Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars: Air Power in Kosovo and Libya / Robert H

Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars

Air Power in Kosovo and Libya

Robert H. Gregory Jr.

Potomac Books An imprint of the University of Nebraska Press © 2015 by Robert H. Gregory Jr. All rights reserved. Potomac Books is an imprint of the University of Nebraska Press. Manufactured in the United States of America.

Proceeds from sales of this book support academic scholarships for veterans and their spouses through the Pat Tillman Foundation’s Tillman Scholar Program.

The views expressed in this book are those of the author and do not reflect official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data Gregory, Robert H., 1981– Clean bombs and dirty wars: air power in Kosovo and Libya / Robert H. Gregory Jr. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 978- 1- 61234- 731- 8 (pbk: alk. paper) isbn 9 7 8 - 1 - 6 1 2 3 4 - 7 8 6 - 8 ( e p u b ) isbn 9 7 8 - 1 - 6 1 2 3 4 - 7 8 7 - 5 ( m o b i ) isbn 978- 1- 61234- 788- 2 (pdf ) 1. Precision bombing— United States— Case studies. 2. Air power— United States— Case studies. 3. Libya— History— Civil War, 2011— Aerial operations, American. 4. Kosovo War, 1998– 1999— Aerial operations, American. I. Title. II. Title: Air power in Kosovo and Libya. ug703.g73 2015 949.7103'15480973— dc23 2015008546

Set in Minion by Westchester Publishing Services. Dedicated to Brian H. Collins Major, U.S. Army 1977– 2013

Contents

List of Illustrations ix Acknowledgments xi List of Abbreviations xv

Introduction 1 1. Before the Bombing 17 2. The Bombing Begins 54 3. Protracted Bombing 72 4. After the Bombing 102 5. The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo 124 6. Spring in Libya 149 7. Bombing Libya 175 8. Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars 207

Notes 219 Bibliography 277 Index 293

Illustrations

figures 1. Willingness to tolerate casualties in Bosnia, 1995 31 2. General Clark, 13 April 1999 press briefing 82 3. Incorporation of counter- battery radar acquisitions 93 4. Comparison of poststrike damage assessments 105 5. Destroyed tank in Klina, Kosovo 106 6. Future Combat System components 129

Maps 1. Kosovo xviii 2. Libya xix

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I thank my wife, Christina Fishback, for supporting my writing endeavors over the past decade. I produced the bulk of this work during time off from my normal military duties, which we otherwise would have shared in a different manner. Fortunately, she understood from her own academic experience how writing a long work affects the psyche, though her idea of a Christmas and summer vacation did not entail waking up to a stack of pages to proofread each morning. I owe her a great deal of time that I promise to repay in the future. Starting in 2006, Professors Daniel Moran and James Wirtz at the Naval Postgraduate School inspired me to write what eventually became chapter 5 of this book. Seven years later, historians Sean Kalic, Jonathan House, and John Kuehn gave excellent advice as the first half of this book evolved as part of my studies at the Command and General Staff College (cgsc). These individuals fueled my lifelong interest in military history. I also thank Lt. Col. Kenneth Slover, Jack Kem, Lt. Col. Scott Roxburgh (usaf), Dennis Linton, Matt Broaddus, and Nicholas Murray for their encouragement while I was at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The William J. Clinton Presidential Library, the Dudley Knox Library, and the Combined Arms Research Library had great researchers who helped me with source materials. Among them, I give special thanks to Brittany Gerke, archives technician at the Clinton library; Rob Seibert, mandatory declassification review archivist at the Clinton library; Greta Marlatt from the Dudley Knox Library; as well as John Dubuisson, Russell Rafferty, and Michael Browne at the Combined Arms Research Library.

xi Also I thank Beth Bernstein at the rand Corporation for helping with the process of getting permission to use several figures in the book. While I was at Fort Leavenworth, Dean Nowowiejski, the Ike Skelton chair of the Art of War Scholars program, stimulated much of my writing and thinking on this work. I was fortunate to participate in a program that facilitated the extensive study of modern military history while also meeting the career requirements for professional military education. By design the Art of War Scholars program allows military officers from all U.S. services (and foreign countries as well) who are interested in researching and writing on their professional interests to do so with academic independence, disciplined initiative, overhead cover, writing time, research travel funds, and peer encouragement. Without this program and Nowowiejski’s strong belief in providing students an alternative path from the standard military curriculum, I would have curtailed this endeavor. Three of my peers, Jason Alexander, Lance Tomlinson, and Bobby Gichert, who all participated in previous iterations of the program, recommended it to me— I am thankful for their advice. I discussed this work with several people via e-mail and in person. Among them, Scott Porter (Department of Command and Leadership at cgsc), who worked on the battle damage assessment team in Kosovo, gave his perspective on the impact of the bombing. He shared photographs taken in 1999 of destroyed tanks and decoys that the Serbian army left behind in Kosovo after the air campaign (one of the photographs is in this book). Via e-mail, Douglas Macgregor (Colonel, U.S. Army, retired), who served as the j- 5 at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (shape) before Operation Allied Force and as the director of joint operations during the operation, answered several of my questions pertaining to the air campaign and nato’s subsequent bombing damage survey. As the lone armor officer in cgsca seminar with four aviators from the U.S. Army and two from the U.S. Navy, I gained a great deal of insight on air power through daily interaction with my peers. My Art of War classmates Doug White and Bob Stone read portions of the work and gave feedback over breakfast and lunch on several occasions. Doug participated in operations over Libya in 2011 and pointed out how the rebels painted the tops of their vehicles pink so that nato aircraft did not mistakenly xii Acknowledgments bomb them. This revelation led me to numerous sources pertaining to air– ground coordination with the rebels. Also, my longtime friend and workout partner, Paul Stelzer, during our daily weightlifting sessions at Gruber Fitness Center served as a sounding board for my ideas on how to revise the manuscript to make it sharper. Numerous colleagues, friends, and relatives gave feedback on early versions of the manuscript. Lifelong West Point friend Dave Dixon read the entire manuscript and provided numerous comments and sugges- tions throughout. Charles Bies caught an important error with dates, and Travis Neely gave advice on how to trim portions of the first half of the work. I am thankful for comments provided by my sister- in- law, Allison Fishback, who read the entire work from the perspective of someone who had never served in the military. She gave significant advice on how to keep the work readable for a general audience and served as a litmus test for whether particular military terminology should be included or substituted by plain English. Additionally, Lt. Col. Vida Burrell discussed the work with me during a three and a half hour drive across the Arabian Desert while steering around camels, potholes, and numerous reckless drivers. Later on Dan Lichlyter did the same during seven hours of driving from Hofuf to Riyadh to Dhahran. During the revision process, my interpreter and friend Abdulaziz al-Banyan read the second half of the work and suggested appropriate spellings for Arabic names while providing a regional perspective on the Arab Spring movement. Any errors contained herein despite all the support, encouragement, and proofing I had from others are solely my own. Many people also gave their moral support. Among them, I owe many thanks to my parents, Robert and Engracia Gregory, as well as Bonnie Collins, Johnny Anderson, Chris Lyons, Donnie Workman, Michelle Gregory- Van Dyke, Mike Kelly, Matt Nilson, Tara Dean, Dana Kornburger, Mike Kornburger, James Hayes, Ryan Seagreaves, Shannon Schwaller, Sam Allen, Jeff Fuller, Andy Rohrer, Joanna Fishback, Rob Altman, Sherrod Dantzler, Jane Fishback, Kyle Lippold, Steve Weber, Bryon Bonnell, Juan Berlanga, Scott Davidson, and Rob Hedge. This work would never have made it to publication were it not for Alicia Christensen, acquisitions editor at Potomac Books; Maggie Boyles,

Acknowledgments xiii editorial assistant at the University of Nebraska Press; and Tish Fobben in the marketing department. Alicia recognized that Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars had potential as a book, and I am grateful for her efforts in guid- ing me through the University of Nebraska’s peer review and publication process. Sean Kalic and several others recommended Potomac Books as a potential publisher because of its focus on academic books pertaining to military affairs. Maggie guided me through the various phases of publishing. Additionally, I thank Vickie West and Debbie Masi for their roles in copyediting and production. Finally, I recognize Robert O’Connell. He planted the genesis of this work in my head during a graduate course discussion in January 2007. In class, he explained the premise of his book Of Arms and Men, arguing that military professionals favor certain types of weaponry and as a consequence tend to overlook the role of inconspicuous apparatuses. Sometimes innovative means or mechanisms have a great impact on military campaigns yet remain ignored by military institutions because of their cultural pre- dilections. Seven years later O’Connell’s course inspired me to examine the role of radar and Twitter in recent air campaigns. Although this work showcases all of my biases as a person who fights on land, I hope, in the spirit of joint-mindedness, that what follows offers a new perspective on air power and the political motivation to employ it.

xiv Acknowledgments Abbreviations

abccc airborne battlefield command and control center Adm. Admiral afac airborne forward air controller africom Africa Command apc armored personnel carrier awacs Airborne Warning and Control System Brig. Gen. Brigadier General caoc combined air operations center Capt. Captain centcom Central Command cia Central Intelligence Agency Col. Colonel dia Defense Intelligence Agency eucom European Command fcs Future Combat Systems fofa Follow- On Forces Attack gao General Accounting Office (U.S.) Gen. General gnc General National Congress (Libya) gps Global Positioning System harm high- speed anti- radiation missile iads integrated air defense system icty International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ifv infantry fighting vehicle

xv ir infrared jdam Joint Direct Attack Munition jfc Joint Force Command jstars Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System kla Kosovo Liberation Army Lt. Col. Lieutenant Colonel Lt. Gen. Lieutenant General Maj. Major Maj. Gen. Major General meat Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team mgv manned ground vehicle mlrs Multiple Launch Rocket System mup Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova nato North Atlantic Treaty Organization nlos non– line of sight nsc National Security Council ntc National Transitional Council (Libya) Pfc. Private First Class r2p responsibility to protect raf Royal Air Force rand Research and Development Corporation (a nonprofit organization that aims to help improve decision making through research and analysis) reforger REturn of FORces to GERmany saceur Supreme Allied Commander Europe sam surface- to- air missile sbct Stryker Brigade Combat Team sead suppression of enemy air defenses sfor Stabilization Force S.Sgt. Staff Sergeant shape Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe sms Short Message Service (text message) soscoe System-of- Systems Common Operating Environment tlam Tomahawk Land Attack Missile xvi Abbreviations tradoc Training and Doctrine Command trap Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel uav unmanned aerial vehicle un United Nations unpredep United Nations Preventive Deployment Force unscr United Nations Security Council Resolution V. Adm. Vice Admiral

Abbreviations xvii Map 1. Map and location of Kosovo. Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Kosovo,” The World Factbook 2013– 14, Washington dc: cia, 2014. Map 2. Map and location of Libya. Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Libya,” The World Factbook 2013– 14, Washington dc: cia, 2014.

Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars

Introduction

Nothing comparable to this state of affairs had been known in the previous history of warfare, unless we take such a case as that of a nineteenth century warship attacking some large savage or barbaric settlement, or one of those naval bombardments that disfigure the history of Great Britain in the late eighteenth century. — H. G. Wells, The War in the Air, 1908

Herbert George Wells coined the phrase “air power” in The War in the Air, a work of science fiction published in 1908.1 Three years later during the Italo- Turkish War, on 1 November 1911 Italian aviator Lt. Giulio Gavotti wrote in a letter to his father: “Today two boxes full of bombs arrived. We are expected to throw them from our planes. . . . It will be very interesting to try them on the Turks.”2 Although Austrian forces had dropped bombs on Venice using unmanned balloons in 1849, Gavotti’s attempt would be the first aerial bombardment from a manned, heavier- than- air flying machine. Later that day Gavotti flew on a reconnaissance mission over a Turk- ish encampment east of Tripoli, Libya.3 Following secret orders, Gavotti had brought along four hand grenades, and he tossed them out of his monoplane, trying to hit the Turkish soldiers below.4 After the mission, Gavotti wrote another letter to his father, boasting of his experience:

I take the bomb with my right hand, pull off the security tag and throw the bomb out, avoiding the wing. I can see it falling through the sky for [a] couple of seconds and then it disappears. And after a little while, I can see a small dark cloud in the middle of the encampment. I have hit

1 the target! I then send two other bombs with less success. I still have one left which I decide to launch later on an oasis close to Tripoli. I come back really pleased with the result. I go straight to report to [Lt.] General [Carlo] Caneva. Everybody is satisfied.5

The next day, newspaper headlines around the world read: “Aviator Lt. Gavotti Throws Bomb on Enemy Camp. Terrorized Turks Scatter upon Unexpected Celestial Assault.”6 It was an exaggeration. In reality, the grenade that exploded inside the camp did not injure anyone, and another grenade was a dud and did not detonate.7 Ottoman officials claimed that Italy had violated the Geneva Convention because Gavotti intentionally struck a hospital, injuring several civilians.8 Making matters worse, the Turkish infantry “stood their ground and let loose a hail of rifle fire” against subsequent air raids.9 Things were not going as Lt. Gen. Carlo Caneva, the commander of the Italian expeditionary force, had planned. Nevertheless, this moment was the dawn of aerial bombing.10 Nearly one hundred years after Gavotti’s bombing run, on 20 October 2011, near Sirte, Libya, a seventy- five vehicle military convoy sped westward across the Libyan Desert toward Wadi Jarif.11 Meanwhile, seven thousand miles from Libya, at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada, from “a windowless bunker, lit by constantly flickering computer screens,” a Predator drone operator zoomed in on the convoy and fired a laser- guided Hellfire missile at the lead vehicle.12 Upon reaching the target, the Hellfire exploded, disrupting the convoy and its occupants. Subsequently, after receiving coordinates from a Boeing e-3 Sentry flying forty miles from the Libyan coast, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato) warplanes belonging to France and Britain pummeled the convoy, destroying eleven vehicles.13 Shortly thereafter Muammar Gaddafi, the dictator of Libya for forty- two years, fled on foot from one of the vehicles in the convoy.14 From nearby several Libyan rebel fighters spotted Gaddafi, closed on his position, captured him, and later stabbed him with a bayonet.15 The rebels filmed the event with a smartphone and shared the video on YouTube with a global audience.16 Air power had come a long way since an enterprising Gavotti tossed grenades from his airplane in 1911. Or so it seemed.

2 Introduction Gavotti’s primitive effort fit within the realm of air power— the use of flying contraptions to facilitate or deliver violence for a political aim. Along with aerial bombing, the comprehensive domain of air power includes the use of aircraft for transport, communications, and reconnaissance purposes. Adhering to the theme of Gavotti’s maiden bombing run, this book focuses primarily on the employment of air power against military ground formations during air campaigns that took place from 1991 to 2011 with the purpose of analyzing contemporary thinking on air power among politicians, military leaders, and the general public. The majority of studies on recent air campaigns have focused on the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead, this book centers on two less- examined case studies: Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011), both of which involved nato and had comparable political motives for Western military intervention along with similar constraints on the commitment of ground forces. Operation Allied Force, nato’s 1999 air campaign to expel Slobodan Milosevic’s Third Army from Kosovo, solidified the belief that air power could succeed in a limited military intervention that excluded the use of ground forces. The apparent success of air power in Kosovo inspired a similar air campaign, Operation Unified Protector, against Gaddafi’s forces in Libya during 2011. At the start of both campaigns, without having anyone on the ground or at the very least coordinating with the rebel fighters on the ground,nato could not employ air power effectively. Just as with Gavotti’s bombing run in 1911, the initial stages of nato’s 1999 and 2011 air campaigns proved ineffective— the bombs merely agitated the enemy, stiffening their resolve. In the latter part of each campaign, however, nato stumbled to victory after inadvertently discovering a way to target the elusive ground forces of Milosevic and Gaddafi. During the last two weeks of Operation Allied Force, the U.S. Army’s counter- battery radars— deliberately positioned near Albania’s border with Kosovo— helped air forces neutralize more than half of the artillery employed by the Yugoslav Third Army (see chapter 3). This sensor- to- shooter linkage proved critical in aerial warfare. Accordingly, in Libya during the second half of Operation Unified Protector nato embraced a unique form of sensor-to- shooter linkage.

Introduction 3 France and Britain—nato ’s two largest contributors of strike sorties— coordinated openly with Libyan rebel fighters via Twitter. Consequently a large network of dispersed rebels wielding smartphones tweeted friendly and enemy locations with accurate coordinates obtained from Google Earth. This helped nato destroy over one thousand of Gaddafi’s heavy weapon systems and contributed to his demise (see chapter 7). The popular perception, forged in Kosovo and carried forth in Libya, was that air power succeeded without the need for a ground contingent. This was an illusory view.

The Origin of “Tank Plinking” Pilots in the U.S. Air Force developed the phrase “tank plinking” during the 1991 Gulf War. They used it as a condescending description of their efforts to meet Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf’s objective of destroying 50 percent of the Iraqi army’s tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery prior to the commitment of coalition ground forces. Despite the word “tank,” usage of the phrase also included efforts to destroy armored personnel carriers, artillery, and other mobile targets with precision guided munitions.17 Alongside the Gulf War’s tank plinking efforts,b - 52s carpet bombed large swaths of desert occupied by Iraqi divisions with tons of unguided munitions, or “dumb bombs.”18 Although they may have had a psychological impact on enemy soldiers and a fixing effect on their units, these unguided munitions, due to their limited accuracy, destroyed very little of the Iraqi equipment. Attacking ground formations seemed the perfect mission for the a- 10 Warthog, which the air force had designed to conduct close air support. However, this was not quite how things worked out when it came to picking off individual tanks in earthen fighting positions with overhead concealment to hide from aerial observation. Instead it was primarily aircraft such as the f-111 f, f-15 e, or a-6 with guided munitions that slowly chipped away at the combat power of Saddam’s army. In all, only 8.4 percent of the total 88,500 tons of munitions that coalition air forces dropped during Operation Desert Storm were precision guided.19 General Schwarzkopf’s air component commander during Operation Desert Storm was U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner. In December

4 Introduction 1990 Horner’s operations deputy discovered that “fighter aircraft equipped with new infrared (ir) targeting pods would be able to find and destroy armored vehicles from medium altitude at night.”20 The technique originally started as a plan to accurately target fixed surface- to- air missile sites deep within enemy territory. One month before initiating the Gulf War air campaign, during a series of training missions dubbed “Operation Night Camel,” cockpit videos from ir targeting pods revealed that metal objects held residual heat from the daytime sun well into the hours of darkness.21 As a result, between sunset and midnight, the thermal image from these ir sensors contrasted tanks and other military vehicles with the cooler desert sands around them. Before this revelation the Iraqi army—in line with common military thinking in 1991— believed that dug- in fighting positions and dispersion made armored vehicles invulnerable to aerial bombardment. With ir sensors and open desert terrain, this was no longer the case. General Schwarzkopf was pleased with this discovery but insisted that aviators use the more aggressive-sounding term “tank busting” to describe such efforts.22 In a fit of rage, Stormin’ Norman (Schwarzkopf’s nickname) exclaimed to his air deputy, “Tell them [the pilots] not to call it ‘tank plinking!’ ”23 Horner infuriated Schwarzkopf even further by sarcastically replying, “That’s the surest way to get them to call it ‘tank plinking.’ ”24 Next, with a hint of insubordination, Horner mockingly obeyed the order, later recalling that “I told the troops, ‘General Schwarzkopf does not want you to call it tank-plinking,’ and that way I ensured that it would forever be known as ‘tank plinking.’ ”25 This petty disagreement reflected a larger divide in thinking between the U.S. Air Force and Army regarding targeting matters. But it was not entirely a climate of disagreement. The one matter that both the U.S. Air Force and Army agreed upon during Operation Desert Storm was that bureaucrats in Washington should not have much say on operational matters during the campaign. Throughout the 1980s the Army and Air Force had developed a complementary view of military operations encapsulated by nato’s concept of Follow-On Forces Attack, or fofa.26 With this concept, given a wartime scenario against the Soviet Union in central Europe, the Army’s new ground-based rocket artillery systems (the Multiple Launch Rocket System, mlrs) and Apache helicopters

Introduction 5 would attack Soviet forces in depth up to the fire support coordination line. Beyond that point, air forces would interdict the second and third echelons of Soviet armor. There was some semblance of harmony between the services with this operational concept, despite air power theorists’ longstanding ambitions to win wars on their own with a “decisive blow” delivered deep in the industrial heart of an enemy nation. This brief harmony in strategic and operational thought fell apart during Operation Desert Storm. On 20 August 1990 the meddling of Washington bureaucrats culminated in a visit by U.S. Air Force Colonel John Warden to Lieutenant General Horner’s forward headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. As an air power theorist, Warden represented the views of the senior air force leaders in Washington, and he had coauthored a June 1990 white paper entitled “Global Reach—Global Power.”27 This work represented the U.S. Air Force’s strategic vision for independent power projection— a view that contradicted the Army’s doctrinal stance on the integration of air and land power.28 In applying “Global Reach—Global Power” to the crisis in the Middle East, Warden theorized that a strategic attack against eighty- four targets throughout Iraq, mainly against regime control nodes in Baghdad, would bring a quick end to Saddam Hussein’s designs on Kuwait. Warden had briefing charts (shown earlier to General Schwarzkopf) to back up his claim and sell his idea. Before the briefing started, Lieutenant General Horner grabbed Colonel Warden by the tie and berated him for coming from Washington to tell a forward-deployed commander how to run a campaign. Horner then threw the packet of Warden’s briefing slides against the wall, sending papers fluttering to the floor. After picking his papers back up, Warden proceeded to give Horner and his staff a large bag full of “razors, sunscreen, lip balm” and other sundries, which Warden had thought was a considerate gesture due to the unavailability of various items in the theater. Horner replied, “What is this shit?” and pushed aside the gift. By the time the briefing started, it was clear to all present that Warden did not impress Horner. In the middle of the briefing, Horner asked Warden what would happen if the Iraqi Republican Guard moved south and attacked into Saudi Arabia. Warden replied, “Ground forces aren’t important to the campaign.”29

6 Introduction Lieutenant General Horner believed that Warden’s plan did not address the issue of how the air campaign would work in combination with a ground force offensive. In Horner’s view, Warden’s plan did not account for the Iraqi army at all. Horner said, “It sounds like a ‘decapitate the snake plan.’ I don’t see it as a slick plan, but as a ‘hit- him- in- the- face plan.’ ”30 Nevertheless, after the briefing, Horner asked Warden’s team of planners to join the air component in Riyadh while Warden returned to Washington. Although Horner’s final plan included Warden’s initial target list, the eventual plan was much more comprehensive. Despite Horner’s personal animosity toward Warden, the idea of independently employing air power for strategic effect fit with the longstanding institutional penchant within the U.S. Air Force. Warden’s ideas were beginning to hold sway. As Horner’s deputy, Brig. Gen. Buster Glosson led Horner’s planning effort. In contrast with Warden’s thinking, Glosson believed that the air campaign should “last for fifteen rounds, not two or three . . . a marathon, not a dash.”31 And so it was. The eventual plan included significant attacks on Iraqi ground forces with the use of both “tank plinking” and conventional unguided munitions. Although the majority of sorties went toward the unguided conventional effort, aircraft such as the f-117 Nighthawk simultaneously struck “strategic targets” in Baghdad, as originally envisioned by Warden.32 In all, a panoply of a-10s, f-16s, b- 52s, and other aircraft flew over 43,000 strike sorties against Iraqi ground forces. On 14 January 1991 two prototype Boeing 707s configured with the new Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (jstars) co-developed by the U.S. Army and Air Force made their combat debut over the Kuwait theater of operations. Thejstars had a synthetic aperture radar that could search a 4x5-kilometer area and obtain accurate coordinates for individual enemy vehicles and other similarly sized equipment. This was known as “targeting mode.” In “surveillance mode” the radar could scan (with lesser accuracy) a larger 20x25- kilometer sector that was up to several hundred kilometers distant. With sufficient manning, jstars could perform in both modes at the same time. These aircraft eventually proved their worth in the mind of Horner despite his initial skepticism. Shortly after commencement of the air campaign, with a flight of b-52s

Introduction 7 inbound but unable to find targets due to poor visibility, Horner’s staff suggested the incorporation of jstars to find targets. Horner replied, “Fine, get the officer in here,” not realizing that the Army manned the ground station for the jstars with a sergeant and one enlisted soldier.33 Horner’s staff brought in Pfc. Timothy Reagan, who explained that his sergeant was “in the latrine.” The fact that the U.S. Army had a lowly private assigned to operate the ground station added to Horner’s doubts. Nevertheless, Reagan brought Horner to the jstars terminal and showed him a computer screen with clutters of yellow dots on a black and white terrain image. The young soldier confidently explained that the yellow dots represented a convoy of forty Iraqi military vehicles moving along a road in Kuwait. Horner ordered the b-52s to strike the convoy, thereby generating a digital information relay from the jstars to an orbiting Airborne Warning and Control System (awacs), which in turn passed the coordinates to the b- 52s in flight. From the air component headquarters in Riyadh, Horner watched Reagan’s computer monitor with delight as the jstars moving target indicator revealed that the Iraqi convoy ceased movement after theb -52s unleashed their massive payload of bombs. Horner was no longer a skeptic.34 During the Gulf War, confidence in the jstars and other aerial sensors quickly spread among U.S. Air Force officers in the air component headquarters. In the aftermath of the air campaign, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill A. McPeak concluded, “My private conviction is that this is the first time in history that a field army has been defeated by airpower.”35 During Operation Desert Storm, General Schwarzkopf demanded that Iraqi ground forces be the first priority in bombing. This created tension between Schwarzkopf and his air component commander, Lieutenant General Horner, who preferred striking what the U.S. Air Force deemed “strategic targets.” This same sort of tension reemerged in Kosovo a decade later with debates between the nato’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (saceur), Gen. Wesley K. Clark, and Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, the air component commander for Operation Allied Force. Throughout the campaign, Clark and Short argued back and forth via video-teleconferences with their staffs in Belgium and Italy watching. On one occasion, shortly

8 Introduction before a nato strike on “strategic targets” in Belgrade, the following conversation unfolded: “This is the jewel in the crown,” Short said, referring to Belgrade. Upon hearing this, General Clark replied, “To me, the jewel in the crown is when those b- 52s rumble across Kosovo.” Next, Short summed up their disagreement, saying, “You and I have known for weeks that we have different jewelers.” Having the last word on the matter, Clark ended the discussion: “My jeweler outranks yours.”36 After Operation Allied Force, Short told the editor of Air Force Magazine, “I never felt that the [Serb] 3rd Army in Kosovo was a center of gravity. . . . [General Clark’s] No. 1 priority, which he expressed to me every day on the [video-teleconference session], was the fielded forces in Kosovo. And we all understood that and followed the direction of the saceur.”37

Kosovo and Libya The legacy of tank plinking manifested during nato’s military interventions in Kosovo and Libya. The nature of the objectives in each campaign entailed the destruction of mobile ground forces. The assumptions behind the first of these campaigns, Operation Allied Force, originated from perceptions of U.S. technological superiority in the application of precision munitions. This mindset evolved during the decade after the 1991 Gulf War. The brief air campaign over Bosnia in 1995 seemingly validated how air power worked by itself to achieve national ends—Milosevic adjusted his Balkan designs shortly afternato ’s bombing commenced. But the same did not occur in 1999. On 24 March 1999 President William J. “Bill” Clinton addressed the nation from the Oval Office to announce that the United States, along with its nato allies, had initiated air strikes against the Serbian forces of Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo. During the speech Clinton emphasized, “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.”38 Clinton reasoned that the air strikes would deter Milosevic from conducting genocide against Kosovar Albanians by limiting the Serbian army’s capacity to carry out its plans.39 Less than a week into the campaign, the American news media demanded information regarding the status of tank plinking, and the response from General Clark during the press conferences did not satisfy the reporters’ questions. After seventy- eight days of bombing,

Introduction 9 Milosevic capitulated. One year later, on 5 October 2000, Milosevic lost his re-election bid and was out of power. Nearly two years later, starting on 12 February 2002, Milosevic would stand trial at the Hague for war crimes and would die of a heart attack in 2005 before the trial ended.40 To some, for the first time in the history of warfare it appeared to be a victory achieved solely by the employment of air power.41 At the end of the Kosovo conflict, the prominent military historian John Keegan proclaimed, “Now there is a new turning point to fix on the calendar: June 3, 1999, when the capitulation of President Milosevic proved that a war can be won by air power alone.”42 As a result of this event he predicted, “The new bomber barons will be heard with the greatest attention when future peace- making operations are discussed.”43 After all, ground forces did not enter the equation in Kosovo as they did in Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War. Consequently, the U.S. public, along with political and military leaders, developed exaggerated expectations of air power after the turning point proclaimed by Keegan. nato’s air campaign over Libya in 2011 magnified this trend— political decision makers again ruled out the use of ground forces. In December 2010 a wave of revolutionary protests erupted in the Arab world, the culmination of underlying resentment at autocratic rule and perceptions of corruption and injustice. By 15 February 2011 these protests, known collectively as the Arab Spring, came to Benghazi, Libya. The Twitter hashtag “#Feb17” transitioned the protests into a revolutionary movement.44 Over the next three days, angry crowds gathered throughout Libya calling for a new government. Following Gaddafi’s orders, Libyan security forces reacted violently, killing hundreds of civilians. Reports of these atrocities sparked international condemnation and calls for military intervention.45 Operation Allied Force in Kosovo inspired the 2011 U.S. intervention in Libya. Several key members of President Barack Obama’s national security team had had significant experiences related to the 1999 air campaign in Kosovo: Hillary Clinton had been First Lady, Susan Rice had been an Assistant Secretary of State, and Samantha Power had been a journalist. These three individuals had a great deal of influence in Obama’s decision to intervene in Libya, where once again air power and precision weapons

10 Introduction seemingly offered a way to intervene without becoming entangled in a messy ground war. On 18 March 2011 President Obama announced that the United States and its allies would intervene in Libya with military force and that the United States would “provide the unique capabilities that we can bring to bear to stop the violence against civilians.” Yet he cautiously added, “the United States is not going to deploy ground troops into Libya.”46 The unique capabilities referred to by the president included unmanned aircraft and precision munitions as well as the ability to destroy Libyan air defenses and to perform aerial refueling. In contrast with the Kosovo intervention, the political objective in Libya went further than merely expelling ground forces from a piece of terrain— Gaddafi had to be removed from power. In seeking this objective, the United States, Britain, and France committed the most resources. President Obama, British Prime Minister David Cameron, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy presented a united front, jointly signing a letter that stated, “it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in power.”47 The rest of thenato alliance, combined with partner nations, contributed resources in an uneven manner; some participants had restrictive national caveats on how nato could utilize their military contributions. For the three main participants in the campaign, however, what started as a no- fly zone eventually became what Secretary of State Clinton referred to as a “no- drive zone.”48 In her correspondence with foreign officials, Clinton used the phrase “no- drive zone” to emphasize that the coalition needed to conduct air strikes on “tanks and troops” to prevent Gaddafi’s army from reaching the rebels’ initial stronghold in Benghazi before it was too late.49 Attacking Gaddafi’s ground forces was a divisive issue within nato alliance, and the campaign participants never achieved consensus on the matter. However, they eventually agreed on working within nato’s command structure to maximize efficiencies where their interests aligned. Just as in Operation Allied Force, the air campaign in Libya exposed significant challenges in the ability to find and target mobile ground forces exclusively from the air. Ultimately, nato solved this problem in Libya by coordinating directly with rebel fighters via the Internet. In each campaign, nato aircraft destroyed similar quantities of the heavy weaponry

Introduction 11 (tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers) employed by ground forces. Yet in the Libyan campaign, fewer allied aircraft participated, and the bombing lasted nearly three times as long as the seventy- eight day campaign in Kosovo. Limited military intervention, as best illustrated by gunboat diplomacy in the nineteenth century, is not a new phenomenon. The use of air power for limited military intervention, however, is an increasingly popular choice for the United States. The decision to use air power against adversaries who might harm civilian populations implies optimistic underlying assumptions and perceptions about air power. This newfound faith in the effectiveness of airpower is due in part to a belief that technology allows air power to discriminate between targets just as well as a person on the ground. This flawed belief formed in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm and solidified with Operation Allied Force.50 Further study of the latter operation provides context for subsequent limited military interventions. Moreover, whether or not Operation Allied Force was actually a “turning point” as far as the capability of “air power alone” to defeat an army deserves further scrutiny—Keegan’s statement had a great deal of influence on policy makers and the general public, but it did not reflect the realities of air power in the conflict he was describing. Even with the latest sensor and precision munitions technologies, finding and targeting the enemy proved a significant challenge for air power in both Kosovo and Libya. Despite the perception otherwise, successful targeting required a ground component. As became evident during the military interventions in Kosovo and Libya, a preponderance of the American public, politicians, and military leaders assumed that clean bombs were ideal for intervening in dirty wars where the adversary purposely blurred the distinction between combatants and noncombatants with indiscriminate force. With precision weaponry, employing air power was the favored middle ground between doing nothing or getting troops bogged down in messy and protracted ground wars. For Americans, faith in air power lessened the cognitive load when contemplating whether to go to war. Risking troops on the ground was a hard decision, but risking a few pilots’ lives from high in the sky placed the moral burden of war on the shoulders of technology. As an amoral

12 Introduction abstraction, technology could bear the immense weight of heavy decisions with cognitive ease.

The Way Ahead The following chapters explore how the U.S. public, policy makers, and military services perceived the use of air power before, during, and after Operation Allied Force to highlight the extent of mainstream belief in a turning point regarding what air power can accomplish on its own. Chapter 1 covers the assumptions made by the public, civilian policy makers, nato, and each of the military services before the commencement of Operation Allied Force. Chapters 2 and 3 trace the perceptions of these groups during the three operational phases of the air campaign. The latter chapter includes a description of how ground forces, though not used in the conflict, jointly integrated their counter- battery radars to help air forces accurately strike Milosevic’s artillery. The last part of chapter 3 covers the diplomatic endgame conducted by the United States, Britain, and Russia leading up to Milosevic’s capitulation. Chapter 4 compares several post– Operation Allied Force assessments of how well the bombing worked in achieving nato’s objectives. The Department of Defense, political leaders, nato, the news media, rand Corporation, and various authors have provided differing assessments of the campaign; chapter 5 includes a brief summary of these efforts. The first half of the book demonstrates how Operation Allied Force, despite perceptions otherwise, represented a continuity in the necessity for air– ground cooperation in order to effectively employ air power. The apparent success of air power in Kosovo spurred the U.S. Army to undertake a large-scale modernization program. Chapter 5 reveals how the Army reacted to Operation Allied Force with the announcement its Future Combat Systems program. This program commenced in 1999 and lasted until its cancellation by Secretary of Defense Gates in 2009. Chapter 6 includes the Army’s perspective on modernization within the larger military transformation framework established by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2000. Operation Allied Force inspired a decade of military transformation that centered on the development of precision munitions, unmanned sensors, computer networking, and— for the Army in particular— rapidly deployable forces.

Introduction 13 Operation Unified Protector had significant parallels with the Kosovo intervention and occurred after the turning point proclaimed by Keegan at the end of Operation Allied Force. Therefore, the assumptions laid out in chapter 1, though related specifically to the use of air power in Kosovo, also reflected contemporary thinking on air power leading up to the 2011 intervention in Libya. As such, this work places more emphasis on the assumptions leading up to nato’s air campaign in Kosovo because many of those assumptions overlapped and resurfaced during the campaign in Libya a decade later. In some instances, the personalities involved in decision making in Libya had held key positions in President Clinton’s national security apparatus during the Kosovo intervention. Instead of repeating the “before, during, and after” structure used to outline Operation Allied Force, the chapter leading up to the Libya intervention covers the role of social media in the Libyan uprising and the key personalities within the rebel movement—both of which played a major role in how the campaign evolved and concluded. Chapter 6 covers the Arab Spring movement in Libya followed by nato’s emerging objectives and command structure for Operation Unified Protector. Chapter 7 picks up where the U.S. bombing of Libya begins. After a brief U.S.- led effort to destroy Gaddafi’s air defenses, France and Britain took the lead in nato operations in Libya. From the air, distinguishing between Gaddafi’s forces and those of the Libyan rebels proved challenging. Consequently, the campaign dragged on much longer than expected, and more than twice as long as the 1999 Kosovo campaign. Like in Kosovo, however, nato leveraged an advantage in targeting methodology toward the end of the campaign. Chapter 7 reveals how rebel fighters used Twit- ter to transmit targeting data to nato during the latter half of the 2011 intervention in Libya. Social media, wireless Internet access, and Global Positioning System (gps)-enabled mobile phones with cameras were central to the Libyan rebel movement from its very onset, but nato did not realize the full potential of these developments until after a major fratricide incident with the rebels on 8 April 2011. Afterward, nato harnessed social media for targeting, thereby giving air power a better linkage with rebel ground maneuvers. Operations Allied Force and Unified Protector significantly altered the perception of policy makers, military leaders, and the general public

14 Introduction regarding the use of air power. Operation Allied Force enhanced popular conceptions of the level of precision that air strikes might achieve. By the time of Operation Unified Protector in 2011, the U.S. public viewed the use of air power without ground forces with nonchalance, assuming in the aftermath of these two campaigns that future bombing campaigns would bring rapid, precise results. Yet the reality is that contemporary adversaries can counter the impact of air power using decoys, camouflage, air defenses, entrenchment, and dispersion—all methods used during World War I for the same purpose. In the one hundred years since Gavotti’s bombing raid, ground forces have consistently used the same techniques to mitigate the impact of air power. Thus, gaining air superiority is only half the battle. Finding enemy ground formations is an equally difficult process, particularly when employing air power without the integration of a land component. This work concludes that there is a growing and problematic inclination to use air power for limited interventions. In contemporary times Americans are often tempted to bomb other countries in hopes of changing the behavior of despotic rulers who harm their own citizenry and undermine international stability. Despite the allure of such a simplistic idea, Kosovo and Libya demonstrated that the complexity of war mani- fests in seemingly limited interventions. Enacting violence to achieve a political aim has similar dynamics no matter the perceived scale of commitment. Hence, “limited” interventions tend to escalate over time, with the possibility of violence spiraling out of control and resource expenditures growing beyond what was originally anticipated. Yet the notion of employing “clean bombs” with the hope of a quick win in a “dirty war” persists to the present.51

Introduction 15

1 Before the Bombing

And the hearts that beat so loudly and enthusiastically to do something, to intervene in areas where there is not an immediate threat to our vital interests, when those hearts that had beaten so loudly see the coffins, then they switch, and they say: “What are we doing there?” — William Cohen, Senate Armed Services Committee, 22 January 1997

Assumptions made by each of the military services, the American public, Congress, civilian policy makers, and nato regarding the use of air power leading up to Operation Allied Force in the Kosovo War influenced planning for the operation. Within the U.S. military each service had different assumptions relating to the employment of air power. These assumptions are evident in both service culture and doctrine. Public opinion polls and news articles reveal the U.S. public’s underlying assumptions regarding intervention in Kosovo, and the congressional assumptions are evident in their resolutions and statements. President Clinton and key members of the National Security Council (nsc), including Vice President Al Gore, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, General Hugh Shelton, and nsc advisor Samuel Berger, publicly revealed their assumptions pertaining to air power through speeches and interviews in the years prior to the intervention. Additionally, summary notes of the nsc principals and deputies committee meetings on Kosovo in the year before the bombing were declassified in 2009. These notes reveal the nsc members’ assumptions on air power in conjunction with their diplomatic strategy. In the international environment, newspapers and

17 polls reveal public opinion within the various nato member nations. General Wesley Clark served as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (saceur) during the Kosovo War. In this role, General Clark’s assumptions on how to best intervene in Kosovo were also a critical component in driving nato’s campaign.

Assumptions of U.S. Military Services Service culture, doctrine, and professional publications reveal what the U.S. armed forces assumed air power could accomplish in Kosovo. The functional grouping of those who employ similar weapon systems stabilizes the cultural inclinations of the military services.1 Military technology and culture evolve at separate paces, with culturally grounded thinking often steering a conservative approach in regard to the employment of new weaponry. Early air power theorists such as Billy Mitchell established modes of air power thinking that persisted in Operation Allied Force, indicating a continuity of the aerial arm’s preference for targeting (with greater success) fixed objects deep in the heart of an opponent’s territory rather than targeting (with more difficulty) mobile ground forces that pose a direct threat to those in their immediate vicinity. Leading up to the U.S. intervention in Kosovo, the U.S. military services made assumptions regarding how they might be employed in future conflicts based upon their recent experiences in Operation Desert Storm (Persian Gulf ) in 1991 and Operation Deliberate Force (Bosnia) in 1995.2 In the aftermath of the Cold War, these two operations largely shaped how the services developed warfighting concepts and doctrine. Yet it was the Cold War setting that sparked the idea, first introduced by Soviet Marshal Nikolai Ogarakov, chief of the general staff in the late 1970s and early 1980s, of an emerging “military-technical revolution.”3 Ogarakov believed that precision conventional weapons would eventually be on par with nuclear weapons in terms of destructiveness, thus rendering the employment of mass armored formations (a significant component of Soviet military power) obsolete.4 Andrew Marshall, director of the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment from the Nixon through Obama administrations, discovered Ogarakov’s writings in Soviet military journals and used them to extol the idea of a potential American “revolution in

18 Before the Bombing military affairs” based on the development of precision- guided munitions, computer networks, wide- area sensors, and other technologies.5 Marshall’s ideas became popular in U.S. defense circles in the 1990s due to the lopsided results of the 1991 Gulf War.6 He unintentionally sparked enthusiasm for the notion that sufficient investment in particular types of weapons technology could make war clean, risk- free, and requiring minimal manpower. In the aftermath of Desert Storm, given looming defense cuts, one of Marshall’s main acolytes, retired U.S. Army Lt. Col. Andrew Krepinevich, gave the following procurement advice:

Given tight defense budgets, less emphasis should be placed on maintaining force structure over the near-term future and more emphasis accorded to research and development of new military systems, doctrines, and organizations. Assume, for example, that long- range precision strikes will be a dominant military operation in future conflicts. Substantial changes in U.S. defense planning would then be needed. It would make sense for the Army to reduce funding and emphasis on direct-fire and short- range systems (tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and short- range artillery, for example) as well as the organizations built around them (armored divisions). At the same time the Army would increase its emphasis on long-range, precision-strike systems (satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, attack helicopters, and extended-range missiles) and attempt to identify the new doctrines and organizations (a deep- strike brigade, for instance) that would employ the new systems in an optimal matter [sic]. This approach would apply to the other services as well.7

Krepinevich’s approach garnered momentum across several groups—from politicians and defense contractors to a public weary of maintaining large standing armies— all willing to place the future of American military strategy on the altar of high technology. Military professionals throughout the U.S. armed forces eagerly jumped on this bandwagon, without a full understanding of where it would take them.

U.S. Army Those who employ force on land tend to view the adversary’s army as the center of gravity during conflict.8 Given this mindset, the U.S. Army’s

Before the Bombing 19 targeting preferences for friendly air forces are typically enemy artillery, tanks, and mechanized vehicles— the heavy weapon systems capable of inflicting the most damage to forces in their direct path. During Operation Desert Storm, Army leaders at multiple echelons were highly concerned with destroying enough Iraqi tanks and artillery from the air prior to the ground assault due to Iraqi numerical superiority.9 A January 1991 estimate by the Defense Intelligence Agency indicated that Iraq possessed 4,200 tanks, 2,800 armored personnel carriers, and 3,100 artillery tubes.10 Therefore, accurate accounting of coalition air forces’ damage to Iraqi ground forces was critical in timing and developing the combined land offensive plan. From a purely ground perspective, the goal of the air campaign was to degrade the combat effectiveness of the Iraqi army by 50 percent, quantified solely in terms of destroying Iraqi armor and artillery in corresponding amounts.11 In examining bomb damage assessments during the air campaign, General Schwarzkopf’s Central Command (centcom) staff concurred with the estimates of Lieutenant General Horner’s staff despite differing estimates from the national intelligence community. On the eve of the ground assault centcom’s staff, conferring with those planning the air campaign, concluded that bombing destroyed 47 percent of Iraqi artillery and 39 percent of tanks.12 In contrast, the Central Intelligence Agency (cia) and Defense Intelligence Agency (dia) estimated that air forces destroyed as few as 15 to 20 percent of Iraqi platforms before the ground assault.13 The discrepancy was due in part to the air component’s inclusion of cockpit video to confirm strikes whereas the cia and dia insisted on confirming strike damage through secondary and impartial means to avoid a bias in accounting. General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shared Schwarzkopf’s optimistic assumptions about air power. Before the start of the ground campaign he stated, “Air power is the decisive arm so far, and I expect it will be the decisive arm into the end of the campaign, even if ground forces and amphibious forces are added to the equation.”14 Indeed, in the aftermath of the campaign further bomb damage assessments such as the Gulf War Air Power Survey indicated that both theater and national- level intelligence estimates of the damage were too conservative.

20 Before the Bombing Authors of the Gulf War Air Power Survey concluded that centcom’s damage estimates were short by eight hundred tanks and six hundred artillery pieces, translating to 20 percent greater destruction before the ground offensive than previously thought.15 The Republican Guard’s heavy divisions, however, which were estimated to have 34 percent attrition by planners during the war, actually only suffered 24 percent damage.16 After the ground offensive the Iraqi army suffered 76 percent attrition in tanks and 90 percent in artillery, with the exception of those tanks and artillery in the Republican Guard divisions that were still at 50 percent strength.17 This additional destruction was due to the effect of ground combat. The U.S. Army’s ground- based target acquisition radars, linked by an automated fire direction system, allowed U.S. artillerymen to detect and “fire back at the Iraqi guns literally before the Iraqi barrage impacted the ground.”18 This sensor- to- shooter linkage contributed to the high level of destruction of Iraqi artillery during ground combat. During the Gulf War overhead surveillance systems such as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Systems (jstars), u-2s, and reconnaissance satellites all used aerial sensors to find Iraqi ground forces and assess bombing damage from the air campaign.19 These radar and imaging systems were susceptible to being fooled by Iraq’s use of decoys, camouflage, and digging in of forces. In fact, Iraq purchased thousands of dummy tanks and artillery from an Italian company before the Gulf War. After the Gulf War un observers noted that some Iraqi decoys were impossible to distinguish from actual equipment—even when observed on the ground from twenty- five yards away.20 The use ofa /n tqp-36 and a/n tqp-37 counter-battery radars made up for the inadequacies of visual imaging systems when it came to targeting artillery accurately. After the Gulf War an Iraqi army artillery battalion commander revealed shortcomings in the ability of air forces to target his artillery: “After a month of bombing, I had 17 of 18 tubes left . . . after one day of ground war . . . I had one tube left.”21 This statement indicated the effective use of a/n tqp- 36 and a/n tqp- 37 radars to locate Iraqi tubes in concert with accurate counter-battery artillery fire cued using data from these sensors. The a/n tqp- 36 consists of a large rectangular radar dish mounted on a trailer that is typically towed

Before the Bombing 21 by a Humvee. It can acquire the trajectory of artillery rounds from out to eighteen kilometers and rockets out to twenty- four kilometers, both across a ninety degree sector, depending on the orientation of the radar.22 The a/n tqp-37 is an improvement over the a/n tqp-36, and consists of a larger trailer-mounted radar that detects the trajectory of artillery out to thirty kilometers and rockets out to fifty kilometers.23 After Desert Storm nato employed these systems in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) to detect Serbian artillery. Throughout the 1990s Saddam Hussein colluded with Milosevic on how best to use decoy equipment to fool American forces based on the Iraqi army’s experience in eluding air power.24 Artillery decoys may appear real from the air, but they cannot actually fire rounds. Compared to the airborne visual sensors that searched for Iraqi artillery, counter-battery radars cannot be fooled as easily because they track gun positions based on the trajectory of rounds fired. These new counter- battery radar systems, developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, provided a significant capability for British and French artillery batteries in Bosnia in 1995, and were inadvertently brought into Albania along with Task Force Hawk in 1999. U.S. Marine aircraft eventually incorporated Task Force Hawk radar acquisitions on the fly to their target sets during the last two weeks of Operation Allied Force.25 This overlooked capability played “a very big part” in the final stages of the campaign in June 1999, according to Air Force General John Jumper, commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe at the time.26 In Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo the counter-battery radars distinguished real artillery tubes from decoys when aerial sensors could not. The U.S. Army’s capstone doctrinal publication during the time of the Kosovo conflict was the 1993fm 100- 5, Operations. This manual series underwent significant revisions in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, including de-emphasis on the operational level of war.27 One difference from the 1986 manual was that the 1993 version of fm 100- 5, Operations, added a chapter on “Operations Other than War.”28 Chapter 1 of this manual, in a section entitled “The American Way of War,” stated that “the American people expect decisive victory and abhor unnecessary casualties. They prefer quick resolution of conflicts and reserve the right to reconsider their support should any of these conditions not be met.”29

22 Before the Bombing These assumptions played out in 1999 with the Army’s deployment of Task Force Hawk with twenty-four Apache attack helicopters, which were not employed in the conflict. General Clark requested these helicopters in the early stages of the campaign, but Gen. Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, overruled their use due to concern for potential casualties. General Shelton claimed that “the anticipated benefit of employing the Apaches against dispersed forces in a high- threat environment did not outweigh the risk to our pilots.”30 The Apache, though slow moving and vulnerable, exists because the U.S. Army believes that it cannot depend exclusively on the U.S. Air Force to provide air support for its deep battle constructs. This attack helicopter saw great success during Operation Desert Storm when employed in concert with ground forces. After all, the Army designed the Apache specifically to destroy second and third echelon Soviet armor with Hellfire missiles before these echelons joined battle at the forward line of troops. Apache helicopters destroyed approximately five hundred Iraqi armored vehicles in the Gulf War.31 Based on assumptions from that conflict, General Clark requested early in the Kosovo campaign that Apache helicopters be based in Macedonia for up- close employment against Serbian tanks.32 Army attack aviation doctrine considers the employment of Apaches in a deep- strike role, as envisioned in Kosovo, as “high-risk, high-payoff operations that must be executed with the utmost care.”33 Clark indicated a willingness to assume this risk but was overruled by General Shelton. In fact, even President Clinton believed that the Apaches were “slow flying” and “vulnerable,” claiming that they were “wisely withheld from combat.”34 Given the sophistication of Serbian air defenses, Clinton’s assessment was accurate. The Apaches would have been at much greater risk of being shot down than the fast-moving, fixed- wing aircraft from high above.

U.S. Air Force The early development of American air power doctrine took place within the U.S. Army, as the Air Corps was initially a subcomponent of the Army’s Signal Corps.35 In 1913 Brig. Gen. George P. Scriven, chief signal officer of the U.S. Army, testified before Congress that “the aeroplane is an adjunct to the cavalry.”36 As such, airplanes could potentially spot

Before the Bombing 23 hostile artillery from the air, but the notion of using aircraft solely in a reconnaissance role to support ground forces did not take root. During World War I units of horse cavalrymen waited behind the trench lines to exploit a breakthrough that never occurred. Personnel in these unused units were shifted to other roles. One such role was the newly formed units that flew airplanes.37 Once these cavalrymen took flight, bypassing the trenches from above, their imaginations took flight also. In cavalry spirit they held on to the concept of the decisive blow, but in application they no longer believed it necessary to deliver war’s decisive blow against a fielded army. Instead, air forces could deliver war’s decisive blow directly against an enemy’s industry, logistics, and command centers. In 1931 Army Chief of Staff Gen. Douglas MacArthur made an agreement with Admiral William Pratt, Chief of Naval Operations, whereby naval air forces would be based primarily in support of the fleet at sea while the U.S. Army’s air arm would be based primarily on land and pursue the development of strategic bombing at longer ranges.38 On 18 September 1947 the U.S. Air Force ended a forty- year association with the Army. Less than a year later, on 21 April 1948, the Key West Agreement further differentiated the roles of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, widening the divide between close air support and strategic bombing priorities in each service.39 The cultural and policy underpinnings of U.S. Air Force doctrine shape its planning assumptions. Those who employ force from the air tend not to view the adversary’s army as a high priority for targeting.40 Instead, once air superiority has been attained, the industrial centers, key leaders, critical infrastructure, political centers of power, or even the enemy’s society become the potential targets for air power because of their vulnerability. This view manifested itself during Operation Allied Force as General Clark disagreed with his air component commander, Lieutenant General Short, over what constituted the enemy center of gravity. Short used the analogy of attacking a snake to describe how he preferred to wage the air campaign; he implied that the head of the snake was Milosevic’s political headquarters in Belgrade along with the critical infrastructure supporting the city, rather than the Serbian army. The problem with the analogy is that a snake’s head is both a weapon system

24 Before the Bombing and a control center for the body, with the latter being harmless. Follow- ing the logic of the analogy, the Serbian army represented the body of the snake. After the war, in Congressional testimony, Lieutenant General Short claimed that he was not allowed to go after targets he preferred to strike:

I’d have gone for the head of the snake on the first night. I’d have turned the lights out, I’d have dropped the bridges across the Danube. I’d have hit five or six political- military headquarters in downtown Belgrade. Milosevic and his cronies would have woken up the first morning asking what the hell was going on.41

This claim, though made after the bombing, was consistent with Short’s assumptions before the bombing. In October 1998 during negotiations with Serbian leaders, Lieutenant General Short described to his counterpart, the commander of the Serbian air force, how the bombing campaign would unfold if Milosevic did not concede to nato’s terms:

You’ve studied the Gulf war and the 1995 campaign in Bosnia. I know you believe you understand how I’m going to do my business. But you’re not even close. No matter what you’ve done, you can’t imagine what it’s going to be like. The speed and violence and the lethality and destruction that is going to occur is beyond anything you can imagine. If, indeed, you’re not going to accept my terms, we need to break this meeting right now. I suggest you go outside, get in your car and ride around the city of Belgrade. Remember it the way it is today. If you force me to go to war against you, Belgrade will never look that way again—never in your lifetime, or your children’s lifetime. Belgrade and your country will be destroyed if you force me to go to war with you.42

Thus, the U.S. Air Force entered the Kosovo campaign with very old assumptions established at air power’s birth by those who first flew past the trenches—Mitchell, Douhet, and Trenchard—believing that the decisive blow could take place somewhere behind the gun lines. These assumptions evolved through the years and reached a new pinnacle with respect to precision bombing in the late 1990s. According to air power theorist John Warden, if enough “centers of gravity” are precisely struck at the same time, then a “system” will go into paralysis.43 Lieutenant General

Before the Bombing 25 Short’s language about cutting the head off of a snake and bombing specific targets in Belgrade indicated that he bought into Warden’s theories to some degree. Leading up to the intervention in Kosovo, the Air Force assumed it could strike with an unprecedented level of accuracy—cleanly cutting off the head of the snake on the opening blow, like a cavalryman descending unseen from the sky as the decisive arm in warfare—were it not for political constraints.

U.S. Navy The U.S. Navy maintains its own separate air force with carrier aviation. Aircraft carriers supported U.S. interventions in both Bosnia and Kosovo. The uss Theodore Roosevelt participated in both operations. Additionally, the Navy provided electronic warfare aircraft such as the ea6- b Prowler in both campaigns because the U.S. Air Force lacks this capability.44 At the onset of Operation Deliberate Force in 1995, the uss Theodore Roosevelt was already in position to contribute sorties alongside the Air Force with a second carrier, the uss America, arriving the second week of September.45 Leading up to the Kosovo campaign, however, the Navy moved an aircraft carrier out of the Mediterranean as part of its normally scheduled rotations. To be fair, the Navy is perpetually deployed, in war or peace, and manages its forces accordingly for purposes of maintenance, upgrade, overhaul, and crew morale. Regardless, by adhering to a strict schedule for the rotation of carriers, the Navy indicated its assumption that the Air Force sufficed to handle the situation in Kosovo, provided that a few ships and submarines remained on station in a supporting role with Tomahawk cruise missiles. As it had done in Bosnia during Operation Deliberate Force and Opera- tion Joint Endeavor, the Navy had to balance participation in the Kosovo campaign with the requirement to provide carrier aviation in support of patrolling no-fly zones in Iraq (Operation Northern Watch and Opera- tion Southern Watch). Additionally, in March 1999 it also had to account for a training exercise with Brazil and several nato navies, and longstanding requirements in the Pacific. In the view of James Phillips and James Anderson, two critics of Clinton’s Balkans policy, intervening in

26 Before the Bombing Kosovo left the United States unprepared to defend other interests because it “forced the U.S. Navy to reshuffle its deployment of aircraft carriers, leaving forces assigned to defend South Korea without a carrier presence.”46 They went on to say, “Operation Allied Force also severely depleted the U.S. arsenal of conventionally armed air-launched cruise missiles, which the United States would need in the event of a crisis in the Persian Gulf or on the Korean Peninsula.”47 In actuality, the Navy did not “reshuffle” its carrier schedule for the conflict. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson and Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig denied General Clark’s request for the uss Enterprise, a second aircraft carrier, holding firm to the Navy’s rule of only keeping aircrews and sailors at sea for six months at a time.48 In addition to carrier aviation, cruise missiles fired from ships or submarines provide a significant long- range precision strike capability and were used extensively throughout the 1990s—particularly in the opening stages of the Operation Desert Storm, Operation Deliberate Force, Operation Infinite Reach (Afghanistan and Sudan), Operation Desert Fox (Iraq), and Operation Allied Force. In August 1998 as a response to embassy bombings by Al-Qaeda in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States launched seventy-five cruise missiles as part of Operation Infinite Reach on suspected terrorist bases of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan alleged to be developing chemical weapons for Al-Qaeda.49 In the aftermath of this attack, bin Laden, who reportedly had departed the Afghanistan site a few hours before the strike, jokingly said, “the attack only killed camels and chickens.”50 Once again, in December 1998, three months before Operation Allied Force, the United States fired naval cruise missiles (as well as air- launched ones from b-52s) against Iraq during Operation Desert Fox.51 By the time of the Kosovo campaign, cruise missile diplomacy was so commonplace that Congress became concerned about depleting the inventory of these missiles.52 In context, each of these five campaigns— compared individually— used more cruise missiles than were fired on Afghanistan in 2001.53 The Navy viewed its capability to project air power from carriers and fire cruise missiles from other vessels as useful in contingency operations.

Before the Bombing 27 This assumption presupposed accurate targeting data for locating the enemy. Moreover, the Navy believed it could project air power without disrupting its regular carrier rotations. Thus, in the Navy’s view, only a minor surge in naval operations sufficed for Operation Allied Force.

U.S. Marine Corps Like the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps has an organic air force consisting of both rotary and fixed- wing aircraft. Unlike the Navy, however, Marine Corps pilots specialize in close air support, viewing their air assets as supplemental firepower for vulnerable ground forces.54 This perspective allowed the Marine Corps to effectively integrate with elements of Task Force Hawk, the U.S. Army’s only commitment during Operation Allied Force, despite the absence of a land component commander. The primary doctrinal role for Marine air power is fire support for ground commanders because their units do not have the same tactical staying power and logistical backbone as Army units. This view of Marine Corps air support emerged during World War II. The U.S. Marines prefer to retain operational control of their air component, as part of the Marine Air Ground Task Force concept. This originates from the Marine Corps’ perpetuation of the institutional memory that they were dropped on the beach during the Battle of Guadalcanal and abandoned by the U.S. Navy without air support. This fear of abandon- ment has been written into their doctrine in the form of the Marine Air Ground Task Force, which calls for limited commitment of Marine air assets for employment in support of other services (than the Navy) unless there are “excess sorties.”55 Subsequent to World War II, tension over Marine Air Ground Task Force doctrine emerged in operations where joint command structures consolidated the air elements of all services under the direction of a single air component commander at the theater level. For example, in the Korean War, an air force command amalgamated all air assets to achieve theater- level efficiencies.56 U.S. Marines vowed that this would never happen again. Yet during the Vietnam War Gen. William Westmoreland’s air deputy, U.S. Air Force Gen. Joseph H. Moore, consolidated the air assets of the services under its Tactical Air Control System, contrary to Marine Corps

28 Before the Bombing preferences.57 Again, during Desert Storm, General Schwarzkopf wanted to maintain control of all joint air forces under a single commander, Lieutenant General Horner, in order to plan and execute the bombing campaign centrally. A compromise was struck whereby the Marine Corps would put aircraft on the air tasking order that would remain in vicinity of their ground forces and under their control.58 In Operation Allied Force, however, there were no U.S. Marines on the ground, so the tension normally generated when organic assets were placed outside their command was less evident. Instead, the Marines’ concern was that they might be called upon for an unforeseen contingency elsewhere, with their organic air assets meanwhile tied up in Kosovo. This same type of argument—that Kosovo was a sideshow tying up resources that might be needed in a more serious crisis elsewhere—manifested itself at the policy level and in public opinion.

