburg and Luxembourg. The military desired the ‘black line,’ which called not only for the acquisition of most of Eupen and Malmédy, the cantons lost in 1815, but also for changes in the Ger- man-Dutch and German-Luxembourg borders. These would cement Belgian control over the railroad linking the German Rhineland cities of Cologne and Trier, keeping it under possible Belgian artillery fire in the event of a German attack. The generals were not deluded about being able to hold for long, but they thought the black line could buy time for the Meuse defenses to be read- ied.53 The Belgian military and other ‘annexationists,’ including many in the Min- istry of Foreign Afairs, had supported Belgium’s territorial claims, not because of any arguments based on common (or allegedly common) ethnicities but rather in the hope of strengthening the nation and of avoiding French encirclement should Luxembourg and the Rhineland fall to their recent ally. The cantons of Eupen, Malmèdy, and the two parts of Moresnet would serve as useful bases for a defense of Belgium at the frontier by pushing said frontier further east. They hoped thereby to secure Belgian security and independence, while some even hoped to lift Belgium out of ‘small power’ status. In addition, many in the “political class” sought, through the acquisition of parts of the Nether- lands, to bolster the position of Francophones against the Flemish nationalists and those demanding social reforms and to restore the Catholic political dom- inance by annexing more “Catholic” territory.54 The Belgian Socialists and Flemish nationalists, the same groups who would hold rearmament hostage in the mid-1930s, opposed any Belgian acquisitions. The Socialists feared annexation would empower reactionaries and opposed territorial demands, especially those against Holland. They recognized that the populations concerned had no interest in joining Belgium. They did want to

52 Johansson, p. 104, 113; Devleeshouwer, p. 195; quoted in Ibid., p. 198. Interestingly, one reason the Belgians wanted land on the Rhine was the fear of theFrench moving in and surrounding their country. Ibid., p. 197; Ibid., p. 199; Marks, pp. 137-141. 53 Johansson, p. 114. 54 Johansson, pp. 151-153; Coolsaet, pp. 354-355. Belgium And World War I 35 change the regime of the Scheldt which, they believed, left Belgium at the mercy of the Dutch. It should be pointed out that the Socialists were far from unanimous on the issue. The Flemish nationalists were loathe to harm the Netherlands or strengthen the Belgian state. Rejecting the ‘Activists’ and their wartime collaboration, many Flemish nationalists called for making Flanders more Flemish and suspected any territorial demands on the Netherlands that would harm relations and Flemish interests. They were more concerned about economic control over the Scheldt and Meuse rivers, including a canal joining Antwerp and Liège. Other anti-annexationists feared antagonizing Belgium’s neighbors or making their nation dependent on a great power. They also wanted to preserve Belgian neutrality. It was the annexationists who held sway since 1916 and dominated the peace delegation. In fact, despite popular enthusiasm for mentions of resolving outstanding issues with the neutrals as well as the Allies, most Belgians rejected annexationist ideas and concentrated on rebuilding the nation and, to the extent they cared about politics, worried much more about domestic issues, such as the language issue, than about territorial demands.55 In any case, the Belgians argued that Germany’s invasion in 1914 had destroyed the system of Western European “equilibrium” established in 1839 to keep the peace and shown how pointless the system was. It was therefore reasonable to end it and properly provide geographically for Belgium’s defense. This would not result in many annexations because most of the land would be simply “restituted.” Naturally, this argument alarmed Belgium’s erstwhile allies as well as the Dutch. The French saw it as a threat to their own expansionist aims, the British saw Belgian control over the mouth of the Scheldt as a threat to their security, and the Americans saw a violation of national self-determination. These issues circumscribed the room for maneuver of the Belgian government, which had to “act prudently, not explicitly define the object of the demands, but ‘pose the problem’ before the Allies,” who would recognize the justice of the Belgian claims and act on them. 56 The Belgians also cast covetous eyes on Luxembourg. In 1915 the government was unanimous in its desire for the Grand Duchy. This desire was shared by the Annexationists such as Pierre Nothomb, who advocated closer ties between the two countries. The arguments raised went from the historical (it was part of Belgium until 1839) to the practical/historical (Luxembourgois neutrality benefited and protected Germany). However, the French were also interested in the Grand Duchy and had their own claims. Despite Belgian aid,

55 Johansson, pp. 94-97; Devleeshouwer, pp. 201-207. 56 Devleeshouwer, p. 200. 36 Chapter 1 few Luxembourgers were really interested in joining Belgium while most wanted to remain independent and, eventually, most Belgians recognized that and reduced their hopes to an economic union. Eventually, the French promised to persuade the Luxembourgois to enter an economic union with Belgium, but only in exchange for the French keeping the most important railroad and the Belgians signing a military convention with France. The Belgians were deeply disappointed and offended that they did not get all they wanted. Bel- gium did pick up four German-speaking cantons in the east from Germany as well as some African colonies. Belgian troops also took part in the occupation of the German Rhineland, which they would leave in 1929.57 Robert Devleeshouwer observes that conditions really were not favorable to Belgian territorial adjustments. He points out that in none of the desired territories did the locals really want to join Belgium while most Belgians did not care either. What is surprising is that so many Belgian politicians believed it possible to succeed. Their nationalism was inflated by the victory over Ger- many and they hoped to see the Allies force the Dutch to give in. The campaign for annexation was led by the government through straw men, especially Pierre Nothomb, who had remarkable access to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the support of other departments. Nothomb was key in the founding of the Comité de Politique Nationale (Committee of National Policy) to support a “large, strong, and united Belgium.” This committee took a maximalist approach to territorial demands, including the creation of a Rhenish buffer state dominated by Belgium. The Committee obtained 275,000 signatures on its petitions and the support of government ministers, generals, and communal councils although the government never openly supported it. 58 Failing territorial acquisition, the Belgians in Paris sought to achieve conditions in the Rhineland that would prevent another German invasion, because they all believed Germany was still the greatest threat. For a time, some of the Belgians, such as the chief negotiator Paul Hymans, like the French, who felt equally threatened, supported an independent, or at least autonomous, Rhenish state, or, at least, permanent Allied occupation thereof. Other Belgian delegates Émile Vandervelde and Jules Van den Heuvel did oppose the idea for fear of increasing French power and leverage over their nation.59 In his memoirs, Belgian foreign minister, and sometime prime minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, about whom much more will be said later, observed that the

57 Devleeshouwer, pp. 209-212; E. H. Kossmann, p. 575; Devleeshouwer, pp. 153, 212, 244, 270- 285. 58 Devleeshouwer, p. 215. 59 Johansson, pp. 134-136. Belgium And World War I 37 friction between the two countries came as a result of the French premier’s mistreatment of Hymans and the lack of French support for Belgian demands. Many Belgians formed right-wing nationalist groups in order to press for Bel- gian territorial acquisitions. One such was the Légion Nationale (‘National Legion’), formed in 1922 by disappointed veterans and army officers who opposed Marxism and Flemish nationalism. The National Legion was the only one of these early interwar associations to last until 1940. It early on followed the Italian Fascist model, developing the uniformed squads of the ‘Protection Services’ and ‘Mobile Groups.’ It became part of the ‘Federation of National Action’ along with the Comité de Politique Nationale (‘Committee of National Policy’), later continued as the Action Nationale (‘National Action’), founded in 1924 by Pierre Nothomb and others in order to unite the nationalist groups, and which published Action Nationale as its organ in order to influence Belgian defense policy and to push Belgian territorial demands regarding the mouth of the Scheldt River, Limburg, Prussian Wallonia (Eupen-Malmèdy), and Lux- embourg. This organization would become increasingly “authoritarian Catho- lic” and the most noteworthy in terms of size, duration, and dynamism, although the left considered it fascist or reactionary and the other nationalists opposed it. Although the National Legion broke with the Committee of National Policy as a result of a controversial affair, it rejoined after suffering electoral failure in the 1925 election. Two years later, the nationalists joined a ‘sacred union’ against the release of August Borms. Many Francophones realized they would have to address the language issue head on. A 1929 compromise consecrated the unity of Belgium while also recommending monolingual regions.60 The issues with which the framers of Belgian defense policy between 1932 and 1940 had to deal were also present before World War I. There was a controversy over the ideal size of the army, with the goal being an army of a size and capacity to dissuade any of Belgium’s larger neighbors from using Belgium to get to its enemy. Just as in the interwar period, Flemings were at the forefront of opposition to military spending. The language issue also bedeviled Belgian leaders as the Flemish speakers fought an uphill battle for equality with the

60 Spaak, p. 10; Francis Balace, “Pierre Nothomb et les autres nationalistes belges de 1924 à 1930,” in Pierre Nothomb et le nationalisme belge, nouvelle série 8 (Arlon: Académie Luxembourgeoise, 1976), pp. 62-67; Witte, et al., p. 129; Jacques Willequet, “Pierre Nothomb en 1914-1918,” in Pierre Nothomb et le Nationalisme Belge., p. 11. The National Legion would become increasingly anti-Axis before the war and in favor of a new “specifically Belgian and National order” based on the king after the 1940 defeat. Balace, “Pierre Nothomb et les autres nationalistes belges de 1924 à 1930,” pp. 63-64; Witte, et al., pp. 128-132. 38 Chapter 1

Walloons and that had not been achieved by the beginning of the war – Bel- gian officers did not need fluency in Flemish although most soldiers were Flemish. Finally, there was a debate in the heart of the Belgian monarchy and General Staff over how best to deploy the army and what would be called ‘defense in depth’ won out over ‘integral defense of the territory’ just as it would twenty-two years later. During the war, Albert took personal control of the army, as permitted by the constitution, and set a precedent for his son, Leopold III, to follow in 1939- ’40. The Belgian army fought well against overwhelming odds but was forced out of nearly the entire country. The German occupation was brutal from beginning to end. Once it was clear there would be no quick victory, the Ger- mans set about dismantling Belgium and favoring the Flemings over the Wal- loons. This exacerbated the language issue while across the front line, many Flemish soldiers resented being commanded by officers without proficiency in their language and founded the ‘Frontist’ movement to advocate for Flemish equality. The destruction wrought on Belgium during the war determined Bel- gian policymakers, civilian and military alike, to do whatever possible to avoid a repeat, and this spirit animated the formation of Belgian defense policy. After the war, Belgium looked for reparations for all the destruction committed by the Germans, going so far as to invade the Ruhr alongside France in 1923 to force the Germans to pay their reparations. Many Belgians also sought security through territorial annexations, with nationalists calling for Dutch Zeeland, giving Belgium control over both banks of the Scheldt river and opening Antwerp to military seaborne traffic, and Dutch Limburg, allowing for a more effective Belgian defense on the Meuse River. Many also wanted Luxem- bourg. Their desires would go unrequited, although Belgium would pick up some cantons and parts of Africa from the Germans. Belgium Looks For Allies 39

Chapter 2 Belgium Looks for Allies

Belgium’s attempts to gain security in the interwar period operated on both the diplomatic and military planes and they cannot really be understood in isolation. This chapter looks at the efforts of Belgian diplomats to replace the old statutory neutrality with a series of alliances to guarantee the country against a new German invasion. It begins with a look at the successful Belgian repudiation of neutrality and then examines Belgian attempts at collective security through the League of Nations, the Locarno Pact, and international disarmament. The Belgians also tried to obtain treaties with their two main previous allies, Britain and France, and Belgium would suffer from the inability of the two later to maintain their alliance. Despite the (more than) occasional ruffled feather in Belgian-French, diplomacy, they did succeed in establishing a military accord in 1920. Unfortunately, as we will see in further chapters, it would turn out to be an albatross for the Belgians and would impede the organization of an effective defense. Belgian attempts to gain a similar accord with the Brit- ish failed. Belgium had secured its release from the perpetual neutrality imposed upon it by the treaties of 1839. This had been urged even during the war. As Belgian Foreign Minister Baron Beyens had explained to Sir Edward Grey, the British secretary of state for foreign affairs, in 1916:

Neutrality being abolished, Belgium, decided to make all its efforts to assure its defense, does not, however, desire an alliance with great powers. An alliance fatally leads small states into the orbits of their great neighbors and confers on them politically the role of satellite. The Bel- gian people, so tested by the world war, aspires to an independence which would be weighed down neither with any international charge nor any political obligation.1

On July 27, 1917, the Belgian foreign minister declared that the German invasion of Belgium, with its alliance with Austria-Hungary, meant two of its guarantors had violated the original agreement that was therefore now invalid and needed to be modified. The Belgian argument was that because the treaties had not done their job – which was to protect Belgium – and because the trea-

1 Quoted in ARP-Capelle XV/1/25.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004269736_004 40 Chapter 2 ties had been violated by its signatories, they were null and void and Belgium had the right to determine and practice its own foreign policy. Few Belgians challenged this position. It carried the day both in Belgium and in the other signatories of the treaties of 1839 and Belgium was released from its obligation in this respect. During the interwar period, Belgium would follow a policy close to neutrality but would cherish its right to freely determine that policy.2 Interwar Belgian foreign policy was based on a fear of Germany justified by the horrific experience of German occupation during World War I. Former Bel- gian Foreign Minister Henri Jaspar summed things up in a speech in Paris in which he sketched the view of “the average Belgian”:

fidelity, strongly tempered with skepticism, vis-à-vis the League of Nations, inveterate mistrust of Germany and of its most pacific affirma- tions, unanimous decision of the population to defend Belgian territory, and horror of any military adventure into which Belgium could be drawn.3

Both Belgium’s steadfast dedication to the concept of ‘collective security’ until the Rhineland debacle of 1936 and its equally steadfast dedication to ‘independence’ afterwards were based on an assessment of what would best keep the Germans on their own side of the border. Foreign policy affected defense policy because what were perceived to be the needs of the army depended upon the general European climate and especially how big a threat Germany appeared.4 Collective security was embodied in the League of Nations Covenant, especially in Article XVI, which called for members to offer immediate military support to any invaded member, and in the Locarno Pact of 1925, agreed to by Germany, Britain, France, and Italy as well as Belgium, which declared the contemporary borders of Western Europe, including the demilitarization of the Rhineland, inviolable and also required signatories to provide immediate support to the victim of an unprovoked aggression as defined by the Council of the League of Nations. Until the failure of the Locarno regime, Belgian diplomats repeatedly affirmed, at home and abroad, that Belgium’s foreign policy was based on these two documents. The interplay between foreign and military policies was summarized at a 1935 meeting between King Leopold’s secretary,

2 Miller, pp. 70-71. 3 Henri Jaspar, quoted in André de Kerchove [Belgian ambassador in Paris] to Paul van Zeeland [Belgian foreign minister], Paris, April 24, 1936 in AMBAE 11185/1, doc.#2686. 4 Horne and Kramer, pp. 376-381. Belgium Looks For Allies 41

Robert Capelle, and the vice-president of the Belgian socialist party, Henri de Man, “Belgian military policy has an exclusively defensive character, our foreign policy being based on collective security and on the independence of the country.” Belgium was an enthusiastic member of the League of Nations and a signatory to the Locarno Pact.5 The 1925 Locarno Pact was, with the Covenant of the League of Nations, one of the foundations of Belgian foreign policy in the era of collective security. As Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Hymans instructed the Belgian ambassador in London, Baron de Cartier de Marchienne,6 to tell British diplomat Sir John Simon in 1933, Locarno was the basis of Belgian policy. One interesting effect of the Locarno Pact was that now that the British were effectively guaranteeing Belgium, the previous strategy of ‘defense at the frontier’ impelled by the 1920 pact with France could be replaced by a new plan, championed by chief of staff General Galet, for defense in depth. As we will see later, the conflict between partisans of the two conceptions would rage until 1936. Rik Coolsaet sees in Belgium’s adherence to the League of Nations, a completely new form of international political organization, as “the first significant breach with the past,” in which Belgium took upon itself limiting engagements which were also binding on the great powers, thus limiting their ability to coerce Belgium. Locarno was “a first application” of this idea, in which Belgium made military commitments in exchange for multilateral agreements that would protect her. From this viewpoint, ‘independence’ represented the Belgian “political class” bringing Belgium back to its old purely egoistic foreign policy.7

5 Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, p. 31, n. 1; Meeting with Henri de Man 1935(?),Archives of the (Belgian) Royal Palace, Capelle Papers [Henceforth “ARP-Capelle”], XV/11/5, document 8, p. I. 6 Émile de Cartier de Marchienne (1871-1946) was named an attaché on February 8, 1893 and first served in Vienna. He was transferred five months later to Constantinople and then went back to Vienna, where he was promoted in 1894. He also served in Belgrade, Rio, Tokyo, where he was promoted again in 1897. He went on to Peking, Paris, and retired in 1905. The next year, he was sent to Paris and became Counselor of the London Embassy, married, and later went to Washington, where he was named minister resident. His first wife died around that time. He arrived in Peking as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the Chinese emperor on May 26, 1910. He returned to Washington in 1917, married again in 1919, and then served in Havana, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. He arrived in London again on June 10, 1927, where he was the Belgian ambassador until his death in London on May 10, 1946. Among his decorations were the Civic Medal, first class (1919) and the Commander of the Order of Leopold. Archives of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 7 Hymans to Baron de Cartier de Marchienne, Brussels, February 17, 1933, in DDB III: 51; Gerard, p. 81; Coolsaet, pp. 366-367. 42 Chapter 2

The Belgians were also great supporters of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact that outlawed war as a means of settling disputes. Belgium had thus placed its hopes for security on the international framework. Nevertheless, according to Sally Marks, the Belgians always greatly desired and worked towards the protection of the British, French, and (hopefully), the Americans.8 Belgium also placed a lot of stock in the international disarmament conference being held under the aegis of the League of Nations. In December 1932, the British, Italian, and French governments agreed that the vanquished and disarmed nations should have equality in the framework of universal security still to be negotiated. Unfortunately, the three nations could not agree on such a framework. After Hitler came to power, however, the disarmament talks became a Franco-German contest with Hitler rejecting reductions and demanding the international acceptance of a 300,000-man well-equiped army, the French insisting on reductions, and the British and Belgians trying to medi- ate. The Belgians were very concerned about this “duel.” They recognized Ger- many could not be kept disarmed forever, especially since the conference had already recognized its right to equality. They saw a real risk of driving Germany to rearm unilaterally and without limits, leading to an arms race and a new war. However, Germany pulled out of the conference, and the League of Nations, shortly after Hitler came to power. Foreign Minister Paul Hymans told the Belgian Chamber that:

The future is full of darkness. Without doubt, Chancellor Hitler has per- sistently affirmed in solemn and repeated declarations his will for peace and his desire for an understanding with France. But the precipitous retreat of Germany from the disarmament conference and from the League of Nations, the suddenness and abruptness of this rupture seem a worrying symptom. The German people live in a fever. The exaltation of passions, the military training of the youth formed in the camps can lead to adventures. Finally, in certain sensitive regions of Europe accidents are possible.9

Not even the Germans were prepared for the reaction to their move. Count de Kerchove,10 the Belgian minister in Berlin, reported that the Chancellery and

8 Coolsaet, p. 400. Baron Pierre van Zuylen, Les Mains Libres: Politique Extérieure de la Bel- gique 1914-1940 (Brussels?: Desclée de Brouwer, 1950), p. 344. 9 Van Zuylen, pp. 264-267; Chambre des Représentants – Annales Parlementaires, séance du Mercredi 29 Novembre 1933, p. 151, in AMBAE 11179, sous-farde 1933. 10 André de Kerchove de Denterghem (1885-1945) began his diplomatic career as an attaché in Tokyo in 1908 and also served in London, Berlin, Bucharest, the Hague. He was the Belgium Looks For Allies 43 the Ministry of Propaganda were “stupefied” by the international outcry, which was fueled by the fear of a rapidly rearming and threatening Germany. Ger- many’s departure from the disarmament conference meant Germany potentially would recognize no limits on its armaments. This was threatening to the Belgians in general and specific ways. The Belgian documents are full of expres- sions of concern about a new arms race leading to a new war into which the Belgians would inevitably be drawn because Belgium would once again become Germany’s first victim. Ambassador Count de Kerchove, in a report written less than a month before Germany’s twin departures, recommended that, although the rearming Germany would not be militarily nor politically ready for war by 1935,

from the Belgian point of view, properly speaking, it is indispensable to prepare for the future and to construct, here and now, the defenses necessary to remove from Germany the very temptation to recommence the experience of 1914.11

The Count went on to urge increased spending on fortifications and weapons, including chemical weapons. He concluded by citing Belgium’s very exposed position and reminded the Belgian foreign minister of “the Roman adage: Si vis pacem, para bellum” [“If you want peace, prepare for war”]. The next year, Count de Kerchove urged increased defensive preparation. The Belgians were not the only ones to be nervous. In the report of a conversation in Geneva with foreign ministers from Poland (Josef Beck) and Sweden (Mr Sanders), as well as ambassadors from Finland (Mr Holma) and Estonia (Mr Strandman), Paul Hymans noted the unanimity of the diplomats in fearing war “in two or three years.”12

governor of East Flanders from 1921 to 1931 before being named Minister to Berlin. He was promoted to envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary on October 7, 1935 and was sent to Paris two days later. From March 1938 to 1941, he would be the Belgian ambassador to Rome. He finished his career as the ambassador to Lisbon with responsibility of obtaining food and supplies for occupied Belgium. In addition to Belgian medals such as the Commander of the Order of the Crown, Kerchove also received decorations from Italy, Holland, France, and Great Britain. Archives of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 11 Kerchove to Hymans, Berlin, October 17, 1933, DDB III: 190; Kerchove to Hymans, Berlin, September 20, 1933, DDB III: 147. 12 Kerchove to Hymans, Berlin, September 20, 1933, DDB III: 147; Ibid., pp. 145-152; de Ker- chove to Hymans, Berlin, April 19, 1934, p. 3, in AMBAE 11185/3, “Defense Militaire Belge”; Paul Hymans, Geneva, September 26, 1933, AMBAE 11179. 44 Chapter 2

Once Belgium was released from its obligatory neutrality, the diplomats of that country set about trying to reinforce its security by reaching military accords with its two former allies, France and Britain. Unfortunately for Bel- gium, Britain was back to playing its habitual balance of power game, supporting German positions against French ones to keep France from becoming too powerful. J. Wullus-Rudiger warns that one can only properly understand Bel- gian policy if one keeps in mind the friction between the British and French. Britain and France were no longer joined at the hip and this would complicate Belgian diplomacy because Belgium sought equal treaties with each. A further complication was that Britain had unsuccessfully counseled Belgium not to reject its neutrality.13 Belgian foreign policy before the remilitarization of the Rhineland was based on the idea of collective security. An important aspect of this policy was the desire for a rapprochement between France and Great Britain because Bel- gium needed both countries’ support to have a chance of surviving the next war against Germany. A January 1934 note by Fernand Van Langenhove declared that

the safeguard of our independence commands us to avoid being drawn into a conflict with Germany where we do not dispose at the same time of the support of England and of France: there is one of the guiding lines of our policy.14

Unfortunately, agreements between the British and French were few and far between. As historian Roger Keyes notes in his discussion of the reorientation towards neutrality, a major factor in this reorientation was the constant bicker- ing between Belgium’s two putative protectors. The British, playing ‘balance of power’ politics, were encouraging German rearmament and at the same time trying to weaken French defense.15 The Belgians had been bitterly disappointed by the lack of French support for their claims at the Versailles peace conference. Moreover, “the French [were, in the opinion of Belgian diplomats,] so often apt to be haughty and disdainful in their conduct of diplomacy.” And while the Belgians tried to take French concerns into consideration, the French did not extend the same courtesy to the Belgians. Louis Wodon, the head of the cabinet of King Leopold III,

13 Wullus-Rudiger, Les Origines Internationales, pp. 58, 62. Emphasis in the original. 14 F. Van Langenhove, untitled document dated January 9, 1934, in AMBAE 11185/3, “Defense Militaire Belge.” 15 Keyes, p. 45. Belgium Looks For Allies 45 complained that a recent speech of the French foreign minister showed the incompetence of French diplomacy: “[It] will augment in our case the impression of mistrust that currently persists with regard to France.” Later, Belgian Prime Minister Hubert Pierlot would complain about “the unsatisfactory attitude of the French General Staff during the period of the Franco-Belgian military agreement [1920-1936].”16 Belgium was able to reach a military accord with France by linking the issue to that of Luxembourg and this accord proved to be a lot more trouble than it was worth. It in fact impeded Belgian attempts to build a stronger military by fostering a distrust among Flemings and Socialists that Belgium would follow France into a war for exclusively French interests. Both France and Belgium sought economic and railroad union with the Grand Duchy after the war. The majority of Luxembourgeois inclined towards France but the French agreed not to press for a referendum in exchange for the military agreement, signed on September 7, 1920. The agreement consisted of two parts: one public, registered with the League of Nations, and consisting of an exchange of letters between the French and Belgian governments, and one secret. The former declared that the treaty was intended to build upon the Covenant of the League of Nations. Belgium was giving preeminence to the Covenant of the League, the guarantee of collective security. There was nothing automatic about the military treaty; the two nations would be free to construct their own military policies and they would be free to decide whether German action would trigger the arrangement. Rik Coolsaet emphasizes the economic aspect of the treaty, arguing that it was the result of Belgian economic interests forcing Bel- gium onto France’s side in order to get the economic union with Luxembourg. He also sees in it the Francophone conservative political class defending its interests against Flemish nationalism.17 The latter, agreed to by the Belgian and French General Staffs, started from the premise of the joint Franco-Belgian occupation of the Rhineland which then existed and provided for common action in the event of “an unprovoked German aggression.” It called for obligatory reinforcement of troops in the event of a German threat or invasion, a general mobilization in the event of a German mobilization, assistance in material production, the French defense

16 Spaak, pp. 10, 9; Kieft, p. 15; Louis Wodon, Note au Roi, 31 March [1936?], Royal Archives, Section XV/1; Telegram from Sir Robert Clive to Lord Halifax, Brussels, May 19, 1939, MRA- AMB 80 folder 4, page 68; see also: report of conversation between Colonel Blake, Mr. Strang, and [signature illegible], Ibid., p. 185. 17 Witte, et al., p. 131; Text of the Franco-Belgian military accord of 1920, reproduced in Wullus-Rudiger, Les Origines Internationales, p. 333; Coolsaet, pp. 349, 355. 46 Chapter 2 of the Belgian coast, and a common war plan to be agreed upon by the two governments. The Belgian and French staffs would work out a joint defense of their eastern borders, including the eastern frontier of Luxembourg; a joint covering of the linkup of their forces; and would discuss mobilizing more forces in the event of German rearmament and threat. A 1931 exchange of letters between the Belgians and French set out their “common interpretation of the pact”: it was meant to facilitate joint military action against an unprovoked German attack and had the same obligation as the charter of the League of Nations and Locarno. Coolsaet sees a “paradox” in that Belgium joined a military alliance in 1920, when there was no German threat, but rejected one in the 1930s, especially after 1936, when the German threat was becoming real.18 Given that the Germans never threatened nor attacked the Belgo-French forces in the Rhineland, this accord proved to be much more trouble than it was worth and was, in any case, unnecessary because of the lack of any real German threat while when the German threat became real the Belgians were distancing themselves from the French. The terms were kept secret, allowing all Belgian parties, especially the Flemish nationalists and the Socialists, to read into it their deepest fears. The Flemings in particular feared increased French influence. Both Flemings and Socialists were concerned that the treaty could draw Belgium into a war over France’s commitments in East-Central Europe.19 One French military matter in which the Belgians took a keen interest was the fortification of France’s northern frontier abutting Belgium. In 1933, in response to news reports about the French Senatorial Army Commission’s discussion about the matter, Foreign Minister Hymans instructed Ambassador de Gaiffier to “encourage the French government on this track.” De Gaiffier spoke to Generalissimo (French supreme commander) Gamelin about the matter and the latter informed him the French defense of the frontier would be linked to the Belgian defense of the Scheldt. On March 27, 1934, de Gaiffier reported speaking to French politicians and generals, including among the latter Gen- eralissimo Weygand and Chief of Staff (and future generalissimo) Gamelin, about Belgium’s desire to see these fortifications created.

18 Wullus-Rudiger, Les Origines Internationales, p. 332; Ibid., pp. 262-263; Coolsaet, p. 350. 19 Gerard, p. 76; Renouvin, Willequet, et al., p. 17; Albert Crahay, p. 64; Bond, p. 8; Émile Vandervelde and Pierre cited in Kieft, p. 6; Renouvin, p. 20; Général van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, p. 38; quoted in Wullus-Rudiger, Les Origines Internationales, p. 64, n. 1; Ibid., 63-65;. Belgium Looks For Allies 47

“France,” I said, “cannot count on the … breasts of Belgian soldiers to protect it against a German aggression. The Reich must be made to understand that the Belgian frontier is no longer the weakest point of resistance in order to remove from it the temptation to recommence the maneuver of 1914.”20

Even the German ambassador to France encouraged his Belgian counterpart to speak to the French about their defense scheme: “It bristles with [the Maginot Line] and thus renders obligatory to Germany, in the case of a new conflict with France, passage by Belgium.”21 Unfortunately, for various reasons, including the expense, the unsuitability of the terrain in French Flanders, and the presence of the major French industrial city of Lille, these fortifications remained incomplete. For their part, the French occasionally floated the idea of the Belgians fortifying the Arlon region in the Ardennes and they even offered to help pay for it. However, Foreign Min- ister Hymans rejected the French suggestion, sending a coded telegram warning Ambassador de Gaiffier to avoid any official démarche because the question had to be considered free from foreign influence. Hymans rejected French offers of financial aid for the project because that would have represented a loss of national sovereignty. 22 Belgium, which had a tradition of good relations with the United Kingdom, was at least as interested in a military accord with Britain as it was in one with France. Belgium was continually rejected after World War I because it had rejected British advice to stay neutral and had associated itself with France – a

20 Hymans to de Gaiffier, November 3, 1933, in AMBAE 11.096, sous-farde “Defense Militaire Belge,” doc. #19; Handwritten note by Hymans, November 20, 1933, DDB III: 243; de Gaiffier to Hymans, Paris, March 27, 1934, p. 3, in AMBAE 11185/3, sous-farde “1934”. 21 German ambassador quoted in de Gaiffier to Hymans, Paris?, November 6, 1933, p. 1, in AMBAE 11.096, sous-farde “Defense Militaire Belge,” doc. #18; de Kerchove to [Belgian For- eign Minister] Spaak, Paris, November 3, 1936, p. 1, AMBAE 11.096 “Defense Militaire Belge.” 22 In 1933, the Belgian military attaché in Paris noted the cost of the northern fortifications could run over one billion francs while proposed spending reached only 300 million. Gen- eral Du Bois to Minster of National Defense, personal and secret letter dated December 21, 1933, in AMBAE 11.096, “Defense Militaire Belge” doc. #9; J.E. Kaufmann and R.M. Jurga, Fortress Europe: European Fortifications of World War II (Conshohocken, PA: Combined, 1999), pp. 14-15; Hymans, coded telegram to Gaiffier, Telegramme A Chiffrer no. 239, in AMBAE 11.096, “Defense Militaire Belge” doc. #14; Document dated March 24, 1934, signed by Hymans, in AMBAE 11185/3, sous-farde 1934. 48 Chapter 2 step Britain was unwilling to take because it did not want to be involved, even indirectly, in French policies against Germany or in East Central Europe.23 Notwithstanding British unreadiness, Belgium looked to Britain for protection, recalling that the clear British declaration in support of Belgian neutrality had kept the latter out of the Franco-Prussian War. The Belgians also felt that had the British made a comparable declaration in 1914 the Germans would not have invaded. In July 1933, Foreign Minister Hymans told British diplomat Sir John Simon of Belgian concerns and of the capital importance the Belgians placed on British aid in case of war.24 This concern was reciprocal. Foreign Minister Hymans observed that “the impression radiating from the meetings in London is that Belgian security is a problem posed before the British government … ” The British Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, declared in late 1934 that because of the improvements in military aviation “England’s frontiers are found no longer at Dover but rather on the Rhine.” This declaration fit into Belgian conceptions of the importance of air power in determining battles.25 The Belgians still hoped to reach a military accord with the British analogous to the one with France and Paul Hymans suggested it during his 1934 trip to London. The problems with the Franco-Belgian pact would be avoided here because of the generally high esteem in which Britain was held by all sectors of Belgian society. Hymans told three British cabinet ministers that one of the best ways to avoid a freely rearming Germany and a new arms race possibly leading to a new war was for Britain to use Belgium as an obstacle and make a military accord with Belgium similar to the one with France. This plea was without consequence and the Belgian ambassador had recommended against suggesting it because the attitude of the British government was known to be negative, opining that the best the Belgians could hope for was a clear declaration of British support.26

23 Wullus-Rudiger, Les Origines Internationales, p. 69. 24 Hymans to Cartier, February 17, 1933, DDB III: 53; Cartier to Hymans, London, March 6, 1934, DDB III: 329; “Conversation avec Sir John Simon au Foreign Office,” July 10, 1933, p. 3, in AMBAE 11179. 25 “La mission de M. Hymans à Londres”, Brussels, May 23, 1934, DDB III: 376; Stanley Bald- win cited in Cartier to Jaspar, Londres, October 5, 1934, DDB III: 404-405. 26 “La mission de M. Hymans à Londres”, Brussels, May 23, 1934, DDB III: 368-370, 376; Cartier to Hymans, Londres, March 6, 1934, DDB III: 329. Belgium Looks For Allies 49

Belgian-British relations improved during the van Zeeland governments because of a change in British policy and the friendship between van Zeeland and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden.27 The Belgians, who saw that despite the border adjustments achieved in the Versailles Treaty Belgium was incapable of defending itself against the Ger- mans alone, sought Dutch military cooperation in the defense of Limburg with British pressure on the Dutch to accept and a joint American-British-French guarantee of assistance against a new German invasion. The Belgians argued that absent Dutch assistance, they would be unable to base their line of defense on the Meuse and would have to do battle in the heart of the country, “a sacrifice [they] could not reasonably be expected to accept a second time.” The Bel- gians rejected the idea that the demilitarized Rhineland offered sufficient protection. The Belgian attempt to achieve the three-party guarantee were also doomed to failure largely because the British had ceased being afraid of the Germans and were becoming more concerned about the French and this had a negative impact on Belgian diplomacy. The British feared being drawn into another war but were willing to guarantee Belgian integrity and security at the cost of Belgium returning to neutrality. In 1922, the Belgians thought they had a deal with the British, who backed out because it would prejudice their negotiations for a treaty with France. Another obstacle was that the Anglo-French treaty, shown to the Belgians by British Foreign Minister Lord Curzon, called for defending Belgian neutrality – which the Belgians no longer wanted. The Belgian diplomats argued the British should conclude a pact with them because now that France had regained Alsace-Lorraine and could fortify it, the likelihood of the Germans going through Belgium again had increased. The next year, the Belgians, despairing at the widening gulf between the British and the French, and faced with an unacceptable reparations plan endorsed by the former, joined the French in the controversial occupation of the Ruhr to force Germany to meet its Versailles obligations. The Belgians continued unsuccessfully to reach an agreement with the British. Historian Sally Marks assesses that the problem for Belgian foreign policy was that it relied on the British, who never formalized the arrangement.28

27 M.L. Smith, “Britain and Belgium in the Nineteen Thirties,” in Belgique 1940, ed. Francis Balace, 85-111 (Brussels: NCWOII, 1993), pp. 89-90. 28 Marks, pp. 271-273, 346, 378, 392-393, 397, 399. Axel Tixhon and Laurence Ypersele note that “the neutrality abandoned in 1918 produced a literature which presented World War I as a new birth of the greater and more adult Belgium and which considers from there, the neutrality before 1914 as the symbol of “’the childhood of Belgium.’” Tixhon and Yper- sele, p. 92; Marks, pp. 136-137. 50 Chapter 2

Belgian attempts at extending an Anglo-American guarantee of France to cover Belgium as well also foundered due to British reluctance to guarantee Belgium and the American Senate’s desire to withdraw from Europe. Like all the other attempts, this try to obtain greater security for Belgium failed, embit- tering the Belgian leaders who saw themselves freed from the guarantees of 1839 but lacking any new guarantees to replace them and who felt that the suffering of the country during the war had earned only a worse security situation than existed before 1914. These leaders spent the next years desperately trying to secure Belgian safety.29 The Belgians considered that World War I had invalidated the statutory neutrality woven into the treaty that gave their nation birth. At the same time, they looked to find a new guarantee of security so as to avoid another devastating invasion. They believed they had found it in collective security, as embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and Locarno, and disarmament. At the same time, they sought guarantees from their two main allies – France and Britain. They would be disappointed in each. Gaining the treaty with France turned out to be a pyrrhic victory, especially since they could not complement it with a corresponding arrangement with the British or even the Americans.

29 Marks, pp. 335-337. Belgian Defense Policy To The Great Depression 51

Chapter 3 Belgian Defense Policy to the Great Depression

Belgian defense policy between 1932 and 1940 did not spring into being from nothing. It was the continuation of what went on before. The same issues of the size of the army, the length of service time, the proper organization of the defense of the realm, and the linguistic question had to be addressed before 1932. Thus, it is worth looking at Belgian defense policy in the 1920s and early 1930s. This chapter first looks at the system under which defense policy was established – the interplay between the king, minister of national defense, and the chief of staff. It then examines the reduction of the army and service time and the ascent of two the most important figures for interwar Belgian defense policy – the return of Charles de Broqueville and the appointment of Lieuten- ant General Galet as chief of staff and his impact on the Belgian military, including the formation of a mixed commission to prevent his resignation. As the German threat rose, the Belgians needed seriously to plan for defense against their eastern neighbor and that planning is studied. Just as in the main period studied by this book, there was an argument over what would be called ‘integral defense of the territory’ versus ‘defense in depth.’ The linguistic issue also roiled the military and the country and Belgium’s leaders attempted to redress it. As we will see later, those attempts were imperfectly successful. The Depression hit Belgium hard and impacted defense policy.

The Main Actors in Defense Policy

The formation of Belgian defense policy, strictly defined, depended on three individuals and one committee. The relationship between these forces was summarized by Raoul van Overstraeten1 in a 1934 note:

[A]ll military measures … during peacetime are decided by the King, commander in chief, in accord with the minister of national defense. The Chief of the General Staff is

1 Born in 1885 to a Flemish father and a Walloon mother, he rose to prominence during World War I, was one of the leading Belgian military theorists in the interwar period and, among many other things, became the military advisor and aide-de-camp to King Leopold III. A. Crahay and Gérard, p. 9; van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, p. 11.

The right arm of the Minister of N.D. [sic] He is charged, as such, with the study of works relative to the preparation for war of all the military forces. The Superior Council of National Defense occupies itself, under the presidency of the king and the vice-presidency of the minister, in the framework of existing laws, with all questions of general order and of principle relating to [national defense].2

The system was explained to this historian by a Belgian expert:

In theory, the Minister of Defense could not influence military matters (not having received a military education). His job was indeed to prepare the army for war. In reality, he tried to extend his domain and influence the chief of staff (COS). It was up to the king and his COS to decide on the operations.3

In the beginning of the 1932-1940 period the problem for the Chief of the Gen- eral Staff was minister of national defense Devèze overstepping the bounds defined above while the latter part of the period was marked by increasing resentment at the interference by someone not even listed in the above schema: the king’s military advisor, ironically enough the very same Raoul van Overstraeten who so well defined the different roles. This historian has not seen many references to the Superior Council of National Defense in the documents. Historian Joost Vaesen identifies the king as “the most influential actor” because the king appointed the assistant of the minister of national defense and the chief of staff of the army and because the king used advisors with practical powers. King Albert was particularly interested in foreign policy but also in military and colonial issues and King Leopold added constitutional questions. One politician described Albert’s role: to inform and persuade his ministers either in person, through correspondence, or by chairing the council. However, the king did not have a veto and even Leopold, whose dedication

2 Raoul van Overstraeten, “Note sur la Politique Exterieure et la Défense du Pays,” Archives of the Royal Palace, Brussels, Galet-van Overstraeten collection [henceforth “ARP-GVO”], dossier 4, subfolder 1934. At the time this historian examined the collection the documents had not yet been indexed. The archivist informed this researcher that the latter was the first to study the collection. Emphasis in the original. 3 Professor Luc De Vos, e-mail message to the author, April 26, 2005. Belgian Defense Policy To The Great Depression 53 to democracy was later challenged, accepted that Parliament was the final arbiter.4 The King was explicitly placed in charge of the armed forces by article 68 of the Belgian constitution: “The king commands the land and sea forces.” The problem that would bedevil Leopold was that an earlier article of the constitution requires ministerial countersignature to make a royal act valid. There were contesting precedents for Leopold III to follow. His earlier namesake, Leopold I, who commanded Belgian forces in the war against the Netherlands, had a general as minister of war, who countersigned the orders. But Albert’s Minister of War until 1917 was a civilian who was with the government-in-exile in France while Albert, having earlier rejected a suggestion from general Hellebaut to make a general the effective commander, and the headquarters were still in the free part of Belgium and thus Albert was in charge. He finessed the issue by not signing any orders (thus obviating the need for countersignature), instead giving them to the chief of staff, who would then relay them as army orders signed by the chief of staff followed by “In the name of the King, Commander in Chief … [sic].” However, this resulted in nobody being constitutionally responsible for a king’s military decisions and we will see how that complicated the situation in 1940. Historian Carl-Henrik Höjer points out that Article 68 does not explicitly make the king personally commander in chief but rather lists the king’s prerogatives and opinion on how to interpret Articles 64 and 68 was divided. Belgian jurists tended to come down on the side of the kings and Albert claimed the prerogative of Leopold I, as later his son claimed his. In the event, the Parliament and the government allowed both Albert and Leopold to serve personally as commanders in chief. On May 10, 1940, there was no doubt that Leopold was commander-in-chief of the Belgian forces and the government backed him and made him the symbol of resistance.5 The king could make his desires known through either public letters or speeches and Belgium’s second king, Leopold II, was able to assert his right to

4 Joost Vaesen, “Preparing for the invasion: between passéisme and modernization? Belgian military policy and the issue of neutrality, 1926-1940” (Paper presented at the Congress “Small powers in the age of total war: 1900-1940,” Breda, NL, 2008, pp. 2-3; Carl-Henrik Höjer, Le régime parlementaire belge de 1918 à 1940 (Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells, 1946), pp. 351-353, Charles de Broqueville quoted in Ibid., pp. 351-352. 5 Höjer, pp. 353-355; quoted in Ibid., order signature quoted in Ibid., p. 354; Jean Stengers, Léopold III et le gouvernement: Aux origines de la question royale (Paris: Duculot, 1980), pp. 23-24; Mathieu Leclerc, quoted in Ibid., p. 23; Leopold II also directed Belgian military affairs during the Franco-Prussian War, which Belgium was able to avoid. Jules Gérard-Libois and José Gotovitch, Léopold III de l’an 40 à l’effacement, 2nd ed. (Brussels: Politique & Histoire, 1991), p. 12. 54 Chapter 3 urge the reinforcement of the national defense. His successors followed that line of conduct, often discussing military issues, advocating better defensive organization, and even penetrating into the details. One example came in 1923, during Albert Devèze’s first stint as minister of national defense. King Albert sent him a letter comparing Devèze’s scheme for defense with that of the Socialists, who wanted a popular militia, and recommended the former. Albert intervened again in 1927 when he urged Parliamentarians to improve the national defense. We will see later how his successor handled the argument between the rival defensive schemes of Albert Devèze and Generals Galet and Nuyten. We will also see later how important and influential Leopold’s October 14, 1936 discourse would be.6 As important as the king is, the minister of national defense is equally necessary to the system. Before World War I, the ministers of war (as they were called then) were all but one soldiers although after the war, only two were soldiers until 1936 while ten were politicians. With the resignation of Devèze, the ministry went once again to a military ‘technician.’ General Werner notes that this reflects political necessities: a general would not need to have his party win elections and therefore could make the tough and politically dangerous choices, such as increasing military service. Alternately, a political minister of national defense could seek votes through military policy to the point where it becomes hard to tell which is the main aim and which is the side benefit. A. Servais cites the example of Albert Devèze, who is alleged to have aimed at votes with ‘defense at the frontier’ as the side benefit. Devèze, however, was acting according to the doctrine of his party, the coalition agreement, and Par- liamentary democracy. Many factors influenced the minister’s actions regarding operational plans. The most important was the governmental declaration – the policy laid down at the formation of each government. Others included recommendations of mixed commissions and edicts from the Superior Coun- cil of National Defense, input from the king, and changes in governmental policy or the international situation, or even the effect of pressure groups.7 The Ministry of National Defense consisted of a ministerial cabinet, an administration, and the General Staff. The cabinet’s director was a field grade officer or general named by the king (another example of the king’s influence on policy). The decision was usually based on merit but the officer’s political leanings and languages also weighed in the decision, especially when the minister was a civilian.8

6 Höjer, pp. 356-357. 7 Servais, 27-28; General Werner quoted in Ibid., p. 27. 8 Ibid., 29; General Werner, quoted in Ibid. Belgian Defense Policy To The Great Depression 55

The General staff before 1926 consisted of a chief of staff with two subordinates each running four sections. In 1926, each ‘group’ of four sections got two ‘underchiefs.’ The most important sections were: “1st Section: Military operations; 2nd Section: Information; 3rd Section: Organization, Mobilization, Coastal Defense; 4th Section: Transport, Resupply, Evacuations, Stages, Rail- roads, communications.” According to Devèze, the job of the chief of staff of the army was to advise the minister and then carry out his orders. He was not to make independent decisions about cooperating with foreign militaries. Any technical discussions carried out with foreign militaries could only result from governmental directives although once entered into, the chief of staff was responsible for their success and for keeping the government informed of their progress through the minister of national defense.9 Servais, basing himself on General Werner, points to a gap between theory and reality in the interaction between the three main actors (although his model only works for the 1936-1940 period). The king comes up with a plan and then submits it for the study of the minister of national defense with the chief of staff. They work out the execution and funding of the plan and the minister then goes with the whole to a mixed commission and the Superior Council of National Defense before bringing it to the Parliament.10 Before 1936, things did not work so smoothly because controversies between politicians of different parties brought politics into technical discussions. Dur- ing and after 1936, A. Servais sees a shift in power to the king’s military advisor, Raoul van Overstraeten, who changed the General Staff’s plans and gave orders to fulfil his plans to which the other organs – the minister and the General Staff – could only accede.11

The Reduction of the Belgian Army

The army Albert Devèze inherited as minister of national defense at the end of 1932 had been at its height fourteen years earlier, when it fielded twelve infantry divisions (D.I.) organized into six ‘army divisions,’ a cavalry division, and a division of heavy artillery, and maintained an occupation zone on Germany’s left bank of the Rhine river approximately between Emmerich in the north and Montjoie in the south. In 1921, Belgium, in imitation of the French occupation of Frankfort a/m Main (to protest against German failures to

9 Servais, p. 30; Devèze to Prime Minister, April 1934(?) quoted in Ibid., pp. 30-31. 10 Ibid., p. 36. 11 Ibid., p. 36; Servais, p. 172. 56 Chapter 3 obey Versailles), occupied the bridgehead of Duisburg. In January 1923 France, frustrated by Germany’s continued failure to pay reparations in coal and wood as required by the Versailles Treaty, sent troops into Germany’s main industrial region of the Ruhr. Backed by the 1920 Belgian-French agreement, the Belgian army also sent troops into the Ruhr, occupying a zone approximately 30 kilometers east-west and 20 kilometers north-south. The Germans responded to this mainly with passive resistance although there were attacks on French and Belgian soldiers. Belgian troops would only withdraw two years later. In the wake of the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, minister of national defense Albert Devèze, a reserve artillery officer during the war and an enthusiastic Walloon partisan, and the Liberal party had to accept making Ghent University Flemish as well as allowing some regional recruitment as the cost of getting military service extended to one year from ten months for most branches. Nevertheless, the language of command was still effectively French.12 By 1923, despite the demands of the occupation, the Belgian force structure was felt to be excessive since Germany was no longer a threat, and great faith was placed in the new League of Nations. Moreover, all available bodies were required to rebuild Belgium. On October 29 of that year, by royal order, four infantry divisions and their support were eliminated and the army was reorganized into a ‘first army’ (active) of four army corps (CA) of two infantry divisions. There was one CA on occupation duty in Germany. The ‘first army’ also included ‘army troops’ comprising a light division, an army artillery division, military aviation, a regiment of tanks, a brigade of engineers, and technical troops. There were also eight reserve divisions in a ‘second army.’ Servais identifies several reasons for the pacifism, shared in many countries, that resulted in the shrinkage of the army which would continue into 1928. There was a general belief that there would be no more wars and large armed forces would only negatively impact a country’s finances. There was no more need for large armies while there was need for economic changes and social spending. While the British went back to a small professional army after World War I, this was impossible in Belgium because the Socialists and others feared a professional army as a species of mercenary and the Socialists demanded a popular militia- type army.13 The army was reorganized again on January 20, 1926,14 when it lost another six infantry regiments, three cavalry regiments, five artillery regiments, and an engineer regiment, due to a Belgian economic crisis. The ‘second army’ was

12 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 20, 26-28. 13 Crahay, pp. 52-53, 68, 70-71; Servais, pp. 174-175. 14 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A) gives the date as February 13, 1936 (p. 31). Belgian Defense Policy To The Great Depression 57 eliminated. Four months later, the time of service was reduced to ten months for non-cavalrymen and thirteen for mounted services. Many officers (about 800) were fleeing the sinking ship. Charles de Broqueville, now the minister of national defense, observed that the reserves had ceased to exist and there was no protection for mobilization. However, the burden on the Belgian army was lightened when the army left the northern part of its German occupation zone in February 1926. At the end of that year, the light division was reorganized into a Cavalry Corps (Corps de Cavalerie, CC) of two cavalry divisions, although the army also lost another four artillery regiments.15 In protest against the decline of the army and the new law on reducing the length of military service, minister of national defense Lieutenant General Kestens and chief of staff Lieutenant General Maglinse retired in the beginning of 1926. Officially, the dispute with LTG Kestens was not over length but over how the new law would be applied – Kestens did not want to apply it ret- roactively to the draft then being trained and the next. The reality was messier. There was a fundamental disagreement between the Parliamentary majority and government and even, possibly, between the king and the minister of national defense. A Liberal (opposition) member of the Chamber alleged the official reason was a “red herring.” Devèze, then a Parliamentarian, jumped in, condemning the Poullet government for its poorly thought out and temporary laws and for having disposed of the general because the rest of the government opposed laws that would actually promote Belgian security. Count de Bro- queville’s own notes seem to confirm Franck’s and Devèze’s view of events and that Kestens had been promised a laundry list of items, sine qua non for a reduction of service time to ten months.16 According to Servais, a comparison of the resignations of Devèze in 1923, who was seeking a reduced term of service and a militia-type army, and Kestens in 1926, whose conditions were “in sum close to those of Devèze,” does not shed light on the issue. Moreover, the two similar situations were modified by exter- nal events: in 1923, Devèze was thwarted by the occupation of the Ruhr, but then bailed out by royal intervention, while in 1926 the internationalist spirit of Locarno and the League of Nations defeated Kestens’s hopes.17

15 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 34; Vaesen, p. 10; Charles de Broqueville quoted in Crahay, p. 71. 16 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 32; Servais, pp. 59-65; Accounts Parliamentaire de Chambre, 2 février, 1926, quoted in Ibid., p. 63. 17 Charles de Broqueville papers, farde 656(?), cited in Servais, p. 64. This account is con- firmed by a never-denied editorial in the Belgique Militaire of January 17, 1926, quoted in Ibid. Servais suspects a “royal intervention” in the Kestens case that persuaded him to take the job in the first place. Ibid., p. 65. 58 Chapter 3

Plans for Defense Against a Threatening Germany

In light of the German invasion of 1914 and the atrocities committed by the German troops, many Belgians, and certainly many Belgian generals, deeply distrusted the Germans. However, Belgian defensive plans between the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1926 were academic because Germany was in no shape to attack. The Belgians would defend from the Rhineland in cooperation with the French. Lieutenant General Maglinse, then the chief of staff, issued the first memo in favor of ‘defense in depth’ in 1921. Historian Eric Simon comments that there is an interesting similarity between these plans from 1921 and the actual battlefields of 1940, with the exception of the Albert Canal, which had not been dug yet.18 As the German threat rose in the 1920s and the Belgian army left Germany, the General Staff had to start working seriously on plans for the defense of the east. The plan had been, in the absence of enough troops to defend against a surprise German attack either directly across the common border and/or after the Germans invaded the Netherlands, to base the defense on Antwerp, Namur, and Givet – a much shorter line that could not be easily turned. The first real plan was devised by a Major Deguent, an engineers officer, in 1926-7. It called for defense in depth and a ‘national redoubt.’ In aid of the defense, the Forti- fied Positions of Antwerp, Namur, and Liège would be renovated (as would be recommended by the 1927-1928 Mixed Commission), a bridgehead would be created at Ghent, and the modern fort of Eben-Emael would be built. In any case, the main line of defense would be on the Meuse River forward of Liège.19 However, voices, supported by the French, were raised calling for an integral defense of Belgium at the frontier. This idea was proposed and championed by General Hellebaut, a leading Belgian military thinker, during the 1927-1928 Mixed Commission. It called for the creation of an 18-division militia that would be ready to fight immediately. This militia, in a thin line, would defend a line of fortifications along the border from the Netherlands to France. A. Ser- vais points out that this plan fails to account for a possible German attack outflanking the line from the north and also runs the risk of the complete collapse of the Belgian army if broken. And if the Germans get through? “Too bad, … but at least we will have spared the interior of the country the horrors of battles” and destruction. Van Overstraeten called the plan “fruit of a rusty brain” and de

18 Luc De Vos, e-mail message to the author, April 26, 2005; Eric Simon, “Coup d’oeil sur la campagne de Mai 1940 (Partie II),” Centre Liègeois d’ Histoire et d’Archaeologie Militaires, Bulletin d’Information (Juillet-Sept. 2005), pp. 58-59. 19 Simon, p. 59. Belgian Defense Policy To The Great Depression 59

Broqueville called it “indefensible.” A. Servais attributes Hellebaut’s zeal to defend his program to his desire to attain the ministry of national defense in a Socialist government and backs this attribution up by noting how close Helle- baut’s desire for a militia serving for only six months was to the Socialist demand. Hellebaut’s idea was shredded by the members of the 1927-1928 Mixed Commission and by de Broqueville and disappeared from public discourse until Hellebaut testified again at the 1936 Mixed Commission.20 One of the loudest voices in favor of ‘defense at the frontier’ was that of Devèze himself, who in 1931 accused General Galet’s 1928 defense plan of abandoning the three easternmost provinces to the Germans. Another major voice was that of Pierre Nothomb, who urged spending BF 10 million for fieldworks in the east of the country to reassure members of Parliament from the threatened provinces. The call for ‘defense at the frontier’ was supported by the majority of Walloon opinion, which remembered the suffering of Wallonia under the Germans in the First World War. Under this pressure and under the influence of Count de Broqueville, the chief of staff created a new plan that at least appeared to protect Wallonia and link up with the French. This plan was unanimously accepted by the Superior Council and the king in April 1931 and in Parliament de Broqueville rejected the allegation that the Belgian army was planning to abandon three provinces. He affirmed that it would defend the frontier and protect the French left and fulfil the Franco-Belgian staff agreements. A. Servais emphasizes the importance of de Broqueville’s speeches of the time which declared that they were not going to abandon the population of the border areas and that Galet was on record as not rejecting defending the border. Galet’s planned deployments, on which the above-mentioned Superior Council of National Defense based their opinions, does indicate a desire to defend the Ardennes, at least until the arrival of French troops. In case of defeat, the army would retreat to the Meuse, and if forced again to retreat, it would fall back to the ‘national redoubt’ based on Antwerp and Ghent. The plan, creating strategic depth, was adopted by a vote of nine members of the Superior Council of National Defense out of ten.21

20 Servais, pp. 153-154; van Overstraeten and de Broqueville, quoted in Ibid., p. 154. Hellebaut made so many criticisms of the general staff that de Broqueville had to create a committee of inquiry to investigate them. Ibid., p. 154; letter from the French military attaché, cited in Ibid. 21 “Miles” (Pierre Nothomb) in Le Flambeau, in the de Broqueville Papers quoted in Servais, p. 145; Servais, pp. 145-146; “Discours del compte de Broqueville” quoted in Ibid., pp. 146- 147; Servais, pp. 147-148. 60 Chapter 3

By 1931 the Allied occupation of the Rhineland was over and, although it was still demilitarized, the German army seemed again threateningly close. The Belgian government, in an attempt to avoid being dragged into a war for French interests against Germany, sought increasingly restrictive definitions of Bel- gium’s international obligations while the military, backed by the king, was coming up with plans for ‘defense in depth’ based on the Meuse and Scheldt rivers and based on the assumption of British support. It was, predictably, opposed by Walloon and Liberal groups and individuals, especially Albert Devèze, for abandoning Wallonia. Galet described to Raoul van Overstraeten his testimony on his project for the system of fortifications in Belgium to the Chamber and the Senate. “’I was listened to with sympathy by the Catho- lics … Liberals welcomed me as a suspect who could think only of a retreat.’”22 General Galet came up with a new plan presented to the prime minister in early 1931 that, although lost, can be pieced together from other witnesses and which did offer up much of eastern Belgium to the Germans. He recognized that the Hellebaut plan was unworkable and that the Belgians, using twelve divisions (including six reserve divisions) could not produce an army that could stand toe-to-toe with the Germans and so the front had to be shortened. One option, running the line from Liège to the Meuse downriver, would be open to outflanking on both sides, while another, running along the Scheldt and Lys rivers, would give too much to the enemy. The best option ran from the lower Scheldt to Antwerp, Namur, and then to the upper Meuse. It offered a short line with strong anchors on the flanks. That plan was ultimately adopted by the commission to determine the defensive organization of the army. It is important to note that Galet and his disciples never planned to give up any Belgian soil they did not have to and that they would try to at least delay the Germans in the Ardennes but the frontier could not really be defended.23 Nevertheless, Galet’s ideas were increasingly challenged. Why? A. Servais suggests the explanation lies in the fact that neither the public nor its representatives really knew the Belgian plans. Ignorance led to fear and fear led to opposition. There was also the example of the 1930 Galet plan which did abandon the easternmost provinces to the Germans and conformed to Galet’s thoughts as revealed by his conversations with General Kestens, his views of the French, and his reliance on the British – as evidenced by his plan to retreat (if necessary) towards ports from which British help could come. Galet’s plan

22 Gerard, p. 165; Note by van Overstraeten, dated March 12, 1931, ARP-GVO 1930-1934. 23 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 35; Simon, Ibid., Wanty, 1: 156; Crahay, p. 123; van Overstraeten and press accounts cited in Servais, p. 146; van Overstraeten quoted in Ibid., p. 156; Ibid., pp. 156-157. Belgian Defense Policy To The Great Depression 61 was, however, a dead letter in Parliament not only because it was too expensive but also because it had something for everybody to hate: Walloons would oppose it because it abandoned them and called for a withdrawal to Flanders and Flemings would oppose it because it would turn the great Flemish cities into battlefields.24 Francophone opposition, channeled by Devèze, led de Broqueville, worked to forestall the departure of the left Liberals from the government, to accept Devèze’s demands for light infantry to defend Belgian Luxembourg although, as we will see later, this light infantry, in the form of the Chasseurs ardennais, was only created once Devèze became minister of national defense.

General Galet

The year 1926 saw the arrival on the scene of two important figures for Belgian defense: Charles de Broqueville, former prime minister and war minister,25 who became the minister of national defense, and Lieutenant General Émile Galet, who became chief of staff.

Figure 2 Lieutenant-General Émile Galet. Collection of the Royal Army Museum, Brussels

General Galet, born to a working class family in 1870, enlisted in the army, where “his tenacious will, put at the service of remarkable faculties,” got him

24 Servais, pp. 147-150; “Discours du comte de Broqueville”, quoted in Ibid., p. 148. 25 See above. 62 Chapter 3 into the École militaire, which he left as an artillery second lieutenant. His term in an artillery unit was the only time he dealt directly with troops. He then entered the École de guerre (at which institution he later taught), where he shone, and was admitted into the Special Corps of the Headquarters. As a mere capitaine-commandant (O-4), Galet became military counselor to King Albert I during World War One. After the war, he commanded the Ecole royale militaire until being tabbed for chief of staff.26 General Galet had three main goals: create a good permanent army organization, instruct the troops well according to “coherent regulations,” and create “a strict discipline and a solid cohesion.” He succeeded at the first, with his peacetime organization remaining unchanged until May 1940. He also succeeded at the second, creating a new Instruction sur l’emploi tactique des grandes unités (“Instruction on the Tactical Use of Large Units”) as well as regulations for the various branches, and the third, improving unit cohesion (although he has been criticized for having eliminated the schools for reserve officers and NCOs). Belgian historian and World War II veteran Lieutenant General Albert Crahay observes that Galet made a very strong impression very quickly, improving and emphasizing training, imposing “a coherent doctrine,” improving military appearance and “discipline,” and making officers more involved in the lives of their men. A less charitable historian and veteran, Gen- eral Émile Wanty, declares that “In the matter of the psychology of command, he [Galet] committed astonishing errors of judgment.” Wanty especially condemns Galet’s suggestion that a regimental commander should use his worst captain as his adjutant. In other words, he felt there would somehow be an advantage to a colonel having an incompetent assistant. Galet’s attention to the regular army at the expense of the reserve units has also been marked against him, as has, perhaps more seriously, his excessive attachment to “schemes and theories.” He was known to favor a small but well-trained professional army and felt the 1926 reductions would not seriously affect Belgian security.27 However, on December 15, 1927, in order to forestall LTG Galet’s resignation, because he claimed that Belgium would become indefensible if pressures for disarmament succeeded, and in the face of evidence that the Germans were rearming in spite of Versailles, King Albert I established a military-civilian ‘mixed commission’ to examine the needs of the military. General Galet warned that Belgium was in a very difficult position and needed a military that could

26 Wanty, 1: 142-144, 149-150. There is a major divide between those who love General Galet and those who hate him. There seems to be little middle ground. 27 Crahay, pp. 116-117; Wanty, 1: 143; Vaesen, 10. Belgian Defense Policy To The Great Depression 63 overcome it. The army had to be able to deter an aggression or stop one on the border because a line in the middle of the country would mean disaster for Belgium. In addition, the army had to be prepared to block a sudden invasion. He also called for improvements in armament and equipment as well as fortifications. Much of the Belgian army’s equipment was either obsolete, such as the Mauser rifle, out-performed, such as the light machine gun, or lacking in quantity, such as artillery pieces, airplanes, communications gear, and others. He called for spending 500 million Belgian francs to modernize the military – a 725% increase over 1928 military spending. In response to a call from General Hellebaut for an eighteen-division army (including reserves), General Galet argued that such a large army would be too expensive, would disorganize mobilization, and exceed the available armament. In addition, there would not be enough officers. General Wanty observes that Galet wanted to focus on the active infantry divisions and cavalry division, to “sacrifice” the reserve divisions, and barely deal with the reserve cadres. This was a “[c]urious aberration of a very active intelligence.” The Commission, in its order of the day for April 3, 1928, rejected calls for a new reduction in time of service and recommended the assurance of coverage of the frontier, the creation of a sufficient cadre of NCOs and technicians, the provision to the army of modern weapons and equipment, the speeding up of troop training, the creation of fortifications to support the field army, and a new linguistic regime with regional recruitment. A law of November 7, 1928 fixed the term of duty for the first 21,000 draftees at between twelve and fourteen months (fourteen for candidate reserve NCOs, thirteen for mounted troops, and twelve for others) and eight months for a second group of 23,000 draftees. It also provided for single-language units up to company size and for the grouping of these units into single-language battalions or regiments when numbers permitted. The provisions of the 1928 law came into effect with the class of 1930.28 Galet oversaw most of a period of modernization starting in 1926. He, and the General Staff, was concerned about three different types of attack: “’irruption’ (penetration), ‘attaque brusque’ (sudden knock-out assault) and ‘attaque massive’ (massif [sic] attack).” The first predicted an assault by mechanized or motorized forces with air support that would later be called ‘Blitzkrieg’; the second a rapid attack by a not completely mobilized enemy (as happened in 1914 at Liège) and the third would follow the second, using most of the enemy’s forces. The type of attack predicted by the General Staff conditioned the types of materiel it requested. Further complicating the situation was the fact that

28 Servais, p. 175; General Galet quoted in Crahay, p. 108; Vaesen, p. 15; Crahay, pp. 106, 112, 115; Général Émile Wanty, 1: 150-151; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 36-37. 64 Chapter 3

Belgian industry, despite having some excellent gun and artillery factories, was far from being able to provide all of Belgium’s requirements. In this first period, the Belgians were worried about the first two types of attacks and wanted to buy time for mobilization by making more forts, bunkers, roadblocks, and preparing demolitions. Galet and his supporters saw the proper role of the fortifications as supporting the army in the field while the Devèze school wanted to fortify the Belgian-German frontier using bunkers and fieldworks which would channel the Germans to the field army although, as we will see later, Devèze also wanted to fortify the Herve Plateau outside Liège. Interestingly, Galet’s plan was modified in order to obtain support from Flemings and Walloons. Fortifying Antwerp would be delayed and new fortifications would be erected to defend Wallonia and, as we will see later, the Chasseurs ardennais would be created with the same mission.29 General Galet left the General Staff on December 26, 1932 by reason of advanced age, four days after a new minister of national defense came on the scene.30

The Language Issue between 1918 and 1932

In the linguistic arena, nothing had changed after the war. Flemish and Wal- loon soldiers were mixed in the units, as were non-commissioned officers, although most of the latter spoke at least a little French. On the other hand, even officers who had learned some Flemish during the war spoke only French amongst themselves. Indeed, some spoke so little Flemish that they needed NCOs to translate for them. This even extended to the military doctors. Flem- ish senior officers were few and only French was spoken in the bureaucracy, the headquarters, and the mess. Entry examinations for the École militaire were exclusively in French and while there was an examination in Flemish proficiency, it was literary Flemish of no practical use for officers. Courses, including those teaching Dutch, were given in French. Aspiring second lieutenants did have to pass an exam in Dutch but at worst a failure would delay their careers for six months. Aspiring majors had to prove their “effective knowledge” of Flemish but the test was not hard, because “it was feared it would eliminate too many good officers.” Belgian officers seeking higher education at the École de guerre would take their entrance examinations and learn their lessons in French until 1940 while only two years earlier had the first course in

29 Vaesen, pp. 17-19. 30 Crahay, p. 128. Belgian Defense Policy To The Great Depression 65

Dutch been introduced. Historian Richard Boijen argues that the attempts “to create Belgians by means of the army [failed] because the leaders remained wedded … to a policy of “one-way bilingualism.”31 Flemings demanded real equality in the army between the two national languages. They also wanted regional recruitment with Flemish soldiers serving in Flemish units which trained and commanded in fluent Flemish, equal chances at promotion for Flemings and Walloons, and the formation of exclusively Flemish or Walloon units up to the regimental level. Not surprisingly, many Francophone officers resisted these demands. Some opposed any Flemish demands out of resentment against Frontist behavior during the war; others, Belgian patriots, feared the breakup of their country or felt that the mixing of Flemings and Walloons in the units was the best defense against the fragmentation of the army. Many officers pointed to the practical difficulties of making the army half-Flemish, including translating all regulations into Dutch, creating Dutch words for French technical terms, and getting enough university- trained Flemish officers (especially hypocritical since the creation of a Flemish university was also resisted). Finally, there was simple laziness. Why, they asked themselves, should Francophone officers bother to learn a language that was essentially useless abroad, especially since most recruits spoke not classi- cal Dutch but Flemish dialects? Flemish circles reacted against all this resistance to what they felt were their justified demands by rejecting the army and becoming anti-militarist.32 The army regulations were translated into Dutch for the first time in 1930. Charles de Broqueville, the minister of national defense reported, on May 6 of that year, that the application of the law has rendered necessary the translation of the regulations bearing directly on the instruction of subaltern officers … . The regulations translated into Flemish will be distributed shortly; all the officers will receive a collection as well as a copy of the French-Flemish and Flemish-French dictionary having served as the base for the translation of the regulations.33

31 Crahay, pp. 29-30; Boijen, p. 31. 32 Boijen, p. 31; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 26-28; Crahay, p. 32; Boijen, p. 31. 33 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 36-37; Letter from the Minister of National Defense to all military authorities (up to and including commanders of company, squadron, battery and flight), “Object: Application of the law relative to the usage of languages in the Army in what concerns the instruction of the troop and of the officers,” dated May 6, 1930, reproduced in the 16e séance of the Commission Mixte, Report of the Commis- sion Mixte, p. 99. 66 Chapter 3

Minister de Broqueville would very shortly after note a problem that would haunt the Belgian army up to and including 1940 – the lack of Flemish reserve officers. Although the deficit could be made up by using officers declaring themselves bilingual (despite their first choice of language being French), there were inconveniences because they would need useful terminology translated.34 Despite these efforts, the implementation of the 1928 law left much to be desired. On September 10, 1936, Major General Piraux, commanding the Forti- fied Town of Antwerp, complained about the lack of knowledge of French among the officers under his command and announced he would establish courses allowing the Flemish officers to “perfect” their French. The ignorance (or apathy?) went both ways; on the very next day, the commander of the Sec- ond Infantry Division complained to the commanders of his subordinate units that the courses in Dutch were under-filled because most officers did not see “the importance of the profound knowledge of our second national language.” The Sixth Regiment of the Infantry of the Line established three courses to teach officers and non-commissioned officers enough Dutch over the winter of 1936-1937 to perform their duties when working with Dutch speakers. The courses, one for superior officers and two for subaltern officers (a medium course and a lower course), included “syntax, the critical study of Dutch texts dealing with questions of military order” with the officers learning the “judicial guide” and NCOs learning “the rules of discipline.” The courses would be taught completely in Dutch except for the review of syntax. The student officers were urged to purchase their textbooks, Beknopte Nederlandsche Spraakkunst voor Waalsche Scholen [Brief Dutch Grammar for Walloon Schools] and Oefeningen by de beknopte Nederlandsche Spraakkunst voor Waalsche Scholen [Exercises with the Brief Dutch Grammar for Walloon Schools], which were available for 8 Belgian francs (BFs) 40 centimes at the Van Ishoven bookstore in Antwerp. Civilian professors would take in 35 BFs per lesson if they had doctorates in Germanic philology, 30 BFs if they were just taken from medium or normal education, and 25 BFs if they did not fit into the other two categories.35

