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SEPTEMBER, 2014. I A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF POST-GADDAFI LIBYA BY: OZOR, CHIGBOGU JUDE PG/M.Sc./13/64874 DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA SEPTEMBER, 2014. i TITLE PAGE A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF POST-GADDAFI LIBYA BY: OZOR, CHIGBOGU JUDE PG/M.Sc./13/64874 A PROJECT REPORT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc.) IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS) DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR OBASI-IGWE SEPTEMBER, 2014 ii APPROVAL PAGE This project report has examined and approved by the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka for the award of Master of science (M.Sc) inPolitical Science (International Relations). By ………………………. ……………………………. PROFESSOR OBASI-IGWE PROFESSOR JONAH ONUOHA SUPERVISOR HEAD OF DEPARTMENT ………………………. …….………………... EXTERNAL EXAMINER PROFESSOR A.I. MADU DEAN OF FACULTY Date: ………………… Date: ………………….. iii DEDICATION This research work is dedicated to Almighty God, for without Him I can do nothing. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I wish to recognise the presence of He that always be the Almighty God, and my sincere gratitude goes to my supervisor Prof. Obasi Igwe for his inestimable support and encouragement throughout this project exercise. I say a very big thank you Prof. I also express my profound gratitude to the Head of Department of Political Science, Prof. Jonah Onuoha. I must extent my honest appreciation to the academic staff of the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka in the persons of prof. Aloysius M. Okolie, prof. Ken Ifesinachi, Prof. Ezeani, Dr. Ezirim, Dr. Abada and other lecturers in the Department of Political Science. My special gratitude goes to my dear friends in persons of Dr. Chilaka Francis, Dr. Gerry Ezirim, Ugwu Simeone Ifeanyi, Obani Eberechukwu, Nnaegbo Obiorah for their encouragement during this work. Finally, I also acknowledge my academic colleagues who have rendered their services where the need be in the course of making this work a successful one. Ozor, Chigbogu Jude. Department of Political Science University of Nigeria, Nsukka v TABLE OF CONTENTS Title Page - - - - - - - - - - i Approval page - - - - - - - - - - ii Dedication - - - - - - - - - - iii Acknowledgement - - - - - - - - - iv Table of contents - - - - - - - - - v Abstract - - - - - - - - - - vi CHAPTER ONE: Introduction Background to the Study - - - - - - - 1 Statement of the Problem - - - - - - - 19 Objective of the Study - - - - - - - 34 Significance of the Study - - - - - - - 35 CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review - - - - - 36 Empirical Review - - - - - - - 36 Theoretical Review - - - - - - - - 45 Gaps in Literature - - - - - - - - 60 CHAPTER THREE: Methodology - - - - - - 62 Theoretical Framework - - - - - - - 62 Hypotheses - - - - - - - - - 65 Research Design - - - - - - - 65 Methods of Data Collection - - - - - - - 67 Methods of Data Analysis - - - - - - - 68 Logical Data Framework - - - - - - - 69 CHAPTER FOUR: Domestic and External Actors in the Overthrow of Gaddafi Domestic Actors in the Overthrow of Gaddafi - - - - 71 Tribes and Politics during and after Gaddafi’s rule - - - - 78 External Actors in the overthrow of Gaddafi - - - - - 83 UN Intervention and the overthrow of Gaddafi - - - - 83 The Arab League and the Overthrow of Gaddafi - - - - 87 African Union and the Libyan Conflict - - - - - 89 The NATO and coalition campaign in Libya - - - - - 104 European Union’s Military Intervention in Libya - - - - 106 vi CHAPTER FIVE: Political, Diplomatic and Other Consequences of the Downfall of Gaddafi Political consequences of the downfall of Gaddafi - - - - 123 Diplomatic consequences of the downfall of Gaddafi - - - 133 Economic consequences of the downfall of Gaddafi - - - - 160 Social context and Human development - - - - - 166 CHAPTER SIX: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations - - 176 Summary - - - - - - - - - 179 Conclusion - - - - - - - - - 179 Recommendations - - - - - - - - 180 Bibliography - - - - - - - - - 184 vii ABSTRACT The studyassessed critically the politics and diplomacy of post-Gaddafi Libya. It interrogated the domestic and external actors in the overthrow of Gaddafi as well as the political, diplomatic and other consequences of the downfall of Gaddafi. Overtime, researchers have contributed on the aforementioned topic with fundamental interest on the root causes of the crisis. Most of them anchored their explanation on Centre-Periphery and dependency analysis from the Marxian Political Economy approach. They pay less attention in interrogating the issue in terms of the aftermath or implications the crisis will have on the politics and diplomacy of Libya. This study shall employ theoretical foundation of complex interdependence theory. We relied on secondary data source to investigate our analysis. The study noted that the regime change in Libya has both positive and negative impact on the politics and diplomacy of post-Gaddafi Libya.The study therefore recommends that for the country to effectively reap the benefits of the regime change, the NTC should ensure a proper democratic transition processes which will enhance popular participation and economic integration and liberation. 