U.S. Public and Congress Assumptions Presidential policy is often informed by public opinion and congressional influence. Prior to the start of Operation Allied Force only 46 percent of Americans approved of using military force to intervene in Kosovo.59 Despite this, President Clinton believed the situation warranted military involvement on both moral (humanitarian) and strategic (regional stability) grounds. Given the low level of public support for intervention, Clinton decided on “a low-risk military strategy specifically designed to minimize U.S. casualties in hopes of increasing domestic support for intervention,” according to Thomas Knecht in a study on the impact of public opinion on foreign affairs.60 Public and congressional assumptions regarding the use of air power fit well with this “low- risk” approach. Recent events such as Operation Desert Storm and the 1995 intervention in Bosnia shaped these optimistic assumptions. The perceived success of air power during the Gulf War encouraged its future use as a coercive instrument with “awesome potential” that could be employed with “low cost in American lives,” according to three analysts working for rand Corporation in 1999.61 In relative terms, the U.S. public was less inclined to intervene in Kosovo than in the 1991 Gulf War.62 Nevertheless, public support for intervention in Kosovo was higher

Before the Bombing 29 than it was for intervention in Bosnia in 1995.63 The variance in public opinion hinged on the potential role of ground forces. Americans did not support the notion of employing ground forces concurrently with air forces in a hostile environment.64 On the other hand, Americans supported the idea of troops conducting peacekeeping operations in a permissive environment, subsequent to an agreement compelled by bombing.65 Only in the aftermath of the Gulf War could such a view of operations emerge—an illusory one that entailed air forces bombing adversaries into submission and ground forces mopping up afterward to safeguard peace. With limited strategic objectives, considering a public that was predictably casualty averse in situations that did not entail national survival, air power offered President Clinton a seemingly fitting means to intervene in Kosovo. President Clinton’s 1995 intervention in Bosnia brings to light political considerations regarding potential military casualties that were also a factor in the Kosovo intervention. Public opinion polls indicate, unsurprisingly, that the willingness of Americans to intervene in conflicts depends on what is at stake (interests) and the potential for casualties (risk). As a result of the failed 1993 intervention in Somalia the American public was unwilling to put military lives at risk for interventions deemed as humanitarian in nature.66 Figure 1 indicates how this trend manifested itself in public willingness to intervene in Bosnia, considering various levels of potential casualties. rand obtained the data in this table from a Gallup poll taken in late October 1995 with a sample size of 1,229. Surveyors asked the respondents, “Suppose that you knew that if the United States sent U.S. troops to Bosnia as part of an international peacekeeping force, that no American soldiers would be killed. With this in mind, would you favor or oppose sending U.S. troops to Bosnia? (Then asked if respondent would support with twenty- five, one hundred, and four hundred U.S. troops killed.)”67 Naturally, if the stakes are low, as perceived by Americans in the case of distant humanitarian or peacekeeping efforts, then the public is not willing to risk lives. Given this dynamic and assuming an intervention entails virtually zero casualties, the American public will be overwhelmingly supportive. The trend held true in Bosnia. In November 1996, eleven months after the first U.S. troops deployed to Bosnia, Clinton announced

30 Before the Bombing Fig. 1. Willingness to tolerate casualties in Bosnia, 1995. Source: Eric V. Larson and Bogdan Savych, American Public Support for U.S. Military Operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad (Santa Monica ca: rand, 2005), 68. Copyright 2005 by the rand Cor- poration. Reprinted with permission. that troops would remain for another eighteen months. Writing at that time, New York Times correspondent Elaine Sciolino noted, “In the absence of American casualties in Bosnia, the public no longer seems to be so intent on knowing just when its troops will return from a mission overseas.”68 Public assumptions regarding the use of air power, as shaped by widely held interpretations of the Gulf War and combined with initial concerns over the use of ground forces for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, influenced how politicians in Congress represented their constituencies with regard to intervention in Kosovo. The divide in public opinion on U.S. foreign policy concerning Kosovo was evident in Congress through its chaotic voting on various resolutions. In theory the legislature of a representative democracy votes in a manner that mirrors the society it represents. By design the House

Before the Bombing 31 of Representatives is more fluid than the Senate, where positions move slowly.69 On 11 March 1999 the House passed (219 to 191) a Republican- sponsored resolution authorizing the president to deploy U.S. armed forces to Kosovo as part of a nato peacekeeping force, provided the size of the force did not exceed 15 percent of the combined nato commitment.70 This resolution did not pass in the Senate.71 Leading up to operations in Kosovo, however, the Senate endorsed air strikes whereas the House did not.72 Overwhelmingly, despite partisan rhetoric, members of Congress supported the intervention by providing full funding for supplemental expenditures related to the conflict. Yet this support must be examined in the context of contradictory congressional resolutions during the conflict. These resolutions indicated a lack of consensus on the issue of presidential power to use military force in international conflicts. Congressional positions on Kosovo did not exclusively follow party lines. The majority of Republican leaders were initially reluctant to take a stance on war in the Balkans, purposefully restraining their comments as a political strategy to later saddle blame on the president if the campaign proved unsuccessful.73 Alternatively, at a time when his party was tentative in its views on intervention, Senator John McCain (r-az ) voiced support for intervention in Kosovo.74 As with Bosnia four years earlier most Democratic members of Congress took a hawkish stance against Milosevic’s actions in the prelude to intervention.75 In contrast to this prevailing trend Sena- tor Robert Byrd (d-wv ) strongly asserted congressional prerogative over military intervention by pressing for a vote on the matter.76 Nevertheless, when it came time to cast votes, Byrd fell in line with his party, voting to authorize the president to intervene with military air operations. In a more pronounced position against intervention, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (r-tx ) wrote an editorial for the Wall Street Journal entitled “One Balkan Quagmire Is Enough.”77 Fellow Texan Senator Phil Gramm (r- tx) asked that Hutchison’s article be entered into the Congressional Record, as it encapsulated his position also.78 According to Hutchison, “There is no reasonable number of American ground troops that can end this crisis. . . . Again, as in Bosnia, the U.S. finds itself serving the purposes of the most unsavory elements in an ethnic crisis. We are trying to divide

32 Before the Bombing the acceptable center between Serbian strongman Milosevic on the one side and a violent insurgency group, the kla, on the other.”79 One year after these comments, both Texas senators held firm with their positions and voted against the intervention. On 23 March 1999, one day before the initiation of Operation Allied Force, the Senate voted to approve Senate Concurrent Resolution 21 by 58 to 41.80 The resolution stated that “the President is authorized to conduct military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation with our nato allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”81 Senator Joseph “Joe” Biden Jr. (d-de ) sponsored this resolution together with several Republican cosponsors, including Senators Ted Stevens (r-ak ), Chuck Hagel (r- ne), and Mitch McConnell (r-ky ), indicating support across party lines for U.S. intervention. Senator Stevens initially attempted to add language to the resolution barring funding for ground forces but decided to drop this provision before voting at the request of his Republican colleagues.82 In a 22 February 1999 op- ed in the Washington Post, Vietnam- era U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated, “Kosovo is no more a threat to America than Haiti was to Europe.”83 Kissinger implied that Europeans should deal with regional burdens on their own, just as the United States did in neighboring Haiti. Kissinger added, “We must take care not to stretch ourselves too thin in the face of far less ambiguous threats in the Mid- dle East and Northeast Asia.”84 Ironically, Kissinger’s concern was that Kosovo might become a quagmire like Vietnam. His view struck a chord with Senator James Inhofe (r- ok), who quoted Kissinger’s statement in congressional testimony on 23 March 1999, leading up to the vote on Senate Concurrent Resolution 21.85 The day of the vote, in responding to Senator James Inhofe’s concern of getting involved in a “quagmire,” Biden responded, “This is not a Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which was clearly open ended,” referring to the 1964 resolution that paved the way for greater U.S. involvement in Vietnam.86 In further Senate debate Inhofe stated, “People may lie to you and say this is going to be an airstrike. Anybody who knows anything about military strategy and warfare knows you can’t do it all from the air.”87 Inhofe went on to argue that ground troops would be needed and that their eventual

Before the Bombing 33 deployment would detract from the ability to respond to a more serious crisis elsewhere.88 Notably absent from Senate Concurrent Resolution 21 was any mention of intervening with ground forces. This issue would resurface in the Senate later in the conflict, despite Clinton’s reluctance to pursue ground options.89 Nevertheless, the president entered the conflict with the majority support of the Senate, an irresolute House, and a wary public. Clinton and his party attained political consent for the Kosovo intervention by excluding the use of ground forces at the onset of the campaign.

Policy- Level Assumptions The president, nsc, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff make up the key actors in forming strategic policy. The policy- level assumptions regarding U.S. intervention in Kosovo with air power were mostly optimistic due in part to views shaped by Operation Desert Storm. Before the Kosovo intervention, attempts to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq set a U.S. foreign policy precedent that continued from the George H. W. Bush administration to the Clinton administration and centered on the idea that air power could achieve political aims without involving ground troops. In addition the recent success of Operation Deliberate Force, which took place from 30 August to 20 September 1995, involved key administration officials within the nsc and Joint Staff who were still on board in 1999.90 Alongside this perceived success, however, the failed intervention in Somalia in 1993 still loomed as a cautionary tale during the Clinton administration on foreign policy decisions entailing the use of ground forces. The nsc and Joint Staff served as the medium through which policy assumptions flowed— in both directions— between the president and the armed forces. President Clinton and General Clark were both Rhodes scholars, two years apart in age, who had grown up fifty miles apart from each other in Arkansas. Despite this commonality, Clinton communicated with General Clark “seldom, and formally,” mainly to keep him in check; Clinton believed that “Clark wanted to win so badly that he was not above leaking his doubts about their [nsc and Joint Staff] commitment,” according to Taylor Branch, author ofThe Clinton Tapes and former roommate of Clinton.91

34 Before the Bombing President Clinton’s Assumptions During the 1992 presidential campaign Governor Clinton criticized his opponent, President George H. W. Bush, for inaction in dealing with “the renegade regime of Slobodan Milosevic,” and called for the United States to “take the lead” and conduct “air strikes” against Serbian forces that were interfering with humanitarian aid deliveries in Bosnia.92 In the same speech Clinton compared Slobodan Milosevic to Saddam Hussein due to both individuals similarly being “responsible for the slaughter of innocent civilians.”93 These statements invoked a response from the Bush administration, which claimed that Clinton’s proposal for intervention in the Balkans was a “reckless approach” to the complex political situation in Yugoslavia.94 Upon assuming office Clinton fulfilled his campaign rhetoric by deepening U.S. involvement in the Balkans, spurred in part by the July 1995 massacre at Srebrenica where the Serbian army slaughtered eight thousand Bosnian Muslims.95 On 30 August 1995, the eve of Opera- tion Deliberate Force, Clinton handwrote a note to his chief foreign policy speechwriter Tony Blinken calling for more discussion of the Srebrenica massacre in future speeches.96 A month after the campaign Clinton sent Blinken a Washington Post article with the following two sentences circled:

The accounts now available indicate that the massacres in the Srebrenica area during the week starting July 11 were the worst atrocities committed in Europe since World War II. . . . According to numerous eyewitnesses, the operation to round up draft age Muslim men was personally supervised by Mladic, who was indicted by the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague in July for his alleged participation in earlier atrocities.97

The atrocity at Srebrenica was the justification and impetus fornato ’s military intervention in Bosnia in 1995. The apparent success of Operation Deliberate Force shaped Clinton’s optimistic assumptions regarding the use of air power in Kosovo. Yet it also shaped his caution in employing ground forces. On 15 November 1996, ten days after being re- elected to a second term, Clinton announced that the United States would keep troops in Bosnia for an additional eighteen

Before the Bombing 35 months. He initially alluded to a one- year timetable when the first U.S. troops arrived in Bosnia in December 1995.98 During a 3 December 1995 presidential speech at Smith Army Barracks in Germany to the deploying soldiers of the First Armored Division and their family members, a woman in the crowd held up a sign that read, “The President Who Stole Christmas.”99 Another sign stated, “Draft Dodger Go Home.”100 It was amid this backdrop of criticism that Clinton also approached the Kosovo intervention though he was no longer as concerned with public opinion during his second term.101 In his autobiography, My Life, Clinton wrote that he “hoped we [nato] could avoid sending ground troops [to Kosovo] until their mission was to keep the peace,” but later stated, “I was ready to send troops in if necessary, but I still believed [in May 1999] the air war would succeed.”102 Based on the U.S. experience in Bosnia, Clinton assumed that air power could set the conditions whereby ground forces could be employed in a risk- free manner. The cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan along with the brief bombing campaign in Iraq, both in 1998, indicated that Clinton had few reservations about the political fallout from employing air power unilaterally against nations without the capacity to respond in kind. Within an alliance framework his reservations were probably even less so. Early in the Kosovo bombing campaign Clinton stated, “the reason we went forward with air actions is because we thought there was some chance it would deter Mr. Milosevic based on two previous examples— number one, last October [1998] in Kosovo, when he was well poised to do the same thing; and number two, in Bosnia [1995], where there were 12 days of nato attacks over a 20-day period.”103 Throughout his presidency Clinton’s schedule had three hours per day blocked off for reading books suggested by his staff and other close advisors. In February 1999 while on a trip to Mexico with Senator Biden, Clinton found an opportunity to discuss the Kosovo situation to get a feel for the Senate’s position on intervention. Biden recalled, “All the way down on the plane I was reading a book about the Balkans and he saw me reading it. . . . And you know how he is, he asked me to give it to him to read. And I said, ‘No, get your own copy.’ ”104 The book wasHistory of the Balkans by Barbara Jelavich, part of a two-volume series.105 The first volume

36 Before the Bombing deals with movements for national sovereignty in the Balkans during the nineteenth century, and volume two deals with internal development of states in the region in the twentieth century, with a particular focus on the Cold War and internal development of regimes in the 1980s.106 Biden assumed Clinton later read the book.107 In any case, it was widely reported that Clinton read Balkan Ghosts by Robert Kaplan, but it is highly unlikely that he bought into the thesis that “ancient passions and intractable hatreds for outsiders” would make it difficult for outside powers to influence the region with success.108 Regardless of his views on air power, it is probable that Clinton was well-versed in the political intricacies of the Balkan region from a variety of perspectives.

National Security Council Assumptions Under President Clinton, the nsc operated based on guidance outlined in the 1993 Presidential Decision Directive/nsc- 2, which expanded membership of the nsc to include the Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. representative to the United Nations, the assistant to the president for economic policy, and the chief of staff to the president. The attorney general attended meetings pertaining to covert activities on an invitational basis. Additionally, a provision was added for permanent and ad hoc interagency working groups, established at the direction of the deputies committee.109 Leading up to the U.S. intervention in Kosovo the key members of the nsc were Vice President Al Gore, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and Secretary of Defense William Cohen. In addition, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton and Director of Central Intel- ligence George Tenet attended meetings as statutory advisors. Several of the first- term nsc principals, particularly defense secretaries Les Aspin and William Perry, Gen. Colin Powell, Gen. John Shalikashvili, and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, played an influential role in curtailing Balkan intervention during crises in Clinton’s first term. From 1997 to 2001 National Security Advisor Sandy Berger chaired meetings of the principals committee and played a key role in shaping Kosovo policy.110 As President Clinton’s special Balkans envoy, Richard “Dick” Hol- brooke gave advice to nsc principals during the Bosnian and Kosovo interventions, mentioning in “eyes only” diplomatic cables to the nsc

Before the Bombing 37 principal advisors that he recommended brief periods of bombing as part of a negotiation strategy.111 He concluded one of his cables to Perry, Lake, Albright, and Shalikashvili during Operation Deliberate Force with “this recommendation should not be read as a call for a sustained and prolonged campaign. We are not Sarajevo’s air force and this is not ‘Rolling Thunder’ [a U.S. bombing campaign during the Vietnam War]”112 Earlier in the same cable, referencing another air campaign during the Vietnam War, Hol- brooke said, “This is not a recommendation for a Linebacker- type campaign [another U.S. bombing campaign during the Vietnam War]. Indeed, there will undoubtedly come a time when, from a political/diplomatic point of view, suspending the bombing will be more useful than continuing it.”113 This statement highlighted the view among most of the nsc that bombing was more useful for gaining diplomatic leverage than in physically compelling Milosevic’s army to cease its activities. The vice president shared this mindset, yet he focused mostly on gaining diplomatic leverage over Milosevic through talks with allies rather than by employing military force. Vice President Gore supported the idea of air strikes in Kosovo but was strongly against the idea of using ground forces.114 As a leading Democratic contender for the upcoming 2000 elections, Gore did not want to be associated with the intervention if things went sour, so he rarely voiced his opinions on Kosovo in official meetings.115 In public, however, Gore championed the humanitarian aspects of U.S. policy in the Balkans, announcing that the U.S. would take in refugees from Kosovo.116 Additionally, he assisted with diplomatic components of U.S. strategy by personally calling Rus- sian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov to notify him of the impending bombing on the eve of nato’s campaign and by being the administration’s primary contact with Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russian special envoy for Kosovo.117 Leon Fuerth served as the national security advisor for Gore. In this role, Fuerth attended both the nsc principals and deputies meetings on Kosovo.118 Fuerth’s previous experience as a Foreign Service officer in the Balkans proved useful in garnering international support for sanctions against Milosevic.119 Fuerth represented Gore’s position on Kosovo in nsc meetings and focused mainly on diplomatic solutions to the crisis.120 In contrast Secretary of State Madeleine Albright became most associated with military intervention in Kosovo. Born in Prague in 1937, Albright’s

38 Before the Bombing strong conviction to stop Milosevic stemmed from her upbringing. Her family fled their native Czechoslovakia after the Nazis invaded in March 1939, and several of her family members died during the Holocaust.121 Given this background, Albright felt a personal connection with the refugees who were being evicted from Balkan regions by Milosevic’s regime.122 In 1999 Time magazine correspondents referred to the intervention in Kosovo as “Madeleine’s War,” a phrase echoed by supporters and critics alike.123 Surrounded as she was by a cabinet from the Vietnam generation, Albright highlighted the different context in which she saw events:

My mind-set is Munich; most of my generation’s is Vietnam. . . . I saw what happened when a dictator was allowed to take over a piece of country and the country went down the tubes. And I saw the opposite during the war when America joined the fight. For me, America is really, truly the indispensable nation. I’ve never seen America as an imperialist or colonialist or meddling country.124

In April 1993 Albright advised President Clinton to use air strikes to destroy Bosnian Serb heavy weaponry and the bridges used to support these forces’ resupply.125 General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, convinced Clinton to abstain from using force.126 Dur- ing an exchange with Powell on this matter, Albright forcefully asked, “What’s the point of having this superb military you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”127 In his autobiography Powell recalled Albright’s confrontation with him over the Bosnia matter, saying in frustration, “I thought I would have an aneurysm.”128 Powell found support for his position, however, with national security advisor Anthony Lake, who compared the situation to Vietnam. Lake took Powell’s side, saying that military officers had not spoken up against the Vietnam War, as Powell was duly interjecting in the case of Bosnia.129 Nevertheless, after exactly four years as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and five months after his confrontation with Albright, Powell retired. His successor, Gen. John Shalikashvili, assumed the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman position on 25 October 1993 and served until 20 September 1997.130 On 9 August 1993 Secretary of Defense Leslie Aspin sent President Clinton a memorandum that recommended either General Shalikashvili,

Before the Bombing 39 a U.S. Army officer, or Marine Gen. Joseph Hoar as the next Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman after General Powell’s retirement.131 The memorandum’s enclosures had detailed biographical papers on both candidates, including selected comments dating back from officer evaluations on Hoar as a young captain as well as Defense Secretary Aspin’s comments on how each general might advise the president (and speak in public) on the use of force for limited interventions.132 Included within the recommendation package were video segments of Shalikashvili and Hoar’s testimony (as nato and centcom commanders, respectively) before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 20 April 1993.133 On 13 August President Clinton read the files of both candidates and watched recordings of their recent Senate testimonies to prepare for interviews with each general.134 At one point during Shalikashvili’s testimony Senator Sam Nunn (d- ga) asked Shalikashvili whether air strikes might be successful against Serbian artillery.135 At the time the Serbian army was shelling various Muslim towns and cities in Bosnia, sparking calls for intervention.136 Shalikashvili carefully responded, “militarily, it can be done,” but later admitted, based on questioning from Senator John Warner (r-va ), that “the effectiveness of air attacks would decline over time as the Serbs hid their artillery.”137 Secretary Aspin urged Clinton to watch this particular section of the testimony: “When asked by Senators about the use of airpower to suppress artillery in the Balkans, he [Shalikashvili] stressed that in the future, we should expect to see artillery deployed next to churches and hospitals rather than in the classic manner.”138 Additionally, Aspin noted that Shalikashvili had “the perfect Army wife” and described Hoar as “an Irish Gary Cooper” whose wife, Charlie, was a talented psy- chologist.139 As revealed through Clinton’s interview notes, the reason he selected General Shalikashvili over General Hoar, who would have been the first U.S. Marine to serve as chairman if selected, was due in part to the different answers each general gave to Clinton’s first two questions regarding Balkan intervention and peacekeeping operations during their separate interviews.140 From 1997 to 2001 Gen. Hugh Shelton served as Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman. General Shelton had a personal dislike for Gen. Wesley Clark,

40 Before the Bombing the saceur. In his autobiography, Without Hesitation, Shelton accused Clark of being overly concerned with his career.141 He condescendingly referred to him as a “Rhodes scholar and West Point valedictorian” who could “brief well in front of the cameras” but was unable to come up with a “solid plan” for Kosovo.142 In describing Clark, Shelton wrote, “both Cohen and I thought he tended to be somewhat of a loose cannon at times, and absolutely in it for whatever was best for Wes.”143 Secretary of Defense William Cohen, a former Republican senator from Maine, joined Clinton’s cabinet in 1997 as the second Republican defense secretary to work for a Democratic president.144 As a senator, Cohen expressed disagreement with Clinton’s decision to intervene in Bosnia. During his confirmation hearing this issue resurfaced when Senator John Warner (r- va) asked about an exit strategy for peacekeepers stationed in Bosnia. Warner pointed out that Cohen had opposed the intervention in the first place: “You and I took the floor many times on the issue of Bos- nia, and we stood toe to toe in resisting that because we did not recognize it as vital.”145 Cohen responded by defending Clinton’s eighteen month timeline: “It’s telling our European friends that we’re not going to make an unlimited commitment to that region.”146 At his confirmation hearing Cohen clearly differentiated between “vital” and “less than vital” interests, with Balkan interventions falling into the latter category.147 Cohen went on to explain that less than vital interests could turn into vital interests in the case of Bosnia if instability spread further in the region.148 As national security advisor, Sandy Berger quietly shaped policy behind the scenes while other principal actors such as Albright were more publicly associated with the Kosovo intervention. In early 1998 Berger expressed doubts about whether a bombing campaign could be explained to Congress.149 Yet in considering the actual application of air power, Berger stated,

We had an advantage of 100-to- 1/1000- to- 1 from the air. If we were forced to go in on the ground in deep summer, it would have been maybe 3- to- 1 or 2-to- 1. Milosevic would have been able to be on much more equal grounds with nato as we came over these mountains, through the caves

Before the Bombing 41 that Tito had built in Yugoslavia. An equally good school of thought says that Milosevic would have loved to get us into a ground war.150

In nsc principal and deputy meetings from June 1998 to March 1999 Berger worked closely with other members of the committee to outline U.S. objectives, garner nato support, and synchronize the timing of the nato activation order with administration statements.151 The potential employment of ground forces was not discussed in these meetings.152 At the onset of policy-level planning, in a 19 June 1998 meeting the nsc outlined a strategy of “sticks” and “carrots” that applied in different ways to both Milosevic and Kosovars, as both sides appeared as potential instigators in escalating the conflict.153 Within this framework Berger viewed the “graduated use of air power” as just another “stick” to be used in negotiations.154 nato Assumptions nato’s European policy makers contended with varying levels of public support. Given this context, each nation’s policy makers and military forces had different assumptions relating to the intervention. In addition, the 1995 intervention in Bosnia shaped the political and military assumptions of nato’s European members. As the nato commander, General Clark played a critical role in holding the alliance together. Clark and his staff faced disparate challenges in maintaining alliance cohesion based on the varying levels of public opinion within nato member nations. European public approval of nato’s intervention was varied among the nations: United Kingdom, 67 percent; France, 62 percent; Germany, 54 percent; Italy, 51 percent; Belgium, 42 percent; Portugal, 41 percent; Spain, 39 percent; and Greece, 2 percent.155 In concert with public sentiment British and French heads of state favored intervening in Kosovo. British Prime Minister Tony Blair appeared to be the most hawkish of nato’s leaders owing to his belief that Milo- sevic’s actions were similar to the genocide committed by Nazis during World War II. Blair said, “I saw it essentially as a moral issue,” and he was backed by overwhelming public support for intervention.156 In addition,

42 Before the Bombing Blair was more in favor of introducing ground troops than any other member of nato.157 At the same time, French President Jacques Chirac, during a 19 February 1999 conference in the White House with President Clinton, stated, “Our agreement on the present problems in Kosovo is an unqualified agreement, it’s a complete agreement.”158 Leading up to the Kosovo intervention, the French Parliament was marginalized; its members learned of French participation in air strikes via television rather than by official notification from their head of state.159 Parliament eventually received notification from Chirac forty- eight hours after the air campaign commenced, contrary to the spirit of the French constitution.160 In contrast, other European leaders sought approval from their parliaments prior to their participation in the bombing.161 Italy and Germany’s closely divided public opinion regarding intervention mirrored the positions expressed by their political leaders. Italians preferred an all-or- none approach in terms of military force for the Kosovo intervention due to concerns that a drawn-out campaign would create problems with the flow of refugees into their country.162 Italy provided more basing for nato aircraft than any other country participating in the campaign.163 Italian Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema and Defense Minister Carlo Scognamiglio suggested that Italy would provide troops for a ground war if nato went that route.164 Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini did not support the use of ground troops, however.165 In any case, it is likely that D’Alma and Scognamiglio would have prevailed in Italian debate over ground troops had Clinton not ruled it out. Like nato’s other members, Italy made assumptions pertaining to Kosovo based on the 1995 Bosnia intervention. As Prime Minister D’Alma stated, “We looked to the Bosnian precedent when limited air raids had brought him [Milosevic] to the negotiating table.”166 Operation Allied Force was Germany’s first major combat operation since World War II, and the German Luftwaffe would bomb some of the same locations that the Nazis had attacked fifty years earlier.167 It was amid this historic sensitivity that German political leaders approached the Kosovo intervention. Despite significant opposition from the pacifist Green Party, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder

Before the Bombing 43 garnered political support for participation in the air campaign.168 In contrast to Italy, however, Chancellor Schroder publicly opposed the use of ground forces.169 The overwhelming Greek opposition to intervention in Kosovo stemmed more from anti-American sentiment than from common ties with Serbia. As Greek journalist Alexis Papachelas put it, “The Greek reaction to the Kosovo crisis was the result of 80 percent of the Greek anti-American feelings and only 20 percent of the Greek solidarity towards the Ser- bian people.”170 This animosity was due in part to U.S. policy vis- à- vis Macedonia, where the U.S. had deployed a small contingent of troops to deter Serbian aggression in 1993.171 As with Italy, Greek politicians were also concerned about the potential for a massive refugee influx that could follow the instability generated by the imminent bombing. Kostas Kara- manlis, president of the Greek Conservative Party, believed that nato’s intervention would spur “the emergence of a great wave of refugees who will seek shelter in neighbouring and more prosperous countries such as Greece.”172 Greek Conservative Party members also expressed concern that U.S. interests in the Balkans stemmed from the area’s significance for the flow of oil and gas supplies from the Caucasus because other regions had similar humanitarian problems in which the United States had expressed little interest.173 In a speech at Princeton University in January 1999 Greek Prime Minister Apostolos Kaklamanis attempted to provide Americans with insight into the Greek perspective on Kosovo intervention:

The Americans have to seriously consider the consequences of this war; especially the possibility of causing permanent instability in the whole Balkan Peninsula. Perhaps for the United States this is not a major issue, because Americans are thousands of miles away from the conflict. How would they feel if this war was taking place on their own continent?174

Despite this sentiment Greek politicians were also concerned with maintaining their longstanding nato ties, so they elected to remain somewhat neutral in the conflict rather than diminish their longterm strategic role in the alliance.175 It was quite unlike the outcome of the Melian dialogue

44 Before the Bombing in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, though the sentiments were similar.176 nato Commander and Military Assumptions As nato commander, General Clark’s assumptions regarding military intervention and the use of air power shaped the manner the alliance carried out the war. In contrast, Britain and France, who were more apt to use ground forces, had different assumptions and played an overlooked role in the 1995 Bosnia campaign. During the Bosnia campaign, Clark’s experiences as a military advisor to Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs, solidified political assumptions formed early in his career. In his thesis for a master’s degree in military art and science in 1975, as a student at the Command and General Staff College, Capt. Wesley Clark wrote,

Interventions whose purpose is to support friendly governments or stabilize political situations have quite justifiably had to accept a high degree of constraint, down to the lowest tactical levels. Such operations are intrinsically civil-military in nature and seem to work best when the shock effect of military power can be exerted in coordination with civil and international law and without reliance on overt violence. . . . The desirability of any particular objective will often be in inverse proportion to the violence necessary to effect its seizure. . . . At every level the political and diplomatic impact of military actions must be carefully considered in military decision- making.177

His views were based upon examination of seven contingency operations conducted by the U.S. military during the Cold War. These views foreshadowed the nature of operations in Kosovo and indicated that Clark had an understanding of the type of challenges he would face later on in his career. In Waging Modern War, Clark recounted how he and many of his peers were concerned about the “fallacies of gradualism” after their personal involvement in Vietnam.178 In fact, these concerns inspired him to write the thesis while a student at Fort Leavenworth.179 One of the contingencies Clark examined in his 1975 thesis was Opera- tion Rolling Thunder, an air campaign in Vietnam that took place from

Before the Bombing 45 1965 to 1968.180 When thinking back to his thesis research in 1975, in 2001 Clark wrote, “It was clear that the U.S. effort to halt North Vietnamese support of the fighting in South Vietnam by ‘signaling’ U.S. resolve through carefully constrained, politically designed bombing, which avoided seeking a decisive impact, had been a failure.”181 In Waging Modern War, Clark argued that the failure in Vietnam was because the “pace and intensity of the campaign” was insufficient due to political constraints.182 In the same section of the book, fast forwarding past the Gulf War, Clark revealed his assumptions on how military technology had evolved since the Vietnam War. In addition to these broad- based foundational assumptions on military interventions, in Waging Modern War Clark revealed his assumptions pertaining to the advancement of precision- strike weapons technology in the 1990s. He wrote that the Gulf War brought public awareness of these types of weapon systems.183 Since the Gulf War, according to Clark, additional advances such as Global Positioning System (gps)– guided munitions and “precision intelligence” offered an even greater capability.184 In contrast, his assumptions about the capabilities of ground forces were less optimistic:

Ground forces had a few new weapons also, but they lacked the combination of reliable striking power, action from a distance, and controlled risk- taking that airplanes and missiles can provide. Ground combat retains the possibility of turning nasty and unpredictable at close quarters; its weapons— tanks, ground artillery, and infantry fighting vehicles— tend to be more numerous and less controllable than the air platforms; and the crews are less experienced, and more vulnerable.185

Thus, Clark viewed air power as more precise and less risky than the use of ground forces— a view shared by policy makers in the United States as well as some, but not all, nato allies. In contrast, Britain and France had more optimistic assumptions on the utility of ground forces, mirrored by their high public support for intervention. After the United States, Britain and France contributed the most resources to Operation Deliberate Force in 1995. nato flew a total of

46 Before the Bombing 3,515 sorties (of all types, not just strike sorties) during the air campaign over Bosnia. Of these, the United States flew 2,318 (65.9 percent), the United Kingdom flew 326 (9.3 percent), and France flew 284 (8.1 percent).186 Additionally, the contribution of artillery by Britain and France during Operation Deliberate Force added an overlooked capability to the campaign that proved highly capable—more so than air power—at shorter ranges. In synchronization with nato’s artillery shelling and aerial bombing, the Croatian and Bosnian armies launched significant ground offensives against the Serbs.187 Altogether, it was a combined- arms operation. Despite these facts, political and military leaders in the United States perceived air power as the decisive contribution to the Bosnian campaign. Yet in all the sorties, allied air forces only expended 708 precision- guided munitions and 318 nonprecision bombs.188 Bad weather combined with a four-day bombing pause for political reasons limited the number of days of bombing to only twelve out of twenty.189 In comparing the challenges of Bosnia to those of bombing in flat open desert with clear skies, former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Merrill McPeak said, “Imagine flying over the Blue Ridge Mountains at 600 miles an hour . . . in overcast [conditions] . . . and picking out the right target down there somewhere in the woods.”190 Alongside the air commitment, the British army provided two batteries of 105- mm towed artillery, consisting of twelve guns, combined with one battery of the French army’s 155- mm self- propelled artillery, consisting of eight guns.191 In addition, the French Foreign Legion and Royal Netherland Marines provided three companies of 120-mm mortars.192 Altogether, nato referred to this combined package as the Rapid Reaction Force (rrf), led by British Royal Marine Maj. Gen. David Pennefather.193 The combined rrf package established its guns at Mount Igman, Bosnia and Herzegovina.194 From this location, less than twenty kilometers from Sarajevo, the allied artillery could range the Serbian guns that had besieged Sarajevo since 5 April 1992.195 To find the Serbian guns, the Royal Netherlands Army provided one platoon of a/n tqp-36 counter-battery radars.196 In addition to the radars, the British army brought along a newly developed system known as halo

Before the Bombing 47 (short for Hostile Artillery Locator).197 The British army contracted a company to develop this system on a six- month timeline specifically for employment in Bosnia to break the siege of Sarajevo.198 In contrast to large radars such as Northrop Grumman’s a/n tqp- 36 the halo system consists of small, eight- pound devices placed on the ground, with coordinates plotted by gps and connected by a digital network to a computer that runs algorithms to determine the location of artillery by triangulating sounds.199 Thehalo system is passive, consisting only of directional microphones, so it does not emit a radar signature that gives away its location.200 The low- technology technique of sound ranging to determine the location of hostile artillery originated during World War I.201 Yet the addition of networking, computers, and gps plotting of known positions brings capacity to this old technique that is far beyond what the human ear, compasses, and paper maps could achieve in 1917. Low- tech microphones and high-tech radars lack the glamor of jet aircraft, so it is natural that the role of British and French artillery in Bosnia is forgotten. Each of the British and French guns could fire at a sustained rate of six rounds per minute in any weather, day or night. Given these rates of fire, the sixteen- gun positions at Mount Igman, excluding mortars, were capable of firing 7,200 rounds in just one hour— far more rounds than the 1,026 bombs dropped by aircraft during the entire campaign.202 In an actual scenario, however, artillery requires additional time to adjust and fire at new positions, so it is unlikely that the maximum mathematical hourly volume of fire was shot in Bosnia. Furthermore, artillery rounds have far less explosive impact than the two- thousand- pound gbu- 10 or gbu- 28 dropped by nato aircraft. Nevertheless, in the weeks leading up to the start of the air campaign, halo and a/n tqp-36 tracked Serbian artillery locations using their sensors. On 30 August 1995, the opening day of the campaign, British and French guns fired around six hundred rounds per hour, according to The Herald, a Scottish newspaper.203 Com- bining this rate of fire with the average ninety- six- pound weight of an artillery shell illustrates that one hour of firing delivered 57,600 pounds of ordinance.204 Even with this conservative estimate of artillery fire, British and French guns delivered in just a few hours far more ordinance than nato aircraft did in the entire campaign.205

48 Before the Bombing Forty- eight hours into the campaign, the un headquarters in New York discovered that the rrf was conducting counter-battery fire missions and ordered it to stop what the un deemed as “offensive” operations.206 Yet the air campaign went on for ten more days, though Sarajevo no longer experienced the daily casualties associated with Serbian shelling for the first time since 1992. Despite the prevailing American view that air power silenced the Serbian guns around Sarajevo, it was actually British and French artillery that dealt the decisive tactical blow.207 Meanwhile, nato’s future commander would make different assumptions concerning the employment of military force during the 1995 Bosnia campaign. Wesley Clark’s thinking on military interventions, from a political perspective, was also shaped by the 1995 intervention in Bosnia. Dur- ing the U.S. intervention in Bosnia, Lieutenant General Clark served as a military advisor to the Balkans envoy Richard Holbrooke.208 In this role he gained firsthand experience with the political negotiations with Milosevic. In the middle of Operation Deliberate Force, from 1– 5 September 1995, nato commander Gen. George Joulwan had ordered a bombing pause to allow time for negotiations.209 Initially, Joulwan intended the pause to be for only twenty- four hours.210 Hol- brooke and Clark requested a longer pause to buy more time to strike a deal, and General Joulwan reluctantly agreed.211 Milosevic agreed to withdraw from Bosnia, but on 5 September 1995 nato reconnaissance assets observed Serbian heavy weapons still in the vicinity of Sarajevo, so bombing resumed.212 Lieutenant General Clark’s assumptions, shaped by Vietnam, were reaffirmed by Bosnia— there would be no bombing pause during the Kosovo campaign.

U.S. and nato Objectives in Kosovo On 24 March 1999 President Clinton addressed the nation to announce that the United States and nato allies had initiated air strikes against Serbian forces in Kosovo. During the speech President Clinton stated three U.S. objectives: first “to demonstrate the seriousness of nato’s purpose,” second “to deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians,” and third “if necessary, to seriously damage the Serbian military’s capacity to harm the people of Kosovo.”213 He summed up U.S. objectives in

Before the Bombing 49 Kosovo by saying, “If President Milosevic will not make peace, we will limit his ability to make war.”214 He emphasized, “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.”215 He thus implied that ground forces would not be used to influence Milosevic’s capitulation and that U.S. ground forces would not be involved until later in the campaign as part of a nato peacekeeping force, and only after Milosevic accepted a peace agreement.216 Accordingly, the United States constrained the nato military intervention in Kosovo to use air power exclusively to attain the campaign objectives. As the leading member of nato, the United States predetermined this constraint for the alliance member nations, although most other nato countries were also hesitant to commit ground forces.217 Due to concerns regarding the flow of refugees, the geographic proxim- ity of various nato members to Kosovo was a considerable factor in the degree of support each country was willing to commit for Operation Allied Force. Among the alliance’s nineteen members, positions with respect to intervention varied. British Prime Minister Tony Blair had a hawkish stance on intervention, as evident in his call for using ground forces from the onset. Due to apprehension over refugee flows, Italy called for a temporary pause in the bombing after it had already committed aircraft. Greece was reluctant to participate in the conflict and attempted to remain neutral. Hungary, nato’s newest member at the time, was hesitant to intervene because of its shared border with Serbia. Fourteen members of the nato alliance committed aircraft, twelve of which also participated in air combat operations.218 The twelve participants that flew actual combat sorties were the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Turkey.219 The United States contributed approximately 70 percent of the sorties during Operation Allied Force, yet it was highly dependent on nato consensus for the overall success of the campaign.220 Strategically, alliance consensus presented a unified front against Milosevic. Operationally, consensus was necessary for the basing of aircraft and clearance of airspace. On 12 April 1999 nato headquarters in Belgium issued a press release stating that air strikes would continue until President Milosevic complied with the following five demands:

50 Before the Bombing 1) a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression; 2) the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces; 3) the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence; 4) the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations; 5) the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords, in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.221

These demands equated to the political objectives of nato’s air campaign and were reaffirmed on 23 April 1999 by all nineteen member nations.222 nato spokesperson Jamie Shea reinforced these objectives in daily press briefings throughout the conflict. Despite their disagreements throughout the campaign, the nato alliance remained cohesive based on the premise that ground forces would not be used. After the war German Gen. Klaus Naumann, who served as nato’s military committee chairman, reluctantly admitted that “the issue of ground forces was very divisive in the Alliance. Some nations without any necessity to do so ruled it out long before we started the bombing campaign. We knew that we would not get consensus on ground forces, so we backed off in order to maintain consensus.”223 Throughout the campaign, Milosevic hoped this consensus would break; at times it appeared on the verge of doing so.224 The large influx of refugees across Italy’s borders sparked Amadeo de Franchi, Italy’s nato representative, to call for a pause in the bombing due to worries that tourists might cancel plans to vacation in Venice during Easter.225 Yet the alliance held strong and quelled this discord. An alliance official responded to Italy’s proposal by asking, “Can you square your conscience with a bombing pause that gives President Slobodan Milosevic ten extra days to kill people?”226 Critics such as retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Buster Glosson, who ran the air campaign during the Gulf War, claimed that fighting a war by consensus limited U.S. strategy and caused the campaign to drag on longer than necessary.227 Nonetheless, maintaining nato consensus was a central component of U.S. strategy in Kosovo— without it the mission would have failed. But the process of

Before the Bombing 51 getting fourteen nations to agree on targeting matters diluted the impact of air power. In the end nato prevailed, yet the bombing took longer than expected to achieve its results. By the end of Operation Allied Force over one million refugees had fled Kosovo. In time most would return, but for those who had suffered the loss of relatives Milosevic’s damage was irreparable. The peace process would not be easy.

Summary of Assumptions At the strategic level, policy makers’ assumed that ground forces were not required to accomplish the stated political objectives in Kosovo. This speaks to a larger underlying assumption— common among policy makers, military leaders, and the general public—regarding the efficacy of air power to degrade the capacity of mobile ground forces. The divergence in military opinions centered on the preferred technique rather than the actual capability of air power. Leading up to Operation Allied Force the U.S. Army and Air Force had differing views on how to limit the capacity of the Serbian military. The 1991 Gulf War and the 1995 campaign in Bosnia had shaped military service perspectives on air power. From the Army perspective, destroying tanks and artillery through precision aerial bombing limited Serbian military capacity. From the Air Force perspective, bombing Serbian leadership, command centers, critical infrastructure, and resources (such as fuel, ammunition, and power generation) indirectly degraded the effectiveness of the Serbia’s fielded forces, more so than targeting them directly. Nevertheless, both viewpoints assumed that air power could quickly accomplish the Kosovo campaign objectives, albeit with different techniques. The U.S. strategy in Kosovo, by exclusively relying upon air power, did not link to the three stated U.S. objectives in Kosovo. Ruling out the use of ground forces contradicted the first objective of demonstrating nato’s resolve; it revealed that the United States perceived the nato alliance as so fragile that it might fall apart if called upon to employ the full depth of its resources. Using air power to achieve the second objective of deterring genocide assumed that bombing would not spur increased levels of atrocity. Finally, solely using air power to achieve the third objective of

52 Before the Bombing limiting the Serbian military’s capacity to harm Kosovars was the most noteworthy assumption in terms of the operational capability of air forces to find and destroy ground forces. This latter assumption is the primary focus of the next three chapters, with implications that would resonate later during the air campaign over Libya in 2011.

Before the Bombing 53 2 The Bombing Begins

The newspapers and magazines that fed the American mind— for books upon this impatient continent had become simply material for the energy of collectors— were instantly a coruscation of war pictures and of headlines that rose like rockets and burst like shells. — H. G. Wells, The War in the Air, 1908

On 24 March 1999 nato initiated Operation Allied Force, a campaign of limited air strikes against the Serbian forces of Slobodan Milosevic. During the operation, the news media captured events in a manner that shaped perceptions that the bombing was “clean” in light of new developments with precision munitions. When the bombs failed to hit their targets— or worse, when they mistakenly hit the wrong targets—the news media sought quick explanations from those who were waging the campaign. At a cursory glance one might blame the media for applying an unrealistic level of scrutiny during the campaign, but in reality the media merely reflected the larger views of the American public regarding air power. During the Gulf War, the U.S. military sold the American people a sanitized view of war, one based upon significant investment in precision munition guidance systems and aerial sensors as a way to ensure that military forces struck only the right targets while leaving innocent bystanders unscathed. Global audiences watching the Kosovo campaign expected the bombing to be clean based on this superficial understanding of contemporary war. At the start of the operation nato had 344 military aircraft positioned at bases in Europe.1 Of these, 214 were U.S. aircraft, and 130 belonged to nato allies.2 In addition, two b-2s flew fifteen hours from Whiteman

54 Air Force Base in Missouri and dropped thirty-two Joint Direct Attack Munitions (jdams) in their combat debut on the opening night of the operation.3 In relative terms, the overall size of the initial Kosovo air package was one- tenth of that committed to Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and similar in size to the force committed for Operation Desert Fox, the four-day bombing of Iraq in 1998.4 By June 1999 the total number of nato aircraft in Europe was over one thousand.5 Alongside this commitment, the U.S. Army deployed twenty-four Apache helicopters to Albania, though these were not used in the conflict.6 In the course of the operation, the U.S. commitment swelled to 731 aircraft, and that of the Allies doubled to a size of around 300 aircraft.7 Operation Allied Force consisted of three phases. Phase I covered the first three days of the air campaign and focused on Serbian air defense systems. Phase II started on day four of the campaign and encompassed strikes against military targets in Kosovo and parts of Serbia below the 44th parallel. nato transitioned to phase III on day nine of the campaign. This phase added operations north of the 44th parallel, which included Belgrade, and incorporated strikes on civilian infrastructure. This latter phase was the most lengthy of the campaign, lasting until 10 June 1999 when the bombing ended. The perceptions of allied leaders, U.S. policy makers, the Ameri- can public, the U.S. Congress, and military leaders evolved during the campaign. Initially these groups shared the common outlook of a short operation, with Milosevic capitulating after a few days of bombing. As the campaign dragged on, however, perceptions were less optimistic and began to diverge. Two days into the campaign, Italy called for a bombing pause in order to renew diplomatic efforts.8 A few days later, on 31 March 1999, Pope John Paul II echoed this sentiment by proposing a bombing pause during Easter weekend.9 When Gen. Wesley Clark transitioned to phase III of the operation, France, Germany, Italy, and Greece resisted, arguing that they did not want to “escalate the bombing” past what they established in “war plans” on 13 October 1998.10 Subsequently, during the third phase of the operation, U.S. policy makers and members of Congress (from both parties) elevated the debate over the possibility of introducing ground troops.11

The Bombing Begins 55 Amid the growing political fervor for introducing ground troops, U.S. public support for a ground option steadily dropped, from a high of 46 percent in favor of ground combat in April 1999, to a low of only 26 percent in favor by the final week of the campaign in June.12 The drop in public support for ground combat was likely due to a growing perception that the air campaign was working. Alongside polls indicating a lack of support for using ground forces, however, other polls indicated that Americans were willing to support a ground war if the air campaign failed. An abc News/Nightline poll taken in April 1999 demonstrated this proclivity, tempered with the likelihood of casualties. When asked their opinion on including ground troops, 57 percent of U.S. respondents supported sending ground troops if the air campaign failed. When asked their opinion again after considering the possibility that there might be as many as one hundred, five hundred, or one thousand casualties, the same respondents’ levels of support dropped to 37 percent, 31 percent, and 26 percent, respectively.13 Political and military leaders in the United States mirrored the sentiments revealed in polling data concerning the commitment of ground forces. Despite President Clinton’s initial reluctance for a ground option, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright argued for “a credible threat of ground invasion.”14 Additionally, in a 28 March 1999 interview with the New York Times, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Ryan stated, “I don’t know if we can do it without ground troops.”15 At the same time, General Clark requested a team of officers from the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to develop plans for an “opposed- entry land invasion” should the air campaign fall short of its objectives.16 These statements and actions, combined with the introduction of the U.S. Army’s Task Force Hawk (consisting of twenty- four Apache helicopters, thirty-one support helicopters, a rocket artillery battalion, and a battalion- sized ground maneuver element for protection), raised the specter of ground combat to a degree that caused Serbian leaders to notice.17 Indeed, the Serbian army made defensive preparations along potential invasion routes and placed eighty thousand mines on Kosovo’s border with Albania.18 By 18 May 1999 President Clinton had reversed his earlier position of ruling out the use of ground forces, stating, “I don’t

56 The Bombing Begins think we or our allies should take any options off the table, and that has been my position from the beginning.”19 Of course, this was not Clinton’s position at the beginning of the campaign. Nor was it a position shared by his key advisors from the onset. The chaotic tides of war shifted throughout the conflict, altering the perceptions and inclinations of various key actors during each phase of the operation. Despite fighting a war for less than vital interests with a minimalist strategy based on optimistic air power assumptions, President Clinton and other nato leaders gradually raised the stakes to avoid losing and preserve nato’s standing as a functional alliance.

Phase I: 24 March to 26 March 1999 nato’s first wave of attacks consisted of cruise missiles. As part of nato psychological operations, several Serb generals received phone calls threat- ening their impending doom. Serbian Third Army commander, Gen. Nebojsa Pavkovic (related to Milosevic by marriage) recounted, “There was a moment when my mobile rang, and a voice that spoke in bad Serbian informed me that the bombing was about to start—that it was going to be a lot more intense than Iraq, and that I had a chance to save the Serbian people.”20 Pavkovic ignored this plea. On the morning of 24 March 1999 cnn’s live footage of eight b-52s taking off from Royal Air Force raf( ) Fairford in Great Britain (Gloucestershire) alerted the Serbian air defense command in Zemun that an attack was imminent.21 Two of the eight aircraft were “spares” and returned to base, while six continued their mission.22 At around 2000 hours Kosovo time six U.S. Air Force b-52s fired the opening shots of the war.23 Theb -52s launched agm-86 c conventional air-launched cruise missiles from outside Kosovo’s airspace. In addition, from the Adriatic Sea, three surface ships (uss Gonzalez, uss Philippine Sea, uss Nicholson) and three submarines (consisting of the uss Albuquerque, uss Miami, and hms Splendid) fired Tomahawk land- attack missiles into Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia.24 Altogether the United States and the United Kingdom launched fifty- five cruise missiles against twenty- three targets on the first night of the operation.25 These cruise missiles struck targets in Pristina (Kosovo’s capital), Batajnica (Serbia’s main military airfield), and Golobovci (the

The Bombing Begins 57 largest airport in Montenegro).26 The targets at all three locations encapsulated components of the Serbian air defense system. At Pristina the cruise missiles damaged the electric power grid in an attempt to force Serbian radar operators to rely on backup generators for power, with the secondary impact of turning out the lights in the city.27 At Batajnica and Golobovci the missiles damaged airfields and command centers as part of an effort to gain air supremacy without directly engaging the Serbian air force.28 The second wave of attacks continued throughout the night of 24 March and consisted of strikes from aircraft based out of Italy, Spain, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.29 Serbian air defenses remained functional despite the first wave of cruise missile strikes, and they detected nato’s approaching strike package. In response the Serbian air force scrambled four MiG-29 fighters to intercept the threat.30nato ’s e- 3a Sentry, an airborne early warning and control (awacs) aircraft, vectored Dutch f- 16s and U.S. Air Force f- 15cs to protect the strike package from the MiG- 29s.31 A British raf Nimrod r1 electronic surveillance aircraft helped with the effort by confirming that the MiG- 29s were Serbian.32 Subsequently, Dutch and American aircraft shot down three of the MiG- 29s with air- to- air missiles fired from beyond visual range.33 In addition to fighter aircraft, the Serbians fired several sa-3 and sa-6 surface- to- air missiles (sams) on the opening night, but to no avail.34 In the long run, however, the threat posed by Serbian air defense artillery, shoulder- fired rockets sa( - 7s), and sams persisted, forcing nato aircraft to fly above fifteen thousand feet during hours of darkness throughout the conflict.35 At this elevation nato aircraft were safe from small- arms fire and shoulder-fired rockets, yet still vulnerable to sams.36 At the onset of the air campaign, Serbian sam operators switched to passive optical tracking in lieu of radar tracking.37 By turning off their radars, the Serbian military degraded the allied sead (suppression of enemy air defense) capability, which relied on radar emissions to detect sam battery locations.38 Faced with this tactic, the U.S. Navy’s agm- 88 high- speed anti- radiation missile (harm) proved unable to destroy sam sites, as this missile, by design, homed in on enemy radar emissions.39 Nevertheless, by forcing the enemy to turn off their radars, the presence of the harms seriously degraded Serb air defenses. To maintain a persistent air defense threat, Serbian sam

58 The Bombing Begins operators “adapted their tactics to balance lethality with survivability” and exhibited “greater firing discipline than the Iraqis did during Desert Storm,” according to Benjamin Lambeth of rand.40 In all, nato flew four hundred sorties and struck forty targets on the first night of the operation.41 In addition to air defenses, the day- one targets included five airfields, several army barracks, communications centers, and military storage sites.42 On the second night of the bombing, which again commenced at 2000 hours local time, sixty- four aircraft participated alongside naval forces that launched additional cruise missiles.43 Combined, these forces struck Serbian army barracks at Urosevic and Prizen in Kosovo and airfields at Nis and Golubovci.44 At nato’s daily press conference, spokesman Jamie Shea declared, “Milosevic now knows nato is serious and that he is in a grave situation.”45 In the same press conference, however, Air Commodore David Wilby revealed that the Serbs had released “some 300 hard line Serbian prisoners who have been added to the ranks of the paramilitary troops,” foreshadowing an escalation of the attacks on Kosovar Albanians through means air power could not target.46 At the tactical level Serbian air defenders responded to the air attacks by firing around ten sams on the second day, again with no hits, and dispatching additional fighters.47 A pair of U.S. Air Forcef -15s shot down two more MiG-29s, which had apparently lost communication with their headquarters and drifted into Bosnia.48 The two Serbian pilots ejected into a sector patrolled by Russian troops serving as peacekeepers within nato’s Stabilization Force (sfor) in Bosnia, prompting strategic-level interplay between Russia, Serbia, Bosnia, and the United States.49 In a press conference Patricia Kelly of cnn asked what would happen if the Russians picked up the downed pilots before other sfor troops. nato spokesman David Wilby responded, “I’m sure if the air crew come [sic] down into a Russian sector, and they are part of sfor, they will deal with the prisoners carefully, sensitively, and they will bring them to the authorities very quickly.”50 Instead, the Russians rescued the downed pilots and promptly returned them back into Serbian hands.51 This act indicated Russia’s initial position vis-à- vis Kosovo, one of tenuous support for both sides. Indeed, both Clinton and Milosevic sought the support of Russian

The Bombing Begins 59 President Boris Yeltsin during the conflict. In a secret communication with Yeltsin, Clinton stated, “Milosevic must not feel that he can split us,” revealing the pivotal role played by Russian diplomacy throughout the campaign.52 Alternatively, Milosevic hoped for eventual Russian aid, encouraged by the Communist-led Russian parliament’s vote of 279 to 30 in favor of sending military aid and advisors to Serbia.53 The third night of bombing was similar to the previous night, with targets in Mali Mokri Lug, Ayala, Vozdovac, and the outskirts of Belgrade.54 Another downed Serbian fighter broughtnato ’s tally to five aircraft shot down in air-to- air combat.55 The Serbian air force subsequently ceased challenging nato aircraft.56 Likewise, Lt. Gen. Michael Short claimed that Serbian pilots “lost any semblance of air situational awareness and, as a result, set themselves up as easy prey for the f-15.”57 That same day, however, an awacs detected a flight of Mi- 8 Hip helicopters violating Bosnian airspace.58 On detection the helicopters dropped into a valley and escaped back into Serbia unharmed, despite being pursued by a pair of f-15 cs.59 Day three marked the end of nato’s focus on Serbian air defenses, as the plan transitioned to the next phase. Meanwhile, concerns within the alliance over reports of “killing, looting, harassing, and the intimidation of ethnic Albanians inside Kosovo” altered the focus of the campaign.60 The Serbs adjusted to a new level of discomfort and accelerated their campaign of ethnic cleansing. During nato’s daily press conference on 27 March 1999, Mark Laity of the bbc asked,

You are talking about the urgency of the crisis in the field in Kosovo, but you are attacking targets that are supporting those forces in the field, not those forces in the field who are able to operate reasonably independently given that they’re just doing things like house clearing, so when will you be able to attack those targets in the field and actually get them effectively before it’s too late?61

This question revealed four significant features of waging an air- only campaign against an opponent who was concurrently waging a counterinsurgency operation against a declared terrorist organization (the

60 The Bombing Begins Kosovo Liberation Army, kla) while attempting to depopulate Kosovo of ethnic Albanians. First, the question magnified a recurring theme in targeting debates between General Clark and Lieutenant General Short, who each had differing views on what to target during the operation.62 Second, the Serbian light infantry and paramilitary forces conducting unopposed “room clearing” suffered no appreciable loss of combat power from having their logistical support bombed because they had no qualms about looting from the civilian population for supplies. In fact, plunder of civilian homes contributed to Milosevic’s strategic objective of removing certain ethnicities from Kosovo. Third, on a fundamental level the question exposed a problematic linkage between the ends (limiting genocide) and ways (air campaign) of nato’s strategy. Finally, the question revealed widely held assumptions concerning the efficacy of air power to halt a ground campaign’s effort to depopulate Kosovo of Albanians.

Initial Perceptions of Key Actors Both political and military leaders initially expected that the air strikes would last for three days. On the first day of the campaign, pbs News Hour anchor Jim Lehrer interviewed Madeleine Albright. In his interview, Lehrer asked Albright to give an estimate on the potential duration of the campaign. She bluntly replied, “I don’t see this as a long term operation. I think this is something . . . achievable within a relatively short period of time.”63 Military leaders echoed this attitude, though with slightly less conviction. Even General Clark believed there was a “40 percent chance that Milosevic would fold” after three days of bombing.64 This trend in thinking manifested at the operational level, as nato’s original bombing plan encompassed only a few days’ worth of targets.65 Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Charles Krulak said, “The fact that we ran out of targets so quickly would somewhat indicate to you that, in fact, they were thinking of a short campaign.”66 The initial targeting focus on Serbian air defense systems spurred members of the press to question whether the air campaign would target Serbian ground forces.67 General Clark responded to this questioning by saying that attacking Serbian air defenses was a “preparatory step” taken

The Bombing Begins 61 to protect nato aircraft before targeting ground forces.68 By the end of phase I, however, Clark admitted that nato was unable to destroy the Serbian air defense system.69 Yet it was Milosevic’s ground forces who carried out the campaign of ethnic cleansing, so these forces were naturally the centerpiece of journalistic inquiry, intelligence assessments, and military planning.

Serbian Response to the Bombing In February 1999 the director of central intelligence, George Tenet, predicted that Serbian forces “might respond” to a bombing campaign by “redoubling their effort” to intimidate ethnic Albanians into leaving Kosovo and to crush the kla.70 Regardless of whether nato intervened, the Central Intelligence Agency (cia) assessed that Milosevic intended to commence a renewed campaign, dubbed “Operation Horseshoe,” to eliminate the kla permanently in the spring of 1999.71 nato’s bombing likely accelerated Milosevic’s actions. Upon the commencement of nato’s campaign, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Vuk Draskovic said, “All Serbs all over the world are from now in a state of war with our enemies.”72 He went on to explain, “We are not ready to make any difference between the bombs of Adolf Hitler from 1941 and the bombs of nato.”73 Thus Serbia viewednato ’s limited war in terms closer to that of a total war, at least in a rhetorical context. While facing nato air attacks, Serbia waged a separate war against the kla and Kosovar Albanians with regular and paramilitary forces. The regular forces, armed with at least one thousand heavy weapons (tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters), used indiscriminate force to intimidate the population.74 Meanwhile the paramilitary forces used tactics such as rape and pillage to compel Kosovar Albanians to leave.75 With ranks swelled by the calculated release of prisoners, these forces had a monetary incentive to loot, as this was their only source of income.76 Working in concert, the regular forces formed cordons around towns while the irregular forces intimidated the population inside. The surrounding cordon allowed only Kosovar Albanians to flee.77 In counterinsurgency terms, Operation Horseshoe sought to “drain the sea in which the rebel fish swam by forcibly removing the local population.”78 Subsequently, the

62 The Bombing Begins kla, devoid of sanctuary from a nonexistent population, like fish out of water fell victim to direct attack by the Serbians due to their exposure.79

Tank Plinking On 26 March 1999 in a cnn interview with Christiane Amanpour, Gen- eral Clark explained, “It was always understood, from the outset, that there was no way we were going to stop these (Serb) paramilitary forces who were going in and murdering civilians in these (Kosovo) villages.”80 Resonating this, in response to a question from bbc reporter Jonathan Marcus during nato’s daily press conference, spokesperson Jamie Shea frustratingly admitted, “I’ve never pretended from this podium that nato is able to stop, or anybody for that matter is able to stop, every armed Serb knocking on every door in any village and looting or intimidating or forcibly evacuating, or whatever, people inside. It’s not possible to do that from the air.”81 He continued, however, “We are not going to systematically target troops but we are going to systematically target the heavy artillery and tanks and the equipment without which the troops would not be able to carry out their brutal repression.”82 Consequently, a recurring theme emerged in nato’s daily press conferences. Each day members of the press asked Clark, “How many tanks did you kill today?”83 In turn, political leaders frequently asked Clark the same question. According to U.S. Air Force Gen. Joseph Ralston, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “All of a sudden this [destroying tanks] became the measure of merit that had nothing to do with reality.” He added, “The tank, which was an irrelevant item in the context of ethnic cleansing, became the symbol for Serb ground forces.”84 General Clark’s focus on destroying Serb heavy weapons frustrated his air component commander, Lieutenant General Short. The majority of U.S. Air Force officers on Short’s staff equated what they referred to as tank plinking with “the fruitless hunt for Scud missile batteries during the Persian Gulf War.”85 Despite Short’s frustration, he “followed the direction of the saceur” and focused primarily on targeting the Serbian Third Army in Kosovo. But he admitted, “I used the rest of my assets to attack that target set that I genuinely believe to be compelling.”86 Eventually, in Short’s view, he convinced Clark to target “more lucrative and compelling

The Bombing Begins 63 targets . . . in Serbia proper.”87 Of course, in a nineteen- member alliance, Clark was not the final decision maker on targeting matters, so Short’s interpretation of events is not entirely accurate. Nevertheless, the tension between General Clark and Lieutenant General Short over tank plinking persisted throughout the campaign.