34 Letter from the Minister of National Defense to all military authorities, “Object: Linguistic régime of unit schools and evening courses,” dated May 9, 1930, reproduced in Ibid., p. 103. 35 Letter from the Commander of the Fortified Town of Antwerp to the Headquarters of corps and services of the garrison, dated 10 September, 1936, in the Musée Royale de l’Armée-Belgian Archives from Moscow (also known as the “Moskow Records”) [henceforth “MRA-BAFM”] 396 (185-14-823), document 63; Letter from the Commander of the 2 D.I. to the Commanders of the 5, 6, 9 [Infantry Regiments], 2 A[rtillery], and Dép/2 D.I., dated 11 September 1936, Ibid., document 60; Headquarters, 6th Regiment of the Infantry of the Line, Annex to the document concerning reserve officer personnel of 30 November Belgian Defense Policy To The Great Depression 67

The Depression and the Belgian Military

Belgians gripped by the Depression did not want to spend on defense and the Belgian military suffered accordingly, lacking personnel, equipment, defenses, and morale. This was not only an issue of defense spending but was also affected by other economic considerations. In addition, the overall Belgian budget faced deficits each year but 1935. At the same time, industries were too rigid and captivated by past efforts and uninterested in new ideas or diversifi- cation and the state could not sufficiently influence the industrialists. Robin L. Hogg argues that the Belgian economy was harmed most by the lack of new start-ups and the failure to adapt its economy. This was a time of dramatic increase in the number of trade union members as many working people sought unemployment insurance. Up to half of all workers were unionized. Nevertheless, these were dark times for the unions, which saw their unemployment funds overwhelmed by need and their near-monopoly over worker activities resulting in blame for economic problems that were not their fault. At the same time, although wielding “considerable and almost exclusive influence on the primary unemployment insurance societies,” and greatly influencing social life in Belgium, the unions found themselves threatened by the employers who feared for the safety of the “capitalist economy.” Confused government policies made things worse. Guy Vanthemsche declares, “the specific organization of unemployment insurance in Belgium became one of the most intractable vari- ables in the arguments over public-expenditure cuts” and thus had an impact on defense spending.36 Many means were used to achieve cuts to the defense budget: reducing the annual intake of recruits, lowering wages (with a predictable effect on retaining cadres) and expenses, stinting on building maintenance, reducing privileges, and putting off or slowing purchases. Some projects did move forward. However, there were ideological reasons as well for the reluctance to build up the military. The Socialists and the left wing of the Catholic Party, the Chris- tian Democrats, who were predominantly Flemish, had long traditions of opposing military spending, “Socialist internationalism, Christian pacifism,”

1936, object “Course of Dutch for officers”, Ibid., Document 54; Le Ministre de la Defense Nationale “to all military authorities”, dated 20 Novembre 1936; Ibid., Document 57. 36 Kieft, pp. 40-41; Hogg, p. 14; Guy Vanthemsche, “Unemployment Insurance in interwar Belgium,” International Review of Social History (1990), pp. 361-362; Guy Vanthemsche, “Recent Trends in the Social and Economic Historiography of Contemporary Belgium (Ninteenth Century to 1940),” in Historical Research in the Low Countries, ed. N.C.F. van Sas and E. Witte, 47-57 (Den Haag: Nederlands Historisch Genootschap, 1992); Vanthemsche, “Unemployment Insurance in Interwar Belgium,” p. 374. 68 Chapter 3 an abhorrence of drafting fathers of large families, and other financial priori- ties. The Depression further eroded support for military spending. In addition, Germany was not yet perceived to be a major threat. On July 28, 1934, Prime Minister de Broqueville informed Colonel van Overstraeten that there would be no war and consequently the Belgian army needed only six months service time. Van Overstraeten was appalled. Service time for draftees was then generally eight months, meaning that, because two classes under arms did not over- lap, the Belgian army was only at full strength from April to October (the presumed campaigning season). At the same time, the Belgian army was facing serious manpower shortfalls as a delayed result of the slaughter of World War I. Although the law called for annual contingents of 44,000, the class of 1935 was estimated to be only 40,000, with the next class being 35,000, and dropping dramatically until 1939, when the draft would crawl up to 34,000. A law was passed in 1933 allowing the government to deal with all five classes at once, swapping men between years to assure an acceptable 33,000 per year. There was also a relaxation of standards.37 Meanwhile, ordinary Belgians were becoming increasingly concerned about the rise of the extremist parties and about the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact negotiated in 1935 and seen as a possible back door into an undesired war for French interests, increasing German aggressiveness, and the Spanish Civil War. As international events were pushing Belgium away from commitments, domestic concerns were making it increasingly important for Belgium not to be seen as favoring one side of the looming fascist-Communist conflict. The French, having ratified a treaty with the Soviets, counted among the latter. His- torian Jane Kathryn Miller argues that after Leopold’s famous October 14, 1936 speech, national defense was the overriding issue through which all other political issues would be viewed.38 Between them, the king, his minister of national defense, and his chief of staff made defense policy, although in the next chapter we will see how King Leopold III added a fourth – his military advisor, Raoul van Overstraeten. The king, as constitutional commander in chief according to article 68 of the constitution, and the minister of national defense made peacetime policy while the chief of staff was responsible for implementing policy and preparing the military for war. The military in question shrank during the 1920s as optimism

37 Kieft, pp. 40-41; Vaesen, pp. 8-9, 12, 15; diary entry for July 28 [1934], in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, p. 123; Kieft, p. 45; Diary entry for April 18, [1934], in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, p. 111. 38 Kieft, p. 105; Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times from the Enlightenment to the Present. 5th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), p. 372; Miller, p. 52. Belgian Defense Policy To The Great Depression 69 about collective security and the League of Nations led to the belief that a strong army was not necessary. However, as the decade went on and Germany gained strength, Belgians began to become alarmed. This led to serious plans for how to defend against the Germans and to the beginning of the debate over whether to defend Belgium at the border, the ‘integral defense of the territory’ or have several lines extending back from the border, the ‘defense in depth.’ At the same time, one of the most important Belgian military thinkers of the interwar period, Émile Galet became chief of staff. The 1927-28 mixed commission was founded to keep Galet from resigning at the state of the army and recommended improvements, including in the linguistic arena. The Depres- sion hit Belgium hard and the Belgian army was having difficulty due to the reduction in budgets and the delayed demographic impact of all the Belgian casualties of World War I. Finally, there was the rise of extremist parties in Belgium and abroad and an increasingly threatening international environ- ment. 70 Chapter 4

Chapter 4 The Devèze Years

The years between 1932 and 1936 were of major importance for the formation of Belgian defense policy. They saw the appearance, or reappearance, of major personalities, the opposition in earnest between ‘integral defense of the territory,’ or ‘defense at the frontier,’ and ‘defense in depth,’ the creation of new units that would distinguish themselves in 1940, and the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, the supine response of the Allies to which would impact Belgian defense and foreign policy, making ‘integral defense of the territory’ impossible and ultimately leading to Leopold’s declaration of ‘independence.’ The chapter begins with a look at two of the major figures of the time, Min- ister of National Defense Devèze and Chief of Staff LTG Nuyten, and their opposition, which would roil not only military circles but nationalist circles as well, because their quarrel involved the organization and costs of Belgium’s defenses and feelings ran high, especially in more vulnerable Wallonia. It then discusses the formation of the elite Chasseurs ardennais and Unités cyclistes frontières and the budget controversy that would ultimately be the undoing of LTG Nuyten in 1934. That same year saw the ascension of Leopold III and his military advisor, Raoul van Overstraeten. Despite his lack of an official position in the military hierarchy, van Overstraeten is one of the most important figures in Belgian defense policy in the late 1930s through the ‘18-Days’ Campaign’. The chapter looks at his personality and then the dénouement of Nuyten. It studies the important staff talks between the French and Nuyten’s successor, LTG Cumont. The motorization of the Belgian Cavalry Corps began on Cumont’s watch and we go over the initial controversy between advocates of motor and horse and then the progress of the motorization. Meanwhile, Belgian politicians and generals were arguing over how best to cover the mobilization of the army and, inextricably linked to it, the length of military service for draftees. The chapter addresses the issues and partisans, especially LTG Van den Bergen, who replaced Cumont as chief of staff. The chapter ends with a look at the response of the Locarno powers to the German remilitarization of the Rhine- land and its effect on Belgian defense and foreign policy. The dominant figure for Belgian defense in the first part of the 1932-1940 period was the minister of national defense, Albert Devèze. A child of Ypres in West Flanders, Devèze was born in 1881. By profession a lawyer and a Doctor of Laws, Mr. Devèze was also a major Liberal Party politician. He was the representative of the arrondisement of Brussels from 1912 to 1939, at which time he

Figure 3 Minister of National Defense Albert Devèze. Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels switched to the arrondisement of Verviers, which he represented until 1946, finishing up back in Brussels from 1946 to 1958, and dying a year later.1 Devèze was a veteran of World War I, in which he fought as an infantryman and then an artillerist. He would remain a reserve officer even while serving as minister of national defense, which he did for the first time starting on Novem- ber 20, 1920. The French military attaché in Brussels at the time, General Latour, described Devèze as extremely intelligent and active but very proud, confi- dent, and too ambitious. Devèze was also an enthusiastic Walloon partisan. It was under his ministry that Belgium sent three battalions of infantry and three batteries of artillery into the Ruhr. That August, Devèze succeeded in increasing the term of service for infantrymen to twelve months and from ten to thirteen for artillerists while reducing the terms for the service branches to ten months. He was replaced on August 6 of that same year. He would return to the Ministry of National Defense on October 23, 1932. In 1934, General Swaegers, a departing aide de camp of King Albert I, described Mr. Devèze to then-Colonel Raoul van Overstraeten as “of impulsive temperament, impulsive, has a new idea every day … . On the other hand, the minister is active; he stimulates, he circulates … .[sic].” Van Overstraeten himself wrote

1 Yves-William Delzenne and Jean Houyoux, Le Nouveau Dictionnaire des Belges, de 1830 à nos Jours, vol. A-H (Wavre, Belgium: Le cri and La Libre Belgique, 1998), s.v. Devèze, Albert. 72 Chapter 4

I keep the image of the minister … behind his desk, the authoritarian ges- ture, the rapid and precise language, the gaze scrutinizing my impressions, spying my least reflexes on my face, even while he read certain texts on the desk.2

The next year, Louis Wodon, the chief of King Leopold’s cabinet, complained in a note to the king that Devèze was running amok and exceeding his man- date, which was only “to prepare the instrument of defense, the army, and to put this latter in a state to play its role in case of war.” As Wodon pointed out, the minister of national defense and the chief of staff always quarreled. When you had personalities like Devèze and Nuyten, it became even more difficult to decide.3 General Prudent Nuyten was, practically speaking, Minister Devèze’s first chief of staff. He was a disciple of General Galet, a “‘practitioner,’ ‘professional,’ military historian, more truly chief than his predecessor, although he had not served with the troops other than his command as a colonel.” While General Galet had been solitary, General Nuyten spent his time among the staff at headquarters. Historian General Émile Wanty describes him as always inter- acting with his colleagues on various matters and tolerating disagreement, at least temporarily. He had a probing intellect and was always altering plans. On the other hand, General Swaegers, the departing aide-de-camp for liaison, described Nuyten as thin-skinned, interpreting disagreement as offense. Nuy- ten was also reputed to be a Francophobe, like his predecessor.4 The first big battle between Devèze and Nuyten was over two (ostensibly) conflicting strategies for the defense of Belgium against a German attack: ‘defense at the frontier’, or ‘the integral defense of the territory’, against ‘defense in depth’. In other words, should the Belgian army and its fortifications be concentrated on Belgium’s eastern border or should the army prepare several lines of resistance going west from the Meuse River. Thus the quarrel between the two conceptions came to be personified in the quarrel between the two men. Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen notes that the ‘integral

2 Crahay, pp. 66-68; General Serot Almeras Latour, quoted in Ibid., p. 66; Wanty, I: 127, 134, 156; Raoul van Overstraeten, Albert 1er-Léopold III. Vingt ans de politique militaire belge – 1920-1940 (Bruges: Desclée-De Brouwer, 1949), diary entry for April 15, 1934, p. 110; Ibid., diary entry for 23 April, 1934, p. 113. 3 Louis Wodon, “Note au Roi 10 Mai 1935,” ARP-GVO 4, sub-folder 1935A. 4 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 65, n. 1; Wanty, I: 154-5; General Swaegers quoted in van Overstraeten, diary entry for April 15, 1934, p. 110; Raoul van Overstraeten quoted in Crahay, p. 130. The Devèze Years 73

Figure 4 Lieutenant-General Prudent Nuyten. Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels defense of the territory’ relied on the “immediate” aid of the best army in Europe – the French army.

The ensemble constitutes a body of doctrine, a conviction, a faith above all discussion. One enters there into the domain of the sacred. To contest its validity was a scandal. To profess other ideas is a matter of heresy. It is absolute evil, the abomination of desolation, something impious which nurtured treason. The “camarilla” of military counselors who surround the king on this downward path [Galet, Nuyten, van Overstraeten] is the grievous incarnation.5

He further argues that Devèze, as well-informed as he was, had to know his plan necessitated the French being in prepared positions and thus inviting the French in before a German invasion, although, obviously, he could not state that openly for fear of public reaction.6 Support of ‘defense at the frontier’ took the form of support for minister Devèze against the General Staff, as exemplified by a 1936 letter from Stembert- les-Verviers:

5 Vanwelkenhuyzen, le gâchis des années 30, 1: 71. 6 Ibid., 1: 92. 74 Chapter 4

Figure 5 Map showing the rival defensive conceptions, Galet’s and Nuyten’s and Devèze’s. Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 41

It has come to our attention that the Government wants to abandon the defense of the East under the pressure of Generals Gallet [sic] and Nuy- tens [sic]. As much in my own name as in the names of all those, and they are numerous, with whom I have discussed the question today, I want to protest energetically against this baseness, because it is a baseness to abandon an easily defendable part of the territory in order to retrench behind an illusory line of the [Scheldt]. What is the point then of having an army and officers!!7

Opponents of the plan for ‘defense at the frontier’ included Generals Galet and Nuyten, and Colonel van Overstraeten. Van Overstraten condemned the plan for leaving the French border unguarded and for implying that French inter-

7 King Albert to van Overstraeten April 10, 1931, cited in Servais, p. 149; letter dated 11 June 1936 from Stembert-les-Verviers, MRA-BAFM 5448 (185-14a-6983) subfolder “Suggestions.” The Devèze Years 75 vention would be sought before a German invasion. He called for a main line of resistance on the Antwerp-Namur axis, which would benefit the Belgians and their allies in the event of a German invasion. Lieutenant General and Chief of Staff from 1936 to 1940 Eduard Van den Bergen argued to Minister Devèze that the only way to save Liège was to deter a German invasion based on the assumption that Belgium was an easy target. To do that, they had to find a position strong enough, supported by the terrain, defendable by the Belgian forces available, that could stop an assault. The Meuse would be a prime candidate.8 Not even all residents of eastern Belgium were in favor of ‘defense at the frontier’. A group of Ardennais, “all ardent patriots who have made war,” sent a twelve-page memo arguing against such a plan because it would require a battalion to guard fifteen kilometers (the generally accepted maximum for defensive purposes being 1200 meters). “This would be a thin spider-web punctured with a steel chisel by the Germans” who would then attack the Belgians in the Ardennes from the north, east, and west if the Belgians attempted to hold in place or, if the Belgians attempted to retreat from the frontier, the Belgian units would be driven back until they became useless.

In sum, they will furnish trophies to the enemy and cause the devastation of the entire frontier zone without their sacrifice having, far from it, cor- responded to the profit drawn from it … .The system of defense of Luxem- bourg at the frontier – system Devèze-Bovesse [another Walloon politician] – is a monstrous error which will result in the massacre of the population of all this province, without any possible useful result for Belgium or for France.9

The campaign, especially in the press, against the General Staff and its perceived plan got so bad that King Albert was forced to send a letter to minister Devèze in which he complained that:

One risks panicking opinion by unconsidered attacks against the General Staff … . [Albert condemned the idea of ‘integral defense of the frontiers’ as] absurd, and calamitous to Belgium if, God forbid, a war comes to break out, [and] the military authority, as much in the period of prepara-

8 Servais, p. 155; van Overstraeten, diary entry for March 15, 1934, p. 108; note from Van den Bergen to Devèze reproduced in van Overstraeten, diary entry for March 24, 1936, p. 212. 9 “Ce qu’on reproche au périlleux système de defense du Luxembourg à la frontière,” pp. 2-4, 12, in ARP-GVO 4, emphasis in the original. 76 Chapter 4

tion as in the period of execution, committed the weakness of being inspired by such a rudimentary strategy!10

In fact, there was not much difference between the two plans, at least as conceived by Minister Devèze and the General Staff. Émile Wanty points out that in their testimony to the 1927-1928 Mixed Commission, all the witnesses pro- nounced themselves in favor of ‘defense at the frontier’ but differed as to whether a surprise attack from Germany could be expected, which affected their views of the proper strategy. One of Colonel van Overstraeten’s friends wrote to him that Minister Devèze had not in fact changed General Galet’s plan of defense “starting from the frontier” but that Devèze had placed the emphasis on ‘frontier’ rather than on ‘starting from.’ General Nuyten, a major target of written attacks, declared to the Third Army Corps that he had “never” desired to give up any of the country and would not order a retreat unless it was absolutely necessary but that tiny Belgium could not take on mighty Germany sin- glehanded.

I feel that to leave our army alone to battle the enemy would be to doom it to destruction and to rush to a certain disaster, and I refuse to adopt such a solution. In evoking the operations of 1914, I remind you that it is the retreat to the Yser which saved the army and the country.11

The quarrel between proponents of ‘integral defense of the frontier’ and those of ‘defense in depth’ would only be resolved with the replacement of Minister Devèze in June 1936, after the conditions had changed with the Germans reoc- cupying the Rhineland and the French planning only to advance as far as the Antwerp-Namur-Meuse position. The Belgians were thus robbed of the precious time to prepare and mobilize that the demilitarization of the Rhineland afforded them (because the Germans would have been seen coming in literally miles away) and deprived of the assistance necessary to any chance of actually holding the Germans at the frontier. The integral defense of the country at the frontier thus became impractical.12

10 Diary entry for December 26, 1932 in van Overstraeten, p. 83; original letter from the King to M. Devèze, dated 31 Dec. 32 in ARP-GVO 1930-1934. 11 Wanty, 1: 147; undated letter from Robert Leurquin to Raoul van Overstraten, ARP-GVO 1930-1934; Declaration of Lieutenant General Nuyten to 3 C.A. at Beverloo (on September 30?), ARP-GVO 4 1934, emphasis in the original. 12 Vaesen, pp. 4-5; Crahay, p. 85; Vaesen, p. 5; Crahay, pp 171-172. The Devèze Years 77

The Chasseurs ardennais

One of Minister Devèze’s projects for the defense of the frontier was the creation of an elite light infantry regiment (later expanded to a corps), composed mainly of volunteers, to guard the heavily wooded and relatively hilly Ardennes region and Belgian Luxembourg in general, the vulnerability of which was recognized as early as the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War. In 1931, Devèze, then on the Superior Council of National Defense, demanded the creation of a battalion of Chasseurs ardennais (‘Ardennes Light Infantry’) in exchange for supporting the construction of fortifications on the Herve Plateau outside of Liège. On February 7, 1933, a new organization, the Command of the Troops [for the] Defense of Luxembourg and Namur (‘TDLN’), was formed to which the new light infantry regiment would belong. The creation of this regiment, and the later formation of the Unités cyclistes frontières (‘Units of Frontier Cyclists’), represented encroachments on the territory of the chief of staff. The 10th Line Infantry Regiment based in Arlon was renamed the Régiment de Chasseurs ardennais by royal decree 34284 on March 10, 1933. The new unit was to have a distinctive uniform to reflect its new status; élite units usually have a unique badge or uniform accessory to emphasize that they are above the ordinary. These indicators, like the green beret worn by American Special Forces, become greatly prized and fiercely guarded. They bring great respect for those who have earned the indicator. Ideas based on the uniforms of the élite German Grenzschützen (border guards) or the Italian Alpini (mountain light infantry who wore, and still wear, a distinctive cap with a feather) or the French Chas- seurs Alpins (mountain light infantry who sport an oversized blue beret) were rejected in favor of retaining the standard infantry uniform with the addition of a green beret (no other Belgian unit wore a beret at that time) carrying a wild boar’s head badge – the wild boar being native to the Ardennes and cele- brated for its tenacity – and special unit insignia colors, “pine green collar tags with a red border, also bearing the wild boar’s head.” That September, the regiment was provided with a platoon of six Belgian- made 47mm anti-tank guns mounted on British Carden Lloyd Mark VI light tank chassis, known as T-13s. The platoon of four Belgian-made 76mm mortars came on January 15, 1934. That July, at Minister Devèze’s instigation, in light of Arlon’s isolation and the distance separating it from its combat positions, the Ardennes Light Infantry Regiment was disbanded in favor of three mixed groups, each consisting of a Chasseurs ardennais battalion, a battalion of Fron- tier Cyclists, and mortars and anti-tank guns. These groups would be based at Arlon, Vielsalm, and Bastogne and were officially formed on August 31 while they received their flags on September 15, 1934. The original plan was, in case of 78 Chapter 4

German attack, that each group would fight from its pillboxes near the frontier and then conduct a fighting retreat based on “destructions and obstructions,” finally arriving at the Meuse River between Dinant and Givet and possibly even further south, if necessary.13 In September 1934, the Groupe d’Artillerie des Chasseurs ardennais, the artillery group for the unit, was created with three batteries of 75mm Swedish Bofors field guns. On November 19, 1934, the three mixed groups and the artillery group were combined into the Corps des Chasseurs ardennais, with its headquarters at Arlon. In October of that year the Corps transferred its headquarters to the beautiful town of Namur (which is now the capital of the federal region of Wallonia) at the junction of the Meuse and Sambre rivers. On March 24, 1937 the mixed groups were renamed regiments and the Corps became the Division des Chasseurs ardennais on July 1. In September 1938 the artillery group was reinforced with a 105mm howitzer battalion and became the Régiment d’Artillerie des Chasseurs ardennais and the artillerists received the green beret, but with “two crossed cannons on a gearwheel” replacing the wild boar’s head.14 The Chasseurs were noted for their modern light weapons, including the 1935 and 1936 models of the Mauser system rifles and carbines, the Model 1930 light machine gun (a license-built Browning Automatic Rifle), the Fabrique Nationale GP pistol, and the DBT grenade launcher. They also received bicycles (the Chasseurs battalions had been on foot) and motorcycles, allowing the formation of a motorcycle company per regiment. In 1938 the Chasseurs lost their 76mm mortars but were compensated with an augmentation in the number of T-13s (now sixteen per regiment) and the provision of three T-15 light tanks (the same chassis as the T-13 but with a 13.2mm Hotchkiss machine gun in a turret) per regiment. With this equipment, the Chasseurs ardennais impressed the German high command in 1939 and would give a very good account of themselves in 1940.15 To replace the lost 10th Line Infantry Regiment in the Third Army Corps, the 14th Line Infantry Regiment was raised on June 15, 1934. Even this was not without controversy. General Nuyten drew Minister Devèze’s attention to the fact

13 Wanty, pp. 159-160; De Broqueville Papers quoted in Servais, p. 144; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A) 42; Crahay, p. 132; Commandant Luc Vangansbeke, “Resist and Bite! The story of the Belgian Ardennes Rifles (Unpublished paper courtesy of the Museum of the Chasseurs ardennais), p. 6. The Belgian ‘Adrian style’ helmet with its crest was considered a distinctive attribute of the Belgian soldier and was recognized as such in memori- als to those soldiers who fell in World War I. Tixhon and van Ypersele, p. 107. 14 Vangansbeke, pp. 6-7. 15 Vangansbeke, p. 7; Crahay, p. 165. The Devèze Years 79 that the new formation, and the proposed six new artillery groups (one per infantry division), would aggravate the already serious lack of trained officers – they were 175 short on January 1, 1933 and 412 short on January 1, 1934 – such that the need for 200 officers for these units would put the Belgian army, by the most generous accounting, 612 officers in the hole. In fact, the numbers should have been higher and the army would be down 1,000 officers for the mobilized forces. The ‘military contributor’ of Metropole complained that the creation of a new active-duty regiment would have an unfortunate effect on already existing regiments. The army would find itself short of ready forces necessary to Devèze’s cherished ‘defense at the frontier.’16 In the provinces of Liège and Limburg, and formed for the same purpose as the Chasseurs ardennais, the Unités cyclistes frontière were raised from volunteers on March 1, 1934 at the camp of Beverloo. Initially, units were deployed at Maaseik, Liège, Verviers, Arlon, Vielsalm, and Bastogne, with the last three ear- marked for the Régiment de Chasseurs ardennais, which they joined on August 30, 1934. By May 1, 1935, the Frontier Cyclists consisted of two battalions: one in Limburg (Maaseik and Lanaken) with its headquarters at Maaseik and one in Liège (Verviers, Visé, Hombourg, Henri-Chapelle, and Malmédy) with its headquarters in Verviers. They were reinforced on March 24, 1937 into three battalions with headquarters in Maaseik, Visé and Verviers. They became the Régiment cycliste frontière on October 1 of that same year.17

The Budget Controversy

In September, 1933, a 700 million franc loan was awarded to the Ministry of National Defense by Prime Minister de Broqueville. Minister Devèze wanted to spend BF 230 million on fortifications, BF 430 million on equipment for the field army, BF30 million on casernes, and BF 10 million on the Ghent bridgehead. General Nuyten complained to the king that he would rather spend nothing on fortifications and forego the loan in exchange for a better extraordinary budget. However, Devèze was determined to speak last. To keep that privilege from LTG Nuyten, Devèze installed two of his men, Generals Termo- nia and Verhavert, as the heads of the Fortifications Commission that would

16 Crahay, p. 133; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 42; Nuyten to Devèze, dated March 12, 1934, ARP-GVO 4 1934, subfolder Creation du 14e Line”; “notre collaborateur militaire,” [“Our military contributor”] Metropole, August 22, 1934, ARP-GVO 4 1934. Emphasis in the original. 17 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A). pp. 42-43; Crahay, p. 131; Vangansbeke, p. 6; 80 Chapter 4 study defensive preparations on the eastern border. On July 27, King Albert sent a letter to the minister of national defense, opposing the latter’s arguments, condemning the heads of the Commission for playing politics rather than simply giving their professional opinions. He argued that guaranteeing the defense of the frontier was misleading, threatening, and admitted by Gen- eral Verhavert to be beyond Belgian capabilities.18 Essentially, just like the French, and like them lacking the ability to fund both, the Belgians had to decide between a major fortification system and a well-equipped field army, with the politician, who supported the fortification as the traditionalists and the General Staff as the “innovators.” Devèze, like the French, believed in the ‘continuous front’ and ‘the fire that kills’ with the army deployed on a fortified position for the ‘stopping battle’ that would (theoretically) protect the entire country. Albert and Nuyten, on the other hand, opposed a static conception of battle. In a note of August 28, 1933, Nuyten condemned spending millions of francs on concrete for the eastern border fortifications and staking everything on a position determined by the border. He argued for saving money there in favor of facilities deployed throughout the country “in echelon,” especially focusing on the Scheldt River, Antwerp, and Ghent. The new forts on the Herve Plateau were white elephants taking money from properly equipping the more important field army, which was in desperate need of anti-tank guns and machine guns to cope with low-flying planes. The army needed more light machine guns and more artillery shells. He wanted to create an army capable of fighting a war of maneuver and, as events would later show, he was right, even if it probably would not have saved his country. It would have saved his country around 275 million francs and resulted in a budget of 300-350,000,000 BF. In any case, Deveze refused to budge, played to public opinion in an interview with a major daily newspaper, and demanded Nuyten obey him as a chief of staff must obey the minister of national defense after providing him his opinion as technical advisor. The issue was threatening the government and the country. 19 Prime minister de Broqueville took matters into his own hands in a council meeting on August 31. After silencing Devèze, he declared that war was coming and he would have to speak with the king and then with the ministers of finance and national defense. After the meeting, Devèze met privately with de

18 Crahay, p. 130; Nuyten quoted in Ibid., pp. 130-131; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 39; Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 75; letter from Albert to Devèze, dated July 27, 1933, quoted in Ibid., 1: 76. 19 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 78-79; note from Prudent Nuyten to the minister of national defense, dated August 28, 1933, quoted in Ibid. The Devèze Years 81

Broqueville for an hour, forcing the latter to agree with the reservation that he would still have to talk to the king and the minister of finances. Devèze, however, as was his wont, used the press, who happened to be waiting outside the prime minister’s building. He declared to them that he had been successful and the reporters reported it as fact and Fernand Neuray’s La Nation Belge, not one of the most distinguished papers but very influential and “the journal of officers, of Veterans, of the Croix de Feu, of War Wounded … ” and other osten- tatious patriots, claimed he would ask the Parliament for between 650 and 700 million francs. De Broqueville and Nuyten had no option but to give in.20 Devèze met with King Albert on September 14 and informed the king that there would be a war with Germany within two years, rejecting the king’s argument that the German army was not even able to defend itself, let alone launch an attack in two years. Devèze also claimed to be of the same mind as the Gen- eral Staff in all matters except the eastern frontier. The king riposted that Devèze had given no consideration to the lack of regular army officers, especially in the artillery, but the minister of national defense claimed the army to be at full strength. Albert pointed out that they were short of junior officers. Ultimately, even the king had to give in to Devèze, the master of the media, and the Walloon movement!21 On October 11, 1933, his platform for ‘defense at the frontier’ was approved by the Council of Ministers led by the king. De Broqueville explained that they were not looking at a new plan but rather the perfection of the plan accepted in 1930. The preparation of defenses on the Scheldt was not a rejection of ‘defense at the frontier’ but a necessary guarantee in case things went wrong. Devèze then backed the prime minister’s assessment. The plan included the defense of the Herve Plateau by the creation of a new belt of fortifications around Liège with three new, modern forts – Aubin-Neufchâteau, Battice, and Pepinster-Tancrémont22 – and 179 pillboxes, generally for two automatic weapons. It also included the defense of the Ardennes by demolitions blocking roads or destroying bridges, pillboxes, and specialized troops in order to gain time for the French to arrive, and new equipment for the field army. That same meeting admitted that the Belgian army could, by itself, short of troops, weapons, and funding, defend only north of the Vesdre River. The fortifications on the Herve Plateau were thus to support the field army north of the Vesdre. The military was also looking more and more at a German offensive not just cutting

20 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 79-80. 21 Ibid., 1: 80-82; Van Overstraeten quoted in Ibid., 1: 80-81. 22 Tancrémont would resist until the day after the Belgian surrender. Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 146. 82 Chapter 4 through Dutch Limburg (as they expected), but actually going through most of the Netherlands. Therefore, the disposition adopted, following the waterways running from northwest to southeast, aligned most of the field army (five active infantry divisions, three reserve infantry divisions, and a cavalry division) facing the Netherlands. The front ran 150 kilometers and the troops had prepared positions with anti-tank positions and machine gun nests. Still, the position was ‘linear’ and risked being turned, especially since most of the troops were on the southern half of the line. There was also an issue of time: the Limburg Frontier Cyclists were there to delay the Germans long enough for the body of the army to arrive but it would still take three to four days for that body to arrive, with another day for the services and another day after that for the reserve divisions. The Council also agreed to urge the French to fortify their northern frontier to reduce the attractiveness to the Germans of going through Belgium.23 Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen comments that it was less the convincingness of Devèze’s arguments than the Catholic need of the Liberals to enact their economic plans, given the reluctance to bring the Socialists into the gov ernment, that won the day. Backing ‘defense in depth’ would have toppled the government and there was a sizeable part of public opinion that supported ‘the integral defense of the territory’ and considered ‘defense in depth’ to be virtually treason. Both houses of Parliament approved Devèze’s plans, including a yearly sum of 25 million francs, that December. However, many Flamin- gants saw in the obsessive concern about Belgian Luxembourg evidence of French plans to drag Belgium into war and of “French control of Belgian foreign policy through the 1920 secret agreement” and were spurred to greater opposition to more military spending.24

Raoul van Overstraeten

On February 18, 1934, Belgian King Albert I died in a mountain-climbing accident at Marche-les-Dames in the Ardennes. He was replaced by his son Leopold, whose military advisor, Colonel (later major-general) Raoul van Over straeten, would have a huge impact on the Belgian army. Van Overstraeten had made a name for himself in World War One as an advisor during the Belgian

23 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 72; Servais, pp. 166-168; Report of Devèze to de Broqueville, April 21, 1934, quoted in Ibid., p. 167; Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 84-85. 24 Ibid., 1: 88-99; Helmreich, Belgium and Europe, p. 319. The Devèze Years 83

Figure 6 Colonel Raoul van Overstraeten (as a major-general). Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels victory at Haelen in 1914 and in the victory by Belgian colonial troops at Tabora in (formerly) German East Africa in 1916. He taught military history at the École militaire from 1919 to 1927 and the art of war at the École de guerre up to 1933 and became commandant of the latter in 1939. He was promoted major- general in 1938. He also served as military advisor to King Albert. He was made aide-de-camp for liaison with the Ministry of National Defense and involved himself in all vital matters. This, in fact, was a facet of his unpleasant personality: he was a micromanager. Lieutenant General Oscar Michiels, after his return from German captivity after May 1940, complained that

the least relief between [infantry divisions] occupying the Albert Canal, the least displacement of any element whatsoever, was ordered by the military counselor of the King, who intervened even in the means of execution in fixing, for example, the number of stages [of marches].25

25 Crahay, pp. 135, 143-145; Crahay and Gerard, p. 207; “copie d’une note manuscrite rédigée par le Lieutenant Général MICHIELS après son retour de captivité,” p. 1, SGRS-S/A, Cam- pagne 1940, Généralités G1, Carton A, Folder 2, sub folder b. 84 Chapter 4

This was far from van Overstraeten’s only problem. General Michiels went on to say that he “always abided with difficulty [van Overstraeten’s] unyielding, authoritarian character; his curt ways which did him so much harm in the minds of his comrades … .” Michiels was far from the only Belgian soldier who had problems with van Overstraeten. However, van Overstraeten was also an excellent instructor and one of his former students, who went on to become a general, remembered that “the result was dazzling, and young students that we were, little inclined to the blind admiration of our professors, immediately recognized a superior mind.” General Émile Wanty described van Overstraeten, who would go on to play a major role in the campaign in 1940, as

endowed with a profound knowledge of military history, proved by his course at the Ecole de Guerre, exposed synthetically, clearly, but showing flaws in the critical examination of sources and resulting in dogma- tism … . Colonel Van Overstraten possessed an indisputable aptitude for the large views of the whole, for the gripping summaries. He understood the modern forms of war; he was one of the co-authors of the motorization of the cavalry.26

Devèze v. Nuyten

Upon Leopold’s accession, Minister Devèze threatened to resign if General Nuyten still fought him. In a meeting on March 15, 1934, Devèze boldly told the new king that he would have to choose between the two. Leopold would have preferred not to make the choice because Devèze’s resignation would topple the government and bring in a lesser man as minister of national defense but on the other hand, Leopold relied on Nuyten. That March, Devèze went to Paris to meet with French generals and the French minister of war, Marshal Henri Pétain, who warned him the French army would go only as far as “the Meuse (upstream from Namur).” This nullified one of the most important assumptions of the plan for the ‘integral defense at the frontier’ – that the French would take charge of the defense of Luxembourg. In the face of Devèze’s protests, the French generalissimo Maxime Weygand promised to send some French units further if the Belgians held the Germans at the border and invited the Allies into the country quickly. Nuyten complained that

26 “copie d’une note manuscrite rédigée par le Lieutenant Général MICHIELS après son retour de captivité,” p. 3; Blake to Oliphant dated 10th February 1940, MRA-AMB 80/4, #84, 85; www.google.com search: “Sir Lancelot Oliphant”; Wanty I:176. The Devèze Years 85

the minister of national defense has not judged it necessary to worry himself about my prerogatives [in dealing with the French]. As for the French staff, it arranges that I know nothing of what happens.”27

An April 13 note promised two French infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions at the covering position within two days of their deployment at the Franco-Belgian border. Albert Crahay sums up the situation: the withdrawal of the occupation forces in the Rhineland and Pétain’s unwillingness to take risks changed the dynamics of the situation for the Belgians and put paid to the old Franco-Belgian accord.28 Nevertheless, 1934 saw many successes for Minister Devèze. That April the Parliament had voted him credits for the positioning of the Chasseurs ardennais and the Unités cyclistes frontières; the creation of the 14th Line Infantry Regiment and supplementary artillery units for three infantry regiments; the constitution of six ‘second reserve’ infantry divisions; and the preservation of the ‘integral defense at the frontier’. These plans were largely opposed by Gen- eral Nuyten because the annual draft contingent was too small, there was a lack of officers and NCOs, and the necessary credits were extravagant at a time of economic depression. He felt that they were trying to do too much and it would be impossible to stop the Germans on the border, assuming French troops were only allowed in after a German invasion. King Leopold, however, supported the minister even though his military advisor, and many others, including the British military attaché, felt the ‘second reserve’ units were almost worthless and “their existence was only due to a press campaign.”29 On the other hand, the Depression was biting and Devèze refused to make any cuts. His intransigence was threatening social programs and education. Colonel van Overstraeten consulted Nuyten, who claimed he could save 120 million francs. On September 1, Prime Minister de Broqueville then met with Nuyten, who now saw savings of 300 million francs. However the prime minister still needed the Liberals for his program and put off action. Unfortunately, Devèze learned of this and again hit the press to ward off the cuts. At the end of the month, the stock exchange reeled under the blows of the economic crisis. On the 28th, Devèze apologized to de Broqueville for his recent interviews

27 Crahay, p. 132; Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 159-161; Leopold III, quoted in Ibid., 1: 160; Raoul van Overstraten, quoted in Ibid.; Crahay, pp. 132-133; Nuyten, March 14, 1934, ARP-GVO 4 1934. 28 Crahay, pp. 132-133. 29 Ibid.; British military attaché in Brussels and Raoul van Overstraeten cited in Vaesen, p. 11. 86 Chapter 4 and realized the weakness of his position because if he caused the government to fall (the minister of finances had threatened to resign but then withdrew his resignation), he could not guarantee the next prime minister would make him minister again. He announced finding 144 million francs in savings.30 Devèze was not the one to accept defeat easily. In a letter, Devèze asked the chief of staff for his suggestions while condemning his nerve. In strictly military terms, Nuyten was right about the savings, but he had gone about things wrongly. His reply of the 28th did not satisfy the minister, who saw the general’s behavior as “a guilty indifference with regard to the interests of the country, which requires the disinterested effort of all to assure its financial health.” On October 1, Devèze met with the prime minister and complained about Nuy- ten’s response, suggesting that the true guilty party was de Broqueville for having requested the suggestions. However, it was more diplomatic to emphasize Nuyten’s proposals and the fact that he had concealed them from his minister. Devèze thus effectively kept de Broqueville out of it and the latter did not want to plunge back in by defending Nuyten. Devèze then sent Nuyten another letter rejecting his response of the 28th as unacceptable and returning it while demanding specifics of his August suggestions. Nuyten then complained about the interviews Devèze had given the press, condemning the general for having abandoned his duty to the government. Devèze rejected this note as well, informing Nuyten that he did not need to defend his interviews and pointing out that again Nuyten had not indicated his suggestions. On the 3rd, Nuyten finally got down to specifics, calling for cuts in the minister’s favorite programs, especially the three forts on the Herve Plateau.31 Again, the press opened fire against Devèze’s enemy, condemning Nuyten for interfering in political matters, planning for Devèze’s successor, and even being part of a military cabal working to thwart Devèze and the cabinet. This was but the first shot in a campaign against the General Staff. Leopold sent a copy of the article to de Broqueville, condemning the attacks on the army, demanding the prime minister accept his responsibility in the matter and defending Nuyten and the army. However, the king could not allow himself to be drawn into the controversy. De Broqueville responded to the paper, declaring that over the past two years, Nuyten had never seen him spontaneously but had always been summoned, and that he had never proposed a successor for Devèze. However, L’Indépendence Belge then went on to say that it changed

30 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 199-207; Raoul van Overstraeten quoted in Ibid., p. 202; Capelle Papers (Archives of the Royal Palace), quoted in Ibid., p. 207. 31 Ibid., pp. 207-212; Devèze to Nuyten, quoted in Ibid., pp. 210-211; Devèze, quoted in Ibid., p. 212. The Devèze Years 87 almost nothing and even condemned de Broqueville, former minister of war, for going around the current minister. Things only got worse, with the Sambre et Meuse, a Liberal journal, accusing the army of opposing the cabinet and plotting to surrender most of the country. It called for Nuyten’s ouster. Le Matin accused Nuyten of publicly condemning ‘defense at the frontier’ before the officers of the III CA and arguing that the defense of Belgium should be on the Meuse, with a fallback position on the Scheldt on which to await Allied help. It would be better to use the funds to improve the officer corps.32 Meanwhile, Devèze was working to oust Nuyten. He sent de Broqueville a note on October 7, declaring that he had to end a situation that was damaging the military and the nation. He called for relieving the general of his duties as chief of staff. He sent a copy of the note to the king as well. He summoned the commander of the IIICA, LTG Mozin, who denied Nuyten had said what was attributed to him, but rather stated “at the frontier one defends himself as he can.” That same day, two captains provided COL van Overstraeten notes from Nuyten’s speech in which he declared the IIICA at Liège would hold to the death unless absolutely necessary. Both of these put the lie to Devéze’s claims. He turned back to the press, denying those allegations against the general. Unfortunately for the honest – if unsubtle – general, the issue was now not who was right but rather who was expendable. The prime minister, frustrated with his minister of national defense, would have preferred replacing Devèze with General Verhavert, the commander of the Troops of the Defense of Luxembourg and Namur, who would be in charge of defending the eastern border anyway. Van Overstraeten advised the king that de Broqueville, the real culprit, would have to take responsibility to save the chief of staff. The Liberal minister of justice, François Bovesse, informed Leopold’s secretary of his party’s demands: a General Staff that obeyed the minister and an alliance with France. At the same time, Devèze could not be replaced without creating a massive crisis. Nuyten had to be thrown to the wolves. The French military attaché, General Riedinger, informed Paris that on October 11, Devèze had presented the king with an order dismissing Nuyten as chief of staff and if the king did not sign it by October 23, Devèze would resign, followed by the four other Liberal ministers, toppling the government, and causing great troubles in Wallonia, where Walloon advocates were calling for secession if Wallonia could not be defended by Belgium. Leopold wanted to hear from Nuyten but

32 L’Indépendence Belge, October 4, 1934, quoted in Guido Provoost, quoted in Vanwelken- huyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 212; Leopold to the prime minister, dated October 5, 1934, quoted in Ibid., 1: 213-214; Sambre et Meuse, October 6, 1934, quoted in Ibid., 1: 214; Le Matin, October 9, 1934, quoted in Ibid., 1: 215. 88 Chapter 4 the cabinet was meeting at the same time and Devèze was again declaring he could not work with Nuyten and calling for him to be replaced with LTG Van den Bergen. De Broqueville agreed to relieve Nuyten and offer him command of the IICA. The ministers agreed or kept silent. When van Overstraeten came to Nuyten to hand him the king’s order, Nuyten told him the media had already announced it! Nuyten rejected the offer and retired. He explained to Devèze that

Considering the slanderous press campaign of which I am the object, this change would embarrass me in the eyes of public opinion and of the army; it could only be interpreted as a disavowal by the government of sympathies and of professional acts against the national interest which are attributed to me without the least proof. In any case, it is a matter of a sanction and my dignity is challenged. Consequently, I regret not being able to accept the offer you have made to me.33

Leopold complained that he had been forced to deal unfairly with General Nuyten, “an elite officer, eminent servant of the country, and whom my father honored with his confidence” and fire him without warning because of his disagreement with Devèze over the integral defense of the nation. Others, however, were not as sorry to see Nuyten go. Radio Wallonie crowed that the scandal had shown Wallonia’s danger and the results of threatening it. General Wanty praises both men, declaring that “Devèze and [Nuyten] struggled, for the ideas that they believed right, for the general good that they believed they were defending best.” Wanty feels that Nuyten was right in his belief that the lack of immediately deployable forces and the delay in French aid meant that a battle at the frontier was doomed to failure although Nuyten and his predecessor should have done more to augment the number of available forces “by a policy of cadres, above all of reserve cadres” and should have supported “without delay the principle of the creation of covering units, [and] kept personal contacts with the French High Command.” Devèze was right to support a

33 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 216-219; Devèze to de Broqueville, dated October 7, 1934, quoted in Ibid., 1: 216-217; General Riedinger to Paris, dated October 9, 1934, quoted in Ibid., 1: 217; van Overstraeten, quoted in Ibid., 1: 219; Ibid., 1: 219; Riedinger to Paris, dated October 11, 1934, quoted in Ibid., 1: 220-221; Ibid., 1: 217, 221; Provoost quoted in Ibid., 1: 223; Joost Vaesen quoted in Ibid; van Overstraeten cited in Ibid., 1: 223-224; Vae- sen cited in Ibid., 1: 224; Nuyten to Monsieur le Ministre de la Défense Nationale, Personal and secret, dated 12 Octobre 1934, ARP-GVO 4 1934. The Devèze Years 89 system of fortifications east of the Meuse although “he should have given to this last less scale … [and] more coherence; not to see in it the skeleton of a battlefield.” Albert Crahay found Nuyten to have been right in rejecting the call to commit the Belgian army to a very long line very close to the frontier but Nuyten was wrong in constantly opposing Devèze’s ideas, including the ones that benefited the army. Devèze should have left operational matters to the General Staff and should have kept the debate out of the media. Jean Van- welkenhuyzen quotes the British military attaché, Major William Fraser, who informed London that the problem went far beyond matters of national defense; as devoted as General Nuyten was to Belgium, he came from Flanders, instinctively opposed “any suspicion of French domination in Belgian affairs,” and was as ready to use the army against the French as against the Germans.34 The issue then became the finding of a replacement for General Nuyten. Albert Devèze preferred Lieutenant General Edouard Van den Bergen.35 “It is, I assure you, a choice which would respond to the unanimous sentiment of the army” and unite the military. King Leopold was also working through the problem. He found that General Van den Bergen had a “negative tendency.” General van Emelin “knows nothing.” General Adolphe Cumont, who was due to be pensioned off in September 1935, was described by Leopold variously as having a “very great intelligence,” “intelligible,” “at the moment strong,” and “is close to Van den Bergen,” but he was “too much an artillerist” and “has to become an infantryman.” Cumont was selected on October 24, 1934. General Wanty describes him as having a “cool character, clear spirit, firm judgment, frequently incisive tone, true temperament of a chief, seeing the ensembles, deciding with promptitude, he impressed all.”36

Franco-Belgian Staff Talks

Upon Cumont’s appointment the French expressed their desire to renew staff talks. In preliminary discussions, van Overstraten discussed with the new chief of staff his strategic conceptions, including the likelihood of a German attack

34 Draft written by Raoul van Overstraeten, approved and sent by Leopold, ARP-GVO 4 1934; Radio Wallonie quoted by van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, diary entry of October 20 1934, p. 133; Wanty, 1: 157, 164; Crahay, p. 134; Foreign Office Annual Report 1936, quoted in Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 232. 35 Also seen as “Vandenbergen” and even “Van den Berghe.” 36 Devèze to Comte de Broqueville, October 14, 1934, p. 2, ARP-GVO 4 1934; note by the king regarding the choices for new Chief of Staff of the Army, ARP-GVO 4 1934; Vanwelken- huyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 554; Wanty 1: 166. 90 Chapter 4

Figure 7 Lieutenant-General Adolphe Cumont. Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels along the Dusseldorf-Brussels axis – the path of least resistance – crossing the Meuse River in the Netherlands, threatening the rear of the Belgian deployment along the Belgian Meuse, taking Antwerp, and conquering Brussels. The first day of the attack would see two German divisions and “the heads of six motorized columns” with another three infantry divisions and six infantry regiments. This would completely bypass the defenses on the eastern border and the hypothesis showed “the inanity of the theory of integral defense on the eastern frontier.” General Cumont went to Paris with the advice of the king to act “as chief of staff of an army of which one would be very pleased to have the aid, and not as a poor parent.” The main Belgian talking points were the possibility of a German attack through Dutch Limburg and the desire to join battle only at the time and place at which all forces were reunited. The French, who had not considered the former as a possibility, declared the possibility that two French divisions would deploy towards Turnhout and Hasselt behind the Bel- gian lines starting from the sixth day of mobilization. Another six, and a brigade of Spahis37 would be available twelve days later. Cumont and the French, including Generalissimo Gamelin reached an agreement that in a new war against the Germans the Belgians would be responsible for Antwerp, Limburg,

37 Elite North African cavalry. The Devèze Years 91 and Liège while the French would be responsible for Arlon and for closing the Luxembourg gap by controlling the Lesse and Meuse rivers. The reason the talks were so successful was that Cumont had acted as a professional and not an ambassador for Devèze and his ideas, which would have thrown the meetings into chaos. Further, none of the French generals supported those ideas. Colonel van Overstraeten, summarizing the results for the king, noted that the French proposals suggested not ‘defense at the frontier’ but rather defense on the Meuse. The French would relieve the Chasseurs ardennais in Belgian Lux- embourg, Liège must be defended, and the rest of the army must be ready to block the area between the Meuse and the Scheldt. Antwerp also must be defended and linked to the main body of the army, and the Cavalry Corps must be modernized.38 In February 1935, Devéze told a visiting French general that “for political reasons,” he was sticking to the defense of Belgian Luxembourg and the Herve Plateau against the opinion of his chief of staff. Yet Devèze noted Cumont “has his military reasons” and indicated the minister of national defense, exhausted from his fight against Nuyten, would support anything that came but also expected the new chief of staff, LTG Van den Bergen, would support his ideas. Devèze had admitted strategic motivations trumped political ones (his own were purely political) and that he was on very shaky ground. Jean Vanwelken- huyzen calls Devèze’s triumph over Nuyten “a pyrrhic victory” because even though Devèze had replaced the general, the general was right on the facts. At the same time, the military conversations with the French forced Devèze to acknowledge that French aid would not come soon enough to make his conceptions feasible. 39 On March 16, 1935, the Germans announced the inception of conscription and the creation of a thirty-six division army, more than tripling the size of their army and increasing the feeling of threat for the Belgians who, it will be recalled, had six active divisions and another six reserve divisions. Subsequent Franco-Belgian talks, also in Paris, on April 25, 1935, reached a further understanding that the French forces at Arlon would constitute the “eastern hinge of a defensive front on the Chiers [river] held by two divisions” while the French

38 Van Overstraten, Albert I-Léopold III, entry for November 14, 1934, pp. 140-141. Emphasis in the original; Wanty, 1: 166. Vanwelkenhuyzen notes that the idea of an attack through Dutch Limburg was also not considered by Minister Devèze, who only had eyes for the eastern border. Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 303-304; van Overstraeten, quoted in Ibid., 1: 304. 39 Meeting of General Loizeau with the general chief of staf of the Belgian army at Brussels, February 22, 1935, quoted in Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 400. Ibid., 1: 400-401. 92 Chapter 4 would hold the Sedan-Givet area (location of the eventual German 1940 breakthrough) with a motorized division, a cavalry division, and a brigade of Spahis. The French promised five divisions, of which two were motorized and one cavalry, to help the Belgians in the north. The Belgian 1935 plan was designed to remedy the flaws of the 1934 plan, which concerned many Belgian military figures and Devèze himself, who was still calling for the defense of the entire country and advocating improving the defenses on the Dutch border. A major difference with the 1934 plan was an increase in forces deployed: six divisions between Antwerp and Liège (including one ‘second reserve’ division) with units derived from the active units and the Unités cyclistes frontieres covering their deployment, obtaining intelligence on the enemy, and blowing up bridges and the like before falling back to the Albert Canal. Another two regular divisions (one cavalry) and four reserve divisions would either reinforce the Albert Canal or back up the forces if they were forced to retreat. The fallback position would be Galet’s old Antwerp-Namur line and then the Ghent bridgehead. In the Ardennes, the Chasseurs ardennais would, if forced to retreat, follow the French to the Lesse-Meuse line to defend the section of the line joining the Maginot Line. However, the Belgians lacked the forces to do the above and still keep the forces as strong elsewhere, so they pulled troops off of the Herve Pla- teau and moved the main line of defense around Liège to the old forts, effectively giving up the plateau and Belgian Luxembourg. The plan also required the fortification of the Meuse from Givet to Liège. These options freed up three infantry divisions for the north although these forces would return when the fortifications on the Herve Plateau were completed. The 1935 plan, however, satisfied nobody but did represent the epitome of the idea of ‘defense at the frontier’.40 On March 25, 1935, a new government was formed led by a ‘technician,’ Paul van Zeeland, an economist, professor, and former vice-governor of the Banque Nationale. The explicit goal of the new regime was to fix the Belgian economy. Van Zeeland headed a tripartite government of the Catholics, Liberals, and Socialists. Among the new ministers were Paul-Henri Spaak,41 as minister of

40 James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, KS: UP Kansas, 1992), p. 183; Wanty, 1: 167; Servais, pp. 168-171. Servais argues that Devèze’s desire to defend the Dutch-Belgian border shows that he was not only concerned about Walloons. Ibid., p. 168, n. 3. 41 Paul Charles Henri Spaak was born in Schaerbeek in 1899, descendant of politicians, arrested by the Germans trying to escape occupied Belgium to join the Belgian army in 1916, doctor of law in 1921, member of the Belgian socialist party, the Parti Ouvrier Belge, elected deputy to the Chamber in October 1932, minister of transport in March 1935, foreign minister in June 1936, he would go on to become prime minister in May 1938, lose The Devèze Years 93 transport and communications, and Henri de Man as finance minister. At this time, minister of national defense Devèze and the chief of staff, Lieutenant General Cumont, wanted to increase the term of service of the draftees from twelve months to eighteen months for some branches and to sixteen months for others. However, Premier van Zeeland rejected the idea because it would adversely affect Belgium’s economic restoration and because he believed it was unnecessary due to the lack of any immediate danger of war. As well, the founding agreement of the government incorporated a Socialist ban on increasing service terms while the participation of all three major parties was necessary to fight the Depression. Van Zeeland’s efforts succeeded in restoring the economy and Belgium could start worrying more about foreign affairs.42 Vanwelkenhuyzen warns against looking at the Belgian situation in isolation and points out that Britain and France were having the same problem with their own anti-militarist lefts and France, in particular, as the most important democracy in Europe, was interfering in Belgian affairs. French economic woes impacted Belgium and the image of France had important repercussions as the Flemish movement opposed French culture as well as French language and the religious Flemings opposed French laicism while many Francophones focused on France. The opposition took part in many spheres, with defense being the most visible.43

The Motorization of the Cavalry Corps

A major initiative of the Cumont period was the motorization of the Cavalry Corps. Several reasons impelled the Belgians to motorize their cavalry units. In

that job in February 1939, become foreign minister again on September 3, 1939, and hold that position through the Phony War, the ‘Eighteen Days’ Campaign’, and the government- in exile. After the war, he became prime minister again in 1946 and 1947-1949. He served as foreign minister until 1949, and then again from 1954 to 1957 and 1961 to 1969 while he was also vice premier. He was also the first president of the General Assembly of the United Nations, chairman of the Council for European Recovery, and secretary general of NATO. He died in 1972. Michel Dumoulin, Spaak, 2 ed. (Brussels: Racine, 1999), pp. 13, 21, 25, 41, 69, 133; New Columbia Encyclopedia, s.v. Paul Henri Spaak. 42 Luykx, Prof. Dr. Th. And M. Platel, Politieke Geschiedenis van België, vol. 2 “Van 1944 tot 1985” (Antwerp: Kluwer rechtswetenschappen, 1985), p. 938; Kossmann, pp. 666-667; Vanwelkenhuyzen, 1936, p. 13, n. 1, 26, n. 1; Witte, et al., p. 137; Diary entry for July 20, 1935, in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, pp. 168-169; Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 13. 43 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 14. 94 Chapter 4 the early and mid-1930s, Belgium was faced at the same time with a lack of immediately available horses, indeed of horses generally. The economic effects of the Great Depression also encouraged the replacement of costly horse units with cheaper motorized units. Belgian defensive plans required forces that could deploy quickly to a gap in the lines opposite Dutch Limburg in the event of a German invasion. Motorization would also increase the power of the Cav- alry Corps. As well, Belgian armor enthusiasts, notably Major General (in 1940) Keyaerts, Colonel Raoul van Overstraeten, and Colonel B.E.M.44 de Lannoy, recognized that World War I, at least on the Western Front, showed the obso- lescence of horse cavalry units and the value of tanks and internal combustion engines. It should be kept in mind that armor theorists in other countries, especially Britain, France, Germany, and even Italy, were putting their ideas into practice so that the Belgian military was well informed about these efforts and felt it had to keep up.45 Colonel van Overstraeten complained in an October 26, 1934 memo that the spin-off unit of the artillery of a cavalry division, “hitched up with all requisitioned horses, composed exclusively of reservists, will be, for long weeks, only a very mediocre horsed group” although it would be of greatest importance at the beginning of the campaign. He would note in a diary entry for January 13, 1935 that the General Staff had identified a severe shortfall in the number of cavalry horses that could not be made good by requisition. In a note to Minister Devèze, Lieutenant General Cumont responded to an earlier note by the commander of the Cavalry Corps, Lieutenant General van Strydonck de Burkel46 by arguing that

as far as the number, what is necessary will, in effect, be found, but I do not agree with the commander of the C.C. as to the immediate military value of these horses … . Remember that before 1914 it was well admitted that a mounted unit of a D[ivision of] C[avalry] could not, in principle,

44 Breveté État Major. (educated for service in the General Staff) 45 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 44; Commandant e.r. Guy Stassin, “La Motoriza- tion de la Cavalerie Belge,” in Cavalerie: Du Cheval au Moteur/ Van Paard tot Motor 1937- 1997 [special edition of Tank Museum News (1997)]: 23-24; Colonel B.E.M. van Overstraeten “Avis & [sic] Considerations sur la motorization eventuelle des batteries a cheval,” dated 26 Octobre 1934, ARP-GVO 4 1934; LTG Cumont, “Note pour Monsieur le Ministre [of National Defense]. Objet Motorisation des groupes à cheval de l’A/Ch,” dated 7 Novembre 1934, ARP-GVO 4 1934. 46 Later to lead the Free Belgian forces during World War II. The Devèze Years 95

be composed of requisitioned horses [because it would take too long to train them].47

Colonel van Overstraeten noted that “the budgetary benefit would result from the substitution of 2 auto batteries for 2 horsed batteries.” He was backed up by Lieutenant General Cumont. In any case, as General Cumont pointed out, the money could be found because the motorization would allow the suppression of a Frontier Cyclist company, the cancellation of a proposed Frontier Cyclist company, and the cancellation of the proposed fortress of Sougnée-Remou- champs near Liège.48 The motorization of the Cavalry Corps was also considered necessary for the creation of a rapidly deploying unit that could react to a sudden German invasion via Holland and thus cover the mobilization of the rest of the Belgian army. Lieutenant General Cumont pointed out that a reserve motorized group (such as for artillery) could mobilize and displace more quickly than a horsed unit that had to train its horses to draw artillery.49 Advocates for motorization argued that the change (and the consequent reorganization of the Cavalry Corps) would make the corps more powerful. Lieutenant General Cumont noted that horse-drawn artillery units could not benefit from the increased range of the new 75mm cannons while “[f]or motorized groups, a light augmentation of weight is not susceptible to reduce mobility.” He did the math, comparing the contemporary Cavalry Corps of four cavalry regiments, four cyclist regiments, two armored car squadrons, and two batteries of 47mm anti-tank guns with the projected Cavalry Corps of six cavalry regiments, four cyclist regiments, two “mounted” regiments, two motorcy- clist groups, two armored car groups, and two groups of 47mm anti-tank guns. He found that the new arrangement resulted in the addition of 132 “fusils-

47 Van Overstraeten, “Avis & [sic] Considerations sur la motorization eventuelle des batteries a cheval,” dated 26 Octobre 1934, ARP-GVO 4 1934; Diary entry for 13 January, 1935, in van Overstraeten, Albert !-Léopold III, p. 148; Chef d’État-Major General [Cumont], “Note pour Monsieur le Ministre,” dated 19 Decembre 1934, ARP-GVO 4 1935; Ibid., 4ième partie, p. 1; Van Overstraeten, 26 Oct. 1934 in ARP-GVO 4 1935; Lt.Gen. Cumont, dated 7 Novem- bre 1934, ARP-GVO 4 1935; Lt.Gen. Cumont, “Note pour Monsieur le Ministre [of National Defense],” dated 5 Février 1935, pp. 1-2 in ARP-GVO 4 1935. 48 Van Overstraeten, “Avis & [sic] Considerations sur la motorization eventuelle des batteries à cheval,” dated 26 Octobre 1934, ARP-GVO 4 1934; LTG Cumont, “Note pour Monsieur le Ministre [of National Defense],” dated 5 Février 1935, p. 2, ARP-GVO 4 1935; Stassin, p. 24. 49 Crahay, p. 178; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 44; Cumont to Devèze, “Note pour Monsieur le Ministre,” dated 7 Novembre 1934, ARP-GVO 4 1934, p. 2. 96 Chapter 4 mitrailleurs [Browning Automatic Rifles], 24 machine guns, 24 armored cars, and 24 anti-tank guns.” 50 Colonel van Overstraeten, “a decided and declared partisan, for a long time, of the motorization, and even the mechanization of units,”51 stresses in his diary entry for January 13, 1935, the need for the Belgian army to keep up with motorization in Germany and France. Colonel B.E.M. de Lannoy went even further in a 1937 article in L’Ordre, advocating the creation of a Belgian armored division that would be able to stall the Germans long enough for Allied aid to arrive. He argued that it was time to start thinking about the use of tanks in a defensive role as an instrument of counterattack. The most important sup- porter of motorization was King Leopold III himself, who, in his words, saw its importance to the military effort.52 Not all Belgian military opinion was favorable to the motorization of the Cavalry Corps. Lieutenant General van Strydonck de Burkel, who would later be praised by the king for his work transforming the Cavalry Corps, initially opposed such a transformation. In his confidential note to Minister Devèze dated December 8, 1934, he examined the arguments in favor of reorganizing the cavalry divisions, especially in favor of replacing cavalry units with truck-borne infantry and knocked down what he cited as the three main ones: the alleged crisis of the requisition of horses, the need for budgetary savings, and “the desire to be able to dispose immediately upon mobilization of the [complete] C[avalry] D[ivisions].” He argued that the presidents of the Remount Committees had said there was no crisis in requisitioned horses so there was no need to worry about “reducing” the number of cavalry units. He opined that the replacement of cavalry units by truck-borne infantry would reduce the mobility of the light units “and yet our regulations insist on the necessity of this mobility.” He cited the French Regi- ment of Mounted Dragoons and concluded that “this adjunction of infantry … is in our case by the existence of our two cyclist regiments which suit better” because of the familiarity of most Belgians with bicycles and “ because of … the presence of cycle-able tracks not only on our secondary routes but

50 Cumont to Devèze, 19 December 1934, 3ième partie, p. 7; Cdt. e.r. Guy Stassin, “Organisa- tion,” in Cavalerie: Du Cheval au Moteur/ Van Paard tot Motor 1937-1997, p. 38. 51 “Motorized” means using internal combustion engines while “mechanized,” in American military usage, means using tracked vehicles (as opposed to wheeled ones). 52 Van Overstraeten, 26 Octobre 1934, ARP-GVO 4 1934; Van Overstraeten, Albert 1er-Leopold III, p. 148; Colonel B.E.M. de Lannoy, “La motorization de la cavalerie,” L’Ordre, February 13, 1937, Fonds de Lannoy, Boite 3, doc. 11, Belgian Military Archives (Service Générale de Renseignements-Securitè-Section/Archive) [Henceforth “SGRS-S/A”]; Leopold III, quoted in diary entry for March 2, 1935, van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, p. 154. The Devèze Years 97

Figure 8 Lieutenant-General van Strydonck de Burkel inspecting T-13s. Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels even on the length of our dirt roads.” However, Lieutenant General Cumont responded that:

The new units are not less mobile than the cavalry … nor than the Cy[clists] … . They are automobile transported and motorcycle units capable of more rapid and longer displacements than the cyclists … . The commandant of the C.C. indicates that the maneuvers at the Beverloo camp have established that our D.C. possess by their current organization this mobility of which the necessity is underlined by regulations. The argument is not peremptory precisely because the units on maneuvers in camp were weighed down neither by requisitioned horses nor by all their complements of mobilization.53

53 King Leopold III to Minister of National Defense Devèze and Chief of Staff Cumont, ARP- GVO 4 1935; Le Commandant du Corps de Cavalerie A Monsieur le Ministre de la Défense Nationale (Chef d’État-major Général)/ Objet: Réorganisation des Grandes Unités de Cavalerie,” dated 8 décembre 1934, ARP-GVO 4 1934, pp. 2, 3, 7, emphasis in the original; Cumont, 19 Decembre 1934, ARP-GVO 4 1935, 4e partie, p. 2. 98 Chapter 4

The debate was also carried on in the military and civilian press. In Belgique Militaire in 1933, French Lieutenant Colonel Requette called Belgium delayed in the motorization of its army compared to France and Britain. A 1934 article in the same publication commented on the recently concluded maneuvers of the Cavalry Corps and advocated for equipping the forces with all-terrain vehicles. Two 1935 articles by A. Lepère note that in the Beverloo maneuvers the motorcyclists could get around the enemy and catch him flatfooted. They were also very useful for reconnaissance. A 1937 article that appeared in La Dernière Heure commented on the August maneuvers, pitting the Chasseurs ardennais against motorized units, which proved the importance of the new units and converted devout cavalrymen.54 The leading literary opponent of motorization was Lieutenant General Peteau. He suggested that it was suitable for large countries like France and Germany to motorize but that it was not necessary for a small country such as Belgium, an argument that Major (at that time) B.E.M. Wanty would echo sixty years later, writing in retrospect as a retired general that it was a mistake to assume that “an integral motorization, very expensive, responded to the strategic defensive needs of a country as small as ours” when the money could have been spent on armored vehicles. In an April 28, 1937 article in La nation Belge, Peteau cited the expense, public opinion, the opposition of the officer corps, especially in the cavalry, and the unfeasibility of raising new horsed units. He implied the new units could not successfully conduct reconnaissance.55 Once the motorization was decided upon, it had to take place on two planes: the physical and the spiritual. Both were done gradually. Lieutenant General Cumont noted that “the experience [of] France has proved that the hardest evolution to realize in the transformations of great cavalry units was ‘the motorization of spirits.’” The cavalrymen had to stop thinking like mounted personnel and to start thinking like motorized personnel with entirely new potential or they would not get the most out of their new technology. As then- Colonel van Overstraeten pointed out, most generals lacked the energy and decisiveness to command the new mobile units. It is very hard to change entrenched ways of thought, especially when the old ways have centuries of knightly glamour and tradition behind them. The change would take time and

54 Stassin, “La motorization et les publications militaries,” in Cavalerie: Du Cheval au Moteur/ Van Paard tot Motor, p. 93; Major Lecorbesier in Belgique Militaire, issue 2809, cited in Ibid., A. Lepère, cited in Ibid.; “Leçons des grand manoeuvres,” La Dernière Heure, 1er Sep- tembre 1937, cited in LtCol (Hre) Marcel Dion, “Et les Echos dans la presse civile” in Caval- erie, p. 97. 55 LTG Peteau, cited in “La motorization et les publications militaries,”, p. 93; Wanty, p. 163; Peteau, “Le Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale et la Motorisation de la Cavalerie,” La nation Belge, 28 Avril 1937, Fonds de Lannoy, Box 3, Document 11, #19. The Devèze Years 99 effort. For this reason, the reorganization and motorization of the Cavalry Corps proceded by stages. The units to be motorized were the six regiments of cavalry, the artillery, cyclists, support units, the brigade of mounted cavaliers, and the anti-aircraft and armored car squadrons.56 On March 17, 1935,57 several days after officially announcing the creation of a German air force, the Luftwaffe, in an “Appeal to the German People,” Adolf Hitler proclaimed German universal military service and the creation of a 36-division army (Belgium had only fifteen divisions, including reserves). The Versailles Treaty was dead; there remained only Locarno and the Rhenish Pact.