1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY From 1969 to early 2011, the politics and diplomacy of Libya was determined de facto by Muammar Gaddafi, who had been in power since his overthrow of the Kingdom of Libya in 1969.Gaddafi abolished the post-1951 Libyan Constitution and introduced his own political philosophy, based on his Green Book published in the 1970s (Davis,1990:16). Gaddafi's system was known as Jamahiriya and was notionally legally based on the legislative General People's Congress (GPC), consisting of 2,700 representatives of Basic People's Congresses, and the executive General People's Committee, headed by a General Secretary, who reported to the Prime Minister and the President (Davis, 1990:16). The "Jamahiriya sector" was overseen by the "revolutionary sector." This was headed by Muammar Gaddafi as "Brotherly Leader of the Revolution", the Revolutionary Committees, and the surviving members of the 12-person Revolutionary Command Council established in 1969. This "revolutionary sector" held office by virtue of having led the coup officially described as "the Revolution" and therefore was not subject to election. As a consequence, although Gaddafi held no governmental post after 1980, he maintained absolute control over the country until the collapse of his regime during the Libyan civil war (Liam Stack, 2012:87). For the first seven years following the 1969 revolution, Colonel Gaddafi and 12 fellow army officers, the Revolutionary Command Council, began a complete overhaul of Libya's political system, society, and economy. On 2 March 1977, Gaddafi convened a General People's Congress (GPC) to proclaim the establishment of "people's power," change the country's name to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and to vest, 2 theoretically, primary authority in the GPC (Patrick, 1992:245).Gaddafi remained the de factochief of state and secretary general of the GPC until 1980, when he gave up his office. He continued to control all aspects of the Libyan government through direct appeals to the masses, a pervasive security apparatus, and powerful revolutionary committees. Although he held no formal office, Gaddafi exercised absolute power with the assistance of a small group of trusted advisers, who included relatives from his home base in the Sirte region, which lies between the rival provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. During his rule, Gaddafi took increasing control of the government, but he also attempted to achieve greater popular participation in local government. In 1973, he announced the start of a "cultural revolution" in schools, businesses, industries, and public institutions to oversee administration of those organizations in the public interest. The March 1977 establishment of "people's power" with mandatory popular participation in the selection of representatives to the GPC was the culmination of this process. In the 1980s, competition grew between the official Libyan Government and military hierarchies and the revolutionary committees. An abortive coup attempt in May 1984 apparently mounted by Libyan exiles with internal support, led to a short-lived reign of terror in which thousands were imprisoned and interrogated. An unknown number were executed. Gaddafi used the revolutionary committees to search out alleged internal opponents following the coup attempt, thereby accelerating the rise of more radical elements inside the Libyan power hierarchy (Eljahmi, 2006).After the 1986 bombing of Libya by the United States Air Force, Gaddafi decreed that the word "Great" should be appended to the beginning of the name, rendering its official name Al Jumahiriyah al Arabiyah al Libiyah ash Shabiyah al Ishtirakiyah al Uzma, or Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 3 In 1988, faced with rising public dissatisfaction with shortages in consumer goods and setbacks in Libya's war with Chad, Gaddafi began to curb the power of the revolutionary committees and to institute some domestic reforms. The regime released many political prisoners and eased restrictions on foreign travel by Libyans. Private businesses were again permitted to operate. Around the same time, Gaddafi began to pursue an anti-fundamentalist Islamic policy domestically, viewing
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