Congress Reacts During the first three days of the air campaign, congressional leaders expressed varying levels of support. Trent Lott (r-ms ), the Senate majority leader, voiced support for the nato attack despite policy disagreements: “Whatever reservations about the President’s actions in the Balkans, let no one doubt that the Congress and the American people stand united behind our men and women who are bravely heeding the call of duty.”88 Further support was evident from Senator John H. Chafee (r-ri ) in his declaration, “The danger of inaction in Kosovo— of doing nothing— greatly exceeds the dangers of the action begun today.”89 Amid these general statements of support, other members of Congress indicated less support and optimism for the air campaign. Most insight- fully, Representative John P. Murtha (d-pa ), a ranking Democrat and former U.S. Marine, predicted a prolonged air war against dug-in Serbian forces; “I think it could go on for a month.”90 In contrast, Senator Mitch Mc Connell (r- ky) believed he had a better idea on how to intervene in Kosovo: “Arming the Kosovars would be a lot cheaper, less dangerous to American troops and wouldn’t put us in the middle of a civil war.”91 Yet from the outset Clinton’s strategists approached supporting the kla with extreme caution. Secretary of Defense William Cohen warned, “My concern was that nato not be seen as the air force of the kla.”92

Phase II: 27 March to 31 March 1999 On 27 March the air campaign entered its second phase. The focus of targeting shifted from suppression of air defenses to interdiction. On the first night, sixty- six aircraft flew in two waves, attacking seventeen targets.93 The targets included bridges, storage facilities, assembly areas, and a small number of Serb heavy weapons spotted from the air.94 Admi- ral James O. Ellis, the commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe in

64 The Bombing Begins Naples, Italy, noted that “the only thing new in Phase II were eight bridges to be struck,” as all other targets were either the same as those in phase I or entailed too much risk of collateral damage.95 At the beginning of phase II, in an interview with the Washington Post, General Clark warned, “There’s nothing that air power can do by itself to deter paramilitary forces from committing acts of brutality.”96 During phase II, nato averaged around fifty strikes per night, and the U.S. Air Force added five b- 1 bombers to its sorties.97 Theb - 1s employed the newly developed Raytheon ale- 50 towed decoy, which successfully diverted sams by attracting them to the decoy’s larger radar cross section.98 Despite their technological inferiority, however, the Serbs proved adept at countering nato’s efforts. Three significant nato setbacks occurred during phase II. First, the Serbs shot down an American f- 117a Nighthawk stealth aircraft. Second, the region’s refugee predicament threatened the internal stability of the alliance countries neighboring Kosovo.99 Third, on the last day of phase II, Serbs captured three American soldiers of the First Infantry Division serving in Macedonia on a border- monitoring patrol in the mountains.100

Downing of “Stealth” Aircraft At 1945 hours (Zulu time) on 27 March 1999, the Serb’s 250th Air Defense Brigade, under the command of Colonel Zoltan Dani, downed an American f- 117a Nighthawk stealth aircraft piloted by U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Dale Zelko.101 After he had ejected from the aircraft and while descending into a cornfield under the “stealth” aircraft’s brightly colored orange and white parachute, Zelko sent emergency radio messages of his last known position, revealing that he was alive.102 After he had hidden in thick vegetation near the crash site for eight hours, special operations forces rescued Zelko.103 U.S. Air Force Capt. James Cardoso led a five and a half hour flight of three mh- 53 Pave Low helicopters to Zelko’s location.104 One of the three mh- 53 helicopters was struck with small-arms fire during the rescue attempt but managed to continue the mission.105 After less than a minute on the ground, pararescue personnel on board the helicopters secured Lieuten- ant Colonel Zelko and the mh- 53s returned to the sky, flying at 100 feet to avoid radar detection.106

The Bombing Begins 65 The Serbian operational chain of efforts to down thef - 117a started in Italy. Spies observing activity at Aviano air base monitored the takeoff and landing of military aircraft, notifying the Serbian air defense command of each instance.107 These takeoff notifications, coupled with further analysis of egress routes from where bombs fell, determined the readiness posture at the sam batteries. Upon spotting aircraft, air defenders followed strict standard operating procedures, handing over the acquisition from a series of positions, using a combination of optical and radar tracking methods.108 At the tactical level, rather than talk by radio (which emitted signals that could be exploited by signals intelligence), the Serbs orchestrated their actions using landline communications and carefully turned on radars for only twenty seconds at a time to keep their positions concealed.109 In the course of the war Col. Zoltan Dani’s batteries traveled over 100,000 kilometers, constantly repositioning to avoid detection.110 According to Benjamin Lambeth of rand, “by remaining dispersed and mobile, and activating their radars only selectively, the Serb iads [integrated air defense system] operators yielded the short- term tactical initiative in order to present a longer-term operational and strategic challenge to allied air operations.”111 To his credit, Colonel Dani developed a method of tracking the f-117 when its bomb bay doors opened (or when the aircraft was wet) by modify- ing his radars (Russian- made snr- 125 Neva/Pechora “Low Blow” I/D- band; 1s91 “Straight Flush” G/H band; and p- 18 “Spoon Nest” vhf) to operate on longer wavelengths.112 With information from the radars, the Second Battalion of the 250th Air Defense Brigade identified thef - 117 from twelve kilometers away.113 Upon detection of the aircraft, Dani ordered his batteries to fire a barrage ofsa -3 missiles, one of which hit the f-117 at an altitude of 23,000 feet.114 Thus, with Soviet technology from the 1960s, Colonel Dani and his determined air defenders brought down America’s state-of- the- art stealth aircraft— a symbolic event, given American fervor for the technological wherewithal of the U.S. armed forces. In an interview with usa Today, Dani said, “Long before the 1999 war, I took a keen interest in the stealth fighter and on how it could be detected. . . . And I concluded that there are no invisible aircraft, but only less visible.”115 He went on to add, “The

66 The Bombing Begins Americans entered the war a bit overconfident. They thought they could crush us without real resistance.”116 The U.S. Air Force exemplified its overconfidence in stealth technology by its decision to retire the ef- 111 “Raven” electronic warfare aircraft.117 The use of stealth, a passive measure, gained favor in the late 1970s, with its popularity reaching new heights during the 1991 Gulf War. After that war, the U.S. Air Force decided to retire the Raven, disregarding their highly effective employment over Iraq against sam operators. In 1995 when defending the decision to retire the ef-111, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, under the pretext of joint-mindedness, argued, “When [the military services] can only afford to have one standoff jammer, then it has to be carrier-capable.”118 After retirement of the Raven, the U.S. Navy’s ea- 6b Prowler became the only jamming aircraft in the U.S. inventory. In contrast with stealth, standoff jamming is an active measure. The Prowler, which can take off from carriers, became the mainstay of U.S. aerial jamming capability and supported Operation Allied Force in 1999.119 In 1965 the U.S. Air Force began development the “Wild Weasel” series of aircraft specifically to counter the sam threat in North Vietnam. By using a “here kitty, kitty” technique—also known as “weaseling”—pilots used their airframes as bait to incite sam operators to turn on their radars.120 The ensuing radar emissions compromised the location of the sam batteries, allowing other aircraft to deliver fatal blows to thesam sites. During Opera- tion Allied Force, the f- 16 cj served in the Wild Weasel role, attempting to provoke sam radar operators to turn on their systems. If the radars turned on, f- 16 cj’s subsequently engaged the source of the radar emissions with harm radar- seeking missiles. Because of concerns with the weather, on the night of 31 March 1999 Lieutenant Colonel Zelko’s f- 117a embarked on its mission without an accompanying Prowler package for jamming support or fighters f( -16 cj) equipped with harm radar-seeking missiles.121 This decision indicated the U.S. Air Force’s confidence that stealth aircraft could hide from Ser- bia’s extensive sam threat. It was a perfect storm for Zelko and his f- 117. The day after Lieutenant Colonel Zelko’s rescue, he received phone calls from General Clark and President Clinton thanking him for his

The Bombing Begins 67 service and expressing gratitude for his safety. During the first phone conversation, Clark urged Zelko to participate in a scheduled media event celebrating his rescue.122 Zelko refused, saying that he did not want his name released as this would preclude him from continuing to fly Nighthawks because of the operational requirements pertaining to the disclosure of pilot identities in the stealth community.123 According to Zelko, “in an annoyed tone” Clark said, “I guess it’s your call.”124 Hours later in the next phone call someone named “Tony” asked, “Are you the pilot?” then told Zelko to stand by for the president.125 Next on the line, President Clinton expressed that he was “deeply relieved” Zelko was safe because of “what it would have meant had you been captured,” referring to a potential setback at the strategic level if the Serbs acquired prisoners of war.126

Humanitarian Crisis Unfolds According to nato’s estimates, at the start of phase II Kosovo had half a million persons displaced from their homes— over 25 percent of the population.127 Among these, some remained internally displaced, and others headed for Kosovo’s borders with Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. At the border, Serb authorities removed license plates from cars and seized identification papers with the intent of preventing Kosovar Albanian refugees from ever returning.128 Paramilitary units under the command of Zeljko Raznatovic, known by the nickname Arkan, terrorized the cities of Kosovska, Mitrovica, and Velika Hoca.129 In addition, the Interior Ministry troops known as Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova (mup), under the control of Franco Simatovic, roamed Kosovo in small armored units of around twenty personnel, intimidating Albanians.130 The paramilitary and mup forces often wore “carnival masks with images of vampires” or black balaclavas, and executed civilians in villages to generate a “climate of terror.”131 The public execution of a few key individuals or groups in each town was sufficient to generate widespread fear and motivation for the survivors to evacuate. The Serbian Third Army under the command of Gen. Nebojsa Pavkovic was the backbone of these evacuation operations, forming cordons around towns then subsequently announcing to the civilians that they would leave an open path for their departure that led to the border.132

68 The Bombing Begins The refugee situation reached “the likes of which have not been seen in Europe since the closing stages of World War II,” according to nato spokesperson Jamie Shea on the day after the downing of the stealth aircraft.133 But this was only the beginning; by the end of the conflict the number of refugees would double, reaching one million.

Capture of American Soldiers On 31 March 1999 five kilometers from Serbia, the section leader of a three- Humvee patrol in the mountains of Macedonia received the following radio transmission from another Humvee in his section: “We’re in contact, we’re taking direct fire.” He responded, “You better not be bullshitting me, are you?” To which his subordinate replied, “No, we’re taking direct fire. We’re trapped. They’re all around us. We can’t get out.”134 This final transmission, received at 1434 hours Macedonia time, was the last message heard from the three soldiers in the Humvee until they emerged on Serb state-run television nineteen hours later.135 In the television broadcast, the three captured soldiers appeared bloodied and beaten, one with cuts on his face and another with a bashed nose, and all three looked haggard.136 The prisoners, S.Sgt. Christopher J. Stone, S.Sgt. Andrew A. Ramirez, and driver Specialist Steven M. Gonzales, were part of screening mission to provide early warning of any Serbian incursion into Macedonia.137 Their three- Humvee scout section reportedly “split up to do some individual training” with the intent of rallying at a central location later in the day.138 Their unit was Bravo Troop, First Squadron, Fourth Cavalry Regiment, First Infantry Division, based out of Schweinfurt, Germany.139 This cavalry squadron was part of the larger United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (unpredep), an ongoing mission since 31 March 1995 that included 1,500 allied troops, with 350 from the United States.140 The day after their capture, members of the media asked Department of Defense spokesperson Kenneth Bacon what kind of “training” were the three soldiers doing near the border.141 General Clark wrote of the incident, “Some of my subordinates believed that the three soldiers had strayed into Serbia. I didn’t.”142 Instead Clark believed it was a preplanned Serbian gambit taken as an alternative means to capture Americans after failing to nab downed pilots.143

The Bombing Begins 69 At the Oval Office, upon learning the incident, Vice President Al Gore exclaimed, “Mr. President, General Shelton owes you a goddamn explanation . . . you were explicitly told just yesterday that our troops had been pulled back five kilometers from that border.”144 President Clinton calmly responded, “Well, Al, you know we are in a war over there, and sometimes in a war things just don’t play out the way we hope they would.”145 After Gore settled down, Shelton went on to brief the details of the incident, explaining that the U.S. military had no idea of the whereabouts of the three soldiers and could not find their Humvee, despite sending out a search party consisting of American, British, French, and Italian helicopters that had combed the mountains over the last known location of the patrol, staying inside Macedonian airspace.146 A decade later, in summing up the incident in his autobiography, Shelton wrote, “It’s what Sun Tzu called ‘the fog of war.’ ”147 On 11 May 1999 after thirty- two days of captivity, Serbia released the prisoners. To secure their release, the Reverend Jesse Jackson traveled to Belgrade with a religious delegation that met with Milosevic. Prior to Jack- son’s trip, however, White House spokesman David Leavy cautioned that the members of Jackson’s delegation “do not have the authority to negotiate on behalf of the United States government.”148 In addition, national security advisor Sandy Berger met privately with Jackson, urging that he not make the trip.149 Nevertheless, after the prisoners returned to their unit, Maj. Gen. David Grange, the commander of First Infantry Division, acknowledged Jackson’s role in obtaining the soldiers’ release, stating, “[Jackson] had told me it was a ‘tough sell,’ but that he would be successful—and he was.”150 Even after the release of the American prisoners, the U.S. military continued to hold several Serbian military prisoners as a bargaining chip in the event of future incidents.151 Meanwhile, despite Jackson’s insistent calls for a bombing pause (particularly when he was in Belgrade), nato’s campaign continued for another month, broadening in scope and size.152 Owing to the Clinton administration’s deep concern over the captured prisoners and its impact on public opinion, General Shelton devoted nearly half of his writing on the Kosovo section of his memoirs to the captured prisoner saga.153 After the incident Shelton and Cohen increased the frequency of their media interviews, continually calling for Milosevic

70 The Bombing Begins to release the prisoners. Describing this effort, Shelton wrote, “Our battlefield would be the airwaves, our weapons tv cameras, microphones, and newspaper reports.”154 By contrast, reflecting his preoccupation with holding the fragile nato alliance together, General Clark described the incident in less than a page in his book Waging Modern War.155 At the end of phase II, in a telephone interview with the New York Times, General Clark stated, “We’re up against an intelligent and capable adversary who is attempting to offset all our strategies.”156 This statement captured the sense of frustration at the numerous setbacks that occurred during the first two phases of the operation. The tenacity of Serbian air defenses, an exacerbated humanitarian crisis, and the capture of American soldiers all highlighted the complexities brought about by solely using air power against a resilient adversary. The initial assumption of a brief air campaign proved grossly optimistic. Milosevic seemed confident that he could hold out against nato’s fragile coalition, but the alliance leaders redoubled their efforts, expanding and prolonging the bombing beyond what they originally anticipated.

The Bombing Begins 71 3 Protracted Bombing

Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster. — General William Tecumseh Sherman, 1875

Phase III: 1 April to 10 June 1999 After eight hours of arguing, at around 0200 Brussels time on 1 April 1999, the nineteen nato ambassadors of the North Atlantic Council, the political governing body of nato, reluctantly agreed to expand the target list for Operation Allied Force in line with phase III of the plan.1 At the meeting, Germany’s Gen. Klaus Naumann, chairman of nato’s military committee, borrowed Lieutenant General Short’s analogy of the snake, saying that it was time to go after “both ends of the snake by hitting the head and cutting off the tail.”2 His use of this “bellicose- sounding metaphor” spurred the length of the debate by upsetting the Greek and Italian representatives who were reluctant to expand the campaign.3 In addition the French ambassador relayed President Jacques Chirac’s belief in purposefully limiting the bombing as a negotiating strategy to ensure Milosevic had more to lose in the future than in the past.4 Otherwise, in the French view, “if he [Milosevic] feels like he’s already lost everything, he’ll have no incentive to stop.”5 Nevertheless, Gen- eral Naumann prevailed in the debate by reminding officials that Milosevic had expelled thousands of ethnic Albanians since the campaign started and would continue this endeavor unchecked if the campaign relented.6 There- after,nato ’s nineteen political representatives voted to give General Clark authority to broaden the scope of the bombing.7 Nine days into Operation Allied Force, the campaign entered its third and longest phase.

72 At the strategic level, resolve further solidified with the unanimous agreement of nato’s campaign objectives during the 23 April 1999 gathering in Washington dc that celebrated nato’s fiftieth anniversary.8 All nineteen nato heads of state attended the summit.9 Among the terms that they agreed on, one was new: “the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces.”10 In essence, members of the nato alliance raised the stakes, calling for a total withdrawal of Serbian military forces from Kosovo— terms more severe than those Milosevic had rejected at talks in Rambouillet before the bombing. The text of the 23 February 1999 Rambouillet accords allowed the Serbian Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova and border police to remain in Kosovo.11 In a private meeting on the eve of the summit, President Clinton had urged Britain’s Tony Blair to stop talking publicly about a ground invasion, as this might prevent the Russians from helping exert diplomatic pressure on Milose- vic.12 On the day of the summit, Turkey agreed to base additional nato aircraft.13 Meanwhile, back in Europe the bombs destroyed the last intact bridge across the Danube River in the city of Novi Sad.14 U.S. public support for the war reached its highest level—65 percent—during the nato summit, but dropped to an all- time low of 49 percent in the week after.15 At the start of phase III, nato averaged fifty sorties per night.16 On 6 April 1999 the uss Theodore Roosevelt arrived in theater, adding U.S. Navy carrier aviation to the bombing campaign.17 On 2 May Serbs shot down an f-16, but nato rescued the pilot. Halfway through the operation, General Clark had around one thousand allied aircraft at his disposal.18 In the final weeks of the campaign nato’s effort swelled to an average of six hundred sorties per night.19 At the peak of operations in June nato aircraft flew over one thousand sorties per day.20 Likewise, the initial target list expanded, growing from 169 to 973 targets by June 1999.21 Nearly half of these targets (421 of 973) were stationary.22 By its own account, nato destroyed only 35 percent (135 of 421) of these fixed sites.23 Although nato destroyed about seventy Serbian aircraft and 30 percent of surface- to- air missiles (sams) during phase III, it never attained air supremacy, the stated goal of phase I.24 By the end, air defense jamming efforts consumed half of the U.S. Navy and Marines’ inventory of Prowler aircraft, with only one squadron remaining stateside in the event of another contingency.25 In

Protracted Bombing 73 all, nato flew 496 missions with unmanned aerial vehicles uav( s), relying on their employment to spot a determined adversary while avoiding military casualties.26 The Serbs shot down fifteen uavs during the war.27 During the bombing nato had no idea of its success in bombing mobile Serb forces, yet it claimed progress in this endeavor anyway, despite the Serb Third Army’s replenishment of losses from its Second Army and the extensive use of paramilitary forces that easily blended within their surroundings.28 To the chagrin of France, when bombing mobile forces proved fruitless, the alliance increasingly targeted civilian infrastructure in and around Belgrade, attempting to cause civil unrest.29 In the end nato prevailed without any combat casualties after flying 38,018 sorties.30 Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo, and the international peacekeepers of Kosovo Force arrived, remaining until the time of this writing, nearly fifteen years after the first bombs fell.31 Ultimately, nearly a million refugees returned, many to destroyed homes and the mass graves of deceased relatives.32 Back in America the high-priests of military technology lauded the triumph, ushering a new era of expenditures in the latest gadgetry.33 Several key events occurred during phase III. First, as in previous phases domestic politics within the United States, Russia, and Serbia weighed heavily in the strategic considerations of presidents Clinton, Yeltsin, and Milosevic. Second, the international news media continued to influence the course of the campaign, repeatedly drawing attention to target selection matters and whether Serbian ground forces could be hit from the air. In light of this dynamic, Secretary of Defense Cohen restricted General Clark’s encounters with the media, due in part to Clark’s blunt assessments of the bombing’s effectiveness.34 Third, as the scope and intensity of the bombing increased, nato mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, sparking a diplomatic crisis. Fourth, the decision to introduce Task Force Hawk, the U.S. Army’s deployment of Apache helicopters, proved fruitless. nato did not employ the helicopters, yet they produced the war’s only friendly casualties when an Apache crashed during preparatory training flights. Finally, after seventy- eight days of bombing, with Serbia’s growing perception that Russia backed nato terms, Milosevic conceded.

74 Protr acted Bombing Domestic Politics Phase III of the operation involved the greatest volume of congressional debate over Kosovo as the next presidential election neared and the conflict dragged on longer than expected. In Russia the state Duma (the Russian parliament’s lower house) urged President Yeltsin to send Russia’s latest air defense missiles, the s-300 (known by nato as sa- 10), to the Serbian military.35 With secret communications, President Clinton succeeded in convincing Yeltsin to ignore the growing Russian domestic pressure to send military aid to Serbia. Meanwhile, in Serbia popular defiance ofnato ’s attacks solidified support for Milosevic during the first weeks in April 1999.36 By late May and early June, however, domestic attitudes in Serbia wavered amid the growing discomfort generated by the bombing.37 When questioned in April 1999 by the Senate Armed Services Com- mittee about why the use of ground forces had been ruled out before the bombing, Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated:

At that time, you may recall there was great discontent up here on Capitol Hill. If I had come to you at that time and requested authorization to put a ground force in—U.S., unilaterally, acting alone—I can imagine the nature of the questions I would have received. You’d say, “Well, No. 1, where are our allies? And No. 2, who’s going to appropriate the money? No. 3, how long do you intend to be there? How many? How long? How much? And what’s the exit strategy?”38

Given this perspective, Congress nonetheless interposed debate on whether to use ground troops in the ongoing campaign. On 20 April senators John McCain (r- az) and Joseph Biden (d-de ) introduced Senate Joint Resolution 20, which authorized the president to use “all necessary force” to meet nato objectives.39 As opposed to the phrase “military air operations and missile strikes,” written in Senate Concurrent Resolution 21, the phrase “all necessary force” implied a ground invasion.40 In proceedings Senator McCain emphasized, “we are in it; now we must win it.”41 In contrast, rather than take ownership of an American war, Representative Robin Hayes (r-nc ) referred to the intervention as “Clinton’s War” in an effort to distance his party from any potential failure for the bombing to stymie Milosevic’s aims.42

Protracted Bombing 75 After eight hours of debate, on 3 May the Senate voted 78 to 22 to table the McCain-Biden resolution rather than put it to an up-or- down vote.43 Among those voting to table the resolution, Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (d-sd ) argued that Clinton was ruling out the use of ground forces based on sound military advice: “It isn’t just the president. It is all of his Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is everybody in the Pentagon who advises the president who have said, ‘This is not the time.’ ”44 Due in part to Clinton’s urging through private channels, key members of the U.S. Senate voted to drop the issue of using ground troops. After losing the vote, McCain, who was running for president in the upcoming election, attempted to discredit Clinton: “The president of the United States is prepared to lose a war rather than do the hard work, the politically risky work, of fighting it.”45 McCain said that he intended for Clinton to “take courage” from the resolution and “adopt a tougher strategy” against Milosevic.46 The War Powers Resolution of 1973 sought to limit presidential power to commit military forces to a conflict without the consent of Congress. On 28 April, one month into Operation Allied Force, Senate Concurrent Resolution 21 (which passed in the Senate on 23 March) failed to gain the simple majority required in the House of Representatives, with a tied vote of 213 and eight members not voting. The nay votes were primarily Republican (187 of 213).47 The tied vote kept the war raging on without a constitutional check on wartime powers. Before the vote Representative Tom Campbell (r-ca ) took matters a step further, against party lines, by invoking the War Powers Resolution of 1973 in an effort to end America’s intervention in Kosovo.48 His attempt to force a negative vote on a formal declaration of war against Serbia failed. When compared with their votes on funding the conflict, the congressional banter opposed to the air campaign was not credible. In early May 1999 the U.S. House of Representatives approved more than $13 billion in extra funds for Operation Allied Force, twice the amount that had been requested by President Clinton in April.49 Despite any misgivings, the era of budget surplus made it easy for Congress to unshackle the sinews of war. American support for the air war fluctuated throughout the campaign. Nevertheless, domestic backing for air strikes stayed above 50 percent

76 Protracted Bombing throughout most of the campaign. U.S. public support reached its highest levels at two points in the campaign—first during nato’s fiftieth anniversary summit in April 1999, and second in June when Milosevic capitulated.50 Although the Cold War was over, Russia continued its typical rivalry against the United States by brandishing diplomatic power. As the first- ever elected president of the newly formed Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin was well- aware of attitudes among his domestic political constituency. In solidarity with their fellow Slavs many Russians felt bound to support Serbia in fighting nato. In one such action, at 1230 hours (Eastern Standard Time) on 24 March 1999 Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov reversed course on a diplomatic flight bound for Washington to signal Russian displeasure.51 Three hours prior after a refueling stop in Shannon, Ireland, Primakov had called Vice President Al Gore to check whether the air strikes could be averted.52 Gore urged Primakov to hold position in Ireland to avoid arriving in America at the onset of nato’s campaign and thus giving an appearance of collaboration in the bombing. Instead, Primakov’s flight took off for Washington then turned around over the Atlantic after a second phone call from Gore. In doing so, Primakov made it appear that America had closed the door on friendly relations.53 In another instance, still early in the campaign, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott worked to convince Russia not to provide Serbia with s- 300 missiles, suggesting that nato might lose twenty aircraft if Serbia employed these.54 Through public rhetoric President Yeltsin appealed to conservative forces that aimed to safeguard Russia’s military prestige, but in private he circumvented the reoccurrence of Cold War belligerence. On 7 April 1999 the Communist-led Duma voted 279 to 30 in favor of sending military aid to Serbia.55 In response to this vote Clinton sent a private message to Yeltsin, warning him, “nato’s air campaign will continue. I have discussed this problem at length with Jacques, Gerhard, and Tony, and we are in full agreement. I know developments in Kosovo have strained relations between our countries.”56 In the message, Clinton reiterated, “What is most important is that we stay as united as possible in our message to Belgrade.”57 On 14 April, Clinton called Yeltsin again to offer a deal in which Russia would contribute troops to subsequent peacekeeping

Protracted Bombing 77 operations.58 That same day Yeltsin appointed Viktor Chernomyrdin as his chief Balkans envoy, signaling his intention to “salvage” relations with the West.59 In mid- May, faced with a 2 percent approval rating, Yeltsin narrowly survived an impeachment vote in the Duma.60 Clinton believed that Russia’s participation in peacekeeping operations might allow Yeltsin to appease Russian “ultra- nationalists” while simultaneously offering Milosevic a “face- saving way out” that protected Serb minorities with “Russian presence.”61 At the onset of phase III, Serb state television compared the bombing over Easter weekend to that of the Luftwaffe in April 1941, which had killed sixteen thousand civilians in Belgrade.62 For the most part Serbs initially rallied around their leader, as evident from crowds wielding posters of Milosevic and chanting, “Slobo! Slobo!” on 4 April 1999.63 Two months later this support faded, as Serbian unemployment rose to over 50 percent.64 According to a rand Corporation study, as the bombing progressed the price of cigarettes doubled in Belgrade, spurring long lines at street vendors possessing the remaining supplies of this commodity.65 U.S. foreign service officer Louis Sell noted that Milosevic smoked over half a pack of cigarettes in a single sitting during one of his initial meetings with Chernomyrdin.66 Although Milosevic exaggerated the extent of civilian casualties from the bombing, his stress level was clearly rising. He had genuine concern for how the bombing might affect at least one of Belgrade’s residents. On 22 April 1999, nato bombed Milosevic’s Beli Dvor villa on 15 Uzicka Street in Belgrade’s luxurious Dedinje district.67 After this incident, according to one journalist, graffiti appeared throughout the capital that translated, “Slobo, when we needed you most you were not at home,” alluding to Serb displeasure and what might happen with the tides of war in full churn.68 In fact, nato was not attempting to assassinate Milosevic but instead hoped to pressure him indirectly by irritating his wife, Mirjana, over the bombing of their home.69 Earlier in April the Dutch government had refused to approve the Beli Dvor target because it contained a Rembrandt painting somewhere inside.70 An exasperated General Naumann had told the Netherlands’ nato ambassador, “It isn’t a good Rembrandt.”71 On 20 April President

78 Protracted Bombing Clinton called Dutch Prime Minister Willem Kok to get concurrence for the target.72 In a 27 April press briefing General Clark reiterated that nato was not targeting Milosevic personally; there was a command- and- control facility they aimed to destroy in the villa.73 To alleviate a French reporter’s concern Clark explained that several nato military members visited Beli Dvor during negotiations before the bombing and were aware of the positioning of Rembrandt inside, so the painting would be unharmed.74 As the bombs fell, Serbian civilians shared Americans’ belief in precision air power yet with a different interpretation of nato efforts. Near the end of the campaign, after interviewing dozens of Belgrade residents, New York Times reporter Steven Erlanger noted, “nato missiles have largely been so precise that many Serbs no longer believe that nato ever bombs in error, even if the damage is to the Chinese Embassy or a hospital.”75 At 2200 hours on Sunday 2 May 1999 nato bombed a hydroelectric plant in Obrenovac, just west of the capital, plunging Belgrade and areas of Serbia into darkness for seven hours.76 Only twelve hours before the bombing Reverend Jesse Jackson had departed Belgrade, bringing the three captive soldiers back to their base in Germany.77 The next day nato destroyed a major oil refinery at Novi Sad and tank factories.78 Accord- ing to Belgrade taxi driver Kocha Bulbuk, civilian gas rations dropped from ten gallons per month to five, and the lack of income and rising food prices meant his family could no longer feed table scraps to their Rottweiler: “He doesn’t know we might end up eating him.”79 Along with the strikes on refineries and power stations, nato aircraft dropped leaflets with a picture of Milosevic and the words, “No gasoline, no electricity, no trade, no freedom, no future.”80 Initial attacks on the power infrastructure used carbon- fiber filaments (the blu- 114/b “Soft Bomb”) to short out electrical transmission lines temporarily.81 In subsequent attacks, however, nato used high-explosives to cause damage that took longer to repair. Most significantly, on 24 May, coalition aircraft shut off power to 80 percent of Serbia by bombing five power transmission stations.82 Although nato aircraft had trouble hitting mobile Serb ground forces, bombing stationary infrastructure sent a clear signal of nato resolve to Serbian citizens. Of course there were initial reservations about these

Protracted Bombing 79 strikes among some in nato, particularly France.83 With the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy already on board, President Clinton— who personally had approved striking the infrastructure targets— called President Chirac of France and got him on board with the intensified bombing plan.84 Among the Belgrade residents interviewed by the New York Times on 24 May 1999, Dejan Sumrak, with opinions possibly bolstered by state- run television, said he believed nato purposefully bombed heavily on the night Reverend Jesse Jackson arrived in Belgrade and likewise during visits from Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin.85 Foretelling that the end was near, another resident, Sandra, a thirty- year- old office worker said, “He’s [Milosevic] ruined our lives, the best years of our lives. We just can’t take it [the bombing] anymore. We all thought it would get better, but it just gets worse.”86 America exploited the growing resentment for Milosevic by attempting to turn his inner military circle against him. On 6 June 1999 General Shelton reached out to his counterpart Gen. Dragoljub Ojdani, chief of staff of the Serbian army. Shelton asked his intermediary, the Bulgarian chief of defense, to relay the following to Ojdani:

He’s [Ojdani] got to understand that his boss [Milosevic] is hanging on by the thinnest of threads, and one day he is going to carted off and hung for war crimes. I need you to tell him that if he and the rest of his military try to rally around Milosevic, and protect him in any way— then the United States and eighteen other nations would consider them to be vital elements of Milosevic’s team, and they will be taken down just as quickly as he will go down. On the other hand, short of those who have committed war crimes, we would consider everybody else to have been honorable soldiers with none of the repercussions the others would most certainly be facing.87

As the fabric of Serbian society tore, so too did its military-political structure. nato purposefully exploited these developments with robust psychological operations. In addition, Clinton, Gore, Cohen, and Shelton led behind-the- scenes diplomatic efforts to increase the pressure on Milo- sevic’s regime. Meanwhile, from Brussels General Clark’s headquarters

80 Protracted Bombing orchestrated an intensification of the bombing at the operational level while publicly attempting to garner support for nato’s endeavor by explaining the details of the bombing campaign to an ever- inquisitive media.

Secretary Cohen Bans General Clark from Appearing on Television In April 1999 nato Secretary General Javier Solana, sensitive to public affairs from a European perspective, asked General Clark to fire nato spokesperson David Wilby.88 After a press conference where Wilby had made a poor attempt to explain why nato was bombing Serbian television stations, Solana exclaimed, “This is unacceptable. . . . There have been too many mistakes in public affairs. You must find a new spokesman.”89 In the first half of April both Clark and Wilby gave unsuccessful explanations to the media of the military value of bombing Serbian television transmitters.90 At one press conference on 8 April Wilby angrily thundered:

Serb radio and tv is an instrument of propaganda and repression, it has filled the air waves with hate and with lies over the years and especially now. It is therefore a legitimate target in this campaign. If President Milosevic would provide equal time for Western news broadcasts in its programmes without censorship three hours a day between noon and 1800 and three hours a day between 1800 and midnight, then his tv could become an acceptable instrument of public information.91 Mark Laity of the bbc interpreted Wilby’s statement literally, assuming that nato intended to bomb Serb television until they changed their programming.92 Wilby had failed to mention that the Serb military integrated the television transmitters with their command and control architecture, which would have bolstered his argument.93 Because members of the media had a hard time understanding why nato was bombing the television stations in Serbia that housed their own networks’ correspondents, nato adjusted its targeting efforts in this area.94 Yet the media war raged on. On 13 April 1999 General Clark appeared at another press conference and played six cockpit videos from bombing sorties to show the progress of the air campaign (figure 2).95 Clark used one of the videos to explain how nato unintentionally struck a passenger train on two separate passes when actually aiming for a railroad bridge. As he played the video

Protracted Bombing 81 Fig. 2. Gen. Wesley K. Clark pointing out enemy locations on a map of Kosovo during a press briefing on 13 April 1999. After this particular brief, Secretary Cohen prohibited Clark from making future televised press conferences. Source: nato archives. of the first pass, he said, “Look very intently at the aim point, concentrate right there and you can see how, if you were focused right on your job as a pilot, suddenly that train appeared. It was really unfortunate.”96 In the ultimate irony nato missed a stationary target and unintentionally hit something moving on the ground. However, more significant was that global audiences could not make a logical connection between the goal of limiting ethnic cleansing and nato’s decision to bomb railway bridges. Next, when playing a video of the same aircraft’s second bombing pass, Clark said, “Focus intently right at the center of the cross [aimed at opposite end of the same bridge]. He is bringing these two crosses together and suddenly he recognizes at the very last instant that the train that was struck here has moved on across the bridge and so the engine apparently was struck by the second bomb.”97 At the end of the video (and the also end of the press conference), the train appeared to be burning in a large cloud of smoke though the bridge still supported its weight.98 Of course, the pilot did not intend

82 Protracted Bombing this collateral damage, yet it appeared questionable on camera to audiences conditioned by Hollywood action films. Adding to the debacle, the media discovered that the cockpit tape played at three times normal speed during the press conference, falsely strengthening the claims that there had been no time to react.99 After a Department of Defense investigation, Pentagon spokesman P. J. Crowley admitted, “There is a normal acceleration that goes on through this process of converting the gun camera footage.”100 Despite this revelation, nato kept playing the fast- forward versions of cockpit videos.101 Just over a month into the campaign, in a 27 April 1999 press conference General Clark gave the impression that the bombing was not weakening Serb ground forces. John Dugberg of the Los Angeles Times asked whether Clark could give a specific estimate on Serb army losses from the bombing. Clark responded:

With respect to the ground forces and what we’ve done to them, the reason we’re avoiding any specific bean- counting on the ground forces is because without being there on the ground it’s very difficult to give reliable information. We see the tanks that we’ve struck, we’ve shown you some pictures of some trucks that we’ve hit, I’m sure that those are destroyed but as I indicated, he is bringing in reinforcements continually from the Second Army and others so if you actually added up what’s there, if one could do this you might actually find out that he has strengthened his forces in there and that’s going to be a phenomenon until we can further cut the lines of supply and go more intensively against his forces.102

Upon watching this press conference Defense Secretary Cohen got the impression that Clark indicated the bombing was not working in an attempt to advocate a nato ground offensive. In turn, Cohen asked General Shelton to call General Clark and relay the following message verbatim: “get your fucking face off the tv. No more briefings, period. That’s it.”103 Consequently, Clark did not speak to the press on television again until 29 May, and then only briefly. At the 29 May media engagement Clark appeared alongside nato Sec- retary General Solana at Aviano Air Base in Italy.104 Both focused on the

Protracted Bombing 83 accomplishments of the pilots, air crews, and maintenance personnel in their prepared statements. This time, when asked about Serb army losses, Clark said, “Every day they are losing tanks, artillery, air defense systems, trucks, all of the stuff of war.”105 In the last question of the event Jennifer Griffin ofFox News said, “The time is approaching when a decision on a land invasion will have to be made,” then asked, “Is this correct?”106 Clark clarified, “I have said that the time is approaching when a decision will have to be made to keep all the options open.”107 After this question Secretary General Solana interrupted and said that it was time for him and Clark to depart the briefing.108 Subsequentlynato did not conduct another official press conference with General Clark in attendance until after the war on 16 September 1999.109 Accordingly, Clark stayed off the airwaves during the time frame when nato mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy, an incident that required more explaining than the mistaken train bombing. Instead of Clark, Secretary General Solana explained the embassy bombing in the corresponding nato press conference.

Bombing of the Chinese Embassy General Clark pushed the envelope with air operations during phase III, gambling with the air tasking order by personally adding targets not yet approved by political authorities.110 This ploy sent forth aircraft that Clark subsequently recalled if political approval for their targets did not come in time.111 General Short was infuriated by this practice because he did not want to hastily send pilots into harm’s way for targets not yet approved.112 Admiral Ellis noted, “We don’t like this kind of process where something could be left on by omission.”113 nato’s combined air operations center (caoc) in Vicenza, Italy, successfully managed Clark’s additions to the air tasking order without fail, never mixing up the sorties aligned against targets that hadn’t been approved with those that were. Regardless, it was Clark’s drive in pushing air operations to the limit that spurred the unfortunate bombing of the Chinese embassy. To increase the intensity of the air campaign, General Clark demanded that his staff come up with two thousand targets for allied aircraft.114 Staff officers could not find that many targets and believed the number to be

84 Protracted Bombing arbitrary and too large, given that Serbia was merely the size of Ohio.115 Combined with Kosovo, the area of operations was no bigger than Ken- tucky. Amid this pressure, the target list expanded from an initial 169 targets to 973 by the war’s end.116 To find more targets,nato planners harvested interagency support, calling upon the Central Intelligence Agency (cia).117 In response, the cia’s Counter- Proliferation Division, which had little expertise in targeting matters, ended up providing the cia’s first target nomination in the war effort.118 On 7 May 1999 b-2 bombers from Whiteman Air Force Base in Mis- souri dropped five Global Positioning System gps( )-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (jdams) on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing four occupants and hospitalizing twenty- six staff members.119 The intended target, across the street, was an arms warehouse of the Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement used by Zeljko Raznatovic (aka “Arkan”) and his paramilitary Arkan Tigers.120 Although U.S. intelligence had the correct address for the intended target—2 Bulevar Umetnosti Street— they had plotted it incorrectly on outdated maps using archaic methods.121 Conspiracy theorists believed that nato intentionally bombed the Chinese embassy because the jdams precisely struck the part the building housing China’s signals intelligence gathering cell, which was likely in cahoots with the enemy.122 The Chinese intelligence collection effort probably was taking place—most embassies have people who do this sort of thing— but the bombing was not intentional. There was plenty of evidence, however, to generate suspicion of devious machinations within nato. First, American diplomats had previously visited the embassy, so the United States knew its position, despite claims otherwise.123 At the time of the incident the embassy’s address was in the phone book, on the U.S. Department of State’s diplomatic contact lists, and on Serbian maps.124 Second, the use of b- 2 bombers based out of Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri drew suspicion because the United States managed these aircraft separately from nato’s combined air tasking order. Third, signals picked up by nato electronic intelligence indicated that the site rebroadcasted transmissions for the Serbian army.125 According to The Guardian, an unnamed intelligence officer told them:

Protracted Bombing 85 nato had been hunting the radio transmitters in Belgrade. When the President’s [Milosevic’s] residence was bombed on 23 April, the signals disappeared for 24 hours. When they came on the air again, we discovered they came from the embassy compound. The success of previous strikes had forced the vj [military] to use Milosevic’s residence as a rebroadcast station. After that was knocked out, it was moved to the Chinese embassy.126

Though plausible, it is highly unlikely that a democratic alliance could maintain the level of operational security necessary to avoid leaking such a stratagem. Furthermore, it made no sense to purposely damage relations with China and strain the fragile nato alliance for some limited tactical advantage.127 President Clinton dispatched Thomas R. Pickering (third- in- charge at the State Department), a team of other high- ranking diplomats, and second- in- charge deputies from the cia and Defense Intelligence Agency to offer Chinese officials in Beijing an apology and explanation for the mistake.128 Pickering explained that members of the cia compared three outdated maps—one from 1989—to get the general location of the target.129 After this, they plotted the location on a newer 1997 map but had used antiquated methods more suitable for navigation than targeting. As a Chinese translator tried to keep up, Pickering explained in detail the methods used by the cia to plot the target: A 1997 National Imaging and Mapping Agency (nima) map was first used to display the grid pattern of the streets in New Belgrade. Next, in order to identify locations to use as reference points, they identified and drew on the nima map to locate the Hyatt Hotel, the Intercontinental Hotel, and the Serbian Socialist Party Headquarters. Each of these buildings—which were clearly labeled on the maps being used—were approximately one mile east of Bulevar Umetnosti. Using these locations and their street addresses as reference points, parallel lines were drawn that intersected both the known addresses and Bulevar Umetnosti. In what proved to be a fundamental error, those same numbers were then applied to locations on Bulevar Umetnosti, assuming that streets were numbered in the same fashion along parallel streets. The

86 Protracted Bombing effectiveness of this method depends on the numbering system being the same on parallel streets, that the numbers are odd and even on the same sides of the street and that the street numbers are used in the same parallel sequence even if the street names change. Unfortunately, a number of these assumptions were wrong.130

After this process, the cia sent the proposed target to nato. At alliance headquarters, planners checked the target coordinates against the “no- strike” database that listed friendly embassies, hospitals, and other key locations.131 The old location of the Chinese embassy, on the other side of the Danube, was mistakenly still in nato’s database.132 Political leaders directed a two week halt on bombing targets in Belgrade in order to examine targeting procedures.133 Meanwhile, the bombing continued elsewhere.134 After a preliminary investigation, on 11 May 1999 Secretary of Defense Cohen concluded that the bombing was the result of an “institutional error” and not from human or mechanical mistakes.135 On 20 May, nato resumed air strikes in Belgrade.136 On that night nato inadvertently bolstered its claim of mistakenly bombing the Chinese embassy by errantly bombing the residences of the Swedish, Spanish, Norwegian, and Swiss ambassadors along with the Libyan embassy and a civilian hospital— all after developing new “iron- clad” procedures to prevent errors.137 In light of these events, the United States had an easier time convincing the Chinese that it had bombed their embassy due to incompetence rather than malice. Serbian reactions to the Chinese embassy bombing varied. For the most part, Serbian residents believed that the United States purposely targeted the Chinese embassy. One Belgrade resident, Vlade Smiljanic, interviewed by Carlotta Gall of the New York Times asked, “Would you believe that with all their sophisticated weapons, they can miss?”138 Another resident, Zoran Arsic, said, “They did it on purpose to show the whole world that they are the only remaining superpower. To say to us: ‘How can such a small power do anything, when the U.S. can do this to China?’ ”139 Several residents believed that nato would bomb the Russian embassy next.140 On the other hand, Serbian military leaders, upon learning of the intended target through nato’s media apology, had different concerns.141

Protracted Bombing 87 Thecia ’s Counter-Proliferation Division typically focused on preventing the spread of dangerous weapons and technology. The Serbs possessed sixty kilograms of highly enriched uranium at a nuclear research facility at Vinca, Serbia (15 km from Belgrade).142 The facility was once part of a nuclear weapons program that started under the leadership of Jozef Broz Tito in 1948.143 Serb General Pavkovic thought that nato might target the nuclear facility at Vinca. In an interview with the Nedeljni Telegraf, he said, “Can you imagine what would have happened had they struck Vinca . . . we know that in Iraq they attacked nuclear and chemical facilities . . . they could have attacked a facility like that here too. In that event, all of Belgrade would have had to be evacuated to a distance of 100 km.”144 Despite Pavkovic’s fears, nato did not strike Vinca.145

Task Force Hawk Arrives Task Force Hawk was the U.S. Army’s most visible contribution to the Kosovo campaign. At 0800 hours Brussels time on 1 April 1999 General Clark gathered with Lt. Gen. John W. “Jay” Hendrix and Maj. Gen. Dave McKiernan to go over slides pertaining to the proposed Apache mission that they would brief to the Secretary of Defense and all the service chiefs a few hours later via video teleconference.146 A section of the brief covered the risks with a three- page list indicating all the Serb weapons capable of penetrating the skin of an Apache.147 General Clark believed this portion of the brief would make their audience reluctant to approve the mission, and he exclaimed in frustration, “Jay, do you guys want to do this or not? If you don’t, just say so; don’t submarine it in the brief.”148 To alleviate Clark’s concerns, Hendrix said, “Sir, We can do this mission. . . . We just were showing some of the dangers involved, and, anyway, these slides can be changed.”149 And so they were—instead of covering the original list of risks, Lieutenant General Hendrix briefed Secretary Cohen and the group on how the U.S. Army would mitigate risks to the Apaches by using artillery to suppress Serb air defenses before the Apaches went on their deep strike missions.150 This latter idea inadvertently presented a new dynamic in the campaign. After the 1 April video teleconference, General Shelton recommended a compromise to Secretary Cohen where the Apaches would be sent but

88 Protracted Bombing not used in combat until the joint chiefs had reached a consensus.151 On 3 April 1999 President Clinton signed the Apache deployment order but retained the final say on whether to employ the helicopters.152 Based on Clark’s 1 April briefing, however, the total force package consisted of more than just a few helicopters. To protect and support the vulnerable twenty-four Apaches (with the commitment later growing to 48 helicopters), the U.S. Army brought along 5,350 troops, 26 utility helicopters, 14 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, 15 Abrams tanks, 38 Humvees equipped with tow antitank missiles (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided), a 155-mm howitzer battery, a Multiple Launch Rocket System (mlrs) battalion from V Corps, an engineer company, a Bradley stinger missile- equipped air defense battery, a military intelligence platoon, a smoke generation platoon, a military police platoon, the 2-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment of the Eighty-Second Airborne Division, a combat service support team, 90 shipping containers, and enough spare parts for 48 Apaches.153 The Abrams and Bradleys came from Second Brigade, First Armored Division while the Apaches from Eleventh Aviation Regiment, and the utility helicopters from the Twelfth Aviation Regiment.154 In what turned out to be an unintended yet important contribution, the artillery units brought their standard assortment of counter- battery radars. Lieutenant General Hendrix (dual- hatted as V Corps commander) commanded this ad hoc contingent dubbed Task Force Hawk. Hendrix had two deputy commanders— one for aviation and the other for fire support. Brig. Gen. Richard Cody was in charge of aviation operations and Col. Raymond T. Odierno was in charge of fire support and ground operations.155 On 4 April 1999 Department of Defense spokesperson Kenneth Bacon announced that Task Force Hawk would take ten days to deploy, generating false expectations among public and media audiences.156 General Clark initially requested permission to base the Apache helicopters in Macedo- nia, but their government refused, citing the 1995 Dayton Accords which prohibited basing “offensive forces” along the boundaries of the former Yugoslavia.157 Ironically, back in 1995 Clark was the military assistant to Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke and worked on the details of the Dayton agreements.158 The previous Serbian border incursion that

Protracted Bombing 89 captured the three American soldiers, overcrowding from refugees, and the deployment of 1,800 British troops (with fourteen Challenger tanks and forty Warrior armored personnel carriers) were overwhelming the Macedonian government, spurring them to reject the American request for basing Apaches at the nato airfield in Skopje.159 Instead, nato based the helicopters at an airfield in Tirana, Albania, which had a much less developed infrastructure to support their deployment.160 Given the throughput at Tirana, the deployment of the Apaches took twenty-two days.161 In all, deployment of the 24 Apaches and their associated 22,000 short tons of supporting equipment required over 500 sorties of c- 17s (the runway at Tirana was too short for the larger c- 5 cargo aircraft).162 In reaction to the media stir surrounding the Apaches, Lieutenant General Hendrix stated, “I didn’t realize the whole world was waiting to see an Apache landing in Albania.”163 Critics of the Task Force Hawk debacle contend that the U.S. Army deployed an inefficiently large contingent to Albania because its doctrine still focused on fighting the Soviet Union on the Fulda Gap with massive armored formations.164 After the war, the Army would attempt to lighten its forces.165 Based on the 1 April 1999 brief, General Clark intended for the rocket (mlrs) and tube (155- mm howitzers) artillery of Task Force Hawk to pave the way for Apache deep strikes against dispersed Serbian armored forces throughout Kosovo. The mlrs fired the Army Tactical Missile System (atacms), which had a 165- to 300-kilometer range depending on the variant.166 Each missile’s warhead contained 950 m74 submunitions that distributed thousands of marble- sized pieces of steel over a 33,000- square- meter area to suppress the enemy by cutting through radar dishes, soft- skinned vehicles, and other exposed equipment.167 The “bomblet-spewing atacms” would certainly suppress Serb air defenses if employed, but the indiscriminate scattering of shrapnel would also kill or injure anyone in the open over a several kilometer area.168 According to the plan, after theatamcs suppressed a path, the Apaches would fly from their base in Tirana, Albania, to destinations nearly 200 kilometers away in Kosovo and then have five minutes to find targets and fire their Hellfire missiles before having to return to base low on fuel.169 To support

90 Protracted Bombing the plan, Colonel Odierno had the a/n tqp- 37 counter- battery radar forward-positioned about twenty kilometers from the Kosovo border. From there the radar offered the possibility of tracking indirect fire from Serbian artillery. Joint interoperability became a problem when the possibility of employing Apache helicopters introduced friction between the standard operating procedures of the services. General Clark never designated a joint land component commander because Operation Allied Force was mostly an air campaign. Doctrinally, a land component commander manages the functions of ground elements from the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, and stands on equal footing with the special operations, air, and maritime component commands.170 In the Kosovo campaign, such a headquarters might have added a larger ground perspective regarding the use of air power; without it, the military leaders improvised. Tension emerged between Lieutenant Generals Hendrix and Short over how to incorporate the Apaches.171 One unidentified U.S. Air Force officer on Hendrix’s staff expressed his frustrations to Elaine Grossman of Inside the Pentagon:

They do not know, nor do they want to know, the detailed information required to get the Prowler to jam the priority threats, provide acquisition jamming on the correct azimuth, etc. . . . The benefits of integrating with platforms like Compass Call, Rivet Joint and others are off their radar scope.172

General Clark read Grossman’s article on 20 May and concluded that the problems the “disgruntled Air Force officer” described “if real then [on 20 May], had been corrected” shortly thereafter.173 Perhaps Clark’s looking into the matter spurred some staff officers to integrate their methods on a joint level. Although nato never employed the Apaches, the joint sharing of information from the counter- battery radars and other sensors associated with Task Force Hawk proved very useful in finding Serbian artillery and command nodes during the later stages of the campaign.174 The Serbian army used telephone poles painted black and laid on old truck axles to look like the barrels of artillery tubes.175 Flying at fifteen thousand feet, pilots could not tell the difference. Camouflage also hindered air efforts. Many U.S. Navy pilots had to drop their bombs on

Protracted Bombing 91 “dump sites” after not finding targets but needing to lighten their load to bring their landing weights to the maximum allowed for safe landing aboard the uss Theodore Roosevelt.176 By nato’s estimates, most Serb decoys mimicked artillery; a secondary effort imitated tanks.177 Initially, the intelligence section of Task Force Hawk used its collection assets and analysts to develop engagement areas and targets for the Apaches.178 Among these assets were the Hunter uav, the eh- 60 electronic warfare helicopter, and the rc-12 Guardrail electronic warfare aircraft.179 Starting in 1971 nato used rc-12 aircraft to monitor Soviet troop movements in Czechoslovakia and East Germany by intercepting radio traffic.180 In May 1999 analysts in Albania used the Hunter uavs creatively to determine whether Serb forces were near civilian population centers. According to U.S. Army Col. Mike Howell, “They look to see if children are playing or wash is on the clothes lines because that is an indication of whether or not the bad guys are bothering people in that particular village on a given day.”181 Counter-battery radars got the aerial sensors pointed in the right direction. Together, these sensors needed one more element to narrow down the location of Serb artillery: the guns had to actually fire. After realizing that nato would not use the Apaches, starting on 25 May, the intelligence analysts (g- 2 section) of Task Force Hawk passed around 600 targets to the combined air operations center (caoc).182 After double checking to ensure the targets were not near refugees or Kosovo Liberation Army (kla) forces, the caoc radioed the targets to the airborne battlefield command and control center abccc( ) circling overhead.183 Next, the abccc passed the targets on to airborne forward air controllers (afacs) for action. Thennato aircraft bombed the targets. At its best, this process took five minutes from the time of first identifying the target to the release of ordinance.184 To smooth over the process, Task Force Hawk loaned the battlefield coordination element bce)( of the caoc some laptops that ran the automated deep operations coordination system (adocs) software they were accustomed to using to process automated fire missions.185 The staggering number of acronyms required to explain cooperation between two military services from the same country is a testament to the complexity of joint operations. Nevertheless, determined staffs worked around friction, establishing a system (depicted in figure 3)

92 Protracted Bombing Fig. 3. Incorporation of counter- battery radar acquisitions. Source: Bruce R. Nar- dulli, Walter L. Perry, Bruce Pirnie, John Gordon IV, and John G. McGinn, Disjointed War (Santa Monica ca: rand, 2002), 91. Copyright 2002 by the rand Corporation. Reprinted with permission. whereby counter-battery acquisitions could be passed to nato aircraft loitering over Kosovo. Another missing piece in the operational puzzle came on 26 May, when the kla (with the encouragement of the cia) launched a major offensive to establish supply lines through Serb army- held territory.186 The Albanian army backed the kla offensive with artillery fire.187 The Serb artillery returned fire, halting the kla advance in the area of Mount Pastrik, pinning them down with indirect fires.188 All this commotion sparked radio chatter picked up by U.S. Army signals intelligence systems such as the Guardrail and eh- 60, which then determined the sources of the transmissions. Finally, using the ad hoc system whereby Task Force Hawk exchanged laptops with the caoc, electronic systems passed on the counter-battery radar acquisitions of the a/n tqp- 36 and a/n Tqp- 37 to

Protracted Bombing 93 nato aircraft circling overhead.189 Each Serb artillery shot gave away the location of a gun, and each radio transmission gave away the position of a ground command post. The nato alliance checked General Pavkovic’s Third Army at Mount Pastrik, and from 26 May onward nato aircraft pummeled Serbian ground forces with more accuracy than at any point prior, flying over nine hundred sorties per day until the end.190 Just as in Bosnia during Operation Deliberate Force in 1995, counter- battery radars detected the location of Serbian artillery tubes when decoys fooled aerial sensors. According to retired U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Theodore G. Stroup, “The result was that nato air power was finally able to precisely hit the Serb army in the field. The Kosovars acted as the anvil andtf Hawk the eyes and ears of the blacksmith so that the hammer of air power could be effective.”191 Reinforcing this notion, U.S. Air Force Gen. John P. Jumper, commander of the U.S. air forces in Europe, stated that counter- battery radars played “a very big part” at the end of the campaign. Aside from these two acknowledgments, few senior military officers focused on the accomplishments of Task Force Hawk’s sensor capability and joint-minded staff officers who shared their Apache targets with air forces. Instead, the mainstream attention went toward the potential role of the Apaches. Over- all, Task Force Hawk was a secondary effort in the air campaign. Within Task Force Hawk, Colonel Odierno’s fire support assets with their radars were merely a shaping effort for the helicopters. In the end, at the operational level of war Task Force Hawk’s sensors turned out to be a cog in an ad hoc arrangement of military systems with which General Clark sought to wreak havoc on Serbia’s Third Army. Once the allied air forces bombed something other than wooden telephone poles, perhaps Milosevic’s crony generals began to take nato air power seriously. By 10 June 1999 nato aerial reconnaissance observed Serb ground forces withdrawing from Kosovo in accordance with Milosevic’s compliance with nato’s five terms.192 Ten days later the last of over forty thousand Serb ground troops left Kosovo eleven hours ahead of the midnight deadline agreed upon by Serb generals.193 At critical choke points overhead reconnaissance efforts counted 220 tanks, 300 armored personnel carriers, and 308 artillery pieces moving back across the border into Serbia, loaded on

94 Protracted Bombing trucks.194 From the air, it was hard for nato to discern the operational status of this equipment. In the aftermath of the air campaign the alliance turned to two other matters. The first was trying to incorporate Russian peacekeepers without having them form a separate peacekeeping sector that turned a blind eye to continued Serbian repression of minorities. The second was attempting to dissuade kla rebel groups from pursuing the withdrawing Serbs.195 The diplomatic endgame was tense and littered with pitfalls at every step.

Milosevic’s Conundrum After Task Force Hawk’s arrival and the effective use of counter- batter radar to target Serbian artillery, Milosevic faced two additional setbacks and subsequently agreed to a diplomatic solution. First, on 27 May, the day after nato aircraft first struck an artillery tube based upon targeting data from a a/n tqp- 37 radar, Judge Louise Arbor, the chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (icty) at the Hague, announced the indictments of Milosevic and four of his top officials— Serbian President Milan Milutinovic, Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, Yugoslav military Chief of Staff Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Serbian Internal Affairs Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic.196 Theicty indicted all five officials on 340 counts of murder and 740,000 forced deportations of Kosovar Albanians.197 Second, adding to Milosevic’s conundrum on a personal level, in May 1999 the European Union precisely targeted 305 individuals within Milo- sevic’s inner circle with a ban on their travel and business dealings in Europe.198 Nations outside the European Union, including the United States, followed suit. These actions froze the significant financial assets of Milosevic’s cronies, including the family members and spouses of key individuals. In Milosevic: A Biography, Adam LeBor described the inner circle and family tree of Milosevic and his wife Mirjana and argued that the impact of the travel ban further isolated and destabilized the regime. According to LeBor, the European Union’s announcement of “The List” narrowed Milosevic’s power base, despite the public displays of solidarity

Protracted Bombing 95 among those on the list.199 As a result, LeBor wrote, “once their personal assets were frozen, and there were no more weekend shopping trips to Paris, or even Budapest, many judged that loyalty [to Milosevic] demanded too high a price.”200 Faced with these setbacks and increased pressure from nato’s air campaign, on 27 May 1999 Russian envoy Viktor Cherno- myrdin, operating on behalf of President Yeltsin, offered Milosevic a way out of his dilemma.201 On 30 August 1999 Zbigniew Brzezinski (the national security advisor for President Jimmy Carter) published “The Failed Double- Cross” in the Wall Street Journal. In this article, Brzezinski claimed that Yeltsin and Milosevic were attempting to “double- cross” nato by partitioning a separate Russian peacekeeping sector in Kosovo with a “unilateral fiat.”202 Brzezinski described the following sequence of events to back his claim. First, on 26 May 1999 Russia’s Balkin envoy Chernomyrdin published a commentary in the Washington Post entitled “Bombs Rule Out Talk of Peace.”203 That same day, incidentally, thekla ’s offensive and the incorporation of the Task Force Hawk counter- battery radars with bombing missions began.204 Chernomyrdin called for nato leaders to suspend the air campaign and pursue a diplomatic solution:

Now that raids against military targets have evidently proven pointless, nato’s armed force has moved to massive destruction of civilian infrastructure— in particular, electric transmission lines, water pipes, and factories. Are thousands of innocent people to be killed because of one man’s blunders? Is an entire country to be razed? Is one to assume that air raids can win a war? I should like here to turn to the lessons of recent history. The U.S. Air Force and the raf dropped several hundred thousand bombs on Berlin, yet it took a Soviet Army offensive, with its toll of several hundred thousand lives, to seize the city [during World War II]. American air raids in Vietnam proved pointless, and the Russian Army suffered setbacks in Chechnya. Serbs see nato and the Americans as aggres- sors against whom they are defending their native land.205

The next day Chernomyrdin met alone with Milosevic, commencing a series of private consultations that culminated with Russian television’s

96 Protracted Bombing revelation on 2 June that Chernomyrdin “brought not one but two different plans to Belgrade.”206 Partially declassified records of the correspondence between Clinton and Yeltsin in 1999 reveal that Brzezinski’s claim of a Russian “double- cross” was not entirely accurate. Earlier on 14 April President Clinton had called President Yeltsin to request that Russia contribute troops for peacekeeping operations in Kosovo after the air campaign.207 The exact details of this phone conversation remain classified, but when referring to the 14 April 1999 phone call with Yeltsin in his 2004 autobiography, Clinton acknowledged: “I thought a Russian presence would help protect the Serb minority and might give Milosevic a face-saving way out of his opposition to foreign troops.”208 Yet the swiftness of the introduction of Russian peacekeepers on the day that the air campaign ended surprised President Clinton and his national security team, sparking a tense phone conversation between Clinton and Yeltsin where Yeltsin admitted that he personally ordered the action.209 In describing this development, Clinton said, “Yeltsin was getting a lot of criticism at home for cooperating with us from ultra- nationalists whose sympathies lay with the Serbs. I thought he was just throwing them a temporary bone.”210 President Yeltsin, through his Balkans envoy, Viktor Chernomyrdin, offered Milosevic a way to concede tonato ’s terms with Serbia while still retaining significant Serb influence over a portion of Kosovo. According to the Kremlin’s plan, Russian troops would establish a separate peacekeeping sector administered with collaboration between leaders in Moscow and Belgrade.211 Given this alternative, on 3 June, Milosevic capitulated.212 To nato’s surprise, when the bombing ended on 10 June, Russia quickly moved troops from its peacekeeping sector in Bosnia to establish a foothold at the airfield in Pristina, Kosovo.213 Under the guise of introducing a stabilization force, these Russian troops postured to receive reinforcements.214 General Clark responded on 11 June by dispatching British Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Jackson, commander of nato’s Rapid Reaction Corps, to Pristina with two British companies and a French battalion on a mission to occupy the airfield and linkup with the Russian forces.215 Russia’s maneuver caught Lieutenant General Jackson’s forces off guard due to the celebra- tory climate fostered by Milosevic’s capitulation. In his autobiography,

Protracted Bombing 97 Jackson described the mood at 0505 on 11 June: “We were knackered. The whisky bottle was empty.”216 At 1030, General Clark called Jackson and gave him a warning order to move by air to Pristina.217 The movement was rapid; later that day by 1400, in describing his linkup with Russian forces, Jackson said:

I introduced myself to one of the Russians and asked if I could see General Viktor Zavarzin. I was ushered into the back of his command vehicle. My first impression was of a burly man who seemed somewhat nervous. I greeted him in Russian, even though I had an interpreter with me. He was a bit frosty at first, and it was pretty hard going. Then the rain must have got into the electrics because the vehicle filled with acrid black smoke. We got out and stood in the rain, which was still bucketing down. I said to Zavarzin: “Hey, listen, I used to get wet as a company commander, but generals don’t need to get wet.” We found a dry place in what remained of the wrecked airport terminal. I had a flask of whisky in my map pocket and I dug it out and offered it to Zavarzin. Relations warmed up after that.218

Subsequently, on 12 June the Russian military prepared to launch a rapidly deployable contingent of 2,500 paratroopers via air transports to Pristina.219 In reaction, Clark ordered Jackson to block the airfield at Pristina with helicopters.220 Based on Jackson’s assessment of the situation at the scene, he refused to follow the order, sparking a flurry of phone calls between panicked political leaders in Washington and London who were still catching up with the breaking developments.221 At the last minute nato leaders convinced Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania to deny Russia the use of their airspace, thus foiling Russian machinations.222 Yeltsin did not want to risk having the transports forced down, so he ordered a halt to the plan. At 1006 on 14 June, President Clinton called President Yeltsin to discuss the integration of a Russian contingent within an international stabilization force for Kosovo that would operate along the lines of the Bosnian model. The mood was tense. Clinton started the conversation: “Yesterday, you and I agreed to instruct our generals to meet and resolve the problem

98 Protracted Bombing of command at the airport and report back to us on what they worked out. I was quite disappointed.”223 Yeltsin interrupted: “Yes, they did. They met yesterday and I gave instructions to hold the necessary negotiations in order to come to an agreement with regard to the regulations of the support team for the Russian presence at the airport of Slatina near Pris- tina. . . . Generals Zavarzin and Jackson have already exchanged liaison officers.”224 Yeltsin insisted that Russian troops would maintain control of the airport, sharing its use with international peacekeepers in a similar manner as the Tuzla airport in Bosnia. According to Yeltsin, the larger issue was how the United States would address “the provocative actions of the so- called Kosovo Liberation Army.”225 Clinton reassured Yeltsin: “First of all, let me say in regard to the Kosovo Liberation Army, we did learn of a plot against Russia, and we told them we would not tolerate attacks on your forces, and they agreed not to do it. . . . They believe you came into Kosovo only to protect the Serbs, not to be part of the international force. . . . We have to get this resolved or we can expect trouble.”226 Clinton bought time by proposing that Russian troops could stay at the airport as long as there would be no more deployments until the two leaders could meet in Cologne on 20 June to ratify a longterm stabilization plan. Yeltsin agreed. Ahead of the meeting, on 18 June, the Secretary of Defense of the United States and the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation met in Helsinki and came up with a plan where Russian peacekeeping troops would be interspersed within nato zones.227 The end was near. At 1300 hours on 20 June 1999 at the Renaissance Hotel in Cologne, Ger- many, President Clinton, along with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, met with President Yeltsin and four Russian ministerial officials to formalize the role of Russian peacekeepers in Kosovo.228 Both parties ratified the Helsinki plan. Finally, at 1830 hours from the Hyatt Hotel in Cologne, Germany, President Clinton gathered with interpreter Lindita Imami and called the leader of the kla, Hashim Thaci, warning him to keep his rebels from retaliating against the Serbs.229 America tried to restrain the forces it had unleashed in order to hold together a fragile peace.