The future alone will tell how long Germany will respect them and it is with a growing apprehension that all my colleagues, without exception see the approach of the moment where … . the new war with Germany will become inevitable.58

To add to the concern, a report from Lieutenant General Cumont analyzed military attaché to Berlin General Schmit’s reports of 1933-1935, showing all the instances where he was mistaken, concluding that although Schmit’s work was “praiseworthy,” Belgium could not count on advance warning from the military attachés of German aggressive actions. And that September, General Schmit warned that the Germans were definitely motorizing and mechanizing their army, with one motorized division already formed and two others coming in the spring of 1936, raising the danger of a surprise attack. However, he remained convinced that the German Army was unready for a war and “incapable of mobilizing, in normal lengths of time, the masses indispensable for the unleashing of a grand-style offensive inspired by the prewar Schlieffen plan.”59 The first stage of Belgian motorization was timed to coincide with the incor- poration of the 1935 class of militia and took place on May 1 of that year. Each of the two cavalry divisions would have two regiments transformed into ‘mixed groups’ with one horsed group and one motorized group. These regiments

56 Cumont to Monsieur le Ministre, 2 Mars 1935, p. 1 in ARP-GVO 1935A; van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III diary entry for April 12, 1938, pp. 281-282; Stassin, “Organisation,” pp. 38-39. 57 Other documents have the German action as March 16. See, for example, Schmit to Min- ister of National Defense, Berlin, March 20, 1935, in MRA-BAFM 29 (185-2-46). 58 Weinberg, 1: 205; de Kerchove to Hymans, Berlin, March 17, 1935, pp. 1, 15 in ARP-GVO 1935A. 59 “Note pour Monsieur le Ministre” by Cumont, Brussels, July 12, 1935, p. 6, in MRA-BAFM 29 (185-2-48); Schmit to the Minister of National Defense, Berlin, November 18, 1935, p. 7, in MRA-BAFM 29 (185-2-49). 100 Chapter 4 were the Second and Third Lancers of the First Cavalry Division and the First Lancers and the First Chasseurs à Cheval (‘Mounted Light Infantry’) of the Sec- ond Cavalry Division. The latter division was the first to undergo the change. The First and Third Lancers and the First Chasseurs à Cheval were deployed along the German border (the First Lancers) and the Dutch border (The Third Lancers and First Chasseurs à Cheval). From July 31, 1935, volunteers and reen- listing NCOs were aggressively recruited into the cavalry regiments “in order to permit the formation of an important nucleus of long-service troops.”60 Meanwhile, the cavalry school at Brasschaet reduced its equitation courses to one hour per day and replaced them with courses on mechanized devices and the use of the 47mm anti-tank gun as well as one for engineer artificers. Future officer mechanics took a three-month course on automobiles at Bors- beek, near Antwerp. In 1936 the Parliamentary/military Mixed Commission recommended an increase in the service time of cavalrymen to 17 months in order to keep the highly trained troops with the colors longer. That same year the First Guides and Second Chasseurs à Cheval became mixed units while in 1937 the Second Lancers became mixed while the Third Lancers and the artillery of the Cavalry Corps were totally motorized. On January 15, 1938, the First Guides of the First Cavalry Division and the Second Chasseurs à Cheval of the Second Cavalry Division became completely motorized, followed by the First and Third Lancers on February 15. On March 15, 1938, the First Chasseurs à Che- val and the Second Lancers lost their last horses, becoming ‘Régiments Motocy- clistes.’ A fully mobilized Régiment Motocycliste consisted of 49 officers, 105 senior NCOs, and 1160 corporals and cavalrymen. In addition, on a war footing, two regiments of infantry transported in trucks would be raised from reservists. 61 In his evaluation of the Belgian August 1938 maneuvers, British military attaché in Brussels, Major D. K. Paris, noted that the advance of two infantry divisions “was delayed by the mechanized 1st Cavalry Division … . A flank attack by the Mechanised Cavalry Division, the approach march for which was carried out by night with all lights out, was particularly well executed.” In his 1938 annual report, Major Paris also pointed out that “their peace organization closely resembles their war organization” and could deploy within three hours. In October 1939 the German General Staff rated the Cavalry Corps as “good but not very consistent.” From hindsight, Belgian lieutenant general Albert Crahay praises the Cavalry Corps’s “excellent strategic mobility and a good defensive potential” but lamented the absence of offensive weapons like tanks and more

60 Stassin, “Organisation,” p. 39. 61 Ibid., pp. 38-39, 44-45. The Devèze Years 101 mobile infantry. Émile Wanty calls the Cavalry Corps “a great step forward in the way to modernization, … powerfully armed, strongly trained … , rapid, with great facility for movement.”62 The Belgian army had dissolved its Corps des Chars de Combat on March 1, 1935, handing its last worn-out World War I surplus French FT-17 tanks over to the Gendarmerie (the Belgian national police force) to use on striking workers. It was also felt that the Belgian army, having a purely defensive role, had no reason to have armored units, which were considered offensive weapons. The focus shifted to anti-tank weapons instead. However, the squadrons of armored cars called for in the organization of the new motorized cavalry regiments called for four cannon-armed vehicles per group (two groups to a regiment), or 16 for the first four mixed regiments. In December 1934, the eyes of the Belgian General Staff fell on the French Renault AMC/AMR Modèle 1933, also being evaluated by the French army, which found it lacking.63 The next year, Renault came up with a new design, the AMC Modèle 1935 R type ACG-1. Renault was so excited by the new design that it started production before the military trials, in which the French decided to go with a design by Somua, had ended. Meanwhile, the Belgian delegation had ordered twenty- five weaponless turrets from the Puteaux Company, which were delivered by 1936. Renault tried to sell its design to the Belgians, who ordered twelve chassis, to be delivered starting in 1937. The first example was hastily turreted and armed and sent to the August maneuvers of the Chasseurs ardennais, but Lieu- tenant General Pire felt it was unsuitable for operations in the Ardennes. It was sent to the garage of the Second Lancers. The politicians found out about the tank and “showed themselves hostile to the acquisition of other machines as offensive, which happened to be of French provenance while the country had adopted a policy of strict neutrality.” Lieutenant General Denis, the minister of national defense, cancelled the delivery in January 1938, after nine had arrived and had been sent to Ghent to be provided with turrets. They were abandoned there until 1939.64 In September 1939, the Squadron C 4,7/T-13 of the Brigade of Mounted Cav- alrymen was formed under Captain Hullebroeck. On September 11, it went to

62 Major Paris, Annual Report on the Belgian Army for 1938, Musée Royale de l’Armée-Atta- ché Militaire Britannique [henceforth “MRA-AMB”] 80/3/, pp 333-334, 337-338; Oberkom- mando des Heeres, October 28, 1939, cited in Crahay, pp. 164-165; Crahay, p. 179; Wanty, 1: 163. 63 Raymond Surlémont, “Le Regiment des Chars de Combat (1920-1935)” in Cavalerie, p. 60; Stassin, “Motorisation,” p. 34; Commandant e.r. M. Van den [signature illegible], “Les Chars de Combat Renault ACG-1,” p. 1, Chars de Combat 1920-1940, SGRS-S/A. 64 Cdt. M. Van den [signature illegible], pp. 1-2. 102 Chapter 4 direct corps command as the escadron d’autos blindées du Corps de Cavalerie (‘Armored Car Squadron of the Cavalry Corps’) Upon the discovery that there were no T-13s with which to equip them, somebody remembered the Renaults rusting away in Ghent, where they had been left outside for over a year and a half. Eight were put into working order and the crews were trained.65 Meanwhile, the Belgians were also working on their defenses against the new weapons of war – tanks and planes. The Belgian 47mm anti-tank gun was the best in Europe and capable of destroying any German tank of the day. It appeared while the FT-17s were approaching their last gasp as military machines. A solution to the thorny political problem of tanks arose: eliminate the tanks and replace them with anti-tank guns – weapons indisputably defensive. This was an advantage because large and important sectors of the population believed that, since the Belgian army’s role was to be exclusively the defense of its territory it was inappropriate for the Belgian army to have any ‘offensive’ weapons. ‘Offensive’ weapons might also offend the Germans. This mindset resulted in the limitation of the size of the main guns of the Belgian super-fort of Eben Emael to make sure the guns lacked the range to hit targets outside of Belgium. In 1934 the corps of anti-tank arms and accompaniment was created and each army corps was given one battery from this corps starting in May 1935. In 1936 each infantry division would receive a weapons battalion and the next year this battalion was provided at the regimental level while the Chasseurs ardennais and the Cavalry Corps also were allocated these guns.66 Anti-aircraft artillery (‘AAA’) came of age at the same time its target did and Belgium left World War I with an AAA group attached to the First Regiment of Heavy Artillery. Five years later, the Fourth Regiment of Army Artillery became the regiment de defense terrestre contre objectifs aériens (‘Regiment of Ground Defense against Aerial Objectives.’). In 1926 a unified command joining AAA and airplanes was formed while in 1928 it was un-formed in favor of an État- Major de defense terrestre contre aéronefs (‘DTCA’ or ‘Headquarters of Terres- trial Defense against Aircraft’). In 1934 the DTCA was joined with the air force into the Défense aérienne du territoire (‘DAT’ or ‘Territorial Air Defense’) and a second regiment of DTCA was raised while the guns were modernized.67

65 Cdt. M. Van den ????, p. 3; “L’Armée belge et les blindés,” A.S.B.L. Tank Museum, Bruxelles; de Fabribeckers, pp. 259, 274. 66 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 46; René Vliegen, Fort Eben-Emael, Fifth improved English ed. (NL: Wagelmans-Vise, ND), p. 12. 67 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 47. The Devèze Years 103

The Debates over Coverage and Service Time

At the end of September 1935, General Cumont was forced to retire, having reached the statutory age. He was replaced by Lieutenant General Edouard Van den Bergen, whose main concern was for the effective coverage of Belgian territory in order to buy time for the rest of the army to mobilize undisturbed by the enemy.

Figure 9 Lieutenant-General Édouard Van den Bergen (as a major-general). Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels

His plan, offered even before he was named chief of staff, called for the creation in each division of a ‘provisional battalion’ that would spend four months with trained troops on the proposed covering line. This was very important because the Belgian commanders were afraid of a sudden German attack from a standing start with no preliminary period of international tension or an ultimatum as the Germans gave them in 1914. If there were not enough trained troops to stop the Germans the Germans could disrupt Belgian mobilization and win a quick victory. Van den Bergen’s plan met with the approval of Minis- ter Devèze among others, including the commander of the D.A.T., Major Gen- eral Duvivier, who testified before the 1936 Mixed Commission that the plan had the advantage that 104 Chapter 4

[t]he covering troops, composed of trained men, are completely independent of the field army, they are in place from peacetime and at all times. They are ready to intervene at any moment and with minimal delay. They keep watch.68

The provisional battalions would also simplify the peacetime training of draftees at a safe distance from the frontier. The conception ran into the resolute opposition of Colonel van Overstraeten, who complained in his diary that the provisional battalions would not bring any real security and would complicate mobilization by removing the trained troops, it would ruin the esprit de corps by removing familiar officers to fully staff the provisional battalions, and the result of keeping small units on guard in small garrisons would be a diminish- ing of “tactical instruction, discipline, and morale.” In addition, the Belgian army already lacked enough trained officers and NCOs and it would destroy the organic structure of the units based on maintaining the bonds between commanders and their men. The king listened to van Overstraeten and to Prime Minister van Zeeland and rejected General Van den Bergen’s plan because it would disturb the public.69 The public was also not ready for the extension of service time. On April 17, 1935, Devèze had already told the French military attaché that there could be a war within two years and the General Staff had completed its study and was ready to increase service time to 18 months although Devèze would accept 16 months for non-mounted/motorized troops. He was reluctant to bring it to the cabinet’s attention because voters would not accept it. To try to retain draftees in Antwerp and Brussels who were due to be discharged within the next two months would upset the public although he hoped to be able to keep the servicemen from Liège, who had another five months of service to go. Following General Riedinger’s advice, based on events in France, Italy, and Czechoslova- kia, Devèze determined to activate the Union of Reserve Officers, the Union of Brothers of the Field Army, and the major newspapers in a campaign for longer service time. For the most part, the journals were responsible, although the Indépendence Belge was alarmist. Devèze’s plan actually backfired because he had turned to the Francophone media already suspected by those he needed – the Socialists and Flemish Christian Democrats, the plurality in the cabinet. It divided the country when it needed to be united. On June 22, Prime Minister

68 Wanty, 1: 167; Duvivier to the Commission Mixte, 18 Juillet 1936, p. 1, in MRA-BAFM 5448 (185-14a-6983), subfolder “Documentation.” 69 Diary entry for August 10, 1935 in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, pp. 169-170; Diary entry for October 11, 1935 in Ibid., p. 177. The Devèze Years 105 van Zeeland met with Devèze, who realized his mistake and offered to resign. As he predicted, the prime minister could not accept it lest he roil the cabinet.70 The issue was hotly debated in the cabinet and on September 12, 1935, it was given to a committee which included Auguste de Schryver, a Flemish Catholic; Henri de Man, a Flemish Socialist, and Devèze. On the 16th, the cabinet created a Ministerial Committee of National Security, which included van Zeeland and the leaders of the three main parties. The seven ministers in the ‘Restricted Committee’ met on September 25. Backing the General Staff’s conclusions, Devèze made a pitch for a motorized unit of 55,000 men which could deploy to any threatened border – eastern or northern – in 14 hours. Although the audience was impressed, the Socialists still rejected increasing service time.71 The Socialists themselves dreaded any discussion of a military bill. They were dedicated to “collective security, disarmament, and peace.” The rise of Hitler threatened Europe but as doctrinaire Socialists, they could not support rearmament without “appearing to betray Socialism” and their leader Émile Vandervelde was dedicated to doctrine. However, since the POB’s 1931 congress, most Socialists would oppose unilateral disarmament and support self- defense of ‘independent’ Belgium, unjustifiably attacked.72 Van Zeeland, as was his wont in areas outside of his special competence, left the cabinet members time to reflect rather than trying to force an agreement. For his part, Leopold wanted to assure the defense of his realm but also wanted to keep the government that was rebuilding the economy. He wrote a letter to the minister of national defense, pointing out that because of recent events, more people supported improving Belgium’s defense but on the other hand, the government was founded on refusing to change the military. He advised the minister to have clear explanations of what he would do with the prolonged service and informed him that he had received from the General Staff clear plans. He closed by giving Devèze advice on how to proceed.73 However, the Socialists were still opposed. Henri de Man argued for a “shield of destructions analogous to what the Germans had in front of the Hindenburg Line in 1917” and defending it by bringing in well-trained local forces, such as forestry guards and border guards, independent of the army. The army should

70 French military attaché, Brussels, dated April 17, 1935, quoted in Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 443; French military attaché, Brussels, dated May 16, 1935, quoted in Ibid., 1: 444; Ibid., dated May 23, 1935, quoted in Ibid.; Ibid., 1: 444-446. 71 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 56-58. 72 Ibid.,, 1: 515-522; Émile Vandervelde, quoted in Ibid., 1: 519. 73 Ibid., 2: 58; Leopold to Devèze, quoted in Ibid., 2: 58. 106 Chapter 4 be exclusively defensive and rather than increasing the size of the army, it was already too large. Above all, service time must not be increased.74 On December 17, in the Chamber, Hendrik Marck, a Flemish Christian Dem- ocrat, at Émile Vandervelde’s urging, asked the minister of national defense whether a military reform plan was really being prepared. Devèze responded two days later, confirming the preparation of a report. He again demanded prolongation of service time and pointed out that the General Staff and the cabinet had been informed. Devèze had fallen into Vandervelde’s trap. The latter pointed out that it did not appear in the government’s order of the day and the cabinet would address it shortly. Devèze’s admission roiled the Chamber and van Zeeland had to step in and promise there would be no violation of the governmental agreement. Leopold sent Colonel van Overstraeten to meet with the prime minister, who informed him of the emotion in the Chamber, where the minister of national defense had had to defend his plans, including mobilizing the reserves of an infantry division. Because the economic difficulties, which required a government of national unity, were almost overcome, party rivalry was reasserting itself. Van Zeeland estimated Devèze’s plan had only a 10% chance of success, down from 30% three days ago. Van Overstraeten again explained his strategic ideas, including the danger of a German invasion going from the northeast to the southwest that would bypass all the defenses in the east and the risk to Antwerp, Brussels, and Liège. He reiterated the importance of recalling units in time and explained how funds could be found to fund the plan. Van Zeeland summarized the issue, especially the virtual lack of extra cost and the unchanged service time for 30,000 soldiers that he would emphasize. In leaving the prime minister, van Overstraeten reiterated the importance of immediately voting the necessary laws so they could be in force by the summer of 1937.75 A cabinet meeting, much more disciplined than the Chamber, met to discuss the issue and even Vandervelde admitted the need for a reform. The government had settled the issue but it remained to be seen how the Parliament would react. Devèze was worried. He had lost months because of his inability to follow his monarch’s instructions to act diplomatically. But he saw a solution to his problem: eliminate opposition by eliminating the cause of the opposition – the military agreement with France. Discussing it in Belgium was a non-

74 Van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, diary entry for December 17, 1935, pp. 187-189. Emphasis in the original. 75 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 59; Annales parlementaires, Chambre, séance du 19 décembre, 1935, cited in Ibid., 2: 60; van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, diary entry for December 19, 1935, pp. 189-190; Van Zeeland, quoted in Ibid., p. 190. The Devèze Years 107 starter; he would have to get the French to repudiate it and spoke to the French military attaché, asking him to talk to the war minister, who was not encouraging. Devèze then spoke to the prime minister, implying that the abnegation of the Franco-Belgian accord was a French idea. It was personally difficult for the minister of national defense because he had long been the champion of close ties between the nations.76 Meanwhile, Vandervelde was having his own problems. As he told the king on January 15, he could not approve any bill that would increase the army in the casernes or extend service time for all soldiers, although the king wrote to inform him that for 29,000 soldiers, their service time would not increase. Vandervelde had to find a way to get the Socialist rank and file to support aug- menting the military. Perhaps they could refer it to a mixed commission?77 In February, 1936, Minister Devèze put a bill before the Parliament to increase service time to eighteen months in order to end the system in which the Belgian frontier was inadequately garrisoned five months out of the year. The Socialists, who claimed to support a strong defense and wondered why troop strength, considered satisfactory a year ago, was now so desperately lacking, felt Devèze, a Liberal politician, had deliberately not mentioned this earlier in order to lure them into van Zeeland’s coalition government.78 The mainly Flemish Christian Democrats were also at the top of their resistance. They refused any military changes while Belgium was still tied to France by the 1920 accord.79 The resounding rejection among Socialists of eighteen months service led to a resolution demanding the issue be taken up by a mixed commission. In this, they were supported by Flemish Catholics. The main Flemish newspaper, De Standaard, noted that an election was upcoming and suggested that Devèze’s actions were part of the Liberal Party’s looking for a platform. The Socialists opined that Belgium needed a strong defense but also needed to stay apart from any alliance system like the one which had caused World War I. The Franco-Belgian Agreement must either be published or denounced. The Socialist old guard leader Émile Vandervelde suggested that Devèze planned to link the Belgian army to the French one. This was a particularly significant assertion because the 1935 Franco-Soviet Pact caused many Belgians, especially conservatives, to fear that France would be drawn into a war for the interests of the generally disliked Bolsheviks and that because of the Franco-Belgian

76 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 60-63. 77 Ibid., 2: 64-68; Leopold to Vandervelde, quoted in Ibid., 2: 65. 78 Kieft, pp. 45-48. 79 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 59. 108 Chapter 4

Agreement, Belgium would be sucked in despite itself. Many conservatives also wanted to break with France because they dreamed of “an authoritarian reorganization of the Belgian state” in the context of a German-dominated “authoritarian Europe.”80 In response to Vandervelde, Devèze responded that his plan was exclusively defensive and Belgian and had nothing to do with the 1920 accord. Moreover, the international situation was worsening (Germany had announced the creation of an air force, the institution of conscription, and the expansion of the German army to thirty-six divisions in the past year). If Belgium wanted its eastern and northern frontiers adequately protected without expanding the time of service, the southern and western frontiers would be left virtually wide open. In the end, Devèze’s bill crashed in flames, having been shot down by the Socialists, Flemish nationalists, Flemish Catholics, and the Communists.81 Meanwhile, the Flemish movement was increasingly active, largely in response to Devèze’s reliance on superpatriots and the Brussels Francophone media. One Flemish reaction was the pacifist veterans group Vlaamsche Out- strijders. The Flemish wanted to protect their “religious, social, and linguistic identity” from Francophone domination. They especially wanted to save their boys from the army, which was considered “the gateway to Hell” by the Flamin- gants because training was given in French and life in the casernes subjected honest boys to negative influences. One Flemish rallying cry was “nobody is required to be a soldier” (“Niemand gedwongen soldaat!”). Albert Devèze was the incarnation of everything the Flemish feared. They saw the French reaction to Germany’s overt rearmament, raising service time to two years, as mili- taristic and unnecessary given France’s status as the dominant military on the continent. They considered France’s May 15, 1935 alliance with Soviet Russia as “the alliance of the irreligious Republic with the Antichrist.” The Freemason Devèze’s call for the prolongation of service time was interpreted through this lens as following along the warlike path led by France in alliance with the Soviets that would result in another great war that could destroy Christian civilization. As the 1935 congress of the Vlaams Nationaal Verbond put it, “France is war; Flanders, delivered from its ties, peace and happiness.” There- fore, Belgium had to clear itself of all ties with its southern neighbor: los van Frankrijk! (away from France). That July 11, the 633rd anniversary of the Battle of the Golden Spurs, appeared throughout Flanders posters priding the Flem- ish for their historical memory, calling for ties to be broken with France, and

80 De Standaard, quoted in Kieft, p. 46; Le Peuple, cited in Ibid; Ibid., pp. 50-51; La Libre Belgique, quoted in Ibid., p. 51; Coolsaet, p. 355. 81 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 48. The Devèze Years 109 specifically calling for the abolition of the Franco-Belgian accord of 1920. On August 18, the Flemish movement used another sacred moment, the annual pilgrimage to the Yser Tower erected in memory of the fallen Flemish soldiers of World War I, attended by 15,000 veterans, to call for peace through “the suppression of possibilities for war, by the suppression of profits from war,” and by avoiding ties with the Great Powers. The same orator condemned “powerful interests, which have never concerned themselves with the wellbeing or desires of the Flemish people” for having made Belgium “a bastion of France.” The campaign would continue and spawn a Walloon reaction, which committed itself to “the struggle against the Hitlerite regime” and blamed the Flemish nationalists, through their “hatred of what is not Germanic” for planning to sacrifice Wallonia to the Germans.82 After the Belgians and French evacuated the Rhineland in 1930, the Belgians had begun increasingly to consider the 1920 military agreement an albatross around their necks, for both diplomatic and internal reasons. Indeed, in 1934, the Belgian foreign minister did not even consider the Pact as binding on Bel- gium or France. The arrangements of the pact were established for the period, now ended, when the Franco-Belgian forces were on the left bank of the Rhine. The part of the pact in which the French took responsibility for the defense of the Belgian coast became particularly problematic because it would trigger British distrust and hinder the Locarno Pact. In 1936, the potential impact of the treaty was even graver because it threatened the passage of the military bill needed to reinforce the Belgian army in an increasingly threatening international climate. On February 26, 1936, Fernand Van Langenhove83 informed French foreign ministry officials of the danger that the bill could be defeated by the Flemish Catholics and Socialists and that the ‘nays’ had a majority. The same day, Count de Kerchove, now in Paris, emphasized the Belgian government’s “dominant preoccupation” with passing the military law and keeping the staff talks.84

82 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 508-513; Lucien Marshal, quoted in Ibid., 1: 512; Destatte, quoted in Ibid., 1: 513. 83 Sometimes “Vanlangenhove.” The secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “he had the qualities required to succeed in diplomacy: perspicacity, wisdom, moderation, patience. Of sure judgment, he was of good counsel.” Paul-Henri Spaak, quoted in Dumou- lin, p. 72. 84 “Entrevue entre MM. Jaspar et Deveze,” November 11, 1934, p. 4, in AMBAE 11185/1; F. Van Langenhove, January 9, 1934, p. 1; “Entretien au Quai d’Orsay, relative à l’accord militaire franco-belge,” February 26, 1936, DDB III: 482; Annex to Kerchove to van Zeeland [prime minister and foreign minister], Paris, February 26, 1936, DDB III: 479. 110 Chapter 4

The French themselves recognized the accord had become a liability. Gen- eral Riedinger pointed out that it had never been used to formulate commitments in any of the meetings between the ministers, staffs, or military attachés, while it was causing demonstrations, as much anti-French as anti-Belgian government, in Flanders. As well, the Locarno Pact was superior and equally binding. He recommended that the accord be denounced. However, the French foreign minister was reluctant to permit the accord to die. He preferred a common declaration that the accord did not exceed the Locarno obligations. After a month of haggling, letters acknowledging the demise of the accord, with the exception of joint staff talks, were exchanged on March 6, 1936. An April 1936 letter from Prime Minister van Zeeland stressed this point to minister of national defense Devèze. Even despite the exchange of letters, the French still expected to use Belgium to come to the aid of their Eastern European allies or to enter with the rise of diplomatic tensions without a German invasion of Belgium. The French expected to use the League Pact to justify it because they argued the Pact obligated states to take military action (even though nobody else saw it that way). The Belgians, who suspected the French wanted to take the easy way into Germany via Belgium or to defend France by adding the Bel- gian army, urged the French to fortify the Franco-Belgian border lest “the repeated violations of the Versailles treaty, committed by the Reich, [risk] bringing France to reprisals.” The Belgian view was that the Locarno guarantees were operative only after the League Council voted unless there was a “flagrant violation” and the Belgians could rely on the British to restrain any adventures. The French simply could not enter Belgium without her permission.85

The Reoccupation of the Rhineland

The Germans took a step on March 7, 1936 that would change Europe and, eventually, the world – they sent troops into the Rhineland. This step, met with inaction by the Locarno powers, changed the power calculus of the continent, directly threatening Belgium and France and beginning the ascendancy of Adolf Hitler over his generals that would continue through the Munich Pact and end in World War II. Baron Pierre van Zuylen observed later that the Allies

85 General Riedinger, quoted in Devèze to van Zeeland, January 17, 1936, DDB III, p. 451; “Conversation de M. van Zeeland, Premier Ministre, avec M. Flandin, [French] Ministre des Affaires Étrangères,” Paris, February 15, 1936, Ibid., pp. 456-460; van Zeeland to Devèze, April ?, 1936, in AMBAE 11185/1; pp. 275-281. The Devèze Years 111 should have intervened militarily right away because Hitler would have given in. Ordinary Belgians, however, were surprised but calm. They did not demand immediate and drastic action. They argued that the German justification – that the Franco-Soviet treaty violated Locarno and so Germany was no longer bound by it – had some merit and that in any case the Rhineland could not remain demilitarized indefinitely.86 The militarization of the Rhineland would lead to incalculable consequences: in permitting Hitler to fortify his western frontier, it gave him the possibility of ruining France’s eastern alliances. The Führer could struggle separately against his adversaries and beat them one after the other. Leading historian Gerhard Weinberg observes that the successful reoccupation increased Hitler’s self-confidence and sceptisicm about the advice of his generals. It would also be the foreign policy trigger leading to the Belgian policy of ‘free hands’ or ‘independence.’ The Belgians had long been concerned with such a German remilitarization and kept a watch on the area. On May 24, 1935, in response to rumors in the foreign press that the Germans planned to send in soldiers, General Schmit reported he could not find evidence of regular Ger- man troops in the Rhineland although the paramilitary forces were well represented. In December, Count de Kerchove reported that rumors that France would abandon the demilitarized zone in exchange for an arms limitation pact or even an air pact were not true. He always emphasized the importance of keeping Locarno and the Rhenish Pact inviolable. He made that clear when he served in Berlin and one of his contacts, Ministerial Director Köpke, had been able to convince Hitler and the OKW (the German high command) not to invade when many had urged him to. Indeed, at the beginning of the new year of 1936, rumors of a coming remilitarization were discounted by General Schmit because he felt the German military leaders would not risk their unpre- pared army. However, on February 20, 1936, the Quai d’Orsay warned of an imminent remilitarization of the Rhineland and asked about the Belgian attitude. Prime Minister van Zeeland answered that Belgium would continue staff talks.87

86 Van Zuylen, pp. XXII, 345, 352-354; Kieft, pp. 58-59. 87 Gerhard L. Weinberg, Hitler’s Foreign Policy 1933-1939: The Road to World War II, one-volume edition (NY: Enigma, 2005), p. 261; “Bulletin de Renseignements no. 764”, Schmit to Minister of National Defense, May 24, 1935, in MRA-BAFM 29 (185-2-47); Kerchove to van Zeeland, Paris, December 19, 1935, DDB 3: 449; Ibid., p. 450; van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léo- pold III, diary entry for January 24, 1936, pp. 197-198; Ibid., diary entry for February 20, 1936, pp. 200-201. 112 Chapter 4

Small German units entered the Rhineland on March 7, citing French ratifi- cation of their treaty with the Soviet Union as a violation of Locarno (the other Locarno powers rejected that interpretation) and that therefore Germany was no longer bound by that pact. Hitler had chosen to act on a Saturday because it would delay any Allied reaction. The move took the Berlin diplomatic corps by surprise. The important question was what the other powers were going to do beyond referring the question to the League of Nations. Belgium, angry and nervous, was prepared to fulfil Locarno, but only with both France and Britain, whose support would be necessary in a war. The Belgian ambassador to France warned his British counterpart of the danger in which Belgium would be if her protectors failed to react. Belgium would have only the alternative of reaching military agreements with England and France. “’Do you believe,’ responded the English ambassador, ‘that England would be ready to subscribe to that engage- ment?’” Although the Belgians and French were apparently agreed to react to the remilitarization of the Rhineland with sanctions and by sending the matter to the League of Nations, the Belgians did not want to do anything to push the Germans into a corner. Therefore, van Zeeland met with Eden to suggest a means of satisfying the British by conciliating the Germans while at the same time avoiding the humiliation of France – bury Locarno and both Britain and France would guarantee Belgium’s borders. This is, in fact, what ultimately happened.88 Gerhard Weinberg assesses that British Foreign Minister Sir Anthony Eden behaved according to German hopes – acting as a brake on the French and blocking sanctions on the Hitler regime. The French restricted themselves to defensive measures: sending active fortress units into their emplacements and digging more defensive works. Other active units near the frontier not requiring rail transportation were alerted and deployed. However, no reservists were called up. Weinberg observes that the French were fully capable of acting vigorously if they had wanted to and if the French military had planned for such an eventuality. However, the proximity of elections, the reluctance of the French public to embark on military adventures, and the lack of military plans for intervention against the remilitarization took military measures off the table, leaving only diplomacy. In fact, French Foreign Minister Pierre Flandin approached the other Locarno signatories on March 9, when he proposed to remind the Powers of their duties under the Pact. He offered France’s whole

88 Weinberg, pp. 251-252; Graeffe [Belgian chargé d’affaires in Berlin] to van Zeeland, Berlin, March 7, 1936; van Zeeland to Belgian embassies in Paris, London, Rome, March 8, 1936, DDB 4: 122; pp. 350-351; aide mémoire dated Paris, March 9, 1936, attached to Kerchove to van Zeeland, Paris, March 10, 1936, DDB 4: 128; Smith, “Britain and Belgium,” p. 99. The Devèze Years 113 military to react to the remilitarization and threatened to act unilaterally, destroying the system of collective security, if the other Powers did not follow. The ambassadors of the Locarno powers (except Germany) met again on March 10, at the Quai d’Orsay. Mr. Flandin repeated his offer to give France’s forces to the cause of the League of Nations “to repress what it considers as an assassination attempt on international peace” and his hope that the Powers would do their duty. Raoul van Overstraeten noted in his diary that France’s eastern alliances were designed for just such an occasion and the Germans had given the French the perfect excuse to invade.89 It would not have been hard to drive the Germans back out of the Rhineland but resolute action was not the forte of the Anglo-French. On March 10, French Generalissimo Maurice Gamelin declared himself ready to advance into Ger- many via Belgium but complained that the Belgians would not let him in. The next day, Devèze and Van den Bergen proposed forming the provisional battalions and summoning the Superior Defense Council while Gamelin was lowering his aims. The day after that, Gamelin approached the Belgian military attaché in Paris for permission to send troops through Belgium. The response was a question: “What will the French divisions do in Belgium while the Reich, with its embryo of an army, would have great difficulty in defending itself?” Émile Wanty declares “it has been noticed, since then, that all this March affair was led on the French side with neither conviction nor energy” while a resolute French military action in the days just after the German remilitarization would, by the Locarno Pact, draw the Belgians and British into the French “police action.” General Wanty also laments the failure to take the opportunity to stamp out Hitlerism because of the “hesitation of some, the reticence of others, the mediocrity of all before the events of which the scale had already over- taken them.” The present historian has to agree with this judgment. Not to put all the blame on the French, General Wanty points out that a Belgian offensive would have gone against everything the General Staff had advocated: its opposition to the forward deployment of covering forces (i.e. ‘defense at the frontier’) and to “the dispersion of forces on the Herve Plateau.” The results of the successful German action were to reveal the British and French as inert (if not inept) and weak, to show as useless the international agreements guaranteeing Belgium’s status, to kick the props out from under Minister Devèze’s cherished

89 Weinberg, 254; Gamelin cited in Kerchove to van Zeeland, Paris, March 8, 1936; Weinberg, Ibid. Aide mémoire dated Paris, March 9, 1936, attached to Kerchove to van Zeeland, Paris, March 10, 1936, DDB 4: 1, 25-26; Ibid., p. 128; “Compte rendu résumé de la reunion qui a eu lieu au Quai d’Orsay, le 10 mars 1936,” DDB 4: 132-138; Diary entry for March 7, 1935 in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, p. 202. 114 Chapter 4 concept of ‘defense at the frontier’, in part leading to his resignation, and to dramatically change the situation in Western Europe. It also undoubtedly elated many Germans but in the context of this study that is neither here nor there.90 The French rejected any negotiations until international law had been restored; that is, until the Germans withdrew from the Rhineland. The response of Belgian Foreign and Prime Minister van Zeeland was that a united front was necessary, that Belgium would wholeheartedly take part in any action taken by the Locarno signatories, and that he hoped the other Powers would let him know what they were going to do. This was something less than the unequivo- cal support of France’s proposed strong reaction the situation demanded. As seen above, British Foreign Minister Eden raised anew the question of negotiations. Prime minister van Zeeland clarified Belgium’s position to the British ambassador: “I estimate that the solidarity between France and England is indispensable” and Belgium would agree to whatever the French and British concluded. Failing unity, van Zeeland would work to reconcile the French and British.91 Without agreement, there was no chance of success for any policy. When the meeting resumed, van Zeeland rejected the idea of going to war to preserve the demilitarized zone, proposing instead a threat of military sanctions by the Locarno Powers and economic sanctions by the League of Nations. He counseled against putting Hitler in a position in which he had to either go to war or lose power. The meeting broke up without an agreement as Foreign Minister Eden announced he had to go back to London for more instructions. The disappointed French rebuked Belgium for not taking a harder line on Germany’s remilitarization, arguing that if Belgium had reacted more like France, “English public opinion would understand the necessity of putting itself in unison with us.” In fact, the Rhineland crisis offered the Belgians an opportunity to demonstrate that they were not slaves to France and that Belgium could block a revival of the “old arrangements.” There were also domestic concerns: show independence from France, show Belgian pride, and consolidate the government’s programs.92

90 Wanty, 1: 168-169; quoted in Ibid., p. 168; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 51. 91 Van Zuylen, pp. 351-352; Conversation between van Zeeland and Sir George Clerk, March 10, 1936, DDB 4: 139. 92 Ibid., “Compte rendu de la réunion des quatre Puissances locarniennes (suite),” DDB 4: 139-140; Kerchove to van Zeeland, Paris, March 14, 1936, DDB 4: 147-148; Smith, “Britain and Belgium,” p. 103. The Devèze Years 115

The Powers met in London on March 14. Van Zeeland declared that Belgium had suffered the most from the German action because it meant the end of Locarno, one of the keystones of Belgium’s international status. The Belgians joined the British in rejecting the French demands for sanctions against Ger- many. Van Zeeland, like many British conservatives, was of the liberal economic opinion that politics, because it hindered productive economic relations, should be separated from economics. The Germans wanted what the other countries in Western Europe wanted – better quality of life. The best way to deal with them was to appease them, using political and economic ties to bring Germany back into the international system. At the same time, most of the upper-class Belgians rejected ties with Popular Front France and the Soviet Union on ideological grounds. There was support for negotiations of a new Locarno, involving Italy and Germany. On March 19, the Locarno Powers reached an agreement in which Belgium, Britain, and France agreed to aid each other in the event of an unprovoked German attack while they were negotiating with Germany over its last unprovoked action. On March 23, Ambassador de Kerchove reported to Brussels that Mr. Bargeton, a French diplomat, suggested that any negotiations with Germany would end with conces- sions by the Locarno Powers. De Kerchove noted from Paris that “the attitude of Belgium … in the discussions and deliberations, are the object of unanimous praise … .” Meanwhile, the League of Nations achieved not much. On March 19, the Council of the League adopted a resolution branding Germany’s action a violation of Versailles and Locarno. 93 The military staff talks between the French and Belgians, a survivor of the denunciation of the military pact, and intended to deal with a German remilitarization of the Rhineland, began on April 15 after it was made clear that this did not entail an alliance. As early as October 1934, French Generalissimo Wey- gand had recommended to Ambassador de Gaiffier discussions aiming at plans to deal with a German invasion. The Belgian government examined the issue and had no problems with such conversations, as long as they remained technical and not diplomatic. In the wake of the events of March 7 and subsequent negotiations, the French proposed talks with the Belgians and sent a question- naire in which the Belgians were asked to commit themselves “to fix the moment or the circumstances in which we would appeal to the French guarantee.” Pierre van Zuylen ruled that the French would be told the Belgians intended to be faithful to their new obligations of March 19 and would decide

93 Miller, pp. 222-223; Coolsaet, p. 360. Of course, as Coolsaet observes, that policy had precisely the opposite effect, enhancing German “economic and thus also its military power.” Ibid. Keyes, p. 54; Kerchove to van Zeeland, Paris, March 23, 1936, DDB 4: 153. 116 Chapter 4 when to ask for help after discussing the issue with their guarantors. That understood, there would be no problem with talks, as long as there were no commitments. These talks were expanded to include the British. On April 30, British admiral Sir W. James read his opening speech in which he differentiated between specific issues, in which case the talks would be specific and detailed, and “hypothetical issue[s],” in which case the talks would be “more general.”

It is under these latter conditions that we meet today, and our conversations will be circumscribed by the limit set by our respective Govern- ments, that is to say that they can only go as far as is implicit in our existing obligations, under the Locarno Treaty, to come to the assistance of your countries in the event of an unprovoked act of aggression by reason of the crossing of the frontier by German forces.94

It is interesting to note that the definition of ‘an unprovoked act of aggression’ was changed by the lack of an Allied response to the German remilitarization. Previously, Germany sending troops into the Rhineland would have constituted ‘an unprovoked act of aggression.’ In the Allied desperation not to challenge the Germans they altered the definition. After the speech, the discussions started in earnest. The British refused to promise an expeditionary force, which would only be a miniscule two divisions if it were sent; and then only between twenty and thirty days after the beginning of the war. The French suggested the force be used in Belgium, which delighted the Belgians, but the British would not commit. They also brushed off Belgian inquiries as to British arms assistance should the Belgian arms works, which were in the east of the country, be overrun. The British said that was beyond the scope of the talks. The British did promise to stay in touch via the military attachés. That was it. The Belgian For- eign Ministry was deeply disappointed. The explanation given was British opposition to a military accord and British dislike of France. The London talks were, as planned in advance by the French who argued that the limited and delayed British force proposed made Franco-Belgian coordination more important, followed in mid-May by Franco-Belgian talks.95 On May 15, General Van den Bergen, accompanied by his second in command, General Deffontaine, and the Belgian military attaché to France,

94 Miller, p. 222; Jaspar to Gaiffier, November 13, 1934, AMBAE 11185/1, doc. #9108; “Note pour Monsieur le Ministre”, April 1936, pp. 1-3 in AMBAE 11.096; Attachment to Major-General Deffontaine to Baron, Brussels, April 30, 1936, in Ibid. This document is in English. 95 Kieft, p. 72; “Note pour Monsieur le Ministre,” Geneva, May 11, 1936, in AMBAE 11185/1; Crahay, p. 182; Wanty, 1: 169. The Devèze Years 117

Lieutenant Colonel Raquez, went again to Paris, where he met with important officials, including General Bineau, who would command the French troops intervening in Belgium, Generalissimo Gamelin, and the commanders of the French navy and air force. They agreed that the Franco-Belgian limit would be Havelange-Godinne, Mettet-Thuin, the Sambre river, Maubeuge-Givet (inclu- sive) and, at Van den Bergen’s request, extending from Spa to Baraque Michel in the east so as to incorporate advanced Belgian forces. The French would take command once the French cavalry linked up with the Chasseurs ardennais, after which the latter would withdraw to join the bulk of the army and defend the southern flank of the PFL on the Ourthe River.96 The Belgians would hold the Albert Canal and Liège. Belgian troops south of the Meuse, including the Chasseurs ardennais, would come under the commander of the TDLN until the French arrived. The French First Army would arrive in Belgium after a day’s delay and deploy in the Brussels-Nivelles-Wavre- Namur region to face Germans coming from Hasselt or crossing the Meuse. General Van den Bergen promised concrete field works along a line from Ant- werp to Namur at need. The French guaranteed the number of large units intervening until October 15, 1936, after which there would be changes. They also recommended a Belgian rear position on the Scheldt River and through Deynze, Renaix, Condé, and Maubeuge. General Van den Bergen informed the French that the Albert Canal, expected to be the main Belgian defensive position, would be completed in 1938 but the Belgians would also have an advanced position on the frontier canals that would hold long enough for the Albert Canal to be manned. The Belgian forts on the Herve Plateau (PFL 1), comprising a 60km perimeter far exceeding the ability of two divisions to adequately garrison, would be defended in isolation with the main Belgian resistance based on the older PFL 2. If, as the Belgians and French judged unlikely, the Germans respected Dutch neutrality, the forces in the north would be sent south to PFL 2 and the Meuse. These 1936 open staff talks were the last until the German invasion on May 10, 1940.97 These talks were much more successful than the tripartite ones as the French informed the Belgians about what forces they would send early on although the French were less forthcoming about subsequent reinforcements. However, the Belgians were still disappointed they could not get more out of the British. Ambassador Cartier even proposed secret talks with the British,

96 Crahay, p. 182; Wanty, 1: 169; “Observations Militaires Franco-Belges du 15 Mai 1936: Pro- ces-Verbal”, SGRS-S/A “Campagne 1940”/Généralités G1 A-1-26, pp. 1-4. 97 “Observations Militaires Franco-Belges du 15 Mai 1936: Proces-Verbal”, pp. 5-7; Relations militaries franco-belges, cited in Crahay, p. 182. 118 Chapter 4 excluding the French to get around the British animosity towards the latter. In fact, Belgian animosity against the French complicated matters because the Belgian Chamber would not tolerate close Belgian cooperation with the French without British involvement and since the Chamber had not yet passed the military bill, the government had to accede to its wishes. Indeed, the remilitarization of the Rhineland was an opportunity for a Belgium looking to move out of the (perceived) French orbit, resentful at staff ties, French arrogance, and at France’s refusal to help significantly in 1934 when the Belgian economy, on the gold standard, was in crisis and needed support.98 Van Zeeland appealed to Sir Anthony Eden in Geneva in May but Eden put him off. Then events passed by potential Anglo-Belgian cooperation and the attempt to come up with a new treaty to replace Locarno dragged because the French had their alliances with Britain and eastern Europe, Germany was strong enough and well-fortified enough not to need such a pact, and England, especially under Neville Chamberlain, kept trying and failing to find common ground with Germany.99 The remilitarization of the Rhineland changed everything for Belgian strat- egists. The Germans were now at the front door and their strength would only increase. Assuring coverture was of even more paramount importance but military reform was still stalled despite the unanimous military advocacy for eighteen months of service. Neither the abrogation of the Franco-Belgian military accord nor the arrival of the Wehrmacht at Belgium’s front door were enough to convince the Socialists and Flemish Christian Democrats that their voters would see the need for reform.100 For his part, Devèze found himself required to backpedal slightly and support lesser increases in service time. When the king’s military advisor condemned him for not admitting the increases would not resolve the problem, Devèze responded that such an admission would be politically impossible.101 The next day, Leopold, with the assistance of COL van Overstraeten met with the chief of staff, LTG Van den Bergen, to discuss the impact of world affairs on Belgian defense. Van Overstraeten argued that the existing plans would not protect Liège but would rather expose and endanger its mobilization. Van den Bergen was willing to reverse course with Leopold’s backing.

98 Kieft, pp. 72-73; Cartier to van Zeeland, London, May 7, 1936, pp. 2-3, in AMBAE 11185/1; “Contacts entre etats-majors” May 20, 1936, in AMBAE 11185/1; Kieft, pp. 75-77; Smith, “Britain and Belgium,” pp. 100-101. 99 Kieft, p. 77, p. 401. 100 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 177. 101 Ibid.; van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, diary entry for March 11, 1936, p. 206. The Devèze Years 119

Consequently, Leopold wrote to Devèze that the general felt the plans did not adequately address coverage, especially now that the Germans were so close. The main problem was that the plans would negatively impact the development of the infantrymen, with their regiments only functional ten months a year. They would also be very bad for morale. They would not even assure the coverage for which they were intended. Among the problems the king cited were the chance the Unités cyclistes frontiers, responsible for delaying the Ger- mans through demolitions defended by fire, could be taken by surprise before being able to deploy, three regiments were training up in front of their coverage positions and were very vulnerable – the Germans were closer to Liège than the 2nd Cyclists – and the coverage plans not only relied on currently un- armed fortresses but counted 35 kilometers of front. “Even provided with an anti-tank gun per kilometer, one cannot expect that it will prevent the penetration of a mechanized division … .” It was also very exposed to the south. Leo pold informed the minister that he had ordered Van den Bergen to make a full study of the issue so that “the competent authorities” could be on the same page before bringing the plans, which would have to reflect the new geopoliti- cal realities, before the Parliament.102 LTG Van den Bergen came back with a recommendation to increase service time to 18 months for infantry and Cavalry troops; 16 months for fortress, anti- aircraft, and engineer troops; 12 months for conductors of mounted artillery, and 8 months for the others. Coverage positions would be established near the garrisons. The defense of Liège would be based on the ring of old fortifications (PFL2) and control of the Meuse “up to Dinant.” An infantry regiment would be based in Turnhout, and coverage would be serviced by the motorized artillery of the Cavalry Corps. Moreover, the assumptions that guided the fortifications committee of 1931 were made obsolete by German rearmament and remilitarization of the Rhineland. The Chasseurs ardennais were incapable of stopping the Germans between Liège and the French border, the proposed fortress at Sougnée-Remouchamps should be abandoned, three regiments should be pulled back from frontier garrisons, and frontier units should be provided with motorized transport to get them to their positions as soon as possible.The whole would add 47 million BF to the ordinary budget and 181 million BF to the extraordinary budget.103 The minister of national defense, defending his old positions, responded by note to the chief of staff’s proposals. Van den Bergen responded that, for

102 Van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, Diary entry for March 12, 1936, p. 207 (emphasis in the original); Leopold to Devèze, dated March 13, 1936, quoted in Ibid., pp. 207-209. 103 Ibid., diary entry for March 18, 1936, quoted in Ibid., pp. 209-210. 120 Chapter 4 political reasons, he was keeping some Frontier Cyclist units near the border to show he was not abandoning the right bank of the Meuse while he pulled the 1st Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Cyclist Rifles, and the depot of the 1st Lancers further back. Devèze’s concern about abandoning the Herve Plateau’s defense of Luxembourg was unfounded because its own defense could not be assured and would probably have to be abandoned after the army had assembled. Devèze’s worry about leaving Liège at the mercy of German artillery was negated by the development of German air power, which would devastate the city anyway. The only way to save Liège was to deter a German invasion by selecting a strong defensive position, based on a natural obstacle, that there were enough Belgian soldiers to defend.104 Minister Devèze, for his part, refused to accept that his cherished ‘integral defense at the frontier’ had been killed by events. He conceded almost nothing before the conclusions of the Mixed Commission, which he expected to go his way. He warned the king of the consequences of the refusal to defend the Herve Plateau. Abandoning ‘defense at the frontier’ because of Flemish pressure would lead to the disaffection of Walloons. Moreover, the Walloons were the only patriotic Belgians because the Flemish had been corrupted by their veterans organization.105 The year 1932 saw the ascension of Albert Devèze, the veteran Walloon Lib- eral politician and firebrand, to the ministry of national defense and of LTG Prudent Nuyten, professional soldier, to chief of staff. The next few years would see the bitter disputes between the two over whether to defend Belgium at the frontier or in depth and over whether to spend money on fortifications or the field army. Ultimately, it was the budget controversy that forced Nuyten out and thus led to the temporary triumph of ‘integral defense of the territory.’ In aid of that policy, the Chasseurs ardennais and the Unités cyclistes frontier were established and they, and the Cavalry Corps, which was motorized starting from this period, would go on to fight well in 1940. Nuyten’s successor, LTG Cumont then conducted staff talks with the French to coordinate the defense of the country, then spurred on by flagrant German rearmament. 1935 saw the formation of a new government led by a non-party ‘technician,’ van Zeeland, but Devèze kept his hold on the Ministry of National Defense. Once Cumont was replaced due to age in September 1935, the issues of coverage of the mobilization and, inextricably linked to it, the extension of service time took center

104 Van den Bergen to Devèze, dated March 24, 1936, quoted in Van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léo- pold III, diary entry for March 24, 1936, p. 212. 105 Devèze to Van den Bergen, dated March 25, 1936, quoted in Ibid.; Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 182-184. The Devèze Years 121 stage with new chief of staff LTG Van den Bergen although attempts to achieve the latter failed. In early 1936, the Belgians finally successfully repudiated the 1920 Franco-Belgian military agreement that had had such an unfortunate impact on Belgian defense policy. The next day, the Germans remilitarized the Rhineland, changing the international equation, dooming Devèze’s ‘integral defense of the territory,’ now made impossible by the presence of German troops on the common border, and leading the Belgian politicians to recon- sider Belgium’s international position. 122 Chapter 5

Chapter 5 The 1936 Mixed Commission

On March 25, King Leopold ordered the formation of a ‘mixed commission.’ “The commission is a specifically Belgian institution … it is constituted [so] that constructive work, and above all, rapid [work], is impossible.” The results of this commission directly shaped virtually all aspects of the Belgian army that fought in May 1940 and justify discussing it at length. As well, the debates of this commission reveal the concerns not only of the Belgian soldiers but also of the domestic policymakers responsible to their electors and of the senators. It thus also reveals the concerns of the Belgian public. This chapter looks mainly at the testimony of the general officers summoned before the commission to answer questions about how best to defend the country. There is an examination of the language issue, which was debated vigorously in the commission and the implementation of the resulting language law.1 It finally discusses the outcome of the commission and of two other commissions that occurred in 1936. The commission consisted of twenty Parliamentarians and eleven senior officers. They were to look at the army and suggest improvements. The British Military Attaché, Major D.K. Paris, reported that many members showed up only occasionally to propose bills that would help them get reelected.2 The Commission could summon any civilian or soldier it felt could provide it with needed information. Its immediate cause was, as Commission Presi- dent Mr. Hubin pointed out, minister of national defense Albert Devèze’s opinion that the army’s coverage of the country was no longer effective. In addition, the Belgian public was increasingly worried about the armament and equipment of its army and about the “real or apparent divergence of views existing in military circles in what concerns the general conception of the defense of the country.” The commission would have to inform itself on these issues, especially “on these points which are particularly of a nature to raise empoisoned discussions,” enlighten the public on the state of armaments and equipment

1 Wanty, 1: 175. 2 Crahay, p. 172; King Leopold III quoted in Discours de M. Le President Hubin, Commission Mixte, Séance d’Installation, 22 avril, 1936, pp. 7-8, in MRA-BAFM 5448 (185-14a-6983), sous- farde “Documents relatifs à l’élaboration des Cffes.R.”; D.K. Paris to Sir Esmond Ovey, Brussels, August 7, 1936, p. 3, in MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004269736_007 The 1936 Mixed Commission 123 and either “congratulate itself” if the debate were only a quarrel over words or state its opinion if there were real issues at stake.3 The commission met for the first time on April 22, at 10:25 a.m. Minister Devèze opened the proceedings by quoting his predecessor’s speech opening the 1927-28 mixed commission, the starting point for the 1936 mixed commission, which ended,

I express here my absolute faith in your experience and in your enlight- ened wisdom … . Thanks to your labor, the representatives of the nation, duly instructed by the conclusions that you will put forward could, in full knowledge of the cause, take your responsibilities. The Government hopes that the hour of action does not delay.4

One of the central reasons for the formation of the commission was to determine the length of active service for Belgian soldiers. According to a secret 1934 report from the General Staff, the army, with its year of service for infantrymen (four months less for machine gunners and one month more for artillerymen and cavalrymen), was only at fighting strength for about six months out of the year! In 1935, Devèze informed an audience of reserve and veteran officers and civilians at a dinner that at times the dangerous lack of effectives extended even to garrisons close to the frontiers and was even worse for the all-important machinegunners. He promised his audience that he would guarantee trained soldiers and would refuse to bargain with national security. However, the Flemish and the Socialists, even the Francophone Socialists, opposed increasing service time, with the latter still reposing their trust in collective security and discussing leaving the government in the wake of Devèze’s speech, made behind the back of the prime minister while the king was out of the country. This question was intimately linked with the issues of the effective coverage of the frontier, the provision of sufficient NCOs, technicians, and military employees, the equipping of the troops with modern weapons and other necessities, and the improved training of the soldiers. The Commission also had to look into the recruitment and retention of junior officers, the possible increase in and encouragement of physical and military education, and how to make the reserve units readier to fight immediately should war break out.

3 Albert Devèze cited in Commission Mixte, Séance d’Installation, 22 avril, 1936, p. 8, in MRA- BAFM 5448 (185-14a-6983), sous-farde “Documents relatifs à l’élaboration des Cffes.R.” Emphasis in the original. 4 Discours de M. Devèze, Ibid., pp. 1-3. 124 Chapter 5

However, the most immediate question was the assurance of the coverage of the frontier:

Its solution is commanded by the constant presence, in place, of instructed effectives, capable by their number, their preparation, and their armament, of opposing at all times to the sudden eruption an impassible dike.5

The Commission would also consider whether the recommendations of the 1931 Commission on Fortifications to prepare Belgium’s two main physical lines of defense, the Meuse and Scheldt rivers, were still valid given the new conditions. The preparation would involve the modernization of the old forts guarding the Meuse around Liège and Namur. The Antwerp forts guarding the Scheldt needed renovation. Other suggestions included a call for the new fortress of Eben-Emael to block a German thrust between Liège and Dutch Lim- burg and building a bridgehead around Ghent (the ‘TPG’). Also under debate were the conclusions of the Superior Council of Defense regarding “the zone close to the frontier”: create a 60km-long main position for the army on the Herve Plateau near Liège by building new forts (some of which were finished by 1936) and establish “centers of resistance” in Belgian Luxembourg, which had been done and which were to be defended by the newly created Chasseurs ardennais. Finally, the Commission would consider the linguistic regime in the army, as well as regional recruitment, and “all that touches the moral and material well-being of the soldier.”6 Minister Devèze closed by exhorting the Commission in French and Flemish:

May your work, in these hours so grave, have for effect to unite in a common will the country, which is grasped by so many worries; the Parlia- ment, all the tendencies of which you represent here with so much authority and the Army, so profoundly imbued with all its duties, so gen- erously ready to give its blood, as in 1914 for the health of Belgium.7

5 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 1: 41; Albert Devèze, May 19, 1935, quoted in Ibid., 1: 42 and 1: 42, n. 3; Discours de M. Devèze Commission Mixte, Séance d’Installation, 22 avril, 1936, p. 8, in MRA-BAFM 5448 (185-14a-6983), sous-farde “Documents relatifs à l’élaboration des Cffes.R.”, pp. 1-3. 6 Commission Mixte, Séance d’Installation, 22 avril, 1936, pp. 4-6. 7 Ibid., p. 6. The 1936 Mixed Commission 125

Socialist G. Hubin, then spoke, laying out what he perceived to be the reasons for the commission. He closed by rejecting the idea that readiness for war was the best way of avoiding it, but asserted that the best means to peace was creating a sufficient deterrent to any potential aggressor and that it was the job of the commission to offer suggestions leading to the creation of that deterrent. The ‘Flemish Question’ now raised itself as President Hubin acknowledged the criticism of his appointment as president because he did not speak Flemish, even admitting his own doubts as to his competence but promising his dedication. He also proposed the selection of a Flemish vice-president, a role assigned to Senator van Overbergh. Former Prime Minister Charles de Broqueville identified the most important questions: how best to protect Belgium from modern mechanized and air assaults.8 The commission also discussed when to meet, settling on one day a week (Tuesday), but debate centered on when they would begin their work. The goal, as Mr. Hubin pointed out, was to give the report to the government in enough time for it to draft necessary laws by the beginning of the Parliamen- tary session in October. The commission would start in June and work for four months, “taking into account the month of vacation for which the moment will be decided in opportune time.” However, Deputy Balthazar complained about the impression that would be left on the public if the commission were to defer its work until after the upcoming May elections. He argued it would be better to start immediately. Senator Bologne seconded him, noting that “public opinion, justly preoccupied with the question of security, would not understand a more prolonged adjournment [than fifteen days]” Senator van Over- bergh and former Prime Minister and Defense Minister de Broqueville agreed. He also identified the most important questions: “the best means of protecting ourselves against a motorized invasion and against an aerial attack! It is on this essential point that our debates must revolve.” They would meet again on Tues- day, May 5, at 2:30 p.m. and work until 6.9 The commission heard expert testimony from the military. Major Paris, the British military attaché, noted dryly,

[a]s many of the civilian members of the Commission were extremely ignorant of the technicalities of the whole question, this educational period has taken some considerable time.10

8 Ordre des Travaux, Commission Mixte, Séance d’Installation, 22 avril, 1936, pp. 9-10. 9 Ibid., pp. 9-10; M. Balthazar in Ibid., p. 10; M. Bologne in Ibid., p. 11; various, Ibid., pp. 10-11, 16. 10 D.K. Paris to Sir Edmond Ovey, Brussels, August 7, 1936, p. 1, in MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII, #164. 126 Chapter 5

Various generals and minister of national defense Devèze weighed in on the issue of coverage. Devèze’s plan, based on eighteen months service for recruits, called for nine battalions (‘provisional battalions,’ bataillons de marche) plus machine-gun battalions and anti-tank units provided with 47mm anti-tank guns. The units would be formed in regiments by using the instructed class which had already served for one year. While serving as coverage, its draftees would not count towards the strength of the mobilized regiment, leaving three earlier classes to form it.11 The plan called for ‘supplemental’ officers and NCOs who would serve permanently with coverage units. These battalions would need to be armed and equipped separately from their parent regiments. A potential drawback was that there would be no trained effectives behind the provisional battalions. Under Minister Devèze’s plan the most recently trained soldiers would all be separate from the rest of the regiment, which would be formed only of reservists who would not be able to avail themselves of the knowledge (and energy?) of the youngsters serving on the frontier.12 The chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Edouard Van den Bergen, weighed in with his own suggestion, also taking eighteen months service as his point of departure. He agreed with Minister Devèze on the nine necessary battalions (with support). The battalions would come from units based near the coverage positions and again would be formed by the most recently instructed class, but after only six months of training. General Van den Bergen’s mobilized regiments would consist of three classes, but would include the provisional battalions in their organization. Each mobilized company would start with only two platoons, the third being devoted to coverage. This latter would then rejoin the rest of the company. This would ensure “trained effectives in the interior of the country” and would not require any extra weapons or equipment because the provisional battalions would be integral parts of the regiments.13 The chief of staff informed the commission that, at peacetime strength, the army was short 676 officers in the main combat branches. At the same time, there were too few non-commissioned officers even though the statutory number had been reached. There were serious problems with training as can-

11 “Système préconisé par Monsieur DEVEZE” for the Commission Mixte 1936, p. 1, in MRA- BAFM 5496 (185-14a-7095), #518. 12 “Système préconisé par Monsieur DEVEZE” for the Commission Mixte 1936, p. 1, in MRA- BAFM 5496 (185-14a-7095), #518. 13 “Système préconisé par M. le Lieutenant Général VAN DEN BERGEN” to the Commission Mixte 1936, p. 1, in in MRA-BAFM 5496 (185-14a-7095), #519; Ibid., p. 31. The 1936 Mixed Commission 127

Figure 10 Albert Devèze’s provisional battalion scheme. Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels, MRA-BAFM 5496 (185-14a-7095) after #518 noneers and artillery drivers began their military service at different times and 4/5ths of the army lacked adequate training grounds. The problem had not been fixed since the 1927-1928 Mixed Commission. Troops did not have the opportunity to practice enough with their personal weapons or real hand gre- nades. It was impossible to train the troops in modern warfare or defense against low-flying aircraft. Many troops were poorly educated and unfit. But the biggest problem in peacetime was the shortage and advanced age of the officers.14

14 Commission mixte 1936, Compte rendu des travaux, quoted in Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 281. Ellipses in the original. 128 Chapter 5

Figure 11 General Van den Bergen’s provisional battalion scheme. Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels, MRA-BAFM 5496 (185-14a-7095) after #519

Van den Bergen also weighed in to defend his officers against Mr. Marck’s charge of being anti-Flemish by noting that every regiment had courses on Flemish, frequently taught by civilians.

[I]n the regiments there is only one spirit: the esprit de corps, and the Walloons and the Flemings belonging to the same regiment have it to an equal degree … . If the army became sympathetic to the Flemings, there would be more numerous Flemish officers. There is a vicious circle.15

15 M. le lieutenant general Van den Bergen to the Commission mixte, 17e séance – Mardi 4 Août 1936 (après-midi), Report of the Mixed Commission, p. 113. The 1936 Mixed Commission 129

Major General Duvivier, the commandant of the Défense Aérienne du Territoire, Belgian military aviation, weighed in on behalf of General Van den Bergen, citing two major advantages of his coverage plan: the covering troops, all trained, would be “completely independent from the field army.” They would always be ready, even in deepest peace, to react to an attack with little warning. Because the covering troops would be independent of the field army, they would not need to be kept in garrisons and could remain in their positions, with casernes as close as possible to those positions. Because they were already trained, they could devote all their time and energy to performing their duties on the land they were to defend. He reminded the commission that the number of provisional battalions that could be raised would depend in part on the length of service – another major issue for the commission. Six battalions could be raised with sixteen months of service, nine with eighteen months with the colors, and eighteen with two years in uniform. Alternately, if the soldiers were so assigned after only ten months of training, twelve battalions could be raised with eighteen months service.16 General Duvivier saw several flaws in Minister Devèze’s plan: the covering troops would be assigned after only six months with the colors, meaning they would have to be completing their training while on the covering positions, raising the possibility that they could be hit before they were fully prepared. “They are troops without sufficient cohesion, incapable of maneuvering, and barely, or not, knowing how to shoot.” Although they would spend a full year in their positions, some of that time would be spent in camp, not on coverage. Moreover, they would live in existing casernes far removed from their alert positions. Minister Devèze’s plan called for the covering units to rejoin their parent regiments after their covering assignment ended. However, General Duvivier pointed out that if the much feared mechanized invasion occurred, it would be “very optimistic” to assume that these covering units could reinte- grate with their regiments with their weapons and officers and NCOs intact. The troops that made it back would be “reduced in number, physically and morally spent, and momentarily unusable.” In addition, the covering mission would not end because the invasion would not end. Thus, three of Belgium’s most valuable divisions would lose a third of their effectives before even seeing action. In response to the complaint that the system of provisional battalions would leave regiments in the interior deprived of effectives, General Duvivier responded that if nine provisional battalions (recommended by General Van den Bergen) were used, drawn from nine regiments, the other nine would have

16 Attachment to Duvivier to Van den Bergen, Brussels, July 18, 1936, pp. 1-3, in MRA-BAFM 5448 (185-14a-6983), sous-farde “Documentation.” 130 Chapter 5 a class with six months instruction – just like the covering troops in Minister Devèze’s scheme. Thus, it would be a wash; either way, troops with six months training could find themselves in action.17 General Duvivier shared the general orthodoxy that the most dangerous direction for Belgian defense, assuming Liège was properly defended, was via Dutch Limburg on the Belgian left. In responding to criticism that Belgian defense policy was unilateral, that is, oriented against a German invasion, he reminded the commission that in 1914 the army concentrated one stage further west than planned in order not to offend Germany and that two divisions were even kept in Mons and Ghent in case the British landed on the French coast. Of course, the German ultimatum changed things, but Belgian deployments were limited by the obligatory neutrality, which had been abolished. Belgium did still have commitments and needed to face the facts and “see the danger where it is and not weaken ourselves and compromise our situation for conventional questions.” He concluded by reminding the commission that the main goal of coverage was to buy time and space to permit the effective mobilization and concentration of the field army and that to achieve that goal, the covering forces had to be independent of the field army. He argued that “only the system of provisional battalions responds to this desideratum, given the impossibility of realizing the latter with the aid of volunteers.”18 Lieutenant General De Grox, without recommending a specific coverage plan beyond agreeing with General Van den Bergen that the current system of entrusting certain key frontier points to draftees on leave was very dangerous and advocating “complete and permanent” coverage making liberal use of “destructions and obstructions” to delay and disperse a powerful invasion possibly coming without any previous warning, was emphatic in his warnings to the commission of the danger of a German attack. He reminded the commission that although Belgians would not invade a small peaceful country out of the blue, Germany had done it to them only twenty-two years before, justifying it with the infamous saying “Not kennt kein Gebot” (“need knows no law”).19 He warned of the prevalent German spirit, so similar to that of 1914, “as a juridical justification of war unleashed without any previous declaration; and even war beginning in full peacetime” to achieve German aims including keep-

17 Attachment to Duvivier to Van den Bergen, pp. 3-6. 18 Ibid., pp. 2, 5-6. The Unités cyclistes frontières and most of the Chasseurs ardennais responsible for defending Belgium’s border with Germany were volunteers. 19 “Note du Lieutenant Général De Grox sur le problème de la couverture”, to the Mixed Commission of 1936, pp. 1- 3, 8, in MRA-BAFM 5496 (185-14a-7095), Emphasis in the original. The 1936 Mixed Commission 131 ing destruction and devastation away from Germany, disrupting enemy mobilization and concentration, seizing enemy positions before destructions can be carried out, seizing the most important Belgian industrial regions around Liège and Limburg, and keeping enemy forces away from the most important German industrial region of the Ruhr. He noted that Germany was building an army suitable for the spirit prevailing in the land, capable of such sudden and powerful invasions, including six armored divisions.20 He cited what contemporary German military thinkers were writing about the next war. These authors included a Colonel Siebert from a German military school, who noted that motorization permitted a new speed of operations that would allow bomber fleets to be launched a bare fifteen minutes after the head of state had decided to unleash them, “without waiting for any other diplomatic formality, because five minutes later he would have already lost the benefit of surprise.” German Colonel Jürgen von Arnim (who would go on to command all Axis forces in Africa and to surrender those forces in Tunisia) expressed himself similarly, emphasizing the suddenness of concentration and invasion allowed by “mechanization and motorization.” General Erich von Ludendorff, a German hero of World War I, had recently written “it is an error to believe, as is generally supposed, that a war must necessarily commence with a declaration of war.” The great Heinz Guderian had outlined his vision of a powerful surprise one-two punch of bombers and armor flattening enemy industrial regions and disrupting enemy command and control with motorized infantry units occupying the territory seized by the armor so the latter could advance once again. Colonel Walther Nehring (who would command the Afrika Korps under Erwin Rommel and be replaced by von Arnim in Tuni- sia) had described a future armored invasion carried out by “the armies of tomorrow.” General De Grox’s final ‘witness’ was General Hans von Seeckt, the German hero of World War I and the genius behind the evolution of the Reichs wehr, who laid the foundations for the German military of World War II, and who demonstrated that even before the German military’s recent reforms, von Seeckt “had already admitted, as an adequate doctrine for this army, the principle of the surprise attack.”21 General De Grox warned of the possible use of commandos in civilian clothing and of paratroopers, both of which would be used against the BeNeLux nations in May 1940. He closed by reminding the commission of the need for “a

20 De Grox, pp. 3-5. 21 De Grox, pp. 5-7; The Simon and Schuster Encyclopedia of World War II, Thomas Parrish, ed., (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1978), s.v. “Arnim, Jürgen von”; Ibid., s.v. “Nehring, Walther von”. Corum, pp. 25 et seq.. 132 Chapter 5 sure, efficacious, permanent coverage and not a system which would present gaps or defects … generators of catastrophes.”22 Lieutenant General Hellebaut, one of Belgium’s leading soldiers and minister of national defense in 1925, wrote a long memorandum on “Our Security” for the commission. In it, he called for the constitution of an army composed of eighteen divisions “of equal value” that would defend the length of the frontier (300km) on a continuous front, as opposed to the conception of chiefs of staff Galet and Nuyten, who proposed the concentration of the army along the axis of advance of the enemy and the creation of successive lines of defense based on Belgium’s few natural defenses. Among General Hellebaut’s suggestions were proposals for measures to speed mobilization and concentration, which would make coverage less important because it would have to buy less time.23 Hellebaut further recommended allowing draftees to keep military equipment at home to save time spent distributing that equipment in depots and to economize on personnel who would staff those depots and super-regional recruitment to allow mobilization centers to be placed closer to the zones the troops would occupy, which would save on transport. He suggested using not only the railroad for troop transport but also the road network, which, he claimed was underutilized and could serve for many purposes as efficiently as the railroads. He cited as a positive example Hitler’s Autobahnen. His proposed continuous front would also save time on transport because each unit would have an assigned sector from peacetime and would know where it was going when it was mobilized and concentrated, avoiding delays caused by the Gen- eral Staff having to decide which plan to use and where to send which troops.24 General Hellebaut saw the main tasks of coverage as repulsing small-scale enemy raids, which could take place even before a declaration of war, or, in the case of a surprise attack by motorized forces, to buy time for reinforcements to arrive by causing the enemy to have to deploy and fight (rather than just advance in column). As opposed to General De Grox, General Hellebaut asserted that Belgium would have at least a few hours warning and preparation time before an enemy invasion in force. For this, he emphasized, “It is impor-

22 De Grox, pp. 8-9, 11, emphasis in the original. 23 Crahay, p. 249; “Notre Securite./Considerations et Propositions du Lieutenant-General Hellebaut,” to Monsieur le Président de la Commission mixte chargée d’étudier l’état actuel de l’Armée ainsi que les necessities de la defense effective du territoire (Arrêté Royal du 25 mars 1936) à Bruxelles., pp. 10, 12, 17-18, 30-34 in MRA-BAFM 5448 (185-14a- 6983), sous-farde “suggestions.” 24 Hellebaut, pp. 30-34. The 1936 Mixed Commission 133 tant that a good information service guarantees that at any price.” Like General De Grox, General Hellebaut saw only one potential aggressor, asserting that the invasion could come from the east (Germany) or from the north (Germany by way of the Netherlands), with his continuous front extending from Arlon in the Ardennes to Antwerp. 25 His recommendations for coverage included two or three lines of demolitions or obstacles defended by fire along the frontier, so that even if the enemy carried one line it would be hung up on the next. The demolitions would be defended by platoons, under an officer, with a machine-gun section and an anti-tank gun. Behind these lines would be larger mobile groups capable of rapidly “reinforc[ing] or supplement[ing] coverage.” Behind these groups would be the main position of resistance, whose rapidly and first-arriving mobilized forces would function as outposts for that position and at the same time, a second line for the coverage while the other, later-arriving troops manned the main position.26 General Hellebaut recognized that the coverage groups to defend the destructions and obstructions could not be constituted by regular troops, based in too-distant garrisons, without suicidally weakening the forces available for the main position. As well, peacetime active units represented at most one third of their wartime strength (the rest formed by mobilized reservists), so these units would be too small to do the job. Finally, it would take longer to mobilize sufficient covering forces from active units than it would take for an enemy to launch a sudden attack. Special (i.e. elite) units formed of 18-month servicemen would not work because their formation “appears to us a solution scarcely conforming to Belgian psychology.” They would also cause practical problems and be too expensive. He advocated the formation of local militias from soldiers “chosen for this mission in all arms and who would have completed a first recall at least.” These soldiers, aged between twenty-two and thirty-five, under military discipline and regularly drilled, protecting their homes, “would show at least as much tenacity as young recruits of twenty originally from other regions of the country.” These militias would be joined by local gendarmes, border guards, and military foresters.27 The mobile forces forming the second level of General Hellebaut’s coverage scheme would be constituted from motorized units (such as were being formed from the Belgian Cavalry Corps) who belonged behind the front line rather than on the front line. If these units were garrisoned in suitably located areas,

25 Hellebaut, pp. 34-35, emphasis in the original. 26 Ibid., pp. 35-36. 27 Ibid., pp. 37-38, emphasis in the original. 134 Chapter 5 they could both provide coverage and defend Brussels or other large cities by responding rapidly to the threatened area of coverage.28 General Hellebaut’s scheme for eighteen divisions with twelve months under the colors would provide either six or twelve full battalions of fully- trained troops, depending on the time of year. The recall of a single class of reservists would boost that number to twenty-four or thirty battalions, fully trained and having participated in maneuvers, ready at a moment’s notice to deploy to the main position of resistance to form the second echelon of the coverage and the outposts of the main position.29 General Hellebaut argued to the commission that his solution to the problem of coverage was superior to the conception of forming ‘provisional battalions,’ whether of six- or twelve-month recruits, proposed in the newspapers (as well as by Minister Devèze and General Van den Bergen) because having militias permanently in place avoided the continual rotation of units through defensive points. The greatest danger General Hellebaut saw to coverage was a “sudden and rapid” raid, pushing into coverage and mobilization and even, perhaps, breaking into the heart of the country. However, he believed such a raid must, of necessity, be small. The answer was a ‘decentralized’ mobilization scheme that would “spread out the particularly sensitive points.” Belgium had to avoid concentrating the process of mobilization into one area that could be disrupted by a German motorized raid. Forcing the enemy to go after multiple targets in a hostile area would lead to the defeat of the raid. He emphasized, however, that Belgian defense not allow itself to be distracted by such a raid but rather to defend itself against a massive invasion. He also urged the education of the Belgian populace on the matter so it does not mix up “‘coverage of the mobilization’ with ‘coverage of the country’, which could engender panics …” 30 Lieutenant General Tasnier took up a suggestion by Mr. Hubin, who reasonably believed that the security of Belgium required French aid but less reasonably believed that the aid would come right away and make the difference, that the solution to Belgium’s coverage problem was mines strewn along the frontier, possibly extending all the way from the eastern frontier to the Meuse River and this belt of mines, supported and triggered by reinforced fieldworks, could eliminate the need for longer military service or keeping reservists with the colors. These mines would be much larger than current-day land mines, more like the large tunnels filled with high explosives that were used during World

28 Hellebaut, pp. 39-40. 29 Ibid., p. 40. 30 Ibid., pp. 40-41, emphasis in the original. The 1936 Mixed Commission 135

War I (and as far back as Petersburg in the American Civil War in 1864). Mr. Hubin recalled having heard from Belgian officers that German mines in 1918 had delayed the Allied advance and damaged the morale of the Allied troops. The mines would also be cheap, with 3,000 mines between Arlon and Antwerp, dominated by 1,000 already existing pillboxes manned by 8,000 engineers. Plus, there were few accessible routes through the valleys of the Meuse and Ourthe rivers and these routes were perfectly suited for being blocked by mines. In any case, Belgium could not hope to copy the Maginot Line; it only had to delay an aggressor for eight to ten days until its allies came to help. “This solution stands under the sign of the technology which … must henceforth triumph in [the military] domain, as in all others.” It is noteworthy that, although not mention- ing Germany by name as the future aggressor in this testimony, Mr. Hubin, like the others, saw the threat as coming from the area between Arlon and Ant- werp, that is, from the German border or from Germany via the Netherlands.31 General Tasnier responded by first informing his civilian colleagues that technology was only one of three factors in successful warmaking; the others being “moral forces” and the “value of command which dominates one and the other.” Regarding the proposed solution, an engineers’ colonel, Van Daele, would address the technical aspect but he (General Tasnier) would simply note that the plan relied on efficient and certain detonations at any time of unprotected mines (vulnerable to sabotage?), that modern all-terrain fighting vehicles could easily skirt the craters, since they were not defended by fire, that to be effective, the mined zone would have to be so wide that its functioning could not be guaranteed, and that the plan’s success depended on the “initiative and responsibility to detonate the mines advisably” of a few hundred very low-ranking soldiers: privates or junior NCOs. Most importantly, the plan avoided the necessity of extending the service time of the draftees.32 General Tasnier was extremely skeptical about being able to maintain the necessary 8,000 military engineers in permanence. He also addressed Mr. Hubin’s contention that the Belgian army would have to hold for 8-10 days until effective allied assistance arrived; that the entire Belgian army would form coverage for the friendly armies. He agreed completely but noted that the army would need five or six days to mobilize, concentrate, and be ready to fight and that the Belgian army’s own coverage would have to buy that five or six

31 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 291; Hubin, quoted in “Lieutenant Général TASNIER,” pp, 2-3 in MRA-BAFM 5448 (185-14a-6983), sous-farde “Suggestions.” 32 “Lieutenant Général TASNIER,” pp. 3-4. 136 Chapter 5 days. Mines alone would not gain that five or six days but only a matter of hours.33 General Tasnier also doubted Mr. Hubin’s contention that German forces, knowing of the existence of the Belgian mines, would not dare enter such areas. Tasnier cited Belgium’s own miners and quarrymen who always go into extremely dangerous areas. As well, it does not take less courage to face shells, bombs, and machine guns. Besides, the German high command would spot the command posts and some of the mines and would interfere, by saboteurs, smokescreens, and bombing, in their operation, as would the weather.34 The mine solution would have to form part of a larger coverage strategy to “block a [German] motorized irruption as close to the menaced frontier as possible” for some time. Belgium was very fortunate to have the river lines and canals in the northeast as well as the fortresses of Liège to block any invasion from the east. General Tasnier discounted any German invasion through the Ardennes because he believed (wrongly, as it turned out) that it would be stopped by the Meuse River and would then be vulnerable to a flanking attack by the French. Besides, the German General Staff could not launch an attack threatening all 300km of Belgium’s borders with Germany and Holland. It would most likely choose the northeast.35 General Tasnier identified the most dangerous sector for the fate of the Bel- gian army as the thirty kilometers between Turnhout and Réthy, the latter of which, if broken through, would allow the Germans access to Brussels. Small detachments could penetrate elsewhere but they would be insignificant. Bel- gians must be prepared to use demolitions to block the most vulnerable routes into the interior of the country and reinforce them as much as possible. That defense would benefit from the money that Mr. Hubin proposed to spend on mines, 9/10 of which would not be used and could not be moved. Demolitions would only be the overture to the battle for coverage and for the delay necessary to mobilize, concentrate, and have the Allies arrive. The destructions must be guarded to make sure they worked and also because the guard units, once that was done, would become the outposts of the coverage, whose fire would maximize the delays caused by the destructions and make the job of the rest of the army easier once it was constituted. Now, implying that coverage required well-trained troops, he urged the commission to remember that during the debate on service time. In fact, in May 1940, small Belgian Chasseurs ardennais units which did not receive the order to retreat and defended their

33 “Lieutenant Général TASNIER,” pp. 1-5. 34 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 35 Ibid., pp. 1, 6-7. The 1936 Mixed Commission 137 destructions by fire imposed significant delays (several hours) on the German forces at Martelange, Bodange and Chabrehez.36 General Tasnier asserted that coverage battles were of necessity ‘maneuver combats’ because the enemy would have to focus his combat power on a narrow front to achieve a breakthrough the only counter to which was meeting the enemy force with friendly force by rapidly identifying and countering the main enemy thrust. This called for “fixed resistance … and mobile reserves.”37 Lieutenant General Galet testified on Tuesday, June 9. General Galet, feeling he had already said what needed saying and bitter over how he was treated during the 1927-28 mixed commission and after his testimony to the Parlia- ment in 1931, was not happy to be there and made no secret of the fact.

You are aware that the press which supported the minister of national defense and even the French press … represented me as being the pro- moter of a system which pretended to defend the country in not defending it; some gunshots on the Meuse, a rapid retreat to the Scheldt, followed by another on the Yser. In brief, a veritable flight. This same press comes to retake its campaign, on the same theme.38

That vented, he reminded the commission of his testimony before its 1928 predecessor. He had warned of the dangers of “a sudden irruption of a motorized, partially armored force … including tanks, armored cars, infantry on buses, [and] including bombing.” The advantages of such an invasion for the Ger- mans were that it kept the war as far from German industry as possible while seizing Belgian industry and disrupting Belgian mobilization and concentration. The covering forces responsible for parrying or delaying this invasion were made up of frontier garrisons who, as other generals also testified, were responsible for protecting the mobilization and concentration of the army.39 The problem at the time was that because of the ten-month length of ser- vice40 Belgium only had mobilizable garrisons during the summer; at other times of the year Belgium was essentially wide open. Things were not that much better in 1936. The former situation could be justified by the climate of

36 “Lieutenant Général TASNIER,” pp. 7-8; Vangansbeke, pp. 10-11. 37 “Lieutenant Général TASNIER,” p. 7. 38 Galet to the Commission Mixte, Sixième séance. Mardi 9 Juin (Matin), p. 44, in MRA- BAFM 5448 (185-14a-6983), sous-farde “Documents relatifs à l’élaboration des Cffes.R.” 39 Galet to the Commission Mixte, Sixième séance. pp. 44-45. 40 This was changed to eight months after the 1927-1928 Mixed Commission. Belgian Mili- tary Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 36. 138 Chapter 5 the time: there was much clamor in the Parliament for six-month service and so ten months was a victory. Also, they were living in the time of Locarno, when “everybody was at peace” and Germany only had ten divisions, none of which were in the Rhineland.41 The main factors differentiating 1936 from 1928 were: “German rearmament,” which would increase the numerical strength of the Wehrmacht to the extent that now the Belgians had to worry about the German right flank extending as far as Antwerp, a possibility unthinkable in 1928 with the 100,000-man Reichs wehr; “the intensive motorization, the constitution of great motorized units,” giving surprise attacks more punch and requiring the augmentation of Belgian frontier posts; and “the suppression of the demilitarized zone” bringing the Ger- man army to the Belgian border.42 General Galet’s solution was to rely on “troops in place, thus, of frontier garrisons.” He argued against deploying them “en cordon,” thus, dispersing their power. He recommended creating strong and mobile detachments capable of holding their positions and counterattacking into the flanks of an enemy advance seeking to bypass them. These detachments would gain much of their strength by being supported by fortifications, which “constitute thus, with their garrisons, the framework of the line of protection.” He took the opportunity to condemn the poor state of the Antwerp forts compared with the Namur and Liège forts which were being modernized and improved.43 General Galet, like the other generals, saw the most vital sector of the Bel- gian defense as the area between Liège and Antwerp. This area was the likely German target because a German invasion there would skirt the eastern Bel- gian fortifications and lead straight into the heart of the country. He declared that the 80 km between the Antwerp and Liège fortresses was too long to spread troops out from garrisons in those cities. He proposed to keep an active division in permanence at the training camp of Beverloo to cut the length of the interval in half. Because the Belgian army had a strength of six active divisions and a Cavalry Corps, thus, effectively seven divisions, each division would only spend about seven weeks in the Beverloo camp where they would also be completing their training. He saw no problems with having troops in training in the winter because long nights were favorable for instruction and it didn’t get too cold anyway; they would just need to add central heating to the bar- racks. General Galet envisioned a fifteen-km long, well-chosen alert position, strengthened by reliance on the area’s canals and reinforced with fieldworks,

41 Galet to the Commission Mixte, Sixième séance, p. 46. 42 Ibid., pp. 46-47, emphasis in the original. 43 Ibid., p. 47. The 1936 Mixed Commission 139 for the Beverloo division “to hold at all costs.” Thus, the most likely sector for a German irruption would be defended by three divisions – at Antwerp, Bever- loo, and Liège – performing coverage as opposed to the two divisions currently watching the sector (the other four active divisions being deployed along the Albert Canal (between Antwerp and Liège; this canal was built both for the facilitation of waterborne commerce and for defense). The cavalry regiments at Brasschaet and Beverloo and the First Lancers in Liège would constitute the mobile forces capable of counterattacking the flank of a German thrust. There would also be a strong mobile force in Brussels to throw itself in front of an enemy raid. General Galet’s coverage plans, like those of the other generals, also counted on destructions, this time in the areas between the divisions.

This disposition seems to me theoretically efficacious: impossibility of the enemy passing in the 40-kilometer intervals without having previously eliminated one of these posts because of the menace which weighs on their flanks; sufficient force in each of these posts to resist the forces which attack them; permanent coverage thus assured, if the fortresses possessed trained troops at all times.44

However, General Galet identified several key issues that would need to be resolved for his scheme to work: the Antwerp fortresses needed to be rebuild as the Liège fortresses were and the regiments filling the defenses would need to be real regiments. Defining an ‘active’ division as one with “at least one trained class under the colors,” General Galet noted that with service of only one year, Belgium’s ‘active’ divisions were only comparable to German or French ‘active’ divisions for six months out of the year; “in other words, our six divisions called active correspond to the active and first reserve divisions of great countries.” The Belgian 7th-12th divisions, called ‘first reserve’ divisions, were in effect only comparable to third and fourth reserve divisions of the great powers. More- over, limited Belgian manpower meant that in order to field six ‘active’ divisions, each division would consist of only 7,300 soldiers per division, as compared to France’s twenty active divisions of 12,000 poilus and Germany’s thirty-six divisions of 13,000 Landsers. And in one of Minister Devèze’s actions that had triggered the greatest resistance from chief of staff Lieutenant Gen- eral Nuyten, many special units, like the Unités cyclistes frontières and the Chasseurs ardennais were being created, reducing the number of men per unit. Although General Galet was imperfectly informed on events in the army and did not have the exact numbers of troops and establishments, “I am terrified to

44 Galet to the Commission Mixte, Sixième séance, pp. 47-48. 140 Chapter 5 see that there are only forty men per company. The infantry regiments would thus have only 700 soldiers,” or about half the usual complement. The expansion of units also meant that officers and NCOs must have been spread very thin; “I am not exactly informed, but I am not without apprehensions in this regard.” He warned against a return to the pre-1914 situation, where Belgium had many units which existed essentially on paper, like the fortress battalions “which served only to procure the enemy … prisoners. And this is in the middle of Europe in arms that we delude ourselves.” Further, General Galet estimated that only the six active divisions were capable of taking the field; the ‘first reserve’ divisions were in practice only suited to garrison fortresses.45 General Galet then waded into the debate over ‘integral defense of the territory,’ which he defined as the defense of all areas on the Belgian side of the border.

Here appears a first difference with the formula “integral defense of the frontier”; the latter entails, I suppose, the protection of the integrality of the localities which happen to be behind the frontier. But the frontier is a line and the battlefield is a zone, even deeper and deeper; consequently, in order to defend integrally the frontier it requires that [coverage] units be behind it.46

Contrary to what General Hellebaut and Minister Devèze proposed, he, Galet, was in favor of the concentration of the army to face the enemy thrust rather than extending the army to cover the length of the Arlon-Antwerp frontier. “In order to defend ‘the integrality of the territory,’ we will defend nothing.” He condemned the Chasseurs ardennais, Unités cyclistes frontières, and other local units, the creations of “particular interests,” for dispersing the strength of the army. He asked, presumably acidly, “is it not to be feared, now that Limburg is threatened, that the creation of chasseurs campinois will be demanded?” He warned the enemy would appear in force at the place of its choosing and could only be stopped by opposing to it an equivalent force and that battle would decide the fate of all parts of the country, regardless of the provincial units raised to defend them. “It is necessary to know to sacrifice for the principal. It is only at this price that the army can be truly reunited.” If frontier areas had to be very lightly defended in order to concentrate the army, the special units in place would have had no real effect on the outcome of the climactic battle, and thus on the fate of their regions, while if they were reunited with the main

45 Galet to the Commission Mixte, Sixième séance, pp. 48-51. 46 Ibid., p. 51. The 1936 Mixed Commission 141 body of the field army, they could help defeat the invasion, saving the country, including their regions. In any case, Belgium could not afford to fortify effectively the entire frontier region. General Galet dismissed plans for an eighteen- division army because it would involve spreading men and officers too thin and because Belgium simply couldn’t arm all the troops. “In a word, the military state of a façade has been constituted.” He identified another way his ideas departed from that of “‘the integral defense of the frontier’; in that the latter entails a battlefield extending on all the frontier.”47 General Galet also rejected the idea of the proponents of “the integral defense of the territory” that the battle must be waged near the frontier regardless of ratio of friendly and enemy forces. This was one of General Galet’s main ideas: the ratio of forces. He asked the commission a hypothetical question:

The army finding itself on a good battlefield, chosen as close to the frontier as possible, facing the attack, well reunited, that is to say, occupying a front in rapport with its effectives, to what conduct must it hold?48

For him, as opposed to his opponents, the conduct varied. If the enemy did not overly outnumber the Belgians, in other words, if the Belgians could conceivably stop the aggression, they must fight the main battle in position. If, however, the enemy greatly outnumbered the Belgians, or if allied aid was slow in arriving, and the battle was lost before it was begun, the army must stage a fighting withdrawal, delaying the enemy as much as possible, until the ratio of forces was more favorable. Again, he disagreed with the idea of ‘integral defense of the territory;’ it “does not measure the forces; even in this last unfa- vorable eventuality, it accepts a battle lost in advance.” He warned against promising people in the most threatened areas near the frontier that they would be protected; the Belgian army simply could not do it. He brought the members of the commission back to August 18, 1914, when the Belgian army effectively reunited and facing the line of the German advance, having fought for fifteen days on the Gette River in front of Brussels, confronted alone two German armies because the Allied aid had not yet arrived. King Albert, then commander-in-chief of the army, totted up the opposing forces: 100,000 for him and 500,000 high-quality troops for the Germans. Despite the advice of that era’s partisans of ‘integral defense of the frontier’, Albert concluded that if he fought in place he would give the Germans both the army and the capital while if he withdrew to the fortified place of Antwerp he would give the

47 Galet to the Commission Mixte, Sixième séance, p. 52, emphasis in the original. 48 Ibid. 142 Chapter 5

Germans the capital but save the army. General Galet challenged everybody to disagree with the king’s decision. “If not, the formula of integral defense is definitively judged.”49 Mr. Mundeleer, a commissioner from the Chamber, asked General Galet if the latter “feels that it is necessary, at the present time, to augment the time of service for the needs of coverage?” Galet responded by urging two years under the colors as the most productive solution given financial concerns although it was the Parliament that would have to make the final decision and the chief of staff would just have to do the best with what he had. Galet’s solution would work with one year’s service, “but imperfectly.” However, Lieutenant General Van den Bergen, then the chief of staff, objected to Galet’s phraseology. The commission had been established to determine what the army needed for an effective defense and General Van den Bergen was there “to establish the best military solution for this problem and to deduce from that the minimum service necessary for that solution to be applicable.” Only if the Parliament did not give him what he needed would he have to do the best with what he had. What service time would General Galet need to implement his three-division coverage scheme? One year, and he, General Galet, “had had to content himself with less when [he] was chief of staff.” However, the army would be dependent on the government starting mobilization in time. General Van den Bergen emphasized that point to the commissioners – that it was up to the government, in cases of international tension, to recall a class of trained reservists in enough time to man the coverage of General Galet’s scheme. “I am anxious to emphasize that reserve. It is important.”50 General Galet’s successor as chief of staff, Lieutenant General Nuyten, also testified before the commission. He condemned the triumph of the idea of the ‘integral defense of the territory’ and declared that he had resisted it as much as possible “while remaining in the limits of my prerogatives and of my responsibilities.” He reminded the Commission that King Albert, by refusing repeated French insistences that he risk his army in ill-conceived offensives, had pre- served the army. In a 1918 document distributed to the ministries and the army, he had consecrated the strategy of the ratio of forces, onto which General Galet had faithfully held. The doctrine had held until three years previously and was “the base of all the works of the General Staff” and military education. Unfor- tunately, the debate was not a “school discussion,” but had sunk hundreds of millions of francs into permanent fortifications along the frontier. General

49 Galet to the Commission Mixte, Sixième séance, pp. 52-53, emphasis in the oiginal; Wanty 1: 142. 50 Mr. Mundeleer to the Commission Mixte, Sixième séance, pp. 54-55. The 1936 Mixed Commission 143

Nuyten added that recent developments in Germany had not invalidated the concept of the ratio of forces. He complained that the supporters of ‘integral defense of the territory’ would not settle for defending as much as possible of the country, which was possible, but promised to protect the entirety of the country, regardless of enemy strength, which was not. It was simply not possible for the Belgians to hold the German army at the border.

Good sense indicates that no human enterprise can be led to a good end without taking into account the reactions that its realization inevitably provokes. In the military domain, this observation expresses itself by the fact that one can decide on the use of one’s own forces only in consideration of the means of which the adversary disposes; in other terms, it is necessary, in war, to operate in function of “the ratio of forces” present.”51

He reminded the commission that in 1914 the Anglo-French forces coming to their aid were driven back and the Belgian army was saved by being able to withdraw to the Fortified Position of Antwerp. 52 He summarized the plan for ‘integral defense of the territory’ as based entirely on the assumptions that the invader will be German (although, in his testimony, he seems to share this hypothesis); that defenses must be oriented towards the east; that no invasion will be tolerated and for that reason the defenses must be as close to the frontier as possible; that if the enemy invades north of the river Vesdre (i.e. between Verviers and Antwerp), the decisive battle will be fought there despite the lack of any foreign military aid; and that if the enemy invades to the south of the Vesdre, the battle will be fought with guaranteed French aid. Those who disagreed were accused of treason and the desire to hand over much of Belgium to the Germans.53 He pointed out that no Belgian general had ever proposed deliberately abandoning the frontier region, or, indeed, any region that could be protected. The problem with the supporters of the ‘integral defense of the territory’ was that they went beyond this reasonable proposal to insist on no retreat and on the necessity of delivering the decisive battle despite the imbalance in forces, substituting determination for force. They believed that the spending of hundreds of millions of francs on 300km’s worth of frontier fortifications “is susceptible to compensate for the crushing superiority of the German effectives

51 LTG Nuyten to the Commission Mixte, #58-61, in MRA-BAFM 5448 (185-14a-6983), sous- farde “Documents relatifs à l’elaboration des Cffes. R, Emphasis in the original.” 52 LTG Nuyten to the Commission Mixte, #61-62. 53 Ibid., #62. 144 Chapter 5 and … [the idea] contains the seed of a national disaster.” He shared General Galet’s belief in the necessity of uniting the army along the main axis of the enemy advance “while covering as best as possible the major part of the country, [which] is the most hindering for the enemy.” He, like the other generals, identified the eastern and northeastern regions as the most threatening in the assumption of a German invasion, and called for concentrating “in the [northeast] of the country” in that case. He condemned the “weakening of the main part of our forces” by taking troops away to defend secondary sectors like the Ardennes. He who had opposed the creation of the Chasseurs ardennais as chief of staff now singled them out as a division, 15% of the infantry effectives, lost to the defense of the country because they would be cut off in the southeast of the territory, far from the decisive battle (he thought). He wished the money spent creating them and the Unités cyclistes frontières had been spent on more productive things. He invited the commissioners to compare Belgium with the Netherlands. Does the latter “carry important forces to … Dutch Lim- burg, to the detriment of the direct defense of the heart of the Netherlands?” He urged focusing on what was really strategically important even at the risk of losing “the accessory.”54 He complained that the proponents of ‘integral defense of the territory’ wanted to “disperse” troops while they should be concentrated, wanted troops in a “cordon” while they should be deployed in depth, called for troops to be “immobile” rather than maneuverable. He predicted that a defensive line organized by the ‘integralists’ would be “pierce[d], envelope[d], and roll[ed] up. In fact, the integral defense of the territory equals the negation of the conduct of arms” and threatened Belgian security.55 General Nuyten also condemned the belief (shared by many of the generals) that the German main drive would go through Belgian Luxembourg. He argued that an invasion passing by way of Dutch Limburg and Dutch Brabant was “the most dangerous direction of attack.” This invasion would turn, and thus render “absolutely useless,” all the fortifications erected along Belgium’s eastern frontier between Arlon and Aachen in Germany. The Germans would only have to worry about the decrepit fortresses of Antwerp and the fledgling Ghent bridgehead; 578 million francs of the 600 millions spent on defensive works by Minister Devèze would thus have been wasted (the rest having gone to projects that would actually help the field army); “is this the goal of a rational defensive organization?” He condemned Minister Devèze’s cherished fortifications on the Herve Plateau and urged an army concentration in depth in the northeast

54 Nuyten to the Commission Mixte, #62-64, 68. 55 Ibid., #65. The 1936 Mixed Commission 145 of the country; the only forces not concentrated would be the garrisons of the Liège, Namur, and Antwerp fortified positions. However, if the Germans were known to be respecting Dutch neutrality, the army could concentrate east of Liège because its left flank would be covered by neutral Dutch Limburg. As for what the field army would do next, “it would be conditioned by the rapport of forces in presence and not by the ideology of a sentimental doctrine.”56 As for coverage, General Nuyten recommended going back to the pre- ‘integral defense of the territory’ plan in which units would remain together in their garrisons to defend their neighborhoods. This was the best way to handle a surprise enemy attack because the existence of the nodes of resistance would force the aggressor to limit the depth of his advance and would protect the vital sectors of the country. If the enemy advanced past these nodes, the nodes could counterattack into the aggressor’s flank and cut off the main body of his troops. The ‘integralists’ (to coin a phrase) were, on the contrary, dispersing the covering forces along the frontier to the extent that they were far too spread out to stop an attack by a modern army. He noted that there were already complaints about the pillboxes being erected along the eastern frontier to protect these covering troops: “conscientious and experienced officers have declared to me that they will never close their men there in case of hostilities.” These pillboxes were also known by the enemy, who could easily plan the reduction of these vulnerable shelters.57 General Nuyten offered several contingencies for coverage. In case of a surprise motorized invasion, he, like General Galet, recommended keeping a trained division at Beverloo in permanence to help manage the long stretch between Antwerp and Liège and holding a small number of defensive nodes garrisoned by trained troops: the fortified positions of Antwerp, Namur, and Liège. The best way to deal with a raid would be to send the active army to hold “Brussels, Antwerp, Beverloo, Liège, Namur, Mons, and Ghent.” The enemy force would exhaust itself in trying to take the positions and would not dare to bypass them, thus offering its flanks to counterattacks by motorized Belgian formations, including the cavalry regiments. However, General Nuyten did not believe the enemy attack would come without warning and the diplomats would have to warn the army in advance of the signs and the government would have to take appropriate action.58 General Nuyten argued that it would be impossible for any covering force deployed on 300km of border to stop an enemy motorized invasion; even based

56 Nuyten to the Commission Mixte, #67-68. 57 Ibid., #69. 58 Ibid., #73-74. 146 Chapter 5 on a water obstacle like a junction canal with its bridges blown, the covering forces would only delay the aggressor (who would have pioneers and water- crossing technology) for a few hours. He warned against copying the French; Belgium could not, in money or trained troops for a garrison, afford a Maginot Line. Belgium also could not hope to gain air superiority. He closed by noting that Belgium would suffer greatly “whoever are our allies or our enemies” and that consequently, “before thinking of the best fashion of defending the country, let’s think first of the best fashion of not having to defend it.” The way to do that was to make the Belgian army strong enough that Belgium was not the easiest way for one adversary to get at the other. Belgium must make it clear that it is acting impartially, is focused on its “vital interests,” and will defend them.59 General Cumont reminded the Commission that he had recommended eighteen months service. It was not perfect, but would have represented an advance at the time. He warned of the potentially disastrous fate of a Belgian army left to its own devices against a larger enemy and urged an alliance to guarantee effective aid in case of invasion. As far as where to defend the country, he left it up to the government.60 Another former chief of staff, Lieutenant General Maglinse, called for an increase in service time to eighteen months in order that the reserve divisions could be useful, especially in a defensive position. He also praised Minister Devèze’s improvement of regular officer training and called for it to continue. He urged the doubling of the cadres of the active regiments, especially in the higher ranks. “In each active regiment there must be a lieutenant colonel and one or two battalion commanders who would take command of the reserve regiments upon mobilization.”61 Devèze, buoyed by the Commission’s president’s receipt of messages from veterans organizations supporting ‘integral defense of the territory,’ then spoke, declaring that there was not much difference between the two rival conceptions of defense and asserting nobody expected to spread out the first twelve mobilized divisions along 300 kilometers of the border between Maes eyck and Arlon. At the same time, he rejected Galet’s opinions stated earlier and argued there was no question of erecting a Maginot Line along the eastern border because Belgium had neither the money or the trained troops. Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen observes that this new stance, driven by the need to oppose

59 Nuyten to the Commission Mixte, #71, 74; Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 287. 60 Commission Mixte, quoted in Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 304-305. 61 “Audition du Général Maglinse,” p. 6, in MRA-BAFM 5448 (185-14a-6983), sous-farde “Doc- uments relative à l’elaboration des Cffes.R”. The 1936 Mixed Commission 147

General Galet, amounted to a 180-degree shift from what Devéze had made his career claiming and an admission that he had wasted the money he had gotten to defend the frontier. Nevertheless, he continued to insist on his plan. Raoul van Overstraeten noted the minister’s contribution and lamented that with all the good Devèze had done for the military, he was taking away from it by insisting on ‘integral defense of the territory,’ that had been impossible since 1931 and threatened France as well as Belgium.62 It is noteworthy that all the Belgian generals who testified before the commission correctly expected the invasion to come from Germany and to be led with mechanized or motorized units backed by powerful air units, especially bombers. They were less perspicacious in expecting the main German thrust to drive through Belgium’s eastern and northeastern frontiers as the Germans had done in World War I. At most, the Germans would expand their flank to drive through the Netherlands as well, something they had chosen not to do in 1914. In 1936 the Belgians did not expect an invasion through the Ardennes. Nor did the Belgians expect to have to fight the French. Rather, they expected the French to come to their aid, again as had happened in 1914. Whatever passions animated civilian political discourse, the generals did not see the French as a threat. One of the two Flemish-speaking members of the commission, Mr. Marck, returning to an earlier question, raised this point in asking General Galet if he felt Belgium’s defenses should be oriented in a single direction (against Germany) or more “general.”

Certain people feel that the danger menaces [us] from the east side, while others are of the opinion that our defense must be organized on all our frontiers in order that it fits in with our foreign policy. I will not hide from you that I envisage above all the question of the Franco-Belgian military accord.63

In response, General Galet requested time to reflect before giving his answer. On August 4, he sent the president of the Commission a letter in which he declared

The true responsibilities for the fortification plan at this moment in the course of realization, and which is the translation of a unilateral foreign policy that I have always reproved as harmful to the national interest, are

62 Commission Mixte, quoted in Ibid., 2: 305-306; Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 305-306; Diary entry for June 20, 1936, in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, p. 222. 63 “Commission Mixte, Sixième séance,” p. 53. 148 Chapter 5

necessarily found above all among the small Parliamentary group directed by Mr. Devèze.64

He complained that this cabal had achieved power because its agreement was necessary to keeping a “weak” Catholic-Liberal coalition in power. Now that there was a strong tripartite government including the Socialists, there was no further need to placate the people around Devèze.

The whole explanation of the vicissitudes of the fortification plan of the country and even of the whole military question in the course of the last five years finds itself in these observations on the grouping of political forces [my emphasis].65

He also rejected Devèze’s assertion that he had proposed this plan of fortifications. In fact, he had called in 1931 for 700 million francs with 280 million to go to the eastern frontier, 290 millions to go to Antwerp, and 130 million to go to Ghent, whereas Devèze called for 660 millions, almost all of which to go to the eastern frontier and nothing to go to Antwerp or Ghent.66 The generals were unanimous in urging extending the time of service rather than keeping soldiers with the colors longer than promised. To highlight this measure’s importance, Major Paris reported to his ambassador on July 24, 1936, that there had been three incidents of complaining in Belgian units, including in the cyclist battalion in Tervuren.

The [Belgian] General Staff affirm that these incidents had no mutinous character and were quickly and easily suppressed by the regimental officers. The Staff did admit that the emergency measure of retaining certain troops with the colours is a cause of grievance which is almost legitimate and which has proved a good opportunity to the Communists for foment- ing discontent.67

After a six-week intermission, the commission returned to its work on July 17. The cast of characters had changed. Lieutenant General Denis, now the minister of national defense, was replaced by Lieutenant General Jacqmain and

64 Galet to Hubin, August 4, 1936, pp. 1-3, in MRA-BAFM 5448 (185-14a-6983), sous-farde “Documents relative à l’elaboration des Cffes.R”. 65 Ibid. 66 Galet to Hubin, pp. 1-3. 67 D.K. Paris to Sir Esmond Overy, Brussels, July 24, 1936, p. 3, in MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII, #142. The 1936 Mixed Commission 149

Albert Devèze had taken the spot previously held by fellow Liberal Paul-Émile Janson. The Liberals returned to the theme of Germany being the only threat and France being the greatest support. Senator Fernand Demets, who counted (against all likelihood and evidence) on immediate French aid, also advocated staff talks with the French, British, and Dutch. A Socialist deputy warned that although he agreed with Demets, there were others, whose attendance was less than exemplary, who argued against reliance on France. Jean Vanwelken- huyzen comments that the lack of attendance on the part of some Flemish delegates who felt set apart represented a protest against the Commission, which was not so for the Walloons of poor attendance. Brussels Socialist senator Henri Rolin proposed a more diplomatic version of Demets’s proposition, calculated to appeal to Flemings and Walloons. This would also avoid worsening tensions and complicating the negotiations for a new Locarno Pact by sin- gling out Germany.68 In the morning meeting on August 25, Georges Hubin and a Flemish Social- ist named Vandermeulenbroucke gave the Socialist position on service time: if every Belgian man did his duty – and the twelve thousand men per year who got exemptions did their duty as well – he would not need to serve as long as some were demanding. Tensions rose and in the afternoon, the Commission members divided not according to language but according to clerical or anti- clerical as the latter opposed breaks for large families as encouraging political Catholicism. The two Flemish Christian Democrats, Hendrick Marck and A. Van Hoek, were so offended that they offered their resignations. In fact, however, only 2,637 men had been exempted in 1935 for having large families. As General Maglinse had testified, coverage was a matter of trained troops, not just of raw numbers.69 Vandermeulenbroucke referred back to General Van den Bergen’s testimony that he had requested twelve infantry divisions with the Chasseurs ardennais and the Cavalry Corps then being motorized and suggested that it sounded like an offensive military that would violate the sense of the August 4 resolution voted on by the Commission in favor of a defensive posture. Such an army could find itself under the command of one of Belgium’s allies. Vandermeulen- broucke was playing the fear-of-France card but Devèze responded that there had been no consideration of such a possibility or of the Belgian army fighting

68 Commission mixte 1936, Compte rendu des travaux, quoted in Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 292-294. He points out that Demets seems to have been unaware of the staff talks in London in April and Paris in May. Ibid., 2: 292-294. 69 Commission mixte 1936, Compte rendu des travaux, quoted in Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 314-315; Ibid., 2: 315. 150 Chapter 5 on foreign soil but rather foreign units would come under Belgian command in Belgium.70 Another Socialist argued for the “exclusively defensive” nature of the Bel- gian army and asserted that consequently the best means of defense would be “destructions … along the frontier” as well as a strong air force. One of his colleagues posited that Belgium did not need a large army, just one able to delay the enemy until Allied assistance arrived. As Vanwelkenhuyzen observes, the Socialists had to demonstrate that they had tried everything to defend the country short of placing soldiers under the colors longer or increasing the size of the military.71 The Commission closed its proceedings on September 8, 1936. It recommended giving coverage first priority in spending, increasing the time of service to eighteen months for the infantry (except machine gunners) and twelve months for the other arms, and creating units staffed by volunteers to protect the frontiers. Certain military establishments were to be moved to a safer location. The fortified position of Antwerp was to be modernized and the Liège and Namur positions were to be finished. The Albert Canal was to be completed as soon as possible and integrated into the defensive system. It was, in fact, to be the main line of defense until 1940 when concerns about the arrival of Allied troops caused this line to be established more towards the middle of the country. The Commission called for a defensive disposition that was not aimed at any one country. This was necessary to keep the country out of war and to keep the peace between Flemings and Walloons, as was the achieve- ment of true linguistic equality in the military. The Commission concluded by asserting that the Flemish opposed military ties with France and it was thus vital to show that Belgium’s defense was neither aimed at nor especially friendly towards any neighboring powers.72 The Commission declared to the Belgian people that the military needed another 2,750 million BF (2.18 times the entire 1936 military budget) to modernize the military, with special emphasis on acquiring anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons (respectively 94 million and 425 million BF), including passive anti-tank obstacles as well as new anti-tank guns. As the Parliament could not agree on drafting a law based on the Commission’s recommendations, a new ‘Committee of National Security’ was formed by Auguste De Schryver,

70 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 314-316; Commission mixte 1936, Compte rendu des travaux, quoted in Ibid., 2: 315-316. 71 Commission mixte 1936, Compte rendu des travaux, quoted in Ibid., 2: 316; Ibid. 72 Crahay, pp. 176-177; Contribution à l’etude de la question royale and Annales (Chambre) 1936/7, quoted in Kieft, p. 130. The 1936 Mixed Commission 151 a Flemish Catholic representing Ghent, who would go on to become the minister of economic affairs on May 10, 1940 and minister of the interior in the Belgian government-in-exile, Henri DeMan, the Socialist minister of finance, and (by now former minister) Devèze. The Committee responded to increasing German militarization by calling for the extreme growth recommended by the Commission.73 Money was also found to equip and organize the reserve divisions (numbers seven to twelve), which now became ‘first reserve’ divisions, identical to the active divisions. As Lieutenant General De Grox had noted to the commission, it would be futile to arm the ‘second reserve’ divisions if the active divisions and 1st Reserve divisions were “not equipped in a fashion to be able to struggle with chances of success against the eventual aggressor.” Part of this process involved dividing the active officers equally between the active and first reserve divisions to make the two interchangeable. The result was, according to Gen- eral van Overstraeten, to have “65-75%” of regimental officers reservists unfit for their tasks. Starting from 1936, reservists would be called up for one period of sixteen days, rather than two periods of eight days, during which entire divisions would be called up and trained in exercises from battalion to division scale. With two divisions being trained per year, it would take until 1938 for the full effect to be felt. Six new ‘second reserve’ divisions, equivalent to the French ‘Class B’ reservists, were raised (numbers 13 to 18) and equipped with the cast- off weapons of the first reserve divisions, including the virtually universally- detested First World War French Chauchat light machine guns, modified by the Belgians in 1930 (the FM 15-30), the ancient Colt machine guns, and old grenade launchers. These divisions lacked anti-tank guns and had only one artillery group. Most of their officers and NCOs were from the reserve, although some had to be drawn from active units, thus aggravating the already serious lack of active and reserve cadres. The senior officers were reservists or retired. The ‘second reserve’ divisions were initially assigned to the defense of Antwerp and Ghent although they would be mobilized and used like active units in 1939-40 “with deplorable results due to their antiquated armament and to their deficient staffing.”74

73 Vaesen, pp. 23-24; Gerard-Libois and Gotovitch, L’An 40, pp. 497-498. 74 Crahay, pp. 176-178; Lieutenant General De Grox, “Propositions & remarques relatives au ‘Projet de Textes de Resolutions à proposer à la Commission Mixte,” p. 1, in MRA-BAFM 5448 (185-14a-6983), sous-farde “Suggestions”; van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, diary entry for May 9, 1937, p. 260; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 51, 54; Rapport annuel 1936 [by] Major Paris [in English], p. 41, MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII. 152 Chapter 5

Two-and-a-half years later, Major Paris, the British military attaché to Bel- gium would observe that

[d]uring 1938, the full effects of the large-scale reorganisation of the Bel- gian army, which was initiated in 1936 and 1937, began to make themselves clearly felt. Its progress and the spirit animating all classes of the population prove that the national policy of independence has led to no lessening in all measures for defense. The reverse is rather the case.75

The Language Issue from the Mixed Commission to the War

The Mixed Commission had debated the language issue at length. It was still a sore subject. A professor in the university town of Louvain declared

The future of Belgium can not be assured if one does not take as [the] point of departure of all the manifestations of public life the duality of our population. The Flemish problem … . can no longer be eluded; the logical consequences of this duality can no longer be avoided.76

A Flemish deputy declared (in Flemish):

The thesis of [Flemish politician] M. Van Cauwelaert, namely that if ever he had to choose between Belgium and Flanders, he would choose Flan- ders, is that of the overwhelming majority of conscious Flemings … . Numerous would be those who, without doubt, would convert, if Belgium wanted to furnish proof that it understands the legitimate Flemish claims and that it does not want to make of the state the fatherland.77

He went on to declare that “Belgium must not want to pose as a fatherland. Flanders is the fatherland of the Flemings and Wallonia that of the Walloons. Belgium is a state, that is to say, the secondary thing. When the state wants to usurp the fatherland, it must fatally provoke reactions.”78

75 1938 Annual Report, (British) Foreign Office#371/22871/5540, page 332, MRA-Attaché Mili- taire Brittanique 80/3/XIII. 76 Mr. Van Goethem, quoted in “Chambre des Représentants, Session de 1936-1937, no. 255” in MRA-BAFM 24 (185-2-2), II, p. 2. 77 Mr. D’Haese, quoted in “CHAMBRE DES REPRÉSENTANTA-COMPTE RENDU ANALYTIQUE Séance du Mardi 25 mai 1937, p. 598 in BAFM 24 (185-2-2), VI. 78 Ibid. The 1936 Mixed Commission 153

An annex, probably prepared by Albert Devèze to answer earlier questions by Mr. Marck, set out the current state of affairs:

a) Regional recruitment is practiced in our army in the manner defined in article 6 of the militia law [of 1928]. (As much as possible, it is necessary to assign militiamen to garrisons situated at [most] 50 kilometers from their domicile.) b) This regional recruitment is tempered by certain impossibilities of realization … .79

A Flemish member of Parliament noted that the army was viewed very differently in Flanders and Wallonia:

In the Flemish lands, the army, being given the existing situation [of a perceived lack of linguistic rights for Flemish soldiers], is scarcely sympathetic. It can become so only if Flemings and Walloons there have the same rights, by the introduction of an organic linguistic equality that does not exist there at the moment. 80

Indeed, two Flemish deputies on the commission, Hendrik Frans Clemens Marck and A. Van Hoek, had, as we have seen, tried on August 25, 1936 to resign from the commission, citing (among other reasons) that the discussions were being held in French “and that too little interest is attached to the linguistic problem in the army and to the moral protection of the soldier.”81 The same MP also addressed major problems in the Belgian army: the lack of Flemish officers and the desire to use the army as a tool for social engineering to solve the ‘Flemish Question’. Mr. Van Hoek wanted a strong army and a unified Belgium:

It must not be forgotten that there is no good army without excellent chiefs. These latter must speak the language of their soldiers and be capable of uniting in the same sentiments as their troops. The integral

79 Annexe no. 2 aux réponses faites à M. Marck, Report of the Mixed Commission, 16e séance, p. 95. 80 Van Hoek to the Commission Mixte, 17e séance – Mardi 4 août 1936 (après-midi), Report of the Commission Mixte, p. 112. Testimony begins on p. 111. 81 Letter to Prime Minister van Zeeland, reproduced on page 552 of the Proceedings of the Commission Mixte, MRA-BAFM 5448 (185-14a-6983), s/f “documents relatif á l’elaboration des cffes.r”. Their request was denied. 154 Chapter 5

Flamandisation of military education, under a single direction, is alone capable of forming officers capable of commanding the Flemish units and of winning the heart of their soldiers. This Flamandisation will be the first step in the way of appeasement.82

Albert Devèze grudgingly accepted the idea of allowing studies in Dutch but opposed other proposals as leading to a duplication of military schools, officer career tracks, and even armies – one Flemish and one Walloon – and, eventually, “the end for the country.” General Van den Bergen, in rejecting the plea for a Flemish section in the école de guerre, pleaded for more time, explaining that the lack of Flemish officers and cadets was due to the lack of military preparatory schools in Flanders, which lack was being addressed by the creation of such a school in Antwerp. When there would be enough Flemish officers eligible there would be a Flemish section. As to the complaint that only French was used between officers, most officers were Francophone.83 The next afternoon, MM. Marck and Van Hoek presented a resolution for discussion that:

[e]xpresses the wish that, without more delay, a law realize, in our military organization, reforms which, taking into account the technical possibilities, by the action of the law and of the regulations, reforms be realized which, all in respecting the principle of the unity of the army, of its command and of its officer corps, and while taking into account the technical possibilities, definitively establish organic equality from the linguistic point of view, as well as an equal respect for the personality of the Fleming and of the Walloon.84

Mr. Marck, speaking in Flemish, went on to give the Flemish position at greater length: the Flemish wanted to preserve the political unity of Belgium and unilingualism in Flanders, Wallonia, and even in the German-speaking cantons, with the exception of greater Brussels, was a fait accompli recognized by lin-

82 Report of the Commission Mixte, p. 112. 83 Devèze to the Commission Mixte, Proceedings of the Commission Mixte, p. 112, MRA- BAFM 5448 (185-14a-6983), s/f “documents relatif á l’elaboration des cffes.r”; lieutenant general Van den Bergen to the Commission Mixte, Proceedings of the Commission Mixte, p. 114, MRA-BAFM 5448 (185-14a-6983), s/f “documents relatif á l’elaboration des cffes.r”. 84 Marck, Devèze, Van Hoek to Commission Mixte, Proceedings of the Commission Mixte, p. 114, MRA-BAFM 5448 (185-14a-6983), s/f “documents relatif á l’elaboration des cffes.r”. The 1936 Mixed Commission 155 guistic laws. In fact, those laws would reinforce the political unity of Belgium by making the Flemings feel like equal citizens of the state. 85 The Flemish supported unity of direction in the army as well as a single General Staff although the latter should be organized so that it could commu- nicate in Flemish with Flemish units. “We do not demand two armies but rather a linguistic regulation that does not make an abstraction of unification.” They did not want to impose Flemish at the expense of weakening the army. The Flemish wanted unilingual military districts in which troops stationed there would speak the local language and they wanted military education in Dutch. “Finally, we insist that relations between units [be conducted] in Flem- ish from top to bottom of the hierarchy. There, in general terms, is our program.” Devèze returned to the charge that there would be two officer corps although Flemish delegates reassured him that officers from major on up would be bilingual and there would only be one book of seniority and one advancement. He argued that if officers could not pass from units of one linguistic regime to the other there would in fact be two armies. Marck admitted that there were would be officers in both regions unfit to lead units in the other language because they would eventually forget that other language if it were not immediately used. Devèze noted that the linguistic situation was improving and that soon there would be enough Flemish officers issuing from unified military schools with Flemish and Walloon sections and remaining in a unified officer corps to permit real equality, especially since majors would still have to demonstrate their “profound knowledge” of both languages and so could pass from units of one linguistic regime to another. During its debate on the matter, the Chamber of Representatives observed that

The single advancement, inseperable from the principle of the homoge- nous and national army, requires that a vacant place be occupied by the most senior officer in useful order. It is thus necessary that every officer, and particularly the superior officer, can occupy any job coming to his arm, whatever its linguistic regime. The application of this principle is particularly important in a small army where the number of superior jobs is limited … . This unavoidable interchangeability is one of the essential reasons that require that the superior officer be bilingual.86

85 Mr. Marck, Chambre, Session 1936-1937, no. 255, p. 10. 86 Marck, Devèze, Van Hoek to Ibid; Chambre, Session 1936-1937, no. 255, p. 10. 156 Chapter 5

The resolution proposed by Marck and Van Hoek was slightly amended and passed and was taken up by the Belgian Chamber of Representatives in its session of 1936-7. The goal of the bill debated in the Chamber was “to integrate the army equally, as an educational and constructive element in the organization of the country.” The Army would thus be used as a tool for social engineering. Members of the Central Section argued over whether superor officers (majors and above) should demonstrate “proficiency” in both languages. The majority felt it necessary to require “effective” or “professional” knowledge of the non- native language although those commanding mixed units or brevetted to the General Staff should be proficient in both. The Central Section recommended some actions to take in furtherance of the goal. It called for using the division “as the linguistic unit … adaptation of the units of the army to territorial linguistic circumscriptions … [and] push[ing] regional recruitment … .” Flemish soldiers should be put into units where all matters were done in Flemish and Francophone soldiers should be in Francophone units. A. Van Hoek proposed bringing reservists into the active army to alleviate the lack of Flemish-speaking officers, where those reserve officers could take the entry examination in French although their training would be in Flemish. There should be separate military education for recruits, taught only in the specific language of the students, 55% of whom wanted to study in Flemish, 44.5% in French, and.5% in German; distributing officer-candidates and corporals proportionately to the number of militiamen produced by each region; and to promote or assign officers only to units in whose language they had effective knowledge, so Flemish troops would be commanded by their countrymen. This scheme of instruction and recruitment would permit the military and the administration to be “[m] ade Flemish from bottom to top. The same considerations are valid for French units.” Eventually, the system of unilingual regiments would be extended to unilingual divisions, facilitating communications with higher authority in either language. Each section in the Belgian army headquarters and in the Ministry of National Defense would have a balance between Flemish and Wal- loon officers or staffers. The Third Section (operations) of the headquarters would be divided into Flemish and Walloon subsections as would the headquarters of army corps, divisions, and mixed units. This was to be accomplished by 1944. Mixed garrison units would be eliminated. The recommended changes extended to the École militaire, which would be reorganized. Mr. Van Hoek called the changes “the essential point of the reform that we will discuss in the Chamber.” The École militaire would remain one school with a bilingual commander but it would have a Flemish section in which military education and commands were given in Dutch and in which Flemish students were grouped into separate units commanded in Dutch. Subaltern officers would be assigned The 1936 Mixed Commission 157 only to units of the language in which they passed their exams. Evolutions involving the entire school would be bilingual and professors would have to demonstrate their profound knowledge of the language of their section. The number of students would be limited by the needs of each language.87 This last provision led to much resistance from some Walloon advocates because it implied that Walloons desiring a military career would suffer from a quota system. Even a moderate Walloon delegate, the Liberal Émile Jennissen, who admitted the legitimacy of Flemish complaints and supported the measure (article 10), complained

It is certain, however, that the Walloons have consented to considerable sacrifices … . The Walloons will thus be victims of article 10 … . The Wal- loons are thrown back. We give in with good grace because we accept that the Flemish take the control levers which are proper to them.88

However, another Walloon representative, the Socialist Joseph E. G. Martel, called it “linguistic revenge” and complained that it would damage national security and block aspiring Walloon officers. A Flemish delegate, Mr. Ballet, speaking in Flemish, retorted that the Flemish had, in fact given up a lot by accepting the increase in service time and in any case the law did not go far enough. The mentality of the Francophone officer corps would need to be changed, with Flemish officers becoming much more common. The Chamber passed the bill on February 2, 1937 by a vote of seventy-nine to fifteen with fourteen abstentions.89 In its next term, the Belgian Senate (upper house of Parliament) took up the issue. The same fears that affected the military also affected some senators. Within the Commission on National Defense, one member opposed the proposed bill because he feared its provisions would be divisive while another two members expressed concern for the careers of Walloon officers due to the dif-

87 Chambre, Session 1936-1937, no. 255, pp. 2-3, 7-12, 14, 17-18, in MRA-BAFM 24/185-2-2/II. 88 Chambre des Representants, Session de 1936-1937, no 261, MRA-BAFM 24(185-2-2), V, pp. 6-7; Chambre des Representants, Session de 1936-1937, no. 255 in Ibid., 24(185-2-2), II, pp. 1, 3, 18; Chambre des Representants, Session de 1937-1938, No 168, “Projet de Loi relatif à l’usage des langues à l’armée”, Rapport Complementaire, MRA-BAFM 24(185-2-2), III, p. 6; Cham- bre des Representants, Session de 1936-1937, no 255, Ibid., II, p. 5; M. Jennissen to the Cham- bre des Representants, Chambre des Representants – Compte Rendu Analytique, Séance du mardi 25 mai 1937, Ibid., VI, p. 597. 89 M. Martel to Ibid., p. 598; Mr. Ballet to Ibid., p. 599; Chambre des Representants, Session de 1936-1937, no 255, p. 1, Ibid. 158 Chapter 5 ficulty of mastering Flemish. Nevertheless, the Commission recommended that the bill be passed as was and the bill was passed into law on July 30, 1938.90 The British military attaché to Belgium weighed in with his opinion that

The passing of the 1938 law removes any real grievance on the part of the Flemings. The linguistic question is not a cause of dissention in the Army, but, a system involving the use of two languages throughout the Army cannot fail to be a source of difficulty and military weakness both in peace and war.91

It then fell to the Belgian army to implement the new law. It would not be easy. As the chief of staff of the 2nd Infantry Division observed in September 1936, the lack of interest in language courses in Dutch “shows sufficiently that the importance of the profound knowledge of our second national language escapes the majority among them.” In fact, most of the officers who admitted a lack of profound knowledge of Dutch but were expected to have such ability were not taking the classes. In one Flemish regiment, “the colonel, the lieutenant-colonel, 3 majors, 2 commandants, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, have declared [themselves] unable to sit in war counsels” but only two of them wanted to take the language course! One of the greatest difficulties, one which would haunt the Belgian army, was enticing enough qualified Flemish candidates into the École militaire. Lieutenant General Denis stated to the Belgian Senate that of the seventy students admitted to the Artillery and Engineering section in 1938, only thirteen chose Dutch as their principal language, while only six-

90 “O.O. 2”, Ministere de la Defense Nationale, Service du Personnel Militaire, 2e Bureau, No. D. 26/410, MRA-BAFM 396 (185-14-823), documents 12, 13; Sénat de Belgique, Séance du 14 Juillet 1938, “Rapport de la commission de la Défense Nationale chargée d’examiner le Pro- jet de loi relatif à l’usage des langues à l’armée,” Documents Parlementaires (nr. 247), MRA- BAFM 24(185-2-1), XVII, p. 8; Ibid; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 59. 91 Sénat de Belgique, Session de 1939-1940, No. 26, pp. 8, 20; Letter from the MDN Service du Personnel Militaire to “All Military Authorities up to and including Corps commanders. Object. Use of languages in the army. Constitution of unilingual units or sub-units. Train- ing of unilingual draftees,” Fonds van Overstraeten, Box 2, sous-farde [folder] 20 Oct. (1939), document #535; Note from E.M.G.A. to the Commander of the III C.A., Archive GQG 3/II/8 (at the SGRS-SA); Letter from the 15ème DIVISION D’INFANTERIE/ ETAT-MAJOR/ 1er Bureau, dated le 31 Octobre 1939, Objet: Régime linguistique, Fonds van Overstraeten, Box 2, sous-farde 31 Octobre (1939), Service Générale de Renseignements- Securitè-Section/Archive; Le Commandant du C.T./14 D.I. to the General Staff commanding the T.S.T., MRA-BAFM 102 (185-14-53), Document 16; 1938 Annual Report, (British) Foreign Office#371/22871/5540, page 332, MRA-Attaché Militaire Brittanique 80/3/XIII. The 1936 Mixed Commission 159 teen of the 1939 class of seventy selected it. As for the Infantry and Cavalry section, eighteen of seventy candidates selected Dutch in 1938 and seventeen in 1939. French-speaking candidates were urged to shift to the Flemish section. Only seven answered the call in 1938 and ten in 1939. In other words, the Flem- ish sections had an additional forty-one unoccupied slots for Flemish speakers in 1938 and thirty-five in 1939. Van Hoek had suggested to the minister of national defense back in 1937 that in the short term, the former was prepared to accept that the short-term lack of Flemish officers be remedied by recruiting among Francophone reserve officers desiring to pass onto the active list. These officers would be allowed to take their entry examinations in French but would then be educated in Flemish. There were also provisions for courses for officers and non-commissioned officers that would be offered in the garrisons.92 A November 23, 1938 booklet from the Service of Military Personnel of the Ministry of National Defense spelled out the details of the courses for and the examinations on the knowledge of the second national language. Courses for candidate second lieutenants involved teaching grammar, developing vocabulary, especially military vocabulary, and the study of the “Judicial Guide.” They learned through “readings, dictations, translations, unseen translations, and compositions on military subjects; conversations on the military regulations, including the ‘Judicial Guide.’” Conversational Dutch would be bolstered by emphasis on conversation exercises. The candidate second lieutenants had to be able to write, discuss “military theories and regulations,” and function as judges in courts martial. Once graduated, there would be no obligatory use of the unit’s language in the mess. “However, if exceptionally, service communications are made in the locales, they must be made in the unit language.” March 1939 instructions from the minister of national defense provided for the exemption of captaine-commandants and senior officers from taking the exam in the second language if they passed the exam for major provided for by the 1928 law. This would be at the discretion of the corps or services commander after the officer in question demonstrated his proficiency – oral and written – with the language.93

92 The Commander of the 2nd I.D. to the commanders of the 5, 6, 9 [infantry regiments], 2 A[rtillery], and Dep[ot]/2 I.D., “Objet: Cours néerlandais pour officiers et sous-officiers, dated September 11, 1936, in MRA-BAFM 396 (185-14-823; Sénat de Belgique, Session de 1939-1940, Séance du 12 Décembre 1939, “Rapport sur l’application de la loi du 30 Juillet 1938 consernant l’usage des langues à l’armée,” No 26, Ibid., 24(185-2-2), XX, pp. 5-6. Chambre des representants, session de 1936-1937, no 255, Ibid., 24(185-2-2), II, p. 17. 93 “O.O. 2,” from Le Ministère de la Defense Nationale-Service du Personnel Militaire, 2e Bureau to “all military authorities up to and including commanders of companies or similar units; to treasury and administrative officers; to all Gendarmerie authorities (up to and 160 Chapter 5

The realization of this law would have important effects on the war-fighting ability of the Belgian army in May 1940. The lack of qualified Flemish officers, both active and reserve, greatly impacted the effectiveness of the army. Many subaltern officers who had studied in French had to be transferred to Flemish units because of this lack and in Flemish units officers who could not speak Dutch well lacked almost all authority. In addition, to fill the void of qualified Flemings, standards for Flemish officers had to be lowered compared to those of the Walloons. In an early 1939 conversation with Major General van Over straeten, minister of national defense Lieutenant General Denis complained that two well-known Flemish advocates in Parliament were calling for the promotion of incompetent reserve NCOs “who now burn to obtain the [rank] star of second lieutenant” to alleviate the shortage of Flemish officers.94 A senior officer of the 5th Infantry Division, training at Beverloo, was mark- edly unimpressed with the reserve officers while a colonel of the 6th Infantry Division complained to General van Overstraeten that only ¼ of his reserve officers were up to the task while one half were worthless. The Belgian army always faced a dramatic shortfall of cadres. This was in large part due to the low salaries they received compared, for example, to the French. There was a “brain drain” because of the better wages paid by private firms that even the Depres- sion could not cure.95 In his December 12, 1939, testimony before the Belgian Senate, Minister Denis addressed the reorganization of units as wholes. Many regiments in their peacetime organizations had their linguistic regime changed to accord with the law. Things got more complicated when the Belgian army mobilized in August-September 1939. Unilingual regiments could, by reason of the mobilization of old classes of recruit who spoke the other language, become mixed units. Still, the drive was in the other direction. An instruction from the Minis- try of National Defense’s Military Personnel Service to “All Military Authorities up to and including Corps commanders” and dated October 20, 1939 instructed those authorities that

including the commanders of cantons)”, dated 23 Novembre, 1938, Ibid., 396 (185-14-823), Documents 12, 13; Letter from Le Ministère de la Defense Nationale-Service du Personnel Militaire to “all military authorities up to and including commanders of companies or similar units”, dated 27 December, 1938, Ibid., Document 6, p. 2; Ibid., Document 5. 94 Chambre des Representants, Session de 1936-1937, no 255, pp. 17, 11; Crahay, pp. 238-239. Diary entry for October 1, 1939 in van Overstraeten, Albèrt I-Leopold III, p. 380. 95 Diary entry for December 15, 1939 in Ibid., p. 440; de Fabribeckers, pp. 222-223; Crahay, p. 34; Vaesen, p. 12. The 1936 Mixed Commission 161

After having created as many unilingual platoons (sections) as necessary, the corps commanders will change the cpls [sic], cpl candidates [sic], and draftees who do not know the language of the soldiers under their orders from their units … . After execution of these changes, the cpls eventually supernumary from the linguistic point of view will be passed by their new I.D. commander to another regiment of the same linguistic regime, or to the [replacement depot] in order to be appointed to the instruction of recruits while waiting to be able to fill a vacancy.96

This did not necessarily please the troops. Indeed, the Belgian General Staff sent the commander of the III Army Corps a note advising him that it would be impossible to achieve the unity of the linguistic regime in the 3rd, 4th, 8th, and 11th Infantry Divisions as mobilized “without harming unit cohesion” and asking him for instructions.97 Major General Baron de Hennin de Boussu Walcourt, an aide-de-camp of King Leopold and commander of the 15th Infantry Division (2nd reserve), complained about the order to create unilingual platoons, to transfer officers who did not speak the language of their soldiers, and to transfer soldiers who were not numerous enough to have their own unilingual platoons:

This measure has discontented officers, warrant officers, soldiers [both] Flemish and Walloon because all estimate it destructive of the good spirit and camaraderie which unites the soldiers of Flemish expression and of French expression and which all find not indicated.98

On the other hand, Captaine-Commandant [between US Captain and Major] Carette, the commander of the Transport Corps of the 14th Infantry Division, reported on April 15, 1940 that

the C. T. [Transport Corps]/14 D.I. [Infantry Division] includes in its strength 5 Walloon sergeants [maréchaux des logis]and 3 Walloon corporals [brigadiers]. Among these, 3 sergeants have asked to pass into a C.T. of French expression. The two other sergeants and the 3 corporals are

96 Belgian Senate, Parliamentary Documents, 1939-1940, nr. 26, 26 annexe, 12/12/1939, pp. 8, 20; MDN Service du personnel militaire to “All military authorities up to and including corps commanders”, dated October 20, 1939, in SGRS/S-A, FVO Boite 2, sous-farde “20 Oct. (1939), #535. 97 Ibid.; Note from E.M.G.A. to the Commander of the III C.A. SGRS/S-A, GQG/3/II/8. 98 SGRS-S/A “Fonds van Overstraeten,” boite 2, sous-farde 31 Oct. (1939), #627. 162 Chapter 5

desirous of remaining in the unit but have made no serious effort to learn the Flemish language. From this fact, they experience great difficulties in making themselves understood by the men and a certain discontent manifests itself in the case of these last.99

Unfortunately, the Belgian efforts towards full equality in the army were not completed before their great test arrived. Had the Belgians had more time to find and integrate qualified Flemish officers, their war effort would have been more effective because regular Flemish units would have had their recommended complement of ‘active’ officers. Reserve Flemish units would have been better led because the army would not have had to lower standards to attract warm bodies to staff those units. In addition, morale would have been higher and Flemish soldiers would have fought harder had they felt themselves truly equal citizens of the country they were defending and had they had time to rebuild unit cohesion in all the units affected by the personnel changes imposed by the 1938 language law.100

Other Commissions

In addition to the Mixed Commission, 1936 saw two other commissions: one charged with rewriting the main Belgian regulations, l’Instruction Provisoire sur l’Emploi des grandes unités (“Provisional Instruction on the use of large units”) and the Règlement sur le Service en Campagne (“Regulation on Field Service”) and the other charged with rewriting the rules on defense against tanks.101 The discussions of the first committee, made necessary by the motorization of the Cavalry Corps and the evolution of tank and airborne warfare in foreign armies since the last commission in 1926-1927, lasted almost a year and were

99 Le Commandant du C.T./14 D.I. to Grand Quartier Général Commandement des T.S.T., “OBJET: Remplacement des gradés wallons et renforts en gradés,” dated 15 April, 1940, in MRA-BAFM 102 (185-14-53). 100 An October 1939 document lists 182 Francophone infantry companies (including 3 to be created in 1940) against 189 Flemish and 1 German; 36 Francophone cavalry squadrons against 21 Flemish; 59 Francophone artillery batteries against 112 Flemish; 28 Franco- phone engineer companies against 25 Flemish; and 10 Francophone transportation companies against 22 Flemish and 1 German. LTC B.E.M. Tromme, “Objet: Application de la loi sur l’usage des langues à l’armée – Article 10, dated October 5, 1939, in MRA-BAFM 157/185- 14-189, p. 21. 101 Wanty, 1: 175. The 1936 Mixed Commission 163 dominated by Colonel van Overstraeten. Progress was made in clarifying the defense of extended fronts and the conduct of retreats as well as in providing artillery support to forward units and in giving greater emphasis to counterattacks. The commission gave much emphasis to defense against tanks and air attacks although the majority were skeptical about the effective use of paratroopers. “The new regulations were not strongly changed in their spirit; this latter remained prudent, methodical, formal, not formally excluding [overreliance on] formulae.” The other commission broke new ground and “the regulation that it left was very honorable.” It emphasized the use of terrain “to support a position” and “enunciated the principles and the procedures of passive defense and active defense.” This defense would rely on the Belgian-made 47mm anti-tank gun which had excellent armor penetration but a low rate of fire – only seven or eight rounds per minute – and short range. It was also difficult to put into firing condition or, more importantly, to take it back out again. It was lost if it engaged the enemy and its crew were on foot. These drawbacks were rectified in the development of the T-13, although there was a desperate lack of these – only twelve of the sixty supposed to equip infantry divisions 1-12 existed – and those that existed were forced in 1940 to assume roles, such as supporting counterattacks, for which they were not designed. 102 Also in 1936, each infantry regiment was given a weapons battalion consisting of a company of twelve 47mm anti-tank guns, a company of machine guns, and a battery of 76mm mortars while the divisional machine gun battalions and divisional mortar batteries were eliminated. General De Grox urged aug- menting the Belgian army’s anti-tank weapons with heavy machine guns that could be used against “lightly-armored vehicles” as well as “low-flying planes.”103 In light of Minister Devèze’s failure to get service time increased and his assertion that the army could not defend the country, King Leopold III established a ‘mixed commission’ with wide-ranging powers to examine the state of the army and suggest improvements. Despite the disagreements among general officers as to how to cover mobilization and defend the nation, which ranged from General Hellebaut’s proposal to spread an 18-division effectively militia army along the border to the Galet-Nuyten call for the concentration of a 12 infantry division army with mobile units that could counterattack into the flank of any enemy irruption, all the generals agreed that the only enemy they really had to fear was Germany. This viewpoint, however, was not shared by all the civilian members of the commission, especially the Flemish. Ultimately, the commission recommended an all-around defense as the best way of keep-

102 Wanty, 1: 175-177. 103 De Grox, “Propositions & Remarques,” p. 1. 164 Chapter 5 ing domestic peace and avoiding foreign wars. Also unpopular, especially among the Socialists and General Hellebaut, was the proposal for a dramatic increase in service time for some soldiers in order to assure coverage of the mobilization. However, this was achieved and coverage was declared the most important object of military spending. Among other things, the commission called for the perfection/completion of the fortified positions of Antwerp, Liège, and Namur and the addition of the Albert Canal into the defensive scheme once finished. The army was to be modernized and defense against tanks and aircraft improved. Six new ‘second reserve’ divisions would be created while the six ‘first reserve divisions’ would be improved to the status of the active divisions. Ultimately, opposition to these proposals, as written into a military bill, triumphed and it took a lot more work – and Leopold’s declaration that Belgium would be free from foreign entanglements – before the bill would be passed. The use of languages in the army was also studied minutely by the Mixed Commission and improvements were recommended and passed in the 1938 language law. The army, unfortunately, was not given enough time to fully implement the law and it suffered from the lack of reserve officers, especially Flemish reserve officers. This lack would have dire consequences for the Bel- gian army, in terms of fighting ability and morale, in May 1940. The year 1936 saw two other important commissions. The commission tasked with revising the army’s “Provisional Instruction on the use of large units” did not make many major changes although it did improve doctrine on retreats and counterattacks, the use of extended fronts, artillery support, and defense against armored and aviation threats. The new “Regulation on Field Service” dramatically improved doctrine on anti-tank defense, based on the 47mm anti-tank gun, including the mobile anti-tank gun called the T-13, and the intelligent use of terrain and passive as well as active measures. ‘independence’ And Its Origins 165

Chapter 6 ‘Independence’ and its Origins

The Belgian policy of ‘independence,’ similar to neutrality, followed between the end of 1936 and the German invasion in 1940, has been very controversial. Some historians, following the scapegoating of Belgium by her erstwhile allies in 1940, have blamed it for the defeat of the Allies. In fact, it was extremely popular in Belgium and allowed the military bill of 1936 to be passed by eliminating the objections of the Flemings and Socialists. It thus paved the way for a far stronger and more effective Belgian army. It also set out a new defense policy that aimed at France (at least nominally) as well as Germany. The chapter begins with a look at the rise of the extremist parties in both Flanders and Wallonia, made possible by the threatening international atmo- sphere. These parties gained a significant number of seats in the 1936 general election and jolted the major parties out of their complacency. As we will see, the three major parties eventually formed a new government led again by the ‘technician’ Paul van Zeeland. Albert Devèze was on the outside of the new government and dedicated himself to fighting for ‘integral defense of the territory.’ Meanwhile, the increasing aggressiveness of the Italians and Germans and the failure of the League of Nations were making Belgians rethink their reliance on collective security and even on the British and French, who had failed to stop Mussolini from seizing Abyssinia, a fellow member of the League. We look at the increasing number of arguments in favor of a new policy to keep Belgium out of war by facilitating army reform and avoiding being dragged into somebody else’s war. On October 14, King Leopold III made the seminal speech setting out the reasons for the new policy. Its adoption led to the passage of the military bill and to the Allied decision to grant Belgium the status of protected and not protector. One curious result of the new policy was that it required the Belgian army to prepare plans and defenses aimed against the French although none of the generals really expected to have to fight them. The world, and even Belgium, did not stop while the Commission was meeting. There had been a seismic shift in Belgian politics in the 1930s in which the Liberal party lost its preeminence while fringe parties made their appearances and, shortly, their disappearances. At the same time, the linguistic question receded as nationalists and fascists took center stage, shaking the Belgian political scene. The Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (Flemish National League) was founded in October 1933. Led by the Catholic teacher and former Frontist Staf de Clercq, the party attracted pro-Flemish Catholic junior civil servants, small