Protracted Bombing 99 Russia played an influential role in Milosevic’s decision- making during the final weeks of the bombing. Clinton was well aware of this dynamic. Although diplomacy was paramount in ensuring stability as Milosevic began withdrawing his Third Army from Kosovo, the phone conversa- tions and meeting between Clinton and Yeltsin regarding the introduction of peacekeepers took place mostly behind- the- scenes. The news media focused on other things. By 10 June 1999 air power had already stole the show, dazzling the pundits and skeptics by appearing to have single- handedly attained nato’s objectives.

Operation Allied Force Ends: 10 June 1999 In a 10 June 1999 interview with Jim Lehrer on the pbs News Hour, Secre- tary of State Madeleine Albright said, “I never thought it [the campaign] was going to be short. I said [in the 24 March interview] ‘relatively short’ . . . that is what it has been.”230 Later in the interview, in referring to John Keegan’s frequently publicized misgivings in the London Daily Telegraph regarding the sole use of air power, Albright said, Well, I think that there have certainly been an awful lot of armchair strategists, but I’ve been very interested even in the last 24 hours about some of them. Mr. Keegan, for instance, a leading military expert who just flat out came out and said that he was wrong. I think that that takes a lot of courage, and I would hope that some of the others might do the same thing.231 Indeed, many other commentators wrote about the efficacy of air power in the aftermath of the campaign, spurred by Keegan’s statement. In the article with his often- quoted statement, Keegan called for further study on the campaign: There will have to be a new strategic bombing survey and it will perhaps take years to compile before air forces and governments can understand what was achieved and why the effects of the bombing yielded the results they did. Nevertheless, the air forces have won a triumph, [and] are entitled to every plaudit they will receive and can look forward to enjoying a transformed status in the strategic community, one they have earned by their single-handed efforts.232

100 Protracted Bombing What follows is an attempt to show how various key actors interpreted the outcome of the campaign. Subsequent to Operation Allied Force, several studies explained how the bombing yielded its results. Conditioned by scientific spirit, military professionals focused on the destruction of military equipment and supplies rather than measuring intangibles. In particular, the profession persisted in counting the destruction of tanks, artillery, and other military vehicles; analysts had tracked these imple- ments during the intelligence “bean counting” of the Cold War and used them as an operational measure of success during the 1991 Gulf War. The initial verdict was that air power’s new level of precision made the war easy and safe.

Protracted Bombing 101 4 After the Bombing

We achieved our goals with the most precise application of air power in history. — Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Press Conference, 10 June 1999

After the war, different manners of assessing the effectiveness of the bombing emerged. At the operational level, nato headquarters and the U.S. military services attempted to grasp the significance of Operation Allied Force in terms of whether air power had more of an effect by targeting infrastructure or mobile Serb ground forces. Insights from the campaign shaped subsequent military modernization programs, particularly in the U.S. Army, which reacted as if the recent operation threatened its continued maintenance of large armored formations organized around a division- centric structure. At the strategic level, President Clinton and key members of his national security team solidified their belief that bombing was a better option than using ground forces to achieve limited war aims such as that of protecting innocents from the onslaught of ground forces. After the bombing, military and civilian leaders as well as the general public gained an overly optimistic outlook on the effectiveness ofsolely employing air power for limited military interventions. This legacy persists today, adding to the U.S. propensity to bomb other countries with the faith that such an action will shape the strategic landscape in a favorable manner. In the aftermath of Operation Allied Force, American audiences now expect to see precise results and a rapid turn of events when the bombs fall, even without the addition of ground forces.

102 Operational Assessments of Bombing Effectiveness On 10 June 1999 Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Hugh Shelton declared in a joint press conference that nato “severely crippled the [Serb] military forces in Kosovo by destroying more than 50 percent of the artillery and one third of the armored vehicles.”1 Interestingly, the slide used in Cohen and Shelton’s brief indicated that nato destroyed over three hundred Serb artillery pieces in the last ten days of the operation.2 This time frame coincided with the use of counter- battery radar acquisitions from Task Force Hawk. The briefing, however, did not mention the role of Task Force Hawk’s sensors in the final stages of the campaign. Instead Secretary Cohen pointed out how precision air power, delivered from long range by aircraft such as theb -2, “demonstrated some important lessons.”3 He went on to say:

So we have made tremendous strides in our technological advances even since the Gulf War. We have far more precision munitions that are produced at much lower cost. So as we undergo this revolution in military affairs, we will reshape the Army, we will reshape the Air Force in terms of its components, what is going to be required by the Air Force, the Marines, and the Navy.4

In line with Cohen’s statement, the military services commenced an era of military transformation. This transformation accelerated with the election of George W. Bush, who preached the phrase “military transformation” during campaign rhetoric and appointed Donald Rumsfeld as the Secretary of Defense to carry out the effort after Bush had won the 2000 presidential election.5 Shortly after Cohen’s press conference, several newspapers, including the New York Times, challenged Cohen and Shelton’s 10 June damage assessment.6 In a 28 June article, “Damage to Serb Military Less than Expected,” journalist Steven Lee Myers said, “In war, initial assessments of damage are often overblown; the oratory almost always is.”7 Serbian military leaders added to doubts on whether the bombs actually destroyed the heavy weaponry that nato claimed.

After the Bombing 103 Serbian air defense posed unresolved challenges for nato. By not turning on their radars full time, the Serbian air defense system largely survived nato’s initial suppression of enemy air defenses (sead) efforts and continued to threaten allied aircraft throughout the campaign. Com- bined with planning considerations for weather (cloud ceilings) and terrain, the resilient Serbian air defenses kept nato aircraft flying at over fifteen thousand feet for most the campaign. This inhibited the ability to effectively target the Serbian army. In particular, mobile ground forces were hard to target even with advanced sensor capability and precision munitions.

Destruction of Serb Mobile Ground Forces In a June 1999 postwar interview Lt. Gen. Nebojsa Pavkovic, commander of the Yugoslav Third Army who had been responsible overall for Serbian forces in Kosovo, suggested that the ability to damage his army from the air proved inconsequential. He claimed that Serb forces lost only thirteen tanks, six armored personnel carriers, and twenty- seven artillery pieces.8 Three months after the campaign at natoa press conference in September 1999, Gen. Wesley Clark unveiled an operational assessment that backed Secretary Cohen and General Shelton’s earlier claims. Eight months later in May 2000 a Newsweek article challenged Clark’s assessment by highlighting significant problems in the methodology used to back the claims of Serbian army battle damage.9 Figure 4 indicates how the various postwar damage claims aligned with each other. On 16 September 1999 General Clark presented the findings on the results of the air campaign in a press conference at nato headquarters in Brussels. Along with him at this press conference was Brig. Gen. John Corley, chief of the Kosovo Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team (meat). Some of the officers on this team would later refer to themselves as “dead meat” because of the high- stakes impact the study results had on their careers and performance reviews.10 In the three months after the conclusion of Operation Allied Force Brigadier General Corley’s thirty-person team conducted battle damage assessments by correlating information from aircrew mission reports, on- site findings, forward air controller interviews, cockpit video, prestrike and poststrike imagery,

104 After the Bombing Fig. 4. Comparison of post-strike damage assessments. Sources: Created by the author based on Rebecca Grant, “True Blue: Behind the Kosovo Numbers Game,” Air Force Magazine 83, no. 8 (2000): 75; John Barry and Evan Thomas, “The Kosovo Cover- Up,” Newsweek 135, no. 20 (2000): 22; Wesley Clark (saceur) and John Corley (Chief, Kosovo Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team), “Maps and Aerial Views of Post- and Pre-Strikes Used during the Press Conference by General Wesley K. Clark,” nato’s Role in Kosovo, nato Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, updated 16 September 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/slides/m990916a.htm; Stephen T. Hosmer, The Conflict over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did (Santa Monica ca: Rand, 2001), 84.

and witnesses. His team included Col. Ed Boyle, who did planning and coordination in the Combined Air Operations Center in Vicenza, Italy, during the campaign, as well as Col. Brian McDonald, who led the ground assessment team in Kosovo (see figure 5). Corley, Boyle, and McDonald were all at the press conference with General Clark. To varying degrees, all these officers had an interest in proving the effectiveness of the bombing, lest they reveal their potential incompetence during the planning stages of the campaign. In 2014, according to retired Col. Douglas Macgregor, who had served as the director of joint operations at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (shape) during the campaign, many of the individuals involved in the bombing survey knowingly lied about the results:

After the Bombing 105 Fig. 5. Destroyed tank in Klina, Kosovo, found by Colonel McDonald’s team. Source: Scott A. Porter (Lt. Col., U.S. Army, Ret.).

We never degraded the Serb air defenses below 83 percent. Air Force leadership warned Clark in Nov. 1998 that if we did not hit Serb forces in the motor pool we probably wouldn’t hit anything in Kosovo. They were right. 12 tanks, 13 sp [self- propelled] guns and 90 assorted trucks and countless decoys are all we hit. I personally discussed this on the ground in Kosovo in June 1999 with usaf Colonel MacDonald [sic] who led the bda assessment team. He was later forced to lie under threat of losing his future employment. Clark and Jumper knew the truth and decided to lie. The British generals including Rupert Smith [deputy saceur] were disgusted but were ordered by UK mod [Min- istry of Defense] to back up whatever Clark said.11

Macgregor’s extreme claim that those involved in producing the report “lied” was likely an exaggeration. Nevertheless, further examination of the evidence reveals that General Clark pressured those participating in the report to stretch the truth as far as possible. Putting things

106 After the Bombing diplomatically, Clark’s former deputy, British Gen. Sir Jeremy MacKenzie, described Clark’s methodology as being “economical with the truth.”12 Before the press conference, upon hearing that the ground team was surveying the ground from helicopters and only seeing numerous destroyed cars and buses but very few tanks, General Clark said, “Goddammit, drive to each one of those places. Walk the terrain.”13 During the press conference, when asked by Craig Whitney from the Washington Post how the figures of destroyed armored personnel carriers apc( s), tanks, and military vehicles, artillery, and mortars compared with assessments at the immediate end of the conflict, Clark stated that “they’re actually pretty close to the figures we had at the end of the conflict. We were saying 110 tanks, 210 armored fighting vehicles or apcs, and about 449 artillery and mortars.”14 One of the charts that Clark used during the press conference depicted that twenty-five of the “destroyed” vehicular targets were actually decoys. Worse yet, the chart indicated that 128 air strikes occurred against the wreckage of vehicles that were already destroyed.15 During the briefing, Clark admitted that nato’s initial battle damage assessment at the end of the campaign differed from the “final assessment” of Brigadier General Corley’s team due to the repeated strikes on decoys and damaged equipment.16 The impact of bombing Serbian infrastructure was a secondary effort during the study. By focusing mostly on the damage to Serbian military equipment, the assessment may have presupposed that damaging the Serbian army led to Milosevic’s capitulation. On 31 January 2000 Secre- tary Cohen and General Shelton subsequently presented Congress with an after- action report on Operation Allied Force that included General Clark’s revised figures from the 16 September 1999 press conference. Soon thereafter, the postwar damage claims became the subject of more controversy. The May 2000 issue ofNewsweek featured an article refuting the claims made by General Clark and his staff. The journalists John Barry and Evan Thomas said they had obtained a “suppressed Air Force report” with lower damage estimates, and they referred to an unnamed senior nato staff officer who said Brigadier General Corley’s report was all “smoke and mirrors.”17 Barry and Thomas claimed that Corley’s team

After the Bombing 107 recorded strikes as “successful” in some cases based merely on a correla- tion between cockpit video and a flash from a reconnaissance satellite. In terms of physical evidence of destroyed equipment remaining on the ground in Kosovo, a study by rand later revealed that Corley’s team only found the hulks of twenty- six tanks (or possibly fourteen tanks and twelve self- propelled artillery pieces that “looked like tanks,” according to the team), eighteen apcs, and twenty artillery pieces.18 The team assumed that the Serbs recovered the rest of the damaged equipment.19 As indicated in figure 4, the Newsweek claims aligned closely with those of Serbian General Pavkovic. Three months after theNewsweek article, Air Force Magazine contribut- ing editor Rebecca Grant, a former analyst for the office of the Secretary of the Air Force, argued that the “suppressed” report was simply an incomplete “working draft” of the assessment nato produced in September 1999.20 In her article “True Blue: Behind the Kosovo Numbers Game,” she claimed that the methodology used by General Clark’s team “turned out to be the most complete and careful review of strike data in the history of air warfare.”21 The enthusiastic portrayal of thenato report’s accuracy by an air power advocate was undoubtedly a self- interested move— standing behind the credibility of an Army general to advance further investment in Air Force capabilities. The final piece of evidence regarding the air campaign’s damage to Serb equipment lies in a comparison of 1 January 1999 Serbian military inventories with those of 1 January 2000. As part of the Dayton Accords, Serbia had to declare its inventories of heavy weaponry on an annual basis. To ensure transparency in reporting, the data was subject to a third-country audit for verification purposes. A comparison between Serb inventories from January 1999 and January 2000 revealed a net reduction in nine tanks, thirty- nine apcs (with nineteen belonging to the Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova), and twenty- eight artillery pieces.22 Altogether this amounted to seventy- six heavy weapon systems— twelve more than Colonel McDonald’s team had found as wreckage on the ground in Kosovo after Serbian retrograde operations. The discrepancy in tanks was probably the result of confusing tanks with apcs or artillery pieces. In any case,

108 After the Bombing the Serbs reported higher losses in artillery than what was actually found on the ground, though less than what General Clark claimed. Although the true extent of the damage cannot be precisely calculated based on all available evidence, it is fair to say that the destruction was less than advertised. Additionally, although some systems may have been repairable after the conflict, the fact that they were temporarily put out of action had a significant effect on available Serbian combat power during the late May 1999 period when the Serbs were in contact with the Kosovo Liberation Army. By category the damage inflicted against Serbian artillery was undoubtedly the heaviest. More accurately put, air power neutralized (rather than destroyed) half of the Serbian artillery in Kosovo during the final weeks of the campaign.

U.S. Marines, A- 10s, and Task Force Hawk The U.S. Marines proved the most aggressive in bombing targets acquired with counter- battery radar, though it was still challenging to identify camouflaged targets from high altitude despite knowing where to look. After the war, Lt. Col. Philip C. Tissue, a Marine Corps pilot, described the typical process in the closing weeks of the campaign whereby f/a- 18s struck Serbian artillery spotted by counter- battery radars:

Shortly after we arrived on station, the airborne battlefield command- and- control center (abccc) passed us grid coordinates of a Serbian artillery site that was reported to be firing on U.S. troops. Grid coordinates were passed using Have Quick (a frequency-agile net); they had probably been forwarded from U.S. counter-battery radars attached to Task Force Hawk located in Albania. Obviously, we wanted to destroy this target quickly, but we were frustrated. Minimum altitude restrictions, as well as nvg [night vision goggle] and f/a18d forward-looking infrared radar (flir) limitations, made detection of a camouflaged enemy at night difficult at best. We could see with the naked eye the intermittent muzzle flashes of artillery firing from Kosovo into Albania, but the targets could not be pinpointed with enough accuracy to ensure that we did not mistakenly bomb civilians or even U.S. troops. Ultimately, an Air Force fac(a) in

After the Bombing 109 an a-10 illuminated the area with multiple infrared (ir) flares, detected an artillery site, and ran a section of Marine Hornets on it. Thefac (a) appeared to be conducting reconnaissance by fire, and then figuring that if he received antiaircraft artillery aaa( ) in return, the shooters must be bad guys. Two f/a- 18ds dropped two 500-pound bombs, and the Serbs were done firing for the night. The target may or may not have been hit or destroyed, but apparently just the knowledge that air was poised to strike shut down every Serb artillery position along the border with Albania.23

The f/a- 18ds from Lieutenant Colonel Tissue’s Marine All- Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 533 flew their first missions in Kosovo on 28 May 1999, near the end of the campaign. Tissue noted that typical training exercises at the Twenty-Nine Palms bombing ranges incorporated targets in the open that aircrews could easily identify rather than camouflaged vehicles placed in tree lines that might allow pilots to get a better sense of how these appeared on their forward-looking infrared radar while flying at high altitudes.24 Although aviation for the U.S. Marines normally focused on providing air support for ground forces, they ended up needing support from the ground forces to find the targets in Kosovo. U.S. Air Force commanders also acknowledged their dependence on U.S. Army sensors. Within the U.S. Air Force the a- 10 pilots also focused on destroying Serbian artillery. Lt. Col. Chris Haave, the commander of the Eighty-First Fighter Squadron during the conflict, applauded Task Force Hawk in his book a- 10s over Kosovo. Haave wrote, “When a Serb artillery unit fired on a Kosovar village, the U.S. Army’s counterbattery radar could plot the Serb’s position.”25 He went on to acknowledge that the Army’s electronic warfare assets determined the location of enemy command posts.26 Compared with other sources of information fused by the combined air operations center’s force-level execution targeting cell, the Army’s information was “usually quite accurate,” according to Haave.27 In 2002 the U.S. Army commissioned a study by the rand Corpora- tion’s Arroyo Center to determine why Task Force Hawk’s Apaches were not fully integrated into the Kosovo campaign. The result,Disjointed

110 After the Bombing War, determined that Task Force Hawk added significant capability in terms of its sensors despite not employing the Apaches; however, the failure to designate a land component commander, even in an air- only campaign, had hindered coordination.28 In addition, the study mentioned that had Colonel Odierno been in charge of Task Force Hawk he would not have had as good a working relationship with Lieutenant General Short as Lieutenant General Hendrix did, due to the difference in rank.29 Disjointed War did not dispute the validity of the employment concept for the Apache deep- strike mission in Kosovo, however. The Eleventh Aviation Regiment configured their Apaches with an extended-range fuel system consisting of one to four 230-gallon external fuel tanks in order to reach their targets. With the extra fuel tanks the Apache, which normally carries up to sixteen Hellfire missiles, could only carry as few as one to four Hellfire missiles, 440 rounds of 30- mm ammunition, and seventy- six 2.75- inch rockets.30 Task Force Hawk had an inventory of around eight hundred Hellfire missiles in Albania.31 Despite all this available firepower, a March 2001 General Accounting Officegao ( ) report on U.S. Army lessons from the conflict revealed that Task Force Hawk did not have any maps of Albania or Kosovo at the outset of the operation and had to transfer intelligence data manually with higher headquarters due to incompatible systems.32 Based on these challenges, the gao report concluded that the Army should “digitize” at a faster pace.33 In contrast, the authors of the 2002 rand report concluded that joint forces could still successfully employ Apaches and rocket artillery in a deep- strike mission during “the initial phase of a future campaign” so long as there were no “political constraints.”34 One year later during the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the vulnerability of the Apache became evident when the Eleventh Aviation Regiment’s thirty-two aircraft retreated from their attempted deep strike against the Medina Division of the Republican Guard after defenders struck thirty-one of the aircraft with rifle fire.35 The Iraqi army downed one Apache and paraded the captured crew, Chief Warrant Officers David Williams and Ronald Young, on television.36 This embarrassment spurred the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (tradoc) to rethink its doctrinal constructs for deep Apache strikes.37 In the late 1990s, however, attack

After the Bombing 111 helicopter doctrine clearly stated that such operations were “high- risk.”38 Thus, after a situation without political constraints proved that the original doctrine was correct in stating that such operations were high risk, tradoc cautiously decided to change the doctrine; they deemed it too risky to employ Apaches far ahead of friendly lines when the other side shoots back.

Destruction of Infrastructure Targets Targeting infrastructure was one of the most divisive issues among nato members during in the air campaign. Overall, only 30 percent of nato’s strike sorties focused on Serb ground forces. The daily air tasking order directed the remainder of efforts against air defenses and infrastructure targets, though the daily breakdown of this ratio indicated a higher proportion of missions against ground forces near the end of the campaign.39 This was because by the end of the operation hardly any infrastructure remained in Serbia that could be claimed of military value and that had not already been hit after taking into consideration collateral damage restrictions. In fact, General Clark expressed that nato might run out of targets in Serbia when General Shelton called on 3 June and said, “Just keep bombing. Forget about the targets in Kosovo and go after targets in northern Serbia.”40 At this point, political leaders in the United States believed that the continued targeting of Serb ground forces might compromise Milosevic’s recent decision to meet with negotiators and discuss a settlement. In contrast, Europeans (and Clark) wanted to keep the pressure on ground forces.41 Throughout the campaign, members of the nato alliance unanimously agreed on targeting the Serb army’s heavy weaponry but had significant disagreement on whether it was appropriate to target factories, power plants, oil refineries, television stations, barracks, airfields, and bridges. At the conclusion of the bombing, French President Jacques Chirac bragged that his personal involvement and objections in nato target selection matters ensured that there were still bridges intact across the Danube River at the end of the campaign.42 After Secretary Cohen prohibited General Clark from speaking to the media about daily bombing runs, Maj. Gen. Walter Jertz frequently

112 After the Bombing spoke on behalf of Clark and nato. On 5 May 1999 when answering the daily question from Craig Whitney of the New York Times on how many tanks nato had struck, Jertz noted:

When I was talking about the 20 percent [of tanks destroyed so far] keep in mind that I always quote saceur—a tank is not a tank is not a tank—a tank, even if it is not destroyed, if it is hiding somewhere and it doesn’t have any fuel and it doesn’t have any ammunition, it just does not have any combat effectiveness so even though you were asking for numbers of the last few days, numbers always have to be related to the kind of operations we are in so if a tank cannot move there is no difference if it is destroyed or if it is out of order or if it has no ammunition, the effectiveness is exactly the same.43

Jertz’s reasoning behind targeting oil refineries, petroleum storage, tank factories, and ammunition storage depots connected the targeting of infrastructure back to reporters’ continual focus on how many tanks nato destroyed on a particular day. Throughout the campaign, nato spokespersons had a difficult time convincing journalists the reasoning behind targeting infrastructure because the media’s focus remained on tank plinking. In the final tally of infrastructure damage, nato assessed that it destroyed eleven railroad bridges, thirty-four highway bridges, 29 percent of all Serb ammo stockpiles, 57 percent of petroleum reserves, all oil refineries, and ten airfields.44 In addition to artillery decoys, however, the Serbs also developed fake bridges that nato repeatedly bombed. In one case, aircraft struck a phony bridge near Djakovica several times, with one munition punching a hole precisely through the center before splashing in the water.45 The Serbs constructed this bridge with logs and a black tarp.46 In another case, ground forces protected a real bridge by constructing a fake bridge made of polyethylene laid across a river six hundred feet upstream from the actual crossing.47 nato “destroyed” this bridge several times.48 Often these infrastructure decoys— though probably comical from up close—fooled reconnaissance satellites, intelligence analysts, military planners, and nato aircraft. Nevertheless, the pressure exerted on Milosevic from taking out 100 percent of Serbia’s

After the Bombing 113 refinery capacity and shutting down the power in Belgrade was real and likely caused widespread discontent from the local population. It is difficult to determine whether bombing infrastructure spurred anger toward Milosevic or nato; this type of resentment can go either way in a conflict, potentially backfiring on those who feed the flames. After all, Sun Tzu urged caution when making war with fire.49 Though he was literally talking about setting things on fire in ancient times, the logic still applies to modern times in new ways.

Attempts at Synthesis In the years following Operation Allied Force, several authors published books with analysis of the campaign. These contained differing opinions regarding the intensity of the air campaign, the role of nato, and the decision to exclude ground forces. In the year after his retirement Wesley Clark, the former nato commander, wrote Waging Modern War, which gave his account of the campaign. Naturally, autobiographical perspectives on a campaign have varying levels of bias. For example, in Waging Modern War, General Clark attributed the shortcomings of the campaign to political constraints.50 On the other hand, in Without Hesitation, Gen. Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the operation, accused Clark of developing, “a very weak battle plan, one without a strategic plan and corresponding targets.”51 This latter autobiography, published in 2010, had a small section that covered Operation Allied Force, with the bulk of the work addressing a wide range of topics throughout Shelton’s life and career. In any case, despite the potential for bias, Clark’s account of the campaign had an extensive level of detail and revealed his frustrations in leading a fragile coalition in a war of limited scope. From a strategic and diplomatic perspective, the most comprehensive work on Operation Allied Force was Winning Ugly by Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon, published in 2000. Daalder worked for the Clinton administration during the Kosovo campaign and was recently the U.S. ambassador to nato under the Obama administration. O’Hanlon served as a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and was a vocal proponent for American engagement and intervention throughout the world. This position was evident in the concluding sentence of Winning Ugly, which

114 After the Bombing stated, “The United States is more likely to underuse than to overuse its power, to the detriment of most.”52 Daalder and O’Hanlon believed that the United States had a morally justified motive to intervene in Kosovo. Based on this belief, the authors argued that Clinton’s reluctance to use ground troops and Apache helicopters in Kosovo was “an irresponsible way to go to war.”53 They argued that using a decisive level of force at the onset of the campaign, even if only from the air, would have been a better strategy.54 Unsurprisingly, both authors were initially advocates of the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003 though they later reversed positions to varying degrees.55 Among government publications on Operation Allied Force were two studies done by Project Air Force in 2001. Project Air Force is a subsidiary of the rand Corporation that analyzes issues of concern for the leadership of the U.S. Air Force. The first of these studies, nato’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, by Benjamin Lambeth provides an extensive analysis of the campaign. Lambeth served as a senior research associate at rand and has published extensively on air power topics. As a civilian pilot, he has flying experience on over forty different U.S. and nato aircraft, and was the first U.S. citizen to fly the Russian MiG-29 fighter.56 He combined his technical experience from flying aircraft with his knowledge of political affairs to produce a thorough strategic and operational assessment of the campaign. At the operational level he highlighted setbacks due to the lack of interoperability between alliance partners as well as within the U.S. joint community.57 Lambeth concluded that the campaign was a success even though it was “clearly a suboptimal application of air power.”58 Lambeth’s conclusions were very similar to those of Daalder and O’Hanlon. All three authors blamed civilian policy makers for implementing an inefficient campaign by not calling for a more decisive use of air power at the onset, combined with a premature decision to rule out the use of ground forces.59 In contrast, in The Conflict over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did, also published by rand, Stephen T. Hosmer argued that the air campaign applied well- ordered pressure, appropriately intensifying over time, to create an environment where Milosevic’s best option was a diplomatic settlement. In Hosmer’s view, the political constraints on

After the Bombing 115 the campaign actually made it more effective in terms of limiting civilian casualties and holding the alliance together.60 He argued that a more intense campaign at the onset would not necessarily have created an environment conducive to settlement: “Attacking Belgrade heavily from the start of the campaign might have had a perverse effect of ‘killing the hostage’— that is, causing enough damage to convince the Serb leaders that they had little to lose by holding out longer.”61 Hosmer argued that bombing the Serbian army had no impact on its capacity to carry out genocide. Addi- tionally, bombing the Serbian army did not influence Milosevic’s decision to capitulate. Instead, the bombing of civilian infrastructure, combined with Milosevic’s evolving view that nato’s terms were also backed by Russia, motivated the Serbian leader to agree to a settlement before nato bombed Serbia’s infrastructure beyond repair.62 In Hosmer’s view, with the coming winter Milosevic could no longer maintain popular support if there was no electricity in Belgrade. According to Hosmer, the second- order effects of power outages included impacts on heating, water supply, sewage, food storage, food processing, and food preparation.63 Milosevic could only survive in power if Serbia’s infrastructure was functioning at least partially. All five of these books focused on the application of air power within self- imposed constraints. The authors mentioned here agreed that air power alone was not effective in damaging the Serbian army. Lambeth, Daalder, and O’Hanlon argued that constraints on the use of the air power caused the campaign to last longer than necessary. General Clark and Hosmer argued that the constraints were appropriate because they held together nato, limited civilian casualties, and fostered further international consensus for the cause. The truth probably lies somewhere in the middle. Regardless, nato’s campaign in Kosovo proved a significant event in the history of limited military interventions because it shaped strategic-level perceptions regarding the employment of air power.

Strategic- Level Perceptions on Air Power after the Campaign Prior to Operation Allied Force, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in referring to Gen. Colin Powell’s 1993 protest against air strikes in Bosnia,

116 After the Bombing stated, “It wasn’t easy being a civilian woman having a disagreement with the hero of the Western world. But maybe he’d want to rewrite that page now.”64 The page Albright spoke of was in Powell’s autobiography, My American Journey, where he described his disagreement with Albright’s 1995 plea for air strikes in Bosnia. Albright said she “felt some vindication” in the fact that the air strikes in Bosnia commenced on the same day that Powell’s book went on sale.65 Yet this same sense of vindication did not come as easily in 1999. Because the Kosovo air campaign lasted nearly four times longer than the Bosnia air campaign, by the end of the bombing in Kosovo Americans perceived they were in a perpetual state of war— several years before the era of weekly drone strikes— yet they did not seem concerned. The lack of friendly casualties nourished this sense of comfort with aerial warfare. It was business as usual. Three weeks after the conclusion of Operation Allied Force, in a private meeting President Clinton sarcastically stated that “nearly 80 percent of Americans” thought that the bombing campaign was still going on.66 In line with Clinton’s assessment of public awareness of events, Gallup polls revealed that over half of Americans did not know the location of Kosovo at the onset of the war, with 34 percent of those polled saying they thought Kosovo was either in Africa, Southeast Asia near Cambodia, or somewhere in Central Asia.67 Initially, on 25 March 1999 only 40 percent of Americans knew which side (Serb or Kosovar) the United States bombed.68 Two weeks into the campaign, however, 69 percent of those polled correctly identified Serbian forces as the adversary.69 This suggests that Americans are visual learners, quickly absorbing the names of places and people after they see aircraft dropping bombs at them on television. Clinton attributed the lack of public knowledge that the air campaign had ended to the fact that Milosevic was still in power in the immediate aftermath.70 Americans prefer to see a figurehead enemy leader either killed, executed, or on trial at the end of a campaign to get a sense of finality with military operations.71 Nevertheless, Operation Allied Force proved a “win” in public perceptions, though one must consider the marginal level of awareness that Americans displayed with keeping track of current events and world geography.

After the Bombing 117 Before the bombing, only 46 percent of Americans supported military intervention in Kosovo.72 In contrast, after the bombing, public approval of Clinton’s decision to intervene with force was at an overwhelming majority of 68 percent.73 This illustrated that Clinton purposefully used air power to intervene with limited initial public support, assuming that success through air power would garner increasing public support over time. Perhaps Clinton thought that it would be easy to stir the passions of the ill- informed masses in his favor if the bombing proved successful. In the end, Operation Allied Force was a risky gamble that ultimately paid dividends—of the kind that continues to tempt American leaders toward military intervention with air power. President Clinton’s speech on the eve of the Kosovo campaign had one sentence added by national security advisor Sandy Berger: “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.”74 Berger’s reasoning behind the addition was to garner support from both an uncertain public and Congress by limiting the scope of the intervention up front. In previous conflicts American presidents had struggled to gain congressional support for their military endeavors. Ironically, during the Kosovo intervention, by ruling out the use of ground forces from the onset, Congress instead pressured the president to escalate the campaign.75 The Clinton administration spent more time trying to prevent both the U.S. Congress and the United Kingdom’s Tony Blair from expanding the conflict than it did in attempting to garner wartime support.76 Nevertheless, after the bombing, in referring to Clinton’s speech on 24 March 1999, Berger claimed, “We would not have won the war without this sentence,” believing that ruling out ground forces held together the fragile nato alliance.77 That said, the implied promise not to use ground forces undoubtedly encouraged Serbia to defy the nato effort. After the bombing, Clinton defended his decision not to employ ground forces at the onset of the intervention:

Some people have argued that our position would have been more defensible if we had sent in ground troops. There were two problems with that argument. First, by the time the soldiers were in position, in adequate numbers and with proper support, the Serbs would have

118 After the Bombing done an enormous amount of damage. Second, the civilian casualties of a ground campaign would probably have been greater that the toll from errant bombs.78

Like Albright, Clinton cited the newspaper article written by John Keegan as evidence of “a new chapter in military history.”79 Clinton wrote, “He [Keegan] said the reason such campaigns had failed in the past is that most bombs had missed their targets. The weaponry used in Kosovo was more precise than that used in the first Gulf War.”80 The day after the air campaign ended, on 11 June 1999, Clinton and a congressional delegation visited Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri to praise the efforts of the b- 2 crews, stating that “with remarkable precision, our forces pounded every element of Mr. Milosevic’s military machine— from tanks to fuel supply, to antiaircraft weapons, to the military and political support.”81 Clinton also lauded the accomplishments of the other services, saying, “I know the Air Force is grateful for the radar jamming provided by Navy and Marine aircraft.” Finally, he thanked the U.S. Army for “taking care of the refugees.”82 Thus President Clinton viewed air forces as the decisive component of the campaign, based upon advances in precision weaponry, while considering ground forces to be too blunt of an instrument to be decisive and better suited for stability operations. After the bombing started, however, the Serbian army commenced a campaign of ethnic cleansing that accelerated despite nato’s efforts, generating a significant exodus of refugees to neighboring countries in the region.83 By the end of Operation Allied Force, the Serbs had displaced 1.3 million ethnic Albanians.84 Of these, 740,000 fled to neighboring Mac- edonia and Albania.85 General Clark referred to the highly orchestrated expulsion of refugees as Milosevic’s “deep battle”:

Now he was using refugees to destabilize the country. What all the pressure from Serbia hadn’t been able to do, tens of thousands of Alba- nian refugees could: they could split the government apart, and the country with it. Macedonia was Yugoslavia’s deep battle. If Milosevic could knock it out of the war, nato would be driven away from his southern border, lose its base areas, and forfeit any realistic ground option.86

After the Bombing 119 Indeed, the president of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, asked General Clark to evacuate Camp Able Sentry so that the Macedonian government could use this location to accommodate the growing influx of refugees.87 The large flow of refugees overwhelmed the government of Macedonia and spurred a public health crisis.88 Within the camps, the population swelled even further as pregnant refugees gave birth to an average of two babies per day.89 The strain caused by refugees contributed to Gligorov’s refusal to allow nato to base Task Force Hawk and its Apache contingent inside Mac- edonia. This caused Task Force Hawk’s deployment to take longer than expected. Yet in the larger picture Milosevic’s attempt to spread discord within nato suggested that he viewed alliance unity as the primary obstacle to his designs for Kosovo. Likewise, President Clinton and his staff also recognized that alliance unity was central to nato’s success, so they made every effort to hold the alliance together while continually highlighting Serbian atrocities to the international news media. On 22 June President Clinton, accompanied by Hillary and Chelsea, visited an Albanian refugee camp in Stenkovec, Macedonia, located several miles from the Kosovo border. Combined, Macedonia and Albania took on the majority of the one million refugees who fled Kosovo during the bombing. The Stenkovec camp housed around thirty thousand refugees at the end of Operation Allied Force. By the time Clinton visited—twelve days after the bombing had ended— twenty thousand refugees had already departed the camp and returned to their homes in Kosovo.90 While he was at Stenkovec, Clinton addressed a gathering of several thousand refugees and urged those remaining to wait “a couple more weeks” before returning in order to give nato peacekeepers time to remove the numerous land mines and unexploded ordnance from Kosovo. “I don’t want anyone else to lose an arm or leg or a child because of the land mines,” Clinton said.91 For the most part, refugees in the camp greeted Clinton warmly, chanting, “usa!” and “Clinton, Clinton!”92 After speaking to the crowd Clinton and his family met with individual refugees inside tents within the camp. Some of these refugees had a less optimistic mood than the crowd and described to Clinton various atrocities they had experienced

120 After the Bombing firsthand. One lady in particular, Farie Vokshi, aged thirty- seven, said that Yugoslav troops had executed thirteen members of her family on 29 March near Ljubenic, a town in southwest Kosovo. Vokshi told Clinton, “I don’t know where to go. No one in my family is left there.”93 Clinton and his family did their best to console Vokshi and the other refugees with similar stories. Earlier, on 14 June, in working to coordinate the Clintons’ trip, Glyn Davies, the executive secretary of the National Security Council staff, stated in an e-mail to Lt. Gen. Donald Kerrick, the deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs, that “doing it [Clinton’s press conference] from the refugee camp would sure make the President’s point to the Russian people about why we did what we did.”94 At the beginning of the conflict, Russia argued that nato exaggerated the extent of humanitarian issues in the Balkans as a way to gain favorable world opinion and subsequent pretext for a military intervention within the traditional Russian sphere of influence. After the large exodus from Kosovo, with global audiences concerned over the plight of the refugees, Russian leader Boris Yeltsin could no longer deny the fact that the Serb army committed numerous atrocities against Kosovar Albanians. There were two possible explanations behind the sharp increase in refugee flows after the bombing started. The first was that nato’s bombing spurred the crisis. The second was that Serb forces drove out the refugees as part of a previously planned operation that would have been carried out regardless of whether nato bombed. Milosevic claimed the first explanation; nato argued the second. From the refugees’ perspective, it was clear that Milosevic spurred the crisis and that the United States came to the rescue. One of the refugees, Elhame Buqu, summed up this up by saying that Clinton “brought us freedom; he made the Serbs leave . . . without the bombing, Milosevic would never understand.”95 The U.S. participation in Balkan peacekeeping became a recurring issue during the 2000 presidential campaigns of Republican candidate George W. Bush and Democratic candidate Al Gore. In a debate moder- ated by Jim Lehrer on 12 October 2000, Governor Bush said, “I think it’s a triumph. I thought the President [Clinton] made the right decision in

After the Bombing 121 joining nato in bombing Serbia.”96 Later in the debate, however, Bush cautioned, “we can’t be all things to all people in the world,” attempting to distinguish himself as less interventionist- minded than Al Gore.97 Eleven months after that debate, in the aftermath of terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in 2001, President George W. Bush reportedly told four Virginia senators, “When I take action, I’m not going to fire a $2 million missile at a $10 empty tent and hit a camel in the butt. It’s going to be decisive.”98 Bush was referring to Clinton’s 1998 launch of cruise missiles against suspected Al- Qaeda sites in Afghanistan. After rapidly toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, by 2003 President Bush shifted the nation’s focus toward Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. On 5 February 2003, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell addressed the un Security Council in New York City calling for “regime change” in Iraq. That same month Ballantine Books published an updated version ofMy American Journey that included an addendum with Powell’s un speech in an effort to promote American enthusiasm and legitimacy for the pending invasion.99 On 3 February 2003, in preparation for Secretary Powell’s speech at the un headquarters, officials draped a blue curtain over a reproduction of Picasso’s Guernica, which was located at the entrance to the building where key diplomats typically make press statements.100 Using abstract figures, Picasso’s painting depicted the aerial bombardment of Guernica, Spain, by Italian and German warplanes on 26 April 1937. Although the attack was actually aimed at a military unit moving across a bridge, the inadvertent civilian casualties from the bombing generated popular resentment for the notion of aerial warfare directed against civilians.101 With Guernica Picasso symbolized the horror of bombing of civilian population centers along the lines of air power theorist Giulio Douhet’s thinking. According to art critic David Cohen, in the painting “the chopped-up, fragmentary treatment of form makes the image more startling and conveys violence.”102 Based on this assessment, the painting was likely not a good backdrop for Powell’s call for military action in Iraq. Ironically, in a 1956 interview Picasso said that the painting “will do the most good in America.”103 In 1967, however, pro-war artists signed a peti- tion urging Picasso to have the painting removed from the United States for the duration of the Vietnam War.104 Yet the painting remained, serving

122 After the Bombing as a reminder of the unintended consequences of aerial warfare during the Spanish Civil War. But perhaps in the minds of those who decided to cover the replication tapestry of Guernica at the un building, the wars of the future would be clean and precise, with aerial forces as the decisive arm. The use of air power in accordance with Giulio Douhet’s ideas was a thing of the past. John Warden and “shock and awe” were the future.105

After the Bombing 123 5 The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo

As a result of Kosovo, I’d expect there’d be more careful scrutiny of some heavy systems that hardly ever seem to be taken to war these days, and hopefully a little more respect and appreciation for those Air Force capabilities that get there quickly, are easily integrated in coalition operations and provide only fleeting or invisible targets for enemy guns. — U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. (retired) Charles Link, Washington Post, 22 June 1999

The perceived success of air power during Operation Allied Force spurred a dramatic reaction from the U.S. Army. Many within the military community began to question the continued maintenance of large armored formations organized around a division-centric structure. Influential pundits saw the 70-ton Abrams tank as a liability in terms of the Army’s ability to seize the initiative against a hybrid threat equipped with tanks, artillery, and irregular forces. Retired U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles Link’s 22 June 1999 statement highlights how the Kosovo intervention was the catalyst for the U.S. Army’s transformation effort.1 For the U.S. Air Force, operations in Kosovo seemingly validated their Halt-Phase concept, which entailed cutting the size of the Army to increase investment in air force capability.2 Major General Link had authored much of the Halt Phase concept prior to his retirement. The Air Force based Halt- Phase on the belief that “with air and space-based sensors, anything on the battlefield can be located and then destroyed with precision munitions.”3 Naturally, the Halt- Phase concept, much like the 2010 Air- Sea Battle concept, sparked

124 a great deal of concern, whether founded or not, within the Army in the aftermath of Kosovo.4 As a result, from 1999 to 2009 the U.S. Army attempted to transform itself into an agile force that could maneuver out of contact with adversaries while simultaneously delivering long- range precision firepower. The rapid deployment of a brigade- sized unit via cargo aircraft became a significant part of the Army’s modernization focus. This was due, in part, to the slow deployment of Task Force Hawk, which was brigade-sized. But the idea of rapid deployment was also rooted in the Army’s longstanding Jominian conceptions of war—the idea that quickly massing forces for a decisive battle served as a recipe for success. In more recent times, however, Cold War scenarios served as the reasoning for building a capacity to rapidly move mechanized forces from the United States to Europe in order to reinforce nato against an onslaught by Warsaw Pact forces. The fact that attempting to employ twenty- four Apache helicopters in Kosovo generated a similar logistical challenge, although on a smaller scale, haunted the Army’s sense of preparedness for future contingencies. After Operation Allied Force, the U.S. Army launched a transformation effort that consisted of the Future Combat Systems fcs( ) program. This program, designed around lightweight vehicles with thin armor, persisted through the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, all while the U.S. military simultaneously fielded heavily armored vehicles to protect service members from the effects of improvised explosive devices. Combined with the efforts of Boeing and Science Applications International Corporation (saic), the Army’s fcs program picked up enough momentum to last until 2009, when the full- scale program ended. By this time, the widespread use of improvised explosive devices challenged the fcs program’s original design parameters, which depended on increased situational awareness from a network of sensors as a substitute for the cumbersome protection of thick, heavy steel. Ultimately, the U.S. Army’s decade- long transformation effort failed because two of its design assumptions—lightweight armor and precision firepower— proved problematic regardless of whether the Army was conducting counterinsurgency operations or the type of high-intensity conventional operations that the Army theorized might occur in the future. Ironically, the transformation

The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo 125 endeavor distanced the Army from land power’s traditional role of closing with the enemy by embracing a ground version of what air power seemingly accomplished by itself in Kosovo with the delivery of precision munitions from standoff ranges. The impetus for the U.S. Army’s modernization program came during the middle of the Kosovo campaign, as air power seemed unable to turn the tide. On 16 April 1999 journalist Thomas Ricks argued in the Wall Street Journal that the Army, if called upon to do so, was not capable of rapidly moving an armored force into Kosovo to expel the Serbian army from its onslaught against the ethnic Albanians.5 Recognizing this problem, Senator John McCain (r- az), who favored using a ground force, said, “There has got to be a fundamental restructuring of the Army.”6 Army leaders, spurred by these calls for reform, took notice of Col. Douglas Macgregor’s book Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century, which called for a significant reorganization of the army by flattening expansive headquarters elements to create streamlined combined arms “combat groups” incorporated into standing joint headquarters.7 Although the U.S. Army rejected Colonel Macgregor’s ideas, instead adopting a modular brigade structure in line with the fcs program, Breaking the Phalanx spurred significant debate within the defense establishment on how to restructure and modernize the army. Shortly before Macgregor’s retirement, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld took notice of his ideas, believing that Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki’s estimates and military planners’ requests for forces were too large in the 2002–2003 buildup to the Iraq invasion.8 Earlier in December 2000 Secretary Rumsfeld read Breaking the Phalanx and was particularly fascinated with chapter 5, “Fighting with the Information Age Army in the Year 2003.”9 This chapter described a fictional scenario whereby the United States invaded Iraq, toppled Saddam’s regime, and installed a friendly government— all in two weeks’ time.10 One week after the invasion of Iraq, on 26 March 2003, Rumsfeld optimistically stated:

There is no comparison. The weapons that are being used today have a degree of precision that no one ever dreamt of in a prior conflict— they didn’t exist. And it’s not a handful of weapons; it’s the overwhelming

126 The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo majority of weapons that have that precision. The targeting capabilities and the care that goes into targeting to see that the precise targets are struck and that other targets are not struck is as impressive as anything anyone could see.11

There were problems, however, with Rumsfeld’s (and the U.S. Army’s) fascination with “information age” technology and precision munitions. Success in land warfare was not just a matter of accurately striking targets while avoiding retaliation. Nevertheless, from 1999 to 2009, the Army persisted in building a lightweight force that fought with precision munitions from standoff ranges. On 12 October 1999 General Shinseki unveiled his dramatic plan to transform the U.S. Army. He shocked the Army community by announcing that lighter, faster, and more fuel- efficient vehicles would eventually phase out heavy vehicles such as Abrams tank sometime during the twenty- first century. These new vehicles would be the basis for a force that was strategically responsive and dominant across the full range of military operations. Shinseki’s audience consisted of attendees of the annual Association of the United States Army conference in Washington dc. As part of an established pattern, the Army Chief of Staff typically chooses this audience to announce major procurement decisions, as it typically contains a large number of defense contractors with display booths who are eager to peddle their latest wares. The direct appeal to industry served to provide “irreversible momentum” for transformation, although Shinseki was careful to mention that transformation was not about “shiny new equipment.”12 The plan called for an “objective force” equipped with fcs that would eventually replace units organized around the Abrams tank and Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The U.S. Army had not yet determined the exact design of this system; the larger idea was that a “systems approach” might stimulate professional and corporate interest. In the meantime an interim force would use current technology to test new operational concepts. By 2003, after the Army had fielded Third Brigade, Second Infantry Division with 19- ton Stryker wheeled vehicles, the term “interim force” fell out of usage, as the newly organized Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (sbcts) became part of the current force. With the same vehicle weight constraints

The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo 127 as in the interim force, the design parameters for the combat systems in the “objective force” revolved around the goal of deploying a brigade in 96 hours to anywhere in the world, followed by a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in a month.13 From a bureaucratic perspective, General Shinseki’s methodology had three advantages. First, it unshackled designers within the defense industry from thinking in terms of platform- centric capabilities. Second, it embraced a “combined arms” mentality that fit with the U.S. Army’s conception of land warfare. Third, it promised that all branches of the Army might be bestowed with equal monetary blessings. Past programs such as the Comanche helicopter and the Crusader self- propelled artillery vehicle had been branch-specific, but thefcs program had new equipment for every branch. Even the soldiers would receive new items—a black beret and a new uniform with a digital camouflage pattern. This uniform was emblematic of the changes to come—the focus on rapid deployment and the role of digitization in lightening the Army while simultaneously enhancing precision firepower. As transformation efforts gathered momentum, on 14 June 2001— the U.S. Army’s birthday— Training and Doctrine Command (tradoc) issued a new version of its capstone Operations manual, and the entire Army donned black berets. The beret, a form of headgear typically worn by rapidly deployable airborne and ranger units, was intended to sym- bolize that the entire Army would become rapidly deployable. When giving his reasoning for transitioning the Army to the black beret, Gen- eral Shinkseki stated, “As technology allows, we will begin to erase the distinctions between heavy and light forces.”14 Thus, the introduction of the black beret was Shinseki’s preparatory attempt to homogenize the culturally distinct subdivisions within the Army to pave the way for a future force in which every brigade had the exact same equipment—the yet- to- be developed fcs. By 2007 the U.S. Army defined fcs and its purpose with the following statement: “Future Combat Systems (fcs) is the Army’s modernization program consisting of a family of manned and unmanned systems, connected by a common network, that enables the modular force, providing

128 The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo Fig. 6. Future Combat System components. Source: Paul L. Francis, “Defense Acqui- sitions: Decisions Needed to Shape the U.S. Army’s Combat Systems for the Future,” GAO-09- 288, Washington dc: U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 2009, 4. our Soldiers and leaders with leading- edge technologies and capabilities allowing them to dominate in complex environments.”15 The fcs would consist of eight new manned vehicles, various unmanned sensors, robotic vehicles, and remote controlled missiles, all connected by a common network (figure 6). From 1999 to 2007 the fcs program grew to include over 550 contracts and subcontracts in 41 states and 220 congressional districts.16 In 2007 a former U.S. Army officer and congressional staffer declared, “When a program gets to a certain size, in the billions, it employs so many people in so many districts you can’t kill it.”17 In 2009 Secretary of Defense Rob- ert M. Gates proved the staffer wrong by canceling the program. Before its demise, however, it was the second most expensive program on the defense budget after the Joint Strike Fighter.

The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo 129 By the time of the program’s cancellation, the challenge of rapidly moving ground forces to the Balkans—the original impetus for transformation— was a distant memory. In the intervening years of the fcs program, the United States proved highly capable of deploying and sustaining military forces at global ranges. By 2009 the strategic conundrum was the opposite— how to extract ground forces from protracted wars while still getting a return on the investment. It was no longer a favorable political climate for a large-scale investment in land power. After the U.S. Army had squandered a decade of investments on unproven concepts, it returned to the cradle of orthodoxy. But it was too late. The Army’s next idea—a ground combat vehicle (gcv) weighing in at more than 70 tons—fell on deaf ears in Congress.

Army Transformation— A Return to the Past Military institutions have often preferred to fight on familiar terms.18 The U.S. Army’s dominant conception of war originates from its “best memories of itself” in the last year of World War II.19 In The Masks of War Carl Builder makes the point: “In self-imagery, nothing the Army has done since, in Korea or Vietnam, can compare with who it was and what it was doing from June 1944 to May 1945.”20 Given such a mindset, the Army returned to its past for inspiration when contemplating how to face an uncertain future. The parachute assault behind Normandy’s beaches and the armored drive of General Patton’s Third Army across Europe both proved encouraging examples of how the Army had faced past challenges. After 1999 the Army blended these two memories with the notion of vertically enveloping an opponent with armored divisions inserted deep behind enemy lines via transport aircraft.21 It was an absurd plan. The U.S. Army’s decade- long attempt to reinvent itself after Kosovo had similar characteristics with the Army’s post-Vietnam resurgence as a force postured to fight a land war in Europe against the Soviet Union. During the Vietnam War, a frustrated commanding general said, “I will be damned if I will permit the U.S. Army, its institutions, its doctrine and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war.”22 It was no coincidence that the Army changed its slogan three times during the 1970s,

130 The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo then used three different slogans in the 2000s as well.23 In both instances, rapidly changing mottos were a sign of underlying crisis. After Vietnam the Army restored its confidence with new equipment and a renewed focus on conventional doctrine. This preference continued throughout the next two decades and manifested with the Army’s reluctance to become involved in Balkan peacekeeping operations. In the U.S. Army’s view, mastering high-intensity conventional operations was paramount— by doing so everything else would come easily. Expressing this opinion in the foreword of the 2001 edition of Operations, General Shinseki claimed, “Warfighting, and by extension less violent actions, depends on a few ‘rules of thumb.’ First, we win on the offense; we must be able to defend well, but you win on the offense. Next, we want to initiate combat on our terms—at a time, in a place, and with a method of our own choosing— not our adversary’s, our choosing.”24 With the phrase “less violent actions,” Shinseki meant stability operations, and naturally “rules of thumb” referred to Jomini’s principle of offensive action to mass forces at a decisive point. Without realizing it Shinseki was merely repeating phrases from Jomini’s influential nineteenth- century book The Art of War, which boiled down thinking on warfare to a series of simplistic axioms.25 Doctrine reflected the Army’s narrow institutional- level thinking on how to modernize. Past reforms had exhibited this tendency as well. Thus the fcs program would echo deeply of the Army’s previous modernization efforts. The 1976 version of fm 100- 5 Operations became known as “Active Defense.” The opening pages of this manual purposefully oriented the U.S. Army on a conventional fight in Europe: “Battle in Central Europe against forces of the Warsaw Pact is the most demanding mission the US Army could be assigned.”26 Active Defense incorporated insights on new technology from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and argued that the Army needed new weapons to keep pace with advances in modern warfare. The manual stated, “To win, our soldiers need the best weapons that industry and technology can provide.”27 Chapter 2 of the manual had descriptions of modern weapons and elaborate graphs depicting trends in modern war that required new American tanks, artillery, infantry carriers, air defense systems, and helicopters to keep pace with the Soviets. The Army

The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo 131 believed that the weapons it possessed were inadequate and that it needed to qualitatively overmatch Soviet weaponry to compensate for the enemy’s quantitative advantage. Reinforcing this consideration, the manual stated that the Army must “prepare to fight outnumbered and win.”28 The conceptualization of the Big Five weapon systems (Abrams, Bradley, Apache, Blackhawk, and Patriot) took place during the 1970s and gained greater emphasis after publication of the 1976 edition of fm 100-5. The 1976 manual stated, “All great armies of the world rest their land combat power upon the tank.”29 Given this statement, it is no surprise that the first of the Big Five weapon systems was the m1 Abrams main battle tank, which arrived to armor battalions in Germany in 1980. The uh- 60 Blackhawk was already in the pipeline and arrived to units in 1979. It was part of an ongoing program aimed at developing a utility helicopter that could transport either an infantry squad or a 105- mm howitzer, its crew, and ammunition. Units fielded the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle in 1981, shortly after the introduction of the Abrams tank. The ah- 64 Apache went into full production in 1982 and added a capability for U.S. Army aviation to conduct deep counterattacks against Soviet armor. Observations of how the Egyptian army employed the latest Soviet- made surface- to- air missiles (sams, the sa-6) in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War spurred development of the Army’s Patriot sam system. By 1984, U.S. air defense units were fielding these new sams. The Patriot batteries increased the capacity for defending the air space in vicinity of ground units. In all, it was a successful Army procurement effort.30 The 1976 Operations doctrine stated that the “United States could find itself in a short, intense war” whose outcome would be decided so fast that “the US Army must, above all else, prepare to win the first battle of the next war.”31 To do this, several concepts were introduced, such as the idea of trading space for time, using tactical nuclear weapons, and the idea that “the skillful commander substitutes firepower for manpower whenever he can do so.”32 These ideas ignored the political aspects of war and reduced institutional thought on how to conduct war to nothing more than a logistical feat coupled with a targeting drill—with both efforts under constant refinement through the fields of engineering and

132 The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo operations research. Although such fields play a vital role in military institutions, they cannot be the sole calculus in preparing for war. Criticisms of the 1976 doctrine were numerous. Its author, Gen. Wil- liam E. DePuy, spent most of his time defending the doctrine from its critics. Critics centered on the idea that the doctrine was too passive in nature and that it focused only on winning the first battle of a war in a country so small (West Germany) that losing two battles would likely result in the loss of the entire country. Students and faculty at the Com- mand and General Staff College and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, claimed that the doctrine focused too much on the “science of war” rather than the “art of war” and that its author had narrow- mindedly removed the chapter on stability operations that had been present in the 1968 edition of Operations.33 Army officers did not embrace the new doctrine; its hasty publication sparked an intense professional debate that culminated in a new doctrine six years later.34 The next two versions of theOperations manual became known as “AirLand Battle.”35 Gen. Donn A. Starry was the architect behind these revisions. While serving on nato’s frontlines as the V Corps commander in Germany, Lieutenant General Starry criticized the “antiseptic” attri- tional math that underpinned Active Defense.36 Shortly thereafter, in 1977 Starry took over tradoc, and General Depuy retired. At Starry’s direction, the 1982 edition of Operations introduced the idea of deep attacks beyond the forward edge of the battle area to disrupt enemy second echelons.37 Because it was more offensive in nature, it received less criticism from within the U.S. Army while causing some initial controversy and confusion with Germany and other nato allies. The offensive nature of the 1982 doctrine was evident with the reintegration of chemical and nuclear weapons into the deep attack plan.38 The 1986 version of AirLand Battle was mostly the same as the 1982 version, but with one exception. It introduced the term “Follow-On Forces Attack” or fofa, with the idea that air forces and new artillery systems should simultaneously attack these forces throughout the full depth of the theater of operations.39 The 1986 manual marked an intersection with a U.S. Air Force doctrine that called for striking targets deep in enemy

The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo 133 territory, and U.S. Army doctrine that called for striking targets closer to the forward line of their own troops. Attacking the fofa was not only a physical target that could be agreed upon by the Air Force and Army, but a theoretical point of convergence for advocates of air power (strategic bombing) and land power. The goal of winning the first battle of the next war drove U.S. Army reforms in the post-Vietnam era. This fostered a tendency to think of war as a single battle; Army field manuals after Vietnam emphasized the importance of the first battle without much mention of what would happen afterward. This emphasis reflected the fear and uncertainty of nuclear escalation. Loss of the first battle in a Cold War scenario would immediately lead to a choice between nuclear war or capitulation, based on war plans at the time. Naturally, the Army did not want to face either outcome, so it focused only on first- battle scenarios in traditional conventional operations. Central Intelligence Agency (cia) analyses throughout the 1980s further encouraged this focus. Based on their analysis of Soviet ammunition stockpiles and logistical capacity, the cia predicted conditions that might lead to a stalemate if the U.S. Army could prevent or repel a Soviet breakthrough for a period of fourteen days.40 Hence, rapid mobilization was the key to defending central Europe. The U.S. military practiced this mobilization annually with reforger (from REturn of FORces to GERmany) exercises, which entailed the rapid deployment of multiple armored brigades to Germany.41 These exercises involved the Military Airlift Command, Military Sealift Command, and the Civilian Reserve Airfleet.42 In the event of war with the Soviets, the reforger exercise would become Operation reforger, with the goal of moving “ten divisions to Europe in ten days.”43 These exercises continued after the Cold War until April 1993.44 They served to focus planners on rapid deployment requirements and first battle scenarios in accordance with a doctrine that called for winning the first battle of the next war. This preoccupation reemerged in modernization plans after Operation Allied Force, under circumstances different from those of the Cold War. Given nato’s defensive posture during the Cold War, preparation for the “first battle” was fundamental in deterring Soviet aggression.

134 The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo But when conducting an opposed- entry invasion, as envisioned in the Kosovo scenario—and conducted later in Iraq and Afghanistan—it was necessary to plan beyond the first battle. The rapid movement of armored forces and the application of firepower— two features of the post- Vietnam period of restructuring the U.S. Army—emerged again in Shinseki’s attempt to transform the Army after Operation Allied Force. This time, instead of reliance on sea power for rapid deployment, the Army pinned its hopes on air power to gain control of the skies and subsequently to transport mechanized forces deep into the enemy’s rear as part of a turning movement or envelopment. Next, computer-networked sensors would enable the precision application of firepower from lightweight vehicles that maneuvered at standoff ranges from the enemy’s weapon systems. In theory, such a force— one that was lightweight yet packed a heavy punch—could refight the Kosovo scenario and capture the same adulation that the U.S. Air Force did in 1999. Three years after Operation Allied Force, the U.S. Army used computer simulations to refight the Serbian army with thefcs . After conducting a vertical envelopment and landing a fcs brigade in the enemy’s rear, the brigade’s offensive mission eventually reverted to one of defending the location of its airborne insertion.45 The only offensive action that took place was one of breaking out from encirclement by the enemy. The Army’s mission was a failure. After the simulation, despite this omen of defeat, the program continued for seven more years, surviving numerous budgetary snares along the way. But long before it would ever arrive to battle, flawed design assumptions and fiscal realities encircled the fcs.