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004269736_008 166 Chapter 6 storeowners, employees, and a smattering of farmers and workers hard hit by the economic crisis – the same mix that in Germany supported Hitler. De Clercq and his followers wanted to establish an “‘organic democratic’ corporat- ist state.” There would be no political parties and the government would rule by decree. De Clercq was fervently anti-Belgian with German sympathies. He dreamed of a ‘Greater Dietsland’ including Flanders and Holland. The party peaked in 1936 (as did Léon Degrelle’s Walloon fascist Rexist party), winning 16 seats in the 202-seat Chamber, exceeding the Frontist results in the 1932 elections. The party then stagnated as De Clercq’s anti-Belgianism turned off potential defectors from the Catholic Party. He did appeal to the Germans and was subsidized by the German Propaganda Ministry. De Clercq himself, unbe- knownst to the rest of his party, cooperated with the Abwehr.1 He also went against his chief ideologist in pushing the VNV in an anti-Semitic direction.2 The other Flemish fascist party was the Verdinaso (Vereenigde Dietsche Nationaal-Solidaristen / United Dietsch National Solidarists), led by Joris van Severen, which appealed to “young intellectuals and farmers.” He was pro-Bel- gian, used the Belgian flag, and even drew financial support from the Franco- phone bourgeoisie and aristocracy. He believed in a conservative revolution led by a disciplined elite. As a solidarist, he believed in cross-order solidarity. Like De Clercq, van Severen dreamed of a ‘Greater Dietsland’ but he wanted to include Wallonia and northern France. Unlike De Clercq, van Severen supported Belgium during the period of mobilization. This did not save the latter from arrest by the Belgian authorities in May 1940. He was to be shipped to France along with Communists, German spies, Jews, and anti-Nazi German refugees. After being turned over to French authorities in Abbéville on May 20, he was shot by drunken French soldiers. His movement died with him.3 The results of the May 24, 1936, general election threw the Belgian political world into turmoil and alarmed the three traditional parties. German rearmament, the successful Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the failure of Anglo- French sanctions to protect the Abyssinians, and the ‘Brown’ and ‘Red’ perils (Nazism and Communism) led to a political mood where the new Rexist Party of Lèon Degrelle, the main author of the ferment that was the hallmark of internal politics in 1935-6, could take 21 seats in the 202-seat Chamber with 15.26% of Walloon votes, 18.50% of Bruxellois votes, and 7.01% of Flemish votes, mainly drawn from the Catholic Party. Despite its lack of sustained suc-

1 German military intelligence. 2 Witte, et al. pp. 149-150. 3 Witte, et al., p. 153. ‘independence’ And Its Origins 167 cess after 1936, Rex and its leader Degrelle had such an important impact at a critical time that they deserve closer examination.4 Rex was initially less part of a fascist strain than part of an international movement of “a more militant form of political Catholicism,” drawn from Catholic students at the University of Louvain who argued that Catholic ideals translated into political and social forms offered the true solution to the problems of the age. It was “a state of spirit, a mixture of sincere indignation, anti- democratic, but not totalitarian, attitude … and juvenile joy at overthrowing idols.” At the same time, the Catholic Party, although still very popular and a participant in the coalition governments, seemed adrift and was split between Flemish and Francophone elements as well as between the left-wing Christian Democrats and the conservatives. By the end of the 1920s many young, bour- geois Catholics, products of the Catholic educational system and the Catholic University of Louvain, were fleeing the party for which they lacked the respect of their elders. They felt the party was still stuck in the 19th century and lacked any ideas for a new Catholic policy. Many young, enthusiastic Catholics, disen- chanted with politics as usual, created new movements and journals that sought the replacement of liberal Parliamentarism by “a new political order based on the natural communities of region, profession, and family.” These Catholics were also affected by the Depression, whose resulting unemployment crisis meant that even the well-educated could not find jobs, and the rise of anti-Catholic movements abroad, such as the Spanish Republic and “‘pagan’ Nazism.” The solution appeared more than ever to lie in Catholic policies.5 One of these young groups was Rex, led by Léon Degrelle, the son of a provincial brewer from the Ardennes who served as the director of a small Catho- lic publishing house called Christus Rex, referring to the idea of Christ reigning on Earth, as so many young Catholics desired, from which he derived the name of his movement. Degrelle believed in “a more aggressive, intransigent Cathol- icism” and also believed he could boost sales by printing less narrow titles and appealing to a mass audience, even straying into politics. In 1933, the year he took sole charge of Christus Rex, he started assembling a crowd of young mili- tantly Catholic journalists and his journals were more openly political. He also started giving speeches and became a polished orator whose charisma and simple concepts obscured his lack of knowledge and political ideas.6

4 Conway, “Belgium’s Mid-Twentieth Century Crisis,” p. 580; Jean-François Crombois, “Finance, Économie et Politique en Belgique à la Veille de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, 1939-1940,” Cahiers d’Histoires du Temps Présent 5 (1998), p. 172; Vanwelkenhuyzen, 1936, p. 8; Höjer, p. 245; Vanwelkenhuyzen, 1936, pp. 11, 11n1, 12. 5 Conway, p. 5; Höjer, p. 246; DiMuro, p. 75; Conway, pp. 8-9. 6 Conway, pp. 9-10; DiMuro, p. 70; Höjer, p. 246. 168 Chapter 6

The Church did not approve of Degrelle’s politicizing and withdrew from Christus Rex, but Degrelle survived and focused his speeches on the failures of the Catholic Party. In the context of the Depression, he and his ideas had great traction and Rex became a political movement, culminating in the ‘Coup of Courtrai’ of November 1935 when he and some supporters stormed into a meeting of the Catholic Party leaders and condemned their political and moral failings, as well as their failure to unify the party in either the social or linguistic areas. Despite that, he did not break completely with the Catholic Party until some time later, when new Catholic Party president Hubert Pierlot refused to compromise with the Rexists and the twenty-nine year-old Degrelle decided to contest the 1936 general election with Rex as a force completely separate from its former parent party. This decision had major repercussions because it provoked the government to move elections up from the autumn in order to prevent the new movement from strengthening itself. In the end, Rexism greatly impacted the campaigning.7 As we have seen, Degrelle and his party lacked specific ideas, campaigning largely against politicians implicated in a spate of financial scandals and attacking the entrenched political interests. They did oppose any (perceived) internationalism such as Judaism and Marxism, as well as Freemasonry, which threatened the very bases of society. Although Rex reached out to the lower class, it never demonstrated any real understanding of the problems of the proletariat and mainly posed as the protector of the middle classes. Despite the lack of specifics, their “awkward fusion of Catholic moralism and … dema- goguery” gained a lot of support. Historian Martin Conway notes that “in the largely static world of Belgian electoral politics, [the Rexist success] was nothing less than a revolution” while the Catholic Party was the big loser, dropping from 38.5% of the votes in 1932 to 27.6% in 1936.8 Rex’s success did not last long, both because most of its supporters cast votes of protest and not of support of Rexist policies and because Degrelle had a tendency towards impulsiveness. Degrelle called for a ‘March on Brussels’ for October 1936. Intended to evoke Mussolini’s ‘March on Rome,’ it became an embarrassment because of the scant turnout and because those Rexists who did show up were too rowdy. As well, news came out that Degrelle had dealings with the Fascists and the Nazis. He also made an alliance with the VNV, which

7 Conway, p. 10; DiMuro, pp. 76-77; Höjer, pp. 246-247. 8 Conway, p. 11; DiMuro, p. 102; Conway, p. 12. Interestingly, one reason for Rex’s surprising success was a jury finding for Degrelle in a suit where he had been accused of libeling a rightist leader, Paul Segers, and in another suit where he was exonerated of the charge of libeling two other Catholic politicians. DiMuro, p. 79. ‘independence’ And Its Origins 169 alienated his largely Francophone supporters. In addition, the government, with Prime Minister van Zeeland at its head, and the three traditional parties launched a campaign against Rex, holding numerous meetings at which the danger of Rex was discussed. In March 1937, Degrelle announced he was running to replace a Brussels Rexist delegate and challenged the status quo. Bow- ing to pressure from the Socialists and Liberals, Prime Minister van Zeeland ran against Degrelle. Although he was virtually certain of victory, the election was important for how many votes Degrelle would receive – too many would be seen as a repudiation of the current system. Two days before the election, after Degrelle claimed that Cardinal van Roey, the highly influential cardinal of Mechelen (Malines), had not condemned his movement, the cardinal of Mechelen repudiated Rex and called on good Catholics to vote for van Zee- land, who won in a landslide 76% to 19%. This was the end of Rex politically, but its rapid rise, illustrating the discontents of society, forced the establishment to take it into account in forming its policies, including defense policies.9 In Flanders, the extremist Flemish nationalist parties, especially the VNV, did quite well in the 1936 general election, with the VNV winning sixteen seats. A Flemish Catholic priest attributed the Flemish successes to their use of their electors’ fear of the consequences of the secret terms of the Franco-Belgian accord, including seeing Belgium dragged into a war on behalf of the Bolshe- viks alongside France, and voter dislike of increased defense spending. On the other side of the aisle, the Communists also did surprisingly well, tripling their representation to nine seats, mainly at the expense of the POB, the Belgian Socialists. In Belgium, seats in the Chamber were distributed according to a party’s share of the popular vote and the leader of the party with the most votes was traditionally invited to try to put together a coalition that commanded a majority of seats. In this case, the Socialists, despite having lost three seats, came in at number one with seventy seats, trailed by the Catholics, who had lost sixteen of their previous seventy-six mandates, and the Liberals, who lost one seat and ended up with twenty-two. Thus, a bipartite coalition of the Socialists and Liberals, the parties of the left, was impossible because it only had 86 seats and bringing in the Catholics was unfeasible because of the views of the Catholic conservatives. In the end, all that remained was a government led by a ‘technician’ like van Zeeland.10

9 DiMuro, pp. 12-13, 144-145; Höjer, pp. 258-259. 10 Vanwelkenuyzen, 1936, p. 19; Witte et al., pp. 138, 149; Père Rutten quoted in Vanwelken- huyzen, 1936, p. 132; Höjer, p. 248. 170 Chapter 6

On May 27, therefore, after being turned down by the resigning prime minister, King Leopold summoned Émile Vandervelde, the head of the Socialists, to discuss the formation of a new government. Vandervelde was instructed to investigate the possibility of forming a new government of national union consisting of all three major parties and led by the Socialists (especially by himself). He later reported to the general council of his party that, among other things, he and the king had discussed the portfolio of minister of national defense and that neither the king nor the prime minister, nor the Socialists, nor the Flemings, wanted Devèze to continue on in the post. Vandervelde suspected that even many Liberals felt the same way. In fact, Vandervelde wanted a military ‘technician.’ Mr. Devèze shortly thereafter announced that he would not accept a portfolio in order to be able to continue to fight for ‘integral defense of the territory’ and his scheme for march battalions.11 On May 28, Leopold met with the Liberal leader Paul-Émile Janson. Janson called for a decision from the Mixed Commission on the issue of ‘integral defense of the territory’ but noted how much the Commission had left to do. He did not disown Devèze, but suggested he would support having a ‘technician’ – a general – heading up the Ministry of National Defense.12 On May 29, Leopold met with Devèze himself to hear his views on forming a new government. Devèze was in favor of having a general as minister of national defense, but the generals he suggested were presumed to support ‘integral defense of the territory.’ Also on May 29, another leading Liberal and Walloon extremist, Émile Jennissen, declared to the king his faith in the ‘integral defense of the territory’ by the Belgian army assisted immediately by the peerless French Army. Leopold attempted to disabuse him of that notion, pointing out that the Germans were sitting on the Belgian border and would make a sudden attack that the Belgians would have to face alone before the French arrived. Another leading Liberal who met with the king, François Bovesse, generally agreed with Devèze but admitted that Belgium’s defense should not be unilateral although the Germans were the greater threat.13 On June 1 the Socialist leaders met and Vandervelde spoke out in favor of collective security assured in cooperation with Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and any other peace-loving nations, especially the Scandinavian countries which already had strong Socialist parties. Another speaker in the

11 Vanwelkenhuyzen, 1936, pp. 35; Vandervelde quoted in Ibid., pp. 39, 89; President of the Chamber, quoted in Ibid., p. 47. 12 Vanwelkenhuyzen, 1936, pp. 51-52. 13 Capelle Papers, quoted in Ibid., pp. 54-55; Ibid., pp. 67, 81-82; Bovesse, quoted in Capelle papers quoted in Ibid., p. 84. ‘independence’ And Its Origins 171 traditionally pacifist POB noted the inconsistency between fighting Belgian fascists and using only words against a fascist invasion. He supported a strong defense and condemned the current military organization, expressed high hopes for the Mixed Commission, and demanded the complete makeover of the defense system. Leading Belgian historian of the interwar period Jean Van- welkenhuyzen observed that the Socialists, who opposed military accords or the prolongation of service time, retarded Belgian rearmament in the face of Hitlerian militarization.14 The right of the Catholic Party warned against a Socialist-led government that would go beyond its limits in the name of defending the country against a non-existent fascist threat, declaring as part of government policy the defense of “democratic institutions.” Above all, Belgian foreign policy must not follow in the wake of the Franco-Soviet pact! Meanwhile, the Flemish Catholics were trying to stop the hemorrhaging of voters to the Flemish nationalists by playing the los van Frankrijk card, in which, serendipitously, they actually believed. The Catholic press organ, La Libre Belgique, declared on June 4 that the aim of foreign and defense policy must be to preserve Belgium’s freedom of action and to avoid any entangling alliances (that is, with the France of the leftist Popular Front suspected in Belgium as a Bolshevik agent) that could draw the country into a fight in which the country had no dog (such as for the Soviets).15 Vandervelde reported on June 6 that he would try to form a government, but opinion around the Palace was that he would not succeed; the other parties distrusted him too much, especially as he was the head of the Second Interna- tional. In fact, just about everybody hoped for a government with all three parties, but with the sitting prime minister, Paul van Zeeland, who had gotten Belgium out of the worst of the Depression but had refused the king’s initial offer to form the new cabinet, at its head.16 On Sunday, June 7, provincial elections brought more bad news to the three major parties. The Catholics kept their plurality in the provincial councils with 224 seats, but had lost 94; the Socialists came in second with 221 but had lost 20; and the Liberals went from 95 to 89 seats. Again, the big winners were the Rexists (who won their first 78 seats), the Flemish nationalists (a gain of 19, bringing them to 50), and the Communists (from 7 to 27). The results, added to a growing and threatening general strike, pointed out the necessity of putting an end to the governmental crisis, especially because it appeared the new French Popular Front under Léon Blum was grappling with a strike by one mil-

14 Max Buset quoted in Vanwelkenhuyzen, 1936, p. 101; Ibid., p. 102; Ibid., p. 165. 15 La Libre Belgique, June 4, 1936, quoted in Vanwelkenhuyzen, 1936, pp 140, 135. 16 Kieft, p. 99, Vanwelkenhuyzen, 1936, pp. 15-16, 162-165. 172 Chapter 6 lion workers, while the leftist government in Spain was also faced with near anarchy.17 Leopold first invited van Zeeland to form the new government but he recused himself, citing family issues. The king then asked the Socialist leader Vandervelde but on June 8, Vandervelde saw the king and admitted that, after having met with Liberal and Catholic leaders, he could not form a tripartite government and advised Leopold to try van Zeeland again, which was done. After a day’s consideration, van Zeeland agreed to form a government. The King than summoned the leaders of the three main parties and told them to cooperate. By June 13, van Zeeland had his government. The speed with which this was accomplished most likely reflected the conservative fear of a Socialist- led government after the Socialists had appealed to the democrats of the Liber- als and Catholics, the latter of whom, while claiming unanimity, were split and ripe for such an overture. Even more important than the Socialist demarche was the fact that the miners were planning a strike on June 15 and the Catholics and Socialists wanted a government set up before the strike hit. Most Liberals were probably opposed to participating in the government and the Liberal ministers accepted their posts without consulting their party. Van Zeeland’s second government would see a lot of problems. The financial crises that had dominated van Zeeland’s first government had been largely overcome but the sense of national unity faded and was only held together by opposition to Rex. The period 1936-1939 was defined by the Catholic loss of its relative majority and the Catholic-Liberal coalition lost its absolute majority in Parliament.18 In distributing the portfolios, van Zeeland gave nothing to Devèze; the Min- istry of National Defense went to a ‘technician,’ Lieutenant General Henri Denis. The absence of Devèze certainly pleased the king (and would have pleased the king’s father, the late King Albert). It also gratified the Socialists, the Flemish Christian Democrats (one of the members of the Catholic coalition), and the Flemish nationalists, all of whom loathed the man. He had not been removed before because he was very powerful in the Liberal left and the Liberal ministers had threatened to resign en bloc, bringing down the government, if he were. The 1936 elections had brought the Rexists into the large group of Devèze’s opponents, but, argues Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, the changed military situation was the main reason for Devèze’s fall. With the

17 Vanwelkenhuyzen, 1936, p. 167. 18 Höjer, pp. 251-256; Höjer points out that the invitations to van Zeeland and Vandervelde show a desire for a “government of national union” but a fear that the other two parties would not serve under a Socialist prime minister. This fear turned out to be justified (Ibid., pp. 249-250). ‘independence’ And Its Origins 173 remilitarization of the Rhineland, ‘integral defense of the territory’ could no longer work because the delay required to alert the troops no longer existed; the German armored divisions were right across the border and they would get to Belgium before French aid could arrive. The French had made very clear in the May staff talks that they could not support the Belgians on the frontier but, at best, on the Meuse. Rather than accept the death of his dream, Devèze preferred to resign. After his decision was made public, he declared that as a minister he was limited as to how much activism he could participate in but now he needed the freedom to advocate for his conception of necessary service time and military spending. Devèze told his confidant, French General Riedinger, that he was resigning to fight certain ideas held by the military circles around the king (already mistrusted by the French) – again, the idea of ‘defense in depth’ held, among others, by the king and his military advisor, then-colonel van Overstraeten, who would be blamed by the French in 1940 for having been pro-German and for having encouraged the king to capitulate (neither being true). In addition, the Mixed Commission was having difficulties and as a minister, Devèze could not intervene or participate while as a simple deputy he could work for his cause. Devèze carried out his campaign in the press, especially in the Liberal journals like L’Indépendence Belge, La Gazette, and La Gazette de Charleroi.19 On June 9, Major Paris reported to his superiors that Devèze had retired because of a change of defense policy – the victory of ‘defense in depth.’ That same day, Sir Noël Charles, the councilor of the British Embassy, reported to the Foreign Secretary that King Leopold’s secretary, Robert Capelle, had condemned Devèze in a private conversation, observing that Devèze’s “vanity had become glaring and that it appeared that he had squandered millions on useless defensive nests in the Ardennes” rather than protecting the main part of Belgium. Moreover, King Leopold blamed him for the removal of General Nuy- ten as chief of staff. Certainly, relations between the Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff were much quieter until the fateful year of 1940.20 As we have seen, Albert Devèze had a strong influence on the Belgian army. His policy of ‘defense at the frontier’ initially won out against defense in depth.

19 Vanwelkenhuyzen, 1936, p. 167, 170, 181-182, 193-198; Kieft, pp. 98-99. Emmanuel Gerard argues Devèze fell because his “too rigid political position on defense” made him unacceptable to the coalition partners. Gerard, p. 212; Devèze, press communiqué quoted in Vanwelkenhuyzen, 1936, pp. 194-195; Devèze quoted by Riedinger in, Ibid., p. 195; Ibid., pp. 195-196. 20 Major D.K. Paris and Sir Noël Charles, cited in Vanwelkenhuyzen, 1936, pp. 196-197; Capelle quoted in Ibid., p. 197; Leopold III, cited in Ibid. 174 Chapter 6

Two units, the Chasseurs ardennais and the Unités cyclistes frontières, created under Devèze’s stewardship of the ministry, as well as the motorized Cavalry Corps, would impress the Germans before and during the war. The Belgian army also focused its attention on defense against the new threats of tanks and airplanes. Nevertheless, despite Devèze’s successes in getting his ideas improved, his General Staff, probably backed by van Overstraeten, continued in the Galet oeuvre, planning for a retreat behind the Meuse, giving over eastern Belgium to the Germans. This raises an important question addressed at length by A. Servais, namely, how serious was the General Staff about defending Belgian Luxembourg? Its opposition peaked once the Wehrmacht moved into the Rhineland. With the disappearance of that buffer zone, the General Staff was determined not to fight on the east bank of the Meuse. However, even after Devèze’s resignation in 1936, the Chasseurs ardennais were reinforced, eventually growing to two full divisions (one of them reserve) and fortifications and fieldworks were built in the Ardennes. Despite this, the General Staff planned to bring its best units back behind the Meuse, which would then become a major defense line. The fortifications and fieldworks can be explained by the desire to head off Francophone opposition to such plans as an abandonment of their land.21 The choice of Devèze’s successor came up. The king had hoped General De Grox, then commander of the École de guerre, would take the job but the latter declined. He had been cabinet chief when de Broqueville was minister of national defense, had had it with politics, and did not want to repeat the experience. Consideration then centered on Lieutenant General Henri Denis, an artillerist by trade, a Liberal by inclination, and a former collaborator with General Galet. He was in charge of III Army Corps around Liège and was intimately familiar with the Herve Plateau which was one center of controversy. He did not hide what he thought of ‘ integral defense of the territory’: it would lead to a disaster and it would be his troops who would suffer the most. He opposed the deployment of major forces on the Herve Plateau forward of the old forts of Liège and called for a defense in depth based on the second line of defense. Nevertheless, General Denis was clear about wanting to fight the main battle forward of Liège, thus reassuring those in Belgian Luxembourg and the rest of Wallonia who feared the replacement of Devèze meant their abandonment to the Germans. Raoul van Overstraeten praised Denis highly for his education and independence and he had had a distinguished career. He would

21 Servais, pp. 177-178. The present author, in 2011, has found no author who has asserted the contrary. ‘independence’ And Its Origins 175 remain in office through World War II, in Belgium until May 25, 1940, and in the government-in-exile in London for the rest of the conflict.22 Once the new government was formed and approved by the king, it had to get down to business. Prime Minister van Zeeland declared that in any contentious issue, the government would follow the policy of its predecessor and base its defense policies on the recommendations of the Mixed Commission.23 On June 24, van Zeeland gave the governmental declaration to the Chamber, setting out his government’s program. The next day the deputies began to debate whether or not to vote confidence in the new team. This took several days. On Monday, June 29, the debate touched on national defense. A new Flemish Liberal deputy, Adolphe van Glabekke, declared he would vote against the government because the Flemings had not been satisfied and desired ‘defense at the frontier.’ The Flemings, asserted van Glabekke, wanted an effective defense of Wallonia so Flanders would not again become the main battlefield. However, he did not seem to want this if it involved the prolongation of service time – a notion opposed by most Flemings. Another Flemish deputy declared that Flanders wanted absolute neutrality and certainly no alliance with France. In the end, the new government received a greater vote of confidence than that accorded to its predecessor.24 The precondition of the Flemish Catholics for joining the new government was that Belgium should practice complete independence free from any obligations that could draw the country into a war between other powers. In fact, there was a vast majority for that idea among the populace. However, there was a current in the POB, especially enounced by Vandervelde, that Belgium should align its foreign policy with that of the French Popular Front government. Not surprisingly, this idea met with strong resistance from the Flemish and the conservatives.25 Despite his strong desires, Vandervelde did not become foreign minister. That post was taken by Paul-Henri Spaak, who had previously lobbied the Socialist leaders in favor of Devèze’s military reform project, while the other Socialist Young Turk, Henri de Man, wanted Belgium to imitate the Swiss model of local militias. Spaak leaned heavily on two Foreign Ministry functionaries, Pierre van Zuylen and Fernand Van Langenhove, the former of whom was blamed by the French for all undesirable (from the French perspective)

22 Vanwelkenhuyzen, 1936, pp. 242-243; van Overstraeten, quoted in Ibid., p. 243. 23 Paul van Zeeland, quoted in Ibid., p. 258. 24 Vanwelkenhuyzen, 1936, pp. 253, 271; Chamber debate, quoted in Ibid., pp. 277-278; Kieft, p. 122. 25 Kieft, pp. 102-103. 176 Chapter 6 ideas in the Belgian Foreign Ministry. The advice the functionaries gave Spaak was the same as they had given to his predecessors. The advice was about the need to cement internal consensus by clarifying and limiting Belgium’s international commitments. It was also to get out from under Locarno, the obligations of which were no longer supportable by a small country like Belgium.26 Belgium had begun to rethink its policy of relying on collective security in the face of the events of the mid-1930s. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 alarmed Belgium both because Belgium relied on an Anglo-French-Italian entente to protect it from Germany and because the ineffective sanctions high- lighted the inefficacy of the League of Nations. German rearmament and, especially, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, bringing the German army to Belgium’s door, alarmed the Belgians at the same time they showed that Brit- ain and France were not to be relied upon to protect the country, nor was the League of Nations. As Baron van Zuylen observed, the only solution was to build the army as much as possible and stay out of great power disagreements. In April 1936, Fernand Van Langenhove wrote a note examining “The New Sta- tus Destined to Guarantee the Security of Belgium.” He posited that the most important thing to keep in mind was: “war signifies for Belgium mortal peril, devastation of its territory, risk of its existence, or at least of its colonial empire.” His three suggestions for Belgian policy were

a) avoid war breaking out on our frontiers; b) if it takes place in our proximity, to avoid being drawn into it; c) if we are, despite all, involved in it, to assure an immediate and efficacious assistance on the part of the neighboring states interested in the defense of our territory … .27

In order to achieve a) it was necessary to build up the Belgian military to deter any aggressor looking for a quick and easy way to use Belgian territory. In order to achieve b) and give full effect to a), it was necessary to “practice an entirely independent policy, cleared of any exclusive tie.” Even c) must be contingent on avoiding alliances which increased the risk of being drawn into a war.

A small country, dealing with Great Powers, must show itself prudent. Its obligations must be limited to that which is strictly indispensable. It is desirable that it conserves up to the last moment its liberty of decision; if it takes up arms, it must be evident that it is only for the defense of the

26 Kieft, pp. 103-109, 119; Pierre cited in Ibid., p. 105. 27 Van Zuylen, pp. IX-X, XXIII; Fernand Van Langenhove, “Note sur le Nouveau Statut Des- tine a Garantir la Securite de la Belgique,” p. 2, in ARP-Capelle XV/1. ‘independence’ And Its Origins 177

country. On that depends the unanimous élan of the country, such as it occurred in 1914, and the maintenance of national unity.28

This is an excellent statement of the rationale for the Belgian policy of ‘independence.’ The success of the military bill necessary to create an army capable of dissuading any potential invader was dependent on the support of the Bel- gian people, who were adamantly opposed to building up an army that could be used to serve foreign purposes. This same national unity, which was necessary for Belgium to survive and triumph in a war, could only be guaranteed if it were clear war had been forced on the country; it had not been drawn on as a result of any Belgian alliances. Mr. Marck, had declared (in Flemish, during the Mixed Commission hearings) that “[t]he Flemish land … raises itself against a unilateral military policy which would be chained and parallel to the military policy of France.”29 On July 20, 1936, Paul-Henri Spaak, who would go on to become, perhaps, the most famous Belgian ever, made one of his signal speeches as foreign minister. In that speech, he declared “I want only one thing: a foreign policy which is exclusively and wholly Belgian.” In other words, he was rejecting a policy of alliances and foreign influences. The speech delighted the Rexists, the Flem- ings, who were happy to be los van Frankrijk and the Walloons, who were wary of being drawn into a war for foreign interests in Eastern Europe. His own Socialist party, however, felt he was betraying collective security. Spaak explained to the French foreign minister that, in addition to the Flamingant issue, the military bill was dependent upon avoiding any new international obligations, especially any which could be affected by the French pact with the Soviets.30 On September 9, Premier van Zeeland gave a radio address in which he said essentially the same thing; that the world was splitting up between leftist and rightist extremists (such as the Communists and the Rexists) and that he had to prevent such a split in Belgium. Belgium needed unity, which could only be gained through the avoidance of foreign entanglements. Belgium needed a policy of strength and independence. The needs of Belgian domestic policy influenced Belgian foreign policy which, in turn, greatly affected Belgium’s military policy. Domestic policy thus required the Belgian planners seriously to

28 Van Langenhove, “Note sur le Nouveau Statut,” pp. 3-5. 29 M. Marck to the Commission Mixte, 16e séance, Report of the Commission Mixte p. 90, Belgian Central Library of Defense. 30 P.-H. Spaak, quoted in Kieft, pp. 110-111; Kieft, Ibid. 178 Chapter 6 prepare plans and defenses against a French invasion that none of them actually expected to occur.31 Meanwhile, the Flemish were disappointed with the new government’s nationality program and federalism was increasingly urged and started getting support not only from the nationalists but now also from the Flemish Catho- lics in the face of a general strike and the chaos in Spain. This trend led to a Flemish congress in which the Catholic Party practically split in October and the Flemish Catholic Katholieke Vlaamse Volkspartij started talking with the nationalists. Meanwhile, Léon Degrelle and his Rexists, expecting the growing split in Belgian society would continue and that most Belgians would join him in opposition to the Communists, were working to block the function of the Parliament and cause new elections that they would win. However, they could not win without support in Flanders, a region that had been relatively cold to Degrelle although the Flemish supported his anti-French rhetoric. The Rexists had touted the institution of a language-based organization in place of the existing scheme. They now supported a federal solution. Thus, a marriage of convenience was born between the Rex and the Vlaams Nationaal Verbond that would control one-fifth of the Chamber. This ended up being a disaster for both parties: Flemish nationalism was anathema to Rex supporters attracted by Degrelle’s pro-Belgian language while Degrelle’s authoritarian tendencies turned off the Flemish Catholics. However, at the time, the government and the major parties did not know the Rexists and the VNV had shot themselves (shot each other?) in the foot and feared for the future.32 On October 14, 1936, King Leopold III made a seminal speech to the Cabinet during discussions on the defense bill. This speech perfectly captured the “desires, fears, and hopes of his subjects [and] became the official statement of Belgian foreign policy, accepted as such both at home and abroad.” It was pub- licized following the desire of the cabinet ministers. Leopold noted there were several reasons for building up the Belgian military: the rearmament of Ger- many and the militarization of Italy and Russia was forcing other countries, including “deliberately pacific [nations] like Switzerland and the Netherlands,” to build up their forces; advances in air power and motorization made the opening phases of a war more dangerous, especially in the case of small nations like Belgium; the remilitarization of the Rhineland brought the Wehrmacht to Belgium’s frontiers; collective security was all but destroyed; and alliances were forming that threatened war. Belgium’s aim must be not to win a war but to avoid one by creating a military so strong it would deter potential aggressors.

31 Paul van Zeeland cited in Kieft, pp. 113-114. 32 Kieft, pp. 122-127. ‘independence’ And Its Origins 179

This would also contribute to European peace and “create ipso facto a right to respect and to the eventual aid of all the states which have an interest in this peace.” Any favoritism to foreign countries, or even a defensive alliance, would divide the country and be almost useless because said foreign countries would only intervene after Belgium had already been invaded and ravaged. Belgium must be prepared to resist the opening blows of an aggressor. Leopold then quoted approvingly Spaak’s words of three months earlier. Unfortunately, Bel- gium lacked the military to fulfill this policy, especially under the threat of a sudden attack. “It assures neither the permanent defense of our fortresses, nor the security of the mobilization, nor that of the concentration of the army[,]”which was at the mercy of a surprise invasion. He concluded that

in resolving the military problem in a union of high patriotic understanding, you render to the country at the same time as the serenity of spirit necessary to the consideration of foreign events, the feeling of security indispensable to the definitive resumption of public prosperity.33

The Belgian people distinguished between the king and his ministers on this issue and even some in government saw the foreign policy as that of Leopold. Indeed, Foreign Minister Spaak later complained that upon Belgium’s invasion, the king practiced his own foreign policy, which was conducted against the advice of the government and betrayed Belgium’s allies. Nevertheless, although Leopold had some political freedom, he had no real power and he was not acting against the other branches of government. 34 The royal address deeply angered the French because it implied an end to any French alliance and to the use of Belgium as a French battlefield. The Brit- ish worried about the impact on revising the Locarno Pact and were taken aback because the French had implied Belgium was on board with French plans. The small powers, especially the so-called ‘Oslo Group,’ were delighted that the Belgians shared their ideas. The Germans and Italians were also delighted and hoped to split Belgium off from France and Britain. Belgium argued that the royal discourse was not aimed at the Covenant of the League of Nations or at Locarno or the London Accords that endorsed them. The argument satisfied the British but not the French, who demanded staff talks to coordinate French aid and suggested an equal obligation on the Belgian side.35

33 Miller, p. 227; corrected draft of Leopold’s October 14, 1936 speech, in ARP-Capelle, XV/2/5. 34 Höjer, p. 360; Jean Stengers, Léopold III et le gouvernement: Les deux politiques belges de 1940. Aux origines de la question royale (Paris-Gembloux: Duculot, 1980), pp. 5-6; Höjer, p. 361. 35 Van Zuylen, Les Mains Libres, pp. 371-374. 180 Chapter 6

This policy of ‘independence’ was effectively nothing new to Belgian foreign policy. In 1930, while Belgium was still obligated by the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Franco-Belgian accord and Locarno, King Albert commented “neutrality … responds ideally to our position. If it had not existed, we would have had to invent it.” The next year, Paul Hymans, the Belgian Foreign Minis- ter, warned his diplomats about Europe’s division into satisfied and dissatisfied countries and the possibility of war as a result and emphasized the importance of keeping Belgium out of that war by refusing to join any blocs or to intervene in conflicts and by emphasizing Belgian ‘independence.’36 Paul-Henri Spaak himself, who claimed most of the ministerial responsibility for the policy, noted in his memoirs that ‘independence’ did not mark a departure from previous Belgian foreign policy and that despite its failure it was the only real option because it alone offered any chance of unifying the country and thus guaranteeing Belgium’s continued existence in the event of war. The policy was wildly popular among most Belgians although some, especially Walloon partisans, blamed the Flemish and complained that the defense of the eastern border and of Wallonia required military understandings to coordinate rapid French help and that the new policy not only weakened the Belgian military but also Britain and France, while many Socialists, such as Louis De Brouckère, also called for joining the Allies.37 Leopold wrote a letter to Spaak, in advance of the latter’s appearance before the Chamber, in which he elaborated on the ideas he had presented verbally. Locarno was effectively dead and its replacement, a British promise to help France and Belgium in the event of an unprovoked German attack, was not permanent. Leopold rejected the French interpretation that Locarno was alive and Belgium was obligated to come to France’s assistance even if Belgium was not invaded. Spaak was wrong in relying on staff talks and in expecting significant French aid to arrive immediately. The Belgian army would still have to fend off an attack on its own unless the Germans were convinced it could hold on its own, “from where it comes out that that the ‘accords’ of General Staffs can only compromise us politically without being necessary militarily.” Hence, there was the need for the policy of ‘independence,’ which also benefitted the

36 Wullus-Rudiger, Les Origines Internationales, p. 81; Paul Hymans, January 14, 1931, quoted in Van Zuylen, Les Mains Libres, p. XIX. 37 Rik Coolsaet argues that the war showed the opponents of ‘independence’ had been cor- rect and notes that Spaak himself became a strong proponent of “a close political collaboration” with Belgium’s neighbors. Coolsaet, pp. 28-29; Spaak, p. 10; Wullus-Rudiger, Ibid., pp. 87-88; M. Jean Rey, “La Politique Étrangère de la Belgique,” Gazette de Charleroi, June 29, 1937, in AMBAE 11185/1, “Politique Militaire”; R. Dupriez, “La Politique Indépendante et les accords d’état-major,” Gazette de Charleroi (?), July 4, 1937, in Ibid; Coolsaet, p. 26. ‘independence’ And Its Origins 181

British and the French because the British wanted to avoid war and would benefit from a not-invaded Belgium while the French would avoid having to fight on the northern frontier.38 In response to a Foreign Ministry query on the potential result of stopping staff talks with the Allies, LTG Van den Bergen noted that the size and time of arrival of French reinforcements was up to the French and stopping staff talks would have no effect on the German threat. The French would send troops because it was in their interest to do so. There was a chance that the French would reduce the promised reinforcements if other factors changed. Italy was unpredictable. The destination of French reinforcements could not be predicted because the status of the Belgian army could not be predicted. There would be a benefit to staff talks that would inform the French as to how the Belgians planned to defend their country and to military intelligence talks because the French had a better organization.39 On October 27, the government presented the military bill to the Parlia- ment. It was a massive document. Its purpose was to harness the resources of the nation to defend itself in the face of growing international threats. It was vital that mobilization be protected and a German invasion blocked to buy time for that mobilization. For that the army needed eighteen-months’ service.40 The debate was fierce. Georges Hubin wanted to know from Foreign Minis- ter Spaak what the king meant by “neutrality” in his October 14 speech and whether Spaak still considered staff talks necessary to Belgian security. A Com- munist deputy queried the prime and foreign ministers in asserting that the new policy would be playing into Hitler’s hands and threatening the nation by splitting the democracies. The Rexist deputies had sent two orders of the day condemning the government for not denouncing Locarno. A VNV representative then questioned whether the van Zeeland government was following the king’s policy as expressed on October 14, asked whether anything had changed, defended German rearmament, and observed that Belgium was far from truly independent. Spaak went on the offensive, declaring he intended “to sacrifice nothing of our security and of our interests to formulas or to ideologies that we

38 Leopold to Spaak, dated October 27, 1936, quoted in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, diary entry for October 27, 1936, pp. 237-239. Emphasis in the original. 39 Van den Bergen, quoted in Diary entry for October 31, 1936 in Ibid., pp. 240-241. Van Over straeten points out that Van den Bergen would be shown wrong about the French having better military intelligence. 40 Chambre des représentants, 2nd session extraordinaire de 1936, no. 89, quoted in Van- welkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 516-517. 182 Chapter 6 cannot transpose in a clear manner into reality.” He went on to say that Bel- gium would keep its obligations as long as they were spelled out and follow a policy responding to Belgium’s position and needs. He warned against an uncritical devotion to collective security. Belgium was not returning to neutrality but moving to ‘independence.’ Belgium had a unique function that no other country could fill. Belgium must be unified in order to face and overcome the looming European dangers and in order to be unified, it must practice an independent foreign policy. Walloon deputy Émile Jennissen rose to challenge Count Henry Carton de Wiart, who argued that ‘independence’ was essentially nothing new. Jennissen asserted that even if Belgium were able to stay out of a new conflict in the beginning, a German invasion would follow a French defeat. He called for continued ties with the Allies.41 Criticisms of Spaak’s anwers to the earlier questions resulted in him being recalled. He stated that the king’s discourse did not change any Belgian ties or relationships, including staff talks. Further, it was ridiculous to expect that Bel- gium would change its policy without having a new one ready to adopt and reminded the deputies that negotiations were ongoing to replace Locarno. The following day, the Chamber overwhelmingly passed an order of the day approv- ing the government’s answers.42 On November 3, the whole Chamber bitterly debated the military bill. It voted down eighteen months service by 98-36 with 16 abstentions but approved the bill as a whole. French military attaché General Riedinger explained the seeming contradiction to his minister of war: voters would not accept increased service time but the representatives did not want to topple the government by rejecting the entire bill.43 On November 24, the Special Commission of the Chamber, which had been hearing testimony from members of the government and examining proposed amendments to the military bill, met again. Nearly all of the commission wanted to build up the Belgian military, especially by providing for coverage that would stop an invasion and buy time for the mobilization of the rest of the army and agreed that the bill in question would achieve that goal. The

41 Annales parlementaires, session 1936-1937, Chambre des répresentants, séance du mercredi 28 octobre 1936, quoted in Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 518-522. 42 Annales parlementaires, session 1936-1937, Chambre des répresentants, séance du mercredi 28 octobre 1936, quoted in Ibid., 2: 524-525; Ibid., 2: 525-526. Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen points out, with Guido Provoost, that the three major parties were in favor of the bill because the no votes came from the Rexists and Flemish nationalists. Guido Provoost, quoted in Ibid., 2: 526. 43 General Riedinger to Éduard Daladier, quoted in Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 526. ‘independence’ And Its Origins 183 controversy was still over whether to require longer service time. Nevertheless, the Commission voted for the bill 8-5 with six abstentions.44 The next day saw the meeting of the general council of the Parti Ouvrière Belge, where they debated the issue. Two suggestions had already been shot down by the Commission. Van Zeeland had proposed a month of leave for all soldiers. Why could that not come out of the proposed eighteen months’ service? Why couldn’t soldiers serving longer than twelve months receive a 300- franc indemnity per month? One delegate argued that eighteen months’ service was unpopular. Georges Hubin answered that the public needed to be fully informed and the Socialist proposal must be defended against the Gen- eral Staff’s proposal but that they could not afford a collapse of the government. An Anvernois senator, Edward Van Eynconck, complained that the General Staff was using the weakness of the government to coerce the Social- ists to accept its proposal. He agreed that, because of the threatening international situation, coverage must be guaranteed and that it took six months to train an infantryman. Plus, they were coming up on four years where, due to the slaughter of World War I, there would be an unusually low number of new soldiers. He would accept increasing service time by four months to cover those years. He suggested an alliance with the Catholics. Émile Vandervelde, himself, after taking credit for putting the matter before a mixed commission, concluded that, despite all their efforts, the Socialist plan had no hope of being adopted and that the Socialists must vote for the plan of the Chamber to stop the fascists.45 Lieutenant General Denis again addressed the Chamber on December 1 and he explained the issue in a technical manner. For Belgium to have a chance at resisting an invasion, it needed the army mobilized and concentrated. There- fore, it needed to stall the invasion long enough to achieve the mobilization and concentration. That was ‘coverage.’ The Cavalry Corps would be ready for anything unexpected, but you needed trained troops providing coverage all year long. Therefore, the army needed six months to train infantrymen and another twelve months for those infantrymen to provide the coverage year- round, for a total of eighteen months.46 Prime minister van Zeeland also testified before the Chamber. He reminded them of the dangerous times in which they were living and declared the necessity of eighteen months’ service in order to guarantee coverage by trained

44 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 526, 534; Chambre des représentants, no. 41, séance du 24 novembre 1936, quoted in Ibid., 2: 534. 45 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 535-538; Ibid., 2: 535, ff 1, 2. 46 Chambre, 1.12.1936, quoted in Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 542. 184 Chapter 6 troops. The bill needed to be passed immediately and posterity would be grateful. Van Zeeland also announced that, following a proposed amendment reducing training time from six months to five months, the army would agree to that if the number of instructors was increased and there were more training grounds and opportunities. This was very popular among the representatives.47 That evening, the Chamber passed on to the over 100 proposed amendments. The Flemish nationalists, and especially those of the VNV, tried to throw wrenches into the process to in order to defeat the bill. After examining the amendments, Chamber president Camille Huysmans called for a vote by name. 186 members voted – 137 supported the bill, 43 rejected it, and 8 abstained. The members of the three major parties and the Rexists supported the bill while 16 Flemish Catholics, 15 VNV members, 8 Communists, and 4 radical leftist Socialists voted no. The abstainers were “4 Catholics, 2 Liberals, and 1 Rexist, all Flemish, and a Communist Walloon.” Having been adopted, the bill then went to the Senate.48 The Senate took the bill up on December 4 and the Socialists immediately announced they would vote for the project. General Denis repeated his speech to the Chamber. There was a need for speed in passing the bill because they were almost ready to call up the class of 1937 draftees. Prime Minister van Zee- land thanked the Senate for agreeing to meet without stopping to pass the bill as soon as possible. He also reprised his speech to the Chamber, emphasizing the desire for a policy “of absolute independence, of complete equilibrium” as the king had elaborated on October 14 and which, being reprinted by the government, had become an ‘act of government.’ He reiterated the Belgian desire not to be used as an easy means of access from one enemy to the other. After one more speaker, the president of the Senate, in the absence of any other speakers signed up, closed the discussion and the Senate went on to study the bill. Once completed, they moved on to the name vote. One hundred twenty- three senators voted for the bill, nineteen against, and six abstained. All the Socialists and Liberals had voted for the bill, as did most Catholics and Rexists. Some Flemish Catholics and all VNV members and Communists voted against it. The bill passed and would be sent on to the king.49 The policy of ‘independence’ stemmed from European developments since Locarno that made those undertakings impossible given Belgium’s limited

47 Chambre 2.12.1936, quoted in Ibid., 2: 556-560. 48 Chambre, 2.12.1936, séance du soir, quoted in Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 563. 49 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Le gâchis des années 30, 2: 564-566; Senat, 4.12.36, quoted in Ibid., 2: 564-566. ‘independence’ And Its Origins 185 resources although Belgium was still determined to help keep the peace as much as possible. Spaak addressed Article XVI of the League Convenant, which called for mutual assistance and argued that the right of passage could not be forced on Belgium and that such consent would only be granted in support of “a common action.” The new policy of independence precluded unilateral military treaties while common sense precluded multilateral military treaties that would involve sharing secrets. Thus, Belgium could not accede to France’s wishes for staff talks. Open contacts between the staffs and also between the defense ministers were broken off to preserve Belgian neutrality. On April 29, 1937, Spaak declared the age of staff agreements over and that it was a good thing. There were those, particularly, but not exclusively, on the left who did not see ‘independence’ as ‘neutrality’ and called for “a benevolent attitude” to the Allies. They could not overcome the “policy of equilibrium of the Court and the radical right.”50 Now the Belgian army had to become strong enough to deter any of its neighbors from attacking it. The Belgians hoped the British would help them in this by supplying war material. The British response that they would be having trouble satisfying their own rearmament needs for the next two years reinforced the belief in Leopold and van Overstraeten that the Allies were incapable of adequately supporting the Belgians in the case of a German offensive and thus reinforced the Belgian trend towards neutrality.51 On April 24, 1937, the British and French officially accepted Belgium’s policy, freed Belgium from its Locarno obligations and those of March 19, 1936, while still guaranteeing their assistance to Belgium in case of need. Belgium had sought, and obtained, the Anglo-French guarantees in exchange for improving its defenses, thus protecting both Britain and France. For Belgium, as Pierre van Zuylen notes, it was the best possible result. Five days later after the Anglo- French declaration, Foreign Minister Spaak stated to the Belgian Parliament that “the Franco-English declaration closes for us this period that one could call the era of military accords.” On October 13, 1937, Germany freely gave Bel- gium a declaration analogous to that of Britain and France. The Belgians have been accused of naiveté in accepting Hitler’s guarantee but in fact they still mistrusted Germany and in fact rearmed to a greater relative degree than Belgium’s main guarantors. The Belgians also sought to remove any justification to invade and to make any invasion “more odious and more inexcusable if

50 (?), “Note pour Monsieur le Ministre,” October 21, 1936, pp. 1-2, in AMBAE 11.096; Ibid., p. 4; P.-H. Spaak, quoted in Van Zuylen, Les Mains Libres, p. 388; Ibid., p. 391; P.-H. Spaak, April 29, 1937, quoted in Ibid., p. 394; Coolsaet, p. 356. 51 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 53; Vaesen, p. 22. 186 Chapter 6 it attacked us again.” Belgium would maintain the policy of ‘independence’ until the beginning of the Second World War.52 The new policy was to be one of strict independence and ‘armed neutrality.’ In other words, Belgium was not to be seen as favoring one of its neighbors over the others. This policy satisfied the Flemish majority of the population, which distrusted France, as well as the many Belgians who resented French diplomatic behavior. The occasionally rocky relations with the French factored into Belgian policy and made the severance of overt ties more acceptable. The less-than-stellar French diplomacy was not helped by the inopportune comments of Marshal Henri Pétain who, twice in the early 1930s, told the Belgian ambassador to France that Belgium would inevitably become involved in a Franco-German war and that the French army could be forced to enter Belgium without prior consultation with Brussels. Indeed, the marshal noted, it might be forced to do so against the will of the Belgian government.53 ‘Independence’ allayed the fears of many of the Socialists, who were opposed to military spending lest it bring Belgium into a war. The Flemish nationalists and Socialists then supported a major expansion and rearmament of the Bel- gian military. Neutrality also pleased King Leopold III who, unlike many generals, actually believed in such a policy. Many Belgians believed neutrality offered Belgium its best chance of staying out of the Western European war looming on the horizon by allowing its army to make itself a true deterrent and by giving no justification for invasion. Thus, the Belgian policy of ‘independence’ had the paradoxical effect of forcing the Belgian army to defend its border with France in order to stave off the German threat. Yet, it was a key factor in getting enough support to pass the December 1936 defense bill that started Belgian rearmament.54 The most important military consequence of the new policy was, as urged by the 1936 Mixed Commission, to avoid the appearance of preparing a defense more against one neighbor than the other. The Belgian generals, despite considering a French invasion improbable, set about using some of their forces to create defenses facing France, work described by a senior Belgian general as inspired solely by politics. Following the report of the Mixed Commission and the official declaration of the policy of independence, the king ordered the

52 Keyes, pp. 115, 68; van Zuylen, Les Mains Libres pp. XXIV-XXV; ECNRS, p. 33; Miller, p. 252; van Zuylen, pp. 392-393. 53 Kieft, p. 12; Marshal Philippe Pétain, quoted in Ibid., p. 17. 54 British ambassador to Belgium Robert Clive to I.A. Kirkpatrick, July 7, 1939, Musée Royale de l’Armée et d’Histoire Militaire-Centre de Documentation Historique, Archive of the Atta- chés Militaires Britanniques, [henceforth “MRA-AMB”] box 80/4, p 103; Miller, p. 247. ‘independence’ And Its Origins 187

General Staff to examine and prepare plans for the relocation of army supplies further away from France. However, the project was cancelled several months later, due to lack of funds.55 In 1937, while still concentrating its defenses towards the northeast [i.e. towards Germany], the king’s military cabinet revisited the idea of a ‘national redoubt,’ centered on Ghent and Antwerp, that could be defended against the French as well as the Germans. In 1938, Flemish deputies succeeded in getting the government to commit to preparing a defense to the south as well as to the east while the government took care to show itself ready to defend the country in both directions. The defense line facing south and covering Brussels was based on a line connecting “Ninove-Castre-Hal-Waterloo” as well as the Ghent bridgehead. In order to test and study the proposed defensive positions, maneuvers were carried out on March 22, 1938, when the Cavalry Corps and the 6th D.I. (infantry division) occupied covering positions between the Den- dre and Senne rivers, and again on April 12 when they covered the area between the Senne and Dyle rivers. That July, the Cavalry Corps moved from its camp in Beverloo to Renaix-Audenarde, officially to show its mobility. British military attaché Lieutenant Colonel Paris commented that the move was taken as implying “an intevention towards the south frontier.” In August, the Belgian army held a three-division exercise in the region of Spa. LTC Paris noted that these maneuvers reawakened suspicion among Walloon activists that the location of those maneuvers facilitated “a rehearsal to withstand a possible attack from France. Nothing is further from the truth.” Yet these maneuvers, which Leopold was expected to attend, aroused controversy as the burgomaster of Liège, Mr. Neujean, in France to attend an international exposition, called for the people of Spa to protest by flying French flags during the maneuvers. This suggestion, however, drew criticism from the leading French-language Belgian papers.56 A recent study of the Belgian defenses facing south suggests that the Bel- gians may have planned to defend part of their country without impeding a French drive into Germany through the Ardennes, keeping the Belgian army out of France’s way, and that had the Belgians been serious about preventing

55 LTC Paris to Ambassador Clive, MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII, p. 21 (doc. Page 2); Ibid., p. 152 (doc. Page 2). 56 Renouvin, et al. pp. 31,33; Crahay, p. 187; E. Wanty, “Les relations militaries franco-belges, 1936-Octobre 1939,” Revue d’histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale 31 (Juillet, 1958), pp. 14-15; LTC Paris to the British Chargé d’Affaires in Brussels, MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII, p. 151; “Discours de M. Neujean, bourgmestre de Liège,” Le Soir, 5-8-38, AMBAE 11185/1; Gazette and Vingtième Siècle quoted in Libre Belgique 7 août 1938, AMBAE 11185/1. 188 Chapter 6 any French incursion the Belgian army would have been oriented to the southwest. Thus even the deployment of the Belgian army exhibited a belief that Belgium would not be drawn into an all-out struggle against France.57 The mid-1930s were marked by the rise of extremist parties, especially of the right, such as Léon Degrelle’s Rex, in Belgium, and the advance of the fascist powers in the face of the perceived impotence of the Allies and the League of Nations. The combination of the two, evidenced in the results of the May 24 general election, shocked and appalled the Belgian political establishment and resulted in a new tripartite government led by Paul van Zeeland. For the first time in almost four years, the government did not include Albert Devèze, who was generally unpopular and determined to fight for his ideas about national defense. This was the final triumph of ‘defense in depth.’ Devèze was replaced by a ‘technician,’ LTG Henri Denis. The new government tackled the defense bill at the same time as the tri- umphs of the Germans and Italians raised doubts about relying on collective security. The combination of the two led to the new policy of ‘independence’ – a move away from international accords and obligations and an elimination of the main grievances preventing the passage of the military bill. It was seen as the best way of keeping Belgium out of a new war. Belgium no longer ran the risk of being dragged into a French war, no longer had to worry about a divided population in the event of an invasion, and now had the hope of building an army of such a size and capability that it would deter an aggressor looking for an easy path. The seminal event was King Leopold’s October 14, 1936 speech to the cabinet laying out his justifications for the new policy. The speech was published by the government, which thus adopted it. The Parliament passed the military bill and the British, French, and Germans recognized Belgium’s new status of ‘guaranteed but not guarantor.’ Belgium would stick to this policy, although with secret military conversations through the military attachés, up to May 10, 1940. In the wake of the disastrous defeat of the Allies in Flanders and France in 1940, this policy, accepted even by French generals at the time, has come in for a lot of criticism in the form of a ‘what-if?’ The argument goes that had Belgium been allied with France, and even invited the Allies in before a German invasion, the Allied intervention would have worked out and they would have won. That has the benefit of hindsight and ignores the facts that, as

57 Eric Simon, “Neutralité Armée: 1936-1940, LA DEFENSE FACE A LA FRANCE,” Centre Liè- geois d’histoire et d’archeologie militaries, Bulletin d’information,VII:2 (Avril-Juin 1998), p. 13; Ibid., VII:6 (Avril-Juin 1999), p. 5. Simon also notes that less than half of the units assigned to the Belgo-French border were the weakest second-line reserve units. Ibid., VII:7 (Juillet-Septembre 1999), p. 8. ‘independence’ And Its Origins 189 we will see in subsequent chapters, the Allies did know what the Belgians were planning, did have information about how they would advance into Belgium, and did get to their positions in the middle of Belgium on schedule. The Ger- man fatal breakthrough went through the French army. 190 Chapter 7

Chapter 7 The Belgian Army to May 10, 1940

Belgium’s international status and defense policy did not significantly change between the passing of the defense bill of 1936 and the outbreak of World War II. Belgians were united in maintaining the country’s ‘independence’ both diplomatically and by building a strong enough military to dissuade any potential (German) invader. There was no significant Belgian reaction to the Anschluss (the German union with Austria) and the policy of neutrality did not change as a result of the Sudeten Crisis, which tested Belgian diplomacy and resulted in a mobilization oriented as much towards the south as to the east. Nor did it change while Hitler occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia and took Klaipeda from Lithuania. Meanwhile, the Belgians were building new fortifications, preparing a new main line of defense to be known as the K-W Line, and remaking their mobilization and defense plans in light of the problems experienced during the ‘Sudeten Crisis.’1 The chapter looks at the arming of the Belgian forces and the assessment of the army by foreign military professionals. It discusses the building of Belgian fortifications, especially the the ‘K-W Line’ (so named because it extended from Koningshooikt south to Wavre), on which the Belgians and Allies planned to fight in 1940. It then examines the development of the Belgian Air Force. It shows how Belgian plans and soldiers were tried and found wanting by the Sudeten Crisis. The Belgian army spent the period between the passage of the defense bill in December of 1936 and the German invasion instituting the provisions of the bill, hurriedly preparing for a European war that seemed more and more likely. Because of Belgium’s status as “a small, peaceful nation,” these preparations primarily consisted in equipping the army with defensive weapons at the expense of offensive aircraft and armored units. The Belgian army was lavishly equipped with the new 47mm anti-tank gun, at the rate of 60 per infantry division. By comparison, a German infantry division had 36 37mm anti-tank guns although each infantry regiment had another twelve while Belgian regiments only had six. The Belgians also “received a new grenade launcher, the light machine gun was renovated, the rifle modernized, the endowment in 75mm mortars tripled.” More artillery was added to each infantry division (4 to 5

1 Pierre van Zuylen points out that the inability of the Franco-British to protect Austria showed the importance of the policy of ‘independence,’ Les Mains Libres, p. 421.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004269736_009 The Belgian Army To May 10, 1940 191 groups) and to the army corps (4 to 6 groups) while some corps artillery was motorized. In addition, the D.T.C.A. adopted the very good 40mm Bofors anti- aircraft gun and Belgian signals capabilities were improved.2

The Development and Assessment of the Belgian Military

By August 1938, most of the changes had been instituted and were put on display in Belgium’s largest maneuvers since World War I. The American military attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Brown, took particularly favorable note of the Belgian 47mm anti-tank gun and of the morale of the Belgian soldiers despite the weather and the effort. He was impressed with the army’s training and determination and noted the efficiency of the General Staff. He saw the Belgian army as a significant obstacle to any German invasion. LTC Brown rated the Belgian army’s fortress and specialist units, the Chasseurs ardennais, and the Cavalry Corps as “excellent,” although the Cavalry Corps was expected to serve as mobile infantry rather than as an armored striking force. The six active infantry divisions and four of the ‘first reserve’ divisions were “good,” the other two ‘first reserve’ divisions “fair to good,” and five ‘second reserve’ divisions “poor to fair.” The Germans essentially echoed those evaluations. The German military attaché in Brussels assessed favorably the Belgian soldiers, equipment, and officers, and considered the Belgian army “a defensive instrument of the first order.” He even thought the Germans could learn something from the defensive organization of Belgian battalions.3 There were problems. Belgian army Captain Guy Dumortier notes that although the reequipment and expansion of the Belgian army went well initially, problems, especially regarding foreign materiel, such as planes and anti- aircraft artillery, arose alongside the growing international crisis. LTC Brown reported the lamentable state of the Belgian air arm and warned of the vulnerability of the Belgian cities and industries. He also found the biggest problem facing the Belgian army to be a lack of modern equipment, including rifles,

2 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 54; “L’effort Militaire Belge depuis 1918,” p. 6, in SGRS- S/A Campagne 1940, Généralités G1 A.1.1; Andrew Mollo, The Armed Forces of World War II (NY: Crown, 1981), pp. 4-5, 44-45; “L’effort Militaire Belge,” pp. 6-7. 3 Brown to War Department, September 12, 1938, quoted in Helmreich, “An American Perception,” p. 423. Dumortier, p. 43; “Helmreich, “An American Perception,” pp. 424-425; Oberkommando des Heeres, quoted in Crahay, pp. 164-165; Colonel Goethals to the Chief of the Military Household of the King, et al., Berlin, September 9, 1938, pp. 1-3, attached to Vicomte Jacques Davignon to Spaak, “Impressions allemandes sur les manoeuvres belges,” Berlin, September 14, 1938, AMBAE 11185/1, “Politique Militaire.” 192 Chapter 7

Figure 12 (L-R) LTG Denis, King Leopold III, LTG Van den Bergen, MG Deffontaine, MG van Overstraeten in April, 1938. Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels machine guns, and especially anti-aircraft guns. A May 1939 newspaper article called for the necessary improvement and augmentation of anti-aircraft artillery, warning of the danger of poison gas collecting in bomb shelters. The American assistant military attaché for air noted in February 1940 that the Bel- gian air force was pathetic and the Belgian Air Force could best help the Allies by “stay[ing] out of the way” and allowing the Allied use of Belgian airstrips along with “spotting refueling and repair facilities on as many emergency air- dromes as possible.” It was not just a lack of funds that hampered Belgian aviation. The British air attaché, Wing Commander Davis, noted in his 1938 report on the Belgian Air Force that “events of the past twelve months tend to show that indecision and lack of co-operation have largely been responsible for this state of affairs.”4

4 LTC Brown quoted in Helmreich, “An American Perception,” pp. 425-426; “Preoccupations de l’heure,” May 12, 1939, in AMBAE 11185/1; Capt. John M. Stirling, quoted in Helmreich, “An American Perception,” p. 426; Major Paris and Wing Commander Davis, “Annual Report on the Belgian Army for 1938,” in MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII, #342 [henceforth “1938 Annual Report”]. The Belgian Army To May 10, 1940 193

Belgian ‘armored cars’ were too small and too poorly armed. In January 1940 General van Overstraeten had the military attaché in London try to get British light tanks equipped with two light machine guns but was turned down because the British needed all they could produce. The Belgian communications system left a lot to be desired and the Belgian logistical system was designed for a long war and Belgian war industry was located in the east of the country.5 The lack of qualified officers has already been discussed. Although the active officers were well-trained and motivated, they did not concern themselves enough with the lives of their soldiers. Many reserve officers, especially infantrymen, lacked the requisite ability. The officer corps was also too conservative and was not ready for modern warfare and spent far too much money and energy on linear defenses. In addition, they were “held back by hum-drum methods, pencil-pushers, and deprived of imagination.” Maneuver warfare to block the enemy axes of advance and to deliver a powerful counterattack was not generally appreciated and far too few resources were devoted to it.6 The main hindrance to the improvement of the Belgian military was financial. Indeed, one aspect of the Belgian mobilization during the Sudeten Crisis was the difficulty in paying for it.7 In December 1936, van Overstraeten had directed the chief of staff that there would be provisions for two possible ‘alert dispositions’: either a limited alert, garde à vous (‘attention’) in which only active troops would be alerted or a general alert or Pied de Paix Renforcé (‘Reinforced Peace Footing’ or P.P.R.) in which active units and the ‘first reserve’ divisions would go on a wartime footing. Belgian defenses against France in these years have already been discussed but those against Germany relied in the first instance on the covering forces who would occupy the bridges and casemates along the Frontier Canals from Antwerp to Lanaye, the Meuse, the PFL2 and the PFN. In the event of a threat coming from the east, five infantry divisions and the Cavalry Corps would hold the Albert Canal, two infantry divisions would defend Liège, one would defend Namur, and the Chasseurs ardennais would protect the Meuse between Liège and Namur. Another four infantry divisions would be on the Nèthe and Demer rivers. In 1937, in the face of doubts about effective French aid, a withdrawal position was considered. Should the Belgians be forced from the Albert Canal or the Meuse, they would fall back on a position running from Antwerp to Wavre, with the majority of the army on the section from Antwerp to Louvain,

5 Diary entry for January 25, 1940, in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, p. 484; De Vos, p. 29. 6 De Vos, p. 29; Crahay, pp. 246-247; Wanty 1: 192. 7 Crombois, p. 179. 194 Chapter 7 while the motorized forces would hold the southern half from Louvain to Wavre. This line would become the main line of resistance in 1940. This position would be held by five divisions in the north and another three in the south along the Dyle River; thus, the Allied plan for intervention to this position was called ‘the Dyle Maneuver.’ Antwerp itself would be held by four ‘second reserve’ divisions supported by the PFA, an anti-tank ditch, and the Scheldt River. Nevertheless, the Belgian army went into 1938 planning for a main line of resistance along the Albert Canal. In any case, the main objective of the Bel- gian forces was to defend the heart of the country.8

Fortifications from 1938 to 1940

Belgium was also moving ahead with its plans and fortifications. The two were, in fact, tightly linked, as were the coverage plans already discussed. In fact, they were tied in with those of the French because it was only through French assistance that Belgium would remain free in the event of a German invasion. The system of fortifications protecting Belgium in 1940 had been started in 1928 and was increasingly pushed forward. “Tightly tied to the plan of campaign, the plan of fortifications and the measures of coverage evolved with it.” Until the death of ‘the integral defense of the territory,’ fortresses were concentrated on Belgium’s eastern frontier, in the provinces of “Liège, Limburg, Namur, and Luxembourg.”9 The six old fortresses around Liège that had held the Germans up in 1914 were modernized beginning in 1928, while starting in 1934 pillboxes with machine guns were erected to protect the flanks of the fortresses. “A [permanently occupied] belt of shelters against surprise invasion” armed with 47mm anti-tank guns, machine guns, and searchlights and protected as well with anti-tank obstacles, was created to block all avenues to Liège from the east. These shelters were larger than 8.5m by 6.25m and were designed to resist a 150mm shell. Strategic locations nearer the frontier became ‘fortified centers’ with garrisons. In addition to the old fortresses and shelters, work began on a new belt of modern fortresses like the ones for the old fortresses. In fact, there were four lines of the PFL (‘Position fortifié de Liège’ or ‘Fortified Position of Liège’). PFL I, “a vast circular arc going from Visé to Comblain-au-Pont,” included the new forts of Aubin-Neufchâteau, Battice, and Pepinster-Tancre- mont as well as 179 cement pillboxes, 8.5m by 6.25m, usually containing two

8 Crahay, pp. 155, 184-185; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 54. 9 “L’Effort Militaire Belge depuis 1918,” p. 3. The Belgian Army To May 10, 1940 195 machine guns. PFL II included three of the 1914 forts and 61 shelters. PFL III was constituted by bridgeheads at “Visé, Argenteau, and Jupille” with another 42 shelters. PFL IV, or the ‘Meuse line of defense’ constituted 31 pillboxes on the left bank of the Meuse, nine on the Albert Canal, two 1914 forts, and “ten large shelters.” In addition, as we saw above, many works of demolition were prepared and guarded by the Unités cyclistes frontières.10 The Liège forts, although formidable against ground assault, were vulnerable to aviation. This was quickly learned by the garrison of fort Eben-Emael on May 10, 1940. The ‘neutralist’ bent of the Belgian politicians, which has already been seen in the lack of armored vehicles, also affected the Belgian fortifications. The guns of the forts around Liège, “the only real justification for the hundreds of millions – at the time – that had been consecrated to their construction” lacked both quantity and quality. The guns were too small and the heaviest, the 120mm guns were deliberately limited in range so they could not reach targets beyond the German border! “A pusillanimous conception of the policy of neutrality obliged it.”11 In Limburg and Antwerp the defenses were based on the waterlines, especially the Maastricht-Bois-le-Duc and Meuse-Scheldt junction canals. These waterlines were defended by flanking shelters like those in Liège and bridges were blocked by obstacles. Controlled flooding – like that which saved the Bel- gian army in 1914 – and demolitions were planned and prepared. Also in this region was the Albert Canal which, for most of the 1936-1940 period, represented the Belgian Main Line of Resistance. It ran from the Fortified Position of Antwerp (which no longer had artillery) south-east to the Fortified Position of Liège. The line then ran south-west to the Fortified Position of Namur. The stretch of the canal from Antwerp to Liège had the south bank built up to control the opposite bank, 148 machine-gun-armed shelters, or one every 500-600 meters, and bridgeheads on the north bank to protect the vital locks. The Meuse from Liège to Namur had 70 shelters.12 In Namur and Luxembourg, the central defensive point was the ‘Fortified Position of Namur’ (‘PFN’), which had been renovated and improved like that of Liège. The PFN consisted of seven fortresses dating back to 1914 (two had been destroyed beyond repair) and 156 flanking shelters. The fortresses contained forty artillery pieces “under cupolas, of which two [were] 105mm cannons, 12 75mm, and 26 75mm howitzers” as well as small arms. In addition, the Chasseurs ardennais were entrusted with the defense of the region. They were

10 “L’Effort Militaire Belge,” pp. 3-4; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 72. 11 Wanty, 1: 187-188. 12 “L’Effort Militaire Belge,” p. 4; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 72-75. 196 Chapter 7 to be skirmishers. “This tactic, favored by cuts in the terrain and by demolitions, was capable of inflicting losses and important delays on an invader.” Shelters in the Ardennes were 3.25m by 3.5m with walls only.4m-.6m wide, designed to stop a 77mm round, and to hold a machine gun and four men.13 After 1936, neutrality required, as we have seen, an emphasis on fortifications facing south, including the ‘national redoubt’ based on the new Ghent Bridgehead and the Antwerp fortifications, as well as an increase in the covering forces, which now had to defend in two directions. Another major consequence was the abandonment of the Albert Canal as the main defensive line. It became instead a covering position. As Colonel B.E.M. Diepenrykx pointed out in his “L’Effort Militaire Belge Depuis 1918,” written in 1941, “Left to itself, the Belgian army could not hold a front of over 200km.” The Albert Canal line also lacked depth, it was too far from France for Allied aid to arrive before the Ger- mans did, and because the line was elliptical, it was very exposed to flank attacks.14 In fact, it was an intervention from the king himself that led to the decision of the General Staff in September, 1939 to build the K-W Line. The decision was based on “Leopold’s appreciation of the speed of modern warfare.” The Bel- gians wanted to interest the Allies in defending this line in order to protect as much Belgian territory as possible.15 General van Overstraeten argued that in the event of a German-Italian war against the Allies, with Britain unable to intervene on Belgium’s behalf (presumably being busy with the Italians in the Mediterranean), the Antwerp- Wavre-Hal-Ninove position (essentially the K-W Line) would serve as a national redoubt as Antwerp had served in 1914. From Antwerp to Wavre, there were 235 machine gun shelters in three lines, “permitting, in what concerns the two first echelons at least, the realization of a deep, dense, and continuous sheet of flame.” There was also “a continuous network of accessory defense, before each echelon, flanked by the first of MGs under shelter,” a buried telephone network, concrete command posts, and an anti-tank obstacle. All told, the Bel- gians had created, in an extremely cold and difficult winter, 302 camouflaged machine-gun shelters.16

13 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 73; “L’Effort Militaire Belge,” p. 4; Crahay, p. 211. 14 “L’Effort Militaire Belge,” p. 5; Keyes, p. 103. 15 Keyes, p. 103; Wanty 1: 188; Simon, “Coup d’oeil (Partie II), p. 57. 16 van Overstraeten, diary entry for September 21, 1938, Albert I-Léopold III, p. 296; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 76; Commandant B.E.M. Bernard, “Historique de la position K-W ed de la 4.D.Gn.F.”, in SGRS-S/A “Campagne 1940” Généralités G 1, Carton A/farde 2/sous-farde a, doc. No. 3, pp. 1, 5. The Belgian Army To May 10, 1940 197

A Belgian Commandant who worked on the line summed things up thus: “those who have proceeded with the building of the K-W barrier can carry a real sentiment of satisfaction, mixed, however, with immense regrets.” Satis- faction because the works were completed in the time allotted; regrets because the commanders at the same time urged haste and delayed completion by changing their minds. “[O]ne worked without firm facts and … each result of reconnaissance, approved at first, was then put in check.” It had taken a year of study before the line was even decided upon and then another three months were wasted because of this dysfunction. Then, between January and April 1940, the obstacles south of Wavre had to be moved, and then moved again. “The officers of the [General Staff] which carried out the reconnaissance no longer showed any enthusiasm” because they knew they would just have to do it all over again.