Assumptions Behind the Future Combat System The two major design characteristics of thefcs were the reliance upon air transport and networked sensors. Manned ground vehicles (mgvs) in the fcs would have weighed significantly less than the 70- ton Abrams tank and 35- ton Bradley ifv (infantry fighting vehicle). The U.S. Army intended for the reduction in weight to accommodate rapid deployment with aircraft. Because themgv s would have had less physical armor than the Abrams tank or Bradley ifv, they would have relied on a network of long- range sensors to maneuver outside the range of enemy weapon

The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo 135 systems, allowing the fcs to “see first and shoot first” as its primary method of force protection. Heavy armor was a secondary concern. The most criticized aspect of the fcs was the reduction of physical armor on eight new manned vehicles. These vehicles would have relied on active protection systems rather than physical armor. Active protection systems detect and intercept incoming kinetic energy projectiles fired from enemy tanks or other sources.46 The U.S. Army argued that these proposed vehicles and units would have been more effective than current forces in future conflict because they could deploy faster (due to less weight) and would be capable of long- range precision firepower as a result of advances in information technology. Nevertheless, these advantages, while real, also reflected a characteristic, longstanding emphasis on scenarios involving only the initial outbreak of war, the role of mechanization, and the range of weapon systems. The U.S. Army based the fcs’s eight manned vehicles on a common chassis in order to decrease logistical requirements yet demanded similar combat capability as the legacy fleet of Abrams and Bradleys. In 1999, the initial vehicle design requirements were as follows. First, to support rapid deployment, the vehicles had to weigh less than 18 tons. In harmony with the weight requirement, the Army demanded a minimum fuel efficiency standard of more than three miles per gallon. This was significantly greater than that of the Abrams tank, which required over ten gallons of fuel just to start the turbine engine. Second, in terms of mobility, the vehicles had to have a “burst speed” of one hundred kilometers per hour and be able to maintain sustained off- road speeds of sixty kilometers per hour. Third, survivability requirements called for being able to withstand a single kinetic energy round from a t-80 main battle tank and multiple rounds from a 25-mm or smaller caliber weapon, both from across a sixty degree frontal arc of the vehicle. Additionally, the vehicle had to survive the impact of 50-caliber machine gun rounds, rocket propelled grenades, and “two to three antitank guided missiles” across 360 degrees of the vehicle’s top hemispherical exposure. From beneath, the vehicle had to survive buried mines of yet to be defined parameters. Fourth, in terms of lethality, the combat systems had to be able to destroy t-72s and t- 80s

136 The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo while simultaneously being capable of targeting “specific individuals” with “low collateral damage” from the weapon systems. Finally, in terms of situational awareness, the design parameters required the systems’ networked sensors to be capable of finding “90 percent of all [enemy] tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and artillery positions” and have these updated at ten minute intervals while simultaneously identifying 95 percent of all noncombatants.47 Combined, these ambitious requirements were clearly a reaction to perceptions regarding the “clean” bombing in Kosovo amidst a noncombatant population—the requirements reflected the Army’s vision that wars of the future required the clean, fast, and precise application of violence. With the exception of the 18- ton minimum weight requirement, most of the design goals remained consistent over the next decade. The U.S. Army calculated the 18-ton requirement by assuming it had to have the ability to transport one vehicle on a c-130 Hercules because this aircraft can land on unimproved dirt or grass surfaces in an austere environment. In 2004 Secretary of the Army Francis Harvey stated that an “evolution in thinking” caused the Army to set a “real requirement” of less than 24 tons, with three vehicles fitting on ac - 17 Globemaster.48 In 2007 the minimum weight requirement increased to 27 tons, with three vehicles fitting on a c-17 and disassembled components trailing behind on two c- 130s.49 It was difficult to match the fighting capabilities of the heavyweight Abrams tank with a lightweight vehicle. Consequently, by trying to match the lethality and survivability of the 70-ton Abrams tank, the fcs designers had to keep adding weighty components to their vehicular prototypes. Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki drove the weight limitations by insist- ing on the goal of deploying one combat brigade anywhere in the world in less than ninety-six hours using airlift rather than sealift. Addition- ally, his transformation goals called for the deployment of a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in one month. If realized, Shinseki’s vision would have set the armed forces on an alert posture necessary to conduct an operation on the scale of the June 1944 Normandy invasion within thirty days’ notice from the air with completely mechanized divisions. The logistical math behind Shinseki’s goals, however, revealed that it

The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo 137 would take longer than ninety-six hours to deploy one brigade of the proposed fcs equipment and personnel. Nevertheless, the U.S. Army proceeded with the modernization program based on the belief, formed in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and reinforced by Desert Storm, that winning a decisive battle during the initial outbreak of a future war would avert the need for a longterm mobilization of resources. Based on logistical calculations, airlift offered only marginal improvements in the deployment time of the fcs when compared with the use of sealift or prepositioned stocks. One brigade of fcs equipment would have weighed 18,700 tons as compared with the current 25,000- ton modular armored brigade.50 Based on measures in the Air Mobility Planning Factors pamphlet issued by the U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command, it would take twenty days to deploy an fcs-equipped brigade and twenty-three days to deploy a modular (or premodular) armored brigade using airlift from Savannah, Georgia, to Djibouti, East Africa.51 Using sealift, it would take twenty- five days for either type of brigade. Thus, using airlift to transport an fcs brigade to this particular destination could speed reaction time by three days. But this three-day advantage was not always the case when comparing airlift and sealift calculations for variety of geographic locations. In 2002 analysts working for the rand Corporation calculated the deployment timelines for the 12,840- ton sbct with the use of airlift or sealift to locations in Asia, Africa, Europe, or the Middle East. For airlift, rand assumed the use of sixty c- 17s and an airfield throughput of two c-17s per hour, with units deploying from airfields near Fort Lewis, Washington; Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; or Fort Polk, Louisiana. For sealift,rand calculated the deployment times for an sbct using two of the U.S. Navy’s Algol-class vehicle cargo ships, assuming a twenty-seven- knot rate of movement, from the ports of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Tacoma, Washington; or Beaumont, Texas. The point of origin for the equipment in the United States depended on the whether the destination was in Asia, Europe, or the Middle East. The destinations included Korea, Indonesia, Colombia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Rwanda, and Kosovo.52 Revealingly, in the Kosovo scenario, deploying an sbct via airlift from Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana (near Fort Polk), to Skopje,

138 The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo Macedonia, stopping at Lajes Field in the Azores for refueling, would take 14.9 days based on rand’s calculations. Deploying an sbct via sealift from Beaumont, Texas (the sea port of embarkation near Fort Polk), to Thessaloniki, Greece (the sea port of debarkation near Skopje), would take 15.1 days, after including 3.4 days for loading and unloading ships, 9.8 days at sea, and 1.9 days for unit assembly followed by a tactical road march to the final destination. Hence, airlift offered only a marginal difference in deployment time when compared with sealift. In fact, for some of the other locations the deployment of one brigade with airlift took up to five days longer than with sealift. Furthermore, the use of sealift to move prepositioned legacy brigade stocks (with Abrams and Bradleys) from Diego Garcia or Guam cut down on deployment times to the Middle East or Korea, respectively, by as much as 75 percent. With the development of the sbct the U.S. Army could get lightly armored wheeled vehicles to Kosovo using airlift about five hours faster than it could get heavily armored Abrams tanks to Kosovo with rail and sea transport followed by a tactical road march.53 Although rand’s scenarios focused on the deployment of just one sbct, contingencies might require more than one brigade. The sbct equipment weighs less than the projected tonnage of a fcs brigade. This means that transporting fcs equipment with airlift would require a higher number of sorties as compared to sbct equipment. At best the fcs brigades could deploy with airlift an average of three days faster than current forces using sealift, at a projected cost of $200 billion, for an operational status by 2025.54 Given fiscal concerns, it was difficult for Congress to fathom how a gain of three days in reaction time would have been “transformational” for the U.S. Army. Provided adequate transit time, sealift accommodated more tonnage than airlift. The reality was that sealift remained the fastest way for the Army to deploy multiple brigades with the logistical infrastructure necessary for their support. The airlift scenarios used by fcs designers also overlooked the logistical requirements necessary to sustain the fcs once deployed. As a reference point, the peak fuel consumption rate for Allied ground forces in Europe during World War II, which occurred between the breakout from

The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo 139 Normandy and victory in Europe, was around 1 million gallons per day. This was delivered using a combination of supply trucks, fuel depots, and specially constructed pipelines under the oceans (pluto).55 Gen. George Patton’s Third Army (400,000 men) burned 380,000 gallons per day at peak consumption during pursuit and exploitation operations.56 During the lowest point (31 August to 8 September 1944) in fuel distribution, at 31,000 gallons per day, Patton told Eisenhower, “My men can eat their belts, but my tanks gotta have gas!”57 In contrast, during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, ground forces smaller than that of Patton required nearly two million gallons of fuel per day.58 Most army vehicles burn jp-8, which weighs six pounds per gallon, which equated to 5,100 tons of fuel per day consumed by ground forces during the peak of combat operations in Iraq. The weight of fuel constitutes 70 percent of the tonnage of logistical support for mechanized forces.59 If the fcs could have burned 50 percent less fuel than current forces, then eight days of fuel supply would still weigh more than the total tonnage of one fcs brigade worth of equipment. This was not factored into the U.S. Army’s overly optimistic deployment calculations. It would have been unlikely that aircraft could transport fcs brigades while simultaneously transporting this volume of fuel using storage bladders in the event fuel was not available in a hostile area. The more prudent manner of calculating deployment times would be to plan backward by first considering the logistical requirements, as there is no point in deploying vehicles without fuel. Regardless, even after assuming that mechanized forces could deploy from the air, there were other problems in the Army’s designs. Amid the controversy regarding the hardware aspects of the fcs, its elaborate software component garnered less attention. Yet the software was the most ambitious part of the fcs program. The seamless integration of sensors and shooters required software developers to write 34 million lines of code.60 This was five times as many lines as necessary for the Joint Strike Fighter— the largest defense undertaking in terms of software thus far. All components of thefcs would have depended on the software for successful operation. Thefcs software component— the System-of- Systems Common Operating Environment (soscoe)— was

140 The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo “supposed to be like Windows, the world’s dominant operating system, only better.”61 In fact, the U.S. Army avoided doing business with Microsoft—soscoe was to use Linux- based code because of its avail- ability in the public domain.62 Boeing and saic undertook the fcs software project with the help of numerous subcontractors. In 2004 saic had been unable to provide the Federal Bureau of Investigation (fbi) with computer systems to replace its paper files after three years and $170 million.63 The level of difficulty in developing software for networking in stationary buildings such as the fbi’s offices seemed much simpler than developing a system that could, according to one journalist from the Washington Post, “conduct a video teleconference in a tank rumbling about 40 mph in the haze of battle.”64 The purpose ofsoscoe , however, was not merely to provide remote video teleconference capabilities via a secure network. Remote control over unmanned ground vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles as well as sensor feeds and control over long- range strike systems required high- bandwidth data transfer capabilities— the kind that live video feeds typically consume. Managing all this data required substantial computing capacity. Accordingly the designers of soscoe described the software as “the glue that holds fcs together.”65 Boeing and saic required $6 billion to design the fcs software alone— 3 percent of the projected total program cost of $200 billion. From a business perspective it would have made more sense to design the software first, given that the combat effectiveness of the more expensive vehicular components of the fcs depended on it. The December 2005 issue of Army magazine (published by the Asso- ciation of the United States Army lobbying group) featured an article on soscoe written by Jean- Pierre Lutz, the program manager for Overwatch Systems. Lutz claimed, “The goal of Army Operations will be to simultaneously attack critical targets throughout the area of operations by rapid maneuver in multiple dimensions and precision fires. . . . Improvements in situational understanding will facilitate extremely rapid, non-contiguous decentralized operations.”66 This was a reiteration of the Cold War– era operational concept that called for simultaneously attacking multiple echelons of the Soviet army— a resurrection of the fofa concept from

The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo 141 1986 but with computer networking added to facilitate decentralized operations. This was the purpose of the soscoe network, by way of long-range sensor-to- shooter linkages. Lutz based his description on the idea that the simultaneous use of precision firepower to destroy multiple targets would somehow “shock and awe” an opponent. In an odd twist, the influence of air power theorist John Warden trickled into concepts regarding the employment of land power. Regardless of whether Warden’s targeting methodology might facilitate destructive effects on a whole (system, regime leadership, or society) that is greater than the sum of its parts, one of the historical roles played by armies is to seize territory and control populations. Navies and air forces cannot do this. On the other hand, it is impossible to seize and hold territory without first destroying indirect fire systems that serve to deny access to terrain. The emphasis on “simultaneously attacking critical targets” in depth conveyed an incomplete understanding of land power’s role in military operations. In any case, the software required to “track 90 percent of all tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and artillery positions” within an area of operations, as well as “95 percent of all noncombatants,” with updates on their movement every ten minutes, had other challenges as well. In 2007 the Defense Science Board raised concerns about whether the extensive programming endeavor had security protocols in place for the subcontractors involved in writing the computer code. To shorten development timelines several of saic’s subcontracts went to foreign software developers. As a result the Defense Science Board’s 2007 report warned the Defense Department that “malicious code could be inserted into the fcs Master Software Baseline and exploited.”67 Given the fact that much of the fcs program’s software revolved around its sensor- to- shooter linkages, malicious computer code could have a catastrophic effect on combat systems. The primary concern was that countries such as the People’s Republic of China might introduce a computer virus or Trojan horse into fcs software during the development phase. A virus might simply cause the network to fail, but a Trojan horse could tap into the functions of the fcs, move vehicle icons on computer screens, or cause “friendly” weapons systems to target one another, whereby the fcs would destroy

142 The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo itself. The ramifications of malicious code were like something out of a science fiction move. Proponents of the fcs argued that new sensor- to- shooter linkages could solve tactical problems such as those faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to retired Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales, with long- range precision firepower and aerial sensors commanders could avoid the dangerous close fight, where mortars, improvised explosive devices, and small- arms fire killed soldiers.68 After retiring from the U.S. Army in 2000 Scales founded Colgen, a defense consulting firm that specialized in “history- based military analysis” regarding land power.69 Colgen provided “advice and perspective to senior executives on land power issues both in government and the corporate world, as well as to Congress and the media.”70 With Boeing, saic, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Fox News as clients, much of Scales’s work consisted of making presentations that supported the rationale behind the fcs. In these presentations Scales used an elaborate chart that advertised the long-range direct and indirect fire capabilities of the infantry carrier vehicle (icv), non– line- of- sight mortar (nlos-m ), mounted combat system (mcs, a replacement for the Abrams tank), non–line- of- sight launch system (nlos- ls, artillery rockets capable of loitering and receiving targeting data while in flight), and the non– line- of- sight cannon nlos( -c , self- propelled artillery that fired Excalibur 155- mm rounds guided by the Global Positioning System [gps]). These new systems could be queued via a computer network that processed target data from aerial sensors. Scales’s chart showed how sensor linkages allowed soldiers to “sense and kill outside the red zone.”71 According to Scales, the red zone was the area in which the statistical preponderance of casualties had occurred in the past century of warfare. He emphasized: “virtually all combat deaths occur within a mile of contact.”72 In theory, with networked sensors and long- range firepower troops could avoid this area. Such a capability may have proven useful for traditional conventional operations in open terrain against an opponent using tanks and other vehicles that could be tracked with sensors, but Scales’s briefings did not adequately address how such a capability would be useful during stability operations. Per- haps, in Scales’s view, ground troops could perform stability tasks from

The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo 143 the safety of armored vehicles. In summing up the rationale behind the U.S. Army’s transformation effort, Scales said, “We can strike strategic targets with precision from thousands of miles distances, but our platoon leader has no way to destroy a mortar over the next hill with any degree of precision.”73 Scales believed that General DePuy was among the first to recognize that the lethality of modern firepower systems meant that maneuvering to “close with the enemy” was no longer a relevant maxim in warfare. Traditionalists— those who believed that the purpose of firepower was to support maneuver— instantly rejected DePuy’s idea as heresy. Yet DePuy insisted it was the other way around—that maneuver should support firepower on the modern high- intensity battlefield. In 2000 Scales wrote “From Korea to Kosovo: How America’s Army Has Learned to Fight Limited Wars in the Precision Age” as part of his anthology Future Warfare, in which he argued that DePuy’s 1976 concepts might be useful in future limited engagements similar to Kosovo.74 Scales summarized DePuy’s operational concept as “once the enemy was located, the infantry’s task was to stay out of the killing zone, avoid decisive engagement and pull back just far enough to allow the effective delivery of ordnance, but not so far as to allow the enemy breathing space to disengage and escape the firepower trap.”75 This firepower- dependent technique had three underlying components. First, given a limited war mindset, the technique was an obvious manifestation of casualty aversion. Second, it depended on superior ground- based weaponry with a longer range than that of the adversary. Third, it required the seamless integration of air power with ground maneuver. As a division commander, setting up a “firepower trap” was Depuy’s operational approach for employment of the First Infantry Division during the Vietnam War from 1966 to 1967.76 After Vietnam this concept became DePuy’s institutional imprint through doctrine for how to modernize the Army to face the Soviet threat in Europe. After Operation Allied Force— based in large part on the influence of Maj. Gen. Scales— this became the U.S. Army’s operational concept for the employment of the fcs as well. But even in the “precision age,” the technique did not work as advertised.

144 The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo In 2002 the rand Corporation conducted a simulation where the U.S. Army fought the Kosovo scenario with a Brigade Combat Team (bct) equipped with the fcs in the year 2020.77 In this scenario, given the circular error probable and blast radius of various theoretical munitions (such as gps- guided 155- mm Excalibur artillery rounds and nlos-ls gps- guided rockets) then under development, the Army could not minimize collateral damage to the levels that the 1999 air campaign in Kosovo had achieved. As a point of reference, by conservative estimates, the 1991 Gulf War killed 50,000 civilians with collateral damage from bombs as compared with the fewer than 1,000 civilians inadvertently killed in the 1999 Kosovo operation.78 Privately President Clinton took pride in the fact that he had killed 49,000 fewer civilians with air power than President George H. W. Bush did during Operation Desert Storm.79 Contrary to the Army’s clean vision for future land warfare, during the 2002 rand simulation munitions from the fcs unexpectedly killed 14,327 civilians while shooting “precision” artillery and rockets at the same targets destroyed by allied air forces during the Kosovo campaign.80 This was not quite the type of clean bombardment that the Army hoped to achieve. In large part, the U.S. Army based the fcs on the idea that information obtained from a network of sensors could facilitate the remote application of violence, thereby negating the need for heavy armor protection. Although there were numerous shortcomings with such a concept, the logic itself was not flawed. In fact, irregular fighters had already adopted the concept in the form of the improvised explosive device (ied). From Chechnya to Iraq to Afghanistan, insurgents employed this precision weapon system remotely, coordinated their activities via the Internet, and maneuvered out of contact with their opponent—all without burning two million gallons of jp- 8 each day. Meanwhile, the Army squandered billions of dollars on its fcs program.

A Problematic Marketing Concept In 2007 the U.S. Army, in partnership with Creative Technologies of Hollywood, California, produced several videos to promote the fcs.81 These videos served to inform soldiers about the new equipment while

The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo 145 also informing the public, the executive branch, and Congress of the Army’s progress in transformation. The videos promoted the idea that wars could be won with technology. Additionally, the videos portrayed the time-consuming preventive maintenance checks performed by soldiers on vehicles as unnecessary with fcs vehicles. With the new systems, networked computers could perform these tasks and order repair parts based on predictive analysis before a part malfunctioned.82 The Army alleviated concerns about the complexity of the new equipment in terms of training by mentioning how the remotely operated systems used the same hand- controller as the popular X- Box 360 video game system.83 This implied that most new teenage recruits who had played video games could easily figure out how to play war also if provided with the same hand- controller. Such equipment may have increased the Army’s capacity to manage remote destruction, but the military profession entails more than simply managing destruction. The Army revealed the true course of the fcs program in the opening scene of one of the videos portraying a fictional fcs scenario. In this scene a commander briefed an operations order to a unit equipped with the fcs. Before getting into the details of the mission and as a way of stressing the significance of the mission to his soldiers, the commander enthusiastically said, “This is a new deal gentlemen. . . . We’re not chasing insurgents anymore.”84 But this new deal was nothing more than old wine in new bottles, poured to quench the growing thirst of Mars. In April 2009 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates canceled the U.S. Army’s $200 billion fcs program.85 When referring to the program in his memoirs, Secretary Gates said, “The program, like so many in Defense, was designed for a clash of conventional armies.”86 Gates believed that the use of remote sensors and networked communications to compensate for heavy armor did not take account of “the lessons of counterinsurgency and close- quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.”87 Gates’s decision to cancel the program fell in line with pronouncements he made after agreeing to stay on board as Defense Secretary in the Obama administration. Earlier, in a January 2009 Foreign Affairs article, Gates wrote: “We should look askance at idealistic, triumphalist, or ethnocentric notions

146 The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo of future conflict that aspire to transcend the immutable principles and ugly realities of war, that imagine it is possible to cow, shock, or awe an enemy into submission, instead of tracking enemies down hilltop by hilltop, house by house, block by bloody block.”88 Gates’s view of land power did not fit with what the Army and Hollywood had envisioned. Furthermore, Gates made a clear departure from the triumphal tone of Rumsfeld’s 2002 Foreign Affairs article that lauded the “first U.S. cavalry attack of the twenty-first century” whereby a combination of special operations forces on horseback supported by “the most advanced, precision-guided munitions in the U.S. arsenal” had defeated the Tali- ban at Mazar-i- Sharif in what Rumsfeld termed a “transformational” achievement.89 Next, in 2010 Gates ordered an overhaul of the Pentagon’s employment of retired senior military officers, requiring them to “disclose their business ties to defense contractors.”90 Gates did this to curb the growing influence of retired generals and admirals with ties to the defense industry. Many of these individuals, such as retired Major General Scales, were promoting large- scale defense programs while also under conflict- of- interest contractual obligations with the Department of Defense. As a case in point, Scales had been providing expert advice to organizations such as the Army Material Command, tradoc’s artillery school, and the various war colleges— all while also representing Boeing, saic, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and Booz Allen Hamilton. With $200 billion of taxpayer money on the line, the public demanded some semblance of accountability, transparency, and— most of all— a return on the investment. Secretary Gates along with many in Congress recognized that the fcs program could not deliver what it promised. The U.S. Army’s attempt to make war easy and safe had resulted in humiliation and disaster. Although the development of precision firepower for ground forces as envisioned by the U.S. Army’s fcs had ended, the idea of applying precision munitions in a “clean” manner persisted. Instead, in the decade after Operation Allied Force political and military leaders— along with most of the general public—believed that air power could rapidly deliver clean

The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo 147 and precise effects from global ranges, thus precluding the risk of exposing ground forces to hostile action. By early 2011 this belief intensified as the United States contemplated how to intervene in the ensuing crisis in Libya. With U.S. troops bogged down in ongoing global commitments, air power again offered its age- old promise of decisiveness from afar.

148 The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo 6 Spring in Libya

When we see brave Libyans, armed at times only with a desire for freedom and the courage to fight for it, confronting the ruthless mercenaries and aerial attacks of the Gaddafi regime, we must recognize in their national resistance the same yearnings that freed Bosnia and Kosovo from the iron fist of Milosevic— and we must provide whatever assistance necessary, as soon as possible, to prevent another Srebrenica and ensure the liberation of Libya after decades of madness. — Senator John McCain, Atlantic Council lecture, Washington dc, 1 March 2011

The Arab Spring On 18 December 2010 a wave of revolutionary protests, demonstrations, and armed resistance against authoritarian regimes commenced throughout the Arab world. It started in Tunisia on 17 December when municipal inspector Fedia Hamdi berated Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi, a twenty-six- year- old street vendor, and attempted to seize his wooden cart full of fruit.1 Bouazizi did not have a permit to sell fruit. On two past occasions the police had given Bouazizi the option of paying a small bribe or receiving a larger fine for selling fruit without a permit. But Bouazizi had had enough— his girlfriend recently left him, and now this.2 Hamdi slapped Bouazizi in the face—a public affront in any society and a particularly insulting one in the patriarchal community of Sidi Bouzid, a town of seventy thousand where the event occurred.3 Instead of paying a bribe or giving up his fruit cart and paying a fine, Bouazizi set himself on fire in protest.

149 The next day angry crowds gathered in the capital city of Tunis to protest the tyrannical state of affairs they attributed to President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, the ruler of Tunisia for the past twenty-three years.4 Youths armed with mobile phones uploaded videos of the protests to Facebook.5 Soon these youths had other weapons, too. Less than a month later on 14 January 2011, Ben Ali fled Tunisia and went into exile. Next, on 25 January 2011 a major protest erupted in Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo, Egypt. Esraa Abdel Fattah, an activist known as “Facebook Girl,” organized the protest with the savvy use of social media.6 On 11 Febru- ary, Egyptian President Honsi Mubarak stepped down from power amid charges of killing unarmed protestors. Enabled by smartphones, social media served as a catalyst for the rapid spread of revolutionary fervor throughout the Arab world. Earlier on 6 January 2011 political science professor Marc Lynch used the phrase “Arab Spring” in an article in Foreign Policy to describe the series of ensuing protests in Tunisia, Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt, and Algeria that seemed related to government corruption, autocratic rule, and social unrest.7 Thereafter commentators used the phrase Arab Spring when referring to the uprisings that commenced on 18 December 2010 in the Arab world. The first usage of “spring” to describe revolutions occurred with “The Spring of Nations,” a series of European political upheavals in 1848. During the Cold War, a Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia reversed the Prague Spring (a term coined in a Foreign Affairs article) that had started in 1966 and ended in 1968. Given this context, usage of spring to describe a revolutionary movement connoted an American strategy of liberalization of “regimes deemed dictatorial,” according to a commentator for Al Jazeera news.8 Of course, it was a stretch to imply that the United States had masterminded the Arab Spring. After commencement of the Arab Spring, however, it was only natural that outside actors took notice and tried to shape events in a favorable manner.

#Revolution By 15 February 2011 protests against the regime of dictator Muammar Gaddafi broke out in Benghazi, the second largest city in Libya. It all started after the arrest of human rights activist and lawyer Fethi Tarbel,

150 Spring in Libya who sought justice for the families of 1,200 prisoners executed by Gaddafi’s regime during a 1996 massacre at Tripoli’s Abu Salim prison.9 On 26 June 1996 prisoners in Abu Salim complained about the harsh conditions, rioted, and subsequently captured two prison guards (one died from injuries soon thereafter). In response Gaddafi’s brother- in- law Abdullah Sanussi negotiated with several of the prisoners and agreed to meet their demands for better food, medical care, family visits, an end to torture practices, and the commencement of prisoner trials. In exchange the prisoners released the surviving prison guard that they had captured in the earlier riot. The next day the Abu Salim guards opened the prison cells, herded 1,200 inmates into the prison’s courtyard, and proceeded to shoot them with automatic weapons from atop guard towers. According to one prisoner who survived the massacre, “The sound of the shooting didn’t stop for an hour. . . . The thing I remember is that the sound didn’t stop. No interruptions. None.”10 Tarbel’s arrest on 15 February 2011 prompted his supporters to riot in Shajara Square in Benghazi. Hundreds gathered. Gaddafi’s security forces responded with tear gas and batons, killing at least one protestor in their initial attempt to disperse the crowds.11 But the crowds only grew. Activists set a date of 17 February for “revolution” and spread the word through social media. 17 February was the anniversary of Gaddafi’s 2006 violent crackdown on protestors outside the Italian consulate in Benghazi.12 On Twitter, @ChangeInLibya posted: “all libyans: the twitter tags for this rev [revolution] are #gaddaficrimes #libya and #feb17– mind the spelling! Let’s get our story out to the world.”13 Another user, @BareeqBarqawi, stated: “Cannot wait till #feb17 for #Libya revolution– #Gaddafi is going down!”14 Twitter erupted with thousands of tweets and retweets with similar sentiments. Those promoting the movement created several Facebook pages announcing the latest developments. In less than twenty-four hours one Facebook group page that called for a “Day of Rage” gained 5,247 followers.15 Activists used both mediums— Twitter and Facebook— to warn protestors about the activities of Gaddafi’s security forces. Due to fears that Gaddafi would soon cut Internet service and block Web sites, @ChangeIn- Libya urged followers to upload protest videos on multiple mediums in order to mitigate the impact of outages.16 The revolution commenced. By

Spring in Libya 151 17 February, protestors in at least five cities— Benghazi, Tripoli, Zentan, al- Bayda, and Ajdabiya— were taking to the streets, demanding that Gaddafi step down from power.17 But a paranoid Gaddafi would not tolerate an Arab Spring in Libya. He responded by blocking Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube Web traffic as well as the Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya television stations.18 Despite Gaddafi’s efforts to restrict access, many Libyans still connected to the Internet and accessed outside television stations via satellite connections. Several individuals risked their lives to reestablish connectivity with the outside world. In Benghazi “as supporters shielded his body from snip- ers,” Mohammed Nabbous, the owner of a local Internet service provider, used his technical knowledge and equipment to set up dish receivers for a satellite Internet uplink.19 Along with this effort, Nabbous set up nine live Web cams and created the online channel Libya Alhurra Television, or Libyan Free Television.20 Over the next three days government forces lost control of the situation. During this time Gaddafi stepped up efforts to quell the rebellion by ordering his military to engage the crowds with deadly force. From 15 to 20 February government security forces killed over one hundred civilians and imprisoned hundreds more. Human rights organizations counted death certificate records of forty- three killed in Benghazi and fifty- eight in al- Bayda.21 Those within Gaddafi’s military who refused to follow the order to kill civilians faced the possibility of execution. In one such instance, during the last week in February, an amateur video showed that pro- Gaddafi military officers executed 130 of their soldiers in a barracks in al-Bayda after these soldiers refused to shoot protestors.22 The executioners tied the soldiers’ hands behind their backs, made them kneel, and shot them in the back of the head one by one, stopping peri- odically to reload ammunition. On 21 February 2011 several unexpected visitors arrived on the island of Malta, located 225 miles from the Libyan coast. At first two helicopters carrying seven French-speaking individuals—with only one carrying a passport—landed at the international airport in Malta. They claimed that they had been working on an oil platform off the coast of Benghazi when the revolution erupted.23 Hours later two French- made Mirage

152 Spring in Libya f- 1 fighter jets requested emergency clearance to land at the airport in Malta, claiming to be low on fuel. The pilots were both senior colonels in the Libyan Air Force, and each brought along a lower- ranking copilot. All four Libyan air force officers requested asylum. After questioning by Maltese officials the Libyan pilots claimed that their chain of command ordered them to bomb civilians, but they refused. The Mirage jets flew from Okba Ben Nafi air base in Tripoli, the headquarters of the Libyan Air Force.24 The defection of these four pilots foreshadowed a larger rift within Gaddafi’s armed forces and government. Next, on 23 February Gen. Abdul Fatah Younis defected to the rebel side. As Libya’s minister of the interior, Younis was Gaddafi’s closest associate within the regime. He was the number two person in Gaddafi’s chain of command, and he was responsible for internal security. The sixty- seven- year- old general had been with Gaddafi from the beginning. In 1963 Younis and Gaddafi were classmates and friends at the Royal Military Academy in Benghazi. In 1969 Younis joined Gaddafi in overthrowing King Irdis in a coup. On 22 February 2011, with rebel forces in control of Benghazi after the defection of the city’s main garrison, Gaddafi dispatched his lifelong comrade Younis to the city with orders to conduct “a Tiananmen Square- style massacre” on the demonstrators.25 The next day Libyan state- owned television announced that rebel “gangs” had kidnapped Younis. A few hours later, Younis made a dramatic appearance on the newly created Libyan Free Television channel announcing a different version of events surrounding his alleged capture:

Gaddafi’s men came to shoot me but the bullets missed me. Those who shot at me were Gaddafi’s men, the bullet missed me but hit one of my relatives. Gaddafi, that dirty man, wanted to say that I was killed by protesters so that my tribe, the Obeidat will stand by him. I am not a traitor. I was a close friend. I was surprised by what Gaddafi did. I stood by him for many years. We undertook [the 1969] revolution for the people of Libya, not to turn around and start shooting at them. I wish Gaddafi had said a prayer for the fallen martyrs rather than his long speech. I gave orders to my men in Benghazi not to shoot at protesters, not one of my men shot at protesters. Many tribes pledged

Spring in Libya 153 to me that they have joined the protesters including the Tuareg [mentioned many other names]. . . . From my knowledge of Gaddafi, he won’t leave, he will stay to the end, but he will stay alone. Gaddafi’s speech was very clear to anyone who has a brain. He is nervous. He is stubborn. He may commit suicide. To Gaddafi I tell him: Please end your life by praying for the martyrs, ask for God’s forgiveness and the people’s. To [the] Libyan people— you are a brave people, stand courageously, Libya will become a strong country. Gaddafi is a stubborn man but it [the regime] is finished. Everything is collapsing now. I am sad for all what [sic] has happened. The people are now in charge. We have crossed the point of no return now.26

According to bbc News reporter John Simpson, who interviewed an “extremely nervous” Younis the next day, there was more to the story.27 In fact, Gaddafi did not try to kill Younis— it was actually the rebels. In a spoiling attack the rebel fighters forestalled Younis’s arrival in Benghazi and captured him. To avoid being killed, in Simpson’s view, “Younis immediately announced that his plan all along had been to come to Benghazi to join the rebels. The rebel leaders immediately guessed this was a fiction, but they could see the advantages in going along with it.”28 Thus the rebels accepted Younis with great caution, making him a figurehead commander in chief rather than giving him a field command. Nevertheless, Younis’s defection was a major victory for the rebels—he brought along the interior ministry brigade and three thousand special forces.29 Altogether, the rebel side gained eight thousand troops from Younis’s defection.30 After combining Younis’s forces with the numerous civilians who had already taken up arms, the rebels now had an army.

Organization of the Libyan Rebels The rebel movement consisted of both a political and military arm. At the top was the National Transitional Council (ntc), an interim government led by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, Libya’s former justice minister. Jalil served as chairman for the ntc and was the de facto head of state. Next in line was Mahmoud Jibril, who led the executive board. The board functioned like a cabinet and had formal responsibility for foreign affairs. In this role

154 Spring in Libya many nations referred to Jibril as the interim prime minister or foreign minister. In practice Jibril served de facto in both of these positions, but the official ntc Web site referred to Jibril as chairman of the executive board.31 With a master’s degree in political science and a PhD in strategic planning and decision making, both from the University of Pittsburgh in Pennsylvania, Jibril had a keen perspective on U.S. foreign policy. Another important Libyan political figure was Ali Tarhouni, who served on the executive board as oil and finance minister for the ntc. Tarhouni fled Libya in 1973 after being kicked out of the University of Libya where he studied economics and became a student activist, calling for liberal reforms. The Libyan government stripped him of his citizenship and sentenced him to death in absentia for his activism. Gaddafi added him to a hit list in 1981. By 1983 Tarhouni had earned a PhD in economics from Michigan State University. At the start of the 2011 revolution, Tar- houni was teaching at the University of Washington. Fluent in English, Tarhouni also doubled as a spokesperson for the ntc and made frequent statements to the news media during the uprising.32 In addition to the executive board, the ntc had a legislative component that consisted of thirty- three representatives from various regions and cities. These representatives drafted a fourteen- page constitutional charter.33 But the real power in the fledgling political arm of the rebellion was at the top, within the executive board. Jibril and Tarhouni were not the only ones with close ties to the United States. The military leadership had its connections too. Within the military arm of the rebel movement General Younis served as the commander in chief of the embryonic military council.34 Although the title “commander in chief” implied that Younis led forces in the field, this position was more akin to that of a civilian defense minister or Sec- retary of Defense. Directly under Younis was Gen. Omar El- Hareri, who served as the chief of staff of the military. In this role Hareri was in charge of both the Free Libyan Army and the Free Libyan Air Force. Third in the chain was Lt. Gen. Khalifa al Haftar (also spelled Hifter), the commander of forces in the field. All three generals had been part of the 1969 coup.35 In 1987 during a conflict between Libya and Chad the Chadian military captured Colonel Haftar and several hundred of his men in the battle of

Spring in Libya 155 Wadi Doum.36 Believing there was an opportunity in this development, the Reagan administration initiated a clandestine training program for Haftar and his men as part of a plot to oust Gaddafi. These former Libyan troops were to be the nucleus of a network of conspirators to overthrow Gaddafi, but the plan came to a halt two years after it started.37 Vice President George H. W. Bush was not comfortable with President Ronald Reagan’s scheme and terminated the effort upon election as president.38 Consequently, in 1989 the newly elected President George H. W. Bush tried to find an honorable way to extract the United States from its association with Hafter and his group of Libyan exiles. The exiles floated from Chad to Nigeria to Zaire to Kenya, after the H. W. Bush administration arranged payments of $5 million to these countries.39 But after two years the U.S. congress cut the foreign aid to Kenya that underpinned the last African country’s willingness to participate in the arrangement.40 According to a 17 May 1991 article in the New York Times,

For two years, United States officials have been shopping around for a home for about 350 Libyan soldiers who cannot return to their country because American intelligence officials had mobilized them into a commando force to overthrow Col. Muammar el- Qaddafi, the Libyan leader. Now, the [H. W. Bush] Administration has given up trying to find another country that will accept the Libyans and has decided to bring them to the United States.41

The exiles’ leader, Colonel Haftar, lived for the next two and a half decades in a Virginia suburb of Washington dc— yet his military career was far from over.42 Perhaps some in the Obama administration believed that Khalifa Haftar provided a “unique capability” in the same manner as Reagan did back in 1987. Nevertheless, the fact that Haftar was no longer living in suburban Virginia by the time the United States decided to intervene in Libya would have a significant impact on Libya’s future political situation. Shortly after the 2011 uprising commenced in Libya, the sixty- seven- year-old Hafter was on board a flight from Reagan National Airport and headed across the Atlantic on the first leg of his journey back to Libya. Fellow exile Aly Abuzaakouk drove Haftar to the airport and subsequently

156 Spring in Libya told a cnn reporter: “Haftar will fight to the death if necessary; he’ll be the one to finish Gadhafisic [ ].”43 Ali Aujali, the former Libyan ambassador to Washington and lifelong acquaintance of Hafter, defended his old friend’s decision to return, saying, “I think working for the cia for the sake of your national interest is nothing to be ashamed of.”44 After 17 February 2011 Hafter’s newfound purpose in life was to do what the cia prepared him for back in 1987: overthrow Gaddafi. In pursuing this course, Haftar was on a meteoric rise to the top rebel leadership position in Libya. But he had rivals within the fledgling rebel military establishment. Upon quickly establishing himself as a field commander, Lt. Gen. Hafter held tangible military power within the rebel establishment, controlling (to varying degrees, depending on tribal affiliations) some thirty- eight brigades ranging in size from one hundred and twenty to two thousand fighters each.45 Meanwhile, as Gaddafi’s former number two man Younis’s power was more political in nature and was based primarily on the fact that only a handful of individuals within the rebel movement knew the true story behind his defection on 23 February. Despite the lie that Younis told with a straight face on Libyan television when describing events surrounding his decision to join the rebels, his sentiment was likely heartfelt. Regard- less, he had crossed the point of no return by renouncing Gaddafi on live television. But after forty- two years of loyally serving a brutal dictator, Younis had plenty of other skeletons in his closet— and living enemies to go along with them. First and foremost his old friend Gaddafi wanted him dead. As expected, Younis also had enemies within the rebel movement. Some believed that he was playing both sides. Others suspected that he still communicated with Gaddafi. Lastly, many of the families and survivors of the Abu Salim prison massacre assumed that Younis, as the minister of the interior, played a role in orchestrating the event. Younis’s past would later come back to haunt him, but during the blossoming stage of the revolution Younis’s decision to join the rebels inspired many others to do the same. The next day an army commander to the east in Tobrouk, Maj. Gen. Suleiman Mahmoud, defected as well.46 Like Younis, Mahmoud was from the Obeidi tribe; unlike Younis, Mahmoud was a scholar— his Arabic language book Rommel in the Libyan Desert had already gone through a second printing.47

Spring in Libya 157 Numerous defections eroded Gaddafi’s combat power while increasing that of the rebels. A disproportionally large number of those changing sides came from the Libyan Air Force.48 Given their lack of aircraft, the defected air force officers applied their broad perspective on terrain and navigation to run makeshift operations centers where they used Google Earth to track rebel ground maneuvers.49 According to Peter Bouckaert, a director for Human Rights Watch who was with rebel fighters in Brega at the onset of the uprising, “The breakdown [of the rebel fighters] is about 60 percent volunteers [without prior military service] and 40 percent ex- military [defectors]. They’re not very well trained, but they definitely have the weaponry. They’re learning as they go along.”50 With many of General Younis’s three thousand special forces serving as trainers, the rebel army’s proficiency grew each day. But actual combat served as the quickest form of training. Ex-special forces Captain Khaled Suweiri captured this notion bluntly, saying, “We fight or we die.”51 Seven days after the revolution started with “#feb 17” on Twitter, things were not looking good for Gaddafi. On 24 February, at 1525 hours local time, the delusional dictator addressed the Libyan people on state television and rambled incoherently about how Osama bin Laden (who was still alive at the time) had inspired “trigger happy” protestors who were “stoned with drugs” and “fueled by milk and Nescafe spiked with hal- lucinogenic drugs.”52 The reference to bin Laden was a desperate attempt to confuse the Libyan people and the international community about the protestors’ motives, though some militias did have links to extremist groups. Gaddafi added, “What is happening now in Libya is not people’s power, it’s international terrorism led by al-Qaeda . . . . There are no queues, people are getting all their daily needs. Why did you have to get involved with this kind of Bin Laden organisation?”53 Earlier, on 22 February—with American news stations interrupting their regular broadcasts to cover a televised speech by the dictator—Gaddafi had referred to the protestors as “greasy rats” and “cockroaches” and vowed to hunt them down and kill them, adding, “We will find you in your closets!”54 In line with his earlier orders to Younis, he made reference to the violent crackdown at Tiananmen Square but added an allusion to the U.S. federal government’s response in 1993 to religious fundamentalist

158 Spring in Libya leader David Koresh in Waco, Texas, as a forewarning of the measures he was about to take.55 With a global audience watching the speech, these statements galvanized world opinion against Gaddafi, sparking calls for military intervention on behalf of the rebels. Less than a week into the uprising, Libyan diplomats working in embassies throughout the world resigned in protest against Gaddafi’s use of violence against citizens. First the entire Libyan mission at the United Nations headquarters in New York disavowed their association with Gaddafi.56 Next the ambassadors to China, India, Indonesia, Poland, and the Arab League quit their posts.57 Ali al-Essawi, the Libyan ambassador to India, publicly stated that Gaddafi’s violence against civilians was “a massacre,” and called upon the United Nations to enact a resolution to block Libya’s airspace from Gaddafi’s air force in order to “protect the people.”58 On 21 February, Ali Aujali, the Libyan ambassador in Washing- ton, promptly removed the Libyan flag from his residence and replaced it with the one used during the rule of King Irdis, saying, “I think [Gaddafi] should step down, of course, after what’s happening in our country now. There’s no other solution. He should step down and give the chance for the people to make their future. How can I support a government killing our people?”59 Omar Jelban, the Libyan regime’s ambassador in London, stayed on the job, but half of his staff abandoned ship.60 In a few months after nato and other coalition members intervened in Libya and recognized the rebel’s National Transitional Council, the few remaining diplomats had to either leave their embassies and return to Libya, request asylum, or volunteer as emissaries of the ntc. For most, the latter two choices made the most sense. un Resolutions and nato Participation At the diplomatic level the main difference between the Kosovo and Libya intervention was that United Nations Security Council Resolution (unscr) 1973, adopted on 17 March 2011, authorized nato to establish a no-fly zone and “use all necessary measures to protect civilians from attacks by forces led by Muammar Gaddafi.”61 This resolution added international legitimacy to the Libyan intervention. In comparison, prior to the Kosovo

Spring in Libya 159 intervention the United States did not press for a un resolution because Richard Holbrooke and Strobe Talbot confirmed through diplomatic back channels that Russia would veto any attempt to authorize force against Serbia. Conversely, prior to the Libya intervention Susan Rice (the United States ambassador to the United Nations) successfully managed to get the People’s Republic of China and Russia to abstain from voting on unscr 1973.62 Earlier, on 23 February, unscr 1970 condemned Gaddafi’s use of force against civilians. unscr 1970 also froze the financial assets of the Gaddafi family, imposed an arms embargo on Libya, and put in place an international travel ban on members of Gaddafi’s inner circle. China and Russia voted in favor of this initial resolution because it did not include the no- fly zone provision. unscr 1970 and 1973 were a result of the 2005 un initiative regarding the “responsibility to protect” (commonly known as r2p), which established a new international norm that diminished the idea of state sovereignty during instances where governments facilitated or allowed “mass atrocity crimes” within their borders.63 The idea of using air power to establish a no- fly zone originated in the aftermath of the Gulf War with President George H. W. Bush’s attempt to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq by way of Operation Provide Comfort I and II. President Bill Clinton intensified these efforts with Operation Northern Watch in 1997. The political appeal of using air power to protect innocents manifested in the United States more so than among other nations. Naturally ulterior motives were also at play when it came to un members’ voting on the enactment of a no- fly zone in Libya. The international community unanimously adoptedunscr 1970, but unscr 1973 had uneven support. Among the permanent members of the un Security Council, those voting in favor of unscr 1973 were the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Among the rotating members, Bosnia, Colombia, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, and South Africa voted in favor. Five countries abstained from voting: Brazil, Russia, India, the People’s Republic of China, and Germany.64 The decision of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle to abstain came as a shock to nato.65 Domestic criticism of Germany’s decade-long commitment in Afghanistan gave Merkel reason

160 Spring in Libya for caution when contemplating a foreign military intervention in Libya. Furthermore, some speculated that Germany wanted to improve its standing among the influential bric block of nations (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as a hedge against French ambitions for a “Mediterranean Union” that excluded Germany.66 In any case, with the new norm of r2p and given Gaddafi’s increasing use of violence to quell the rebellion, the international community voted lopsidedly in favor of a un authorization for a military intervention in Libya.67 On 17 March— the same day as the vote on unscr 1973— President Barack Obama held a meeting with his national security team to discuss whether to intervene militarily in Libya. The principal figures on Obama’s national security team debated their positions for an hour and a half. Vice President Joseph R. Biden, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Chair- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Glen Mullen, National Security Advisor Thomas E. Donilon, White House Chief of Staff William Michael Daley, Homeland Security Advisor John Owen Brennan, and Deputy National Security Advisor Dennis Richard McDonough opposed military involvement. In contrast, Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton, un Ambassador Susan E. Rice, Samantha Power (Special Assistant to President Obama and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights on the National Security Council), and Benjamin J. Rhodes (Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communi- cations and Speechwriting) favored an air campaign against Muammar Gaddafi.68 According to Gallup public opinion polls in March 2011, fewer than half of Americans supported military action in Libya.69 Despite this confluence of opinions, President Obama decided to intervene, privately revealing that it was a “51– 49 call” based on his assessment of the situation.70 Secretary Gates revealed his frustration with the Obama administration’s deliberation to intervene in Libya, saying, “I had four months left to serve, and I was running out of patience on multiple fronts, but most of all with people blithely talking about the use of military force as though it were some kind of video game.”71 According to Gates, the White House and national security staff did not fully understand the military options, and it was supposed “experts” such as Samantha Power who held the most weight with Obama in deciding whether to intervene militarily. Earlier,

Spring in Libya 161 during a 28 February meeting with Admiral Mullen, the Secretary of Defense had bordered on insubordination, stating, “The White House has no idea how many resources will be required. This administration has jumped to military options before it even knows what to do. . . . Don’t give the White House too much information on the military options. They don’t understand it, and ‘experts’ like Samantha Power will decide when we should move militarily.”72 Gates’s decision to withhold military advice only perpetuated the frustration that had sparked his rant to Mul- len. Yet in the public eye, and in faithful service to the office which he was appointed, Gates held his emotions in check. Samantha Power had gained a reputation for expertise on military matters as a journalist reporting on military intervention in the Balkans during Clinton’s presidency. In 2002, she won a Pulitzer Prize for her work A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide.73 In 2013, when announcing the selection of Power to replace Susan Rice as un ambassador, President Obama said, “She showed us that the international community has a moral responsibility and a profound interest in resolving conflicts and defending human dignity.”74 Senator John McCain (r-az ), who had consistently promoted widening U.S. military involvement in just about every global crisis since the mid- 1980s, embraced Power, saying that she was “well- qualified” for her new position.75 Prior to enactment of unscr 1973, Senator McCain took Power’s side and pressed the U.S. military on the issue of a no- fly zone: “We are spending over $500 billion dollars, not counting Iraq and Afghani- stan, on our nation’s defense. Don’t tell me we can’t do a no fly zone over Tripoli. . . . I love the military, I love it, it’s been my life, but they always seem to find reasons why you can’t do something rather than why you can.”76 In contrast, when asked by members of Congress whether the Libyan intervention would include ground forces, Secretary Gates forcefully answered, “Not as long as I’m in this job.”77 With the exclusive use of air power, military intervention found bipartisan support, though for different reasons. The most confusing nato objective in Libya was “to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas from attack or the threat of attack.”78 Each nation that participated in upholding the un mandate interpreted this

162 Spring in Libya loosely worded objective according to their own interests. Sweden, though not a nato member, participated in the operation with the view that the un mandate to protect civilians would be interpreted in conservative terms, as indicated by their reluctance to contribute strike aircraft. Instead Sweden provided reconnaissance aircraft only. Other nations, particularly the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, viewed the un mandate as a license to target every possible element of Gaddafi’s power, from ground formations to infrastructure. Given this loose interpretation of the un mandate and nato’s declared mission, each nation worked within the alliance framework while simultaneously conducting unilateral operations that extended beyond what nato headquarters might approve. Ultimately, these unilateral actions led to greater integration with the Libyan rebels despite the fact that supporting the rebels was not part of the un mandate or nato’s declared mission statement. In line with the purpose of the intervention, nato referred to the mission as Operation Unified Protector. Once again, as with Kosovo, alliance unity and the protection of innocents were key aspects of an air campaign that excluded the use of ground forces. France and the United Kingdom provided the bulk of the strike sorties for Operation Unified Protector. Combined, these two countries contributed over 65 percent of strike sorties. Alongside this commitment, fourteen nato members and four partner countries contributed aircraft and naval vessels. A decade prior during nato’s intervention in Kosovo the United States dropped 90 percent of the precision-guided munitions. During the Libya intervention, however, allied forces— excluding the United States— struck 90 percent of the targets. To be fair the United States contributed the bulk of efforts in the opening phase of the operation, destroying Libya’s integrated air defense system. During the long- haul, however, the United States took on a supporting role: providing intelligence, reconnaissance, and aerial refueling throughout the bombing campaign.79 From the onset President Obama’s strategy was to let European countries take the lead in operations. In fact, French President Nicolas Sarkozy opposed letting nato control operations. At the start of the campaign Sarkozy spread alliance discord by announcing that French planes were in the air and poised to deliver the opening blow on Libya hours ahead of

Spring in Libya 163 the combined plan previously agreed on by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.80 With this announcement, Sarkozy purposely tried to make it look as though nato was following France’s lead instead of the other way around. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was as zealous as Sarkozy for the national spotlight in dealing with the Libyan crisis. As an unspoken rule in European diplomacy, old colonial powers typically took the lead when intervening militarily in their former possessions. Starting in 1911 Italy fought a major campaign to wrest control of Libya’s coastal areas from the declining Ottoman Empire. This resulted in the formation of the colonial region of Italian North Africa, of which Libya was a part until 1943. After the culmination of the Allies’ North African campaign during World War II, Italy and their German allies lost control of Libya. Given this background of colonial influence, Berlusconi believed that Italy should take the lead in the 2011 Libyan intervention. Sarkozy’s action had upstaged Italy’s role in the campaign and caused Berlusconi to threaten to leave the coalition and deny access to the geographically key air bases in Italy.81 Ultimately, after Libya became anato -led mission the alliance discord lessened, albeit with several bruised egos. Turkey agreed on the need for a no-fly zone but disagreed on targeting ground forces. In Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s view, unscr 1973 only allowed nato aircraft to engage Gaddafi’s air forces while they were aloft. France disagreed and refused to operate as part of nato without consensus on the matter. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton sought a compromise, which she described as the following: “If Turkey agreed not to veto action to enforce the no- drive zone— it didn’t have to participate, just abstain from blocking it— then we [the United States] could convince France to give nato full command and control.”82 During a conference call with representatives from France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, Secretary Clinton arranged an agreement suitable to all four parties. Although Erdogan disagreed with the “no- drive zone,” Turkey eventually agreed that nato should command the endeavor. The 17 March abstention from voting on unscr 1973 was the first time that Germany did not vote in line with the nato alliance in the United Nations. But Merkel and Westerwelle slowly back-stepped from their

164 Spring in Libya neutral position on Libya. In its first sign of support Germany strengthened its Airborne Warning and Control System (awacs) contribution in Afghanistan for the expressed purpose of freeing up nato’s Operation Enduring Freedom air assets for the campaign in Libya. When defending this decision before the German Bundestag (Parliament), Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle stated,

We won’t send German soldiers to take part in a military operation in Libya. But that does not mean that we are putting our allies in Libya in danger. Of course we do not want to suggest that we are neutral. We will ease the burden on our allies, even if we will not ourselves participate in military action in Libya.83

This statement highlighted how Germany conducted a delicate balancing act between continuing its military contributions to nato while avoiding direct involvement in Libya. The arms embargo imposed by unscr 1970 prohibited the import or export of weaponry in or out of Libya. Although it was clear to the international community that this resolution prohibited Gaddafi from receiving support from outside sources, it was less clear whether the resolution also meant that the rebels could not legally receive outside support. In March 2011 hawkish U.S. Senator John McCain called for the Obama administration to arm the rebels. On 25 March when responding to a question on the possibility of arming the rebels, White House press spokesperson Jay Carney said, “there was a few weeks ago a statement that the arms embargo prevented us from doing that, and in fact, there’s flexibility within that to take that action [arming the rebels] if we thought that were the right way to go.”84 The “flexibility” that Carney referred to was due to legal interpretation of the “notwithstanding phrase” in unscr 1973, which stated, “all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.”85 During negotiations over the wording of unscr 1973, Susan Rice claimed that the United States “needed the ‘notwithstanding’ loophole for a situation in which the U.S. might have to go in with weapons to save a downed pilot, and wouldn’t want merely carrying weapons to violate the arms embargo.”86 Regardless of

Spring in Libya 165 the reasoning the “notwithstanding loophole” muddied the water with regard to whether the United Nations endorsed arming the rebels when it authorized “all necessary measures.” Several countries openly supplied arms to the Libyan rebels during the conflict. Three weeks into the campaign Libyan rebel leader General Abdul Fatah Younis revealed to Al Arabiya, the Saudi Arabian television station, that his forces received supplies abroad from “unidentified nations” who supported their cause.87 Mustafa Gheriani, spokesperson for the ntc (the rebels’ interim government) confirmed Younis’s statement. Subsequently, the French newspaper Le Figaro had the headline “La France a parachuté des armes aux rebelles libyens” (“France has dropped arms to Libyan rebels”).88 Italy followed suit, with a foreign ministry official in Rome carefully acknowledging that Italy would send “equipment for self- defense” to the rebels.89 After first seeking approval from the United States, both Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (uae) shipped weapons to Libya, with the U.S. caveat that the weapons not be U.S. made. Instead Qatar and the uae sent French- and Russian-made arms. To ensure that these weapons made it to the rebels, the United States alerted nato air and naval forces not to interdict specific cargo planes and vessels headed toward Libya from Qatar and the emirates.90 With this action the United States became complicit in arming the rebels but had plausible deniability if things turned sour. Prior to the intervention in Libya, Wesley Clark, now retired, wrote an article in the Washington Post in which he argued that Libya did not meet the test for military intervention. After referencing his master’s thesis written at Fort Leavenworth in 1975 and his experience as nato commander during the Kosovo intervention, Clark concluded that Americans should not get involved in Libya: “A no- fly zone in Libya may seem straightfor- ward at first, but if Gaddafi continues to advance, the time will come for airstrikes, extended bombing and ground troops— a stretch for an already overcommitted force.”91 In Clark’s view, it was an all- or- nothing decision, and the United States did not have the resources, so it should stay out of Libya. Clark based his view on the guidelines set out by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s famous 1984 speech “The Uses of Military Power,”

166 Spring in Libya given in the aftermath of the bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon.92 The U.S. defense community embraced the Weinberger Doctrine, as outlined in the 1984 speech, and later referred to it as the Powell Doctrine.93 Calls for only the use of “overwhelming force” when going to war became a mantra within the defense establishment.94 In the U.S. military’s generic view, combat power should flow like water from a fire hose rather than trickle like a leaky faucet— and the fire department was out of water. For many Americans, too, there was no such thing as a middle ground when it came to going to war or putting out the world’s brush fires. Instead, with air power, military intervention appeared as a simplistic binary decision process that entailed bombing heavily or not at all. But the situation in Libya was complicated. In any case Clark concluded his Washington Post op- ed with “We don’t need Libya to offer us a refresher course in past mistakes.”95 Several critics of the Obama administration’s handling of the situation in Libya referred to Obama’s foreign policy as one of “leading from behind,” after an anonymous administration official used the phrase to describe the U.S. strategy in Libya. With the presidential election of 2012 looming, Republican candidate Mitt Romney accused Obama of “following the French into Libya” rather than taking the lead.96 In contrast liberal New Yorker columnist Ryan Lizza believed that Obama’s approach of “leading from behind” was the acceptable middle ground, considering U.S. entanglements elsewhere. Lizza believed that the U.S. strategy in Libya was one of “calculated modesty” that had the potential to accomplish far more than Reagan’s blundering attempts to overthrow Gaddafi in the 1980s. Lizza supported the strategy behind the phrase “leading from behind” but cautioned that it would be difficult to sell the strategy in the domestic political arena:

That’s not a slogan [leading from behind] designed for signs at the 2012 Democratic Convention, but it does accurately describe the balance that Obama now seems to be finding. It’s a different definition of leadership than America is known for, and it comes from two unspoken beliefs: that the relative power of the U.S. is declining, as rivals like China rise, and that the U.S. is reviled in many parts of the world. Pursuing our

Spring in Libya 167 interests and spreading our ideals thus requires stealth and modesty as well as military strength.97

By leading from behind the United States avoided entanglement in Libya. Yet as Clark predicted there was always a temptation to up the ante to bring about a more decisive result. Given the disparate level of international commitment toward unscr 1973, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recognized the necessity to coordinate the employment of air power in a centralized manner, saying, “We need a unified command in a single theater of operations.”98 Although the bombing started with disagreement among those in the coalition, by 31 March 2011, with Secretary Clinton cutting deals behind the scenes, a unified command structure emerged. As the dominant member ofnato , the United States still held sway in the alliance, but alongside France and the United Kingdom; it was a relationship of coequals. In terms of policy and symbolic leadership, however, France led the way— dropping the first bombs (19 March), inserting military advisors, supplying the rebels with arms, recognizing the ntc (10 March), employing helicopters (4 June), and conducting naval bombardments.99 In the long run all this worked in the favor of the United States. If the campaign went afoul, it was France’s fault; if it succeeded, it was because the United States had provided “unique capabilities” and worked from the shadows.