In conclusion, the 4.D.Gn.F.17 would have easily finished, for May 10, a magnificent position which, in place of stopping at Wavre, would have united with the [Namur bridgehead] north of Namur. It could have, for the same date, finished the Geenebosch-Tirlemont position, link between the Albert Canal and K-W. Certainly, given the events which occurred south of Namur, a K-W position impeccably finished would have without doubt only delayed the enemy advance. But then – and only then – we would not have incurred any responsibility in the defeat.18

However, even as built, it was a strong position and ready for the Belgian and British forces and, writing after the fact, LTG Crahay highly rated its ability to resist. In the end, as we will see, the K-W Line did not serve its function and had to be evacuated in order to try to get the Allied forces out of the closing Ger- man trap.19 South of the K-W Line, there was a 28km gap, the so-called ‘Gembloux Gap’ in the planned French sector, between the K-W Line and the PFN. To fill this, the anti-tank gap was provided by the path of a railway and obstacles were provided by ‘Cointet elements.’20 The first Cointet elements were emplaced on

17 The 4th Division of Fortress Engineers, the unit responsible for creating the K-W Line under the I Army Corps. 18 Bernard, pp. 15-17. He is referring to the fatal German breakthrough against the French in the Ardennes. 19 Crahay, p. 210. 20 “a steel grill with supports [with a] height of 3 meters, width of 5 meters, weighing 1,300 kg and provided with rollers to permit its displacement. A Cointet barricade is constituted by a range of elements linked together by assembly pins and three metallic cables. In 198 Chapter 7

September 1, 1939 by military laborers while civilian workers installed cement tetrahedrons and rails. Meanwhile, the commander of the Troops for the Defense of Liège and Namur was “authorized to requisition civilian laborers to execute the works of the first echelon of the PFN in the Meuse sector.” 21 The work on the Gembloux gap was completed in March of 1940, at which time General van Overstraeten decided the line left Namur too far forward and had the line moved eight kilometers further east, to a more favorable position. Fifteen more kilometers of Cointet elements had to be taken from the Ghent Bridgehead and from in front of Wavre. General Crahay points out that the Allies were alerted but mainly stuck to the old positions based on the railway. Eric Simon argues that General van Overstraeten, eager to draw the Allies into central Belgium, missed two major things – the defensive line was very unfinished and the French lacked the transport to get to their positions in time. Therefore, the Belgians “commited an unpardonable sin in not completing their line of defense before inviting the Allies to fight there.” On the other hand, “the Allies implemented just as unpardonable an error in accepting [and] endorsing a maneuver that they lacked the capacities to assume” especially since the Allied leaders knew the defenses were unfinished. However, in the test in May, 1940, in three days of fighting, the French armored forces successfully held up German tank formations in front of the Gembloux Gap and the Allies were able to establish themselves on the K-W Line.22 There was also a forward line based on waterlines in the north and east of the country and on shelters in Luxembourg and in the Ardennes. Of Belgium’s organized lines, 120km was not occupied, 780km were occupied and of those, only 80 were lost to enemy attack! Commandant Bernard praises the builders of the K-W Line for their determination and perseverance against weather and cold. It surely goes as well for the builders of Belgium’s other fortifications.23

theory, a tank which charges into this obstacle would be trapped by the elements which would pivot around it.” De Fabribeckers, p. 58. 21 Crahay, p. 210; de Fabribeckers, p. 58; Minister of National Defense to the Commander of the TDLN, August 29, 1939, MDN/EMGA 1ère Sect. no 241/21 in SGRS/SA-Fonds van Over- straeten, Box 1, Doc. 48. 22 Bernard, p. 4; Crahay, p. 210; Simon, “Coup d’oeil sur la campagne de Mai 1940 (partie II),” p. 58; Julian Jackson, The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003), p. 38. 23 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 72; Crahay, p. 212; Bernard, pp. 15-16. The Belgian Army To May 10, 1940 199

Defense Against Aircraft

General Denis and General van Overstraeten were preoccupied with anti-aircraft defense. They agreed that this defense should be based on artillery rather than aviation. General van Overstraeten was opposed to the existence of the Belgian air force both because of the limited extent of Belgian territory and because it would be doomed to failure against the German, French, or British air forces. On the other hand, he believed strongly in anti-aircraft artillery. As there had been problems with the production of anti-aircraft guns by the Bel- gian Fonderie royale de Canons, the Belgians ordered materiel from France, Britain’s Vickers, and Sweden’s Bofors.24 In 1937, Minister Denis achieved the formation of the Garde aérienne du Ter- ritoire (‘Air guard of the territory’ or GAT) which was independent of the army and had a billion-franc budget. Its assignment was to defend urban and strategic areas but as Belgium is a small country, the assignment essentially encom- passed the whole country. The GAT was armed with 40mm Bofors guns for planes flying between 1000 and 2000 meters, 75mm Vickers guns for middle altitude planes, and 94mm Vickers guns for high-flying planes.25 Ignoring van Overstraeten, the Belgians also worked on improving their air force, which was a branch of the army rather than an independent organization. The Belgian air force, like the ground force, had drawn down severely after World War I. In 1925, the air force was divided into three regiments – an organization that would last until 1940. In 1933, the Brigade Aéronautique (‘Air Brigade’), was finally commanded by an aviator while the DAT was created in 1935. The ‘Aéronautique militaire’ (‘Military Aviation’ or ‘air force’) was organized into three air regiments: the first had three observation groups of three squadrons of twelve aircraft each; the second had two groups of three squadrons of monoplane fighters and a group of biplane fighters and the third had one observation group of three squadrons, a squadron of night observation planes, a bombing squadron, and a spare squadron. There was also an aeronautic company, a flying school, an aeronautic school, and a depot.26 A major force for the development of the air force was General Gilliaux. With his retirement, the development of the air arm stalled. When General- aviator Hiernaux took over the Aéronautique militaire in 1938, the air force was

24 Diary entry for 26 décembre 1936 in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, p. 253; Report of lunch conversation with General van Overstraeten (and others), Lt. Colonel Blake to Sir Robert Clive, dated 23rd March 1939, p. 2, in MRA-AMB 80/4/XIV, p. 51 [in English]. 25 Crahay, p. 218. 26 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 91. 200 Chapter 7 in deep trouble for a number of reasons. One was the outmoded thinking of the commanders. British Air Attaché Wing Commander Davis commented in his 1938 report that Minister Denis did not seem to care about the Aéronau- tique Militaire and thus neglected it. Another was the rapid advance of airplane technology. Small countries simply could not afford to keep buying new planes as quickly as they developed. Belgian-designed planes were obsolescent by the time they appeared, although the Renard R-36 and later Renard R-38 fighters showed promise until an R-36 crashed, killing the test pilot and leading the Belgians to look abroad for their materiel. They did produce one indigenous reconnaissance aircraft, the Renard R-31, but this was very unpopular with its crews. In 1937 the Belgians bought a squadron’s worth of obsolescent British Gloster Gladiator biplane fighters while the monoplane Messerschmidt BF 109, one of the most recognizable fighters of World War II, had already appeared three years previously. Another two squadrons flew British Fairey Battle light bombers. Finally, the Belgians tried to obtain British Hawker Hurricane fighters of which fifteen ‘reconditioned’ models, including some ex-RAF models forced down during the ‘Phony War’ by the Belgian air force, were delivered to Belgium in 1939 while the first license-built model arrived just before the war. The Belgians were beaten to the American market by the British and French and had to content themselves with the Brewster Buffaloes which would make such a miserable impression in the battle of Midway in 1942 (although, as modified by the Finns, they did very well against the Russians in the east). Forty were purchased but only arrived after the Belgian capitulation. A major problem in purchasing modern aircraft abroad was that the countries of manufac- ture were also desperately building up their own air forces and had priority of order. The Belgians ended up having to settle for Italian CR 42 biplanes that might have been a match for the Gladiators but not for the BF-109s. They would pay the price.27

The Sudeten Crisis and the Pied de Paix Renforcé

Germany had spent 1937 ratcheting up its military effort and then aimed it at Czechoslovakia, the only remaining democracy in East Central Europe, and a key French ally. Hitler wanted to bring all the ethnic Germans heim ins Reich

27 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 91-94; Crahay, pp. 218-219; Rapport annuel 1937 [by] Major Paris [and] Wing Commander Davis, pp. 87-88, in MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII, pp. 122-123 [in English]; Rapport annuel 1938 [by] Major Paris [and] Wing Commander Davis, in MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII, pp. 341-342 [in English]. The Belgian Army To May 10, 1940 201

(‘home to the Reich’), shorten his lines in the east, allowing him to send troops elsewhere, and to use the Sudeten Germans to raise new divisions. He also viewed the country as Lebensraum waiting to happen. He hoped for a localized war and the obvious reluctance of the Allies to do anything gave him reason to hope. Hitler used the Sudeten Germans as his Trojan horse. Germany swal- lowed up Austria (to the delight of many Austrians) on March 12, 1938, and then moved on to demanding rights for the Sudeten Germans. Hitler was also building his western fortifications at an increasing rate. In mid-May, rumors of German troops massing on the Czech border led to a Czech mobilization and to Allied warnings to Hitler. The rumors turned out to be false and war was avoided. Meanwhile, Hitler’s new military timetable called for an invasion by October 1. On September 5, the Czechs met the demands of the Sudeten Ger- man leader Konrad Henlein and German diplomats were warning Hitler that France and Britain would go to war for the Czechs. Given the German fortifications, the easiest way for the Allies to reach Germany would have been through Belgium.28 Meanwhile, within Belgium, a debate was triggered by the August maneuvers perceived by many Walloons as anti-French. Paul Struye, contributor to La Libre Belgique, and shown in hindsight to have been pretty perspicacious, argued that some threats were greater than others. It would have been ridiculous equally to defend all four of Belgium’s frontiers because then none of them would be effectively defended. He argued for measures to defend all frontiers, but to concentrate on the location where the real danger was: the Ger- man border.29 When the ‘Sudeten Crisis’ broke out, the king, fearing a French invasion aimed at helping the Czechs, urged the acceleration of defensive measures aimed south. Mr. Spaak, speaking for the whole cabinet, declared that Belgian policy regarding the situation would be “complete independence” and that Belgium would not get involved in the conflict. This policy was also backed by the Belgian press. Moreover, two Belgian deputies declared that during their recent trip to Germany, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had assured them that Germany would respect Belgian independence and that Germany was happy to hear Belgium would defend its independence.30

28 Weinberg, one volume pp. 641-644; “Statut de la Belgique. Aperçu hebdomadaire du 19 au 26 mars 1938,” p. 1, in AMBAE 11.451 “Pacte Occidental et statut international de la Bel- gique”; Weinberg, one volume, pp. 690-693, 735-740. 29 Paul Struye quoted in “Statut de la Belgique. Aperçu hebdomadaire du 6 au 13 août 1938,” pp. 1-2, in AMBAE 11.451 “Pacte Occidental et statut international de la Belgique”. 30 Weinberg, one volume, p. 741; Statut de la Belgique. Aperçu hebdomadaire du 10 au 17 septembre 1938,” pp. 1-2, in AMBAE 11451 “Pacte Occidental et statut international de la Belgique”. 202 Chapter 7

On September 20, the Belgian government, deciding not to call Parliament early, declared that it was

decided to apply with an unshakeable firmness the principles of the policy of independence which it has formulated many times before the Par- liament. Its resolution comes notably from the fact that in the course of the current international crisis, it has acquired the certitude that the position taken by it in the matter of foreign policy not only contributes to the maintenance of the general peace but also carries to the maximum the chances that Belgium [will] escape the dangers of war.31

On September 21, King Leopold warned Prime Minister Spaak and Minister of National Defense Denis that defenses aimed south needed to be increased. On September 23 the Unités cyclistes frontières and the Chasseurs ardennais were alerted to act on their destruction plan while the engineers finished the demolition scheme and prepared bridges and tunnels for destruction. On September 24, the government met and opted to recall certain reserve engineers. The works carried out by these engineers, and the demolitions planned, were for both the eastern and southern frontiers. The government also called up one regiment of the artillerists of the class of 1937.32 That same day, the French ambassador to Brussels warned Émile Vandervelde that if Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, France would insist Belgium grant its troops passage in accordance with League of Nations Covenant Article XVI. If Belgium refused, France would withdraw its guarantee to protect Belgium. Vandervelde responded “I believe that Belgium would prefer to lose the guarantee.” To a similar point, Paul Hymans answered “I do not understand this alternative; because to accept is on our part to declare war on Germany.” Another Belgian told the French ambassador that if France required passage, “we would fire on the invader.”33 On September 26, in view of Chamberlain’s failure at Bad Godesberg the previous day, and the partial mobilization of the French, the Dutch, and the Hungarians, the government called up the Chasseurs ardennais, cavalrymen, and fortress troops who were on ‘unlimited leave.’ Some provisional battalions, especially those of the Second and Sixth Infantry Divisions which were south of Brussels facing France, took up their positions.34

31 “Circulaire d’information no. 47” (Brussels, September 20, 1938), in AMBAE 11185/1. 32 Dumortier, pp. 44. 33 Diary entry for September 24, 1938 in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, p. 298. 34 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 55. The Belgian Army To May 10, 1940 203

Figure 13 Belgian soldiers during the P.P.R. Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels

The Belgian army was mobilized to the condition of Pied de Paix Renforcé on September 27, 1938. This brought thirteen Belgian divisions, the Unités cyclistes frontières, fortress troops, D.T.C.A., and aviation assets to a wartime footing by calling up six or seven classes of reservists. Reserve officers were called up based in part on the needs of their parent unit; each reserve officer carried a letter specifying his date to report. Troops manned the observation (i.e. most forward) positions. The air force was expanded by forming reserve squadrons, turning civilian SABENA airliners into bombers. The Belgians, proportionately, did more militarily than any other country. Yet the Belgian defenses at that time were oriented towards the south to discourage the French from using Belgium as a springboard to invade Germany.35 On September 28, the king issued instructions on manning the observation positions. This operation lasted two days and consisted of deploying two divisions in Flanders, one division plus the Cavalry Corps in Hainaut, one in Namur, and two in Liège with another five in the center of the country around Ninove, Hal, and Antwerp. 36

35 Dumortier, p. 45; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 56. 36 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 56-57; van Overstraeten quoted in Belgian Mili- tary Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 56. 204 Chapter 7

Figure 14 Map P.P.R. 1938, sous-farde Attachés Militaires-Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A)

On September 30, after the crisis had blown over, requisitions were halted and demobilization was decreed. A leading Belgian newspaper, Metropole, reported that the government had shown itself supremely competent, deploying the soldiers to the most dangerous areas and partially mobilizing the reserves. It also declared that observers came away very impressed with the Belgian forces. Belgians, like most Europeans outside of Hitler’s inner circle, were thrilled that they had been spared from war. The Belgians credited the wisdom of their government, whose policy of ‘independence’ won approval from all sides and all languages. A contributor to the Nation Belge newspaper wrote on October 2 that the crisis and the Belgian response thereto validated ‘independence’ and contributed to pacifying the continent. On the Flemish side of the aisle, Dr. J. Rombouts declared in De Standaard the faith among the Flemings that Bel- gium’s foreign and defense policies worked only for Belgium.37

37 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 57; Metropole, October 3, 1938, in AMBAE 11185/1; Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et du Commerce Exterieur, “Circulaire d’Information no. 59,” Brussels, October 10, 1938, pp. 136-139, in AMBAE 11185/1, “Politique Militaire”; Le The Belgian Army To May 10, 1940 205

LTC Paris reported that although the General Staff did not expect a French invasion en route to Germany, many Belgians did and the defenses facing south were conducted to support the policy of ‘independence.’ The army was demobilized on September 30. The mobilization, and especially the demobilization, had been flawed. The annual report of the 12th Line Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Infantry Division noted “[n]obody is ignorant of [the fact that] from the points of view of organization and discipline, the P.P.R. was far from being a success.” However, lessons were learned and the 1939 mobilization went much more smoothly.38 Those best qualified to judge the performance of the Belgian army were considerably less satisfied with its performance than were outside observers and gave it a mixed review.

[T]his full dress rehearsal of partial mobilization was of the greatest value to the General Staff and to the country as a whole [because] it proved that the spirit of the population and the troops was excellent [and] both Flemish and Walloons forgot all their differences under the threat of danger and came to the colors rapidly and cheerfully.39

However, the mobilization, and especially the demobilization, of the army revealed several weaknesses in the Belgian military. Major Paris estimated that the greatest problem with the mobilization itself was the logistics, which failed to provide food for men or horses during the first day. As well, the requisitions of transport were conducted haphazardly.40 Perhaps more importantly, the scheme for provisional battalions, fought out so heatedly in 1936, had failed because it did not adequately protect either the Liège-Maastricht front or the Namur-Ostende front. It had not covered the Bel- gian mobilization but it had drawn a great number of active officers, whose absence significantly hindered mobilization and training. Because the troops of the provisional units were already well trained, the chief of staff recom-

Huron, “Pied de paix renforcé et politique d’indépendence,” Nation Belge, October 2, 1938, in AMBAE 11185/1; Dr. J. Rombouts quoted in “Circulaire d’Information no. 59,” p. 137. 38 Wanty, “Les Relations Militaires,” p. 15; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 56; LTC Paris, “Annual Report on the Belgian Army” (1938) MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII, p. 336; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 56; SGRS-S/A, Box P.P.R., sub-folder 3DI, “12e de ligne” p. 517; Crahay, p. 189. Crahay calls the mobilization of 1938 “disastrous.” Ibid. 39 1938 Annual Report, #336. 40 Ibid. 206 Chapter 7 mended allowing reserve officers to compete to become platoon leaders in these units.41 Another flaw in the army was, as we have seen, the lack of reserve officers. Minister Denis warned that there was a lack of 1,000 reserve officers to staff the mobilizable units. He contended that the larger problem was that the Belgian army had too many units. This was the exact argument raised by General Galet and his disciples before the Mixed Commission of 1936. Mobilization was dependent on the existence of sufficient trained cadres of both active and reserve officers. The Belgian army simply did not have them for all the desired units and, if things went on as usual, would not have them, according to the General Staff, until 1947!42 Minister Denis rejected business as usual:

I cannot bring myself [to accept] this solution! We must be ready to face danger immediately and it is from 1939, from now, that we must take measures moving away from the normal rules of recruitment. I know that … we will not have completely and perfectly trained officers.43

Speed was the important thing. Among the new measures implemented were the nomination to the grade of second lieutenant of adjutants coming from training schools in Beverloo; the recruitment of officers from candidate second lieutenants of the Reserve on active service; and the designation of career adjutants as platoon leaders, which would produce another 400 platoon commanders who could replace incompetent or indifferent lieutenants.44 We saw earlier that there were instances of indiscipline in 1936 among troops required to serve longer than expected. These were repeated during the 1938 mobilization and recounted in many journals. On September 30, Minister Denis alerted his commanders to eliminate “the excesses of all types [resulting] from the stay of troops in the cantonments … . (drunkenness, etc … ).” A Mr. Van de Bergh, claiming to have been a company commander in 1914, offered Minister Denis his own explanation of the lack of discipline during the P.P.R.:

41 Dumortier, pp. 45-46; Van den Bergen to Minister of National Defense, January 24, 1939, in SGRS-S/A “Documents 1940 Non Ventilés,” #5. 42 Denis to Van den Bergen, January 30, 1939, pp. 2-3, in SGRS-S/A “Documents 1940 Non Ventilés,” #7. 43 Denis to Van den Bergen, January 30, 1939, pp. 2-3, in SGRS-S/A “Documents 1940 Non Ventilés,” #7. 44 Ibid. The Belgian Army To May 10, 1940 207

“it is necessary to find the cause in the carelessness and the ‘democratization’ which [has reigned] for the last years in our army.”45 The demobilization was also problematical. Major Paris reported that the demobilization orders “gave rise to rather childish exuberance and a display of drunkenness such as has not been seen since the Armistice.” The problem was that the military estimated that it would have required at least three days to demobilize in an orderly manner, returning all equipment to the depots. In addition, the army had to send requisitioned horses, cars, and bicycles back to their owners, and get the soldiers home. Unfortunately, for purely budgetary reasons, the government opted for “an immediate and hasty demobilization” and sent everybody home at once, leading to chaos as the reservists abandoned their equipment and went home, with the officers and draftees left to deal with the mess. Military items were just left lying around. Despite the problems, King Leopold wrote to Minister Denis about the mobilization:

In the grave moments that we are passing through, this measure responded to the wishes of the country, because from the viewpoint of the deployment of the forces of the neighboring states, it proved the resolution of Belgium to avoid war on its territory and to make its independence respected. The preparation by staffs, the zeal of the officers, the good will of the NCOs and soldiers, the patriotic sense of all, have demonstrated, abroad as well as domestically, that the Army was ready and determined to face anything that circumstances might have required.46

In his order calling for this letter to be read to the troops, Minister Denis declared that he was nullifying all punishments incurred in the army during the P.P.R. as of October 5, as well as awarding an extra day of leave to all military “regulated by the chiefs of corps according to the exigencies of service.”47 The Belgian government immediately set about repairing all the flaws revealed by the P.P.R., working on improving the supply system, the requisition

45 Minister of National Defense to I-IV Military Areas, September 30, 1938, in MRA 25/29.1, “P.P.R. 1938 Diverses”; General Van den Bergen quoted in Belgian Military Archives (SGRS- S/A), p. 57; Van de Berghe to LTG Denis, dated October 10, 1938, in MRA 25/29, sous-farde 6. 46 1938 Annual Report, #336; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 57-58; Leopold quoted in Minister of National Defense to all Military Authorities, Brussels, October 5, 1938, in MRA 25/29.1 “P.P.R. 1938 Divers.” 47 Cabinet of the Minister of National Defense, no. 52/928/M.5, in MRA 25/29.1 “P.P.R. 1938 Divers.” 208 Chapter 7 system, and, especially air defense, going all out in the hope of avoiding the war that everybody saw looming.48 By the evening of May 9, 1940, kings Albert and Leopold, the ministers of national defense, the chiefs of the General Staff, the Superior Council of National Defense, and Raoul van Overstraeten had evaluated the military situation of Belgium and its neighbors and, working together or, on occasion, at cross-purposes, created a 650,000 man military with eighteen infantry divisions, twelve of which were of good quality. They had created a motorized Cav- alry Corps and an elite Chasseurs ardennais, both of which impressed foreign observers before, and the German soldiers during, the war.

New Mobilization Plans

In light of certain deficiencies of the provisional battalions revealed by the mobilization during the Sudeten Crisis, the Belgian army also revamped its mobilization scheme. It was completely reshaped into a five-stage process aimed both south and east, the main purpose being to deter a sudden invasion. The units would be deployed closer to their covering positions. The plan dating from January 1940 involved placing Belgium’s twenty-two divisions on an initial 210km front largely along the Albert Canal. No help was anticipated from the Dutch while the Allies were only going to reach the Louvain-Namur-Meuse position. The Belgians would have to hold their current positions long enough for Allied aid to get established on the K-W Line but could not expect to stop a much superior German force there and would have to plan a retreat. The Army would fall back to the K-W Line, there joining the Allied forces, which would be strong enough to halt the enemy. Plans were made for the III Army Corps, which would be exposed in Liège, to retreat to the Méhaigne river north of Huy while I Army Corps would fall back from the Albert Canal to the K-W Line. Groupement K in the Ardennes would defend the Meuse while the III CA fell back westward. The king warned the commanders of ICA and IIICA that they would have to plan for a difficult series of nighttime retreats harassed by enemy aviation and obstructed by the civilian population. The warning was necessary because the civilians – and the soldiers – believed they would hold on the Albert Canal and that was the only thing they needed about which they needed to worry.49

48 Miller, p. 265; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 59. 49 Dumortier, p. 46; Crahay, p. 198; Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Belgian Cam- paign, pp. 32-33; General Van den Bergen to the King, January 23, 1940, quoted in Crahay, p. 198; Leopold III, quoted in van Overstraeten, Dans l’étau, p. 208; Ibid. The Belgian Army To May 10, 1940 209

Walloon activists, especially from Liège, were still “bustling about” – in van Overstraeten’s words. Wallonia would be betrayed “because of the lack of staff contacts” and one member of Parliament from Liège even went to the homes of the foreign minister and Count Capelle. It took the king himself to allay his fears. The next day, Liègeois MPs sent to Pierlot, Spaak, and Denis, demanding to know: “Does the government intend to take direction of the defense of the country? Will it give the order to fight to the end on the first position?” They threatened to call the ministers before the Chamber unless they received an immediate answer.50 Belgian policy between the end of 1936 and May 10, 1940 was marked by ‘independence,’ That policy enabled the passing of the 1936 military law and the army then evolved according to that law, preparing for the war that almost everybody saw coming. The units got new weapons that they demonstrated during the August 1938 maneuvers that so impressed the American military attaché and the Germans, although their opinions of the reservists was less positive. The Belgians were having difficulty purchasing material abroad and their air force was weak. At the same time, the officer corps had its own problems. Meanwhile, the military, with General van Overstraeten, was developing its plans for defense against Germany and forging ahead with new fortifications. The Sudeten Crisis provided an opportunity for the Belgian army to test out its plans and procedures. Several problems, including issues of discipline, manifested themselves. Once it was over, the military examined the lessons learned and redrew their mobilization and combat plans. They still had to defend themselves against allegations of plotting against Wallonia.

50 Diary entry for March 2, 1940, quoted in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, pp. 515-516. 210 Chapter 8

Chapter 8 Belgium to May 10, 1940

In addition to strictly military concerns, Belgian defense policy between 1936 and 1940 was shaped by relations with Belgium’s neighbors and information from its intelligence service. The Belgian commanders accommodated the Allies as much as they could while fending off nearly incessant Allied demands for staff talks and attempts to bring Belgium in on their side. At the same time, the Belgians were trying for greater cooperation with the Dutch than the latter were ready to provide. As the crisis over Danzig seemed increasingly likely to lead to war, the Belgians began mobilization. Belgian deployments varied over the ‘drôle de paix’ (‘Funny Peace’)1 according to which neighbor seemed more likely to try to use Belgium as a thoroughfare. The Belgian army had several alerts triggered by intelligence from Germany, one of which, the infamous ‘Mechelen Incident’ of January 1940, not only embittered relations between the Belgians and the Allies but also forced the Germans to discard their previous campaign plan and adopt the ‘Manstein Plan’ or ‘Sickle Cut’ that was so successful in 1940. The chapter begins with a look at the complicated relations between the Belgians and the Allies during the policy of ‘independence’ and then at the interestingly similar relations between the Belgians and the Dutch. It then describes the mobilization and the difficulties the Belgian army experienced with discipline and morale, especially the issue of leaves. It ends with an examination of the information the Belgians were getting from Germany and the alerts that resulted.

Diplomacy

Theoretically, under Belgian ‘independence,’ the Belgians could not have any relations with the Allies that they refused to the Germans. This meant that the Belgian General Staff could not share military secrets with the Allies and not with the Germans. Nevertheless, the rules were bent somewhat and the Bel- gian military still showed favoritism towards the Allies. This is illustrated by a 1937 report regarding “the attitude of the Belgian General Staff towards the

1 Known in France as the ‘Drôle de Guerre’ or ‘Funny War’ and in Britain and the U.S. as the ‘Phony War.’

French Military Attaché, Colonel Laurent, and myself … ” from British military attaché Lieutenant Colonel Paris to Sir Noël Charles, the chargé d’affaires at the embassy. Belgian chief of staff General Van den Bergen

agreed that Colonel Laurent should do a tour of the Eastern and Northern defensive systems and smilingly concurred that the visit should take place in September, as this would be before the arrival of the new resident German military attaché in October … . I conclude from the forego- ing incidents that the Belgian General Staff, while still holding to their avowed policy of strict equality of treatment to foreign Military Attachés, have reverted to their former methods and are treating my French colleague and myself in a distinctly favoured manner.2

Earlier that year, Major (as he was then) Paris reported receiving from the Bel- gian General Staff two “questionnaires” addressed to their military attaché in London “with the request that I should beg the War Office to give full replies … .” The interpretation by the British diplomats and soldier in Brussels was that the Belgians were essentially still conducting staff talks, only in a new fashion. Sir Esmond Ovey, the ambassador, believed the Belgians were acting thus to give the lie to Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak’s declaration that the era of staff talks was over. The Belgians were indicating that they wished to maintain the old contacts while keeping them secret from other parties. In fact, at the king’s instigation, clandestine exchanges of military information between France and Belgium via the French military attaché in Brussels had been going on from October 1936 and would continue until the German invasion (when relations became overt), intensifying after the January 1940 alert. The Belgians, for their part, passed documents to the French, including information on the Ant- werp and Liège fortifications, on the Antwerp-Namur (K-W) line, maps of the Belgian deployment on the Meuse and Albert Canal, and information on usable Belgian roads. French military attaché Colonel Laurent was allowed to visit military works under a false identity. A January 1937 British document regarding Belgian requests for munitions from the United Kingdom indicates that the Cabinet “authorize[d] conversations between the Belgian Military Attaché and the War Office in order to ascertain exactly what the Belgian request amounted to” and try to fulfil it.3

2 D.K. Paris to Sir Noël Charles, Brussels, August 20, 1937, in MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII, #228-229. 3 Sir Esmond Ovey to Anthony Eden, Brussels, May 4, 1937, in MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII, #190; D.K. Paris to Sir Esmond Ovey, Brussels, May 4, 1937, in MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII, #191; Keyes, p. 115; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 87; ECNRS, p. 35; “Extract from Cabinet Conclusions 1(37) of January 13th, 1937” in MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII, #20. 212 Chapter 8

On May 11, 1939, the British ambassador and military attaché in Brussels attended a dinner with the Belgian chief of staff, general officers, and the commander and officers of the Belgian Regiment of Grenadiers. Other guests included the Dutch minister, the German and Italian ambassadors, and their military attachés. Invited but absent were the French and American representatives although their military attachés did attend. At this party, the national anthems of all the represented countries were played. British Ambas- sador Clive reported that although the event was intended to show Belgian “neutrality,”

[b]oth the Colonel of the Regiment in his speech of welcome to the guests and the Chief of the General Staff who replied (none of the foreign guests made a speech) ended up with a peroration about Belgian determination to resist attacks from any quarter. This was cheered to the echo by all present except the German and Italian Ambassadors who looked very sheepish and extremely uncomfortable.4

At the same dinner, Ambassador Clive discussed with General Van den Bergen the defenses of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Van den Bergen refused to answer pending more thought, but noted Luxembourg’s long frontier. He did mention that the Belgians were strengthening their defenses in (Belgian) Lux- embourg in order to slow an enemy until the French would arrive.5 There were, however, lengths to which the Belgian military was not allowed to go in showing favoritism. In April 1939, the Belgian Foreign Ministry refused an unofficial request, previously accepted by the Belgian Ministry of National Defense, for an exchange of officers between Belgium and Britain. The reason given by the Belgian military attaché in London was that if such a request was accepted, there would be no justification to refuse a similar German request in the future. In fact, the top Belgian generals wanted staff talks but did not control policy or reflect Belgian popular opinion.6 In one 1939 incident the Belgians scrapped a planned meeting with a visiting British military intelligence officer after he had already arrived in Brussels. The explanation from the Belgian military attaché in London was that the visit had become a matter for gossip and the leading Belgians did not want the fact of the meeting getting to the Germans.7

4 Ambassador Clive to Viscount Halifax, Brussels, May 12, 1939, in MRA-AMB 80/4/XIV, #151 5 Ibid., #152. 6 Major Douglas Brown, record, April 13, 1939, in MRA AMB 80/4/XIV, #35; Col. Paris to Clive, cited in Alexander, pp. 33-34. 7 Sir Robert Clive to I.A. Kirkpatrick, 7th July 1939, in MRA-AMB 80/4, p. 101. Belgium To May 10, 1940 213

In early 1939, Belgian emissaries went to the United States in search of supplies. Unfortunately, the Americans had nothing to spare. They suggested talking to the British. However, Baron van Zuylen estimated that relying on the Allies for supplies would be inconsistent with the policy of ‘independence.’8 On October 27, 1939, King Leopold followed up on an invitation to address the American people on radio to explain the Belgian position. He argued that Belgium was “acting in defense of [Christian] civilization by the attitude it has taken amidst the conflict that has broken out in Europe … .” By remaining neutral, Belgium could act as a buffer between the French and the Germans, preventing the kind of destruction of World War I. He informed the Americans that Belgium’s major neighbors not only recognized the new Belgian status of ‘independence’ but guaranteed Belgium’s inviolability. Thus, the Belgian declaration of neutrality was “logical” and “in accord with both the traditions and aspirations of the Belgian people, whose feelings have evolved from age-old struggles.” Moreover, Belgium, a “small but one of the most thickly populated” countries, needed neutrality because it was dependant on trade for its survival, needing both foodstuffs and raw materials to be paid for through exports. In addition,

we have no ambitions for territorial expansion. Neither had we any part whatever in the happenings that brought about the conflict to-day dividing Europe. If we became involved in the fray, it is on our soil that the issue would be fought out, and in view of the small size of our territory, that would spell utter destruction for Belgium … .9

Thus, King Leopold returned to one of the master thoughts of interwar Belgian defense and foreign policy: Belgium must do everything possible to avoid being involved in a war because a war would literally destroy the country. All the Belgian leaders had lived through World War I and were desperate to avoid a similar catastrophe in the future. Leopold informed American listeners (this went out at 8:30 p.m., New York time) that it was exactly twenty-five years ago that the Belgian army under King Albert had stopped “the progress of a cruel invasion.” He promised that, as a result of the policy of ‘independence’ and the military bill,

[i]f we were attacked – and pray God this may not happen – in violation of the solemn and definite undertakings that were given us in 1937 and

8 Diary entry for April 5, 1939, in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, p. 331. 9 Leopold III to the American People (in English), pp. 1-2, in SGRS-S/A FVO Box 2, sous-farde October 27 [1939], no. 599. 214 Chapter 8

were renewed at the outset of the present war, we would not hesitate to fight with the same conviction but with forces ten times stronger.10

The Belgians never lost faith in Allied assistance, even after the declaration of neutrality. In December 1938, General van Overstraeten had noted a possible German axis of attack as perpendicular to SE-NW and, while urging new plans of retreat, noted that the Ardennes divided the ‘Outre-Meuse’ region (‘Beyond the Meuse’) into two parts. Belgians would organize the delaying action in Condroz, the French would be responsible for Luxembourg.11 Once the German against Anglo-French-Polish war began, the Belgians were incessantly bombarded with demands to let the Allied troops in, or at least to have staff talks. The Belgian ambassador to France, despite not thinking a German attack on his country “either imminent or probable,” rejected the Allied overtures because the French could not keep a secret and the Germans would find out and invade – with terrible consequences for Belgium.12 Again the Belgians had to keep in mind the main goal of their policy – to avoid being drawn into a war or, failing that, to be able to face the trial united, without having previously shown partiality and thus alienating one or another segment of the population. Former Prime Minister van Zeeland told a Briton that unity was vital and in order to maintain that unity the government needed a German invasion to be “completely unprovoked” but news of staff talks would give that the lie.13 A secret report from the Belgian military attaché in Paris on October 3, 1939, reported that he had been told by a British colonel that most likely the Anglo- French “would have to take measures vis-à-vis the small countries in order that they can no longer thwart the military measures of the great countries” who were in any case fighting on their behalf. In the middle of October, 1939, French military attaché Colonel Laurent took to blatantly visiting the Belgian headquarters “nearly daily, without him having anything interesting to say.” The French may have thought that if the Belgians were convinced the Germans believed staff talks were occurring, the Belgians might conclude that they might as well have the talks. Pierre van Zuylen observes that the Allies had a point – that without staff talks, the promised Allied aid would not have the best effect, but such talks would have to be secret, to avoid giving the Germans

10 Leopold III to the American People, p. 2. 11 Colloque Franco-Belge quoted in Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, “La Défense des Ardennes en 1939-40,” Revue Internationale d’Histoire Militaire 29 (1970): p. 874. 12 Halifax to Clive, September 23, 1939,p. 1, in MRA-AMB 80/4 #175. 13 Signature illegible, note received September 29, 1939 in MRA-AMB 80/4, #198-200. Belgium To May 10, 1940 215 an excuse to invade, which was ultimately what the Allies wanted because it would bring Belgium into the war on their side. The Allies were not considered above leaking Belgian-Allied relations to force the Belgians into an alliance.14 Although most of the “requests” made by the Allies had the same character as those made above, there was a little bit of understanding for Colonel Del- voie, the Belgian military attaché in Paris, who noted that the head of French military intelligence saw a downside to Belgium joining the Allies before being invaded. On April 11, General van Overstraeten rejected an Allied plea based on the Luftwaffe being busy in Norway and the Allies having thus a better shot at reaching the Albert Canal without being attacked by air. He noted that if the Luftwaffe was busy in Norway, then so was the Royal Air Force, so there would be no air cover.15 The Belgians were so concerned to keep their appearance of neutrality that their military attaché in London was instructed that unless in extremis, “he is not to do anything which might be taken by the Germans as indicative of close touch with the British War Office.” British ambassador to Brussels Sir Robert Clive reported to Sir Alexander Cadogan, the permanent undersecretary of the Foreign Office in London, that the king and his advisors, both Secretary Robert Capelle and General van Overstraeten, shared the belief that Belgium could only stay out of the war if it “shut down any conversations with us or the French, which might conceivably compromise them if known in any other quarter … .” The Belgians knew enough about the Germans and about modern war to fear, given Belgium’s weak anti-aircraft defense, “that a German attack this time would be heralded by a mass bombardment of every railway junction in order to disorganize mobilization.” In a country as densely populated as Bel- gium, this would be a disaster – one the Belgians hoped to avoid “by maintaining a rigid neutrality.”16 Nevertheless, there was hidden cooperation. Starting on November 19, 1939, Generalissimo Gamelin sent “suggestions” to try to coordinate Belgian and French responses to a German invasion and gave suggestions for study by the Belgians. Among these suggestions were the organization of the K-W Line, the improvement of defenses to be used by the French as well as the defense of the

14 “Extrait du Rapport no. 1 O.D./5648/195c du 3-10-1930 de notre Attaché Militaire à Paris” in AMBAE 11185/1 (the cover letter is from General Derousseaux to Pierre and is dated Octo- ber 6, 1939); Pierre for the Minister, Brussels, October 18, 1939, pp. 1-2, in AMBAE 11185/1, “Politique Militaire”; Les Mains Libres, p. 489. 15 Ibid.; diary entry for April 11, 1940, in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, p. 550. 16 Major Douglas Brown, record, April 6, 1939, in MRA-AMB 80/4/XIV, #36; Clive to Cadogan, March 17, 1939, in MRA-AMB 80/4/XIV, #10-11. 216 Chapter 8 routes to be taken by the French, the stockpiling of engineering supplies for the Wavre-Namur position, and the plans for the demolitions in the Ardennes with orders given to the Chasseurs ardennais as to the direction of retreat so as to prevent getting tangled up in advancing French columns.17 On February 14, 1940, General van Overstraeten established a plan for the road and rail travel of the Allies potentially coming to Belgium’s aid on the Louvain-Namur line. He expected eight Allied divisions on that line by the morning of the fourth day after the invasion with another six or eight motorized divisions reinforcing the Belgian dispositions further east. The cooperation was not perfect. For example, after the ‘Mechelen Incident’ (discussed below), van Overstraeten sent only a summary detailing the German plans to Generalissimo Gamelin and refused to give the Allies copies of the documents. On the other hand, after warning the French about a German thrust coming through the Ardennes driving towards the Meuse, the French did nothing – in retrospect a fatal error.18 Certain issues had still not been resolved by May 10th. These included the passage of British troops through Brussels and whether the Belgians or British would be responsible for the defense of Louvain. On March 28, 1940, newly- promoted General Laurent described a conversation with van Overstraeten in which the latter insisted on keeping Brussels and Louvain in the Belgian sector and urged Allied reinforcements for the Albert Canal. The Belgians wanted Brussels in their sector of the line because they planned to declare it an open city and they wanted to deprive the Germans of any excuse to bomb their capital. General Laurent responded, regarding the reinforcements, that they could not go as far as the Albert Canal and would have to limit themselves to the Namur-Louvain line. Also during the conversation, General van Overstraeten supported the Allied plan to link up with the Dutch provided the Allies did not go past Turnhout-Tilburg. The Belgians, for their part, would not advance past the Turnhout Canal. This latter statement by van Overstraeten is interesting because he recorded in an earlier diary entry that the Allied mission to the Dutch could (almost certainly would) end in disaster.19 On April 11, 1940, Colonel Delvoie reported from Allied Headquarters in the Château of Vincennes that French Generalissimo Gamelin could not promise to get troops to the Albert Canal. Earlier indications of this had led the Belgians

17 ECNRS, pp. 35, 97; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 87. 18 Diary entry for February 14, 1940, in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, p. 523; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 83; Vanwelkenhuyzen, Neutralité Armée, p. 121. 19 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 87; General Laurent to French Minister of National Defense, March 28, 1940, quoted in ECNRS, p. 122. Belgium To May 10, 1940 217 to make the new main line of resistance the K-W Line running from Antwerp to Namur. General van Overstraeten was completely in accord, noting that it was unreasonable to expect the Allies to man the longer front of the Albert Canal, in part because of the risk of a German thrust through the Ardennes and because it would be unfair to demand that the Allies advance further into Belgium. That same day, van Overstraeten rejected a French offer to send equipment and materiel for the depots supporting the Wavre-Namur position because General Denis felt he could stock them but van Overstraeten said he would like the materiel already ordered from France and past due.20 Two days later, van Overstraeten’s diary entry encapsulates Belgium’s position: the king rejected the idea the Allies would enter Belgium in spite of the Belgians not inviting them in before an invasion but one infantry division would be sent to reinforce troops south of Brussels and the General Staff would plan for several army corps to shift facing south just in case. Belgium still had absolute faith in the Allies, nevertheless was forced to at least consider defenses against them while still being convinced that the enemy would be Germany. That day at noon, the movement of the 10th Infantry Division south was sus- pended after hearing from General Delvoie in Paris while the Belgian ambassadors in London and Paris were ordered to get an explanation for Allied movements to the Belgian border.21

Belgium and the Netherlands

There is an interesting parallel between Belgium’s relations with the Allies and Holland’s relations with Belgium. Just as the Belgians were bombarded with demands for consultations and talks, the Belgians themselves bombarded the Dutch with similar demands and received similar responses. The Dutch had remained neutral during World War I and hoped to repeat their ‘miracle.’ A verbal note discussing Dutch-Belgian military relations pointed out that the strict neutrality held to by both countries prevented them from coordinating their defensive plans while the sharing of information via military attachés was extremely limited.22

20 Diary entry for April 11, 1940 in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, pp. 549, 551. 21 Diary entry for April 13, 1940, in Ibid., p. 553. 22 J. Vanwelkenhuyzen, “Note sur les relations entre la Belgique et les Pays-Bas en 1939-1940”, p. 1, in SGRS-S/A “Campagne 1940”, Généralités G1 A/2/b/III/7; “Note Verbale”, p. 2, in AMBAE 11984, sous-farde “relations hollands-belges 1939-1941”. 218 Chapter 8

The Belgian ambassador in Berlin reported that the Germans opposed any Belgian-Dutch military alliance because it could threaten their ‘independence’ and would force the Germans to reevaluate their views on Belgium. The Ger- man fear was that a Belgo-Dutch block would join the Anglo-French. In fact, the Belgian military attaché in the Hague, Colonel B.E.M. Diepenrykx, did have much closer ties with the Dutch military than did his British, French, or Ger- man colleagues, but he concealed the fact so as to avoid anything that could seem to the other attachés like collaboration between the Belgian and Dutch staffs.23 After initially refusing an exchange of information between staffs because he thought it was incompatible with the policy of neutrality, Major General Carstens, the chief of the Dutch General Staff, agreed to Colonel Diepenrykx’s proposal after being persuaded it would not entail collaboration between Gen- eral Staffs. The exchange would be limited to information allowing the two armies to link up in the event of a German invasion of both countries. At the very least, each needed to know some of the dispositions of the other. The issue was brought to the Dutch commander-in-chief, General Reynders, who agreed to “discreet contacts.” The foreign and defense ministers were not to be kept in the loop but the chiefs of staff were.24 The plan almost immediately ran into a roadblock thanks to a verbal slip by King Leopold. Colonel Diepenrykx recalled a conversation between Leopold and Dutch Queen Wilhelmina on the occasion of the latter’s visit to the Brus- sels Exposition:

The King believed [himself] able to emphasize the friendly relations between the Belgian and Dutch General Staffs. This assertion of the King, which besides rested on nothing concrete, provoked the most lively reaction from the Queen. From her return to the Hague, the Queen summoned her minister of foreign affairs to ask him if it were true that relations existed between the Belgian and Dutch General Staffs and, when he answered in the affirmative, ordered him to put an end to them as quickly as possible.25

23 Davignon to Pierlot [foreign minister], Berlin, May 20, 1939, in AMBAE 11185/1, #3587; SGRS-S/A FVO, Box 2, sous-farde 27 Octobre [1939], #598. 24 SGRS-S/A FVO, Box 2, sous-farde 26 Octobre [1939], #591; Col. B.E.M. Diepenrykx, “Objet: Considérations au sujet de ma mission à La Haye”, London, January 2, 1941, pp. 1-2, in AMBAE 11984, sous-farde “relations hollands-belges 1939-1941”. 25 Diepenrykx, “Objet: Considérations au sujet de ma mission à La Haye”, p. 1. Belgium To May 10, 1940 219

In early 1940, the Dutch were sufficiently afraid of Germany to discuss some coordination with Belgium. The Belgian high command was requested to align its defenses with the southern end of the Dutch Raam-Peel position, on which the latter planned to make their stand. The Dutch feared a German thrust going below their positions and taking their line from the rear. The Belgians, although concluding that the terrain was unsuitable for the Germans and “the gap in the defensive system [between the Raam-Peel position and the Belgian canal de junction] is more apparent than real,” were willing to align some “light elements and artillery” with the Dutch, but not to go as far as was hoped in The Hague because the Belgians could not do so without weakening the Albert Canal defenses. The junction canal was not suitable as a main defensive position, and the Belgians did not think the Raam-Peel position would hold the Germans anyway.26 The Belgian counterproposal, supported by French Generalissimo Gamelin, was for a Dutch position further west to link the Dutch national redoubt, Vesting Holland (‘Fortress Holland’), with the Belgian K-W Line but the Dutch did not want to abandon their Raam-Peel position. They realized they were too weak to defend the entire country and “by a quite natural reflex, the Dutch leaders thus concerned themselves with the defense of the most populous and richest provinces” comprising Vesting Holland.27 There was thus a fatal disjunction between the Dutch and Belgian plans. On April 11, 1940, French military attaché Colonel Hautcoeur visited General van Overstraeten and asked whether the Belgians could link up with the Dutch until the French arrived. Van Overstraeten responded by citing his fear that the Germans would punch through the Dutch, turn the Belgians from the north, and go on to Antwerp. 28 The Belgians were very concerned about an invasion by Germany of Hol- land alone. On January 23, 1939, General Denis told the British military attaché that if Holland were invaded, “Belgium would certainly intervene.” On Septem- ber 14, General van Overstraeten concluded that a German attack limited to the Netherlands would render Belgium’s continued neutrality impossible because it would trap the Belgians between the German forces in the southern

26 It didn’t. Due in part to German special operations which seized bridges allowing troops to attack the Dutch from the rear, the Raam-Peel position was abandoned during the night of May 10-11, 1940. P.L.G. Doorman, Military Operations in the Netherlands from 10th- 17th May 1940, Trans. S.L. Salzedo (Guilford and Esher, UK: George Allen and Unwin for the Netherlands Government Information Bureau, 1944), pp. 49-52. 27 Vanwelkenhuyzen, “Note sur les relations,” p. 2; Colonel B.E.M. Diepenrykx, untitled, Lon- don, September 18, 1941, p. 5, in AMBAE 11984, sous-farde “relations hollando-belges 1939- 1941.” 28 Diary entry for April 11, 1940 in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, p. 549. 220 Chapter 8

Netherlands and the Allies, both of them uncomfortably close to Brussels and fatally weakening Belgian defenses. The only question was on which side to intervene? However, as Colonel Requette had written in XXe Siécle on April 24, 1939, if Holland were invaded, Belgium could not send troops because it would have to protect its own border with Germany and the reciprocal was true for the Dutch. The issue of Belgium granting permission to French troops to aid Holland was moot because the French had not, and perhaps never would, make such a request. He ended by urging Belgium to remain completely independent.29

Mobilization

Meanwhile, Belgium was reeling from one coalition government to another. A government led by Paul-Henri Spaak collapsed in February 1939 over a scandal in which a Flemish doctor who had taught at the German-sponsored Flemish university in Ghent during World War I and been sentenced to death by the Belgians after the war for that before being amnestied, was appointed to a new Royal Flemish Academy of Medicine.30 Spaak’s government was followed by a Catholic-Socialist government formed by Hubert Pierlot. It lasted six days. New elections favored the Catho- lics and Liberals at the expense of the Socialists. Pierlot formed a new government that lasted until the war.31 On August 25, in the light of the worsening crisis over Danzig and the Polish Corridor, the Belgian government declared Phase A of mobilization, putting on a war footing active units and headquarters including the General Staff of the Army, three corps headquarters (I, II, and III), the HQ of the Cavalry Corps, the HQ of the TDLN, the HQs of the DAT and DTCA, and their subordinate units, as well as the first division of Chasseurs ardennais, the Frontier Cyclists, For- tress Regiments of Namur and Liège, the three regiments of Belgian aviation, and the first two regiments of army artillery. That same night, the Belgian finance minister, Camille Gutt, was informed that the British were no longer going to support the price of the pound, threatening the stability of the Belgian

29 General Denis quoted in Alexander, Le “Cas Hollande”,p. 19; Van Overstraeten, quoted in ECNRS, pp. 81-82; C. Requette, “Entente militaire hollando-belge?”, XXe Siécle, April 24, 1939, in AMBAE 11185/1. 30 Witte, et al., p. 139; Dumoulin, pp. 128-133. 31 Dumoulin, p. 133. Belgium To May 10, 1940 221 franc. Gutt, however, refused to tie the two currencies together, reasoning that, because of the Belgian policy of ‘independence,’ the currency must also be ‘independent.’ On August 28, Phase B was declared with two first reserve divisions (8 and 11), a battalion of special fortress troops, and the second division of Chasseurs ardennais being raised.32 The Belgian commanders were acutely aware of the morale and behavior of their troops. On August 29, 1939, the new British military attaché, LTC Blake, reported that “there have been none of the scenes of excitement which, I am told, took place in September last year.” General Van den Bergen attributed this to two causes: In 1939, as opposed to 1938, the Belgian army brought its active army to war strength before forming the reserve units, thus avoiding “the inter- ruption of the very large number of reserve officers and men joining up simul- taneously as had been the case 12 months ago.” Also, “[m]uch of the disorder caused last year was through cases of drunkenness” but public houses were now limited to restricted hours. The next day, an instruction from General Van den Bergen to the commanders of army corps, the Cavalry Corps, the TDLN, Army Engineers, DAT, and the anti-aircraft brigade read:

I have the honor of drawing the attention of all the military authorities and especially that of the chiefs of corps to the pressing necessity that there is in the current situation to do everything possible to maintain and exalt the morale of the soldier … . It is absolutely necessary to avoid idleness and inaction … . Everything which touches on the well-being of the soldier must be made the object of all cares, particularly the daily diet and the installation of canteens. The commanders of companies (battery, squadron) will give more morale talks.33

The measures taken to avoid discipline problems were imperfectly successful, especially as time went on. L. Parish, His (Britannic) Majesty’s consul in Liège, reported to his superior in Brussels that, largely as a result of discontent among

32 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 79; Gutt to Capelle, August 25, 1939, quoted in Crombois, p. 190; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 79. 33 F.A.A. Blake, “Reports on Belgian Military situation,” August 29, 1939, in MRA-AMB 80/4 #177-178; Van den Bergen to Commanders of C.A., C.C., T.D.L.N., T.GN.A., D.A.T., Br.A.A.; dated August 30, 1939, in SGRS-S/A Fonds van Overstraeten [henceforth “SGRS-S/A FVO”] box 1, document 63. 222 Chapter 8 the soldiers about leave, food, money, and, especially, the perceived pointless- ness of “prolonged mobilization,”

rumours have reached me of serious acts of indiscipline amongst the Bel- gian armed forces in this district. Both the French consul and I have been told that scenes have occurred at Hasselt and at Namur. At Namur, I am told (but do not believe it) that actual rioting occurred in which three gendarmes were killed. My French colleague hears that difficulties also arose at Mons but this is not in his or my district. At Selzate, near [Ghent], my French colleague has been told by an alleged eye-witness that the troops went on hunger strike, cut telephone wires, etc.34

From November, 1939, troops of the field army, “with the exception of those belonging to the Troops of Reinforcement and Instruction,” would get five days leave each month, which had to be used in a block unless they were officers who did not want to be away from their toops too long, in which case they could break up the leave, or they were in certain categories, in which case they could take a 10-day leave every two months. At the same time, care had to be taken “that all the automatic arms and all the artillery can be put into action and that all the services can continue to function.” On December 11, LTG Denis promised the Senate that soldiers who could not use their November leave could use it in December. LTG Van den Bergen warned that “the realization of the promise made to the Senate” would result in most of the field army having “26% of the effective permanently absent from 19 December to 1st January, percentage that will reach 39% each day between 14 hours and 22 hours 30.” Things would be even worse in the 5th and 12 infantry divisions, which would be missing 42% daily – and more than half the troops (52%) gone every day in the afternoon and evening. The chief of staff declared “I estimate that these pro- portions of men on leave are incompatible with our security” and asked for authorization to follow through. Belgian soldiers with specialized training or professions were allowed to go home, with predictably negative impact on the morale of those who had to stay.35 Agricultural leave was a particularly thorny problem. On February 20, 1940, van Overstraeten met with Generals Denis and Michiels, and the head of the 3rd Section to discuss the issue. Because the winter of 1939-’40 was particularly

34 L. Parish to “His Majesty’s Ambassador in Brussels”, letter #29, in MRA-AMB 80/4, #121. 35 Van den Bergen, “Objet: Permissions,” dated 25 November, 1939, in FVO, Box 3, #918, pp. 1-2; Van den Bergen, “Objet: Permissions,” dated 14 December 1939, in SGRS-S/A FVO, Box 3F 14 Dec. (1939) #1121. Belgium To May 10, 1940 223 cold and long, field work had not been done and there was a demand (from the minister of agriculture?) for the “release of 1,000 agricultural chiefs and 15-day leaves per month to share according to atmospheric conditions in favor of 25 to 30 thousand farmers.” The demand was rejected. As important as the agricultural issue was, it could not trump national defense. When spring came, every soldier would be needed. They agreed to give priority in 8-day leaves to farmers as long as it did not reduce the number of effectives. Others would get 10 days every two months. “To avoid jealousies and disappointments, the formula will be explained and commented upon by the colonels and the captains.” For heads of farms, there was still a chance that they could get the Committee on Discharges to get 15-20 day’ leave. At the same time, many farmers were benefitting from discharges as fathers of 3 or more children. The number of transfers was harming unit cohesion. On February 28, 1940, MG van Overstraeten complained that the issue had resurfaced. MG Michiels had to discuss the issue with the ministers of agriculture and national defense at the prime minister’s office. He argued that all soldiers should receive the same amount of leave although farmers could get priority for week-long leave in March and April as long as they only missed three days the other month and no more than 1/6th of the troops were on leave. In April, the government settled the issue. It mandated Michiels, starting on April 8, to give priority to farmers who requested leave based on their “indispensability” to their farms, with chief farmers most favored. In order to continue giving non-farmers equality in leave, the number of troops allowed to be on leave at any time was raised to “¼ of the effectives!” Van Overstraeten complained that it was a rash action committed without involving the king and blamed domestic politics.36 The mobilization was hard on the families of the soldiers who were not earning what they had as civilians. Some units lacked almost all discipline while soldiers in garrison provided fertile soil for the pro-German agitation of the VNV and Rex. On March 4, 1940, the king spoke before forty summoned generals at the military school. He reminded them of the difficult position in which they found themselves, “placed between two strong armies of over 100 divisions each, in quest of a battlefield.” Only the Belgian Army could prevent Belgium becoming such a battlefield. He went on to suggest that “after six months of mobilization and two alerts of the highest gravity,” and entering the campaigning season, the Belgian army should be fully prepared for battle with “the high morale that the circumstances require.” And yet it wasn’t. The prob-

36 Diary entry for February 20, 1940, in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, pp. 507-508; Diary entry for February 28, 1940, in Ibid., pp. 514-515; Diary entry for April 4, 1940, in Ibid., p. 541. Emphasis in the original. 224 Chapter 8 lem was “the deficiency of command,” especially with the regimental commanders, and the public was starting to be concerned.37 Leopold acknowledged that some of the assembled had whipped their regiments into shape but others had let the opportunity the winter provided slip. He reminded them that they were responsible as well for the transport of their units and yet some infantry units lacked motorized transport while some artillery units were “immobilized by the poor state of their horses.” He condemned an overreliance on paperwork and reminded them “It is at the maneuver and in the trenches that [a leader] sees his troops at work, that he instructs and animates them.” Leopold turned words into action when he ordered that every week the troops should go on maneuvers. Among the scenarios were dealing with paratroopers in the rear and offensive operations. Unfortunately, those maneuvers showed that the higher echelons reacted too slowly and the staffs lacked “subtlety and presence of mind in attacks and their support by artillery.” Van Overstraeten blamed the exclusively defensive nature of the army for those problems.38 On September 1, the same day the Wehrmacht rolled into Poland, Phase C was declared. This resulted in an extra hit to the budget of eleven million Bel- gian francs per day, or two billion a year and the government had to assert special powers to pay for them although the resulting decrees were particularly unpopular among rightist Parliamentarians. The government planned a special tax on exempt males. This had been discussed earlier and had been amended at Catholic insistence to exclude families with many children. In exchange, bachelors and unmarried couples had to pay more. Even more, Gutt planned a tax on “exceptional profits,” which was enacted in early 1940 and Minister Gutt complained to Leopold that Belgians were refusing to sacrifice because they did not “feel themselves at war” even though they practically were. Gutt, supported by Foreign Minister Spaak, began planning Belgium’s war economy even though businessmen – and much of the population at large – did not accept the need for restrictions and even sought to profit from Bel- gian neutrality. Gutt declared to Chamber and Senate committees on Novem- ber 21, 1939 that “fiscal sacrifice” was necessary for Belgium’s survival and they could not keep up the army without keeping up their credit.39

37 De Vos, p. 19, Speech of Leopold III, dated March 4, 1940, quoted in van Overstraeten, Dans l’étau, pp. 208-209. 38 Ibid., p. 210. 39 Crombois pp. 192-196; Gutt to Leopold III, November 21, 1939, quoted in Ibid., p. 194; Jaspar Papers quoted in Ibid., p. 196. Belgium To May 10, 1940 225

In the beginning of September, after the declaration of neutrality, King Leo- pold took to the radio to urge his citizens to remain neutral in word and deed. On September 30, General Denis ordered that every Belgian soldier, of whatever rank, had to keep his comportment compatible with the policy of ‘independence,’ “to prohibit anything that could prejudice, irritiate, or divide … ” in order to preserve the precious unity. On November 10, royal orders were pro- mulgated prohibiting, without approval of the military authority, meetings in areas of cantonments to which active-duty soldiers would be admitted. Also prohibited was the sending or distribution to active-duty military of “tracts, tickets, circulars, or other writings, printed or not, of the same nature.”40 Belgium officially declared its neutrality on September 3, the same day the Allies declared war on Germany. A government of national union was formed by the addition of the Socialists to the Catholic-Liberal coalition. This government was given special powers to rule by decree. King Leopold left for Breen- donck (Belgian HQ) to assume his constitutionally mandated position of commander in chief. Belgian forces were still mainly facing south, because the Germans were busy in Poland while the Allies might violate Belgian neutrality to come to Poland’s rescue. This was not the result of a change in the estima- tion of the relative threat posed by the Germans and the Allies but rather a realization that Germany simply did not have enough forces in the west to launch an offensive while the French did. Three army corps and the TDLN confronted the French while two army corps faced north and east. In the Ardennes, the Cavalry Corps and the Chasseurs ardennais had some units facing east and others facing south.41 Neutrality imposed certain burdens on the Belgian military. Most obviously, they had to keep belligerent forces out. Both sides overflew Belgian airspace and the Belgian Air Force had to confront them. Sometimes there were real fights and several Belgian pilots paid with their lives. They also had to watch their deployments. As more Belgian forces were deployed facing east, German protests increased, accusing the Belgians of unneutral behavior. There were also increasing attempts by the Allies to bring Belgium into the war on their side.42 Starting on September 28, following the news of the surrender of Warsaw to the Germans, Belgian dispositions were shifted so most units were facing the

40 King Leopold, quoted in Ministry of National Defense Cabinet to All Army Authorities, Brussels, September 30, 1939, in AMBAE 11177 “Neutralité” Royal Orders of November 10, 1939, in AMBAE 11177 “Neutralité”, sous-farde “Legislation et réglements et la Neutralité.” 41 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 79-80. 42 Van Zuylen, Les Mains Libres, pp. 487-488. 226 Chapter 8

Germans in the east. The next day, the order was given to occupy the PFA and the Albert Canal with three corps of seven divisions plus a regiment (V plus the 17th Line Infantry Regiment, IV, II going from west to east) and another two divisions were sent from Beverloo to Ghent and the North Sea coast while the Cavalry Corps was augmented. At the beginning of November, I Army Corps took up positions on the Albert Canal between the Cavalry Corps and III Army Corps with the 4th and 6th Divisions. The old I Corps positions facing south were manned by the reinforced 10th Division, the 18th Division went to Lou- vain, and the 13th Division joined the Cavalry Corps. These dispositions were essentially those that would come into play on May 10th, albeit with some changing of units. There were some minor troop movements involved with the alert of November 11.43

Belgian Military Intelligence and Alerts

The Belgians had a very good intelligence service and were well-informed on German intentions. They were particularly well served by their military atta- ché in Berlin, Colonel Georges Goethals. Some times the signs were large, flashing, and neon. On September 26, 1938 – at the height of the Sudeten Crisis – Colonel Goethals reported on a conversation with three German generals who told him that nations must expand or “fatally fall into decadence.” Colonel Goethals asserted that this declaration had to be taken seriously because the three generals were on the German General Staff.44 German views of Belgium were signaled by the August 1-3 exercises of Luft- flotte 245 reported on by Colonel Goethals. The exercise consisted of two war- ring sides, Red and Blue, separated by two neutral nations, Yellow and Green. Germany and France are separated by three neutral nations, but since Luxem- bourg is very rarely counted, they are practically separated by two neutral nations. Green remained neutral for the first two days but Yellow, having been overflown by Red aviation, was considered by Blue to have lost its neutrality. The preferred French air route to hit targets in Germany was via Belgium. On Day 3, Green was persuaded to use its air assets to support Red aviation; Blue

43 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 81-82; De Vos, p. 16. 44 Goethals to Chef de la Maison Militaire du Roi [General van Overstraeten], Minister of National Defense, and chief of staff of the army, Brussels, September 26, 1938, annex to AMBAE 11185/1 #6482. 45 “Air Fleet 2” – one of four in Germany in 1939 – the largest organizational unit of the Luft- waffe. Luftflotte 2 had its headquarters in Brunswick. Mollo, p. 9. Belgium To May 10, 1940 227 considered Green to have lost its neutrality. Colonel Goethals warned that “[t] he situation of the two neutral states situated between the belligerent countries merits the greatest attention.”46 On October 23, 1939, Colonel Goethals telephoned the Deuxièmme Section of the General Staff, reporting that the Professional Chamber of the Reich had issued an order calling on “libraries to send immediately all the city plans and road maps of France, Belgium, and Holland to the map depots at Munster or Wiesbaden.” Later that October, he reported again that “numerous collections of maps of Belgium” had been sent to the War Ministry in Berlin and that the maps concentrated on the Dinant-Chimay region in the Ardennes and the car- tons were labeled “Sambre 25.001-30.000.” This region saw the fatal German breakthrough in May, 1940.47 Belgium’s first major alert was issued on November 11 in reaction to increasing German press belligerence against Belgium and Holland and the deployment of troops to their borders. German troops were also sent to the frontier with the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Warnings were arriving from neutral countries, and information came from German military contacts. In the end, all of these came to naught. The Belgians, having received information that the Germans were planning a surprise attack, took appropriate action, in this case sending a Chasseurs ardennais regiment to a newly formed Groupement K48 and sending two infantry divisions to the K-W Line. In the end, a combination of terrible weather and the joint peace appeal of the Belgian and Dutch sover- eigns four days earlier ended up forcing the cancellation of a German invasion that was planned for the night of November 11-12. The alert was called off on November 13.49

46 Goethals to Maison Militaire du Roi, Ministre de la Défense National, Chef of the E.M.G.A, August 6, 1939, in SGRS-S/A FVO, Box 1, Doc. #13, quote from p. 7. 47 Record of telephone conversation from Colonel Goethals to 2ièmme Section of the E.M.G.A. in SGRS-S/A FVO Box 2, sous-farde October 23, 1939, #568; Record of telephone conversation from Colonel Goethals to 2ièmme Section of the E.M.G.A., October 28, 1939, at 14 h., in SGRS-S/A FVO Box 2, sous-farde October 28, [1939], #612. 48 Named after its commander, Lieutenant-General Keyaerts. 49 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 82-83; Crahay, pp. 157-158; Colonel B.E.M. Neefs to Chief of the Historical Section of the Army, Brussels, September 10, 1945, p. 1, in SGRS- S/A “Campagne 1940” “Généralités G2/A/2/C/I; Goethals to Minister of National Defense, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, military house of the king, Berlin, November 13, 1939, p. 1, in SGRS-S/A FVO Box 2, sous-farde “November 13, 1939,” #792. Goethals to Minis- ter of National Defense, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, military house of the king, Berlin, November 13, 1939, pp. 1-2. See also, pp. 510-515. 228 Chapter 8

There was also an alert caused by the ‘Mechelen Incident’ on January 10, 1940. Alarming news had been steadily coming in from around the turn of the year from diplomatic sources including the Italian ambassador to Berlin, from German generals informing the Belgian minister in Berne that they were prepared to depose Hitler if the Allies agreed to their terms and if not, the invasion would start in January, and from King Leopold’s sister, who was married to the Italian monarch’s son. In addition, German planes were increasingly overflying Belgium. However, in addition to these portents, the Belgians recovered the German invasion plans.50 On January 9, German paratroop major Hellmuth Reinberger had attended a briefing on the coming invasion of the west and was given files (not to be taken by air) to deliver to the commander of the First Air Corps in Cologne – files containing the plans for the paratroops in the invasion of the west. How- ever, Reinberger’s friend, Luftwaffe major Erich Hoenmanns, a pilot, offered him a lift in his plane, which he accepted. The plane developed mechanical problems and Major Hoenmanns looked for a place to put down. Seeing a river, and believing it to be the Rhine, he landed. The river was, in fact, the Meuse and Hoenmanns had landed by Mechelen in Belgium, hence the name of this event, the ‘Mechelen Incident’. Major Reinberger tried to destroy the documents behind a nearby haystack but was prevented by the arrival of Belgian troops. He got another opportunity in the stove-heated interrogation room and partially succeeded when the Belgian officer in charge, a Captain Rodrigues, turned the other way. After investigating, including bugging a meeting between the fliers and the local German consul, the Belgians concluded that the plans were genuine. The plans indicated an invasion of Holland and an attack on the Maginot Line, both of which were to be diversions for the main thrust across Belgium, south of Liège and Namur, turning north-west, and smashing through the Gembloux Gap. A paratroop division was to seize the bridges over the Meuse River between Namur and Dinant for the armored forces. This information was shared with the Allies. Pierre van Zuylen notes that after the Belgians provided that information, Winston Churchill publically unveiled this confidence in the design of provoking Hitler’s anger and setting off the invasion of Belgium.51 In the aftermath of the ‘Mechelen Incident’, two battalions in the Ardennes were sent to the intended German landing zones while another one watching

50 Crahay, p. 158; Vanwelkenhuyzen, Neutralité Armée, p. 79. 51 Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, Jean. Neutralité Armée, pp. 79-81; Ernest R May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France (NY: Hill and Wang, 2000), pp. 314-318; Van Zuylen, Les Mains Libres, p. 492. Belgium To May 10, 1940 229 bridges over the Meuse was reoriented facing east on January 12. The next day the 4th Infantry Division was sent from Beverloo while the Chasseurs ardennais battalions at Libramont and Neufchâteau were sent to the Ourthe River. The evening of January 13, the message went out to the units, “attack virtually certain tomorrow at dawn.” Belgian troops on the French frontier were given orders to remove the obstructions blocking the entry of Allied troops and not to oppose the entry of Allied troops. The troops were in position on January 14 with the last three infantry divisions arriving in position. However, nothing happened and on January 15, the alert was called off and the barriers were raised against the Allies again. Hitler had indeed planned to attack but was put off by the foul weather.52 The ‘Mechelen Incident’ led to more friction between the Belgians and the Allies. Not only did the Belgians provide incomplete information about the recovered German plans, but after they did so, King Leopold chose that time to ask for “Allied guarantees for the future of Belgium and the Congo.” He wanted those assurances before inviting the Allies in. He made the request through British war hero and close friend of both Albert and Leopold, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, who flew to Belgium for the purpose. Afterwards, Keyes was grounded by the same fog that had tripped up the German aviators. He therefore had to relay the request by phone to his boss, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill. Unfortunately, there was a serious misunderstanding. The British interpreted this request for guarantees as an invitation for the Allies to enter as long as the king could justify it to his government by producing the promises. Churchill summoned the War Cabinet and then the full Cabinet and urged, as did General Ironside, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, immediate acceptance and entry into Belgium. However, Prime Minister Chamberlain, correctly realizing that Leopold had no intention of inviting the Allies in preemptively, won out. The British sent a message back to the king saying they were prepared to enter the country although they could not make the requested promises. The Belgians demurred.53 On the 14th of January, the French noticed the obstructions barring the routes into Belgium were gone and were also informed of the purported Bel- gian invitation. They immediately sent their troops to the Belgian border (in one case actually entering Belgium) through snow drifts. However, the next day the obstacles were back up. French generalissimo Gamelin was under- standably upset. The Belgian ambassador was summoned to French Prime

52 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Neutralité Armée, p. 82; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 83; May, pp. 318-319. 53 May, pp. 317-318; ECNRS, quoted in Ibid., p. 318. 230 Chapter 8

Minister Daladier and told that the French were ready to aid the Belgians but could not stay long in their current positions and would go home if they were not invited in. The Belgian was also told the French army could not repeat this maneuver every time there was an alert and that henceforth the Allies would only move after the Germans invaded Belgium, thus potentially causing significant delays. The Belgians had until 8 p.m. to decide. Upon hearing of this, Leopold summoned MG van Overstraeten and his ministers and after a short meeting, Foreign Minister Spaak called Paris, declaring “that Belgium had never had any intention of inviting pre-emptive Allied military moves and that they were mystified as to why Daladier thought otherwise.” “Irritation and mys- tification lingered in all three capitals.”54 Phase D of mobilization came on January 14. In phases C and D, new units were created but these creations took place over time. It took over two months to form the last nine infantry divisions while the T-13 companies of the active and first reserve divisions had still not received all their equipment by May 10.55 In the aftermath of the ‘Mechelen Incident,’ Belgian chief of staff General Van den Bergen was replaced for his part in ordering the removal of the barriers to the Allies. In fact, according to Albert Crahay, the blame should have gone to van Overstraeten for having had the message sent, but the orders went out from the General Staff under Van den Bergen’s name and in any case, one could not publically blame the king’s military advisor. Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen for his part argues that van Overstraeten had opposed the ideas contained in Van den Bergen’s orders, as did the government, which orders went out on Van den Bergen’s own responsibility. Historian Ernest May asserts that Van den Bergen misunderstood van Overstraeten, who amended Van den Bergen’s message to the units from “imminent attack probable” to “imminent attack virtually certain.” Because van Overstraeten rarely shared his motives, Van den Bergen, who did not realize that the warning was meant “to startle the hereto- fore phlegmatic Dutch into action, not to state his own assessment of risk, took the words literally” and prepared for the “virtually certain” war. Those preparations included letting the Allies in.56 Prime minister Pierlot saw in Van den Bergen’s orders an encroachment on ministerial responsibilities. General Denis opened an investigation which, on January 27 found that Van den Bergen’s orders had led to a situation where

54 May, pp. 319-321; Relations militaires Franco-belges quoted in May, p. 320; Howard-Vyse report cited in Ibid. 55 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 79. 56 Crahay, p. 199; Vanwelkenhuyzen, Neutralité Armée, pp. 93-94; May, p. 319. Belgium To May 10, 1940 231

for nearly forty-eight hours, the entry of Belgium into the hostilities no longer depended on our will, but on that of our neighbors. If these had penetrated [Belgium] without waiting longer, we would have been drawn, despite ourselves, into the conflict and the government, in ignorance of everything, would have found itself in a singular posture.57

On January 31, General Van den Bergen resigned as chief of staff and on Febru- ary 5, he took command of V Army Corps in Antwerp. The choice of his successor fell first on van Overstraeten, the logical choice, but he demurred and instead the universally respected Major General Oscar Michiels was chosen.58

Figure 15 Major-General Oscar Michiels (as a lieutenant-general). Collection of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels

British Military Attaché LTC Blake reported that:

The reason [for Van den Bergen’s resignation] which is the more generally accepted one is that there has been, for some time, a state of friction between General Van den Bergen and General van Overstraeten. … It is a known fact that General van Overstraeten enjoys a very special position at the Palace. It has been stated that his interference in matters concerning the higher command has exceeded the normal influence of a Com- mandant of the Staff College and Military Advisor to the Sovereign.59

57 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Neutralité Armée, pp. 93-94; Report quoted in Ibid., p. 94. 58 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Neutralité Armée, p. 94. 59 Ibid.; F.A.A. Blake to Sir Lancelot Oliphant, Brussels, February 10, 1940, pp. 1-2, in MRA- AMB 80/4, #84-85. 232 Chapter 8

The Belgians had good contacts in the German anti-Hitler resistance. On March 8, 1940, King Leopold concluded, based on reports from his military attachés in Paris, London, and The Hague, that the Allied plan to link up with the Dutch (the so-called “Breda Variant” of Generalissimo Gamelin’s Dyle Plan to advance the Allies into the middle of Belgium along the Dyle River) was almost certainly doomed to failure. British historian Brian Bond admits, regarding the Belgian commanders, “their reading of German intentions from the end of January was in the main sound and that they did attempt to alert the French.” Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen notes that although the Belgians had recognized that there would be a German attack through the Ardennes, the Belgian General Staff did not recognize it as the main thrust, believing rather that the German maneuver would be a double envelopment, with one axis of advance running from Maeseyck to Brussels north of Liège and the other running from St. Vith to Chimay through the Ardennes. The defense of the Ardennes took on a secondary importance because the main thrust was believed to be the northern one. The Chasseurs ardennais would be expected to withdraw to rejoin the main body of the army after conducting their demolitions and delaying the Germans. 60

Figure 16 Military review in Brussels, April 8, 1940. T-15s shown. RMA EST/I 950 #5. Collec- tion of the Royal Museum of the Army, Brussels

60 Leopold III quoted in diary entry for March 8, 1940, in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, p. 520; Bond, Britain, France, and Belgium, p. 46; Keyes, p. 130; Vanwelkenhuyzen, Neu- tralité Armée, pp. 111, 119-122; Crahay, p. 194. Belgium To May 10, 1940 233

The Belgians had one more major alert before the night of May 9, 1940. This one was related to the German invasions of Norway and Denmark. The Bel- gians rejected, once again, Allied pleas to be allowed to enter Belgium preven- tively. The Allies only promised to go as far as the Antwerp-Louvain-Wavre-Namur position. Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen observes “the demarche was thoughtless. Bel- gium could not agree to it. It would be to return more than half of the territory to enemy occupation” and suggests those who made the offer were unfamiliar with Belgian geography. Faced with this, the Belgian Senate overwhelmingly supported neutrality. The Belgians feared the Allies would use the German dis- traction to attack through Belgium and take the Germans by surprise. On the same night as the invasions, April 9, 1940, the Belgian forces reoriented themselves facing south again, with the 8th I.D. manning the southern part of the PFN, Groupement K guarding against the south, the 7th I.D. leaving the North Sea coast and heading to the Ninove-Hal-Mont-Saint-Jean position and there recovering its 18th Line Infantry Regiment, and the VI Army Corps at Ghent preparing to man the Ghent Bridgehead.61 The next day, the Belgian defenses facing south were even more reinforced. On the 11th, reports reached Belgium that the Wehrmacht was busy on the Lux- embourg border. On the 12th, Colonel Goethals reported that the German Nor- wegian invasion did not rule out a general attack in the West. At the same time, the Belgian military attaché in Paris reported the French had promised not to enter Belgium without being invited. Defenses began being shifted back to the east although on the 13th more reinforcements were sent south. On the 14th, with no more German threats and with the French assurance intervening, the Belgians called off the alert and faced east once again, where they would stay until the German invasion.62 The ultimate alert, the one that terminated in the German invasion on May 10, 1940, began on May 9 from a number of sources. That evening,

the telephones of the 2e Section rang without stop. On the whole front from Holland up to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg German forces were in movement … . The entire length of our frontier, our advanced elements perceived the noise of troops being assembled, the calls and the commands made by the officers, and, dominating it all, the uninterrupted noise of motors turning over.63

61 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 83; “La Belgique en Guerre,” 159. 62 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 84-85. 63 “Les alertes des 11 novembre 1939, 11 janvier, et 10 mai 1940”, pp. 2-3 in SGRS-S/A “Cam- pagne 1940” Généralités G2/A/2/C/I. 234 Chapter 8

Similar information was registered from the Dutch and Luxembourgeois borders. The activity was unprecedented since September 1939. Also on May 9, Colonel Goethals was told that Hitler was determined to launch the war in the West at dawn on May 10 and that the order could not be countermanded after 9 p.m. on the 9th. Goethals immediately telegraphed the information to Brus- sels. At 9:30, an informant told Colonel Goethals that the counter-order had not been given. He telephoned (in code) a confirmation of the previous message at 10:30 p.m., after an unusual 30 minute delay. At 12:30 a.m., the Colonel tried to telephone Brussels to see whether the lines had been cut. The line was not working. Goethals then went to try to reach the German ministers of foreign affairs, defense, and the commander of the Wehrmacht, all of whom were sleeping. At 5 a.m., Ambassador Davignon summoned the colonel to the embassy because the ambassador had been summoned to the German Foreign Ministry.64 In Brussels, where the movement of a German armored division was the only information out of the ordinary, although the adjunct Dutch military atta- ché reported German troops prepared to march into Holland and requested information, General van Overstraeten did not believe an attack was imminent, noting that the Germans seemed less active than previously. He so informed the responsible authorities, including the Palace and the Ministry of National Defense. Major Buisseret, who was then a captain serving in the 2ème Section, notes that the military did not want to make the same mistakes they had made in January, “following which the Cabinet imputed to the E.M.G.A. a faculty of flights of enthusiasm and an excessive pessimism.” III Army Corps was ordered to confirm the Dutch information and responded that the German radio traffic was normal.65 At 8:30 p.m., Brussels time, the telegram from Goethals was received. The intelligence sections of Groupement K in the Ardennes and III Army Corps were alerted. After 10 p.m., “the information began to flood in. The first reports were negative, but they rapidly gave way to positive information.” The noise of the German preparations mentioned above erased the last doubts. Then Colo- nel Goethals’s phone call reached Belgian military intelligence. General van Overstraeten “remained circumspect.” Other information reached the Bel- gians, including a 3 a.m. Dutch report of massive overflights by German aircraft flying west and then at 3:30 reports of similar overflights through Belgian airspace. As Colonel Goethals had warned, the attack came on May 10 at dawn.66

64 Major B.E.M. Léon Buisseret, “Alerte du 9 Mai 1940”, pp. 1-2, in Ibid., G1/A/2/C/V/6. 65 Buisseret, pp. 1-2. 66 Ibid., pp. 2-5. Belgium To May 10, 1940 235

The period between 1936 and 1940 was marked by Belgium’s policy of ‘independence’ or ‘free hands’ but the Belgians still discretely showed favoritism to the Allies and maintained their faith that the French would come to their rescue. There was even secret military cooperation through the military attachés, with the result that the Allies knew how they were going to get to their positions in Belgium and where those positions were. Nevertheless, the Belgians had to keep away from openly supporting them. This did not keep the Allies from making every effort to draw Belgium openly on their side. They even took to sending the French military attaché to visit the Belgian General Staff every day, presumably in the hopes of convincing the Belgians that the Germans would think there were military relations and pulling the Belgians off the fence. Meanwhile, the Belgians were prodding the Dutch, hoping for defensive cooperation and the Dutch rejected contacts after King Leopold accidentally let the cat out of the bag. The Belgians had a very effective military intelligence service and were well- informed on German intentions (although they thought the Ardennes attack was merely secondary) and on several occasions before May 10, 1940, the army was alerted to an imminent German attack. At none of those times did an attack actually occur, but one was planned. The alert with the greatest ramifi- cations came after German plans fell into Belgian hands near Mechelen on January 10, 1940. Ultimately, the alert would result in the replacement of the Belgian chief of staff over his ordering obstacles on the French border to be removed (although it was probably General van Overstraeten’s fault and there was friction between the two) and resentment between the Allies, who thought they would be invited into Belgium, and the Belgians, who did not understand why they felt that way. The final alert came on the night of May 9, 1940, and this time it would not be a false alarm. 236 Chapter 9

Chapter 9 The ‘Eighteen-Days’ Campaign’

The defense policy hammered out between 1932 and 1940 was tested in the crucible of the ‘Battle of Flanders,’ which saw the Germans defeat the armies of five nations. Overall, the Belgian army, notably the new units created during the 1932-1940 period, fought well, although the same problems that preoccupied the framers of defense policy, especially the lack of qualified reserve officers and the linguistic issue, would bedevil it and hinder its efforts. The campaign also saw the breach between the king and his government, the ‘royal question’ that would trouble the nation until Leopold’s abdication in 1951. The chapter looks at the events of the campaign, including the increasing problems between the monarch and his government and the fate of the Bel- gian troops that found themselves either in France, Britain, or the resistance. It also addresses the post-mortem conducted by Belgian officers. The Belgian army on May 10, 1940 constituted eighteen infantry divisions (c. 17,000 men each), two Chasseurs ardennais divisions, two cavalry divisions, a heavy artillery division, two fortress artillery divisions, a fortress infantry regiment, and the Unités cyclistes frontières. The total was about 650,000 men, or about 8% of the population. As we have seen, this army was short on tanks and anti-aircraft weapons. Historian Luc De Vos laments the lack of motorization in the Belgian army although the official history of the Belgian army argues that it was in fact “relatively mobile” with 16.5 cyclist regiments, 6 groups and 12 squadrons of divisional cyclists, 8.5 regiments on motorcycles, and two regiments transported by truck, in addition to the 57 regiments on foot. Of its 1,338 pieces of artillery, very few were motorized outside of the Cavalry Corps and the Chasseurs ardennais. The Belgian air force is generally agreed to have been pathetically weak. It had over 130 combat aircraft of which only 118 were usable. Most were at best obsolescent except for 24 British-made Hawker Hurricanes which would end up being destroyed on the ground in the early hours of the German attack.1 The vast majority of Belgian units fought well but, like their French neighbors, the performance of Belgian units could be broken down by year of call- up, with the active units fighting best and the reserve, especially the second-line reserve, units fighting less well. As mentioned above, this was due in part to the lack of qualified Flemish reserve officers. However, especially towards the end

1 De Vos, pp. 28-29; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 87-88.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004269736_011 The ‘eighteen-days’ Campaign’ 237 of the campaign, there were some desertions among Flemish units which had been affected during the period of mobilization by anti-war and Flemish nationalist propaganda. This was actually made worse by the very law that was supposed to have alleviated it. Because some regions more than others were affected by Flemish nationalist propaganda, regional recruitment and deployment resulted in units susceptible to that propaganda being based close to home, that is, close to the founts of the ideology. Demonstrations among Flem- ish units had already taken place in 1939 in the 23th Infantry Regiment and on January 13, 1940 in the 15th Infantry Regiment. On the night of May 9-10, 1940, Staf de Clercq, told seventy-eight of his propagandists to spread in the regiments the instruction not to open fire but to desert while Joris Van Severen urged his followers to act as the Frontists had in World War I.2 Alongside the Belgians was the miniscule approximately 425-strong Luxem- bourg Volunteer Company. Luxembourg hoped to delay an invader by obstruct- ing the routes from the German and French borders. The Luxembourgers, however, were ordered not to defend these obstructions because “the use of arms, like that of explosives, was prohibited in order not to indispose the invader and to avoid reprisals.” Like the Belgians, the Luxembourgers counted on a prompt and efficacious French intervention.3 Also alongside the Belgians were the stronger Dutch armed forces. On May 10, 1940, they counted about 280,000 men grouped into four army corps, each of two divisions, plus two Hussar regiments, a regiment of corps artillery including only one brigade of three batteries, the corps train, twenty-four reserve brigades, twenty-four frontier battalions, fourteen regiments of army artillery, and other troops. This force was desperately weak in artillery, both in number of tubes and modernity of guns. It also lacked anti-tank guns and anti- aircraft defense. The soldiers were poorly trained. The Dutch had only 40 tanks and 125 planes, of which only half were modern.4 More significant was the British Expeditionary Force, commanded by Lord Gort, 450,000 well-trained and mostly professional ‘Tommies’ strong, in thirteen divisions (later joined by two more), completely motorized, with 640 tanks, including heavy Mark II Matilda tanks with 80mm armor, almost imper- vious to German shells, but sadly undergunned. The BF was supported by 456 planes on the continent and another 850 based in the British Isles.5

2 Wanty, p. 174; de Fabribeckers, La Campagne de l’Armee Belge en 1940, 2 ed. (Bruxelles: Rossel, ND), p. 62. 3 Vic Jaeger, Les Insignes de l’Armée Luxembourgeoise et des Luxembourgeois dans les Armées Alliées (NL: Saint Paul, 1995), p. 17; de Fabribeckers, p. 105. 4 Doorman, pp. 17-20; De Vos, pp. 30-31. 5 De Vos, pp. 31. 238 Chapter 9

The main hope of the small nations in Europe was the French Army, generally considered to be the best in the world. In 1939, Winston Churchill said “Thank God for the French Army.” The number of French divisions varies according to the historian. Julian Jackson states that France had 99 divisions, of which 13 were fortress divisions, while Luc De Vos counts 117 divisions, of which 104 were in the northeast. De Fabribeckers counts 105, including one Polish division and three light divisions that ended up intervening in Norway. France had about 2.24 million soldiers under arms, or about 12% of the population. France had, by one estimate, 2,263 modern tanks, 743 armored cars, and another 540 obsolete models. The French Somua medium tank was considered among the best in the world for the time while the B1 and B1bis were as heavy as anything the Germans had. Seventy-five percent of French tanks had at least 40mm armor and a 47mm or 75mm gun, while the B1 series had both. Unfortu- nately, these tanks were rarely used in a modern fashion as an armored striking force. They were most often used to support the infantry and were dispersed in small groups among the infantry divisions – the French had only four heavy armored divisions (including one, under Colonel Charles de Gaulle, being formed). France, with more tanks than the Germans, achieved only local superiority in tank-on-tank battles. One is reminded of the later-war battles between the Tiger and the Sherman, with the more numerous and mobile Shermans (the 1940 Germans) eventually destroying the heavier but harder to use and less mobile Tigers (the 1940 French).6 The French were in the process of digesting the lessons of the Polish campaign when the Germans invaded the west. The French were generally foot- and horse-mobile and short of air power. France had 3,097 planes on May 10, 1940, with only 879 set to defend northeastern France. Here, as with tanks, resources were ill-used. Among the French planes was the Dewoitine D-520, a modern fighter equal to anything in the Luftwaffe. The French planned for a long war and did not want to risk all their assets right away, keeping many in reserve and dispersing others on many targets at the same time. However, the Germans fought for a short war and achieved air superiority making movement of troops by day hellishly difficult. It also made French bombers easy targets.7 Against the Allies stood the Wehrmacht, 156 Divisions strong, with twenty- one busy in Norway, Denmark, and Poland, leaving 135 divisions, or nearly 3 million men, plus the 100,000 men of the Waffen-SS for the Campaign in the

6 Julian Jackson, The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003), p. 33; De Vos, pp. 32-33. 7 De Vos, p. 33; de Fabribeckers, pp. 86-87. The ‘eighteen-days’ Campaign’ 239

West. 93 divisions took part in the initial offensive. The Germans had 7,378 tubes of artillery, compared to the 10,700 possessed by France alone. They also had 10 modern armored divisions, each with 12-14,000 men and 150-340 tanks, with most being light Panzer Is and IIs, for a total of 3,505. The Germans were actually outnumbered by the Allies, who had arguably superior tanks, but the Germans had the inestimable advantages of knowing how to use them and having the air superiority to allow them to move freely. The Luftwaffe had 5,446 planes, of which only 3,600 were available for the West, and only 2,600 ended up being used. The Allied strategy gave the Germans an air superiority of 2,600 against 1,800. Had the Allies used all their resources, the balance would have been in their favor.8 Both German and Belgian infantry companies were composed of three platoons of four squads, but the Germans had 185 men per company, compared to the 230 of the Belgians – a lightness advantage. The Germans also had the advantage in equipment and armament. The Germans had one combat truck per platoon carrying the soldiers’ personal effects, heavy weapons, and ammunition, compared to none for the Belgians. The German ‘Landser’ carried 180 rounds (half on him and half in the truck) while the Belgian soldier had 120. Both the Belgians and the Germans had twelve light machine guns per company but the German ones fired at a higher rate (900-600) and the Germans also had twelve submachine guns compared to one for the Belgians, three grenade launchers with 800g shells against nine Belgian ones firing 600g rounds, three anti-tank rifles, and three sniper rifles. The Belgian company also had twelve machine guns while the Germans had twelve machine guns and six 81mm mortars. Belgian active and first-reserve infantry regiments had a weapons battalion with twelve machine guns, twelve 47mm anti-tank guns, and eight 76mm mortars. A German regiment was supported by one company of twelve 37mm anti-tank guns and one of eight cannons (6×75mm and 2×150mm). In divisional artillery, the Belgians were outnumbered, since their forty-eight guns (36 75mm guns and 12 105mm howitzers) could send a volley of 375-443 kilos of shot downrange while the forty-eight German howitzers of 105mm (36) and 150mm (12) could send an awesome 1,065 kilos. Professor De Vos argues that the average Allied soldier was no worse than “the average Ger- man soldier … . It is the number of elite units that made the difference, notably the armored troops and parachutists.”9 On May 10, Belgian units were understrength by about 15% because leaves had just been reinstituted after the indiscipline discussed above. Armament

8 De Fabribeckers, p. 81; De Vos, pp. 33-37. 9 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 88; De Vos, p. 35. 240 Chapter 9 was also short – some weapons were not returned from a training center because the center thought it was a false alarm. Infantrymen were given only 60 rounds for their rifles while machine guns got only 840 rounds. Supply was deficient and the soldiers were not equipped for the weather. In addition, discipline and morale left something to be desired and there were communication problems between the Francophone officers and the Flemish soldiers.10 The German blows on May 10 fell on Holland, Luxembourg (which was overrun), Belgium, and French airfields. The Germans threw 26 divisions, 6 of which were armored, at the Belgians. The Belgians paid the price for their inad- equate anti-aircraft defense. Although many Belgian aircraft made it to their deployment airfields, the one modern group was caught with its Hurricanes on the ground and destroyed. Later German air strikes caught the Belgian Air Force on its deployment airfields, destroying much of what remained. Fifty Belgian planes were destroyed, all but three on the ground. Belgian communications were disrupted, making concerted counterattacks and even infantry- artillery communication impossible. German gliderborne commandos invested Fort Eben-Emael, taking it out of the fight, and forcing its surrender on May 11. Other gliderborne troops surprised the Belgian garrisons watching the bridges over the Albert Canal in the zone of the Belgian 7th Infantry Divi- sion by passing over them and coming from the rear. In addition, Belgian soldiers hesitated to shoot, being unsure whether the gliders were Allied or German. Belgians managed to destroy four of the six bridges but the two which fell intact into German hands were sufficient for their needs. The Dutch were able to partially destroy their bridges over the Meuse at Maastricht, but German pioneers ran temporary bridges over the river, allowing two German Panzer divisions to reach the Albert Canal. The Belgians were taken by surprise by the speed and method of the German attack. They expected a traditional land invasion that could be seen and dealt with. There were no Belgian reserves close enough to Eben-Emael and the bridges over the Albert Canal because headquarters expected to have time to send motorized troops from the Ardennes, or even the French Cavalry Corps to deal with any threat there.11 Along the Belgian-German frontier north of the Ardennes, the Belgians by order abandoned their covering positions and the demolition was achieved

10 De Vos, p. 51. 11 De Vos, pp. 55-58 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 113, 146; Jean Vanwelken- huyzen, “La Belgique en Guerre,” pp. 159-60. For detailed information on the Dutch, I rec- ommend P.L.G. Doorman’s Military Operations in the Netherlands, available in a new edition, or the more recent and much larger Amersfoort, Herman and Piet Kamphuis, eds. May 1940: The Battle for the Netherlands. Leiden: Brill, 2010. The ‘eighteen-days’ Campaign’ 241 despite the efforts of German commandos wearing civilian attire. Meanwhile, the German 7th Panzerdivision, commanded by a certain Erwin Rommel, took the 3rd Ch.A. from the south. Delays of about an hour were imposed on the Germans who then turned north and attacked Chabrehez, where two platoons of Chasseurs ardennais held the German advance guard for 2 ¾ hours, finally giving way at around 9 p.m. The official history of the Belgian army notes that the Germans were so impressed with the resistance that they thought there were many more Belgians than were present and retreated. Seven Belgian Chasseurs were killed.12 Further south in the Ardennes, the Chasseurs ardennais were ready and their first division successfully completed all their demolitions and delayed the German advance. A weakened Belgian company at Martelange saw the Ger- mans in Luxembourg but held fire until the Germans crossed the Belgian frontier, at about 7:45 a.m. Despite being threatened by German advances in the north and south, the Chasseurs held up the German 1st Panzerdivision for 2 ¾ hours and then withdrew according to orders. They were ambushed by one of the German commando units roving behind the Belgian lines and suffered significant casualties. Ironically, the action of the German commandos, by cutting off the retreat routes for the Chasseurs, contributed to the stubborn Belgian resistance. One company, the 5th company of the 1Ch. A., led by Com- mandant Bricart, held the area around Bodange and Strainchamps. Two Chas- seurs platoons at Bodange, with one T-13, fought two German battalions – the advance guard of the 1st Panzerdivision and held them up until 6:15 p.m., losing nine dead, including Commandant Bricart. The Germans were shocked by the paucity of the Belgian Chasseurs, asking the surviving prisoners “where are the others?” The Germans “hurried to ‘camouflage’ the reality of the small number of effectives that were opposed to them … .” Similar resistance by a reinforced platoon stopped the Germans at Strainchamps from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. The Ger- man commander had to put off capturing his day one objective of Neufchâ- teau until the next day. This shows the effectiveness of the Chasseurs ardennais and, with their performance later, justifies their creation. It is to be regretted that the Belgian command did not assign them more of a role in the Ardennes!13 At the same time, after their aid was solicited by the Belgians, French units arrived in the Ardennes and linked up with the Chasseurs ardennais. There was, unfortunately, confusion as, due to a misunderstanding, the French did not know of the Chasseurs’ orders to withdraw and thought they were being abandoned. Further north, the French First Army Group was carrying out its

12 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 113-114; Vangansbeke, p. 11. 13 Vangansbeke, pp. 10-12; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 116; Champion, p. 35. 242 Chapter 9 plan for intervention. The 7th Army on the Allied extreme left reached Breda in the Netherlands by midnight, the British Expeditionary Force reached the K-W Line and sent reconnaissance units as far as the Albert Canal. German tanks had prevented the Belgians from covering the advance of the Anglo- French forces as had been planned but the French First Army reached its positions around the Gembloux Gap, pushing its Cavalry Corps (two armored divisions) forward to cover the advance, and the light cavalry divisions of the Ninth and Second French Armies arrived in the Ardennes.14 Not everything had been settled between the Belgians and the Allies but that was also true between the French and British, who had had a lot more time to work things out. Nevertheless, everybody expected the commanders to work together when the action started and that all outstanding problems would be settled. Lord Gort, in his published dispatches, complained that the Belgians had not informed the French about their defensive schema. French documents captured by the Germans and published by them give the lie to this allegation, revealing that French officers, including the military attaché in Brussels, had been allowed to reconnoiter the Belgian defenses of the K-W Line six months before the German invasion and that further documents had been conveyed by the Belgian chief of the General Staff and by the minister of national defense. In June 1939, Baron van Zuylen had complained to the Coun- selor of the British Embassy:

We have furnished, for fifteen years, all the information useful to the French General Staff. The latter knows the organization of our defense, our resources, the transport capacity of our roads and railroads … . What have we obtained in exchange? Fairly vague indications of the forces … at our disposition.15

The British even lent bulldozers to help create the K-W Line, which works were observed by a British officer in mufti. The British were informed about usable airfields and emergency landing strips in Belgium and the Belgians coordi- nated their transport schedules with the French plans. British dispatches indicate “that the intervention of the body of the British forces into Belgium had

14 Georges Hautecler, Rommel and Guderian against the Belgian Chasseurs ardennais: The Combats at Chabrehez and Bodange, Trans. G.F. Nafziger (West Chester, OH: Nafziger Col- lection, 2003), p. 80; Vangansbeke, p. 10; Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, “La Belgique en Guerre,” p. 160; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 118. 15 Vanwelkenhuyzen, “La Belgique en Guerre,” p. 159; to Aveling in Van Zuylen, Les Mains Libres, pp. 463-464. The ‘eighteen-days’ Campaign’ 243 been minutely studied.” Lord Gort himself declared that “[t]he plans made in advance for the advance to the Dyle position actually worked to schedule in almost all respects.”16 On the 11th, the PFL II was, on order, abandoned by its interval troops and the forts were left to fight for themselves. The Luftwaffe hindered Belgian movements, preventing III Corps around Liège from orienting northwards to protect its left from the consequences of the destruction of I Corps on the Albert Canal. On the canal, a powerful combination of Luftwaffe aircraft and 4th Panzerdivi- sion tanks, having passed over the improvised Maastricht bridges at 4:30 that morning, and then over the bridges seized the previous day, ripped a huge hole through the Belgian I Army Corps, destroying the 7th Infantry Division, which had fought hard and aggressively, and throwing the 4th I.D. back in disorgani- zation. In that battle, the lack of sufficiently trained cadres hurt the Belgians as an inexperienced reserve lieutenant left in charge of the rear-guard mistook German reconnaissance for an attack in force and prematurely abandoned the canal. The Belgians lost 40 artillery pieces out of 132 and 26 T-13s out of 38. In addition, by the end of the day, the Cavalry Corps had been ordered to abandon a barrier it had formed around Cortesem and to send attached infantry divisions to the Gette River and to create a new barrier around Lummen. Sec- ond Army Corps was sent from the Albert Canal to the K-W Line and Groupe- ment K and the 2e Chasseurs ardennais division fell back on the PFN. Meanwhile, the Allies were settling into place on the K-W Line.17 On May 12, the remaining Belgian forces on the Albert Canal withdrew, according to the Belgian American Educational Foundation (1940) “in good order;” according to a much more recent history by Luc De Vos “in a chaotic fashion in certain divisions,” to the K-W Line. According to De Vos, “[p]anic, growing indiscipline, and the diffusion of a defeatist propaganda caused repeated problems.” The Cavalry Corps held the line of the Gette River while other Belgian forces fought to cover the retreat. Amidst this retreat, the III Army Corps had lost 63 of its 112 artillery pieces. Most Belgian divisions reached the K-W Line safely and joined Belgian, British, and French troops. Belgians still held the PFN and the French 9th Army was occupying the line from Namur

16 Lord Gort quoted (in English) in Van Langenhove to Monsieur le Capitaine Ducq, October 24, 1941, pp. 1, 4-6, in SGRS-S/A “Campagne 1940” Généralités G1/A/2-b-2/7. 17 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 113, 120-123; de Fabribeckers, p. 223; Senator Paul Kronacker, “Some Facts about the Campaign in Belgium and how the War was lost on the Continent as early at May 15,” in The Belgian Campaign, p. 29; Major General F.F.O. Michiels, “Summary of the Operations of the Belgian Army in May 1940”, in The Belgian Campaign, p. 52. 244 Chapter 9 to Sedan. In the north, the French 7th Army was pulling back from Holland. Historian Roger Keyes notes that the strong Belgian resistance had achieved its objective of allowing the Allies the time to get to the K-W Line. Also on May 12, at a conference at Casteau, King Leopold, commander-in-chief of the Belgian armed forces, agreed to accept the orders of Generalissimo Gamelin, with the commander of the French First Army Group (French Seventh, First, Ninth, and Second Armies, and the BEF), General Bilotte, as intermediary.18 The fourth day of the campaign saw the Germans reach the Turnhout canal, Diest, and the environs of Tirlemont although their attacks on Halen and Tir- lemont were repulsed. The Cavalry Corps holding those positions was nevertheless ordered to retreat during the night. Further south, the French and the Belgian 2nd Chasseurs à Cheval were pushed in. In the sectors of the French Ninth and Second Armies, the Germans broke through and crossed the Meuse River at Houx, Monthermé, and Sedan. This made the success of the Allies in establishing themselves on the KW Line moot.19 The Dutch capitulated on the 14th, but aside from that, things were relatively quiet for the most part. After some initial success, the German attack on Louvain was repulsed by a British counterattack supported by Belgian troops (who ceded Louvain to the British sector).20 On the 15th, yet another German attack on this medieval city was repulsed by British troops while the remains of Belgian aviation lent what help they could. A two-day artillery duel broke out with the Belgian guns of 15 groups firing at a rate of six per minute to fool the Germans into believing the Belgians had gotten more troops. The Belgians were also using their long-range railroad guns. All of this artillery improved the morale and confidence of the Belgian troops. North of Namur, the French First Army was forced back and the Ger- man race to the coast had begun in the sectors of the French Ninth and Second Armies. Leopold summoned Prime Minister Pierlot to inform him that the Panzers would reach the coast within days and threatened the destruction of the Allied forces in Flanders. Pierlot asked him whether he was suggesting a separate retreat and eventual cease-fire.21 The morning of the Sixteenth saw the Belgian troops and their allies on their positions on the K-W Line and prepared to repulse anything the Germans sent at them. Unfortunately, the order they received was to evacuate the K-W

18 Kronacker, p. 29; De Vos, p. 61; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 122-123; Keyes, p. 201; Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch, Léopold III, p. 13. 19 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 123-125; De Vos, p. 70. 20 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 125; De Vos, pp. 77-78. 21 De Vos, p. 78; Kronacker, pp. 29-30; Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch, Léopold III, p. 13. The ‘eighteen-days’ Campaign’ 245

Figure 17 “Northwestern France, 1940-Campaign in the West, 1940 (Situation 16 May and Operations Since 10 May). Maps from West Point Military History Series: Atlas for the Second World War – Europe and the Mediterranean by Thomas E. Greiss, Series Editor, Square One Publishers, Inc. Copyright 2002. Reprinted by permission.

Line and fall back to the west. It was shattering because it meant giving up Brussels and Antwerp. Thus began a morale killing and exhausting series of night retreats and day battles for the Belgians and the rest of the First Army Group. However, it offered the only chance for the Allies of staying out of the trap being sprung by German Army Group A streaming through the gap at Sedan. The Allies also had to cope with another threat: Since the Dutch capitulation of May 14, an entire German army with air support was freed to fall on the Allied northern flank, seize the mouth of the Scheldt, and attack Antwerp. A German attack on the Line around Wygmael was repulsed by the second company of the first battalion of the 4th Chasseurs à Cheval.22

22 De Vos, pp. 78-80; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 127. 246 Chapter 9

The Belgian cabinet met at the HQ in Breendonk and found deep pessimism among the generals and the monarch. On learning that Queen Wilhemina of the Netherlands had arrived in London to continue the fight, Leopold asked his ministers a hypothetical that amounted to the question: if the Belgian army were forced to capitulate, should the king, as head of state, remain in Belgium or flee with the government. The ministers took this as an indication that he disapproved of Wilhelmina’s actions. Historians identify this as the beginning of the breach between Leopold and his ministers. Also at Breendonk, the Gen- eral Staff was working out the plans for a retreat to the Scheldt-TPG-Terneuzen canal line, which would be reached by May 19 after stops and combat on the Willebroek Canal, and the junctions of the Dendre and lower Scheldt rivers. The reserve divisions and artillery would leave the line first, followed that night by the four divisions on the southern part of the K-W Line. This went relatively well. The next night, the four northern divisions fell back. This maneuver was more difficult because they were in contact with the Germans. The German pursuit was thwarted by the Chasseurs ardennais and Belgian cavalry. Thus two of the major army improvement projects of the 1932-1940 period – the creation of the elite Chasseurs ardennais and the motorization of the cavalry – proved their worth on the battlefield. Meanwhile, the British who fought so valiantly at Louvain had to abandon Brussels and the French First Army was ordered to retreat to France. Luckily for the Allies, German aviation was quiet; the Allies had enough problems moving through huge crowds of terrified refugees.23 On the 17th, Prime Minister Pierlot sent the king a message that left no doubt as to the position of the government regarding continuing the struggle. It wanted to persevere alongside its allies and to see the King avoid capture as long as the Allies continued the struggle so that the Belgian state could continue to exist and benefit from the peace treaty. There was a growing gap in the assessment of the war by Leopold and the government, especially since the Germans had just occupied Abbéville. The government expected the French to turn things around as they had done at ‘the miracle of the Marne’ in 1914 while Leopold foresaw a French defeat and the departure for home of the British Expeditionary Force. He expressed his concerns on the 18th and did not retract them during his meeting with General Denis, the minister of national defense, on the 19th.24

23 De Vos, p. 80; Stengers, Léopold III, p. 33; Jules Gérard-Libois and José Gotovitch, Léopold III, p. 14; De Vos, Ibid.; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 127-128. 24 Pierlot to Leopold III, May 17, 1940, quoted in Stengers, p. 33 and in Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch, Léopold III, pp. 14-15; Ibid. pp. 14-15. The ‘eighteen-days’ Campaign’ 247

On the 18th, a reinforced squadron (cavalry battalion) of the 2nd Lancers attacked a German bridgehead across the Willebroek Canal in order to cover the withdrawal of the rest of the Belgian forces while a battalion of the 2nd Chasseurs was outflanked and nearly destroyed by the German forces. That night, the French First Army reached French soil. That same day saw the Bel- gian government, with the exceptions of the prime minister, foreign minister, minister of national defense, and minister of the interior flee to France. These four spent the next week trying to win Leopold over to their view. The question was what the king should do if the Belgian army were forced to give up the fight. The answers were irreconcilable. The government felt the king was “the head of state, and his duty as head of state is to remain, with the government, at the head of Belgium at war” and, therefore, not to be made prisoner. The king felt that he was the commander-in-chief of the Army and his honor required him to share its fate, whatever that fate should be.25 On May 19, Generalissimo Gamelin was replaced by the even older General Weygand, throwing all the Allied plans into disarray and delaying a necessary counterattack planned by Gamelin. In Belgium, the First Chasseurs ardennais Division on the Dendre river was attacked at 11 a.m., held until 12:30 p.m., withdrew seven km, was attacked again at 6 p.m., held again until 8 p.m., then withdrew again to the eastern suburbs of Wetteren. The Cavalry Corps was also hit and some units lost ground but the CC withdrew according to orders towards the Terneuzen Canal. The rest of the army achieved its objectives of “the Ghent- Terneuzen Canal, the TPG, and on the Scheldt upriver from the TPG up to the northern outskirts of Audenarde.” The BEF also left the Dendre but kept the 12th Lancers as its rear guard. Leopold had a meeting with General Denis, who tried to convince him to take steps to avoid capture and being caught in the German occupation but saw he wasn’t convincing the king, especially because Leopold took a narrow view of Belgium’s obligations to her allies. The government felt morally bound to fight alongside the British and French and to share their fate. Although they had not established a formal alliance, the fact that they had called on the Allies for aid and been accepted was the moral equivalent of an alliance, unbreakable until final victory. The king, however, felt that Belgium had promised only to defend itself. Also on May 19, the Germans came out with two radio messages, one for the Flemings and one for the Walloons. The Flemings were told “[the]more rapidly we occupy the country, [the] better it will be for you. Then there will no longer be war: put down your weapons.” The Walloons heard “[t]he destruction of the army will no longer help the

25 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 128-129; Stengers, p. 34. 248 Chapter 9

French much. You are sacrificing yourselves for the English and French capital- ists. Put down your weapons.”26 On May 20, 1940, van Overstraeten called for greater subtlety in dealing with the troops, especially the Flemish ones. By that time the Belgian and Allied forces were in the positions cited above. They had lost a lot of their equipment; their depots, including those for the K-W Line, had not been evacuated in time. Brussels and Antwerp had fallen, and only Bruges and Ghent were still free of the major Belgian cities. Twelve Belgian divisions held seventy kilometers of front between Terneuzen and Audenarde. To their north was a corps from the French Seventh Army and to their south was the BEF. Belgian troops of the 10th Infantry Division repulsed German attacks across the Scheldt and where the Germans did succeed, they were held by a counterattack. At the TPG, the Ger- mans secured small gains despite a Belgian counterattack that recovered some, but not all, of the lost positions. The Germans were surprised by the determined Allied resistance. The Belgian forces were exhausted after days of fighting and nights of marching. Nevertheless, they also stopped the German attempts to cross the canal on May 21 with heavy losses.27 The Belgian General Staff had been forced to relocate to St. André-lez-Bru- ges, where the four ministers remaining in Belgium met with the king. Jules Gérard-Libois and José Gotovitch observe that historians find a lot of “misun- derstandings” between the two parties during this period. This is especially ironic because the ministers had arranged the meeting precisely to eliminate misunderstanding and obtain information on a clear question: what Leopold would do if the Belgian army were to be cut off from the Allies and forced to capitulate. The problem, as Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch point out, is that the two sides were simply not speaking the same language. The ministers still believed the French would recover while Leopold thought the game was up, the British were planning to flee, and the French would have to capitulate. Leo- pold requested a memorandum describing the take of the ministers on the just-concluded meeting. The government argued the king must flee to France if necessary to avoid capture and to keep fighting. The memo also set out the king’s intentions: if the French lost, the king would remain in his country; if not, Leopold would flee abroad to continue the fight and maintain the integrity of the nation. If both France and Britain gave up, and his presence could help his army, he would stay. Thus Leopold had admitted the possibility of leaving a doomed army, relieving the ministers, but he made conditions. The

26 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 129-130; Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch, Léopold III, p. 16; Stengers, Léopold III, pp. 34-35; quoted in “Journée du 19 mai” in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, p. 638. 27 “Journée du 20 mai” in van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, pp. 640-641; De Vos, pp. 80-81. The ‘eighteen-days’ Campaign’ 249 question became who would decide whether Leopold’s conditions had been met? Would it be himself based on his advisors? Would it be himself with ministerial countersignature? This is the heart of the matter. Leopold had said he would stay if he felt the game was over. That implied the king himself would make the determination in the name of his country. This also made ministerial countersignature based solely on the king’s view of the situation impossible in a situation so fraught with consequences not only for the survival of Belgium but also for the Allies.28 The ministers were happy that Leopold did not complain about their memorandum even though it called for keeping Belgium at the side of the Allies. There was a misunderstanding here, too because the two sides did not read the memo the same way. The ministerial elation would only last the day.29 On May 21, the Germans reached the French coast at Abbeville, cutting off the Allied troops in Belgium. The Allied commanders were supposed to meet at Ypres in Belgium. Generalissimo Weygand came to discuss his plans with General Bilotte (First French Army Group), Lord Gort, and King Leopold (as Belgian commander-in-chief). Because of travel complications, the conference unfolded in several independent talks with whoever happened to have arrived. The Belgians agreed to extend their front to take over part of the BEF’s northern/northeastern front, freeing the latter for an attack south. The Belgians also acceded to Generalissimo Weygand’s request for a withdrawal to the Yser River – the site of Belgium’s miraculous stand in 1914. Unfortunately for the Allies, General Bilotte was mortally injured in an automobile accident on his way back from the conference and died without telling anybody what had been resolved at Ypres. He was only replaced on May 25 by General Blanchard, formerly commander of the French First Army. The meeting at Ypres had unfortunate consequences for the relationship between the king and his ministers. Leopold attended the meeting with General van Overstraeten, who was already distrusted by the ministers because of his perceived anti-French bias. Also there was General Michiels, the chief of staff. The issue was who was not there – the ministers, not even General Denis, who as a general and minister of national defense, would be expected to attend. Naturally, they felt excluded and their distrust increased.30

28 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 131; Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch, Léopold III, pp. 17-19; Mémorandum des ministres, 20 Mai 1940, rédigé par Hubert Pierlot après la rencontre avec le roi à Saint-André-lez-Bruges, quoted in Ibid., p. 17; P.-H. Spaak, quoted in Ibid., p. 19. 29 Mémorandum des ministres, quoted in Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch, Léopold III, p. 20. 30 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 132, Michiels, p. 54; Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch, Léopold III, pp. 20-21. 250 Chapter 9

Figure 18 “Northwestern France, 1940-Campaign in the West, 1940 (Situation 21 May and Operations Since 16 May). Maps from West Point Military History Series: Atlas for the Second World War – Europe and the Mediterranean by Thomas E. Greiss, Series Editor, Square One Publishers, Inc. Copyright 2002. Reprinted by permission.

The next day, Leopold directly challenged Pierlot by sending him a letter condemning the flight of the government to France and denying Pierlot’s ability to govern. In response, Pierlot explained that the four remaining ministers remained in Belgium and had no contact with Paris and only telephonic communication with London and could not exercise all their powers.31 On May 22, the Belgians, as agreed, extended their line to 90km (56 miles). However, instead of retreating to the Yser, which would have given the Belgians a 53km front “protected in great part by a waterway or flooding,” the Belgians

31 Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch, Léopold III, pp. 20-21; “Recueil de documents établi par le secretariat du roi concernant la période 1936-1939,” quoted in Ibid., pp. 20-21. Emphasis in the original. “Recueil de documents, quoted in Ibid., pp. 21-22. The ‘eighteen-days’ Campaign’ 251 decided to retreat only to the Lys River and the derivation canal. General Mich- iels writes that the flood of evacuees fleeing to France made the situation more difficult, especially since the French generally kept their border closed. Not much happened on the Belgian front on this day.32 The Germans attacked again the next day, but ran into strong opposition, despite which Ghent was accidentally given to the Germans with between 8,000 and 9,500 prisoners. That afternoon, the General Staff sent out orders for a withdrawal behind the derivation canal of the Lys, which would form, with the Lys, the last stand line of the Belgian army. Professor De Vos points to the decent morale of much of the Belgian army “[d]espite appalling problems.” One of the difficulties was that the terrain favored the attacker.33 In the early morning of May 24, two German armies numbering twelve divisions attacked the Belgians around Courtrai over the Lys. The main effort was with six divisions against two Belgian ones. After a massive air and artillery bombardment, penetrations were made both north and south of the city. The Belgians resisted valiantly and executed several counterattacks but the Ger- mans still held bridgeheads across the Lys at sundown. The (Flemish) Second Line Infantry regiment and Twenty-third Line Infantry regiment were taken by surprise by the German 309th Infantry Regiment at Ronsele on the derivation canal. Each Belgian unit lost at least one battalion and the eleventh company of the 23rd broke and abandoned the canal. Although a Belgian counterattack on the 25th threw the Germans back, the failure of the Flemish units the day before had led to needless casualties. This was also the day when Hitler issued his famous ‘halt order’ preventing the Germans from wiping out the Allied forces that would end up being evacuated from Dunkirk.34 May 25, 1940 is very important in Belgian history because it saw the fatal break between the king and government that would roil Belgium as ‘the royal question’ until 1951. I will therefore be discussing events in a fairly detailed manner. On the 25th, the Belgians forced the Germans back across the derivation canal and the Chasseurs ardennais stopped the Germans at Vinckt. After the Chasseurs ardennais withdrew from that place, the Germans vented their frustration by murdering 86 Belgian civilians. Similar massacres took place in other locales as well. In other places, Belgians were eagerly surrendering. In addition, Germans were using civilians and Belgian POWs as human shields,

32 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 132-133; Michiels, pp. 54-55. 33 De Vos, p. 87; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 134. 34 De Fabribeckers, pp. 302-304; De Vos, pp. 81-82; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 135-137. For a good and provocative discussion on the real reason for Hitler’s halt order, see Frieser and Greenwood, pp. 304-314. 252 Chapter 9 discouraging the Belgians from opening fire. At Meigem, the Belgian 4th Infan- try Division, made up of Flemish units, having lost half its troops on the Albert Canal in the early days of the fighting, poorly equipped, and with low morale, gave up en masse, allowing the Germans across the canal. These troops, however, had already been seen as problems during the period of mobilization. Leopold himself had visited them on January 22. “The impression is unfavor- able, nonchalance of officers, indiscipline of soldiers, disorder, bad will.” Although these troops had reasons other than Flemish nationalism for their “bad will,” propaganda probably also played a role.35 The king gave an order of the day to his troops, promising to share their fate. The previous night, Pierlot and his colleagues sought the location of the king. They tried Saint-André-lez-Bruges but he had already left. They got his phone number from the directory and went to see him at his new headquarters in Wijnendaele. They tried again to convince him to flee Belgium, as they were doing, to continue his role of chief of state, outside of occupied Belgium, if necessary, to pursue the war in alliance with France and Great Britain against the German aggressor, to exercise his function under ministerial responsibility. Leopold’s notes on the meeting noted that they still disagreed over who would win the war. These four ministers (Prime Minister Pierlot, Foreign Minister Spaak, minister of national defense Denis, and Minister for Colonies Vander- poorten) went on to form the Belgian government-in-exile. They argued Bel- gium’s well-being required continuing the fight with all available means. As we will see later, the nucleus of a new Belgian army existed in France. Leopold rejected them, arguing that a new army would need cadres who probably would not escape the encirclement of the Allied forces in Flanders. He wrote to King George VI that his army was on the verge of obliteration and there was no chance of creating the new army. If the army was destroyed, Belgium would no longer be able to help the Allies. The ministers asked him what he expected to do in an occupied Belgium after a Belgian capitulation. He did not know, but he was certain France was defeated and Britain would not return to the continent in the foreseeable future. He hoped to save his people from another brutal German occupation. He expected Belgium might have to endure limited independence and German domination for years until, somehow, the situation would change. He also believed that if he left Belgium he would never return. Historian Jean Stengers observes that the king had given up while his government had not. Leopold also believed that the only way to preserve Belgian independence and his dynasty was to remain in the country rather than flee.

35 De Vos, pp. 88-89; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 138; de Fabribeckers, pp. 307, 62-63; Wullus-Rudiger, p. 281. The ‘eighteen-days’ Campaign’ 253

Leopold asserted that if the Belgian government in France continued the fight after a Belgian armistice, it would cease to be ‘the King’s government’ but would rather be operating against him. Those were fateful words.36 Leopold and General van Overstraeten believed that “an honorable capitulation” would prevent Belgian soldiers from being captured and sent to Ger- many. The departure of the last four ministers to France faced Leopold with a problem: he would not have the minister required to countersign his actions. He had been asked at Wijnendaele if he expected to continue with new ministers after the departure of the last ministers for France. He answered in the affirmative because “I am not a dictator.” He wanted to name three new ministers: Henri de Man, Auguste Tilkens (a lieutenant general and head of Leop- old’s military house) and leading jurist Raoul Hayoit de Termicourt. The question was how the king could appoint new ministers in Belgium if the government was abroad and determined to continue the fight? If there were to be two governments, how would they avoid “reciprocal excommunication?” At the time of the meeting at Wijnendaele, Leopold does not appear to have had a clear answer either on what to do or on what the results would be. At 1 p.m. on that day, after the meeting, Leopold received a letter from Prime Minister Pierlot, stating that the four ministers were rejoining the government in France. Leopold realized that the ministers had not resigned and he had to make them do so. He and General van Overstraeten met with Hayoit at 6 p.m. on the 25th and posed the issue, suggesting the naming of new ministers. Hayoit argued that would not be necessary because the constitution provided that a minister’s immediate subordinate could replace an absent minister although the signature of a minister was required to accept or require the resignation of a minister. The rub (or one rub anyway) was that Leopold hoped to obtain good conditions from the Germans, such as bringing servicemen home again and preventing German capitalization on the spoils of Belgium during the continuation of the war. Any purely military negotiations could be conducted by anybody, such as the chief of staff, delegated by the king, but the result of any political negotiations would have to be countersigned by a minister.37 The next day, fresh German units threatened to split the Belgians and British but two Belgian divisions (one cavalry, one infantry) blocked the attack and with another infantry division, held the line. In other places, the Belgians gave

36 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A) 137-138; Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch, Léopold III, pp. 23-25; Leopold III to George VI, quoted in Stengers, p. 36; Stengers, Léopold III, pp. 36-43; Roger Keyes to Winston Churchill, May 22, 1940, quoted in Ibid., p. 38. 37 Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch, Léopold III, pp. 26-31; Leopold III, quoted in Ibid., p. 29; Stengers, Léopold III, pp. 41-43; Henri de Man, quoting Leopold III in Ibid., p. 42. 254 Chapter 9 way a bit. The French had been unable to send as many divisions as they had promised and the Belgians could no longer count on the British, who were looking to get back to Britain. The struggle was all but over. The planning for what became known as the ‘Miracle of Dunkirk,’ the evacuation of 338,000 Allied troops to Britain, contained no provisions for the Belgians, which is interesting considering the Anglo-French accusations that the Belgians were disloyal. The last Belgian reserves were thrown into the battle. General Mich- iels notes that the Belgians could not expect any real assistance from their allies, who were alerted that the Belgian army was nearing its end. That is important because after the Belgians surrendered, the Allies accused the Bel- gians of not warning them. In fact, as Walter Lord points out, “[a]lthough the Belgians, since May 25, had repeatedly warned the British and French they were nearing the end of their ability to resist,” the relationship was not reciprocal; the Allies did not inform the Belgians about their own plans.38 Meanwhile, the crisis between king and ministers continued as Leopold tried to get a ministerial countersignature to depose the ministers in France and bring in the new ones, just to manage the peace and demobilization. This was a major step because it meant disavowing the government-in-exile and preventing it from continuing the war and it was the fulfillment of the fears of the ministers on May 25. Hayoit stated that the countersignature need not be on the actual order. For that reason, on May 26, Leopold sent his principal private secretary, Frédéricq, then in Paris, a telephone call and a telegram via the Belgian ambassador, instructing him to obtain a ministerial signature (of Min- ister Gutt, if he was still in London) to legitimate the resignation of the current ministers and the appointment of new ministers. However, it was blocked by the unanimous refusal of the ministers to countersign the decree. Jean Stengers points out an irony: Leopold was stymied because he believed he could not act otherwise under the Belgian constitution but Hayoit was wrong and other respectable jurists had argued that a newly appointed minister could countersign his own appointment.39 In Paris, the Belgian government was determined to continue the struggle whatever happened to the army in Flanders or whatever the king did and took the king’s attempt to get the countersignature for the resignation of the government as moving from words to deeds and an indication of his readiness to negotiate with the Germans. If not, why did Leopold need new ministers? Pier-

38 Michiels, pp. 55-56; De Vos, p. 88; Walter Lord, The Miracle of Dunkirk (London: Allen Lane, 1982), pp. 78, 101. 39 Stengers, Leopold III, pp. 43-45; Hayoit, quoted in Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch, Léopold III, pp. 31-39. The ‘eighteen-days’ Campaign’ 255 lot, reporting to the government on the meeting at Wijnendaele, declared if Leopold decided to remain in Belgium, he would be considered to be a traitor to the Allies, to whom Belgium was linked as a result of her appeal, and the government would have to disown him.40 The government made several attempts between May 25 and May 27 to persuade Leopold to see reason and join the government abroad. On the 25th, Minister Camille Gutt called from London and spoke to General van Over straeten with a message for the king: follow Queen Wilhelmina’s example and flee to London. The next day, Spaak sent a letter to Leopold via a British officer in which Spaak tried to persuade Leopold that his reading of the situation was wrong, the Allies would continue to fight, and that Belgium had certain obligations towards the Allies, and that the only chance for an independent Belgium was for both the king and government to be in an Allied country. J. Gérard- Libois and José Gotovitch assert that Leopold may not have received his mis- sive although he would have been unable to change the government’s mind. That night, the government sent a former government minister, Raoul Richard, Count Capelle, and Louis Frédéricq to Leopold to try one last time to persuade him to avoid capture. During the briefing, Count Capelle blamed Leopold’s decisions on General van Overstraeten. In the event, because they had to travel via London and Dover, they arrived too late and found that the Belgian army had already capitulated. Capelle decided to stay with his king.41 On May 27, the Belgian front was cracking in numerous places and there were no more troops available to plug the gaps. There was a 4.5 mile gap through which the Germans could have reached Bruges, the last major city in Belgian hands. General Michiels recalls that the Belgian soldiers were fighting doggedly for every inch while the artillery were exhausting all their rounds and then destroying the guns to keep them out of German hands. The Carabiniers Cyclists even managed to take 200 German prisoners at Knesselaere. However, the Belgians had reached their limit. Their hospitals were full and their cais- sons were empty. There were thousands of refugees concentrated into a small area vulnerable to disease as well as German artillery and aircraft. There was no expectation of Allied aid and no hope for the future. The Belgians could no longer fall back because the army was too spread out and no longer had any reserves. The soldiers were exhausted and the Germans controlled the skies.

40 “Rapport de H. Pierlot sur Wynendaele,” quoted in Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch, Léopold III, p. 35. 41 “Dossier de l’instruction ouvert en cause du comte Capelle; rapport addressé au minister de la justice par Max Huwart, 26 Juin 1948,” quoted in Ibid., p. 39. 256 Chapter 9

Further combat would only shatter the army and result in many pointless deaths.42 There were also problems with the Flemish troops. On May 27, General van Overstraeten discussed the situation with General Michiels. For the most part, things were acceptable, but there were problems with the 12th Infantry Divi- sion of II Corps, which had to retreat because Flemish soldiers were desert- ing.43 On the morning of May 27, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, the British emissary to King Leopold, telephoned Winston Churchill, prime minister since May 10, and warned him that the Belgian resistance “had reached its end.” He conveyed a similar warning to Lord Gort while Colonel Davy of the British mission warned Gort’s chief of staff that Belgium would surrender within 24 hours. Around 3 p.m., General van Overstraeten warned the French chief of mission, General Champon, that “we have arrived at the extreme limit of resistance. Our front is frittering away, like a cord which breaks after complete use.” At the same time, many civilians were being squeezed into the shrinking pocket at the mercy of German guns and bombs. Between 3:30 p.m. and 4 p.m., Leopold decided to send an emissary to find out the German terms and warned the Allied missions. Two French divisions were transported in Belgian trucks towards Dunkirk and relative safety. The Belgian army’s flags and standards were placed in safekeeping or hidden. At 5 p.m., Leopold sent General Derous- seaux, the second in command of the General Staff, who was led to the headquarters of General von Reichenau, commander of the German Sixth Army. At 8 p.m., orders for one last retreat left Belgian headquarters. Around 11 p.m., Derousseaux returned. There were no terms; Hitler demanded unconditional surrender. Leopold accepted, with the surrender to take effect at 4 a.m. on May 28. However, the fort of Tancrémont-Pepinster continued the fight until around 3 p.m. on May 29 while Belgian forces in France were still technically in the Allied camp. 44 Henri Haag, Charles de Broqueville’s biographer, condemns Paul-Henri Spaak’s, and others’s, drawing a direct line between 1914 and 1940 and blaming Albert in part for Leopold’s surrender because Leopold was trying to do what

42 Michiels, p. 56; De Vos, p. 89; Michiels, p. 57. Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 143-145. According to Jean Stengers, General van Overstraeten, who “thought [also] of the Franco-British,” opposed the decision to surrender and even called it “dishonor.” Stengers, Léopold III, p. 31. 43 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 138; de Fabribeckers, pp. 307, 62-63; Wullus- Rudiger, p. 281; “Journée du 27 mai,” in van Overstraeten, pp. 704-705. 44 Leopold III, Pour l’histoire, p. 51; Michiels, p. 57; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 145; De Vos, p. 89-90. The ‘eighteen-days’ Campaign’ 257

Albert would have done. Spaak’s argument goes that without the presence of de Broqueville by his side Albert would have surrendered in 1914 like Leopold did in 1940. The theory posits that both times there were two divergent views on matters: those of the kings and those of the ministers, with the first cast as guilty and the second as ‘saviors.’ De Broqueville blamed Leopold’s surrender on “a faulty interpretation of article 68 of the constitution” dealing with command of the army and condemned Prime Minister Pierlot’s decision to flee to France and abandon the king. Of course, an important difference between Albert at Antwerp in 1914 and Leopold in 1940 is that Albert had seen the French win on the Marne while Leopold saw the looming defeat of the French army.45 After the capitulation, the French government and the Belgian government- in-exile were apoplectic with rage. The Belgian government feared Leopold aimed not just at a military capitulation but at “an armistice putting an end to the war between vanquished Belgium and victorious Germany.” French Prime Minister Reynaud announced on the radio to the French people that Leopold, without alerting his allies, had surrendered, taking his army out of the fight. He accused Leopold of “military treason and of felony.” As Belgian historians Els Witte, Jan Craeybeckx, and Alain Meynen note, the French “considered Bel- gium’s capitulation and Leopold’s surrender nothing short of treason. Paris was looking for a scapegoat because its own defeat was drawing dangerously close.” On the other hand, Jean Stengers argues that given the chaos ruling in the French High Command and government, Reynaud did not really know what was going on when he accused the Belgians of treason. Stengers does not absolve Reynaud entirely of dealing in bad faith in his fateful speech. The speech was largely aimed at a French audience; Reynaud was putting French- men, like Marshal Pétain, who might entertain defeatist thoughts on notice.46 Reynaud went so far as to warn Foreign Minister Spaak that if the Belgian government did not immediately disown King Leopold, Reynaud would not look after the Belgian refugees in France. The Belgian government-in-exile acceded to Reynaud’s demand and Prime Minister Pierlot complained on French radio that Leopold, in spite of his government, had negotiated with the Germans, thus breaking his bond with the Belgian people.”47

45 Haag, 2: 843, 847, 874. 46 De Vos, p. 89; Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch, Léopold III, pp. 42-43; Paul Reynaud, quoted in Herbert Hoover, “The Surender of the Belgian Army,” in The Belgian Campaign, p. 7; Witte, et al., p. 157; Dumoulin, p. 176; Stengers, Léopold III et le gouvernement, p. 48. 47 Ibid., p. 47; Hubert Pierlot, quoted in Ibid., p. 13. 258 Chapter 9

Importantly, he also declared that the King was temporarily unable to rule because he was under German control although, to avoid aggravating the situation, Pierlot, in his speech, omitted Leopold’s words at Wijnendaele or what he expected to do in occupied Belgium, or his desire to eliminate the Pierlot government and appoint new ministers. Nor did he accede to Reynaud’s wishes and announce the ‘deposition’ of the king. In any case, through Pierlot, the government effectively blocked Leopold’s freedom of action, such as appoint- ing new ministers. It succeeded. Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch point out that the government, through Pierlot’s speech, “had … prevented the king from … allowing himself to be led onto the dangerous path desired by [the Germans],” including hosting Hitler himself. Leopold had been invited on May 31 but refused. Leopold deeply resented the government’s accusations of treason and felt them unjustified.48 The British had been on the verge of condemning Leopold in Reynaudian terms but Churchill was deterred by evidence coming from the field. He did not want to “judge” Leopold, “in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian army. That army has fought very bravely and has both suffered and inflicted heavy losses.” He would shortly, however, join in the denunciations of the Belgian capitulation. Belgium lost 12,033 killed, slightly more non-combat- tants than combatants. 250,000 Belgian soldiers ended up as prisoners of war.49 The armistice caught many Belgian soldiers in France, and it was in these troops that the government-in-exile initially placed its hopes. As early as May 12, the Belgian high command decided to send its recruits in need of training, the ‘Troupes de Renfort et d’Instruction’ (T.R.I. or ‘Reinforcement and Training Troops’), consisting of about 85,000 men under Lieutenant General Wibier, divided into one ‘Centre de Renfort et d’Instruction’ (C.R.I. or ‘Center of Rein- forcement and Training’) per peacetime infantry division or special unit or cavalry unit. Some of these units, including the Second Battalion of the Fifty- fourth Line Infantry Regiment and the divisional units of the Second C.R.I., distinguished themselves in combats on French soil, including fights to protect the Channel Ports from the German advance. The T.R.I. started settling into the south of France in and around Montpelier on May 20. The troops were just starting training when they got the news of the Belgian capitulation. Reynaud’s

48 Stengers, Léopold III, pp. 47-53; see also Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch, Léopold III, p. 43; D. Leca, quoted in Stengers, Léopold III p. 49; Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch, Léopold III, pp. 47-48; Leopold III quoted by van Overstraeten, quoted in Ibid., p. 48.; Leopold III, quoted by Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen in Quand les chemins se séparent, mai-juin 1940, aux sources de la question royale, quoted in Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch, Léopold III, p. 48. 49 Stengers, Leopold III, p. 49; Winston Churchill, quoted in Hoover, p. 7; De Vos, p. 89. The ‘eighteen-days’ Campaign’ 259 broadcast led to attacks on Belgians by angry Frenchmen until the government-in-exile had made plain its determination to stick with the Allies. The French requested assistance from the Belgians in the building of a new defensive line on the Seine in front of Paris. However, the French were pushed back and on June 8, thirty-four battalions of the T.R.I. found themselves caught up in the collapse of the French Army. Of 31,000 Belgian soldiers and over 600 officers, only 6,000 men and 130 officers returned to the south of France on June 20. Then the French signed their armistice and the war ended for the Belgians there. The French accusations, the behavior of the government-in-exile (accusing the King without sufficient information), the ‘Limoges incident’ (members of Parliament affirming their loyalty to Leopold III) caused most officers to rally around the royal person. One Belgian officer noted that because Leopold had capitulated unconditionally he had not given the Germans anything they had not seized whereas the French had given them what they had not taken. “Belgium fell. Yes, but not to its knees.” Meanwhile, officers looked to exonerate the army from any failings in the ‘Eighteen Days Campaign’ and put the blame on the Parliamentary regime that had “introduced politics into the army.” One officer complained that many reserve officers were capable of

getting themselves killed valiantly [but] were not at all able to get themselves obeyed. The fault is not completely incumbent on them. If the authority of the officer has much decreased since 1918, it is that the political powers scarcely thought of anything except to protect the poor soldiers against the evil officer.50

Books written by reserve officers who escaped from captivity or after the lib- eration complained that they had been cheated, “that the sacrifice of combatants for the sacred cause of the country was compromised in advance by a poor material and moral preparation.”51 Students from officer candidate or weapons schools were also sent to France while the survivors of the Seventh Infantry Division, hammered on the Albert Canal on May 10, went to Britain to recover and refit. On May 14, the Belgian government decided to call up all men between 16 and 35, receiving 150,000 new recruits (without those from already-occupied territory). These were gath- ered in Flanders and sent to France, although only about 100,000 actually got

50 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 149-152; Francis Balace, “Psychologie de l’officier Belge face a la defaite, Juin 1940-Automne 1941,” pp. 340-346. Emphasis in the original. Henri Duvigneaud quoted in Ibid., pp. 345-346. 51 LT Leblanc quoted in Ibid., pp. 344-345. 260 Chapter 9 through and formed the ‘Centres de Recrutement de l’Armée Belge’ (C.R.A.B. or ‘Belgian Army Recruitment Centers.’). Three air divisions, minus planes, also made it to France.52 The Belgians trapped in France by the armistice found themselves inactive through July as decisions regarding their fate were made. Many of the disillu- sioned and demoralized troops deserted to try to get back to their families while some bases saw protests by the soldiers. In the end, the Germans ran the repatriation of the Belgians and, at the instigation of King Leopold, the soldiers in the C.R.A.B. were able to leave for Belgium starting on July 30 while the transport of the T.R.I. began on August 17.53 Some Belgian soldiers made it to Britain. On May 25, 1940, Lieutenant Gen- eral Van Strydonck de Burkel, who had directed the motorization of the Cav- alry Corps, had set up a camp in Wales to receive Belgian soldiers who had been evacuated at Dunkirk. These forces became the ‘Belgian Forces in Great Britain’ on August 12. These included a four-platoon ‘Belgian Combat Unit’ which eventually became the ‘First Fusilier Battalion’ of 825 men in three companies. The next year, a Second Fusilier Battalion was stood up, consisting largely of recruits brought in from a camp in Ontario. A field artillery battery of two troops was also established in 1941 while Luxembourgeois volunteers composed a third troop in 1944. A company-strength armored car squadron was formed in June 1941. At the end of 1942 the Fusilier Battalions were officially motorized and the Belgian Forces in Great Britain was reorganized into the ‘First Group’ under Lieutenant Colonel Piron, perhaps Belgium’s greatest hero of World War II. The First Group became the ‘First Belgian Brigade’ in January 1943 and on July 27, 1944 the ‘Independent Belgian Brigade.’54 The Independent Belgian Brigade landed in Normandy on August 8, 1944 and fought alongside the Netherlands Brigade under British control in the lib- eration of the French coast. It got to Belgium on September 3 and to Brussels the next day before fighting in the southern Netherlands. On December 6, the brigade was reorganized in Belgium, returning to the Netherlands in April 1945. It formed part of the occupying forces of Germany from May to December 1945.55 A parachute company was also formed in May 1942 and joined the elite and storied British Special Air Service (SAS) and carried out sabotage actions in

52 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), pp. 149-152. 53 Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 152. 54 Nigel Thomas, Foreign Volunteers of the Allied Forces 1939-1945, Simon McCouaig, ill., Osprey Men-at-Arms 238 (London:Osprey, 1991), p. 15. 55 Thomas, pp. 15-16. The ‘eighteen-days’ Campaign’ 261

1944 in German-occupied Belgium and the Netherlands, where it helped retrieve survivors of the disastrous airborne operation at Arnhem. In May 1945, the Belgian Paras helped arrest members of Admiral Dönitz’s government.56 About twelve hundred Belgians served in the Belgian Section of the Royal Air Force either as individuals or in one of two Belgian squadrons (numbers 349 and 350) flying Spitfires.57 Belgian resistance, inspired by hatred of Germany and by the staunch resistance of Great Britain, consisted of groups from across the political spectrum. Rightist resistance units formed around Belgian soldiers and military officials and tended to be royalists who, like Leopold, were initially skeptical about Par- liamentary democracy but ended up supporting the restitution of the pre-war government and system. Francis Balace suggests that in addition to simple patriotism and hatred of the Germans, there was a nostalgic fondness for the good old pre-war days when one did not have to deal with rationing or the Germans or censorship. There was also the omnipresent memory of the first German occupation, with which the new occupation was compared and which drove people to action. The first groups were based on veterans of the first occupation and started the clandestine press, even using the same titles. Bal- ace also argues that the first resistance was more against collaborators and separatists than against the numerous Germans themselves. “There were among the first resistants many reckless, imprudent idealists, there were, thank [G-d], neither crazies nor irresponsibles.”58 The most famous Belgian resistance movement was the Secret Army, founded in 1940 as the Belgian Legion by a colonel and a major, and formed mainly of officers who refused to accept the verdict of May 28, including many Chasseurs ardennais. The Secret Army was initially distrusted by the government-in-exile as royalist and (initially) anti-Parliamentarian. It took the arrest by the Germans of several leaders before the Secret Army gained the trust of, and weapons from, London.59 Other notable Belgian resistance organizations were the White Brigade, based on the Liberal youth of Flanders but drawing patriots from across the political spectrum and the National Royal Movement, which was originally

56 Thomas, pp. 16-17. 57 Ibid., p. 17. 58 Witte, et al., pp. 161-163; Francis Balace, “Du patriotism a la resistance,” in Belgique 1940, pp. 403-406. 59 Van Gansbeke, pp. 16-17. 262 Chapter 9

Flemish and Catholic, which was opposed by the Pierlot government as too royalist.60 Another important base for the resistance, especially the rightist resistance, was the number of veterans organizations, who could easily cooperate with the military resistance because they shared common experiences and bonds as well as a dislike of democracy, a belief in a strong leader, and a desire for a united country. By trying to unmake Belgium, the Germans triggered resistance.61 In Flanders, Balace identifies another trigger for resistance – opposition to the Flemish separatists. This tended to come from the upper- and middle-class Francophones who would have lost a lot in a new Flemish nationalist state. They had not necessarily been at the forefront of anti-fascist advocacy before May 1940 but frequently came from the Liberal movement. They fought not only for an independent Belgium but also for “the survival of a political and philosophical tendency which” would be submerged in an independent Flan- ders. Consequently, many Liberals joined the military resistance movements such as the ‘White Brigade.’62 Finally, there was the issue of King Leopold himself. Leopold’s silence seemed to offer a blessing to those who wanted to unite to fight the occupation or the collaborationists. He had hoped to be treated as a prisoner of war but he was placed under castle arrest at Laeken while the four ministers of the government-in-exile argued that as he was a prisoner of war he could not govern effectively and set out to rule in his stead, keeping Belgium, and the mineral- rich Belgian Congo in the war on the Allied side. Initially, at least, most Bel- gians supported Leopold over the ministers. Many would change their minds as the war and the German occupation continued. Leopold’s choice and his behavior in occupied Belgium were to prove very controversial and would end up costing him his throne. 63 For the most part, the performance of the Belgian forces in the ‘18-Days’ Campaign’ justified Belgian defense policy. The Chasseurs ardennais and motorized cavalry units gave very good accounts of themselves and the Allies attained the planned main line of defense on time. The K-W Line was not really tested. However, there were still problems with the reserve officer corps and Flemish disaffection. As well, the Belgians erred in not giving the Chasseurs

60 Witte, pp. 162-163. 61 Ibid., pp. 408-411. 62 Balace, “Du patriotism à la résistance,” pp. 410-411. 63 William Ugeux, quoted in Ibid., p. 412; Witte et al., pp. 156-158; Velaers and Van Goethem, p. 161. The ‘eighteen-days’ Campaign’ 263 ardennais a greater role in delaying the Germans. Unfortunately, events elsewhere carried the Belgians along as the French collapsed to their south and they had to conduct a fighting retreat in the forlorn hope of avoiding encirclement. At the same time, the seeds of the ‘royal question’ were sown as the king and his government disagreed fundamentally on Belgium’s obligations vis-à- vis the Allies and the likely course of the war. The king, taking seriously his position of commander-in-chief, hoping to ameliorate a German occupation, and believing Belgium owed nothing more to the Anglo-French, remained in Belgium while his ministers, considering the war unfinished and believing themselves honorbound to the Allies who had intervened on their behalf, fled to France, having failed to persuade the king to follow them. Finally, the Bel- gian army could no longer resist while there was a looming humanitarian catastrophe. Leopold’s capitulation has been very controversial and he was accused of treason not only by the French but also by his own government. The capitulation caught many Belgian troops in France, where they were when the French themselves surrendered. Others made it to England and formed the nucleus of the Free Belgian forces. Many who found themselves in occupied Belgium joined growing resistance networks. 264 Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion

Throughout the period between the world wars, the factors influencing Bel- gian defense policy have been constant and, in fact, the same basic debates went on before both wars, frequently with the ministers of war (later ‘national defense’) squaring off against the chiefs of staff. The issues involved the size, deployment, languages, military policy, and equipment of the army and were colored by Belgian geography, foreign policy, and domestic policy. Through the analysis of these issues and their development, one can see how defense planning is conducted in a Parliamentary democracy. Political and natural geography is an important influence on Belgian defense policy, as it must be in any nation. Belgium is in a difficult geographic position; it has been placed between two major nations with designs on hegemony. Bel- gian defense policy has always been designed to protect the country from either Germany (usually), France (occasionally), or both, and to prevent either using the kingdom as a means to come to grips with the other. Further, nature has not blessed Belgium with great natural defenses and this lack has fed into debates on policy because there was no obvious basis for a defensive deployment. Before World War I, General Ryckel, backed by the minister of war, wanted to concentrate the army against the imminent aggressor (assuming that was clear), foreshadowing ‘defense at the frontier’ while LTG de Ceuninck wanted to mass in the center of the country, providing greater flexibility and suggesting ‘defense in depth.’ Both before and after World War I, the proponents of ‘defense in depth’ were accused by Walloons of abandoning Wallonia and this was a difficult proposition in a Parliamentary democracy. In the interwar period, much energy and vitriol was spent on the debate between the rival concepts of ‘defense in depth’ and ‘defense at the frontier,’ or whether to have a ‘plan b’ or to stake it all on one throw. In fact the two sides were closer than generally perceived because the proponents of ‘defense in depth’ did not want to give up any Belgian soil if they were not forced to do so by the proportion of forces. The debate, natural in a democracy, was rendered moot when the Germans remilitarized the Rhineland, putting the Wehrmacht on the Belgian border and changing the military/geographic calculus that had assumed Belgium had a buffer zone. Both before World War I and World War II, the Belgians planned for a last redoubt to which to retreat if necessary, Antwerp in the first case and the Ghent bridgehead in the second.