Gaddafi’s Secrets The enactment of unscr 1970 had the second-order effect of making public secrets that Gaddafi had kept hidden from most of the world for the past twenty-five years. On 14 April 1986, the United States conducted air strikes against five targets in Libya: 1) a terrorist training camp in Benghazi, 2) a military airfield in Benghazi, 3) a naval base in Tripoli, 4) Okba Ben Nafi airfield (from 1943 to 1970, the U.S. Army Air Corps and U.S. Air Force used the location, naming it Wheelus Air Force Base in 1948), and 5) the Bab al- Azizia barracks compound, a control node for Gaddafi’s military and one of his five residences.100 The air strikes— dubbed “Operation El Dorado Canyon” by the U.S. military—were a reprisal for Gaddafi’s role in two terrorist attacks. The first was a bomb on a passenger

168 Spring in Libya airline flight that killed four Americans while transiting Greece on 2 April 1986. The second was on 5 April 1986 when a bomb went off in La Belle discotheque in Berlin, killing two U.S. military service members and injuring seventy- nine other Americans. Before both of these incidents the U.S. Navy had commenced “freedom of navigation” operations, purposely moving southward across Gaddafi’s self-demarcated “Line of Death” at 32 degrees, 30 minutes north latitude in the Gulf of Sidra.101 These operations provoked a naval skirmish with Libya on 24 March 1986. After the two terrorist attacks President Ronald Reagan had a casus belli for war. With Operation El Dorado Canyon’s target number five, President Reagan hoped to kill Gaddafi. But Gaddafi survived the attack, injuring his shoulder on a piece of falling debris.102 In the aftermath Gaddafi claimed that the attack killed his six- month- old daughter Hana, and he displayed a dead baby to the international news media.103 Back in 1986 the Libyan state- run media showed usa Today reporter Barbara Slavin the body of a dead baby girl killed in the attack. “I was a young journalist and had never in my life seen a corpse,” Slavin later recalled.104 Over the next twenty-five years virtually every major news outlet maintained that the dead baby was Gaddafi’s daughter. But starting in 1999 there were a few strange appearances of a “Hana Gaddafi” abroad (in a mall in London and during a family meeting between Gaddafi and Nelson Mandela in South Africa) as well as in medical school in Tripoli by the time the dead baby would have been in her early twenties. With the enactment of unscr 1970, the Swiss government froze the assets of twenty- three of Gaddafi’s family members— seventh on the list was Hana Gaddafi. Muammar Gaddafi had made up the story about his daughter being killed during Reagan’s 1986 air strike in order to garner international condemnation of the U.S. action. Regardless, someone’s baby was dead; the body shown to the reporter was real. At some point in the past twenty-five years British mi( 5/mi6) and German (bnd) intelligence agencies learned that Gaddafi had faked the story about Hana’s death, but they probably allowed the fabrication to continue to protect their source within the Libyan dictator’s regime. After enactment of unscr 1970, however, the cat was out of the bag. When a reporter from the German newspaper

Spring in Libya 169 Die Welt asked a representative from the Swiss government why the name Hana Gaddafi was on the list, the response was “There are reasons why the name is on the list, which we are not revealing publicly.”105 Gaddafi’s ploy—complete with a dead baby as evidence—illustrated the level of decep- tion that he was capable of. It was only natural that someone who went to such manipulative extremes in lying was incapable of trusting anyone. Muammar Gaddafi and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi shared the same plastic surgeon. When undergoing plastic surgery Gaddafi’s vanity and paranoia merged in an odd manner. Gaddafi knew that the United States wanted him dead— Reagan’s 1986 bombing run was proof of that. And he also had rivals within his own regime. Doctor Liacya Ribeiro, a breast augmentation specialist in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, performed facial surgeries on the two world leaders. Ribeiro recounted, “He [Gaddafi] wanted lipo [sic] filling because a desert man gets bad skin and we did the hair implant too . . . . The operation was performed with local anesthetic only. No sedation . . . . He was afraid that somebody might kill him.”106 As an additional precaution, Gaddafi insisted on having the surgeries at 0200 in the morning from tunnels and bunkers beneath his palace in Tripoli. As Ribeiro’s scalpel cut into Gaddafi’s face in the bomb- proof bunker, the paranoid despot stared back with unblinking eyes.107 Meanwhile, a cohort of loyal body guards kept watch. Gaddafi hand- selected the members of his battalion-sized harem of female-only bodyguards. He allegedly raped every single one of them and played them against each other as a twisted measure of attaining loyalty. One of the victims among the harem recalled, “I will never forget that first time, that moment— he violated my body and pierced my soul with a dagger. That blade will never come out.”108 This particular bodyguard, selected by Gaddafi because of her resemblance to actress Angelina Jolie, said that Gaddafi was fueled by “cocaine, whisky, cigarettes, and Viagra,” and would have killed her family if she betrayed him.109 Gaddafi preferred female bodyguards (with high heels, makeup, lipstick, coiffed hair, and western attire) because he believed that an Arab man would be distracted by their appearance and have a hard time shooting a woman.110 Despite Gaddafi’s precautions the Libyan rebels would eventually exact revenge on him for his forty- two years of autocratic rule, sodomizing him

170 Spring in Libya with a bayonet. But before that moment there would be a great deal of fighting, bloodshed, defections, assassinations, bombing, and betrayals in Libya. To the chagrin of the international community, as the rebels fought Gaddafi, their top military leaders had rivalries with each other as well, and tribal loyalties continually shifted. It was a dirty war. After the “#Feb17” revolution commenced, on 22 February at 1756 hours, Gaddafi appeared on Libyan state- run television and vowed that he would fight against the rebels, whom he referred to as “rats,” until his “last drop of blood.”111 Prior to his public speeches, interviews, or discussions with foreign leaders, Gaddafi always snorted a line of cocaine or smoked marijuana, depending on the type of mood— energetic or mellow— that he wanted to convey.112 Just two hours after the speech, at 2017 hours Gaddafi called his old friend Berlusconi (in addition to sharing a surgeon, the pair had inaugurated construction of an oil pipeline between their two countries in 2004) and calmly told him “everything is fine” in Libya.113 But everything was not okay in Libya. True to his word Gaddafi fought to the end, holding onto power for the next 246 days of fighting against rebels. 223 of those days included a coalition and nato bombardment that closely resembled the 1999 Kosovo campaign. Operation Unified Protector would be another dirty war fought with “clean” bombs.

Command Structure and Prelude Command and control of Operation Unified Protector differed from General Clark’s method of running Operation Allied Force in at least two ways. The first major difference, given the fact that Libya was outside of the United States’ European Command (eucom) area of responsibility, was that the newly created U.S. Africa Command (africom) would commence the operation and then subsequently transition the larger campaign to nato control. Second, by designating a subordinate nato joint force headquarters for the operation, the saceur would play a lesser role than General Clark had from Mons, Belgium, in 1999. In a similar vein, however, there would be no land component commander for the Libyan campaign. On 10 March 2011, the defense ministers of nato met in Brussels to discuss Libya. Secretary General Anders Rasmussen presided over the meeting and later made a public announcement regarding the increased

Spring in Libya 171 presence of maritime assets in the Mediterranean to support the arms embargo established by unscr 1970.114 In private, however, Rasmussen discussed the possibility of a no-fly zone with U.S. Defense Secretary Gates and others, as unscr 1973 was still in the works. Thesaceur , U.S. Adm. James Stavridis, explained that enacting a no- fly zone over all of Libya would not be efficient and that the better option would be to establish a no- fly zone over Libya’s coastal areas, where 80 percent of the population lived. To do this, Stavridis estimated that it would take several days of bombing Libya’s air defenses followed by a sustained commitment of forty fighters and twenty tanker aircraft; he underestimated.115 Operation Odyssey Dawn was the prelude to nato’s involvement in Libya. During this operation, from 19 to 31 March 2011, africom-led forces dealt the opening blow to Libya’s air defense network. Headquar- tered in Stuttgart, Germany, the head of africom, U.S. Army Gen. Carter F. Ham, designated U.S. Navy Adm. Samuel J. Locklear as the joint force commander for Operation Odyssey Dawn. Admiral Locklear commanded the operation from on board the uss Mount Whitney in the Mediterranean Sea.116 Serving under Locklear was U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Margaret H. Woodward, the commander of the Seventeenth Air Force and the joint force air component commander.117 At the conclusion of Operation Odyssey Dawn, the United States handed over responsibility for the air campaign to nato. In turn, nato and partner air forces would operate in clear skies according to their varying levels of commitment. Rather than play a direct role, Admiral Stavridis designated a subordinate headquarters to run the Libyan campaign. Stavridis appointed Lt. Gen. Charles Bouchard of the Canadian Air Force to lead nato and partner air forces (including Sweden, a non- nato member) from a joint headquarters in Naples, Italy. This headquarters, known as Joint Force Command (jfc) Naples, was part of a larger alliance transformation effort that commenced after an agreement made by nato’s heads of state in Prague in 2002. By 2004, based on the Prague agreement the North Atlantic Council contributed land, sea, and air components that operated under the command of jfc Naples for the purpose of having standing forces and an allied joint headquarters in the event of a contingency.

172 Spring in Libya Operation Unified Protector presented the first major test case for how well jfc Naples could manage a large-scale contingency. jfc Naples head- quartered its air component at Izmir, Turkey. From this location, starting with the activation of the headquarters on 11 August 2004, nato strengthened its ties with the Turkish Air Force in order to safeguard the southern expanses of nato’s combined airspace. Within the Operation Unified Protector command structure, Bouchard’s air component commander was Lt. Gen. Ralph J. Jodice, a U.S. Air Force officer. The allied maritime component commander was Vice Adm. Rinaldo Veri of Italy. From the same location as the jfc Naples headquarters, the maritime component directed a naval blockade that enforced the arms embargo imposed on Libya by unscr 1970. Notably absent from the jfc Naples structure was a land component command. This omission indicated that nato envisioned a campaign fought primarily from the air and sea, with the only exception being the role played by special operations forces. As a way to justify excluding the use of ground forces, Lieutenant General Bouchard reiterated the language of un Security Council Resolution (unscr) 1973, which stated: “take all necessary measures . . . while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”118 Despite nato’s cautious interpretation of the mandate, several alliance members, working outside the official nato framework, sent teams of military advisors to Libya. These small teams, by being incapable of performing occupation duties, fell within the broader bounds of unscr 1973 yet offered a ground force perspective to the air campaign. But the larger ground force perspective eventually came directly from the rebels via the Internet and social media. Although Gaddafi had one of the more formidable air defense systems in the region, numerous defections eroded his defenses from within. It was no longer the Soviet-reinforced system that the U.S. military faced during the 14 April 1986 raid Operation El Dorado Canyon. Although the Reagan administration explained the 1986 incursion in Libya as a reprisal for Gaddafi’s involvement in a terrorist attack on U.S. troops at a nightclub in Berlin, it was an off- the- shelf plan that was years in the making in terms of preparations. The seemingly off- the- cuff appearance of the plan was merely part of Reagan’s theatrics. He was an actor after

Spring in Libya 173 all, and the speech he gave while the planes were already in the air was the type of theater that Americans loved— the triumph of rapid, decisive, decision making. Penetrating Gaddafi’s air defenses in 1986 required achieving the element of surprise and entailed a great deal of planning and risk.119 Furthermore, it was only a one- time strike that lasted hours rather than months— it accomplished little aside from encouraging Gaddafi’s paranoia. In contrast, destroying the entire Libyan air defense system without having the element of surprise was a significantly larger undertaking than Reagan’s 1986 surprise raid. And that was only the first step in establishing a no- fly zone and a no-drive zone.

174 Spring in Libya 7 Bombing Libya

Let’s just call a spade a spade. A no- fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defenses. That’s the way you do a no- fly zone. And then you can fly planes around the country and not worry about our guys being shot down. But that’s the way it starts. — Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, U.S. Congress, 2 March 2011

Operation Odyssey Dawn Operation Odyssey Dawn overlapped with the initial stage of Operation Unified Protector. Operation Unified Protector took place from 23 March to 31 October 2011.1 The first two days ofnato operations consisted solely of an arms embargo enforced by naval forces. Starting on 25 March, nato and partner air forces contributed to the establishment of a no- fly zone. By 31 March, nato was in sole command of military operations and commenced a lengthy effort to protect civilians from attacks conducted by Gaddafi’s ground forces. Prior to transitioning to a nato-led operation, from 19 to 31 March Operation Odyssey Dawn served as the United States’ opening blow against Gaddafi. President Barack Obama and his advisors intended for nato to lead operations from the onset but, as discussed in chapter 6, disagreements between France and Turkey precluded this from happening initially. On 22 March when describing this delicate matter President Obama said:

nato will be involved in a coordinating function because of the extraordinary capacity of that alliance. But I will leave it to [Chairman of the Joint

175 Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike] Mullen and those who are directly involved in the operation to describe to you how exactly that transfer might take place.2

The day before on 21 March in Brussels, Belgium, the twenty- eight representatives of the North Atlantic Council met to discuss the command arrangement for military intervention in Libya. The Turkish ambassador to nato was upset with France. Earlier on 19 March President Sarkozy held an emergency summit in Paris to discuss the intervention in Libya and purposely did not invite Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan due to France’s opposition to Turkey joining the European Union.3 During the 21 March meeting, the French ambassador to nato stormed out of the room in a melodramatic fashion after Turkey insisted that nato not target ground forces during the intervention.4 On the evening of 21 March President Obama phoned Erdogan and Sarkozy to sort out matters.5 There was still no agreement. In the meantime the United States’ Africa Com- mand (africom) coordinated the initial air strikes to destroy Libyan air defenses. Leaders within the armed forces of Britain and France worked with africom in a parallel fashion while their political leaders dealt with the larger nato alliance issues. There was no coalition- level unity of command when the air campaign commenced, yet separate national-level military chains of command worked together where their interests aligned. Just as in Kosovo, starting on 19 March, the first wave of attacks against Libya’s air defense system consisted of cruise missiles. Eleven U.S. Navy ships and fourteen from the coalition participated in maritime operations during the initial salvo. These included the uss Barry, uss Stout, uss Kearsarge, uss Ponce, one British guided- missile submarine, and the uss Mount Whitney (for command and control). In all, the United States and Britain fired 112 cruise missiles to blast a hole in Gaddafi’s air defenses. The targets included surface- to- air missile sites, early warning radars, and command and control centers. Back in Washington, Pentagon spokesman Vice Admiral Gortney explained to the media, “This will allow us to pen- etrate a medium- to- high threat environment without putting air crews at risk . . . . It opens up as wide a space as possible for the no- fly zone.”6 In near-simultaneous fashion b- 1b and b-2 bomber strikes punched through the hole, expanding the coalition’s zone of control over Libya

176 Bombing Libya airspace.7 Accompanying this aerial armada were U.S. Navy ea-18 g Growler and ea- 6b Prowler electronic warfare aircraft. To support the bombers most of the electronic warfare aircraft flew from U.S. Navy aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean Sea. Threeb - 2s from the 509th Bomber Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri flew to Libya under Stra- tegic Command’s global strike air operations center (the 608th Air and Space Operations Center) at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. After departing the airspace of the continental United States, the b- 2s took a course where they remained over water all the way until their arrival in Libyan airspace. At this point the bombers came under the operational control of africom. Each of the three b- 2s required four aerial refueling iterations for the roundtrip. Thus, tanker support and synchronization were the most significant planning factors for the mission. Depending on the mix of kc-135 r and kc-10 tankers available on any given day, the assortment of bombers required “in the neighborhood of fifteen to twenty tankers” to get to their targets and back, according to U.S. Air Force crisis action planner for the 608th, Maj. Jason Smith.8 The aim was to systematically peel back the layers of Libya’s air defense. The air component commander, Maj. Gen. Margaret H. Woodward and her planner, Lt. Col. Philip G. Morrison, described the priority of targeting using the analogy of peeling an onion:

The first task was to shut down Libyan air operations and air defenses. This represented the first layer of the onion that needed to be peeled back before airpower could discharge the task of protecting the Libyan people. Specifically, the longer range surface- to- air missiles that could threaten the Airborne Warning and Control System, Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System, and tankers needed to be disabled immediately, followed by the rest of the Libyan integrated air defense system (iads).9

As part of standard practice, joint air planners plotted the ranges of Gaddafi’s air defense systems (radars, missiles, and fighter aircraft) and used these as the radius for a series of concentric and overlapping circles overlaid on a map of Libya. Using this depiction as a guide, planners prioritized the destruction of Gaddafi’s air defense systems based upon

Bombing Libya 177 the premise that air defense weapon systems capable of reaching out the farthest should be hit first. Hence, peeling back the layers of the onion entailed striking the most heavily defended targets first. Oftentimes, these were not actually located on the outside of the onion, as the rings on the map equated to long-range radars and missiles that emanated from the center of a radius that was deeper inside of Libya. “Going deep” in such a threat environment called for the use of cruise missiles in the opening blow, as these were difficult for Gaddafi to counter. In the opening blow, b-2s struck forty-five targets at the airfield in Ghard- abiya, Libya. These consisted of hardened aircraft shelters. The goal, as in Kosovo, was to destroy the opponents’ air force before it could get aloft to put up a fight. Shortly after the attack on Ghardabiya, aerial reconnaissance assets photographed the hardened aircraft shelters so that analysts could perform a battle damage assessment. The next day, the U.S. Air Force concluded: “All [aircraft shelters] were collapsed or showed blackened trails emanating from their entrances, confirming that whatever was inside exploded and burned.”10 After attaining control of the skies, the United States could bring several of its other “unique capabilities” closer to the fight. With numerous defections— as indicated by the pair of f-1 Mirages that landed in Malta— the onion was rotting from within at the same time that the U.S. Air Force peeled it from the outside. The Libyan Air Force did not put up much resistance against the onslaught of the United States, Britain, and France, so the casualties were few. During the conflict Britain’s Royal Air Force lost one airman by way of a traffic accident in Italy with a military supply vehicle.11 The United States’ only losses in the campaign were an f- 15e and an unmanned U.S. Navy reconnaissance helicopter. The U.S. Air Force and Department of State extracted the f-15 e crew from Libya— Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector had zero U.S. service members killed in action.

Crash of f- 15e in Libya Around midnight on 21 March a U.S. Air Force f- 15e piloted by Maj. Ken- neth Harney and Capt. Tyler Stark, operating out of Aviano, Italy, crashed over eastern Libya due to a mechanical failure.12 Both pilots safely ejected,

178 Bombing Libya but Captain Stark’s parachute had a tear. As Major Harney descended to the ground, he lost track of Stark. Marines on board the uss Kearsarge initiated a Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel trap( ) mission and quickly rescued Harney, inadvertently injuring six local villagers in the process.13 Thetrap package consisted of two av-8 b Harriers, two mv- 22b Ospreys, two ch- 53e Super Stallions, and a kc- 130j for aerial refueling.14 In describing the higher-level decision to execute a trap mission, U.S. Marine “Aviator of the Year” Maj. J. Eric Grunke said, “When we launch the trap, it’s an all or none kind of thing.”15 Grunke was one of the av- 8b Harrier pilots on the scene. Upon making radio contact with one of the f- 15e pilots that was on the ground, Grunke described his sensations and actions:

At that point it all became real to me, listening to the guy whispering on the radio. This is no longer North Carolina, this is no longer practice— that’s really a guy down there scared for his life. Within five minutes of being on station, I’m able to get my targeting pod sensor on this pursuing vehicle . . . . I tell the pilot, ‘Okay, I can see the guys . . . . I’ve got two 500-pound bombs, do you need them?’ He [the grounded pilot] says, ‘Yes, yes I do.’ He comes up and actually crying on the radio he says, ‘tell my wife I love her.’ And again, just underlying the realness of the situation I said, ‘don’t worry, I’m going to have a bomb on the deck in one minute.’ I released one bomb, and I’m able to guide it for 50 seconds or so, all the way to a direct impact.16

Meanwhile, a group of Libyan rebel fighters approached Captain Stark, who had landed at a separate location from Harney in a “field of wheat and thistles” and hid among sheep on the farm of rebel sympathizer Hamid Moussa el-Amruni.17 Stark was in a rural area twenty-five miles outside of Benghazi. “I was worried sick thinking about this twenty-seven- year- old from Littleton, Colorado, lost in the Libyan desert,” Secretary Clinton later recalled in her book Hard Choices.18 As Amruni approached Captain Stark, a U.S. Marine aircraft on the trap mission strafed him, causing “shrapnel wounds in his leg and back.”19 Despite the injury, Amruni continued walking toward the pilot; he recounted the event:

Bombing Libya 179 We didn’t think it was an American plane. We thought it was a Qaddafi [sic] plane. We started calling out to the pilot, but we only speak Ara- bic. We looked for him and found the parachute. A villager came who spoke English and he called out ‘we are here, we are with the rebels’ and then the man came out.20

Next, according to Amruni, “I hugged him [Stark] and said ‘don’t be scared, we are your friends,’ ” and subsequently introduced Captain Stark to Bubaker Habib, a local English teacher.21 Habib happened to have the phone number to the State Department Operations Center, after having previously made friends with some of the staff at the U.S. embassy in Benghazi [which had closed after the campaign started]. Habib drove Stark to a hotel in Benghazi for medical treatment of “torn tendons in his knee and ankle,” and coordinated Stark’s transfer back to the U.S. Air Force.22 Even with advanced sensors and targeting pods, sorting out what was going on in the vicinity of a grounded pilot was no easy matter. In all, over 150 U.S. and coalition aircraft participated in Operation Odyssey Dawn. These consisted of fighters, bombers, tankers, Airborne Warning and Control Systems (awacs), Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Systems (jstars), as well as transport, jamming, and reconnaissance aircraft. At any given time, an average of twenty- five aircraft were in the air at one time. Absent among the panoply was the f- 22 Raptor. U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton A. Schwartz told the U.S. Sen- ate Armed Services Committee that he anticipated the f- 22 would make its “combat debut” during the campaign. All the U.S. Air Force’s combat capable f- 22s were at bases in Alaska, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Virginia at the onset of Operation Odyssey Dawn. Designed primarily for air- to- air combat, these short- range fighter aircraft were not as readily available as other aircraft such as the f- 15es based out of Aviano, Italy. Furthermore, aircraft such as the olderf - 15e were more capable in air-to- ground strikes than the f-22. In the same Senate hearing as Schwartz’s testimony, Secretary of the Air Force Michael B. Donley acknowledged that the f-22 was “somewhat more limited” than the f- 15e when it came to striking ground targets.23

180 Bombing Libya Operation Odyssey Dawn Ends By 24 March, after six days of attacks, nato had degraded Gaddafi’s air defense system to the point where air operations could transition to the interdiction of ground forces. Air Force Magazine editor John Tirpak described this shifting priority:

Theb -2s were kept on alert for a second strike, but the political situation evolved again. At first nato wanted to establish a no- fly zone to prevent Gaddafi from using his aircraft to attack civilians. However, as an open Libyan rebellion emerged and began to seize territory, nato shifted gears and also targeted Gaddafi’s ground forces, which were attacking rebels and civilians alike.24

Gen. Carter Ham’s staff requested additionalb -2 strikes on ground forces. U.S. Eighth Air Force Commander Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Carpenter denied these requests, arguing that “The b-2s were very busy . . . . You really don’t want to ask for a platform; you want to ask for an effect on the ground.”25 Given this consideration, the U.S. Air Force “shifted to having either the b- 52 or the b- 1 hit the new target set” due to their large bomb- carrying capacity. In addition, according to Carpenter the b-2s had to get ready for an important “operational readiness inspection.”26 After interviewing Major General Carpenter, in reassuring the readers of Air Force Magazine that “strategic” assets such as the b- 2 were not used for tactical missions, editor John Tirpak wrote: “At no point were the b- 2s or b-1 bs tasked to attack individuals or ground combat vehicles.”27 On 24 March France and Turkey put aside their differences. France agreed to operate within the nato command structure as long as it could establish a “separate diplomatic committee” that coordinated actions that went beyond what the alliance was collectively comfortable in doing.28 Turkey agreed to participate in enforcement of the no- fly zone but would not conduct ground strikes. On 24 March nato Secretary Gen. Anders Rasmussen explained the arrangement to the media: “At this moment, there will still be a coalition operation and a nato operation.”29 Thus, nato’s unity of command was getting closer to what President Obama envisioned, but it was not yet there. In any case, during the transition

Bombing Libya 181 between Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector, air strikes had neutralized the air defenses of pro-Gaddafi forces in Libya. After 24 March the focus shifted to interdiction of ground maneuver forces, with the first targets in Adjabiya, south of Benghazi.30 By 31 March Operation Odyssey Dawn ended. As the air component commander, Major General Woodward led an effort that included 1,990 coalition sorties, with 1,206 flown by the United States. Of these, 952 were coalition strike sorties that took out air defense sites as well as initial attacks on tanks, personnel carriers, and artillery. Of the 952 strike sorties, the United States contributed 436. During the 31 March transition to nato-led operations, Woodward said, “We protected thousands of Libyan civilians and significantly degraded the regimes ability to conduct attacks from the air and on the ground. We met our objectives and we continue to support nato under Operation Unified Protector as they carry out the same mandate.”31 According to Pentagon estimates, the first ten days of airstrikes cost $550 million. Of this, $340 million was for munitions and the rest was mostly for fuel. At $1.5 million apiece, replenishing the 192 Tomahawk cruise missiles fired into Libya cost $288 million. The United States committed 175 aircraft and over four thousand personnel to Operation Odyssey Dawn. The loss of the $79.2 million f-15 e was not included in the $550 million estimate, as this could not be replaced. After the initial blow to Gaddafi’s air defenses, the Pentagon estimated that sustaining the no- fly zone would cost $40 million per month.32 All of these expenses would come from the Defense Department’s budget rather than the supplemental Overseas Contingency Operations appropriation.33 On 31 March at 0600 Greenwich Mean Time, “nato took sole command of international air operations over Libya,” according to a statement released by Secretary General Rasmussen.34 Later that day the Secretary General was in Stockholm, meeting with the Swedish parliament. As a non- nato member yet contributor to Operation Unified Protector, the Swedish government participated in the campaign under the auspices of un Security Council Resolution 1973. Like Turkey, however, Sweden had a narrow interpretation of the un mandated no-fly zone and did not participate in striking ground targets.35 Nevertheless, after 31 March the

182 Bombing Libya major campaign participants— the United States, France, and Britain— focused their full attention on targeting Gaddafi’s ground forces.

Operation Unified Protector On 31 March Operation Unified Protector was in full swing. Destroy- ing Gaddafi’s air defenses allowedawacs , jstars, fuel tankers, and unmanned aerial systems to move closer to Libya. The tempo of strikes on ground forces accelerated due to the shorter logistical string and the prox- imity of two key command nodes— awacs for management of airspace control (the air-to- air fight) and jstars for identification and cueing of air strikes against ground targets (the air- to- ground fight). Both of these assets operated unimpeded off of the Libyan coast, circling in orbits that enabled their functions.36 Unmanned aircraft such as the Predator aided in battle damage assessments of Libya’s integrated air defense systems, then shifted to the priority of developing a sharper picture of Gaddafi’s ground maneuvers. The Predator unmanned aerial system, which the United States had first employed in the Balkans in 1995, underwent several developments in the aftermath of its employment over Kosovo in 1999.37 During Opera- tion Allied Force, Predator aircraft simultaneously provided both nato headquarters in Brussels and the air component headquarters in Vicenza with highly magnified aerial views of mobile ground forces in Kosovo. Without a means to designate targets found by Predator pilots, however, passing targeting information to piloted aircraft with munitions was difficult and required the lengthy “talking on” of a target location based upon the Predator’s reconnaissance feed. After Operation Allied Force, with a laser designator and Hellfire missiles added, the Predator became a more versatile aircraft. The rq- 1 variant of the Predator solely performed reconnaissance (the “R” standing for “reconnaissance), but the mq- 1 variant (the “M” standing for “munitions”) performed in an armed role with the capability to shoot Hellfire missiles.38 The United States contributed both Predator variants on a regular basis after the destruction of Gaddafi’s air defenses. With the conglomeration of aerial sensors and strike assets, nato wreaked havoc on every tank, armored personnel carrier, and artillery

Bombing Libya 183 piece that they could spot from the air. These were the type of strikes that Secretary Clinton referred to as part of the enforcement of a “no-drive zone” that prohibited Gaddafi’s ground forces from harming civilians. Compared with Kosovo the terrain in Libya was open desert, the weather was more favorable, and the adversary put up less sophisticated air defenses. The Libyan Desert resembled the terrain in Iraq and Kuwait where coalition forces had prevailed during the 1991 Gulf War. The lack of significant cloud ceilings meant that aircraft could observe ground targets with greater clarity. With the latest assortment of precision munitions, “what could be seen could be hit,” as General Depuy liked to say in 1976. Despite these advantages, nato initially had a hard time distinguishing between the rebels and pro-Gaddafi forces. Without a land component, there was no interactive mechanism to provide accurate and up-to- date information on fluid enemy and friendly dispositions. Instead, targeting depended primarily on the use of aerial sensors and signals intelligence. Unmanned aerial systems corroborated intelligence regarding dispositions, but this was a time and resource- intensive process. Making matters worse, Gaddafi’s ground forces mimicked the aerial signature of rebel vehicles by operating in civilian technical vehicles with the same rooftop markings as the rebels. After numerous defections, both sides employed tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers. The jstars ground moving- target indicator was useful in spotting these formations, but distant aerial observers could not decipher tribal loyalties or allegiances. On 8 April 2011 nato mistakenly bombed a rebel column of around twenty captured t-55 and t- 72 tanks in open desert terrain.39 In frustration, rebel commander- in- chief General Abdul Fatah Younis stated:

We informed them [nato] at the time the tanks were leaving Beng- hazi, and when they arrived at Ajdabiya. We informed them that in the early morning they would be advancing on Brega. We gave them [nato] all the information concerning their number, and that they would be carried on tank transports, and their direction.40

During an 8 April nato press briefing, Rear Admiral Russell Harding, the British deputy commander of the air campaign stated, “I’m not aware what General Younis has said today or yesterday, but I’m not apologizing.

184 Bombing Libya The situation on the ground, as I said, was extremely fluid and remains extremely fluid and up until yesterday we had no information that the ntc [National Transitional Council] or the opposition forces were using tanks.”41 Consequently, new methods of coordination emerged. Initially nato dropped leaflets informing Libyans of a telephone hotline for passing information.42 But the rebels did not use the hotline. Instead, after the 8 April tank incident, rebel fighters painted the tops of their vehicles pink and passed information to nato over Twitter to prevent further “friendly fire” episodes.43 As a precautionary measure on the allied side, starting on 26 April French aircraft began dropping inert 660-pound precision-guided bombs filled with concrete to “literally crush” enemy tanks while avoiding collateral damage from explosions.44 Halfway through the campaign, using Twitter as an impromptu method of coordination, nato commenced air strikes against targets spotted by Libyan rebel ground forces. This indicated a greater level of nato integration with rebel forces as compared with the alliance’s belated coordination with the kla in 1999. Regardless, in both campaigns extensive cooperation with ground forces was necessary to prevent collateral damage, particularly when armored forces were interspersed with innocent civilians in urban terrain. As operations continued, on 22 June among Americans who originally advocated the intervention 85 percent favored continuing the bombing until rebel forces removed Gaddafi from power.45 The lack of nato casualties and perception of low collateral damage nurtured the appeal of air power. The success of air power, however, still depended on a ground component. On 15 April one week after General Younis explained that they had given nato warning of the rebel tank advance on Brega, his field commander, Lieutenant General Haftar, confirmed that nato established a coordination mechanism. According to Mark Urban of bbc News, who interviewed Haftar at a headquarters in Tobruk:

Lt Gen Haftar says that his officers give Nato coordinates for enemy forces that need to be hit, and the alliance then takes action. The Ameri- cans were initially reluctant to act as the “rebel air force” but as the alliance’s involvement in Libya deepens, the policy has shifted.46

Bombing Libya 185 While at the rebel headquarters, Urban noticed that another of the rebel leaders, Lt. Gen. Suleiman Mahmoud al- Obeidi, had a book on German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s campaigns in North Africa during World War II. This ambitious student of Rommel would later take on Younis’s position within Libyan military establishment. In the interim, however, Younis revealed via Twitter on 16 April 2011—eight days afternato had mistakenly bombed the rebel tanks—that the rebels gave the coordinates to nato via “tweets.”47 But nato was not monitoring Twitter very closely at this early stage in the campaign.

The Role of Twitter Ignoring the role of Twitter in the Libyan campaign would be the equivalent of studying military operations during the American Civil War without considering the role of the telegraph. Social media will inevitably play a role in future military decision-making processes, and its potential use spans far beyond the realm of public affairs and media engagements. In Libya the rebels used Twitter extensively to coordinate their military activities. For example, during a firefight the Libyan rebels used Twitter to crowdsource technical questions pertaining to the employment of various weapon systems. Crowdsourcing with Twitter casts a global net to rapidly seek expert answers by simply tweeting a question. On one occasion, while in contact with the enemy, a rebel contingent used crowdsourcing via Twitter to determine the minimum arming distance of a bm- 21 Grad 122-mm multiple rocket launcher they had encountered.48 The rebels quickly found two individuals who knew the answer, Nureddin Asham- makhi in Finland and Khalid Hatashe in Britain, and conference-called them via Skype to learn that Gaddafi’sbm - 21 Grad operators typically used an electric cable to remotely trigger the launcher.49 This knowledge helped Sifaw Twawa’s rebel brigade assault the pro- Gaddafi forces that were barraging their hometown of Yefren with the rocket launcher.50 On another occasion, on 6 May 2011 the rebels, with the help of a New York Times reporter, learned how to diffuse the mines that blocked the path to Misurata’s port by tweeting a picture of a mine along with the text, “#IDthis.”51 Global audiences determined the type of mine (Chinese Type 84, Model A) and, more importantly, how to diffuse it— all in less than

186 Bombing Libya forty minutes.52 Diffusing the mines reestablished the flow of weapons and supplies from the port to the rebels.53 In addition to the use of Twitter to crowdsource information requirements, the rebel fighters also used Twitter to coordinate with nato’s air component. Combined with location data from Google Earth, Twitter became a forum for crowdsourcing targeting data for the purpose of bombardment by nato’s air forces or the cueing of rebel- captured artillery. This development ultimately brought an end to the campaign. Much like the integration of counter-battery radars in Kosovo, the evolution of an information-sharing mechanism between air and ground forces occurred once again in Libya. The next section shows how coordination with Twitter evolved throughout the campaign.

Crowdsourcing Targets In 2011 Google Earth and Twitter, which were not available during Operation Allied Force, enhanced nato’s synchronization with Libyan rebel forces. During an interview with cnn’s Anthony Bourdain on the show Parts Unknown, Libyan rebel fighter Akram Al- Gdery described the methods used to pass on targets from rebel ground forces to nato air forces. When asked to explain how nato aircraft were able to strike tanks, artillery, and other vehicles with success, he stated:

How did it happen? Easy— Twitter. We sent so much information to nato via Twitter. I get a phone call from [rebel ground forces in] Tripoli or Benghazi or whatever. We get the coordinates [of the target] via Google Earth. We verify that that is the location there that needs to be hit, send it to nato—then it is gone.54

The unique aspect of Twitter as compared with other social media is that information can be sent from mobile phones without a data plan or more sophisticated 3g or 4g cellular networks. The 140- character limit on messages (tweets) facilitated the use of “Twitter shortcode” even in the remote areas with a nascent cell phone infrastructure.55 Rebel forces only needed a mobile phone connection to make posts to Twitter (referred to as tweets) using text messaging with basic Short Message Service (sms) protocols.

Bombing Libya 187 Just as in Operation Allied Force, effective targeting during Opera- tion Unified Protector required accurate target location data passed from ground forces. The use of Twitter and Google Earth, in the hands of the technology- savvy rebels who spotted targets, provided nato with the sort of data that Task Force Hawk’s sensors had added during the strike operations in Kosovo. As a point for comparison, near the end of the Kosovo air campaign, on 6 June 1999 the counter- battery radars from Task Force Hawk passed more than fifty artillery radar acquisitions to air forces.56 In contrast, with Twitter the rebel ground forces passed a far greater volume of tweets containing targeting information in a shorter time period. For example, the message stream for the general topic of “#Libya” on 18 January 2014 contained an average of sixty-two tweets per hour.57 Applying this data rate to more specific information reveals that Libyan rebel headquarters likely received an overwhelming volume of targeting information from numerous dispersed rebel fighters. To filter this information, operational- level headquarters such as that of rebel fighter Al- Gdery sifted through reports from frontline forces and verified locations with imaging software such as Google Earth before tweeting them to nato headquarters. Additionally, the use of hashtags allowed operations cells to further filter targeting data into various categories, with subsequent messages appearing on predefined message threads. To incorporate hashtags, a Twitter user simply puts a pound sign (#) in front of whatever keyword they want to become a category, spelling things out without spaces (for example, #Libyastrike). By doing this, Twitter users tailor the flow of information to suit their specific needs. Initially, requests via Twitter for air strikes from ground forces did not include accurate targeting data (although a timestamp and the location of those sending the tweets was available if the Twitter user chose to embed their phone’s location data with messages). For example, the following tweet, typical of messages sent early in the campaign, does not contain useful targeting information: “hey @nato i see tanks, come blow’em up 4 me plz ty #needbackup #war #gaddafisux #bieberfever.”58 Other tweets referred to a town or some other geographical landmark followed by a distance and direction from that point to the enemy’s location.59 Although slightly more useful than the first example, this was also not

188 Bombing Libya accurate enough to aid in targeting. Furthermore, much of the data sent by rebel fighters did not contain hashtags or the addition of “@nato” (the nato headquarters official Twitter account) or @UKMilOps (the U.K. Ministry of Defense official account) to help in filtering the information to nato headquarters.60 In a bizarre turn of events three amateur intelligence analysts helped process data gleaned from Twitter and Google Earth by retransmitting the information (known as “retweeting”) in a manner that made it easier for nato intelligence analysts to access. The first, Janice Clinch, a fifty- nine- year- old grandmother, worked from her home in Seeley’s Bay, Canada, as a site administrator for the Facebook page “Libyan Youth Movement.”61 Working in conjunction with Omar Amer, an expatriate Libyan living in Manchester, England, the two individuals, living in separate time zones, kept watch around the clock, monitoring the Twitter feeds of Libyan youth who were members of the Facebook page they administered.62 In one case Clinch saw that a member of the “Libyan Youth Movement” Facebook site mentioned that Gaddafi forces set up a temporary headquarters near a gas station. Clinch tweeted the coordinates, asking nato to “clean up” pro- Gaddafi troops at the location.63 In an interview with a Canadian newspaper Clinch revealed that although she had never visited the Arab world or even met anyone from Libya, her motivation was simple—“I don’t believe in dictatorships,” she said.64 The third individual, Robert Rowley, a forty- eight- year- old Dairy Queen manager in Tucson, Arizona, combed through imagery on Google Earth and monitored the Twitter feeds of naval enthusiasts in Malta to catch the movement of Libyan ships violating the naval embargo.65 On 1 July Row- ley tweeted, “alert: #Malta cargo ship ‘purki’ 32.65006°/15.05373° Speed/Course: 4.7 kn/300° Running contraband to #Gaddafi from his friend #Turkey @nato,” and in a separate tweet on the same day, “Closely watched the #Turkey Cargo Ship ‘seren ayanoglu’ for last 100 miles approach #Tripoli #Libya, never stopped/checked by @nato,” and finally: “#Turkey cargo ship ‘seren ayanoglu’ 33.3413°/13.9629° now approaching port #Tripoli #Libya w/ supplies for #Gaddafi nato@ .”66 Rowley’s efforts led to nato naval interdictions at sea as well as air strikes on arms warehouses in Libyan shipping yards.67 In June 2011 Rowley told

Bombing Libya 189 reporters, “I just do @Nato and hope for the best. Sometimes if it seems really incredibly important, like there’s 10 tanks heading from Tripoli to Zawiyah, then there’s also @NatoPress.”68 In a nato press conference on 10 June 2011 Mike Bracken, the spokesperson for Operation Unified Protector, publicly acknowledged that nato used information from Twitter to aid in the targeting process:

We’ll get information from open source on the internet, we’ll get Twit- ter, you name any source of media and our fusion centre will deliver all of that into useable intelligence. The Commander will assess what he can use, what he can trust, and the experience of the operators, the intelligence officers, and the trained military personnel and civilian support staff will give him those options. And he will decide “that’s good information, I’m going to act on it.” So where it comes from, again, it’s not relevant to the commander.69

The next day on 11 June the Twitter feed of user hms@ _Nonsuch bluntly stated, “If tweeting the location of pro-G [Gaddafi] forces, state exact latitude & longitude. Don’t assume transliterated Arabic place names are sufficient [to coordinate air strikes].”70 The profile of this Twitter user described the feed as meant for “updates about Libya from a U.K. military perspective,” adding that the account was “unofficial, not run by the Royal Navy nor nato.”71 Nevertheless, this Twitter handle would retweet operational updates from nato’s daily press briefings, highlighting the number and location of air strikes along with the tally of military hardware destroyed each day in the air campaign thereafter.72 Alongside this information, perhaps to give encouragement to rebel forces, @hms_Nonsuch “retweeted” messages that contained the latitude and longitude of targets sent from rebel fighters associated with the “Libyan Youth Movement” Facebook site.73 These tweets often corresponded with several of the targets struck by nato and briefed in the daily press conference roll- up. According to the Washington Post and several other news agencies, nato intelligence analysts were managing the Twitter feed of @hms_Nonsuch.74 After nato publicly acknowledged that its intelligence fusion cell monitored tweets to develop targets for aircraft, the volume and accuracy of tweeted targeting information from rebels increased. The same day

190 Bombing Libya that @hms_Nonsuch asked outright for the exact latitude and longitude of “pro- G forces,” a Twitter user named Suhaib ( ) tweeted: “@Nato plz Recon Zawiya, Libya Coordinates 32.7429141 N 12.8018618 e for current active #Gadaffisic [ ] tanks.”75 Earlier, after sending a series of locations to nato, another user tweeted, “confirmed: Coordinates for positions of more Gaddafi forces near Misurata: 32125190n, 15050767e- hit these too! #Libya.”76 Indicating the importance of hashtags, Twitter user Omar with the handle @libyans_revolt retweeted an older post about Gaddafi- hired mercenaries but added more information to the coordinates: “25.925474,14.442065 Mercenaries camp @nato @natopress @UKMilOps #Libya #Feb17 via @moooonlight22.”77 User @diceylee808 tweeted: “#Libya @nato- Check out south Misrata at the rock crushing plant 4 Gaddafi grad launchers (32.232769,14.854717) & (32.277264,14.686489).”78 Conversation threads on Twitter among rebel fighters discussed which smartphone Global Positioning System (gps) applications worked best for getting coordinates while on the move.79 Other users of Twitter, operating from stationary positions, began taking screenshots of Google Earth position data from their computers, posting the images to Twitter in the form of a “twitpic” (Twitter picture). For example, “Joanne Leo,” who lived in Tripoli, tweeted: “#Tripoli More Geographic coordinates of Gaddafi Forces targets for @nato http://twitpic.com/5vmj1l and http://twitpic.com/5vmjm9 #Libya,” along with three other twitpics on 25 July 2011.80 These images had a red thumb- tack icon overlaid on Google Earth’s “satellite view” map to indicate the location of Gaddafi’s ground forces. In order to the relay the latitude and longitude, a position window on the computer remained open on top of the map, displaying the coordinates. With her computer screen configured in this manner, Joanne did a screen capture and posted the image in the form of a twitpic to the Internet.81 Interestingly, “hms_Nonsuch” and the “LibyanYouthMovement” both followed Joanne on Twitter.82 “Following” another Twitter member puts all tweets of the followed person on the news feed of the individual doing the following, thus filtering user content streams. Of the five “twitpics” sent by Joanne on July 25 with the locations of pro- Gaddafi forces, one

Bombing Libya 191 proposed target was apparently near a site on nato’s “no-strike list,” as indicated by comments on the picture from another user, who stated that loyalist forces hiding near the Tripoli Municipal Sewage Treatment Facility could not be targeted.83 Meanwhile, on the shores of Tripoli, with their backs safely against the nato- controlled Mediterranean Sea, rebel fighters established a fire base consisting of several captured Russian-made truck-mounted bm-21 Grad 122-mm rocket launchers. Shane Smith, a journalist for the Web-based magazine Vice, walked up to one of the Grad trucks as part of a visit to film a documentary on the rebels. Smith gazed at eighteen spent rocket casings littered on the beach as a rebel official verified his press credentials. After Smith’s security screening had finished, a young boy named Mohammed, about fourteen years old, approached him and proudly said in broken Eng- lish, “Rocket, Grad— 20 kilometers,” referring to the range of the captured weapon system.84 The boy, who wore a red, white, and blue ball cap with the words “usa” across the front, looked into the film crew’s camera and said, “Obama and Clinton, I want weapons, New! The oldest [pointing at his rifle]. Gaddafi has new. Yes, I want help from usa! The dream— play in Miami Heat and Los Angeles Galaxy and Dallas Mavericks [basketball teams].”85 After talking briefly with the boy, Smith interviewed several of the older- looking rebels at the Grad site. Smith did not understand what he had uncovered— his interpreter lost most of the pertinent details of the conversation during translation—but the revelations were significant and evident to just about anyone with a military perspective on contemporary land warfare. The rebel fire supporters had oriented their captured rockets on preplanned targets to the west where Smith, earlier in the day, had been interviewing rebel fighters preparing for an assault on pro-Gaddafi forces. After the Grad- equipped rebels told Smith about how Gaddafi’s forces had been shelling various rebel- held positions, he asked them what time they shot back at Gaddafi. “When do they [pointing at the rebel’s Grad launcher] fire their rockets?” he asked the interpreter.86 With a look of frustration, the unnamed rebel fighter said: “We don’t have a specific time for firing our missiles. Just when Gaddafi’s troops start moving forward. And when they [the rebels] start

192 Bombing Libya attacking. We are prepared.”87 Basically, the rebel fighter was trying to explain that they used indirect fire— like any other army— in a coordinated fashion with ground maneuver. Moreover, the rebels were preparing for an offensive against Gaddafi’s forces in Tripoli. For the rebel artillerymen, firing based on a timetable was an incomprehensible question. Mohammed, the boy manning the Grad rocket system, explained to Smith that the rebellion had started with Twitter and Facebook, but that coordinating the actual fighting required the addition of Google Earth.88 As Smith walked away from the site, Mohammed went back to the cab of the Grad truck to monitor his mobile phone, awaiting the receipt of fire mission. Hence, the rebels crowdsourced their own fire support assets alongside those of nato. Mohammed might receive a phone call, e- mail, text message, or tweet, with the latter having certain predefined hashtags. Fourteen-year- old Mohammed determined the priority of fires based upon the medium through which he received the information and the context of the message.

The Assassination of General Younis While preparing for a major offensive to take Tripoli, the rebels suffered a major setback. On 28 July 2011 a group of rebels arrived in Ajdabiya to escort rebel commander General Younis to the Garyounis military camp, located on the outskirts of Benghazi. “A rebel judiciary committee” had summoned Younis for the purpose of inquiring about “recent operations at the front lines,” according to an account by Moatasem Younis, the general’s son.89 The armed group of rebel escorts presented a paper signed by Mustafa Abdul Jalil’s deputy Ali Esawi and judge Jomaa al- Jazwi as proof that it was a meeting sanctioned by the ntc.90 Younis dismissed his personal security detail and went with the armed escorts from to Ajdabiya to Benghazi, a 150-kilometer highway trip.91 During the trip, various rebel factions blocked side roads and opened checkpoints to hasten Younis’s journey.92 The next day on 29 July ntc spokesman Ali Tarhouni announced that two rogue soldiers in the group that escorted Younis to Benghazi assassinated General Younis and two of his aides, dumped their bodies outside of Benghazi, and burned them.93

Bombing Libya 193 On 30 July Abdul Jalil held a press conference where he suggested that Gaddafi may have been behind the assassination. Al Jazeera reporter Tony Birtley attended the ntc press conference and described Jalil’s comments:

Now at the press conference today Jalil inferred that this was the work of pro- Gaddafi agents seeking to create divisions within the opposition. So still we’re no nearer to the truth at the moment. He said that there is investigation ongoing, he also said that there’s going to be a clamp- down on militias and groups who do not come under the umbrella of the opposition armed forces, and if they did not agree and come under the umbrella, they would be dealt with according to the law here.94

For Jalil, the assassination of Younis posed a significant setback for the credibility of the ntc in the international community. Jalil did not want the ntc to be seen as an unstable group of rival military leaders. In press briefings, Jalil tried to make it seem as if the ntc’s decision summon You- nis to Benghazi for an inquiry was no different than when U.S. Congress calls for a combatant commander to testify in a House or Senate armed services committee meeting— minus the assassination part. As word of Younis’s death spread through social media and traditional news outlets, five theories emerged regarding what happened. The first was that a secretive fifth column within the rebel movement was pos- ing as a rebel brigade but was actually a part of Gaddafi’s mercenary forces and responsible for Younis’s death. Second, the fact that Younis, Hafter, and Mahmoud were all rivals for command of Libya’s armed forces generated suspicion that Hafter or Mahmoud orchestrated the assassination as a ploy to overtake Younis as commander in chief. To dispel this notion, Aly Abuzaakouk, a close associate of Haftar in Wash- ington, insisted that “Haftar and Younis are friends” and doubted that they would compete for power in such a divisive manner.95 Third, news agencies reported that Gaddafi may have sent a message to Younis that the rebels had intercepted and believed to be evidence of a double-cross.96 Reporters from the Associated Press and usa Today speculated that this was why the ntc judiciary committee had called for the meeting with Younis in the first place. Fourth, the Globe and Mail released the names

194 Bombing Libya of two individuals under investigation by the ntc—Mustafa Rubaa and Ahmed Bukhattalah—both of whom had been responsible for Younis’s security when transiting to the meeting at Garyounis military camp.97 Ultimately, the ntc investigation disclosed that Younis had made it safely to his meeting at the military camp and dutifully answered the judiciary committee’s questions. According to Associated Press reporter Rami Al- Shaheibi, after Younis’s meeting at the camp, his next destination was the Defense Ministry in Benghazi, where he was to undergo further questioning regarding progress at the front. Two of the guards in his escort to this next meeting were part of the “February 17 Martyrs Brigade,” and it was they who shot Younis and his two aides, then quickly secured the bodies and sped off in a car. Their commander, who had realized what was about to occur, had shouted, “Don’t do it!” shortly before the guards shot Younis.98 The motive for killing Younis was revenge for his role in the 26 June 1996 prison massacre at Abu Salim.99 After Younis’s defection on 23 Feb- ruary 2011, the majority of the rebel leadership had recognized that Libya needed to put its checkered past behind in order to move forward in a united manner. Yet for some individuals, the revolution was more about vengeance than freedom. After calling for the investigation into Younis’s assassination, Jalil selected Maj. Gen. Suleiman Mahmoud to take Younis’s place as commander in chief.100 Major General Mahmoud’s favorite military figure was German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, known as the “Desert Fox,” and he had written two historical studies of his campaigns in North Africa: Rommel in the Libyan Desert and Rommel and the Afrika Korps: The Desert War.101 Suleiman Mahmoud’s intense study of Rommel likely led him to a deeper understanding of combined- arms operations in desert terrain. In any case, Mahmoud was the former deputy of Younis and a member of the same tribe as Younis, the Obeidat. Jalil’s decision to appoint Mahmoud as the next commander in chief preserved the loyalty of the Obeidat tribe and Younis’s family, thereby quelling discord among the rebels. Mahmoud would lead the combined- arms rebel assault to take Tripoli.

Bombing Libya 195 The Diplomatic Tide Shifts against Gaddafi On 15 July 2011 the United States and more than thirty other nations formally recognized the ntc as the legitimate government of Libya. Sec- retary of State Hillary Clinton and representatives from the other thirty nations, consisting of the members of nato, the European Union, and the Arab League, met in Istanbul, Turkey, to decide on the matter and jointly announce the decision.102 A handful of other countries, with France leading the way on 10 March, had already recognized the ntc before the 15 July announcement. These included Qatar (28 March), Maldives (3 April), Italy (4 April), Kuwait (13 April), Gambia (22 April), Jordan (24 May), Senegal (28 May), Spain (8 June), Australia (9 June), United Arab Emirates (12 June), Germany (13 June), Canada (14 June), Panama (14 June), Austria (18 June), Latvia (20 June), Lithuania (20 June), Denmark (22 June), Cape Verde (26 June), Bulgaria (28 June), Croatia (28 June), Turkey (3 July), Poland (8 July), Netherlands (13 July), and Luxembourg (13 July).103 Of note is the fact that the United Kingdom did not recognize the ntc until July 27, due in part because Gaddafi still had a loyal ambassador in London, which complicated matters.104 Gaddafi was outraged at the long chain of diplomatic recognitions and issued a taped audio statement on 15 July on state- run television:

Their decisions, meetings, recognitions and their statements are all under your feet—trample on them. . . . This is our answer to all the decisions they took against the Libyan people. You in America, Europe, Russia and everywhere, look! Look at the millions. Look at the Libyan people. More than 5 million people carrying the pictures of Gadhafi are ready for jihad and for martyrdom.105

Gaddafi’s belief that he had five million supporters was a stretch. His power structure was unraveling. Despite the setbacks related to Younis’s assassination, by 20 August 2011 the rebels took Tripoli.

The Air– Ground Offensive on Tripoli On 20 August when announcing the upcoming air– ground offensive against Tripoli the ntc chairman Jalil said, “We planned this operation

196 Bombing Libya with nato, our Arab associates and our rebel fighters in Tripoli with commanders in Benghazi.”106 As Libya’s largest city and capital, Tripoli was the center of Gaddafi’s power— and the tide had turned. As the nato airpower– backed rebel ground assault commenced, an ever- defiant Gaddafi addressed the nation from state-run television: “Libyans wanted to enjoy a peaceful Ramadan. Instead they have been made into refugees. What are we? Palestinians?”107 As Gaddafi continued his rant, static interrupted his voice. Gaddafi did not actually appear on the television: “He was calling the message in on a poor phone line which crackled at times. He announced the time and date twice to prove that he was speaking live,” according to the Associated Press.108 Perhaps Gaddafi had recorded himself mentioning the date and time earlier, as a diversion to escape Tripoli. In any case, shortly after Gaddafi’s crackling voice came on the airwaves the rebels ransacked Gaddafi’s famed Bab al- Azizia barracks compound, which Reagan bombed back in 1986. Eager for retribution, rebel fighters stormed into the tunnels and bunkers below Bab al-Azizia where Gaddafi had undergone his late- night plastic surgeries.109 But Gaddafi was no longer in Tripoli. He had fled into the Libyan Desert, headed for the town of Sirte to rally his last tribal supporters. Early in the morning on 24 August, Gaddafi again came on the airwaves, claiming that his departure from Tripoli was merely a “tactical retreat” and that he would still “fight to the death.”110 Two days later, on 26 August, Ali Tarhouni, the ntc oil and finance minister, announced that the interim government would move from Benghazi to Tripoli. In fact, Tarhouni was already in what he termed “free Tripoli” along with seven other ministers from the rebel cabinet. Dur- ing the press statement Tarhouni also announced that Libya’s state-run petroleum company would increase production to 600,000 barrels per day by October, with an eventual target of 1.6 million barrels per day after repairs to the oil infrastructure. Over the next week, arrangements would be made with Shell (the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States), Repsol (Spain and United States), Eni (Italy), Wintershall (Germany), and others.111 On 27 August, back in Benghazi, ntc leader Abdul- Jalil said, “We call on Muammar Gaddafi and his associates to surrender so we can protect them and spare them illegal execution. We guarantee

Bombing Libya 197 them a fair trial, whatever their position.”112 Earlier, an unofficial rebel spokesperson had offered a $1.7 million reward for anyone who could hand over Gaddafi, dead or alive.113 As the rebels gained ground, Jalil was losing control of the situation. Two months later, the rebels converged on Sirte, cornering Gaddafi’s forces to “an area 1000 yards by 500 yards” where his loyal fighters “desperately” fought a rearguard action “from house to house” in the suburb of Zafran before breaking out and fleeing yet again.114 Next Gaddafi headed toward Wadi Jarif, twenty- five miles to the west, speeding along Libya’s desert coastal highway in an armored convoy of seventy-five vehicles— the final vestige of his power.115 With the military and diplomatic tide shifting against Gaddafi’s forces, various world leaders, politicians, and diplomats traveled to Tripoli to visit with rebel leaders in a show of support. These actions coincided loosely with the diplomatic recognition of the rebels. Britain and France led the way: the first two visitors were British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who made a joint visit on 15 September; Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited the next day; U.S. senators John McCain (r-az ), Lindsey Graham (r-sc ), Mark Kirk (r- il), and Marco Rubio (r-fl ) visited on 29 September; Italian Prime Minister Franco Frattini visited on 30 September; and British Foreign Minister William Hague visited on 17 October.116 At dawn on 18 October a U.S. Air Force c- 17 took off from Malta and landed at the airport in Tripoli. After coming to a stop and lowering the ramp, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emerged from the aircraft.117 Hours later Secretary Clinton met with Libyan rebel transition leader Abdul-Jalil and declared, “I am proud to stand here on the soil of a free Libya.”118 These symbolic measures of support indicated that the rebels held Tripoli with enough security to ensure the visitors’ safety. The end of nato’s air campaign was near.

Operation Unified Protector Ends During operations in Libya, air–ground integration with the incorporation of Twitter arguably evolved to the point where the method was on par with that of joint terminal attack controllers, the air force personnel who normally work in conjunction with ground forces to coordinate air

198 Bombing Libya strikes via radio. As a result of the use of tweets for targeting, Twitter’s Web site stored a large cache of time-stamped historical data during the Libyan campaign that researchers can use for further analysis. In addition to this record, hobbyists listened in on radio broadcasts from nato’s psychological operations, preserving these messages on Internet blogs. nato conducted psychological operations in Libya using its ec- 130j “Commando Solo” aircraft. This aircraft broadcasted radio messages from nato to Gaddafi, encouraging him to peacefully step down from power.119 Amateur radio enthusiasts picked up these transmissions, recorded them, and posted them to Internet forums.120 One such message, transmitted to Gaddafi around the same time frame as nato acknowledged monitoring Twitter, stated:

nato has been watching you closely. nato knows where you are and will continue to watch you. nato will not tolerate hostile acts or your intent to commit hostile acts against the civilian population. nato will target and strike military equipment which threatens civilians. As you know, we can strike at any time and place of our choosing if you continue to endanger your people. Prove that you want to safeguard your people by moving away from any land, sea, and air military equipment that threatens the Libyan population. If you are operating military equipment including tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, rocket launchers, ships and aircraft that threatens civilians, you will be targeted by nato. Move away from all this equipment now to demonstrate that you mean no harm to your people. nato does not want to kill you. But if you continue to operate, move, maintain, or remain with military equipment of any sort you will be targeted for destruction.121

This message indicated nato’s optimism regarding air power’s capacity to strike mobile targets while also forcing Gaddafi to choose between hiding among his loyal military forces or exposing himself to an increasingly hostile population. Given this dilemma, Gaddafi chose to hold out until the end, attempting to rally loyalist remnants, maneuvering between his last hideouts with the protection of armored vehicles. After 223 days of bombing, Muammar Gaddafi’s reign irreversibly ended. On 20 October 2011, two days after Secretary Clinton’s visit in

Bombing Libya 199 Tripoli, manned (British and French) and unmanned (American) aircraft of nato struck eleven armored platforms in a seventy- five vehicle convoy near Sirte, Libya.122 Gaddafi was in the convoy. Shortly after the air strike, rebel fighters converged on the fleeing occupants from the disrupted pro- cession, killing Gaddafi. The rebels quickly uploaded numerous videos of Gaddafi’s slain body onto YouTube and accordingly started a Wikipedia entry on his death, indicating on Google Earth that the event took place at 31°11'44"N, 16°31'17"E, or with the military grid reference system, 33r 44952 52272.123 Twitter feeds with “#Gaddafi” erupted with word that rebels had killed the Libyan dictator.124 Upon learning about the incident via her smartphone, Hillary Clinton jubilantly mirrored the words Julius Caesar used when returning trium- phant from the Middle East in 47 bc. Between segments of a cbs News interview from Afghanistan, with the camera still rolling, Clinton joked, “We came, we saw, he died!”125 Subsequently, with a more reticent smile Clinton said that her earlier visit to Libya had nothing to do with Gaddafi’s death.126 However, the extensive cooperation of the United States, France, and Britain with the Libyan rebels undoubtedly did lead to Gaddafi’s demise. Through the amalgamation of air power, drones, smartphones, and social media, allied air forces developed a distinctly new method of integration with ground forces. On 21 October, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (sacuer) Adm. James Stavridis gave the first official indication Operation Unified Protector would soon end when he posted on Facebook and Twitter: “An extraordinary 24 hours in Libya. As saceur, I will be recommending conclusion of this mission to the North Atlantic Council of nato in a few hours.”127 Ten days later on 31 October nato air operations ceased.128 The uprising started through social media; nato’s involvement formally ceased with an announcement through the same medium.

Analysis of the Campaign In the final tally, by its own accountnato destroyed over 400 artillery pieces and 600 tanks and armored personnel carriers during the 223 days of strike operations in Libya.129 Throughout Operation Unified Protector, allied aircraft flew 9,700 strike sorties, as compared to the 10,484 strike

200 Bombing Libya sorties flown during Operation Allied Force. The 2011 campaign in Libya lasted nearly three times longer than the 1999 Kosovo campaign yet had only one- quarter the number of aircraft participating. Despite these differences, in relative terms nato targeted mobile ground forces in Libya with a greater success rate than in Kosovo. By nato’s estimates, with 9,700 strike sorties in Libya, aircraft destroyed 1,000 mobile heavy weapon systems for a success rate of 9.7 sorties per successful kill (9,700 divided by 1,000) during a 223-day period. In contrast, with 10,484 strike sorties during operations in Kosovo, nato destroyed only 635 heavy weapons— a rate of 16.5 sorties per kill (10,484 divided by 635) in a shorter 78- day period. nato’s well- rounded figures in the Libyan campaign indicate a less- detailed analysis as compared with that done on the Kosovo campaign by Brigadier General Corley’s team in 1999. Nevertheless, more accurate targeting data combined with better terrain and weather for allied air forces led to greater success in Libya at the tactical level. In Libya a networked system of sensors—people on the ground— employed by amateur ground forces using mobile phones, Twitter, and Google Earth provided better targeting data than the network of sensors envisioned as part of the $200 billion Future Combat Systems program that Secretary Gates canceled in 2009. While this may seem a positive development, these methods only work in situations where there is both a capacity and willingness to tweet target locations. Furthermore, adversaries such as the Islamic State (isis) also used Twitter and Google Earth to coordinate their rapid advances in Iraq in June 2014.130 With the accelerated “challenge and response dynamic” that comes from the wartime interaction of belligerents, technological innovation is often short lived.131 Hence, such technologies will not always work in the United States’ favor in a strategic context— Twitter and Google Earth will even the playing field for future adversaries by enhancing their ability to coordinate military activities. Nevertheless, in Libya the text messages, pictures, videos, and cellphone calls from observers on the ground worked better than counter- battery radars and more expensive sensors such as jstars in identifying a wide- range of dispersed mobile targets for nato headquarters. From March to July 2012 rand Corporation analyst Frederic Wehrey (a U.S. Air Force reserve officer fluent in Arabic) traveled throughout

Bombing Libya 201 Libya and interviewed over twenty Libyan rebel commanders.132 Wehrey discovered that defectors from the Libyan Air Force (who made up a dispro- portionately high number of the rebel leadership) imparted operational-level coherence to the opposition movement by informing amateur frontline fighters about the capabilities and limitations ofnato aircraft.133 Accord- ingly, these former air force officers used their expertise to “shape the application of airpower” by establishing operations centers that inter- faced with nato and plotted friendly and enemy positions using Google Earth.134 According to Wehrey,

Opposition forces and their sympathizers across the country formed a complex network of spotters, informants, forward observers, and battle damage assessors. Anyone with a cell phone, Google Earth, Skype, Twitter, or email was in a position to report by passing coordinates, pictures, and other data. The problem that nato faced, therefore, was not a shortage of targeting information, but a flood of it.135

Initially, military commanders within nato viewed this sort of information with suspicion. According to a French naval officer, “theynato [ headquarters] were very afraid in the beginning because they had no control.”136 From the Libyan perspective, a rebel fighter in Misurata noted, “They [three covert French advisors] were always double- checking our data against their maps.”137 From afar, using social media, French intelligence analysts on board a ship in the Mediterranean established a network of 250 contacts in Libya who accurately reported friendly and enemy ground force locations.138 By the end of the conflict,nato ’s French contingent was gathering 80 percent of its targeting intelligence from social media contacts located on the ground in Libya.139 Moreover, in the final three months of the campaign nato cut the average response time from hours to “minutes” for air strikes based on ground observation of a target by rebels.140 Facebook largely facilitated the instigation of the Libyan rebel movement while Twitter and Google Earth helped with the orchestration of nato’s bombing. YouTube and Wikipedia captured the history of these events. Adm. James Stavridis purposely announced via social media his forthcoming recommendation to the North Atlantic Council to end air operations over Libya, finding the right moment to end the campaign

202 Bombing Libya through the same medium that had galvanized its beginnings. Spencer Ackerman of Wired described Stavridis’s announcement as “a first in the annals of social media,” and he apologized for having once ranked Admiral Stavridis as number one among the “lamest military Twitter feeds.”141 Despite all of the newfound interest in social media for military communications, the factors impacting “information age warfare” were hardly different from those relevant during World War I. Defeat of an opposing army still required friendly ground forces to direct the application of firepower. The way the rebels did this in Libya indicated a wholly new trend in information age warfare. #rma?142

Aftermath After Gaddafi’s demise, rebel brigades held various portions of Libya’s oil production and distribution architecture, and wanted a share of oil revenues in a “free” Libya. Initially, with Gaddafi out of the picture a temporary calm ensued in Libya as the ntc administered governmental functions and transitioned power to a permanent representative body. Given the dismal state of affairs in Afghanistan and Iraq, the campaign in Libya seemed to be a triumph for Western military intervention. With a representative government there might be peace and freedom in Libya after forty- two years of oppressive rule. But beneath the surface, a storm was brewing. Obama administration officials glossed over the difficulties that lay ahead for the Libyan people. In Hard Choices Hillary Clinton summed up the nato air campaign in Libya from a diplomatic context, and alluded to the difficulties that Libya would face next:

The military campaign in Libya lasted longer than any of us had hoped or expected, although we never went down the slippery slope of putting troops on the ground, as some feared. At times the coalition frayed and there was a fair amount of hand- holding and arm- twisting needed to keep all our partners on board. But by late summer 2011, the rebels had pushed back the regime’s forces. They captured Tripoli toward the end of August, and Qaddafi and his family fled into the desert. The revolution had succeeded, and the hard work of building a new country could begin.143

Bombing Libya 203 In Worthy Fights Leon Panetta, who took over from Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense in July 2011, echoed Secretary Clinton’s statements, saying that using air power was an “intelligent compromise” between putting “boots on the ground” or doing nothing.144 Panetta claimed that nato’s intervention was a success, but alluded to Libya’s future challenges in a disassociated manner:

The result was, in military terms, resoundingly successful. A dictator was dispatched, and the Libyan people were given a new opportunity to lead themselves. What they do with it remains to be seen, but the operation proved that not all American military engagements need to become quagmires or occupations.145

Clinton and Panetta’s accounts emphasized that the burden of responsibility for Libya’s future lay primarily with the Libyan people. In political terms, not having “boots on the ground” made it easier to shift the burden of “building a new country” away from nato and other partner nations that participated in the air campaign. In July 2012 the Libyan people elected the General National Congress (gnc). On 8 August the ntc handed over power to the newly elected two hundred-person body. During the ceremonial transfer of power transitional leader Abdul- Jalil said that the gnc was the “sole legitimate representative of the Libyan people” as he relinquished transitional rule.146 Next the gnc elected Mustafa Abushagur as Libya’s new prime minister on 12 September. Less than a month later on 7 October the gnc dismissed Abushagur with a vote of “no confidence” after he announced the names of the ten ministers who would form part of his cabinet. In particular, there was disagreement over the appointment of the oil minister. Furthermore, the gnc believed that the cabinet list did not accurately represent Libya’s various tribes.147 The next leader, Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, appointed on 14 October 2012, had a similar fate but with a new twist. After the revolution in Libya a tenuous political- military structure emerged— one where the legislative branch had great power in thwarting centralized control yet was ineffectual when it came to establishing fiscal policies. Meanwhile, rivalries within the rebel militias precluded any one group from consolidating military power. Politicians could not agree on

204 Bombing Libya how to divide Libya’s extensive oil revenues.148 Making matters worse, rebel brigades fought for control over oil resources based on the positions they had secured while fighting against Gaddafi’s forces.149 When the rebellion commenced, oil accounted for more than 70 percent of Libya’s gross domestic product and 91 percent of government revenues.150 After the drop in oil production during Operation Unified Protector, by October 2012 Libyan oil production was up to a post-Gaddafi peak of 1.5 million barrels per day. By the beginning of 2014, however, production was down to around 400,000 barrels per day.151 In an economy dominated by oil sales, Libyan political power centers on the control of oil infrastructure and revenues.152 On 14 February 2014 Libyan General Khalifa Haftar appeared on television calling for the dismissal of the parliament. Haftar claimed that his action was not a coup d’état but rather “a correction to the path of the revolution.”153 To sever connections between the parliament and Islamic fundamentalists, Haftar argued that the judiciary should lead the country until the 25 June 2014 elections of a new legislature.154 In line with U.S. policy, Haftar wanted a more secular government without ties to religious extremists. On 11 March 2014 Ali Zeidan stepped down as prime minister after a gnc vote of no confidence due to his inability prevent the North Korean- flagged tanker Morning Glory (previously named Gulf Glory and owned by Saudi Arabia) from loading crude at the Es Sider terminal.155 Three days earlier on 8 March Zeidan had appeared on television warning the crew, “The tanker will be bombed if it doesn’t follow orders when leaving [the port]. This will be an environmental disaster.”156 Abb- Rabbo Albarassi, the self-proclaimed prime minister of an autonomy movement, believed that Zeidan was not sharing Libya’s oil wealth and was trying to cut deals on his own. Controlling Es Sider was Ibrahim Jathran, a previous anti-Gaddafi rebel who was responsible for security of the port but had defected with his brigade at the same time as the storage tanks at Es Sider were full of crude oil.157 After being voted out of office, Zeidan joined sides with Haftar.158 On 16 May Hafter launched an attack (Operation Dignity, or “Karama” in Arabic) against the forces of the “February 17 Martyrs Brigade” and that of Ansar al-Sharia, who led a faction that called for strict interpretation

Bombing Libya 205 of Sharia law and was connected with the 11 September 2012 attack on the U.S. embassy in Benghazi. Air power was Haftar’s weapon of choice for Operation Dignity. On Haftar’s side Saqr Geroushi commanded the new rebel air force— eight MiG fighter jets and four Mi-25 attack helicopters. In describing the central government’s level of control over the country, Haftar said, “They [the chief of staff and minister of defense] do not control anything except the few employees in their headquarters and the files on the tables in front of them. The rest of the army is with us.”159 A new revolution commenced. Three years after Aly Abuzaakouk drove Haftar from his home in the suburbs of Washington to board a flight at Reagan National Airport, Major General Haftar was wrestling for control over Libya against Islamist extremists. Abuzaakouk’s original prediction— “Haftar will fight to the death if necessary”—still stands. Hafter’s story is not yet over, but it has two possible endings. He will either end up like Gaddafi or Younis— a dead dictator or a dead revolutionary. The tides of war give him few alternatives: once the fighting starts, it will be hard to stop. The end, whatever it is, will likely be tragic.

206 Bombing Libya 8 Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars

They felt as secure as spectators at a bullfight; they risked their money perhaps on the result, but that was all. And such ideas of war as the common Americans possessed were derived from the limited, picturesque, adventurous war of the past. They saw war as they saw history, through an iridescent mist, deodorised, scented indeed, with all its essential cruelties tactfully hidden away. — H. G. Wells, The War in the Air, 1908

Just as in H. G. Wells’s prophetic 1908 work of science fiction, air power made it easy for Americans—politicians, military leaders, and the general public alike— to go to war. Likewise, the fact that air power could be employed from great distances lulled American audiences and political leaders into a sanitized view of war— one where the decisions were easy so long as ground troops did not enter the equation. This was a flawed perception— one that drifted far from the realities of contemporary air power. In the past twenty years, from Operation Desert Storm to Kosovo to Afghanistan to 2011 operations in Libya, the success of air power consistently depended on a ground component. The widespread perception of these recent operations, however, was that air power succeeded on its own. In Kosovo, the U.S. Army provided a ground contingent with Task Force Hawk. As the V Corps commander, Lt. Gen. John Hendrix became the de facto land component commander for Gen. Wesley Clark, adding a ground force perspective to air operations.1 The overlooked contribution of Task Force Hawk’s sensors proved decisive in targeting Serbian

207 ground forces during the last two weeks of Operation Allied Force. In Afghanistan, during initial operations in 2001, special operations forces, working in concert with Northern Alliance fighters, effectively coordinated air strikes against Taliban forces, quickly toppling the government. In 2002, historian Stephen Biddle referred to interventions that relied on indigenous forces to exploit air power as the “Afghan Model” of warfare, but he admonished advocates who argued that it “represents warfare’s future and should become the new template for U.S. defense planning.”2 Instead, Biddle argued that the success of air power in recent operations indicated a continuity in trends extending back to World War I rather than a divergence from the past.3 As he stated, “The key to success, whether in 1916 or 2002, is to team heavy, well-directed fires with skilled ground maneuver to exploit their effects and overwhelm the surviving enemy.”4 In 2011, nearly a decade after the start of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, nato operations in Libya, as a result of not having any allied troops on the ground, depended heavily on Twitter messages from rebels who spotted targets for air strikes. The disagreement between General Clark and Lt. Gen. Michael Short during Operation Allied Force over whether the enemy center of gravity was the Yugoslav Third Army or the political leadership in Belgrade highlights the limits of such a concept. Clausewitz never intended his metaphor of a center of gravity to be a prescriptive tool for targeting efforts or resource allocation. Instead, the term is only useful as a descriptive framework. After all, Clausewitz originally used the term center of gravity in his 1832 work On War as an analogy, not necessarily as a prescriptive formula on which to base a military strategy.5 Yet U.S. military planners frequently rely on this concept, based upon guidance from Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operational Planning.6 In any case, there are multiple ways to compel a dictator or topple a regime, and each method will have differing levels of success in various situations. During Operation Allied Force, nato’s political objectives did not call for a regime change of the Serbian political leadership by way of bombing. Rather, the aim was to coerce Milosevic into a political settlement or to degrade his army’s ability to wreak havoc among civilian populations in Kosovo. The latter objective required effective targeting of the Serbian

208 Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars army with air power— this was only accomplished after the incorporation of counter-battery radar acquisitions. In contrast, before the start of Operation Unified Protector, President Obama said that it was “time for Gaddafi to go,” explicitly revealing his intention for regime change.7 Furthermore, in policy statements before the air campaign, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton added, “nothing is off the table so long as the Libyan government continues to threaten and kill Libyans.”8 The ec- 130-j messages that nato transmitted to Gaddafi during the air campaign warned him that he would be “targeted for destruction” if he did not peacefully step down from power.9 In both campaigns, the incorporation of innovative measures to increase the accuracy of air strikes occurred inadvertently. This was due to widely held assumptions that air power did not require a ground component. Once the assumptions regarding air power had proved problematic, improvised aspects of air-ground coordination emerged. The integration of counter- battery radars in Kosovo and rebel spotters using Twitter in Libya indicated continuity in the necessity for close coordination with ground forces in order to employ air power effectively. It is no surprise that the staff of Task Force Hawk and a U.S. Army artillery officer, Colonel Odierno, saw in late May 1999 that counter- battery radars had great potential for finding Serbian artillery in Kosovo. But in the early stages of the conflict, the staff within Lieutenant General Short’s air component command focused on the capabilities of aerial sensors to spot targets. The live feed from Predator drones, instantaneously broadcasted to General Clark’s headquarters in Mons, Belgium, and Lieutenant General Short’s combined air operations center (caoc) in Vicenza, Italy, prompted both generals to become personally involved in tank plinking. On one occasion, early in the campaign, Clark and Short, from their separate locations, simultaneously monitored the “highly magnified” aerial view of a tank in Kosovo.10 Clark personally called the caoc to inform them that he “wanted the tank killed.”11 From the caoc main floor, Short had his staff call the abccc (airborne battlefield command and control center—an ec-130 e aircraft circling overhead) to relay Clark’s intent. Next the abccc called the airborne forward air controller (afac) on station to describe the location of the tank. At the time, Predator unmanned

Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars 209 aircraft did not have a method of target designation.12 According to Lt. Col. Chris Haave, the typical caoc transmission to the abccc during Operation Allied Force, particularly when described by a nonpilot viewing the Predator’s feed, would be something like “the tank is in the woods near the dirt road.”13 Of course, flying at twenty thousand feet, the afac saw “dozens of woods and dirt roads.”14 On the occasion that Clark personally demanded someone “kill” the tank he saw on the screen at shape, the flight commander andafac on duty over Kosovo was a-10 pilot Capt. Christopher M. Short, son of Lt. Gen. Michael Short.15 Purposely adding to Captain Short’s stress level, the abccc transmitted Lieutenant General Short’s call sign as a way to emphasize the origin of the directive and the fact that two generals were impatiently watching the tank via Predator feed and demanding “find and kill that tank!”16 An exasperated Captain Short radioed back to the abccc, “Tell Dad I can’t find the fucking tank!”17 Assuming it was not a decoy, this particular Serbian tank crew unknow- ingly survived the U.S. military’s best attempt to kill them from afar. Meanwhile, back in Belgium and Italy, through their magnified “soda straw” view of Kosovo, General Clark and Lieutenant General Short stared in frustration at the video feed of the unscathed tank.18 Hours later, Clark would have to answer the news media’s daily question, “How many tanks did you kill today?”19 From Washington, Secretary Cohen watched these press conferences closely. If Clark told the truth, Cohen might not like the answer, as it would invalidate President Clinton’s assumptions of what air power might accomplish. As the campaign dragged on longer than anticipated, maintaining the façade of air power’s omnipotence required Secretary Cohen to prohibit Clark from speaking to the media. In the interim, aviators such as Captain Short and his peers searched desperately for enemy tanks, loyally pursuing the American people’s inflated expectations of air power. Of the various Serbian heavy weapon systems, tanks were the best at eluding aerial firepower. In comparison, nato struck four times more Serbian artillery pieces than tanks. The belated incorporation of a/n tqp- 37 radar acquisitions undoubtedly led to greater effectiveness in destroying artillery from the air. By giving the caoc laptops that were

210 Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars running software compatible with the U.S. Army’s Advanced Field Artil- lery Targeting and Direction System, Lieutenant General Hendrix’s staff established a system where the coordinates from counter- battery radar acquisitions automatically went to the caoc via tactical data networks.20 With better visibility over Libya than they had had over Kosovo, pilots spotted military ground formations with greater effectiveness. In 2011 after a laser designator had been added to Predator drones, their operators had an easier time pointing out what they saw to other aircraft.21 After a decade of experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other regions, these drone operators mastered the technique of designating targets to other aircraft. Instead of “talking on” other aircraft by referring to terrain features, pilots could push a button to illuminate a target with a laser beam.22 Despite these advantages, pilots initially could not tell whether the armed factions they observed over Libya were rebel or pro- Gaddafi forces. Regime loyalists deceptively used civilian trucks marked in the same fashion as rebel vehicles to confuse pilots.23 The fact that the rebels also had tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery further complicated matters. Thus, effective targeting occurred only after the rebels established a method of coordination with nato via Twitter (with the addition of coordinates from Google Earth). The integration of firepower with ground maneuver— an aspect of combined arms warfare that dates back to World War I— had to be rediscovered in Kosovo and Libya all over again because political leaders assumed that air power could succeed by itself. In Libya the method of integrating air power with ground maneuver— through social media— was a new and noteworthy development. Virtually everyone on the ground in Libya, solider and civilian alike, had the equivalent of a handheld telegraph machine with global reach that automatically filtered the important messages. Meanwhile, the allure of air power continued to fascinate military leaders, politicians, and the general public alike. The same year as the Libyan conflict, a description of renowned military historian Martin van Creveld’s book The Age of Airpower opened with “Airpower is the most glamorous offensive and defensive instrument of war in military history.”24 This sense of glamour precluded a

Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars 211 full understanding of the efforts that took place behind the scenes when air power failed to meet expectations in Kosovo and Libya. Radar and computer networking lack the glamour of jet aircraft, so it is natural that historians might overlook their role in Kosovo and Libya. Counter-battery radar and Twitter deserve more attention in historical interpretations of Operation Allied Force and Operation Unified Protector. That said, a secondary question still lingers over both conflicts: Was the enemy center of gravity the fielded forces or the political leadership? In the 1996 rand study “The Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Power in Four Wars,” which covered World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, Stephen T. Hosmer compared the focus on what he termed “strategic targets”— infrastructure and “targets near or within the enemy’s capital city” with that of “deployed forces”—elements of mobile ground power.25 Hosmer concluded that destruction of deployed forces weighed more critically, in psychological terms, on an enemy leader’s thought processes and thus should be considered as the primary focus in an air campaign:

In every major conflict from World War II on, enemies have capitulated or acceded to peace terms demanded by the United States only after their deployed forces have suffered serious battlefield defeats. In future conflicts, enemy leaders are likely to prove equally reluctant to make concessions or terminate conflicts as long as they see a chance to prevail on the battlefield. To cause future enemy leaders to abandon the strategy of protracted warfare, the United States and its allies must be able to demonstrate that the balance of forces on the battlefield will progressively shift to the enemy’s disadvantage as long as the fighting continues.26

Ironically, in his 2001 work The Conflict over Kosovo, Hosmer completely reversed his earlier position from 1996 and argued that targeting infrastructure in Belgrade affected Milosevic’s decision making more than the destruction of ground forces in Kosovo.27 Hosmer’s evidence led him to a conclusion in line with Colonel Warden and Lieutenant General Short’s thinking. Perhaps Hosmer lacked the evidence support his older theory, or perhaps the appeal of air power theory in the aftermath of Kosovo had seduced him as well. In any case, the fact that Hosmer reversed his

212 Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars earlier conclusion indicated that air power advocates placed less emphasis on attacking fielded forces in the aftermath of Operation Allied Force. Boris Yeltsin’s diary holds the final clue as to why Milosevic conceded. Yeltsin had an inner perspective on Milosevic’s thinking through debriefings from his Balkans envoy, Viktor Chernomyrdin. “Sometimes the conver- sations [between Chernomyrdin and Milosevic] would last nine hours without any break,” Yeltsin jotted in his diary.28 On 22 April 1999, during Chernomyrdin’s first visit, Milosevic seemed confident in his army: “Let them just try to stick their noses in here!” he said. “A ground operation will definitely fail.”29 In describing this exchange, Yeltsin noted that “Milosevic had his own reasons for being so sure that nato’s ground operation would fail. He believed that the Yugoslav army was ready to fight . . . . At times Milosevic even asked Chernomyrdin to conduct the negotiations in such a way that the ground operation would start faster.”30 Afternato starting hitting actual artillery tubes rather than the decoys constructed with telephone poles—and when nearly half of the artillery in Kosovo was neutralized—Milosevic was no longer as confident in the ability of the Serbian army to repel a nato ground operation. In late May, according to Yeltsin, “Milosevic’s position changed. He no longer wanted an escalation of the conflict. He asked to stop the war.” Of course, it is impossible to know exactly what was going on inside Milosevic’s head, but the timing of his decision to concede after almost half of the Yugoslav Third Army’s artillery tubes had been taken out of action suggests that effectively targeting ground forces may have had an impact on Milosevic’s calculus. During Operation Unified Protector, two potential centers of gravity— the political leadership (Gaddafi) and the remnant loyalist ground forces (an armored convoy)— merged into one entity, which nato struck with air power at the end of the campaign.31 Although nato’s bombing in Libya ended shortly after Gaddafi’s death, this outcome does not suggest that a similar regime decapitation strike would have been useful during Operation Allied Force because the political objectives were different in each campaign. nato assured Milosevic that he would not be personally targeted during the air campaign although the bombing of his residence signaled that nato had the capability to do so if its strategy evolved. The idea of a center of gravity in military doctrine often confuses the joint

Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars 213 decision- making process. War is already a complex endeavor without this concept. There are numerous ways to unbalance an adversary— some of these ways are unforeseeable. In regime toppling, the game of Jenga might offer more insight when combined with Clausewitz’s center of gravity analogy from physics. In Jenga, the block structure holds on tenuously after its center of gravity appears compromised.32 Likewise, unstable regimes often hang on precariously even after their power structure begins to disintegrate. In both Jenga and regime toppling the final move that col- lapses the structure is often unforeseen. This analogy has further uses as well: towers of Jenga blocks must be reassembled after they topple, much like nations with regimes that have collapsed rapidly may take years to rebuild in stable form. The impromptu methods of integrating counter- battery radar acquisitions in Kosovo and of using tweeted messages with grid coordinates to locate pro- Gaddafi forces in Libya tipped the scales in both campaigns by simultaneously emboldening the rebels (the kla and the Libyans) while striking elements of ground power that eluded observation by air power. In both conflicts, adversaries successfully used primitive countermeasures such as camouflage, decoys, and dispersion to nullify the impact of air power. The effectiveness of counter- battery radar, tweets, and the other concurrent measures that nato stacked against Milosevic and Gaddafi worked in concert. Ultimately, these efforts played a significant role in removing both dictators from power. In October 2013, the William J. Clinton Presidential Library released 1,170 pages of documents pertaining to the “Ring Around Serbia,” a series of fm transmitters placed in countries bordering Serbia as part of a strategic communications plan aimed at bringing about “regime change in Serbia” in the aftermath of the air campaign.33 This collection contained nsc cables, e-mails, and telephone records from President Clinton’s top advisors. The radio broadcasts from the fm transmitters served as an alternative source of news to the people of Serbia, who typically received their news from the state-controlled media of Milosevic. In October 2000, Milosevic lost his reelection bid due in part to the strategic communications effort.34

214 Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars In contrast, a decade later Gaddafi fell from power with a bayonet stab to the anus, a completely different form of American- instigated “regime change” compared with that of a decade earlier.

The Allure of Air Power In recent operations from Desert Storm to Unified Protector, the successful employment of air power has depended on the incorporation of a ground element for spotting targets. Regardless of whether this land contingent employed counter- battery radars or youths armed with cell phones posting messages to Twitter via sms, the ability to spot targets and accurately relay their location to the appropriate operational-level military headquarters in a timely fashion remains a decisive aspect of air campaigns. The reliance on indigenous forces to locate targets has the secondary consequence of unleashing revolutionary fervor that cannot be fully controlled. Politicians and military planners must consider the methods used to locate targets in planning any future air campaign. Decisions on this aspect of targeting will prove more significant than the actual employment of air forces—it does not matter how precise Joint Direct Attack Munitions (jdams) and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (tlams) can strike if planners cannot find relevant targets. During the opening stage of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, Canadian commentator Michael Ignatieff described with a sarcastic tone America’s newest technique for nation building:

In Mazar-i- Sharif, second city of Afghanistan, in this warlord’s compound, with a Lexus and an Audi purring in the driveway, armed mujahedeen milling by the gate and musclemen standing guard in tight black T-shirts and flak jackets and sporting the latest semiautomatic weapons, the heavyset American is the one who matters. He comes with a team that includes a forward air controller, who can call in airstrikes from the big planes doing Daytona 500 loops high in the sky. No one knows how many cia agents and Special Forces troops there are in country. The number is small— perhaps as few as 350— but with up- links to air power and precision weapons, who needs regiments of

Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars 215 ground troops? When you ask the carpet sellers in Mazar why there has been peace in the city, they point up into the air. Only America, the carpet sellers say, puts its peacekeepers in the sky.35

Ignatieff went on to argue that the United States needed a much higher number of troops on the ground— more than the eighteen thousand peacekeepers in Bosnia— to actually accomplish anything in Afghanistan after toppling the Taliban.36 After the battle of Mazar- i- Sharif, Secretary Rumsfeld noted: “Afghanistan showed that precision- guided bombs from the sky are much more effective if we get boots and eyes on the ground to tell the bombers exactly where to aim.”37 But the age-old linkage of observation and communication for military purposes— what Rumsfeld described as if it was a new thing—did not necessarily require boots. After the marriage of air power with mobile cyber power, special operations forces of the sort that Ignatieff described were obsolete. By 2011 the Libyan rebels had replaced the “heavyset American” that had “up-links to air power and precision weapons” with teenagers wielding smartphones that had Twitter and Google Earth. Of course, gaining air superiority, finding the enemy’s location, and air– ground integration remained as elements of continuity in successful joint operations. Yet in Libya dramatic technological changes in the equipment necessary to coordinate military activities over global ranges with precision position data had allowed teenagers with smartphones to perform the function of coordinating air strikes. In just one decade sensor- to- shooter linkages had come a long way since Task Force Hawk first linked its sensors with air forces using automated data networks. In 2014 when referring to the challenge of employing air power against Islamic State terrorists in Iraq and Syria, retired Adm. James Stavridis, who had commanded nato during the 2011 intervention in Libya, stated, “We often talk about boots on the ground . . . what we really need are eyes on the ground.”38 At the conclusion of Operation Allied Force, John Keegan’s preliminary assessment— the first- ever campaign “won by airpower alone”— was wrong.39 War cannot be won with air power alone. Keegan was correct, however, in stating that advocates for bombing “will be heard with the greatest attention when future peace-making operations are discussed.”40 In the

216 Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars aftermath of Operation Allied Force, the allure of air power unconsciously turned well- intentioned advocates of peacekeeping into warmongers. Those who opposed military interventions for humanitarian purposes found an uneasy solace in the notion that air power, at the very least, offered a way to diminish the inclination to put boots on the ground while satisfying calls for action. Thus, the appeal of “limited military strikes” remains a lucrative option for policy makers, while the risk of committing the U.S. Army calls into question the continued maintenance of its heavy armored formations. After all, when backed with air supremacy and precision munitions, the Libyan rebels proved that tweets make tanks disappear. In describing the impact of coordinated air strikes on armored vehicles, rebel fighter Al- Gdery said that it was just like “out of the movies”—clean, fast, precise, and satisfying— and this was the perspective of someone who had tweeted coordinates from up close to the bomb strikes.41 After the nato intervention in Kosovo, the promise of air power in popular perception shifted full- circle from the brutality of bombing civilian populations to the purity of humanitarian endeavors. What followed in Libya twelve years later echoed the shift. The next American air campaign will happen at any moment while a blithe public learns the name and location of a new place while flipping through television channels the next morning. Meanwhile a drunken Mars will laugh with delight as a bewildered society realizes that the tides of war cannot be controlled with the illusion of precision air strikes.

Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars 217

Notes

Introduction 1. Wells, War in the Air, 79. 2. Alan Johnston, “Libya 1911: How an Italian Pilot Began the Air War Era,” bbc News, 10 May 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13294524. 3. Eyder Peralta, “100 Years Ago, World’s First Aerial Bomb Dropped over Libya,” National Public Radio, 21 March 2011, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo way/2011/03/21/134735395/100-years-ago-the-first-aerial-bomb-fell-over-libya. 4. DeGroot, The Bomb, 2. 5. Johnston, “Libya 1911.” 6. Raul Colon, “Newsflash: Italy Bombs the Turks,” Aeroflight, 29 September 2007, http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/military/italy_turks.htm. 7. DeGroot, The Bomb, 2. 8. Boyne, The Influence of Air Power Upon History, 38. 9. Budiansky, Air Power, 55. 10. Van Creveld, Age of Airpower, 19. 11. Ben Farmer, “Gaddafi’s Final Hours: nato and the sas Helped the Rebels Drive the Hunted Leader into Endgame in a Desert Drain,” The Telegraph [London], 22 October 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews /africaandindianocean/libya/8843684/Gaddafis-final-hours-Nato-and-the -SAS-helped-rebels-drive-hunted-leader-into-endgame-in-a-desert-drain.html. 12. Farmer, “Gaddafi’s Final Hours.” 13. Farmer, “Gaddafi’s Final Hours.” 14. Damien McElroy, “Colonel Gaddafi Died after Being Stabbed with a Bayonet, Says Report,” The Telegraph [London], 17 October 2012, http://www.telegraph .co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/9613394/Colonel-Gaddafi -died-after-being-stabbed-with-bayonet-says-report.html. 15. McElroy, “Colonel Gaddafi Died.” 16. McElroy, “Colonel Gaddafi Died.” 17. Boot, “New American Way of War.”

219 18. Kopp, “Desert Storm.” 19. Kopp, “Desert Storm.” 20. Bodner and Bruner, “Tank Plinking,” 1. 21. Bodner and Bruner, “Tank Plinking,” 1. 22. Budiansky, Air Power, 425. 23. Bodner and Bruner, “Tank Plinking,” 1. 24. Bodner and Bruner, “Tank Plinking,” 1. 25. Budiansky, Air Power, 425. 26. Diver, nato’s Follow- On Forces Attack (fofa), 6– 7. 27. Department of the Air Force, “Global Reach— Global Power.” 28. Farley, Grounded, 120– 22. 29. Budiansky, Air Power, 415– 17. 30. Gordon and Trainor, General’s War, 93. 31. Gordon and Trainor, General’s War, 96. 32. Gordon and Trainor, General’s War, 97. 33. Scales, Certain Victory, 167– 68. 34. Scales, Certain Victory, 168– 69. 35. Grant, “Desert Storm,” 40. 36. Dana Priest, “United nato Front Was Divided Within,” Washington Post, 21 September 1999, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/sept99 /airwar21.htm. 37. Tirpak, “Short’s View of the Air Campaign,” 43. (Brackets for “video- teleconference session” and “Serb” are in the original. Brackets for “General Clark’s” are added by the author. 38. William J. Clinton, “Statement by the President to the Nation,” Oval Office, 24 March 1999, http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/03/1999-03-24-remarks-by-the -president-to-the-nation-on-kosovo.html. 39. cnn, “Bill Clinton Addresses Nation on Yugoslavia Strike,” 24 March 1999, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/03/25/clinton.transcript/. 40. Marlise Simons, “Autopsy Shows Milosevic Died of Heart Attack, Tribunal Says,” New York Times, 12 March 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12 /international/europe/12cnd-milosevic.html. 41. Walker, “Air Power for Coercion,” 13. 42. John Keegan, “Please, Mr. Blair, Never Take Such a Risk Again,” London Daily Telegraph, 6 June 1999. 43. Keegan, “Please, Mr. Blair.” 44. Lynch, Arab Uprising, 167– 77. 45. Lynch, Arab Uprising, 167– 77. 46. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Situation in Libya” (Washington dc: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 18

220 Notes to pages 4–11 March 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/18 /remarks-president-situation-libya. 47. Paul Adams, “Libya: Obama, Cameron, and Sarkozy Vow Gaddafi Must Go,” bbc News, 15 April 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13089758. 48. Clinton, Hard Choices, 374. 49. Clinton, Hard Choices, 374. 50. Van Creveld, Age of Airpower, 336. 51. In fact, President Barack Obama specifically referred to the campaigns in Kosovo and Libya when contemplating a military intervention in Syria during the latter half of 2013, yet carefully stated that his plan for Syria would be quick and decisive rather than a protracted air campaign: “I will not put American boots on the ground in Syria. I will not pursue an open- ended action like Iraq or Afghanistan. I will not pursue a prolonged air campaign like Libya or Kosovo. This would be a targeted strike to achieve a clear objective: deterring the use of chemical weapons, and degrading Assad’s capabilities” (Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to Nation on Syria” [Washington dc: The White House, 10 September 2013], http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and -video/video/2013/09/10/president-obama-addresses-nation-syria#transcript). Earlier, on 19 July 2013 Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, publicly revealed his assessment on the matter in a letter to Senator Carl Levin that circulated on the Internet and among news agencies. Dempsey pointed out the risks and costs of “limited stand-off strikes” and a number of other options. The other options included providing military aid and advisors to rebel forces, establishing a no-fly zone, establishing buffer zones, or controlling chemical weapons with an assault by ground forces— in ascending order of cost and risk. Martin E. Dempsey, “General Dempsey Responds to Levin’s Request for Assessment of Options for Use of U.S. Military Force in Syria,” Washington dc, 19 July 2013, https://web.archive.org/web/20140120042318/http://www.levin .senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/gen-dempsey-responds-to-levins-request -for-assessment-of-options-for-use-of-us-military-force-in-syria.

1. Before the Bombing 1. O’Connell, Of Arms and Men, 7. 2. Owen, “Deliberate Force,” 95. 3. Murray and Knox, “Thinking about Revolutions,” 3. 4. Murray and Knox, “Thinking about Revolutions,” 3. 5. Murray and Knox, “Thinking about Revolutions,” 2. 6. Watts, “Evolution of Precision Strike,” 8. 7. Krepinevich, “Keeping Pace,” 27. Also significant is the fact that Krepinevich is one of the authors of the Air- Sea Battle Concept, which similarly calls for

Notes to pages 11–19 221 continued investment in long- range strike systems. See Van Tol et al., “AirSea Battle.” 8. Pierce and Coon, “Understanding the Link,” 78. 9. Correll, “Strategy of Desert Storm,” 31. 10. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 8. 11. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 105. 12. Hallion, Storm over Iraq, 205. 13. Hallion, Storm over Iraq, 205. 14. Hallion, Storm over Iraq, 201. 15. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 106. 16. Hallion, Storm over Iraq, 201. 17. Hallion, Storm over Iraq, 201. 18. House, Combined Arms Warfare, 273. 19. jstars uses Synthetic Aperture Radar with Moving Target Indicator software to detect and image moving ground forces. 20. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 86. 21. Donald Rumsfeld, “Prepared Statement on the Crusader Recommendation before the Senate Committee on Armed Services,” 16 May 2002, 12, http:// www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2002_hr/rumsfeld516.pdf. 22. Department of the Army, fm 3- 90.12, chap, 4. 23. Department of the Army, fm 3- 90.12, chap. 4. 24. Hallion, Storm over Iraq, 202. For Saddam’s collusion with Milosevic and use of decoys, see Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 130. 25. Dastrup, King of Battle, 305. I will discuss the latter two points regarding the use of counter-battery radars in Bosnia and Albania in the section on nato assumptions and again in chapter 3. 26. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 157. 27. Per Jonathan House, the phrase “significant revisions” was added based on comments from draft on 7 January 2013. 28. Department of the Army, fm 100- 5 (1993), table of contents. 29. Department of the Army, fm 100- 5 (1993), 1– 3. 30. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 151. 31. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 148. 32. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 147–48. The request was not approved until later on in the campaign but not for employment in Macedonia, as that would have violated provisions of the Dayton Accords. Instead, the Apaches ended up deploying to Albania, which had a lesser developed infrastructure to support their deployment. 33. Department of the Army fm 1- 112, 1– 7, and chap. 3, “Employment.” 34. Branch, Clinton Tapes, 547. 35. Green, “Development of Air Doctrine,” 2.

222 Notes to pages 19–23 36. “History of U.S. Air Force Organization,” Air Force News, 18 September 2013, http://www.military.com/air-force-birthday/history-of-us-air-force-organization.html. 37. O’Connell, Of Arms and Men, 262. 38. Green, “Development of Air Doctrine,” 69. 39. James Forrestal, “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” photocopy of Annex I of memorandum outlining agreements made at Key West (Fort Leavenworth ks: Combined Arms Research Library, 21 April 1948), 11. 40. Warden, “Strategy and Airpower,” 68. 41. Cordesman, “Lessons and Non- Lessons,” 63. 42. Hosmer, Conflict over Kosovo, 20. 43. Warden, “Strategy and Airpower,” 71. 44. Robert Wall and David A. Fulghum, “Air Force Embraces Jammer, but Plots Independent Course,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 156, no. 21 (2002), 30. 45. Daniel J. Murphy Jr., “Statement of Vice Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, Jr., U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet, and Striking and Support Forces, South- ern Europe,” Kosovo: U.S. Naval Lessons Learned during Operation Allied Force, March– June 1999 (Washington dc: Naval Historical Center, 1999), 16, http://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list -alphabetically/k/kosovo-naval-lessons-learned-during-operation-allied-force .html. 46. Phillips and Anderson, “Lessons from the War.” 47. Phillips and Anderson, “Lessons from the War.” 48. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 34. 49. Richard J. Newman, Kevin Whitelaw, Bruce B. Auster, Mindy Charski, and William J. Cook, “America Fights Back,” U.S. News and World Report, 23 August 1998, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/980831/archive_004624 .htm. 50. Paul Eckert, “Here’s What Happened the Last Few Times the US Bombed Countries to Teach Them a Lesson,” Business Insider, 4 September 2013, http:// www.businessinsider.com/what-happened-after-us-bombings-2013-9. 51. John Hooper, “Claims That China Paid Bin Laden to See Cruise Missiles,” The Guardian, 19 October 2001, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/20 /china.afghanistan. 52. Ronald O’Rourke, “Cruise Missile Inventories and nato Attacks on Yugo- slavia: Background Information,” Congressional Research Service Reports for Congress (Washington dc: Library of Congress, 20 April 1999). 53. Greg Seigle, “Recent Conflicts Leave Cruise Missiles in Short Supply,”Sun Sentinel [Palm Beach fl], 20 September 2001.

Notes to pages 23–27 223 54. Horwood, Interservice Rivalry, 24. 55. Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Operations, 1– 4. 56. Horwood, Interservice Rivalry, 9. 57. Horwood, Interservice Rivalry, 96. 58. Holman, “Marine Air- Ground Task Force,” 30. 59. Knecht, Paying Attention, 1. Additionally, some Americans believed that Operation Allied Force was meant as a distraction from the Monica Lewinsky scandal and a “Wag the Dog” political strategy. 60. Knecht, Paying Attention, 1. 61. Byman et al., Air Power, 130. 62. Larson and Savych, American Public Support, 76. 63. Larson and Savych, American Public Support, 76. 64. Jonathan Marcus, “Ground Troops: Why nato Says No,” bbc News, 30 March 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1998/kosovo2/307387.stm. 65. Larson and Savych, American Public Support, 78. This divide is indicated by polling data showing a higher level of support for air operations than ground combat or peace enforcement operations. Alongside this data, peacekeeping operations, which are assumed to take place after air operations, have the highest level of support. 66. Larson and Savych, American Public Support, 66. 67. Larson and Savych, American Public Support, 68. 68. Elaine Sciolino, “Loosening the Timetable for Bringing G.I.s Home,” New York Times, 17 November 1999. 69. Cheney and Cheney, Kings of the Hill, xii. The authors described the atmos- phere in the House as “They brought all the passion of the larger society to the chamber in which they served, and although this concentration made for much drama, it fostered little efficiency.” 70. “Peacekeeping Operations in Kosovo Resolution,” H. Res. 421, 106th Cong., 1st sess. (11 March 1999), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/106/hconres42 /text. 71. “Peacekeeping Operations in Kosovo Resolution.” 72. Julie Kim, “Kosovo and the 106th Congress,” Congressional Research Service Reports for Congress (Washington dc: Library of Congress, 18 January 2001), 1. 73. Kim, “Kosovo and the 106th Congress,” 2. 74. Dan Balz, “Kosovo Conflict Gives McCain Prominence,” Washington Post, 7 April 1999, a4. 75. Kim, “Kosovo and the 106th Congress,” 2. 76. Kim, “Kosovo and the 106th Congress,” 2. 77. Kay Bailey Hutchison, “One Balkan Quagmire Is Enough,” Wall Street Journal, 13 March 1998, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB889744790265707000.

224 Notes to pages 28–32 78. U.S. Senate, “The Crisis in Kosovo,” 105th Cong., 2nd sess.,Congressional Record, 17 March 1998, S2141. 79. Hutchison, “One Balkan Quagmire.” 80. Kim, “Kosovo and the 106th Congress,” 10. 81. U.S. Senate, “Authorizing the President of the United States to Conduct Military Air Operations and Missile Strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” S. Res. 21, 106th Cong., 1st sess. (23 March 1999), 1. 82. Miles A. Pomper, “Members Rally around Kosovo Mission Despite Misgivings about Strategy,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 27 March 1999, 763– 64. 83. Henry Kissinger, “No U.S. Ground Forces for Kosovo—Leadership Doesn’t Mean That We Must Do Everything Ourselves,”Washington Post, 22 Febru- ary 1999, reprinted in Congressional Record— House, 11 March 1999, H1211– 12, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1999-03-11/pdf/CREC-1999-03-11-pt1 -PgH1179-2.pdf. 84. Kissinger, “No U.S. Ground Forces.” 85. Pomper, “Members Rally.” 86. U.S. Senate, “The Kosovo Quagmire,” 106th Cong., 1st sess. Congressional Record 145, part 4 (23 March 1999), 5180. 87. U.S. Senate, “Kosovo Quagmire,” 5177. 88. U.S. Senate, “Kosovo Quagmire,” 5177. 89. Jeanne Meserve and Wolf Blitzer, “Congress Faces Debate over Ground Troops in Kosovo,” cnn, 11 April 1999, http://www.cnn.com/US/9904/11/us.kosovo.01/. 90. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 92. 91. Branch, Clinton Tapes, 547. 92. Andrew Rosenthal, “The 1992 Campaign: The Republicans; Clinton Attack of Foreign Policy,” New York Times, 28 July 1992, a1. 93. William J. Clinton, “Partial Text of Clinton on Yugoslavia Plan,” Los Angeles Times, 28 July 1992, 14. 94. Clinton, “Partial Text of Clinton,” 14. 95. Graham Jones, “Srebrenica: Worst European Atrocity since wwii,” cnn, 26 May 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/europe/05/26/Serbia.Mladic .Srebrenica/. 96. William J. Clinton, “Urgent Message to Tony Blinken for Staffing,” 30 August 1995, foia Request Collection 2006- 0647- f (records of genocide in the former Yugoslavia), National Archives and Records Administration, William Jefferson Clinton Library and Museum, Little Rock ar. 97. Clinton, “Urgent Message to Tony Blinken.” Additionally, Clinton circled sentences from this article: Michael Dobbs and Christine Spolar, “Thousands in Bosnia Massacred on March,” Washington Post, 26 October 1995, a1. 98. Elaine Sciolino, “One-Year Limit on U.S. Troops in Bosnia Now an ‘Estimate,’ ” New York Times, 23 October 1995.

Notes to pages 32–36 225 99. Todd S. Purdam, “Clinton Rallies Edgy Troops for Bosnia,” New York Times, 3 December 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/03/world/clinton-rallies - edgy-troops-for-bosnia.html. 100. Purdam, “Clinton Rallies Edgy Troops,” a1. 101. Maureen Dowd, “The 1992 Campaign,”New York Times, 17 February 1999, a12. 102. Clinton, My Life, 852– 55. 103. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 92. 104. Elaine Sciolino and Ethan Bronner, “How a President, Distracted by Scandal, Entered Balkan War,” New York Times, 18 April 1999, 1. 105. Sciolino and Bronner, “How a President,” 1. 106. Jelavich, History of the Balkans, cover. 107. Jelavich, History of the Balkans, inside cover. 108. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts, inside cover. 109. William J. Clinton, “Organization of the National Security Council,” Presi- dential Decision Directive/nsc-2 (Washington dc: The White House, 20 January 1993), 2. 110. John F. Harris, “Berger’s Caution Has Shaped Role of U.S. in War,” Washington Post, 16 May 1999, a01. 111. Richard Holbrooke, “Eyes Only for the Acting Secretary, Secretary Perry, Tony Lake, Ambassador Albright, and General Shalikashvili; Subject: Belgrade Talks,” White House Situation Room, Washington dc (4 September 1995, 1227 Zulu time), declassified 19 March 2013, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/bosniadeclassdocs.html. 112. Holbrooke, “Eyes Only,” 4. 113. Holbrooke, “Eyes Only,” 2. 114. Alain L. Sanders, “Al Gore: Assistant Commander in Chief,” Time, 4 May 1999, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,24036,00.html. 115. Sciolino and Bronner, “How a President,” 1. 116. Sanders, “Al Gore.” 117. Richard Lister, “Chernomyrdin Threatens Russian Withdrawal,” bbc News, 27 May 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/354872.stm. 118. National Security Council, “Summary and Conclusions for the Principals and Deputies Committee (pc/dc) Meetings of the National Security Council on Kosovo,” White House Situation Room, Washington dc (19 June 1998 to 20 March 1999), declassified 19 June 2008 to 23 March 2009, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/declassified .html#DeclassifiedRecords. 119. “Background of Leon Fuerth,” Elliott School of International Affairs: Faculty Background, http://elliott.gwu.edu//fuerth. 120. During Operation Allied Force, Leon Fuerth’s focus on diplomatic matters is further evident in e-mail correspondence between his secretary, Leslie

226 Notes to pages 36–38 Davison, and that of White House staff members. In several of these e- mails, Davidson attempted to obtain for Fuerth the memorandums of correspondence (memcons) between President Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair before they were ready for distribution. Source: Ralph H. Sigler, “Subject: fw: Request by ovp for pm Blair memcon from 18 May,” e- mail message, sent 19 May 1999, 2056 hours, foia Request Collection 2006- 0217- f, Box 7, National Archives and Records Administration, William Jefferson Clinton Library and Museum, Little Rock ar. 121. Blood, Madam Secretary. 122. Walter Isaacson and Douglas Waller, “Madeleine’s War,” Time 153, no. 19 (1999), 26. 123. Isaacson and Waller, “Madeleine’s War,” 26. 124. Elaine Sciolino, “Madeleine Albright’s Audition,” New York Times, 22 Sep- tember 1999, a63. 125. Sciolino, “Madeleine Albright’s Audition,” a63. 126. Sciolino, “Madeleine Albright’s Audition,” a63. 127. Powell, My American Journey, 561. 128. Sciolino, “Madeleine Albright’s Audition,” a63. 129. Sciolino, “Madeleine Albright’s Audition,” a63. 130. Melissa Healy, “Shalikashvili’s Father Tied to Nazi Unit: Military: The Man Clinton Called a ‘Georgian Army Officer’ When Nominating His Son for Joint Chiefs Post Was Said to Be a Waffenss Major,” Los Angeles Times, 28 August 1993. 131. Leslie Aspin, “Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Aspin to President Clinton Regarding Selection of a New Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” 9 August 1993, foia Request Collection 2009- 1055-f , National Archives and Records Administration, William Jefferson Clinton Library and Museum, Little Rock ar. 132. Aspin, “Memorandum,” 1– 25. 133. Aspin, “Memorandum”; “Notes on Video Tape of General Shalikashvili,” 8; and “Notes on Video Tapes of General Hoar,” 12. 134. Aspin, “Memorandum,” 1. Aspin’s papers are stamped “The President Has Seen,” with the date 13 August 1993. 135. Michael R. Gordon, “nato General Is Reticent about Air Strikes in Bosnia,” New York Times, 21 April 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/21/world /nato-general-is-reticent-about-air-strikes-in-bosnia.html. 136. Chuck Sudetic, “Serbian Artillery Shells Sarajevo but Some Relief Flights Resume,” New York Times, 9 February 1993, http://www.nytimes .com/1993/02/09/world/serbian-artillery-shells-sarajevo-but-some-relief -flights-resume.html. 137. Gordon, “nato General.”

Notes to pages 39–40 227 138. Aspin, “Memorandum,” 6. 139. Aspin, “Memorandum,” 5, 9. 140. William J. Clinton, “Interview Questions for Generals Shalikashvili and Hoar,” 9 August 1993, foia Request Collection 2009- 1055-f , National Archives and Records Administration, William Jefferson Clinton Library and Museum, Little Rock ar. 141. Shelton, Without Hesitation, 108. 142. Shelton, Without Hesitation, 372– 73. 143. Shelton, Without Hesitation, 373. 144. Henry L. Stimson, who served as Secretary of War under President Franklin D. Roosevelt from 1940 to 1945 was the first. Also see Kwame Holman, “Tran- script: Cohen at Defense,” pbs News Hour, 22 January 1997, http://www.pbs .org/newshour/bb/politics/jan-june97/cohen_01-22.html. 145. U.S. Senate, “Confirmation Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subject: Confirmation of Former Senator William Cohen to Be Secretary of Defense” (Washington, dc: Federal News Service, 22 January 1997), 24. 146. U.S. Senate, “Confirmation Hearing,” 24. 147. U.S. Senate, “Confirmation Hearing,” 23. 148. U.S. Senate, “Confirmation Hearing,” 23. 149. John F. Harris, “Berger’s Caution Has Shaped Role of U.S. in War,” Washington Post, 16 May 1999. 150. Samuel Berger, “How It Was Fought: Transcript of Interview with Sandy Berger, National Security Advisor,” pbs Frontline, 22 February 2000, http:// www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/. 151. National Security Council, “Summary and Conclusions for the Principals and Deputies Committee (pc/dc) Meetings of the National Security Council on Kosovo,” White House Situation Room, Washington dc (19 June 1998 to 20 March 1999), declassified 19 June 2008 to 23 March 2009, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/declassified. html#DeclassifiedRecords. 152. National Security Council, “Summary and Conclusions.” 153. National Security Council, “Summary and Conclusions,” 19 June 1998. 154. Sandy Berger, “Memorandum for the President, Subject: Preparing for an Ultimatum” (24 September 1998), Clinton Presidential Library, declassified 15 November 2012 per Executive Order 13526, http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/ assets/storage/Research%20-%20Digital%20Library/Declassified/Kosovo.pdf. President Clinton checked “approve” on the memo, indicating that he supported Berger’s approach. 155. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 161. 156. Owen Bowcott, “Tony Blair: Military Intervention in Rogue Regimes ‘More Necessary than Ever,’ ” The Guardian, 1 September 2010.

228 Notes to pages 40–42 157. Tony Blair, “How It Was Fought: Transcript of Interview with British Prime Minister Tony Blair,” pbs Frontline, 22 February 2000, http://www.pbs.org/ wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/. 158. Jacques Chirac, “Joint Press Conference by President Clinton and President Jacques Chirac of France,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary, The East Room, 19 February 1999, 1544 Eastern Standard Time. 159. Eric Rouleau, “French Diplomacy Adrift in Kosovo,” Le Monde Diplomatique, 4 December 1999, http://mondediplo.com/1999/12/04rouleau. 160. Rouleau, “French Diplomacy.” 161. Rouleau, “French Diplomacy.” 162. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 163. 163. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 148. 164. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 163. 165. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 163. 166. Croci and Verdun, Transatlantic Divide, 160. 167. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 163. 168. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 163. 169. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 163. 170. Tsakona, “Anti-Americanism in Greece,” 2. 171. Ted Galen Carpenter, “Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing No. 30: U.S. Troops in Macedonia: Back Door to War?” The cato Institute, 17 March 1994, 1. 172. Carpenter, “U.S. Troops in Macedonia,” 5. 173. Carpenter, “U.S. Troops in Macedonia,” 19. 174. Carpenter, “U.S. Troops in Macedonia,” 6. 175. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 164. 176. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 504– 8. The passage from the Melian dialogue follows: “For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with spe- cious pretenses— either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us— and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did not join the Spartans, although their colonists, or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” 177. Clark, “Military Contingency Operations,” 142– 43. 178. Clark, Waging Modern War, 5. 179. Clark, Waging Modern War, 5. 180. Clark, “Military Contingency Operations,” 95– 108.

Notes to pages 43–46 229 181. Clark, Waging Modern War, 5. 182. Clark, Waging Modern War, 5. 183. Clark, Waging Modern War, 9. 184. Clark, Waging Modern War, 9– 10. 185. Clark, Waging Modern War, 10. 186. Tirpak, “Deliberate Force,” 39. 187. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 93. 188. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 40. 189. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 92. 190. Tirpak, “Deliberate Force,” 39. 191. Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force; see the order of battle appendix. 192. Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force. 193. Dittmer and Dawkins, “Deliberate Force,” 13. 194. Dittmer and Dawkins, “Deliberate Force,” 17. 195. Sylvia Poggioli, “Two Decades after Siege, Sarajevo Still a City Divided,” National Public Radio, Morning Edition, 5 April 2012, http://www.npr .org/2012/04/05/150009152/two-decades-after-siege-sarajevo-still-a-city-divided. 196. Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force, order of battle appendix. 197. Selex Galileo, “halo Hostile Artillery Locating System Brochure” (Essex, United Kingdom: Selex Sensors an Airborne Systems Limited, 2008), 1. 198. Galileo, “halo,” 1. 199. Galileo, “halo,” 1– 2. 200. Galileo, “halo,” 1– 2. 201. House, Combined Arms Warfare, 60. 202. Two batteries of French 155- mm and one battery of British 105- mm equals twenty guns (not including mortars). With a rate of fire of six rounds per minute, with sixty minutes in an hour, the following formula indicates the maximum firepower these guns can dish out in one hour: 20 × 6 × 60 = 7,200. Of course, each shell weighs less than the bombs, so the total tonnage of artillery versus aerial bomb ordinance varies in comparison. 203. Ian Bruce, “un Comes of Age as an Enforcer,” The Herald [Scotland], 31 August 1995, http://www.heraldscotland.com/sport/spl/aberdeen/ un-comes-of-age-as-enforcer-1.664014. 204. 600 × 96 = 57,600. 205. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 93. 206. Dittmer and Dawkins, “Deliberate Force,” 22. 207. Roskin. “Bosnian- Serb Problem,” 21. In 1992, at the start of the siege of Sara- jevo, Roskin identified the potential for counter- battery radars to facilitate silencing Serbian artillery, given the limitations of airpower: “Air strikes would not easily locate the Serbian artillery tucked away in the folds and woods. The U.S. Air Force may have done a good publicity job in Desert Storm, making

230 Notes to pages 46–49 it look easy to destroy targets with pinpoint accuracy. But targeted buildings don’t move. Serbian howitzers and mortars do.” 208. Dittmer and Dawkins, “Deliberate Force,” 28. 209. Dittmer and Dawkins, “Deliberate Force,” 27. 210. Dittmer and Dawkins, “Deliberate Force,” 27. 211. Dittmer and Dawkins, “Deliberate Force,” 28. 212. Banja Luka, “Bosnian Serbs Win a Pause in nato Bombing,” Sun Sentinel [Palm Beach fl], 18 September 1995, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1995-09-18 /news/9509180005_1_bosnian-serb-leader-bosnian-government-serb-strong hold. Also see Dittmer and Dawkins, “Deliberate Force,” 32. 213. cnn, “Bill Clinton Addresses Nation on Yugoslavia Strike.” 214. cnn, “Bill Clinton Addresses Nation on Yugoslavia Strike.” 215. William J. Clinton, “Statement by the President to the Nation,” Oval Office, 24 March 1999, http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/03/1999-03-24-remarks-by-the -president-to-the-nation-on-kosovo.html. 216. Clinton, My Life, 852. 217. Barnaby Mason, “Europe Fifty Days On: How Credible Isnato ?” bbc News, 12 May 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/342324.stm. 218. Steve Bowman, “Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military Operations,” Congressional Research Service Reports for Congress (Washington dc: Library of Congress, 8 July 2003), 4–5. Total Sorties (37,200): U.S. 62 percent, Allies 38 percent; Strike Sorties (9,500): U.S. 53 percent, Allies 47 percent; Intelligence/ Reconnaissance Sorties (1,200): U.S. 79 percent, Allies 21 percent; Support Sor- ties (26,500): U.S. 65 percent, Allies 35 percent. 219. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 276. 220. Shaw, “Operation Allied Force,” 3. 221. nato, “Statement Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Held at nato Headquarters, Brussels, on 12th April 1999,” http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-051e.htm. 222. nato, “Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council.” 223. Klaus Naumann, “How It Was Fought: Transcript of Interview with General Klaus Naumann,” pbs Frontline, 22 February 2000, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh /pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/naumann.html. 224. Hosmer, Conflict over Kosovo, 61. 225. Michael R. Gordon, “At nato: Allies War by Consensus Limiting Strategy,” New York Times, 3 April 1999. 226. Gordon, “At nato.” 227. Gordon, “At nato.”

Notes to pages 49–51 231 2. The Bombing Begins 1. William S. Cohen and Henry H. Shelton, “Department of Defense Kosovo/ Operation Allied Force After- Action Report to Congress” (Washington dc: Department of Defense, 31 January 2000), 31. 2. Cohen and Shelton, “Department of Defense Kosovo/Operation Allied Force,” 31. 3. Chris Hellman, “Lessons of Kosovo: More b-2 Bombers?” Weekly Defense Monitor 3, no. 24 (1999). Six of these aircraft rotated in pairs from Whiteman, conducting around fifty missions throughout the conflict. 4. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 103. 5. Cohen and Shelton, “Department of Defense Kosovo/Operation Allied Force,” 32 6. Gordon et al., “Operational Challenges,” 54. 7. Gordon et al., “Operational Challenges,” 54. 8. Mark Urban, “nato’s Inner Kosovo Conflict,” bbc World News, 20 August 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/425468.stm. 9. Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Thwarted, nato Agrees to Bomb Belgrade Sites,” New York Times, 30 March 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/ learning/students/pop/articles/033199kosovo-us.html. 10. Urban, “nato’s Inner Kosovo Conflict,” 2. 11. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 132. 12. Larson and Savych, American Public Support, 78. 13. “Support for Action in Kosovo Is Tempered by Risks of War,” abc News/Night- line Poll, 9 April 1999, http://abcnews.go.com/images/pdf/788a1Kosovo.pdf. 14. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 132. 15. Elizabeth Becker, “Conflict in the Balkans: The Air Commander: A Leader Who Climbed the Ranks, as His Father Did, to Become the Chief of Staff,”New York Times, 29 March 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/29/world/conflict-bal kans-air-commander-leader-who-climbed-ranks-his-father-did-become.html. 16. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 45. 17. U.S. General Accounting Office, Kosovo Air Operations: Army Resolving Lessons Learned Regarding the Apache Helicopter: Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives (Washington dc: U.S. G.A.O., 2001), 6. 18. Gordon et al., “Operational Challenges,” 57. 19. R. W. Apple Jr., “A Domestic Sort with Global Worries,” New York Times, 25 August 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/25/world/a-domestic-sort -with-global-worries.html. 20. Nebojsa Pavkovic, “Interview with Yugoslav 3rd Army General Povkovic,” pbs Frontline, 22 February 2000, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline /shows/kosovo/interviews/pavkovic.html.

232 Notes to pages 54–57 21. Ripley, Conflict in the Balkans, 53. 22. Tim Hunter, “Operation Noble Anvil: 2nd Air Expeditionary Group raf Fairford, February–June 1999,” http://sharpshooter-maj.com/html/profil05 .htm. 23. Henriksen, nato’s Gamble, 175. 24. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 20. 25. Hayward, “nato’s War in the Balkans,” 11. 26. Carl Rochelle, Brent Sadler, and Christiane Amanpour, “Airstrikes on Yugo- slavia Suspended, More Attacks Likely,” cnn, 25 March 1999, http://www .cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9903/25/kosovo.strikes.01/. 27. Chris Gray and Boris Worrall, “Bombs over Belgrade; Wave of nato Air Strikes as Milosevic Remains Defiant,” Birmingham Post [United Kingdom], 25 March 1999, 1. 28. Gray and Worrall, “Bombs over Belgrade,” 1. 29. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 21. 30. Ripley, Conflict in the Balkans, 53. 31. Ripley, Conflict in the Balkans, 53. 32. Ripley, Conflict in the Balkans, 53. 33. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 23. 34. Cordesman, “Lessons and Non- Lessons,” 187. 35. With exceptions. General Short stated in a pbs Frontline interview that forward air controllers could drop below this level if unable to confirm targets. 36. Michael Short, “Transcript of Interview with Lieutenant General Michael C. Short, Joint Air Force Component Commander,” pbs Frontline, 22 February 2000, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews /short.html. 37. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 115. 38. Naval Air Systems Command, “Aircraft and Weapons” (Patuxent River md: Public Affairs Office), http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home. display&key=AF4153AA-5454-44D2-B01A-AA69417C5B49. 39. Naval Air Systems Command, “Aircraft and Weapons.” 40. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 22. 41. Wesley Clark, “Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary General, Dr. Javier Solana and saceur, Gen. Wesley Clark,” nato hq, 1500 hours, 25 March 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990325a.htm. 42. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 22. 43. Jamie Shea, “Transcript of Press Conference by nato Spokesman Jamie Shea and Air Commodore David Wilby,” nato hq, 1500 hours, 26 March 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990326a.htm. 44. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 23. 45. Jamie Shea, “Transcript of Press Conference,” 26 March 1999.

Notes to pages 57–59 233 46. David Wilby, “Transcript of Press Conference by nato Spokesman Jamie Shea and Air Commodore David Wilby,” nato hq, 1500 hours, 26 March 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/all-frce.htm. 47. Wilby, “Transcript of Press Conference,” 26 March 1999. 48. Wilby, “Transcript of Press Conference,” 26 March 1999. 49. Ripley, Conflict in the Balkans, 54. 50. David Wilby, “Transcript of Press Conference by nato Spokesman Jamie Shea and Air Commodore David Wilby,” nato hq, 1500 hours, 27 March 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/all-frce.htm. 51. Ripley, Conflict in the Balkans, 54. 52. William J. Clinton, “Message of President Clinton to be Delivered by Russian Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission to President Yeltsin,” 3 April 1999, Clinton Presidential Library, declassified 29 April 2010, http://www.clinton library.gov/declassified.html. 53. Hosmer, Conflict over Kosovo, 33. Also see Celestine Bohlen, “Don’t Push Us, Yeltsin Warns West on Balkans,” New York Times, 10 April 1999. 54. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 24. 55. Wilby, “Transcript of Press Conference,” 27 March 1999. 56. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 23. 57. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 23. 58. Jamie Shea, “Transcript of Press Conference by nato Spokesman Jamie Shea and Air Commodore David Wilby,” nato hq, 1500 hours, 27 March 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/all-frce.htm. 59. Ripley, Conflict in the Balkans, 54. 60. Jamie Shea, “Transcript of Press Conference,” 27 March 1999. 61. Mark Laity, “Transcript of Press Conference by nato Spokesman Jamie Shea and Air Commodore David Wilby,” nato hq, 1500 hours, 27 March 1999. 62. Tirpak, “Short’s View of the Air Campaign,” 43. 63. Madeleine Albright, “Transcript of Jim Lehrer News Hour,” pbs News Hour, 24 March 1999, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/jan-june99/albright_3-24 .html. 64. Kagan, Finding the Target, 191. 65. Shelton, Without Hesitation, 370. 66. Charles Krulak, “How It Was Fought: Transcript of Interview with General Charles Krulak, Marine Corps Commandant,” pbs Frontline, 22 February 2000, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews /krulak.html. 67. Javier Solana, “Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary General, Dr. Javier Solana and saceur, Gen. Wesley Clark,” nato hq, 1500 hours, 25 March 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990325a.htm.