After World War I, concerns about improving the kingdom’s geographic defensibility led to territorial demands on the Netherlands that would allow Belgium to defend the Meuse River by taking Dutch Limburg and to control the seaborne approaches to Antwerp by getting the Scheldt estuary. The Bel- gians had learned, to their sorrow, how important controlling the access to Antwerp was when they could not get reinforcements or supplies because of Dutch neutrality. Belgium’s delegates to the Paris Peace Conference spent a lot of time on the issue while many Belgians argued the populations involved would be happier in Belgium, but unfortunately, the Belgians were thwarted in this, receiving only a few cantons and African colonies from Germany. The confluence of geography and military policy also led to the construction of the Albert Canal, intended both to link the vital city of Antwerp to the Meuse River for commerce and also to form the main defense line of the Bel- gian forces in the expectation that the Germans would again come across north of Liège. Foreign policy also had a major impact on defense policy and vice-versa. Belgium’s statutory neutrality shaped its defense planning before World War I. Unfortunately, neutrality proved no protection. During that first war, there was disagreement in the government over relations with the Allies but King Albert’s conception of the international status of Belgium as a neutral and not an ‘Ally or Associated Power,’ and his status of commander-in-chief of the Belgian forces, determined the use of his troops and his own willingness to contem- plate a compromise peace while insisting that Belgium would not help the Allies achieve any goals beyond liberating his nation. After the war, the Belgians concluded that their neutrality had failed them and renounced it. The Belgian government’s repeated attempts to reach an agreement with the British failed and Belgium fell into French arms. This resulted in the 1920 Belgian-French accord that so complicated Franco-Belgian relations and Belgian internal policy. Nevertheless, this tie, and the renuncia- tion of neutrality, allowed the Belgians to concentrate on the defense of their eastern frontier. It also called for military staff talks to coordinate Franco-Bel- gian actions if the Germans threatened Allied troops in the Rhineland. At the same time, it allowed the triumph, especially under Albert Devèze, of the idea of ‘defense at the frontier’ in the faith that the French would ride to the rescue. On the other hand, the French repeatedly tried to use the Belgians for their own purposes, with French Marshal Pétain threatening to enter Belgium in the event of war with Germany even without Belgian permission. French diplomacy towards the Belgians was notably maladroit during the entire period under discussion and the Belgians resented the patronizing and insensitive approach of Paris. 266 Conclusion

During the interwar period, the Belgians, especially after their adventure going into the Ruhr alongside the French in 1923, were dependent on agreement between the British and the French and that agreement was not forthcoming, complicating, especially, the reaction to Germany’s wanton violation of the Versailles Treaty and the Locarno Pact by remilitarizing the Rhineland because there was a very large constituency that would have opposed following the French into another German adventure without the fig leaf of British support, again showing the problems a Parliamentary democracy has in bal- ancing international commitments with domestic political issues. The Belgians were very concerned about what the Germans were doing and what they were likely to do. The fact that Germany was not considered a threat in the 1920s justified the downsizing of the military to what military leaders like the chief of staff, LTG Maglinse, and minister of national defense LTG Kestens considered a dangerous level, leading to their resignations and the 1927-1928 Mixed Commission. As Germany increased the rate of its rearmament, the Belgians followed suit and Belgian diplomatic communications are replete with warnings and advice to improve the military. At the same time, Belgian military diplomacy was devoted to trying to persuade the French to fortify the Franco-Belgian border, thus eliminating the incentive for Germany to try to invade France via the Low Countries. When the French offered to pay for fortifications on the Belgian-German border, the Belgians had to refuse because that would constitute a violation of national sovereignty. Ultimately, the Belgians, at least until 1936, placed their trust in collective security, which was supported by a majority of the population, and were firm supporters of the League of Nations and its Article XVI that enshrined member support of a victim member, despite interpreting such article as not implying military assistance. They were also champions of the Locarno Treaty that was supposed to guarantee the borders of Western Europe – including the demilitarization of the Rhineland. It was at the same time the Germans were rearming that the Belgians were moving towards their policy of ‘free hands’ or ‘independence’ as well as their policy of defense in depth, in both cases driven by increasing alarm because the French were showing they could not be relied upon to stop the Germans. The year 1936 was a watershed year in Belgian foreign policy. It saw the final repudiation of the infamous 1920 Franco-Belgian military agreement and the Rhineland crisis, when the French were at least pretending to be bellicose and the British, as Hitler expected, were blocking any useful action. Belgian Prime Minister van Zeeland constantly and futilely tried to get the British and the French to agree on a common action, while the result was only to embolden Hitler, start his moral ascent over his generals, and thwart France’s interwar Conclusion 267 policy of surrounding Germany by making alliances with its eastern neighbors. It marked the death of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties and it was the failure of Locarno that led the Belgians to seek, and ultimately achieve the status of guaranteed but not guarantor. The same year also saw Belgium proclaim its ‘independence,’ the absence of any alliances or ties other than the Covenant of the League of Nations. This was a political and diplomatic move but one laden with consequences for defense. Once Leopold enunciated – and the government adopted – the policy of ‘independence,’ Belgian defense was again forced to plan à tous azimuths (“in all directions”) although in practice this meant defending against the Ger- mans and French and much less against the Dutch or British. The new policy led to new challenges, including the expenditures of men and materiel on a defense against France that nobody in the Belgian military thought was necessary. Despite ‘independence,’ Belgium continued military relations with France through the military attachés that went beyond strict neutrality. These relations consisted largely of sharing information, including the information that the French did not expect to be able to arrive at the Albert Canal in useful time. This forced the creation of a new main line of defense along the Dyle River – the K-W Line – designed with the mobility concerns of the Allies in mind. Despite the many critiques about the K-W Line and its unfinished nature, especially in the southern French sector, the Allies managed to reach their pre- planned positions in time to repulse the Germans. At the same time, the Belgians reached out to their northern neighbor in the hopes of coordinating defenses. Just as the Belgians rebuffed Allied overtures, the Dutch rejected Belgian appeals after King Leopold accidentally revealed ongoing secret talks between the military attachés and the two different defense conceptions of the Dutch and Belgians precluded joining the two armies. However, after examining the case where the Germans would invade only the Netherlands in 1939 or early 1940, the Belgian leaders decided the strategic implications of the Germans controlling the Netherlands, and thus outflanking the Belgian defenses, on the one side and the Allies just across on the other side meant Belgium would have to go to war for the Netherlands even if it could not directly intervene, needing the troops to defend Belgium itself. Belgian deployments in 1939-1940 were affected by the international military situation. At the beginning of the war, the Belgian army was deployed mainly facing south because the Germans were busy in Poland while the Allies, deployed on the Franco-Belgian border, might have tried to advance through Belgium to help the Poles. After the fall of the capital of unhappy Poland, the Belgians redeployed with most units facing Germany. The Belgians redoubled 268 Conclusion their efforts on the K-W Line, which was now planned to be the main line of defense. Domestic politics and economics also shaped defense policies. The most important factor in interwar Belgian politics – equally important today – was the divide between the Walloons, who generally favored France and strong defenses, and the Flemish, who distrusted France and, because they felt dis- criminated against in the military, tended to be against increasing defense expenditures and the length of service. Flemish politicians championed Flem- ish linguistic rights in commissions such as the 1927-1928 and 1936 mixed commissions and thus had an impact on policy. The 1936 Commission’s cham- pioning of a defensive posture not aimed at any one power came from a desire to mollify both Flemings and Walloons and thus stemmed in part from domestic political considerations. The Belgian military was made to serve as a tool of social engineering, bringing true linguistic equality through policies aimed at easing Flemish resentments by increasing the number of Dutch-speaking officers and by creating Flemish unilingual military units. Unfortunately, the shortfall in trained and competent Flemish officers and NCOs would have an impact on the performance of some Flemish units during the ‘Eighteen-Days Campaign.’ The geographic split between Flanders and Wallonia also had a major impact on defense policy. Many, if not most, of the Walloons, who were physically closer to Germany, demanded ‘defense at the frontier’ because they lived near that frontier and did not want to experience another German occupation as they had suffered so much from the first one. This policy was championed by Albert Devèze, who, as a Liberal politician, used it to draw Walloon Liberal votes. They also traditionally looked to France, not only militarily but also cul- turally, and supported close ties. The Flemings, further away from the German threat and feeling more of an affinity with the Netherlands and, in extreme instances, with Germany itself, favored ‘defense in depth’ and an independent stand free of France. An interesting example of the intersection between domestic/linguistic issues and the military is the 1938 Belgian military maneuvers, which were opposed by many Walloons as appearing to be anti-French. At the same time, the Socialist reluctance to increase the length of military service for their supporters and to spend money on defense had a baleful effect on Belgian defenses during the 1920s, although the lack of a German threat made the Socialist demands feasible. After 1929, the Great Depression had an important impact on the military as ordinary people and politicians alike were reluctant to spend scarce funds on defense. The economic crisis, combined with German rearmament and the evident weakness of the Anglo-French in the face of Italian aggression in Conclusion 269

Africa, also brought to the fore radical groups like Rex and the VNV. The shock of their success, as well as that of the Communists, led to the formation of the second van Zeeland government that decisively rejected ‘defense at the frontier.’ This decision, tied to the subsequent declaration of ‘independence,’ was one of the most important developments in interwar Belgium. The new government included as minister of national defense General Denis, who would go on to help shape the Belgian military in the four years before World War II. The success of the fringe parties also helped lead to the policy of ‘independence’ because it showed the importance of a policy that would unite the major parties against the others. The Belgian military, like all militaries, was designed to do the best job it could of accomplishing the goals set for it by the political authority, the most important of which was to defend the country, and its deployment was affected by political considerations. The Belgian army championed territorial acquisitions after World War I in the hopes of achieving strategic depth and defensible borders. The Belgian military had to try to do more with less in the 1920s as it was being downsized and length of service was being shortened, with the military reaction resulting in the 1927-1928 Mixed Commission, which analyzed the state of the military and called for another reduction in time of service as well as the protection of the frontier and the augmentation of the corps of non- commissioned officers and technicians. The commission also demanded the improvement of Belgian arms and equipment and more rapid training of the conscripts. It supported the building of fortifications on which to base the field army and a change in the linguistic régime through regional recruitment. The early 1930s saw lean times for the military, as well as the most bitter struggle over the two conceptions of ‘defense at the frontier’ and ‘defense in depth.’ They saw the reappearance of Albert Devèze as minister of national defense and his feud with LTG Nuyten, the chief of staff, over both strategy and budgetary policy. The Devèze years saw many important evolutions in the Belgian military. He championed the creation of an elite corps tasked with defending the Ardennes, or at least delaying the Germans: the Chasseurs ardennais. This unit, formed from a converted infantry regiment and grown to two divisions by May 1940, served with distinction during the conflict. Also on his watch was the beginning of the motorization of the Cavalry Corps, intended to provide a well- armed and mobile covering force to protect mobilization and to save money and reduce dependence on horses. This was controversial because many Bel- gian officers were devoted to the horse but resulted in an effective unit that certainly did its duty in 1940. As part of his cherished ‘defense at the frontier,’ he also supported fortifications in Belgian Luxembourg and on the Herve 270 Conclusion

Plateau outside the vital city of Liège. At the same time, however, he engaged in a conflict with the chief of staff, ultimately forcing him out, and played to the Walloon crowd. The 1936 Mixed Commission, created to examine the needs of the military, resulted in many changes for the Belgian army. Its recommendations included an emphasis on covering forces, including volunteer units to defend the borders, to protect Belgian mobilization and the extension of military service to eighteen months for infantrymen and twelve months for others. The defenses of Antwerp were to be modernized and those of Liège and Namur completed. The commission called for the completion of the Albert Canal as the main line of defense but also for a neutral defensive posture. It recommended the expansion of the army by 50% through the creation of ‘second reserve’ infantry divisions of doubtful efficacy, but also spending more money on ‘modernizing’ the military, especially through improving its anti-aircraft and anti-tank capabilities. These measures were passed in the climate of increasing German rearmament and thanks to the support of Leopold himself. The 1938 ‘Sudeten crisis,’ in which the Belgians were not even directly interested, put the Belgian military to the test as war was seemingly becoming more and more likely. It was able to test its mobilization plans, leading to improvements that would bear fruit in 1939. Its deployment was oriented primarily against France because the king was concerned that the French might force passage through Belgium into Germany if war broke out, although passive defenses and demolitions were planned against both the French and German borders. Ultimately, the crisis blew over and the Belgian army was demobilized in a chaotic way. Lessons learned led to a drastic reform in the mobilization procedures and resulted in a much smoother process starting in August 1939. Mobilization started on August 25, 1939 in the face of the worsening crisis over Danzig and went well, especially as the commanders were on the lookout for the kinds of discipline problems, often caused by alcohol, which had bedeviled the mobilization the previous fall. The active army was fully mobilized first, so the system was not overwhelmed by the numbers of enlisted and cadres showing up at the same time. In addition, the Belgian army, seeking to avoid the kind of mass drunkenness that had marred the 1938 mobilization, reduced its soldiers’ access to drinks by controlling the hours of taverns while at the same time it provided more ‘distractions’ for soldiers in cantonments. The mobilization system worked imperfectly well, as troops with special skills or jobs were allowed to go home to the resentment of those who had to stay and whose families were suffering from the reduced income of their soldier providers. There were incidents of ill discipline and extremist influences. Conclusion 271

Belgian deployments depended on the international situation, and especially on the location of major German or French forces. The Belgian army was put on alert several times during the so-called drôle de paix as a result of information coming from its military attaché in Berlin or, in one case, information literally falling from the skies. The first alert came on November 11, 1939, when the German press was exceptionally warlike with regard to the Belgians and Dutch and the Wehrmacht was massing on the Belgian border. Information was coming in from many sources that the Germans were planning a surprise attack. Fortunately, a joint Belgian-Dutch peace appeal and very bad weather resulted in the cancellation of the German invasion. The second alert came as a result of the ‘Mechelen Incident’ on January 10, 1940, in which two German military aviators strayed into Belgium with plans for the invasion of the Low Countries while warnings were coming in from other sources about a planned German attack. In this case, after verifying the German plans, the Belgians passed a summary of the information retrieved to the Allies – a violation of neutrality! This alert had several unfortunate consequences. The captured German plans reinforced the confidence that the Ger- mans were going to do exactly what the Allied planners expected and that the charge into central Belgium was a good idea while the capture of their plans forced the Germans to radically alter their intentions and cut in behind the Allies through the Ardennes. There was also a misunderstanding about whether Leopold was prepared to invite the Allies into Belgium before a Ger- man invasion, which led to bad feelings between the Allies and the Belgians. Finally, responding to ambiguous instructions from Leopold’s military advisor, the Belgian chief of staff ordered the barriers on the Franco-Belgian border to be lifted, potentially encouraging a fateful Allied entrance into Belgium leading to a German invasion. In this case too, the atrocious weather came to the rescue of the Netherlands and Belgium and the alert was called off. Another alert was caused by the German invasion of Scandinavia. In this case, like that of the German invasion of Poland, the immediate threat was believed to be the Allies, whose appeal for pre-emptive entry into Belgium was rejected, especially since the Allies were only willing to go to the K-W Line and not the Albert Canal. On the night of April 9, the Belgians reoriented themselves facing south. After several days, during which the French promised not to enter without permission, starting on April 13, the Belgians again redeployed facing east, even if some reinforcements were also sent south. Belgium’s policy of ‘independence’ did not keep the country out of war. However, the same policy was credited, in Belgium and abroad, with being a wise policy and with keeping Belgium out of the turmoil of the Sudeten Crisis and, without the benefit of hindsight, the Belgians had every right to hope for 272 Conclusion a similar result after the breakout of World War II. The overarching goal of the Belgian leaders was to keep the country out of war. ‘Independence’ offered them that chance while inviting the Allies in preemptively would have been the negation of all their plans and hopes. If Belgium could not keep out of war, ‘independence’ was the only policy that could have united all parts of society and gotten their support for the expansion and improvement of the Belgian army, thus ultimately providing a stronger Belgian force and benefitting the Allies until they suffered the full consequences of their own fatal deployment, training, doctrinal, and equipment failures. How did Belgian defense policy fare against reality? That policy gave Bel- gium eight more months of peace than it might otherwise have had if it invited the Allies in earlier. Belgium had done nothing to bring the invasion on. Its leaders could have an easy conscience on that score. The Belgians assumed a German invasion and planned how to meet one. The Germans did, in fact, invade and the Belgians eventually found themselves in a strong defensive position supported by the Allies they expected. Again, Belgian policy worked. The fatal breach was not made through Belgian units. Elite Belgian units played praiseworthy roles in the defense of their country. Under pressure from politicians, among others, the Belgians had set about creating an army skilled in defense (although unfortunately deprived of ‘offensive’ weapons). That army showed its worth in the battles after the evacuation of the K-W Line. It fought bravely in the face of increasingly long odds. The goals of defense policy were met there as well. Young Belgian reserve officers retorted to critiques from World War I veterans that they could get themselves obeyed, that the average Flemish regiment was not worse than the others, that the soldiers were not “spoiled children” and that nobody could have stopped the Germans.1 It is not appropriate to judge a plan or a policy solely on hindsight. Just because a policy did not work out, that plan was not a priori misguided. The evaluation must also consider whether the plan was based on reasonable premises, accorded with reality, and had the interests of the planners at heart. Yes, the Belgian military policies from 1932 to 1940 did not keep Belgium from being occupied, much less kept out of the war. But the goal of keeping the country out of war was an eminently reasonable one and the Belgians framed policies, first tied to France and then ‘independent,’ that had gave them the only chance to do so. In fact, the policy of neutrality kept Belgium out of the Sudeten Crisis and won praise from all sides for doing so. Since May 1940 the

1 R. Janvier cited in Francis Balace, “Psychologie de l’officier Belge face a la defaite, Juin 1940-Automne 1941,” in Actes du Colloque d’Histoire Militaire Belge (1830-1980), 339-361 (Brussels: Musée Royale de l’Armée et d’Histoire Militaire., 1981), p. 346. Conclusion 273

Belgians have been castigated for not allying with the Franco-British and for not allowing Allied troops into Belgium before a German invasion. To do so would have been to commit national suicide, changing a probable German invasion to a definite one. Belgian policymakers from 1932 gave their best ener- gies to formulating a scheme to protect their country. The failure of that policy in the face of an evil that overturned the plans of much stronger nations should not obliterate the efforts of those policymakers and their subordinates who carried them out! 274 Bibliography Bibliography Bibliography

Archives Archives du Ministère Belge des Affaires Étrangères Dossiers 11177, 11185/1, 11185/3, 11451, 11984 Archives of the [Belgian] Royal Palace Capelle Papers Galet-van Overstraten Papers [Belgian] Central Library of Defence Report of the (1936) Commission Mixte Musée Royale de l’Armée et d’Histoire Militaire – Centre de Documentation Historique Belgian Archives from Moscow / “Moskow Records” British Military Attaché P.P.R. 1938 Diverses Service Générale de Renseignements-Securitè-Section/Archive [Belgian Army archive] Campagne 1940 Documents 1940 Non Ventilés Fonds de Lannoy Fonds van Overstraeten

Articles Alexander, Martin S. “Les Réactions à la menace stratégique allemande en Europe occi- dentale: la Grande-Bretagne, la Belgique et le ‘Cas Hollande’ (décembre 1938-février 1939).” Cahiers d’Histoire de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, 7 (avril 1982): pp. 5-38. Balace, Francis. “Du patriotism a la resistance,” In 1940: Belgique: Une Societé en Crise, Un Pays en Guerre, Actes du Colloque Tenu à Bruxelles du 22 au 26 Octobre 1990, edited by Francis Balace, 403-412. Brussels: NCWOII, 1993. ––––––. “Pierre Nothomb et les autres nationalistes belges de 1924 à 1930.” In Pierre Nothomb et le Nationalisme Belge, edited by Roger Petit. Nouvelle Série 8. Arlon: Académie Luxembourgeoise, 1976. ––––––. “Psychologie de l’officier Belge face a la defaite, Juin 1941-Automne 1941.” In Actes du colloque d’Histoire Militaire Belge (1830-1980). Brussels: Musée Royale de l’Armée et d’Histoire Militaire, 1981. Boijen, Richard. “The Army as Melting Pot of the Nation?” Cahiers d’Histoire du Temps Présent 3 (1997): pp. 390-1. Conway, Martin. “Belgium’s Mid-Twentieth Century Crisis: Crisis of a Nation-State?” Revue belge d’histoire contemporaine XXXV (2005, 4): pp. 573-596.

Crombois, Jean-François. “Finance, économie et politique en Belgique à la veille de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, 1939-1940.” Cahiers d’Histoire du Temps Présent 5 (1998): pp. 171-206. Devleeshouwer, Robert. “L’Opinion Publique et les Revendications territoriales Belges a la fin de la Premiere Guerre Mondiale 1918-1919.” In Sur l’histoire et le present: Liber amicorum. EPO: Brussels, 1999. Dumoulin, Michel. “Léopold III: les enjeux d’une controverse.” Cahiers d’Histoire du Temps Présent 10 (Novembre 2002): pp. 199-213. Helmreich, Jonathan E. “An American Perception of Belgian Military Preparedness, 1937-1940.” Belgische tijdschrift voor militaire gesschiedenis/ Revue belge d’histoire militaire, XXV:5 (Maart/Mars 1984): pp. 421-431. Kesteloot, Chantal. “’ Il ne s’agit pas ici d’un best-seller de qualité incertaine’: Quelques échos suscités par la parution de L’An 40.” Cahiers d’Histoire du Temps Présent 15 (Mai 2005): pp. 13-28. Lyet, Col. P. “Les Divisions Légères Mechaniques En Belgique Mai 1940.” Revue Historique de L’Armée, 23:4 (1967). Marnay, Philippe [pen name of Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen]. “La Politique militaire de la belgique en 1939-1940.” Revue générale belge, Mai 1960, pp. 4-60. Simon, Eric “Coup d’oeil sur la campagne de Mai 1940 (Partie II).” Centre Liègeois d’histoire et d’archeologie militaires, Bulletin d’information IX:7 (Juillet-Sept. 2005): pp. 43-65. ––––––. “Neutralité Armée: 1936-1940, LA DEFENSE FACE A LA FRANCE.” Centre Liègeois d’histoire et d’archeologie militaires, Bulletin d’information VII: 2-7 (Avril-Juin 1998-Juillet-Septembre 1999). Smith. M.L. “Britain and Belgium in the Nineteen Thirties.” In 1940: Belgique: Une Societé en Crise, Un Pays en Guerre, Actes du Colloque Tenu à Bruxelles du 22 au 26 Octobre 1990, edited by Francis Balace, 85-111. Brussels: NCWOII, 1993. Tixhon, Axel and Laurence van Yersele. “Du sang et des pierres: Les monuments de la guerre 1914-1918 en Wallonie.” Cahiers d’Histoire du Temps Présent 7 (Mai 2000): pp. 83-126. Vanthemsche, Guy. “Unemployment Insurance in Interwar Belgium.” International Review of Social History (1990-3): pp. 349-376. ––––––. “Quelques Traits Majeurs de la Crise des Années 1930.” Cahiers de Clio 96 (1988): pp. 3-36. ––––––. “Recent Trends in the Social and Economic Historiography of Contemporary Belgium (Nineteenth Century to 1940).” In Historical Research in the Low Countries, edited by N.C.F. Van Sas and E. Witte, 47-57. Den Haag: Nederlands Historisch Genootschap, 1992. Vanwelkenhuyzen, Jean. “La Belgique en Guerre” Historiens et Geographes 328 (Juillet- Août 1990): pp. 157-168. 276 Bibliography

––––––. “La defense des Ardennes en 1939-40.” Revue Internationale d’Histoire Militaire, 29 (1970): pp. 869-891. ––––––. “Neutralité=defense tout azimuts?” Les dis-huit jours, series Jours de Guerre. (Brussels?: Credit Communal, 1990), pp. 23-29. ––––––. “Un intéressant témoinage sur la neutralité belge de 1939-1940.” L’Armée-La Nation 115 (Mai 1, 1956): pp. 4-9. van Ypersele, Laurence. “La représentation de la monarchie en Belgique Durant l’entre- deux-guerres.” Cahiers d’Histoire du Temps Présent 3 (Novembre 1997): pp. 11-25. Wanty, E. “Les relations militaires franco-belges, 1936-Octobre 1939.” Revue d’histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale 31 (Juillet 1958): pp. 12-23.

Books Alexander, Martin S. The Republic in danger: General Maurice Gamelin and the politics of French defence, 1933-1940. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2002. Balace, Francis, ed. 1940: Belgique: Une Societé en Crise, Un Pays en Guerre, Actes du Colloque Tenu à Bruxelles du 22 au 26 Octobre 1990. Brussels: NCWOII, 1993. Belgian American Educational Foundation. The Belgian Campaign and the Surrender of the Belgian Army, May 10-28, 1940. New York: Belgian American Educational Foundation, 1940 Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Belgium: The Official Account of what happened 1939. London: Evans Brothers, 1941. Belgium and Luxembourg, 1st ed. New York: Fodor’s, 2001. Bond, Brian. Britain, France, and Belgium 1939-40, 2nd ed. London: Brassey’s, 1990. ––––––. British Military Policy between the Two World Wars. Oxford: Clarendon, 1980. Centre de Documentation Historique des Forces Armées. Histoire de l’Armée Belge de 1830 à nos Jours, vol. II, de 1920 à nos jours. Brussels: Editions Centre de Documentation Historique des Forces Armées, 1988. Chaix, Bruno. En Mai 1940, Fallait-il Entrer en Belgique: Décisions stratégiques et plans opérationnels de la campagne de France. Paris: Economica, 2000. Champion, Général Major e.r. Lucien. La Guerre du Sanglier des côteaux frontaliers aux rives de la Lys. Braine-l’Alleud, Belgium: J.M. Collet, 1977. Clough, Shepard B. A History of the Flemish Movement in Belgium: A Study in Nationalism. NY: Richard R. Smith, 1930. Conway, Martin. Collaboration in Belgium: Léon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement. New Haven: Yale UP, 1993. Cook, Bernard A. Belgium: A History. Studies in Modern European History, vol. 50. NY: Peter Lang, 2002. Coolsaet, Rik. La Politique Extérieure de la Belgique: Au Coeur de l’Europe le Poids d’une Petite Puissance. Trans. (from the Dutch), Serge Govaert. Brussels: De Boeck Uni versité, 2002. Bibliography 277

Cooper, Matthew. The German Army 1933-1945: Its political and Military Failure. Lanham, MD: Scarborough House, 1990. Crahay, A. and Jo Gérard. Le general Van Overstraeten: “Vice-roi” en 1940. Braine-l’Alleud, Belgium: J.M. Collet, ND. Corum, James S. The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform. Lawrence, KS: UP Kansas, 1992. Crahay, Albert. L’Armée belge entre les deux guerres. Brussels?: Louis Musin, 1978. Craig, Gordon A. Germany 1866-1945. Oxford History of Modern Europe. New York: Oxford UP, 1980. Deak, Istvan. Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848-1918. New York: Oxford UP, 1990. De Fabribeckers. La Campagne de l’Armee Belge en 1940. Brussels: Rossel, ND. De Schaepdrijver, Sophie. La Belgique et la Première Guerre mondiale. 3rd ed. Docu ments pour l’Histoire des Francophonies #4. Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2006. De Visscher, Ch. and F. Van Langenhove eds. Documents Diplomatiques Belges 1920- 1940: La Politique de sécurité extérieure, Tome 3: Période 1931-1936. Brussels: Palais des Académies, 1964. ––––––. Documents Diplomatiques Belges 1920-1940: La Politique de sécurité extérieure, Tome 4: Période 1936-1937. Brussels: Palais des Académies, 1964. De Vos, Luc. La Belgique et la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. Brussels: Racine, 2004. DiMuro, Giovanni F. Léon Degrelle et l’aventure rexiste. Series Voix de l’Histoire. Brussels: Luc Pire, 2005. Doorman, P.L.G. Military Operations in the Netherlands from 10th-17th May 1940, Trans. S.L. Salzedo.Guilford and Esher, UK: George Allen and Unwin for the Netherlands Government Information Bureau, 1944. Dumoulin, Michel, Spaak. 2nd ed. Brussels: Racine, 1999. ––––––, Mark Van den Wijngaert, and Vincent Dujardin. Leopold III. Questions à l’histoire. Brussels?: Editions Complexe, 2001. Dunford, Martin and Phil Lee. Belgium and Luxembourg. Rough Guides. London: Rough Guides, 1997. Encyclopédie du Mouvement wallon. 3 vols. Charleroi: Institut Jules Destrée, 2000. Frieser, Karl-Heinz with John T. Greenwood. The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West. Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005. Funcken, Liliane and Fred Funcken. L’Uniforme et les Armes des Soldats de la Guerre 1914-1918. Tome 1, Infanterie- Blindés-Aviation. Tournai, Belgium: Casterman, 1970. ––––––. Arms and Uniforms: The Second World War. Part 1: France, Germany, Austria, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Belgium, 1933-41. London: Ward Lock, 1975. Galet, Lieutenant-General. Albert King of the Belgians In World War I: His Military Activities And Experiences Set Down With His Approval. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1931; n.p. Kessinger, n.d. 278 Bibliography

General Staff, War Office. Handbook of the Belgian Army 1914. Reprint Edition. London: Imperial War Museum / Nashville, TN: Battery Press, ND, 1995. Gerard, Emmanuel. La Démocratie rêvee, bride et bafouée. Nouvelle Histoire de Belgique. Nivelles, BE: Le Cri, 2010. Gerard-Libois, J. and José Gotovitch. L’An 40: La Belgique occupée. Brussels: Crisp, ND. ––––––. Léopold III de l’an 40 à l’effacement. 2nd ed. Brussels: Politique & Histoire, 1991. Griess, Thomas E., series ed. West Point Atlas for the Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean. The West Point Military History Series. Garden City Park, NY: SquareOne, 2002. Haag, Henri. Le Comte Charles de Broqueville, ministre d’État, et les lutes pour le pouvoir (1910-1940). 2 vols. 6th Series, Louvain: Université de Louvain: Collége Érasme, 1990. Harris, William H. and Judith S. Levey, eds. The New Columbia Encyclopedia. NY: Columbia UP, 1975. Hastings, Max. Inferno: The World at War, 1939-1945. NY: Knopf, 2011. Hautecler, Georges. Rommel and Guderian against the Belgian Chasseurs ardennais: The Combats at Chabrehez and Bodange. Trans. G.F. Nafziger. West Chester, OH: Nafziger Collection, 2003. Helmreich, Jonathan E. Belgium and Europe: A Study in Small Power Diplomacy. Issues in contemporary Politics: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives #3. The Hague: Mouton, 1976. Hogg, Robin L. Structural rigidities and policy inertia in inter-war Belgium. Verhan delingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wettenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van Belgie 48:118. AWLsK: Brussels, 1986. Hojer, Carl-Henrik. Le régime parlementaire Belge de 1918 à 1940. Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells, 1946. Horne, John and Alan Kramer. German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2001. Jackson, Julian. The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003. Jaeger, Vic. Les Insignes de l’Armée Luxembourgeoise et des Luxembourgeois dans les Armées Alliées. NL: Saint Paul, 1995. Johansson, Rune. Small State in Boundary Conflict: Belgium and the Belgian-German Border 1914-1919. Lund Studies in International History 24. Lund, Sweden: Lund UP, 1988. Kaufmann, J.E. and R.M. Jurga, Fortress Europe: European Fortifications of World War II, Conshohocken, PA: Combined, 1999. Keyes, Roger. Outrageous Fortune: The Tragedy of Leopold III of the Belgians, 1901-1941. London: Secker and Warburg, 1984. Kieft, David Owen. Belgium’s Return to Neutrality: An Essay in the Frustrations of Small- Power Diplomacy. Oxford: Clarendon, 1972. Bibliography 279

Kossmann, E.H. The Low Countries, 1780-1940. Oxford History of Modern Europe. Oxford: Clarendon, 1978. Leopold III. Pour l’Histoire: Sur quelques episodes de mon règne. Brussels: Racine, 2001. Lipkes, Jeff. Rehearsals: The German Army in Belgium, August 1914. Leuven: Leuven UP, 2007. Lord, Walter. The Miracle of Dunkirk. London: Allen Lane, 1982. Marks, Sally. Innocent Abroad: Belgium at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981. Marshall, S.L.A. The American Heritage History of World War I. NY: Dell, 1967. Mason, Antony. Xenophobe’s guide to the BELGIANS. Updated ed. London: Oval, 2001. May, Ernest R. Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France. NY: Hill and Wang, 2000. Miller, Jane Kathryn. Belgian Foreign Policy Between Two Wars NY: Bookman, 1951. Mollo, Andrew. The Armed Forces of World War II: Uniforms, insignia and organization. NY: Crown, 1981. Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1986. Parrish, Thomas, ed. The Simon and Schuster Encyclopedia of World War II. NY: Simon and Schuster, 1978. Pawly, R. and P. Lierneux. The Belgian Army in World War I. P. Courcelle, ill. Men at Arms #452. Oxford: Osprey, 2009. Pirenne, H. La Belgique et la Guerre Mondiale. Series “Histoire Économique et Sociale de la Guerre Mondiale. (Serie belge)” Paris: France UP, ND. Polasky, Janet. The Democratic Socialism of Émile Vandervelde: Between Reform and Revolution. Oxford: Berg, 1995. Popkin, Jeremy D. A History of Modern France. 2nd edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001. Renouvin, Pierre, Jacques Willequet, et al. Les Relations Militaires Franco-Belges de mars 1936 au 10 mai 1940, Travaux d’un colloque d’historiens belges et français. Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1968. Spaak, Paul-Henri. The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European 1936-1966. Ray Steding, et al. trans. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971. Stengers, Jean. Léopold III et le gouvernement: Les deux politiques belges de 1940. Aux origines de la question royale. Paris-Gembloux: Duculot, 1980. Strikwerda, Carl. A House Divided: Catholics, Socialists, and Flemish Nationalists in Nineteenth Century Belgium. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997. Thielemans, Marie-Rose. Albert 1er: Carnets et Correspondance de Guerre. Paris: Duclot, 1991. Thomas, Nigel. Foreign Volunteers of the Allied Forces 1939-1945. Simon McCouaig, ill. Osprey Men-at-Arms 238. London:Osprey, 1991. Tuchman, Barbara W. The Guns of August. NY: Ballantine, 1994. 280 Bibliography van Overstraeten, Général. Albèrt I-Leopold III: Vingt Ans de Politique Militaire Belge 1930-1940. Brussels?: Desclée de Brouwer, ND. ––––––. Au Service de la Belgique: Dans L’Étau. Paris: Plon, 1960 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Jean. Le gâchis des années 30, 1933-1937. 2 vols. Brussels: Racine, 2007-2009. ––––––. 1936: Leopold, Degrelle, van Zeeland et les autres … . Brussels: Racine, 2004. ––––––. Neutralité Armée: La Politique militaire de la Belgique pendant la “Drôle de Guerre,” Coll. “Notre Passé.” Brussels: La Renaissance Du Livre, 1979. Van Zuylen, Baron Pierre. Les Mains Libres: Politique Extérieure de la Belgique 1914-1940. Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer, 1950 Vliegen, René. Fort Eben-Emael. Fifth improved English ed. NL: Wagelmans-Vise, ND. Wanty, Général Émile. Le Milieu Militaire Belge de 1914 a nos Jours. 2 Tomes. Bruxelles: Musée Royal de l’Armée et d’Histoire Militaire, 1999. Weinberg, Gerhard L. The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany. 2 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, 1980. ––––––. Hitler’s Foreign Policy, 1933-1939: The Road to World War II. One volume edition. NY: Enigma, 2005. Witte, Els, Jan Craebeckx and Alain Meynen. Political History of Belgium from 1830 Onwards. Brussels: VUB UP, 2000. Witte, Els, Jan Craebeckx, Alain Meynen and Harry Van Velthoven. Language and Politics: The Situation in Belgium in an Historical Perspective. Balans #12. Brussels: VUB UP, 1999. Wright, Gordon. France in Modern Times from the Enlightenment to the Present. 5th ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 1995. Wullus-Rudiger, J. En Marge de la Politique Belge 1914-1956. Brussels: Berger-Levrault, 1957. ––––––. Les Origines Internationales du Drame Belge de 1940. Brussels: Vanderlinden, 1950. Zuckerman, Larry. The Rape of Belgium, the Untold Story of World War I. NY: NYU UP, 2004.

E-mails Didier Amaury, Librarian, Diplomatic Archives, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Luc de Vos, Professor, (Belgian) École Royale Militaire

Websites http://www.google.com search: “Sir Lancelot Oliphant” http://www.mil.be/armycomp/units.html http://www.naxos.com/NewDesign/fintro.files/bintro.files/operas/Muette_de_Portici _La Bibliography 281 http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/europe/lgcolor/becolor.htm http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leaguecov.htm http://www.mil.be/def/news/index.asp?LAN=fr&ID=640 http://www.mil.be/def/index.asp?LAN=fr

Unpublished Works Dumortier, Guy. “Doctrine et Plans Defensifs Pour une Politique d’independence et de Neutralité Armée.” Thesis, Ecole de Guerre, 1974. Epstein, Jonathan. “Between France and Germany: The Formation of Belgian Defense Policy, 1932-1940.” PhD diss., City University of New York – Graduate Center. Servais, A. “L’evolution de la politique militaire belge de 1920 a 1936.” 2de License, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1974. Vaesen, Joost. “Preparing for the invasion: between passéisme and modernization? Belgian military policy and the issue of neutrality, 1926-1940.” Presented to Small Powers in the Age of Total War: 1900-1940. Breda, NL, 2008. Vangansbeke, Commandant Luc. “Resist and Bite! The Story of the Belgian Ardennes Rifles.” Unpublished paper courtesy of the Museum of the Chasseurs ardennais. 282 Index Index Index

Aéronautique militaire 199-200 Cavalry Corps 57, 70, 91, 93-102, 119-120, Abwehr 166 133, 138, 149, 162, 174, 183, 187, 191, 193, 203, Action Nationale 37 208, 220-221, 225-226, 236, 240, 242-244, Activists 26, 28, 30, 35 247, 260, 269 Albert Canal 5, 58, 83, 92, 117, 139, 150, 184, coverage and service time 103-110 193-197, 208, 211, 215-217, 219, 226, 240, deployment controversies 19-22 242-243, 252, 259, 265, 267, 270-271 and Depression 67-69 Albert I, King of the Belgians 1, 8, 20-24, 28- divisions 22-24, 55-58, 60, 63, 66, 78-79, 82- 29, 33, 38, 52-54, 62, 71, 75, 80-83, 141-142, 83, 85, 90-92, 94, 96, 99-100, 102-103, 106, 172, 180, 208, 213, 229, 256-257, 265 108, 117, 129-130, 132, 134, 138-142, 144, 146, Allied First Army Group 1, 241, 244-245 149, 151, 156, 158, 160-161, 163-164, 174, 187, Allied (Great) Powers 12, 35, 36, 41, 109, 190-191, 193-194, 202-203, 205, 208, 217, 112-114 220-222, 226-227, 229-230, 236, 239-241, Allies 1-2, 5, 10, 24-25, 33, 35-36, 60, 70, 84, 243, 246-248, 251-253, 256, 258-260, 269- 87, 96, 110, 112, 116, 135-136, 141, 150, 165, 270 180-182, 185, 188-190, 192, 194, 196, 198, 201, 1st Cavalry Division 100, 236 208, 210, 213-217, 220, 225, 228-230, 232- 2nd Cavalry Division 100, 236 233, 235, 238-239, 242-249, 252, 254-255, 2nd Infantry Division 66,158, 202 259, 262-263, 265, 267, 271-272 3rd Infantry Division 161, 205 Anschluss 190 4th Infantry Division 161, 226, 229, 243, anti-Semitism 166 252 Antwerp (see also PFA) 3, 15-16, 19-23, 25, 30, 5th Infantry Dvision 160, 222 32, 35, 38, 58-60, 64, 66, 75-76, 80, 90-92, 6th Infantry Division 187, 202, 226 100, 104, 106, 117, 124, 133, 135, 138-141, 7th Infantry Division 139, 151, 158, 240, 143-145, 148, 150-151, 154, 164, 187, 193-196, 243, 259 203, 211, 217, 219, 231, 245, 248, 257, 264- 8th Infantry Division 139, 151, 158, 161 265, 270 9th Infantry Division 139, 151, 158 Austria-Hungary 39 10th Infantry Division 139, 151, 158, 217, 221, 226, 248 Baldwin, Stanley 48 11th Infantry Division 139, 151, 158, 161, Battle of the Marne 21, 246 221, 226 Ballet, Henricus 157 12th Infantry Division 139, 151, 158, 222, Balthazar, X 125 256 Battle of Flanders 236 13th Infantry Division 226 Belgian Army 14th Infantry Division 161 Army Corps 13, 56, 102, 156, 159-161, 191, 15th Infantry Division 161 207, 217, 221, 225 18th Infantry Division 226 I Army Corps 208, 220, 226, 243 equipment of 63-67, 70-121 II Army Corps 220, 226, 243, 256 fortifications of 2, 20, 22, 43, 46-47, 58, 60, III Army Corps 76, 78, 161, 174, 208, 226, 63-64, 72, 77, 79-81, 89, 92, 119-120, 124, 234, 243 128, 138, 142-144, 148, 174, 190, 194-198, 201, IV Army Corps 226 209, 211, 266, 269 V Army Corps 226, 231 languages of 56, 63-68, 152-162 VI Army Corps 233 mobilization of 220-226 budget problems 79-82 modernization of 62-64

Belgian Army (cont.) Beyens, Baron Napoleon Eugène 39 national redoubt 19, 22, 58-59, 187, 195, 219 Bilotte, Gen. Gaston 244, 249 reduction in size 55-57 Blake, Lt. Col. Francis 221, 231 staff talks with France 89-93 Blum, Léon 171 regiments 18, 29, 56-57, 62-63, 65-66, 77-79, Borms, Dr. August 30, 37 85, 95-96, 99-102, 119, 126, 128-129, 139-140, Bourg-Léopold 19 145-146, 148, 151, 156, 158, 160-161, 163, 190, Bovesse, François 75, 87, 170 199, 202, 205, 212, 220, 224, 226-227, 233, Brigade Aéronautique 199 236-237, 239, 251, 258, 269, 272 British Expeditionary Force (BEF) 237, 242, 1st Chasseurs à Cheval 100 246 2nd Chasseurs à Cheval 100, 119 Brown, Lt. Col. Robert D. 191 Fortress Regiment of Liège 220 Brussels 16-18, 22, 25-27, 29, 70-71, 90, 100, Fortress Regiment of Namur 220 104, 106, 108, 115, 117, 134, 136, 139, 141, 145, 1st Guides 100 149, 154, 168-169, 186-187, 191, 202, 211-212, 1st Lancers 100, 119 215-218, 220-221, 232, 234, 242, 245-246, 2nd Lancers 100 248, 260 3rd Lancers 100 Buisseret, MAJ Léon 234 1st Line Infantry Regiment 119 2nd Line Infantry Regiment 251 Cadogan, Sir Alexander 215 6th Line Infantry Regiment 66 Capelle, Robert 41, 173, 209, 215, 255 10th Line Infantry Regiment 77-78 Cartier de Marchienne, Baron Émile de 41, 12th Line Infantry Regiment 205 117 15th Line Infantry Regiment 237 Carton de Wiart, Henri de 29, 182 17th Line Infantry Regiment 226 Catholic Party 13, 29-30, 34, 37, 60, 67, 82, 92, 18th Line Infantry Regiment 233 148-149, 151, 166-169, 171-172, 178, 184, 220, 23rd Line Infantry Regiment 237, 251 224-225 54th Line Infantry Regiment 258 Catholics 15-16, 60, 92, 107-109, 165, 167-169, Regiments of Army Artillery 220 171-172, 175, 178, 183-184, 220, 262 Regiment of Grenadiers 212 Central Powers 12 troops 36, 45, 56, 58, 62-63, 72, 77, 81-83, Chamberlain, Neville 118, 202, 229 85, 87, 92, 100, 103-104, 107, 117, 119, 123, Champon, GEN 256 127, 129-130, 132-134, 136, 138-139, 141, Charles, Sir Noël 173, 211 144-146, 148-150, 153, 155-156, 161, 173-174, Chasseurs ardennais 10, 61, 64, 70, 77-79, 183-184, 193, 198, 201-203, 205-207, 214, 85, 91-92, 98, 101-102, 117, 119-120, 124, 136, 216-217, 219, 220-224, 226, 228, 236, 240, 139-140, 144, 149, 174, 191, 193, 195, 202, 208, 243-244, 248, 252, 255-256, 258. 260, 263, 216, 220-221, 225, 227, 229, 232, 236, 241, 265, 267, 270, 273 243, 246-247, 251, 261-263, 269 units 18, 29, 62-66, 70, 75, 77-79, 84-85, 88, Christian Democrats 67, 104, 107, 118, 149, 92-100, 104-106, 119-120, 123, 126, 129, 132- 167, 172 134, 136, 139-140, 144-145, 147-148, 150-151, Churchill, Winston 1, 28, 228, 238, 256, 258 154-157, 159-164, 174, 188, 190-191, 193, 195, Clive, Sir Robert 212, 215 202-203, 205-206, 208-209, 220-221, 223- Comité de Politique Nationale 36-37 226, 229-230, 236-237, 239, 247, 251-252, Commission on National Defense 157 257-258, 260-262, 267, 270, 272 Committee of National Security 105, 150 war preparations 190-209 Communism/Communists 68, 108, 148, 166, in World War I 22-25 169, 171, 177-178, 181, 184, 269 See also Chasseurs ardennais; Devèze; conservatives 18, 107-108, 115, 167, 169, 175 Mixed Commission (1936); Nuyten Council of Flanders 26-29 Belgique Militaire 98 Crahay, Albert 8-9, 62, 85, 89, 100, 197-198, BeNeLux nations 131 230 284 Index

Cumont, LTG Adolphe 70, 89-91, 93-95, 97- Dumortier, CPT Guy 191 99, 103, 120, 146 Dunkirk 5, 14, 24, 251, 254, 256, 260 Curzon, Lord George 49 Miracle of, 254 Dutch 14, 31-36, 49, 92, 100, 117, 145, 149, 202, Davis, Wing Commander E.P.M. 192, 200 208, 210, 212, 216-217, 219-220, 227, 232, de Broqueville, Charles Comte 5, 13, 18-23, 234-235, 237, 240, 244-245, 265, 267 29, 51, 57, 59, 61, 65-66, 68, 79-81, 85-88, Dutch Brabant 144 125, 174, 256-257 Dutch Limburg 31, 33-34, 37-38, 49, 79, 82, De Brouckère, Louis 180 90, 94, 124, 130-131, 144-145, 194-195, 265 de Ceuninck, Armand 19, 29, 264 Dutch Zeeland 33, 38 De Clercq, Staf 165-166, 237 Duvivier, MG Émile 103, 129-130 de Decker, Pierre 15-16 Dyle Line 5 Défense aérienne du Territoire 102, 129, 220- Dyle River 3, 187, 194, 232, 267 221 Deffontaine, MG Georges 116 Eden, Anthony 49, 112, 114, 118 de Gaiffier, Herstroy, Baron Edmond education Ferdinand Félix 32-33, 46-47, 115 of the Flemish 14-18, 28, 64, 66, 155-156 de Gaulle, Charles 238 of the Walloons 4, 18, 167 Degrelle, Léon 166-169, 178, 188 Entente Powers 12 De Grox, LTG Charles 130-133, 151, 163, 174 de Kerchove, Count André 42-43, 109, 111- fascists 165, 168, 171, 183 112, 115 Flamingants 16-17, 26-27, 82, 108. See also de Lannoy, COL E.R.A. 94, 96 nationalists Delvoie, COL Maurice 215-217 Flanders 14-19, 23-24, 26-28, 35, 47, 61, 70, 89, de Man, Henri 41, 93, 105, 175, 253 108, 110, 152-154, 165-166, 169, 175, 178, 188, Denis, LTG Henri 101, 148, 158, 160, 172, 174, 203, 236, 244, 252, 254, 259, 261-262, 268 183-184, 188, 199-200, 202, 206-207, 209, Flandin, Pierre 112-113 217, 219, 222, 225, 230, 246-247, 249, 252, Flemings/Flemish 2-3, 11-18, 26-31, 34, 37- 269 38, 45-46, 61, 64-67, 93, 104, 107-109, 118, Depression 51, 67, 69, 85, 93-94, 160, 167-168, 120, 123, 128, 149-150, 152-167, 170-172, 171, 268 177-178, 180, 184, 186-187, 204-205, 235, de Raet, Lodewijk 17 237, 240, 247-248, 251-252, 256, 262, Dérnière Heure, L’ 98 268. See also Catholics; Flamingants; Derousseaux, MG Oliver 256 Flemish Question; language (French); de Ryckel, Baron Hubert 19-21, 264 nationalists; Socialists de Schryver, Auguste 105, 150 Flemish Front Party/Frontists 12, 28, 30, 38, de Selliers de Moranville, LTG Antonin 20- 165-166, 237 22 Flemish Question 13, 17, 26-27, 29, 125, 153 Devèze, Albert 19, 52, 54-57, 59-61, 64, 70- Foch, Marshal Ferdinand 4 73, 75-89, 91-94, 96, 101, 103-108, 111, 113, Fortifications Commission 79, 124 117-124, 126, 127, 129-130, 134, 139-140, 144, France 1-8, 10, 13-14, 18, 20, 22-24, 26-27, 31- 146-149, 153-155, 163, 165, 170, 172-175, 188, 42, 44, 45-50, 53, 55-56, 58-60, 68, 70-71, 265, 268-269 73-74, 75-77, 80-82, 84-85, 87-94, 96, 98, Diepenrykx, COL Pierre 196, 218 101, 104, 106-120, 130, 134, 136-137, 142-143, diplomacy 146-147, 149-151, 160, 165-166, 169-171, 173, Belgian 39, 44, 120, 210-217 175-182, 185-189, 193-194, 196-203, 205, 210- French 39, 44, 49, 112, 186, 265-266 220, 222, 225-230, 232-233, 236-244, 246- DTCA (État Major de defense terrestre contre 250, 254, 256-260, 263-268, 270-272 objectifs aériens) 102, 220 Franck, Louis 57 Index 285

Franco-Belgian Agreement 45, 48, 85, 107, Groupement K 208, 227, 233-234, 243 109, 118, 120, 147, 169, 180, 266 Guderian, COL Heinz 131 Franco-Prussian War 48, 53, 77 Gutt, Camille 220-221, 224, 254-255 Franco-Soviet Pact 107-108, 171 francs tireurs 25 Hanoteau, LTG E. 21 Fransquillons 15 Hautcoeur, COL Auguste 219 Fraser, MAJ William 89 Hayoit de Termicourt Raoul 253-254 Frédericq, Louis 254-255 Hellebaut, Albert 53, 58-60, 63, 132-134, 140, Freemasonry 168 163-164 French Second Empire 16 Heinlein, Konrad 201 Frontier Cyclists (see Unités cyclistes Helleputte, Georges 29 frontières) Hennebicq, Léon 18-19 fusils-mitrailleurs 95-96 Hennin de Boussu Walcourt, MG 165 Herve Plateau 64, 77, 80-81, 86, 91-92, 113, Galet, LTG Émile 8, 20-23, 41, 51-52, 54, 59- 117, 120, 124, 144, 174 64, 69, 72-74, 76, 92, 132, 137-142, 144-147, Hiernaux, General-Aviator P.G.L.J. 199 163, 174, 206 Hitler, Adolf 42, 99, 105, 109-114, 132, 166, 171, Gamelin, Generalissimo Maurice 1, 4, 7, 46, 181, 185, 190, 200-201, 204, 228-229, 232, 90, 113, 116, 215-216, 219, 229, 232, 244, 247 234, 251, 256, 258, 266 Garde aérienne du Territoure (GAT) 199 Hubin, Georges 122, 125, 134-136, 149, 181, 183 Gazette, La 173 Hullebroeck, Capt. X 101 Gazette de Charleroi, La 173 Huysmans, Camille 184 George VI, King of Great Britain 252 Hymans, Paul 32-34, 36-37, 41-43, 46-48, Germany 1-7, 12-13, 18-28, 30-36, 38-40, 180, 202 42-49, 51, 55-60, 62, 64, 66, 68-70, 72-73, 75-78, 81-85, 89-92, 94-96, 98-100, 102- L’Indépendence Belge 86, 104, 173 103, 105-106, 108-121, 124, 130-131, 133-139, Ingenbleek, Jules 21, 23 141-145, 147, 149, 151, 154, 163, 165-166, 170, internationalism 67, 168 173-174, 176, 178-182, 185-191, 193-203, 205, 208-220, 223, 225-230, 232-249, 251-273 Jacqmain, LTG 148 Ghent 14-15, 24, 26, 58-59, 79-80, 92, 101-102, James, Sir W. 116 124, 130, 144-145, 148, 151, 187, 196, 198, 222, Janson, Paul-Émile 149, 170 226, 233, 248, 251, 264 Jaspar, Henri 40 Ghent-Terneuzen Canal 22, 33, 247 Jennissen, Émile 18, 157, 170, 182 Gilliaux, GEN 199 Judaism 168 Goethals, COL Georges 226-227, 233-234 Jungbluth, LTG Harry 20-21 Gort, Viscount John 237, 242-243, 249, 256 Great Britain 4-5, 7, 24, 31-33, 35, 39-44, 47- Katholieke Vlaamse Volkspartij 178 50, 56, 60, 77, 85, 89, 93-94, 98, 100, 109- Kellogg-Briand Pact 42 110, 112-118, 122, 125, 130, 149, 152, 158, 165, Kestens, Lt. Gen. Prosper 57, 60, 266 170, 173, 176, 179-181, 185, 187-188, 192-193, Keyes, Sir Roger 33, 44, 229, 244, 256 196-197, 199-201, 210-216, 218, 221, 229, 231, Kossmann, E. H. 30 236-237, 242-244, 246-248, 252-256, 258- Keyaerts, MG Maurice 94 261, 265-266, 273 Köpke, Gerhard 111 Greater Dietsland 166 K-W Line 190, 196-198, 208, 211, 215, 217, 219, Grey, Sir Edward 39 227, 242-244, 246, 248, 262, 267-268, Groupe d’Artillerie des Chasseur 271-272 ardennais 78 286 Index languages Maginot Line 1, 4, 47, 92, 135, 146, 228 Dutch 3, 13-17, 29-30, 64-66, 119, 154-156, Maglinse, LTG Henri 57-58, 146, 149, 266 158, 160, 231, 265 Manstein Plan (see also Sickle Cut) 210 Flemish 14-18, 26-27, 29, 37-38, 56, 64-66, Marck, Hendrik 106, 128, 147, 149, 153-156, 124-125, 128, 152-162, 167, 177, 268 177 French 3, 13-15, 18-19, 26-29, 56, 64-66, 93, Martel, Joseph E.G. 157 108, 124, 153-154, 156-161, 187 Le Matin 187 See also Belgian Army: languages of Marxism 37, 158 Latour, Gen. Serot A. 71 McLeod, Julius 17 Laurent, COL Edmond 211, 214, 216 ‘Mechelen Incident’ 210, 216, 226, 228-230, League of Nations 39-42, 45-46, 56-57, 69, 235, 271 112-115, 165, 176, 188, 266-267 Metropole 99, 204 Covenant of 40-41, 45, 50, 179-180, 202, 267 Meuse River 3, 19-22, 25, 33-35, 38, 49, 58-60, Légion Nationale 37 72, 75-76, 78, 84, 87, 89-92, 117, 119, 124, Leman, LTG Gérard 21-22 134-137, 173-174, 193, 195, 198, 208, 211, 214, Leopold I, King of the Belgians 53 216, 228-229, 240, 244, 265 Leopold II, King of the Belgians 53 Michiels, LTG Oscar 83-84, 222-223, 231, 249, Leopold III, King of the Belgians 1-2, 7, 9, 21, 251, 254-256 33, 38, 40, 44, 52-54, 68, 70, 72, 82, 84-89, military intelligence (Belgian) 181, 234-235 96, 105-106, 118-119, 122, 161, 163-165, 170, Mixed Commission (1927-1928) 51, 58-59, 62, 172-173, 178, 180, 185-188, 196, 202, 207-208, 69, 76, 127, 137, 266, 268-269 213, 218, 224-225, 228-230, 232, 235-236, Mixed Commission (1936) 100, 107, 120, 122- 244, 246-250, 252-263, 267, 270-271 155, 163-164, 170-171, 173, 175, 177, 185-186, Lesse River 91-92 206, 268, 270 Liberals/Liberalism 15-16, 30, 36, 57, 60-61, Mundeleer, Léon 142 70, 82, 85, 87, 92, 107, 120, 148-149, 157, 165, Mussolini, Benito 165, 168 169-175, 184, 187, 220, 225, 261-262, 268 La Libre Belgique 171, 201 Namur (see also PFN) 3, 20, 22, 58, 60, 75- Liège (see also PFL) 3, 17, 19-22, 25, 31, 34-35, 78, 84, 87, 92, 117, 124, 138, 145, 150, 164, 58, 60, 63-64, 75, 77, 79, 81, 87, 91-92, 95, 193-195, 197-198, 203, 205, 208, 211, 216-217, 104, 106, 117-120, 124, 130-131, 136, 138-139, 220, 222, 228, 233, 243-244, 270 145, 150, 164, 174, 187, 193-195, 198, 203, Napoleonic Wars 14 205, 208-209, 211, 220-221, 228, 232, 243, La Nation Belge 81, 98, 204 265, 270 National Royal Movement 261 Locarno Pact 33, 39-41, 46, 50, 57, 70, 99, nationalism 36-38, 45, 178, 252 109-116, 118, 138, 149, 176, 179-182, 184-185, nationalists 18, 27, 34-35, 37-38, 46, 108-109, 266-267 165, 171-172, 184, 186 London Accords 179 Nazism 166-167 Louvain 25, 152, 167, 193-194, 208, 216, 226, Nehring, COL Walther 131 233, 244, 246 Netherlands (Holland) 6, 13-14, 23, 32-36, Low Countries 266, 271 49, 53, 58, 82, 90, 117, 133, 135, 144, 147, 178, Luftwaffe 99, 215, 228, 238-239, 243 217-220, 242, 246, 260-261, 265, 267-268, Luxembourg (grand duchy) 13-14, 20-21, 31, 271 34-38, 45-46, 61, 174, 212, 214, 226-227, 233- Neuray, Fernand 81 234, 237, 240-241, 260 Nothomb, Pierre 35-37, 59 Lys River 24, 60, 251 Nuyten, LTG Prudent Armand 19, 54, 70, 72-74, 76, 78-81, 84-89, 91, 120, 132, 139, Maastricht 14, 195, 205, 240, 243 142-145, 163, 173, 269 Index 287

L’Ordre 96 Sambre et Meuse 87 Oslo Group 179 Scheldt River 3, 22, 24, 32-33, 35, 37-38, 46, Ostende 205 60, 74, 80-81, 87, 91, 117, 124, 137, 194-195, Ovey, Sir Esmond 211 245-248, 265 Schlieffen Plan, 99 Paris, LTC D.K. 100, 122, 125, 148, 152, 173, 187, Schmit, LTG 99, 111 205, 207, 211 Secret Army (Belgian Legion) 261 Parish, L. 221 Senne River 187 Parti Ouvrière Belge (see also Socialists) 183 Sickle Cut 210 Passivists 26, 30 Siebert, COL 131 Pétain, Marshal Philippe 4, 84-85, 186, 257, Simon, Eric 58, 198 265 Simon, Sir John 41, 48 Peteau, LTG Albert 98 Socialists (POB) 2, 18, 29, 32, 34-35, 45-46, PFA (Position Fortifiées d’Anvers) 143, 150, 54, 56, 59, 67, 82, 92-93, 104-105, 107-109, 194-195, 226 118, 123, 125, 148-151, 157, 164-165, 169-172, PFL (Position Fortifiées de Liège) 117, 119, 175, 177, 180, 183-184, 186, 218, 220, 225, 268 193-195, 243 Spaak, Paul-Henri 36, 92, 175-177, 179-182, PFN (Position Fortifiées de Namur) 193, 195, 185, 201, 202, 209, 211, 220, 224, 230, 252, 197-198, 233, 243 255-257 Pied de Paix Renforcé (P.P.R.) 20, 193, 200- Spahis 90, 92 207 De Standaard 107, 204 Pierlot, Hubert 45, 168, 209, 220, 230, 244, Stembert-les-Verviers, 73 246, 250, 252-253, 257-258, 262 Struye, Paul 201 Poullet government 57 Sudeten Crisis 190, 193, 200-201, 208-209, Piraux, MG 66 226, 270-272 Pire, LTG Jules Joseph 101 Swaegers, Gen. 71-72 Popular Front 115, 171, 175 Tasnier, Lt. Gen. X 134-137 Raam-Peel position 219 TDLN (Troupes de Défense du Luxembourg et Reichswehr 131, 138 Namur) 77, 117, 220-221, 225 Requette, LTC 98, 220 Termonia, Gen. Louis 79 Rex/Rexist Party 166-169, 171-172, 177-178, 181, Tilkens, Auguste 253 184, 188, 223, 269 Reynaud, Paul 257-258 Ultramontanists 16 Reynders, MG I.H. 218 Unités cyclistes frontières 70, 77, 79, 82, 85, Rhenish Pact (see also Locarno Pact) 99, 111 92, 95-97, 119-120, 139-140, 144, 174, 195, Rhineland 4, 32-34, 36, 40, 44-46, 49, 58, 60, 202-203, 220, 236 70, 76, 85, 109-116, 118-119, 121, 138, 173-174, University of Ghent 15, 17, 30-31, 56, 220 176, 178, 264-266 University of Louvain 167 Richard, Raoul 255 Riedinger, GEN Émile 87, 104, 110, 173, 182 Van Daele, COL 135 Rogier, Charles 16 Van de Bergh 206 Rolin, Henri 149 Van den Bergen, LTG Edouard 70, 75, 88-89, Rombouts, Dr. J. 204 91, 103-104, 113, 116-120, 126, 128-130, 134, Rommel, GEN Erwin 131, 241 142, 149, 154, 181, 211-212, 221-222, 230-231 Ruhr Valley 13, 32-35, 38, 49, 56-57, 71, 131, Van den Heuvel, Jules 36 266 Vandermeulenbroucke, Hippolyte 149 Vanderpoorten, Arthur 252 288 Index

Vandervelde, Émile, 29, 32, 36, 105-108, 170-172, Vlaamsche Outstrijders 108 175, 183, 202 von Arnim, COL Jürgen 131 van Emelin, LTG Jean 89 von Below Selaske, Klaus 20 Van Eynconck, Edward 183 von Ludendorff, Gen. Erich 131 Van Glabekke, Adolphe 175 von Reichenau, Generaloberst Walter 256 Van Hoek, A. 149-153-154, 156, 159 von Ribentrop, Joachim 201 Van Langenhove, Fernand, 44, 109, 175-176 von Seeckt, Generaloberst Hans 131 van Overbergh 125 van Overstraeten, MG Raoul 9, 51-52, 55, Wallonia 16, 19, 26, 28, 37, 59-60, 64, 70, 78, 58-60, 68, 81-85, 87-88, 91, 94-96, 98, 104, 87-88, 109, 152-154, 165-166, 174-175, 180, 106, 113, 118, 147, 151, 160, 163, 173-174, 185, 209, 264, 268 193, 196, 198-199, 208-209, 214-217, 219, Walloon Assembly 18-19 222-224, 230-231, 234-235, 248-249, 253, Walloons 2-3, 11-13, 16, 18, 27-28, 38, 54, 61, 255-256 64-65, 120, 128, 149-150, 152-153, 157, 160, van Roey, Cardinal Jozef-Ernest 169 177, 201, 205, 247, 264, 268 Van Severen, Joris 166, 237 Wanty, GEN Émile 7-8, 62-63, 72, 76, 84, 88- van Strydonck de Burkel, Lt. Gen. Victor 94, 89, 98, 101, 113 96, 260 Wavre 117, 190, 193-194, 196-198, 216-217, 233 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Jean 5, 7-8, 72, 82, 89, 91, Wehrmacht 1, 118, 138, 174, 178, 224, 233-234, 93, 149-150, 171-172, 230, 232-233 238, 264, 271 van Zeeland, Paul 49, 92-93, 104-107, 109-112, Werner, MG Victor 54-55 114-115, 118, 120, 165, 169, 171-172, 175, 177, Weygand, Generalissimo Maxime 46, 84, 181, 183-184, 188, 214, 266, 269 115, 247, 249 van Zuylen, Baron Pierre 110, 115, 175-176, 185, White Brigade 261-262 213-214, 228, 242 Wibier, LTG 258 Verdinaso 166 Wilhemina, Queen 218, 246, 255 Verhavert, LTG Henri 79-80, 87 Wielemans, COL 21-22 Vermeylen, August 17 Wodon, Louis 44, 72 Versailles Peace Conference 44 Wullus-Rudiger, J. 7, 44 Versailles Treaty 6, 32-33, 49, 56, 62, 99, 110, 115, 266-267 “Young Flanders” 26 Vlaams National Verbond (VNV) 108, 166, 168-169, 178, 181, 184, 223, 269