234 Notes to pages 59–61 68. Christiane Amanpour, “nato: Yugo Ground Troops May Be Targeted,” cnn, 26 March 1999, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9903/26/clark.01/#1. 69. Clark, Waging Modern War, 221. 70. George Tenet, “Statement of the Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet before the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats (as Prepared for Delivery),” Central Intel- ligence Agency Speeches and Testimony Archive, 2 February 1999, https://www .cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1999/ps020299.html. 71. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 24. 72. Gray and Worrall, “Bombs over Belgrade,” 1. 73. Gray and Worrall, “Bombs over Belgrade,” 1. 74. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 110. 75. Human Rights Watch, Kosovo: Rape as a Weapon of Ethnic Cleansing, 1 March 2000, d1203, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a87a0.html. 76. Human Rights Watch, Kosovo. 77. R. Jeffrey Smith and William Drozdiak, “The Anatomy of a Purge: Milo- sevic’s Intimate Understanding of His Enemies Facilitates His Campaign of Terror against the Kosovars,” Washington Post Foreign Service, 11 April 1999, a1. 78. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 114. 79. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 24. 80. Amanpour, “Yugo Ground Troops May Be Targeted.” 81. Jamie Shea, “nato Press Conference,” Brussels, Belgium, 27 March 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990327a.htm. 82. Clark, Waging Modern War, 208. 83. Priest, “United nato Front Was Divided Within,” a1. 84. Priest, “United nato Front Was Divided Within,” a1. 85. Priest, “United nato Front Was Divided Within,” a1. 86. Tirpak, “Short’s View of the Air Campaign,” 43. 87. Tirpak, “Short’s View of the Air Campaign,” 43. The final bombing tally indicated that strikes increased on tanks and artillery as well as targets in Serbia proper toward the end of the campaign, however. Also see Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 120. 88. Frances X. Clines, “nato Opens Broad Barrage against Serbs as Clinton Denounces Yugoslav President,” New York Times, 25 March 1999, http://www .nytimes.com/1999/03/25/world/conflict-balkans-overview-nato-opens-broad -barrage-against-serbs-clinton.html. 89. Clines, “nato Opens Broad Barrage.” 90. Clines, “nato Opens Broad Barrage.” 91. Clines, “nato Opens Broad Barrage.”

Notes to pages 62–64 235 92. William Cohen, “Transcript of Interview with Secretary of Defense William Cohen,” pbs Frontline, 22 February 2000, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages /frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/cohen.html. 93. Jamie Shea, “nato Press Conference,” Brussels, Belgium, 28 March 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990328a.htm. 94. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 25. 95. Clark, Waging Modern War, 216. 96. Thomas W. Lippman and John F. Harris, “U.S. Rescues Pilot of Downed Jet,” Washington Post, 28 March 1999, a1. 97. Ball, “Operation Allied Force.” 98. Friedman, Naval Institute Guide, 407. 99. Jamie Shea, “nato Press Conference,” Brussels, Belgium, 28 March 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990328a.htm. 100. Kenneth H. Bacon, “Transcript of DoD News Briefing,” 1 April 1999, http:// www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=564. 101. Guy De Launey, “Foe Now Friends: US Stealth Pilot and the Serb Who Shot Him Down,” bbc News, 5 November 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world -europe-20209770. Zoltan Dani now runs a bakery in Belgrade and is friends with former pilot Dale Zelko. 102. The Second Meeting, dir. Zeljko Mitrovic (Belgrade, Serbia: Optimistic Film, 2013). 103. Lippman and Harris, “U.S. Rescues Pilot,” a1. 104. C. Douglas Sterner, “Awards for the Silver Star for Conspicuous Gallantry in Action During Operation Allied Force in Kosovo,” Home of Heroes Enhanced Research Library (Alexandria va: Home of Heroes, 1999), http://www.home ofheroes.com/members/04_SS/6_PostRVN/12_kosovo.html. 105. Sterner, “Awards for the Silver Star.” 106. Sterner, “Awards for the Silver Star,” 3. Overhead a-10 Warthogs, led by Air Force Capt. John A. Cherrey, protected the search-and- rescue task force from ground threats. 107. Eric Schmitt, “Shrewd Serb Tactics Downed Stealth Jet, U.S. Inquiry Shows,” New York Times, 11 April 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/11/world /crisis-balkans-lost-warplane-shrewd-serb-tactics-downed-stealth-jet-us -inquiry.html. 108. Schmitt, “Shrewd Serb Tactics.” 109. Ellis Neel, “Serb Discusses 1999 Downing of Stealth,” usa Today, 26 October 2005, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-10-26-serb-stealth_x .htm. 110. Second Meeting. 111. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 111.

236 Notes to pages 64–66 112. Larkins Dsouza, “How Was f- 117 Shot Down?” Defence Aviation, 8 February 2007, http://www.defenceaviation.com/2007/02/how-was-f-117-shot-down -part-1.html. 113. Olsen, History of Air Warfare, 234. 114. Olsen, History of Air Warfare, 234. 115. Neel, “Serb Discusses 1999 Downing of Stealth.” 116. Neel, “Serb Discusses 1999 Downing of Stealth.” 117. Tirpak, “Electronic Warfare.” 118. Tirpak, “Electronic Warfare.” 119. Cohen and Shelton, “Department of Defense Kosovo/Operation Allied Force,” 66. 120. Burt Gustafson, “f- 105- g Wild Weasel,” http://www.aircraftresourcecenter .com/Gal11/10001-10100/gal10007-F-105-Gustafson/00.shtm. 121. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 103. 122. Second Meeting. 123. Clark, Waging Modern War, 217– 18. 124. Second Meeting. 125. Second Meeting. 126. Second Meeting. 127. Jamie Shea, “nato Press Conference,” Brussels, Belgium, 28 March 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990328a.htm. 128. Shea, “nato Press Conference,” 28 March 1999. 129. Smith and Drozdiak, “Anatomy of a Purge,” a1. 130. Smith and Drozdiak, “Anatomy of a Purge,” a1. 131. Smith and Drozdiak, “Anatomy of a Purge,” a2. 132. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 114. Also see pbs Frontline interview of Commander Nebojsa Pavkovic at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline /shows/kosovo/interviews/pavkovic.html. 133. Jamie Shea, “nato Press Conference,” Brussels, Belgium, 28 March 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990328a.htm. 134. Shelton, Without Hesitation, 375. 135. Daniel Williams, “We’re Trapped . . . We Can’t Get Out,” Washington Post Foreign Service, 2 April 1999, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl /daily/april99/soldiers040299.htm. 136. Brent Sadler et al., “Three U.S. Soldiers Captured by Yugoslav Army: Serb tv Shows Servicemen Bruised and Bleeding,” cnn, 1 April 1999, http://www.cnn .com/WORLD/europe/9904/01/nato.attack.02/. 137. Gerry J. Gilmore and U.S. Department of Defense, “U.S. Soldiers Ambushed in Macedonia, Beaten by Serb Captors,” American Forces Press Service, 11 May 1999, http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=42986.

Notes to pages 66–69 237 138. Kenneth H. Bacon, “Transcript of DoD News Briefing,” 1 April 1999, http:// www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=564. 139. Bacon, “Transcript of DoD News Briefing,” 1 April 1999. 140. Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 118. 141. Bacon, “Transcript of DoD News Briefing,” 1 April 1999. 142. Clark, Waging Modern War, 286. 143. Clark, Waging Modern War, 286. 144. Shelton, Without Hesitation, 374. 145. Shelton, Without Hesitation, 374. 146. Hugh Shelton, “Press Briefing by Secretary of Defense William Cohen and General Hugh Shelton,” Norfolk va: Norfolk Naval Station, 1 April 1999, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47857. 147. Shelton, Without Hesitation, 374. Of course, he actually meant the Clausewitz- ian notion of friction. 148. bbc News, “Jesse Jackson Arrives in Belgrade,” 29 April 1999, http://news .bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/331137.stm. 149. bbc News, “Jesse Jackson.” 150. Gilmore, “U.S. Soldiers Ambushed,” 1. 151. Candice Hughes, “U.S. Turns 2 Serb pows Over to Yugoslavs; nato Missiles Cut Highway; Jets Hit Military Airport,” Deseret News, 18 May 1999, http://www .deseretnews.com/article/697636/US-turns-2-Serb-POWs-over-to-Yugoslavs .html. 152. Bill Glauber, “Jesse Jackson Arrives in Belgrade to Seek Release of Ameri- can pows,” Baltimore Sun, 30 April 1999, http://articles.baltimoresun .com/1999-04-30/news/9904300135_1_jesse-jackson-yugoslavia-belgrade. 153. Shelton, Without Hesitation, 370– 88. 154. Shelton, Without Hesitation, 376. 155. Clark, Waging Modern War, 286. 156. Craig R. Whitney, “On 7th Day, Serb Resilience Gives nato Leaders Pause,” New York Times, 31 May 1999, http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world /europe/033199kosovo-solana.html.

3. Protracted Bombing 1. William Drozdiak, “nato Leaders Struggle to Find a Winning Strategy,” Washington Post, 1 April 1999, a22. 2. Drozdiak, “nato Leaders Struggle,” a22. 3. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 25– 26. 4. Mark Urban, “nato’s Inner Kosovo Conflict,” bbc News, 20 August 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/425468.stm. 5. Clark, Waging Modern War, 236– 37. 6. Drozdiak, “nato Leaders Struggle,” a22.

238 Notes to pages 69–72 7. To mitigate alliance member concerns, nato did not officially refer to operations after 1 April 1999 as part of phase III. Yet in reality nato commenced phase III of air operations on 1 April. In a press conference on 24 April, spokesman Jamie Shea carefully said, “We may not necessarily see a Phase 3. All I want to say is at the moment that saceur has, as you can see, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, from the operations that have been going on that he has all of the flexibility that he needs.” 8. William Drozdiak and Thomas W. Lippman, “nato Summit Ends with Restoration Vow,” Washington Post, 26 April 1999, a1. 9. Drozdiak and Lippman, “nato Summit Ends.” Twenty- three other world leaders also attended. 10. nato, “Statement Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at nato Headquarters, Brussels, on 12th April 1999,” Brussels 12 April 1999, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-051e.htm. 11. United Nations, “Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo,” (Rambouillet, France, 23 February 1999), Article IV: vj Forces and Article V: Other Forces, http://peacemaker.un.org/kosovo-rambouilletagreement99. 12. Dana Priest, “Kosovo Land Threat May Have Won the War,”Washington Post, 19 September 1999, a1. 13. Drozdiak and Lippman, “nato Summit Ends,” a1. 14. Drozdiak and Lippman, “nato Summit Ends,” a1. 15. “The Kosovo Conflict in the Polls,” http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/Poll%20 Data%20Kosovo.pdf. 16. Ball, “Operation Allied Force,” 1. 17. Daniel J. Murphy Jr., “Statement of Vice Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, Jr., U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet, and Striking and Support Forces, South- ern Europe,” Kosovo: U.S. Naval Lessons Learned During Operation Allied Force, March– June 1999 (Washington dc: Naval Historical Center, 26 October 1999), 16, http://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/ title-list-alphabetically/k/kosovo-naval-lessons-learned-during-operation- allied-force.html. 18. Cohen and Shelton, “Department of Defense Kosovo/Operation Allied Force,” 32. 19. Keegan, “Please, Mr. Blair.” 20. Cohen and Shelton, “Department of Defense Kosovo/Operation Allied Force,” 68. 21. Ball, “Operation Allied Force,” 1. 22. Ball, “Operation Allied Force,” 1. 23. Ball, “Operation Allied Force,” 1. The low rate of target destruction was due in part to efforts to minimize collateral damage. 24. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 121.

Notes to pages 72–73 239 25. Conrad C. Lautenbacher, “Statement of Vice Admiral Conrad C. Laut- enbacher, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments Kosovo Lessons Learned,” http://www.fas .org/man/congress/1999/99-10-19lautenbacher.htm. Also see the statement of Brig. Gen. Robert M. Flanagan, U.S. Marine Corps, at http://www.fas.org /man/congress/1999/99-10-26flanagan.htm. 26. Dixon, “uav Employment in Kosovo,” 8. 27. Brian Palmer, “Is It Hard to Kill a Drone?” Slate Magazine, 6 June 2012, http:// www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2012/06/cia_drone_ program_is_it_hard_to_shoot_one_down_.html. Door gunners on Serb helicopters shot down some of the drones while sam operators took out others. The Serb War Museum in Belgrade displays some of theseuav s, including a Predator shot down in 1995 and the wreckage of the f- 117. Russia has some pieces of the f- 117 wreckage as well, using these in their own stealth program. 28. Wesley K. Clark, “Press Conference by Jamie Shea and General Wesley Clark,” Brussels, Belgium, 27 April 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990427a .htm. 29. Shelton, Without Hesitation, 384– 85. 30. Ball, “Operation Allied Force,” 1. Also see Clark, “United States and nato,” 10. 31. Fort Hood Public Affairs Office, “504th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade to Deploy to Kosovo,” Fort Hood Press Center, 10 December 2013, http://www .forthoodpresscenter.com/go/doc/3439/1998906/. 32. Brad K. Blitz, “Balkan Returns: An Overview of Refugee Returns and Minority Repa- triation,” United States Institute for Peace, 30 December 1999, http://www.usip.org/ publications/balkan-returns-overview-refugee-returns-and-minority-repatriation. 33. Earl H. Tilford Jr., “Operation Allied Force and the Role of Airpower,” Param- eters, Winter 1999– 2000, 24–38. Those lauding the technological aspects of the triumph included John A. Tirpak (senior editor of Air Force Magazine), Maj. Gen. Charles Lind (ret.), and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan. 34. Clark, Waging Modern War, 273. 35. Sergei Balmasov and Vadim Trukhachev, “Russia’s Efforts to Save Yugoslavia from nato Could Have Led to Nuclear War,” Pravda, 24 March 2009, http:// english.pravda.ru/world/europe/24-03-2009/107289-yugoslavia-0/. 36. Guy Dinmore, “nato Destroys Major Bridge,” Washington Post, 4 April 1999, a14. 37. Steven Erlanger, “Belgrade’s People Still Defiant, but Deeply Weary,” New York Times, 24 May 1999, 1. 38. Elaine Sciolino and Ethan Bronner, “How a President, Distracted by Scandal, Entered Balkan War,” New York Times, 18 April 1999.

240 Notes to pages 73–75 39. Kim, “Kosovo and the 106th Congress,” 14. 40. U.S. Senate, “Authorizing the President of the United States to Conduct Military Air Operations and Missile Strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” S. Res. 21, 106th Cong., 1st sess. (March 23, 1999), 1. 41. Kim, “Kosovo and the 106th Congress,” 14. 42. Helen Dewar and Juliet Eilperin, “gop Leaders Take Cautious Course on Kosovo.” Washington Post, 28 April 1999, a20. 43. Helen Dewar, “Senate Shelves McCain Proposal on Kosovo,” Washington Post, 5 May 1999, a27. 44. cnn, “Senate Tables Kosovo Resolution Authorizing ‘All Necessary Force,’ ” 4 May 1999, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/05/04/kosovo .congress/. 45. Dewar, “Senate Shelves McCain Proposal,” a27. 46. Dewar, “Senate Shelves McCain Proposal,” a27. 47. U.S. Senate, “S. Con. Res. 21– 106th Congress: Kosovo Resolution.” http://www .govtrack.us/congress/bills/106/sconres21. 48. Kim, “Kosovo and the 106th Congress,” 2. 49. Mike Williams, “No Let-up in Kosovo Bombing,” bbc News, 7 May 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/337582.stm. 50. “The Kosovo Conflict in the Polls,” compiled from multiple sourcesabc ( News, cbs News, Princeton Survey Research Associates, Newsweek, Yankelvich Partners for Time, cnn, Los Angeles Times, nbc News, Wall Street Journal), http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/Poll%20Data%20Kosovo.pdf. Respondents were asked: “Do you approve or disapprove of the United States and nato conducting military air strikes against Serbian targets?” 51. Thomas W. Lippman, “Russian Leader Cancels Trip in Protest,”Washington Post, 24 March 1999, a22. 52. Lippman, “Russian Leader,” a22. 53. Jim Mokhiber, “Why Did Milosevic Give Up?” pbs Frontline, 22 February 2000, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/fighting/giveup .html. 54. Ignatieff,Virtual War, 109. 55. Hosmer, Conflict over Kosovo, 33. Also see Bohlen, “Don’t Push Us.” 56. William J. Clinton, “Message to President Boris Yeltsin,” Clinton Presidential Library, April 1999, declassified 22 June 2010, http://www.clintonlibrary.gov /declassified.html#DeclassifiedRecords. 57. Clinton, “Message to President Boris Yeltsin.” 58. Clinton, My Life, 852. 59. Mokhiber, “Why Did Milosevic Give Up?” 60. Colin McMahon, “Yeltsin Survives Impeachment Votes in Duma,” Chicago Tribune, 16 May 1999.

Notes to pages 75–78 241 61. Clinton, My Life, 852– 59. 62. Dinmore, “nato Destroys Major Bridge,” a14. 63. Dinmore, “nato Destroys Major Bridge,” a14. Also, in an act of solidarity with their leader, Serbian demonstrators gathered on bridges across the Danube wearing T- shirts emblazoned with a target. For additional examples, see LeBor, Milosevic, 298. 64. From an unnamed journalist in Belgrade: “Harsh Reality under the Bombs,” Institute of War and Peace Reporting, 3 June 1999, http://www.ddh.nl/fy/kosova /news/1999/reality0306.html. 65. Hosmer, Conflict over Kosovo, 54. 66. Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, 309. 67. James McKillop, “Warplanes Set Their Sights on Milosevic, Villa Is Destroyed but Leader Was Not at Home,” The Herald [Edinburgh], 23 April 1999, http:// www.heraldscotland.com/sport/spl/aberdeen/warplanes-set-their-sights-on- milosevic-villa-is-destroyed-but-leader-was-not-at-home-1.295271. 68. Graffiti depicted in “Harsh Reality under the Bombs.” 69. McKillop, “Warplanes Set Their Sights.” 70. Ivanov, Transforming nato, 93. 71. Lord, Proconsuls, 181. 72. Michael T. Manning, “Draft MemCon: potus-Dutch Prime Minister Kok, 20 April 1999,” e-mail sent 20 April 1999 at 1753 (edt), foia Request Collection 2006- 0217- f, Box 7, National Archives and Records Administration, William Jefferson Clinton Library and Museum, Little Rockar . 73. Wesley Clark, “Press Conference by Jamie Shea and General Wesley Clark,” Brussels, Belgium, 27 April 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990427a .htm. 74. Clark, “Press Conference,” 27 April 1999. 75. Erlanger, “Belgrade’s People Still Defiant.” 76. Steve Erlanger, “nato Attack Darkens City and Areas of Serbia,” New York Times, 3 May 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/03/world/crisis-in-the -balkans-belgrade-nato-attack-darkens-city-and-areas-of-serbia.html. 77. Erlanger, “nato Attack Darkens City.” 78. Daniel Williams, “Serbs Unsettled by nato Strikes on Power Plants,” Wash- ington Post, 4 May 1999, a1. 79. Williams, “Serbs Unsettled,” a1. 80. Erlanger, “nato Attack Darkens City.” 81. Phillip Bennett and Steve Coll, “nato Warplanes Jolt Yugoslav Power Grid,” Washington Post, 25 May 1999, a1. 82. Bennett and Coll, “nato Warplanes,” a1. 83. “The Mixed Feelings of Europeans,”The Economist, 351, no. 8115 (1999), 54. 84. Shelton, Without Hesitation, 385.

242 Notes to pages 78–80 85. Erlanger, “Belgrade’s People Still Defiant.” 86. Erlanger, “Belgrade’s People Still Defiant.” 87. Shelton, Without Hesitation, 381. 88. Clark, Waging Modern War, 249. 89. Clark, Waging Modern War, 249. 90. David Wilby, “Press Conference of nato Spokesman Jamie Shea, Air Com- modore David Wilby, and Commander Fabrizio Maltini, shape,” nato hq Brussels, Belgium, 8 April 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990408a .htm. 91. Wilby, “Press Conference,” 8 April 1999. 92. Wilby, “Press Conference,” 8 April 1999. 93. Jamie Shea, “Press Conference of nato Spokesman Jamie Shea, Air Commodore David Wilby, and Commander Fabrizio Maltini, shape,” nato hq Brussels, Belgium, 8 April 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990408a.htm. 94. Clark, Waging Modern War, 250. 95. Wesley Clark, “Press Conference by Jamie Shea and General Wesley Clark,” Brussels, Belgium, 13 April 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990413a .htm. 96. Clark, “Press Conference,” 13 April 1999. 97. Clark, “Press Conference,” 13 April 1999. 98. nato, “Cockpit Video of Railway Bridge II Played at Press Conference,” Brussels, Belgium, 14 April 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/video.htm. 99. David Martin, “Did nato Alter Bombing Tape?” cbs News, 6 January 2000, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/did-nato-alter-bombing-tape/. 100. Martin, “Did nato Alter Bombing Tape?” 101. nato, “Roll- up of All Videos Used during nato Press Conferences,” Brussels, Belgium, 26 March to 16 September 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/video. htm. 102. Wesley Clark, “Press Conference by Jamie Shea and General Wesley Clark,” Brussels, Belgium, 27 April 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990427a .htm. 103. Shelton, Without Hesitation, 383 (italics in original). In describing this exchange, General Shelton said, “I give Secretary Cohen a lot of credit for crafting a succinct instruction without a whole lot of ambiguity.” Shelton added, “For a smart guy, he [Clark] said some pretty dumb things.” To be fair, however, the Serbian army did increase its presence in Kosovo throughout the air campaign, as Clark accurately said in the press conference, despite the strategic ramifications of such a revelation. 104. Wesley Clark, “Press Conference of Javier Solana, nato Secretary General and General Wesley Clark, saceur,” Aviano Air Base, Italy, 29 May 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990529a.htm.

Notes to pages 80–83 243 105. Clark, “Press Conference,” 29 May 1999. 106. Clark, “Press Conference,” 29 May 1999. 107. Clark, “Press Conference of Javier Solana, nato Secretary General and Gen- eral Wesley Clark, saceur,” 29 May 1999. 108. Javier Solana, “Press Conference of Javier Solana, nato Secretary General and General Wesley Clark, saceur,” Aviano Air Base, Italy, 29 May 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990529a.htm. 109. Wesley Clark (saceur) and John Corley (Chief, Kosovo Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team), “Press Conference on the Kosovo Strike Assessment,” nato Headquarters, Brussels, 16 September 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/all-frce. htm. 110. Priest, “United nato Front Was Divided Within,” a1. 111. Priest, “United nato Front Was Divided Within,” a1. 112. Tirpak, “Short’s View of the Air Campaign,” 45. 113. Priest, “United nato Front Was Divided Within,” a1. 114. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 145. 115. Steven Lee Myers, “Chinese Embassy Bombing: A Wide Net of Blame,” New York Times, 17 April 2000. 116. Ball, “Operation Allied Force,” 1. 117. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 145. 118. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 145. 119. Alva McNicol, “nato Hits Chinese Embassy,” bbc News, 8 May 1999. 120. Javier Solana, “Press Conference Given by nato Secretary General Javier Solana, nato Spokesman Jamie Shea, and shape Spokesman Major General Walter Jertz,” nato hq, 8 May 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990508b .htm. 121. Brent Sadler, John Raedler, and Carl Rochelle, “Outdated Intelligence May Be to Blame for ‘Very Bad Mistake,’ ” cnn, 8 May 1999, http://www.cnn.com /WORLD/europe/9905/08/kosovo.03/. 122. Myers, “Chinese Embassy Bombing.” 123. Thomas Pickering, “State Department Report on Accidental Bombing of Chinese Embassy,” oral presentation to Chinese government, 17 June 1999, http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/070699.html. 124. Pickering, “Accidental Bombing of Chinese Embassy,” 2. 125. John Sweeney, Jens Holsoe, and Ed Bulliamy, “nato Bombed Chinese Embassy Deliberately,” The Guardian, 16 October 1999. 126. Sweeney et al., “nato Bombed Chinese Embassy Deliberately.” 127. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 147. 128. Richard Lister, “US Sends Envoy to Pacify China,” bbc News, 14 June 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/368290.stm. 129. Clinton, My Life, 854.

244 Notes to pages 84–86 130. Pickering, “Accidental Bombing of Chinese Embassy,” 2– 3. 131. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 146. 132. Pickering, “Accidental Bombing of Chinese Embassy,” 5. 133. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 144. 134. Walter Jertz, “Press Conference Given by nato Secretary General Javier Solana, nato Spokesman Jamie Shea, and shape Spokesman Major General Walter Jertz,” nato hq, 8 May 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990508b. htm. 135. Paul Richter and Doyle McManus, “Pentagon to Tighten Targeting Procedures,” Los Angeles Times, 11 May 1999, http://articles.latimes.com/1999/may/11/news /mn-36073. 136. Walter Jertz, “Press Conference Given by nato Spokesman Jamie Shea and Shape Spokesman Major General Walter Jertz,” Brussels, Belgium, 21 May 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990521a.htm. 137. Steven Pearlstein, “nato Bomb Said to Hit Belgrade Hospital,” Washington Post, 21 May 1999, a1. 138. Carlotta Gall, “Embassy Attack Followed by Defiance towardnato ,” New York Times, 10 May 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/10/world/crisis- in-the-balkans-belgrade-embassy-attack-followed-by-defiance-toward-nato. html. 139. Gall, “Embassy Attack Followed by Defiance.” 140. Gall, “Embassy Attack Followed by Defiance.” 141. Jertz, “Press Conference Given by nato Secretary General Javier Solana.” 142. Andrew Koch, “Yugoslavia’s Nuclear Legacy: Should We Worry?” Nonprolif- eration Review, Spring– Summer 1997, 123. 143. Koch, “Yugoslavia’s Nuclear Legacy,” 126. 144. Milos Antic, “Gen. Pavkovic Interviewed; Sees Army Return,” Nedeljni Telegraf, 26 August 1999, trans. fbis, http://www.ex-yupress.com/telegraf/telegraf5 .html. 145. Hosmer, Conflict over Kosovo, 96. 146. Clark, Waging Modern War, 230. 147. Clark, Waging Modern War, 230. 148. Clark, Waging Modern War, 230. 149. Clark, Waging Modern War, 230. 150. Clark, Waging Modern War, 231. 151. Dana Priest, “Army’s Apache Helicopter Rendered Impotent in Kosovo,” Washington Post, 29 December 1999, a1. 152. Priest, “Army’s Apache Helicopter,” a1. 153. Phillips, Operation Joint Guardian, 15. 154. Mark M. Hennes and Cory J. Delger, “fa Battalion c2 in Albania and Kosovo,” Field Artillery, January– February 2000, 20.

Notes to pages 87–89 245 155. Phillips, Operation Joint Guardian, 15. 156. Kenneth H. Bacon, “U.S. Attack Helicopters and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems to Deploy in Support Operation Allied Force,” DoD News Briefing, Press Release No. 145-99, 4 April 1999. 157. Priest, “Army’s Apache Helicopter,” a1. 158. Dittmer and Dawkins, “Deliberate Force,” 13. 159. Tim Youngs, Mark Oakes, Paul Bowers, and Mick Hillyard, “Kosovo: Opera- tion Allied Force,” compiled for members of Parliament (London: House of Commons Library, 29 April 1999), 20. 160. Youngs et al., “Kosovo: Operation Allied Force,” 20. 161. Gordon et al., “Task Force Hawk,” 55. 162. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 150. 163. Priest, “Army’s Apache Helicopter,” a1. 164. Thornburg, “Army Attack Aviation Shift,” 30. 165. Steven Lee Meyers, “Army Is Restructuring with Brigades for Rapid Deploy- ment,” New York Times, 13 October 1999. 166. Andreas Parch, “Lockheed Martin (ltv) mgm- 140 atacms,” Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles, http://www.designation-systems.net /dusrm/m-140.html. 167. Parch, “Lockheed Martin (ltv) mgm- 140 atacms.” 168. Priest, “Army’s Apache Helicopter,” a1. 169. Priest, “Army’s Apache Helicopter,” a1. 170. Department of Defense, Joint Operations, II- 14. 171. Lambeth, “Task Force Hawk,” 81. 172. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 154. 173. Clark, Waging Modern War, 320. 174. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 157. 175. John Corley, “Press Conference on the Kosovo Strike Assessment,” Brussels, Belgium, 16 September 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990916a.htm. 176. Richard Norton-Taylor, “How the Serb Army Escaped nato,” The Guardian, 8 March 2000, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/mar/09/balkans1. Also, based on comments from John T. Kuehn (24 January 2014) another factor is that navy regulations do not permit certain munitions from being recovered onboard a carrier by an arrested landing, based on previous experiences such as the uss Forrestal fire on 29 July 1967, which killed 134 sailors. For example, U.S. Navy aircraft do not recover with napalm or Gator (an air- delivered mine munition similar to fascam [Family of Scatterable Mines]). These sorts of weapons are termed “unrecoverable munitions.” The navy guidelines covering which munitions fall in this category are in Naval Air Training and Operat- ing Procedures Standardization (natops) manuals for the various types of aircraft and the Landing Signal Officerlso ( ) handbook.

246 Notes to pages 89–92 177. Wesley Clark, “Press Conference on the Kosovo Strike Assessment,” Brussels, Belgium, 16 September 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990916a.htm. 178. Bridgford, Hersey, and Varner, “Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force in Kosovo,” 11. 179. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 157. 180. Brandon Pollachek, “Guardrail Turns 40, Modernization Keeps It Going,” Official Homepage of the U.S. Army, News Archives, 7 July 2011, http://www.army.mil /article/61251/Guardrail_turns_40__modernization_keeps_it_going/. 181. Dixon, “uav Employment in Kosovo,” 5. 182. Brigford and Grossman, “bcd Targeting,” 17. 183. Brigford and Grossman, “bcd Targeting,” 17. 184. Brigford and Grossman, “bcd Targeting,” 18. 185. “Automated Deep Operations Coordination System— adocs, General Dynamics c4,” Defense Update, no. 3 (31 August 2006), http://defense-update.com/products/a /adocs.htm. 186. Dana Priest, “Kosovo Land Threat May Have Won War,” Washington Post, 19 September 1999, a1. 187. Priest, “Kosovo Land Threat,”a 1. 188. Brigford and Grossman, “bcd Targeting,” 19. 189. Brigford and Grossman, “bcd Targeting,” 19. 190. Priest, “Kosovo Land Threat,”a 1. According to the Washington Post, upon learning of the struggle at Mount Pastrik, Clark told his subordinates over the video-teleconference (vtc), “That mountain is not going to get lost. I’m not going to have Serbs on that mountain,” later adding, “We’ll pay for that hill with American blood if we don’t help [the kla] hold it.” 191. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 157. 192. Javier Solana, “nato Press Conference Transcript,” Brussels, Belgium, 10 June 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990610b.htm. 193. Steven Lee Myers, “Last Serbian Troops Pull Out of Kosovo,” New York Times, 21 June 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/21/world/crisis-in-the-balkans- withdrawal-last-serbian-troops-pull-out-of-kosovo.html. 194. Steven Lee Myers, “Yugoslav Army Not Hobbled as Believed/Serbs Hid Tanks, Used Decoys to Limit Damage,” New York Times, 28 June 1999. 195. Myers, “Yugoslav Army Not Hobbled.” 196. Christiane Amanpour, John King, Fill Dougherty, and Walter Rodgers, “Milosevic Indictment Makes History,” cnn, 27 May 1999, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD /europe/9905/27/kosovo.milosevic.04/index.html. 197. Amanpour et al., “Milosevic Indictment.” 198. LeBor, Milosevic, 294. 199. LeBor, Milosevic, 294. 200. LeBor, Milosevic, 294.

Notes to pages 92–96 247 201. Richard Lister, “Chernomyrdin Threatens Russian Withdrawal,” bbc News, 27 May 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/354872.stm. 202. Brzezinski, “Failed Double- Cross,” 328– 32. 203. Viktor Chernomyrdin, “Bombs Rule Out Talk of Peace,” Washington Post, 27 May 1999, a13. 204. Chapter 3 of this work covers these events. 205. Chernomyrdin, “Bombs Rule Out Talk of Peace,” a13. 206. Brzezinski, “Failed Double- Cross,” 330. 207. Clinton, My Life, 852. 208. Clinton, My Life, 852. 209. Michael A. Hammer, “fw: draft guidance, re: potus Yeltsin call,” e- mail sent 12 June 1999 at 1825 hours (edt), foia Request Collection 2006- 1185-f , National Archives and Records Administration, William Jefferson Clinton Library and Museum, Little Rock ar. 210. Clinton, My Life, 859. 211. Brzezinski, “Failed Double- Cross,” 331. 212. nato, “Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (kfor) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia” (Brussels, Belgium: nato, 9 June 1999), http:// www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm. 213. Clark, Waging Modern War, 375– 403. 214. Clark, Waging Modern War, 376. See this source for General Clark’s interpretation of the message he receives from Brig. Gen. Pete Chiarelli, his executive officer, regarding the incident. Based on Chiarelli’s report, Clark believed that the Russian troops were under orders “to occupy the Pristina airfield and receive reinforcements.” 215. Clark, Waging Modern War, 378– 80. 216. Michael Jackson, “My Clash with nato Chief,” The Telegraph, 4 September 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1562161/Gen-Sir-Mike- Jackson-My-clash-with-Nato-chief.html. 217. Clark, Waging Modern War, 378. 218. Jackson, “My Clash with nato Chief.” 219. Brzezinski, “Failed Double- Cross,” 331. 220. Clark, Waging Modern War, 385. 221. Tom Peck, “Singer James Blunt ‘Prevented World War 3’—Refused U.S. Order to Attack Russian troops,” Belfast Telegraph, 15 November 2010, http://www. belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/singer-james-blunt-prevented-world- war-3-refused-us-order-to-attack-russian-troops-28570698.html. Also see Clark, Waging Modern War, 375– 80. 222. Brzezinski, “Failed Double- Cross,” 331.

248 Notes to pages 96–98 223. National Security Council, “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin,” declassified documents concerning Russia, Clinton Digital Library, 14 June 1999, http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/ show/36619. 224. National Security Council, “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin.” 225. National Security Council, “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin.” 226. National Security Council, “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin.” 227. “Agreed Points on Russian Participation in kfor” (Helsinki, Finland: nato, 18 June 1999), http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990618a.htm. 228. Carlos Pascual (notetaker), “Meeting with President Yeltsin of Russia,” Memo- randum of Conversation, 20 June 1999, 1300– 1400 hours, Participants: President Clinton, Secretary Albright, Samuel Berger, Deputy Secretary Talbott, President Yeltsin Minister Ivanov, Minister Shapovalyants, Foreign Policy Advisor Prik- hodko, Deputy Minister Mamedov, Russian interpreter/U.S. interpreter Peter Afanasenko. Renaissance Hotel, Cologne, Germany, Declassified 23 October 2010, William Jefferson Clinton Library, http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/assets /storage/Research%20-%20Digital%20Library/Declassified/LP-WJC_NSS-4.pdf . Earlier, during a 12 June phone conversation, President Yeltsin told President Clinton that “our friendship had reached its limits,” but on 20 June, Yeltsin stated, “I agree with this formulation of the issues.” 229. William J. Clinton, “Telecon with Kosovar Leader Hashim Thaci,” Hyatt Hotel, Cologne, Germany (20 June 1999), declassified 15 May 2012, Clinton Presidential Library, http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/declassified.html. 230. Madeleine Albright, “Transcript of Interview with Jim Lehrer of Madeleine Albright,” pbs News Hour, 10 June 1999, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb /europe/jan-june99/albright_6-10.html. 231. Albright, “Transcript of Interview with Jim Lehrer.” 232. Keegan, “Please, Mr. Blair.”

4. After the Bombing 1. John Barry and Evan Thomas, “The Kosovo Cover- Up,” Newsweek 135, no. 20 (2000), 22. 2. Secretary William Cohen, General Hugh Shelton, and Major General Chuck Wald (j- 5), “DoD News Briefing” (Washingtondc : Pentagon, 10 June 1999), http://www.defense.gov/news/briefingslide.aspx?briefingslideid=246. See press briefing slide entitled: “nato Effectiveness against Serb Ground Mobile Tar- gets in Kosovo (Cumulative).”

Notes to pages 99–103 249 3. William S. Cohen, “DoD News Briefing Transcript,” DoD Press Operations (Washington dc: The Pentagon, 10 June 1999, 1605 hours edt), http://www. defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=487. 4. Cohen, “DoD News Briefing Transcript.” 5. McNaugher, “Real Meaning of Military Transformation,” 140. 6. Steven Lee Myers, “Damage to Serb Military Less than Expected,” New York Times, 28 June 1999, a1, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/28/world/crisis-in- the-balkans-the-toll-damage-to-serb-military-less-than-expected.html. 7. Myers, “Damage to Serb Military,” a1. 8. Grant, “True Blue,” 75. 9. Grant, “True Blue,” 75. 10. Barry and Thomas, “Kosovo Cover- Up,” 23. 11. Douglas Macgregor, e- mail message to author, 4 February 2014, Colonel Macgregor (ret.) served as the Director of Joint Operations at Supreme Head- quarters Allied Powers Europe (shape) during Operation Allied Force. The statement quoted in the text was part of a longer e-mail exchange discussing the challenges of targeting mobile ground forces. 12. Douglas Macgregor, e- mail to author on 26 August 2014. 13. Barry and Thomas, “Kosovo Cover- Up,” 23. 14. Wesley Clark (saceur) and John Corley (Chief, Kosovo meat), “Press Con- ference on the Kosovo Strike Assessment,” nato Headquarters, Brussels, 16 September 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/slides/m990916a.htm. 15. Clark and Corley, “Press Conference.” See the chart entitled “Final versus Initial Assessment.” 16. Clark and Corley, “Press Conference.” See the portion of transcript associated with “Final versus Initial Assessment” chart. 17. Barry and Thomas, “Kosovo Cover- Up,” 23. 18. Hosmer, Conflict over Kosovo, 83. 19. Hosmer, Conflict over Kosovo, 83. 20. Grant, “True Blue,” 74. 21. Grant, “True Blue,” 76. 22. Hosmer, Conflict over Kosovo, 84. 23. Tissue, “21 Minutes to Belgrade,” 40. 24. Tissue, “21 Minutes to Belgrade,” 40. 25. Haave and Haun, a- 10s over Kosovo, 141. 26. Haave and Haun, a- 10s over Kosovo, 141. 27. Haave and Haun, a- 10s over Kosovo, 141. 28. Nardulli et al., Disjointed War, 114. 29. Nardulli et al., Disjointed War, 77. 30. Hal Klopper, “U.S. Army Evaluated New Fuel Tank for ah- 64d Apache Longbows,” Boeing, 2 February 1997, http://boeing.mediaroom.

250 Notes to pages 103–111 com/1997-10-13-U.S.-Army-Evaluates-New-Fuel-Tank-For-AH-64D-Apache- Longbows-Internal-Unit-Offers-Greater-Range-Increased-Safety-in-Combat. 31. Nardulli et al., Disjointed War, 83. 32. Curtin, “Kosovo Air Operations, 19. 33. Curtin, “Kosovo Air Operations,” 15. 34. Nardulli et al., Disjointed War, 140. 35. Ricks, Fiasco, 119. 36. bbc, “Iraq Shows Off Apache Crew,” 25 March 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/middle_east/2883043.stm. 37. Puttre, “Rethinking Combat-Helicopter Doctrine,” 28. 38. Department of the Army, fm 1- 112, 1– 7, also see chap. 3, “Employment.” 39. Cordesman, “Effectiveness of thenato Tactical Air,” 18–19. 40. Clark, Waging Modern War, 352. 41. Clark, Waging Modern War, 352. 42. Mark Urban, “nato’s Inner Kosovo Conflict,” bbc News, 20 August 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/425468.stm. 43. Walter Jertz, “Press Conference Given by Mr. Jamie Shea and Major General Walter Jertz,” nato Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 6 May 1999, http:// www.nato.int/kosovo/all-frce.htm. 44. Cohen and Shelton, “Department of Defense Kosovo/Operation Allied Force,” 82. 45. Myers, “Damage to Serb Military.” 46. Myers, “Damage to Serb Military.” 47. Cordesman, “nato Tactical Air and Missile Campaign,” 24. 48. Cordesman, “nato Tactical Air and Missile Campaign,” 24. 49. Sun Tzu, “The Attack by Fire,” inSun Tzu on the Art of War, chap. 12. 50. Clark, Waging Modern War, 424. 51. Shelton, Without Hesitation, 370. 52. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 343. 53. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 225. 54. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 225. 55. This is evident in that both authors are signatories on documents published by the “Project for the New American Century,” an organization that advocated intervention in Iraq. 56. “Biography of Benjamin S. Lambeth,” rand, http://www.rand.org/about/ people/l/lambeth_benjamin_s.html. 57. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 161. 58. Lambeth, nato’s Air War for Kosovo, 276. 59. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 225, where they argue that Clinton pursued a “minimalist strategy” in a situation where “decisive military action” was a better strategy. In nato’s Air War for Kosovo, Lambeth is

Notes to pages 111–115 251 critical of the “gradualism” applied by nato during Operation Allied Force (250). 60. Hosmer, Conflict over Kosovo, 125. 61. Hosmer, Conflict over Kosovo, 129. 62. Milenko Vasovic, “Serbia’s Incredible Reconstruction,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting no. 115 (11 February 2000), http://iwpr.net/report-news/ serbias-incredible-reconstruction. 63. Hosmer, Conflict over Kosovo, 104– 5. 64. Elaine Sciolino, “Madeleine Albright’s Audition,” New York Times, 22 Sep- tember 1996. 65. Sciolino, “Madeleine Albright’s Audition.” 66. Branch, Clinton Tapes, 555. 67. “Location of Kosovo?” Gallup, 19 February 1999, http://media.leidenuniv .nl /legacy/Poll%20Data%20Kosovo.pdf. Pollsters asked respondents the following question: “Just from what you might know, which of the following would you say best describes Kosovo?” The choices were a) Is in the Balkans region of Central Europe, north of Greece; b) It is located in Central Asia, and was part of the Soviet Union before it broke up; c) Is in Central African and was a former possession; d) Is in Southeast Asia, near Burma and Cambodia; or e) Don’t know. Based on these questions (sample size N = 1,000) 42 percent selected a; 26 percent selected b; 8 percent selected c or d; 24 percent selected e. 68. “Which Side Is the US Supporting and Opposing in Kosovo,” Los Angeles Times, polling data, 25 March 1999, http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/Poll%20 Data%20Kosovo.pdf. Respondents were asked, “Do you know which side the United States is supporting (in Kosovo) or haven’t you heard enough about it yet to say? (If yes, ask:) Which group is the U.S. opposing?” Only 37 percent of respondents said that the U.S. supported the Albanian Kosovars, given four possible choices (N = 544). 69. “Which Side Will the US Be Bombing?” Fox News, polling data, 7–8 April 1999, http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/Poll%20Data%20Kosovo.pdf. The question was, “From what you know about the conflict in Kosovo, which side will the United States be bombing: the Serbs, or the Albanians?” 70. Branch, Clinton Tapes, 555. 71. Barbara F. Walter, “Why Does the U.S. Suddenly Prefer Its Enemies Dead?” 21 September 2012, http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2012/09/21/why-does -the-us-suddenly-prefers-its-enemies-dead/. Also see “Most in U.S. Favor Death If Saddam Is Convicted,” Associated Press, 8 March 2006. 72. Knecht, Paying Attention, 1. 73. Knecht, Paying Attention, 1. 74. Knecht, Paying Attention, 1. 75. Kim, “Kosovo and the 106th Congress,” 14.

252 Notes to pages 116–118 76. Clinton, My Life, 851. Clinton mentioned both Congress and Britain’s efforts to expand the campaign, writing, “opposition to our policy was coming from both directions.” 77. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 97. 78. Clinton, My Life, 851. 79. Clinton, My Life, 859. 80. Clinton, My Life, 859. 81. William J. Clinton, “Remarks by the President to Whiteman Air Force Base Personnel,” Whiteman Air Force Base Knob Nobster, Missouri, 11 June 1999 (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary), http://clinton6.nara. gov/1999/06/1999-06-11-remarks-by-the-president-at-whiteman-afb.html. 82. Clinton, “Remarks by the President.” 83. Jamie Shea, “Press Conference of nato Spokesman, Jamie Shea and Air Commodore, David Wilby, shape” (Brussels: nato Headquarters, 28 March 1999), http://www.nato.int/kosovo/all-frce.htm. 84. Steve Erlanger, “Milosevic Yields on nato’s Key Terms: 50,000 Allied Troops to Police Kosovo,” New York Times, 4 June 1999, http://www.nytimes .com/1999/06/04/world/crisis-balkans-overview-milosevic-yields-nato-s-key -terms-50000-allied-troops.html. 85. Power, Problem from Hell, 450. 86. Clark, Waging Modern War, 235. 87. Clark, Waging Modern War, 235. 88. Bill Hemmer, “New Surge of Kosovo Refugees Threatens to Overwhelm Camps,” cnn, 27 April 1999, http://www.cnn.com/world/europe/9904/27 /kosovo.refugees.02/. 89. Hemmer, “New Surge of Kosovo Refugees.” 90. Matthew Chance and Wolf Blitzer, “Clinton Leaves Balkans Hailed a Hero by Kosovar Albanians,” cnn, 23 June 1999, http://www.cnn.com/world /europe/9906/22/clinton.05/. 91. Charles Babington and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Kosovo Albanians Greet Clinton with Cheers, Tears,” Washington Post, 23 June 1999, a1, http://www.washing tonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/clinton062399.htm. 92. Babington and Smith, “Kosovo Albanians,” a1. 93. Babington and Smith, “Kosovo Albanians,” a1. 94. Glyn Davies, “Subject: re: ru tv Interview,” foia Request Collection 2006- 1185-f , Box 1, National Archives and Records Administration, William Jefferson Clinton Library and Museum, Little Rockar . 95. Babington and Smith, “Kosovo Albanians,” a1. 96. George W. Bush, “Presidential Debate Excerpts: Gov. George W. Bush vs. Vice President Al Gore,” pbs News Hour, Transcript, 12 October 2000, http://www .pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec00/for-policy_10-12.html.

Notes to pages 118–122 253 97. Bush, “Presidential Debate Excerpts.” 98. Howard Fineman, “A President Finds His True Voice,” Newsweek, 24 September 2001, 50. 99. Powell, My American Journey, rev. ed., 608– 42. 100. David Cohen, “Hidden Treasures: What’s So Controversial about Picasso’s Guernica?” Slate Magazine, 6 February 2003, http://www.slate.com/articles /news_and_politics/the_gist/2003/02/hidden_treasures.html. 101. John Corum, “The Persistent Myths of Guernica,” Military History Quarterly 22, no. 4 (2010): 16. 102. Corum, “Persistent Myths of Guernica,” 16. 103. Corum, “Persistent Myths of Guernica,” 16. 104. Israel, Kill for Peace, 22. 105. Margaret Warner and John Warden, “Shock and Awe Strategy on Day 3 of the Iraq War,” pbs News Hour, 21 March 2003, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb /military/jan-june03/military_03-21.html. In the opening question of Warner’s interview with Warden, she asked, “Col. Warden, are we finally seeing the shock and awe campaign that we were expecting?” To which Warden replied, “Margaret, I think we’re seeing a pretty good chunk of it and certainly we are seeing an awfully impressive display of our ability to bring very large numbers of important strategic targets under attack at the same time. I would find it very difficult to conceive of how those utterly critical internal security organizations, the things on which Saddam Hussein depends, I find it very difficult to think that they could really be functioning and could maintain the degree of repression that they need to if even the guy is still alive.” Warner: “Very carefully selected targets.” Warden: “Very carefully selected.”

5. The U.S. Army Reacts to Kosovo 1. Bradley Graham, “Air Force, Army Battle for Lead in Future Wars,” Wash- ington Post, 22 June 1999, A1. 2. Tilford, “Halt Phase Strategy,” 3. 3. Tilford, “Halt Phase Strategy,” 4. 4. For a discussion on the Army’s reaction to Air Sea Battle, see Kuehn, “Air-Sea Battle and Its Discontents,” 43– 47. 5. Thomas Ricks, “Gung- Ho but Slow: Why the U.S. Army Is Ill- Equipped to Move into Kosovo Quickly,” Wall Street Journal, 16 April 1999, a1. 6. Ricks, “Gung- Ho but Slow.” 7. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx, 73– 89. 8. Douglas Macgregor, “Rumsfeld’s War,” pbs Frontline, transcript of interview with Douglas Macgregor, 26 October 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages /frontline/shows/pentagon/interviews/macgregor.html. 9. Macgregor, “Rumsfeld’s War.”

254 Notes to pages 122–126 10. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx, 95– 131. 11. Derrick Z. Jackson, “Beware Military Hype on Technology,” Boston Globe, 26 March 2003, a15. 12. Joe Burlass, “Commentary on Farewell Speech: Shinseki Leaves Indelible Legacy of Irreversible Momentum,” 11 June 2003, http://www.army.mil/fea tures/ShinsekiFarewell/FarewellArticle.htm. 13. Vick et al., “Stryker Brigade Combat Team,” iii. 14. Eric K. Shinseki, “csa Sends: The Army Black Beret,” csa Message, 3 Novem- ber 2000, http://www.army.mil/features/beret/beret.htm. 15. Department of the Army, “Future Combat Systems.” 16. Alec Klein, “The Army’s $200 Billion Makeover,” Washington Post, 7 December 2007, a01. 17. Klein, “Army’s $200 Billion Makeover.” 18. Weigley, American Way of War, xxii. 19. Builder, Masks of War, 123. 20. Builder, Masks of War. 21. U.S. Army and Creative Technologies, Inc., “Assault on Normandy,” http:// vimeo.com/album/52169/video/2636689. 22. Keith Johnson, “Mission Impossible,” Time, 8 February 1971, 1. 23. In 1971 the U.S. Army’s slogan was “Today’s Army Wants to Join You”; in 1973, “Join the People Who’ve Joined the Army”; in 1978, “This Is the Army”; in 1981, “Be All That You Can Be”; in 2001, “Army of One”; and in 2006, “Army Strong.” Mary Kate Chambers and David Verdum, “Army Recruiting Messages Help Keep the Army Rolling Along,” United States Army News, 9 October 2006, http://www.army.mil/-news/2006/10/09/322-army-recruiting-messages-help- keep-army-rolling-along/. 24. Department of the Army, fm 3- 0 (2001), foreword. 25. De Jomini, The Art of War, xii. 26. Department of the Army, fm 100- 5 (1976), 1– 2. 27. Department of the Army, fm 100- 5 (1976), 1– 3. 28. Department of the Army, fm 100- 5 (1976), 1– 3. 29. Department of the Army, fm 100- 5 (1976), 1– 2. 30. U.S. Army Center of Military History, The Whirlwind War, ed. Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus (Washingtondc : Government Printing Office, 2001), 29– 33. 31. Department of the Army, fm 100- 5 (1976), 1. 32. Department of the Army, fm 100- 5 (1976), 3– 4. 33. Fishback, “U.S. Army Operations Doctrine,” 7. 34. Fishback, “U.S. Army Operations Doctrine.” 35. Kagan, Finding the Target, 59. 36. Kretchik, U.S. Army Doctrine, 202.

Notes to pages 126–133 255 37. Kretchik, U.S. Army Doctrine. 38. Monson, “Star Wars and AirLand Battle,” 621. 39. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, “New Technology fornato ,” 3. 40. Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, “Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces and Doctrine through the 1990s,” National Intelligence Estimate, Key Judgments and Executive Summary (14 November 1989), 9. This section indicated that the Soviets could only sustain combat operations for thirty to forty- five days, providednato could seal off or prevent a breakthrough for a period of fourteen days. At this point, the Soviets would have to move stocks from the strategic reserve. 41. Farington, Confrontation, 133. 42. Farington, Confrontation, 133. 43. McNaugher, “Refining Army Transformation,” 295. 44. Global Security, “reforger,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops /reforger.htm. 45. John Matsumura et al., Exploring Advanced Technologies, xvii. 46. Robin Hughes, “Israel Armor Protection System ‘Revolutionary,’ ” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 16 March 2005. 47. Joseph N. Mait and Jon G. Grossman, “Relevancy and Risk: The U.S. Army and Future Combat Systems,” Defense Horizons, May 2002, 4. 48. Greg Grant, “U.S. Army Drops c-130 Requirement for fcs,” Defense News, 26 September 2005. 49. Kris Osborne, “Iraq War Drove Weight of fcs Vehicles,” Defense News, 10 April 2007. 50. Lussier, “Army’s Future Combat Systems Program,” 36. 51. The variables used to calculate deployment time are tonnage, dimensions, number of aircraft, hours each aircraft will fly, and time needed to fly to and from destination. Using the air force’s planned fleet of 180 c-17 aircraft, given the distance from Savannah ga to Djibouti, East Africa, assuming that airfields will be used for 24 hours per day, and that it would take 3.5 hours to unload equipment. Based on: Department of the Air Force, Air Mobility Command, “Air Mobility Planning Factors,” Pamphlet 10-1403 (18 December 2003). rand estimates are more optimistic, as they are based on a higher sortie rate, yet still short of the goal. 52. Vick et al., “Stryker Brigade Combat Team,” 124–25. 53. Vick et al., “Stryker Brigade Combat Team,” 124– 25. 54. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Role of Lead Systems Integrator,” 1. This amount can purchase fifteen brigades’ worth of equipment. 55. Krammer, “Operation pluto,” 441– 66. 56. Steven Anders, “pol on the Red Ball Express,” Quartermaster Professional Bulletin, Spring 1989, 2.

256 Notes to pages 133–140 57. Anders, “pol on the Red Ball Express,” 2. 58. Anne Flaherty, “Military Feels Fuel Cost Gouge in Iraq,” Huffington Post, 3 April 2008. 59. National Research Council Committee to Perform a Technology Assessment Focused on Logistics Support Requirements for Future Army Combat Systems, “Reducing the Logistics Burden.” 60. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Com- mittee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 1 April 2004, in “Defense Acquisitions: The Army’s Future Combat Systems’ Features, Risks, and Alter- natives” (Washington dc: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004), 10. 61. Alec Klein, “The Complex Crux of Wireless Warfare,”Washington Post, 24 January, 2008, d1. 62. Klein, “Complex Crux.” 63. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Role of Lead Systems Integrator,” 1. 64. Klein, “Complex Crux.” 65. Bassett and Emery, “soscoe,” 21. 66. Jean-Pierre Lutz, “Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intel- ligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,” Army, December 2005, 49. 67. Defense Science Board Task Force, “Mission Impact,” 97. 68. Scales, “Infantry and National Priorities.” 69. Colgen, “America’s Premier Land Power Advocate,” http://www.colgen.net /home/ (accessed 19 June 2014). 70. Colgen, “Clients,” http://www.colgen.net/clients.html (accessed 19 June 2014). 71. Robert H. Scales Jr., “Future Combat Systems: Its Origin and Operational Concept,” 3 June 2007, PowerPoint presentation, slide 18. 72. Scales, “Future Combat Systems,” slide 18. 73. Scales, Future Warfare Anthology, 108. 74. Scales, Future Warfare Anthology, 108. 75. Scales, Future Warfare Anthology, 96. 76. Cole, General William E. DePuy, 167. 77. Matsumura et al., Exploring Advanced Technologies, 4. 78. Branch, Clinton Tapes, 552. 79. Branch, Clinton Tapes, 552. 80. Matsumura et al., Exploring Advanced Technologies, 74. 81. Creative Technologies, “Basic Info,” Facebook, 26 August 2011, https://www .facebook.com/pages/Creative-Technologies-Inc-CTI/186615114742476?sk=info (accessed 19 June 2014). 82. U.S. Army and Creative Technologies, Inc., “Ready to Go,” http://vimeo.com /album/52169/video/2621821 (accessed 19 June 2014). 83. U.S. Army and Creative Technologies, “A Soldier’s Perspective,” http://vimeo .com/album/52169/video/2843591.

Notes to pages 140–146 257 84. U.S. Army and Creative Technologies, “Vanguards,” http://vimeo.com /album/52169/video/2584791 (accessed 19 June 2014). 85. Noah Shachtman, “Pentagon Chief Rips Heart out of Army’s ‘Future,’ ” Wired, 6 April 2009, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/04/gates-rips-hear/. 86. Gates, Duty, 320. 87. Shachtman, “Pentagon Chief.” 88. Robert Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (January/February 2009), 39– 40. 89. Donald Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2002), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2002-05-01/transforming-military. 90. Tom Vanden Brook and Ken Dilanian, “Gates Orders Overhaul of Pentagon Mentor Program,” usa Today, 2 April 2010, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com /news/military/2010-04-01-mentors_N.htm.

6. Spring in Libya 1. Elizabeth Day, “The Slap That Sparked a Revolution,”The Guardian, 14 May 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/15/arab-spring-tunisia -the-slap. Hamdi claims that she did not slap Bouazizi, and that protestors made her into a scapegoat. Hamdi later said, “I would never have hit him [Bouazizi]. It was impossible because I am a woman, first of all, and I live in a traditionally Arab community which bans a woman from hitting a man. And, secondly, I was frightened . . . . I was only doing my job.” 2. Kareem Fahim, “Slap to a Man’s Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia,” New York Times, 21 January 2011, a1. 3. Day, “The Slap.” 4. npr Staff, “The Arab Spring: A Year of Revolution,”National Public Radio, 17 December 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/12/17/143897126/the -arab-spring-a-year-of-revolution. 5. npr Staff, “The Arab Spring.” 6. npr Staff, “The Arab Spring.” 7. Lynch, “Obama’s ‘Arab Spring.’ ” 8. Joseph Massad, “The ‘Arab Spring’ and Other American Seasons,”Al Jazeera America, 29 August 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opin ion/2012/08/201282972539153865.html. 9. William Edwards, “Violent Protests Rock Libyan City of Benghazi,” France 24, 16 February 2014, http://www.france24.com/en/20110216-libya-violent-protests- rock-benghazi-anti-government-gaddafi-egypt-tunisia-demonstration/. 10. Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Abu Salim Prison Massacre Remembered,” 27 June 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/27/libya-abu- salim-prison -massacre-remembered. 11. Bassiouni, Libya, 515.

258 Notes to pages 146–151 12. Earlier, on 15 February 2006, Italian politician Roberto Calderoli removed his shirt on live television to reveal an offensive T- shirt underneath that had a condescending cartoon caricature of the prophet Muhammad. A week before cartoonists had published a caricature of Muhammad in a Dutch newspaper, sparking animosity throughout Islamic populations, and Calderoli’s T-shirt featured the same image. After the T- shirt incident, Italian Prime Minis- ter Berlusconi asked Calderoli to resign, amid outcries from those insulted throughout the Muslim world. By 18 February 2006, Calderoli had resigned. 13. @ChangeinLibya, tweet sent 1412 hours, 15 February 2011, https://twitter.com /ChangeInLibya/status/37635463640514561. 14. Amira Al Hussaini, “Libya: Protests Begin in Benghazi Ahead of February 17 Day of Wrath,” Global Voices, 16 February 2011, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/02/16 /libya-protests-begin-in-benghazi-ahead-of-february-17-day-of-wrath/. 15. Al Jazeera, “Day of Rage Kicks Off in Libya,” 17 February 2011, http://www .aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201121755057219793.html. 16. Al Hussaini, “Libya.” 17. Ian Black, “Libya’s Day of Rage Met by Bullets and Loyalists,” The Guardian, 17 February 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/17/libya -day-of-rage-unrest. 18. Ian Black, “Libya Cracks Down on Protesters after Violent Clash in Benghazi,” The Guardian, 16 February 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011 /feb/16/libya-clashes-benghazi. 19. Pollock, “People Power 2.0.” Gaddafi’s forces killed Nabbous on 19 March 2011. 20. Pollock, “People Power 2.0.” 21. Bassiouni, Libya, 515. 22. News 24, “Libya: 130 Soldiers Executed,” 23 February 2011, http://www.news24 .com/Africa/News/Libya-130-soldiers-executed-20110223. 23. John Hooper and Ian Black, “Libya Defectors: Pilots Told to Bomb Protestors Flee to Malta,” The Guardian, 21 February 2011, http://www.theguardian.com /world/2011/feb/21/libya-pilots-flee-to-malta. 24. Hooper and Black, “Libya Defectors.” 25. Guardian News and Media, “Defection of Gaddafi’s Right Hand Man Raised Questions,” Sydney Morning Herald, 5 August 2011, http://www.smh.com.au/ comment/obituaries/defection-of-gaddafis-righthand-man-raised-questions- 20110804-1iddx.html. 26. Translated by Sultan Al Qassemi (@SultanAlQassemi on Twitter); Clay Claiborne, “The Assassination of General Abdul Fattah Younis,” Daily Kos, 7 August 2011, http://m.dailykos.com/story/2011/08/07/1002918/-The -Assassination-of-General-Abdul-Fattah-Younis. 27. John Simpson, “Libya’s Rebel Chief Who Never Won Trust,” bbc News, 29 July 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14349736.

Notes to pages 151–154 259 28. Simpson, “Libya’s Rebel Chief.” 29. Chris Stephen, “Gaddafi’s Right- Hand Man to Libya’s Rebel Leader,” The Guardian, 28 July 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/28 /abdul-fatah-younes-profile. 30. Claiborne, “Assassination of General Abdul Fattah Younis.” 31. David Gritten, “Key Figures in Libya’s Rebel Council,” bbc News, 25 August 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12698562. 32. Kareem Fahim, “Rebel Insider Concedes Weaknesses Inside Libya,” New York Times, 23 March 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/world /africa/24minister.html?_r=0. 33. Gritten, “Key Figures.” 34. Mark Urban, “The Task of Forming a More Effective Anti- Gaddafi Army,” bbc News, 15 April 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/markur ban/2011/04/the_task_of_forming_a_more_eff.html. 35. Urban, “Task of Forming.” 36. Brian Todd, Tim Lister, and Katie Glaeser, “Khalifa Haftar: The Man Who Left Virginia to Lead Libya’s Rebels,” cnn, 4 April 2011, http://www.cnn .com/2011/WORLD/africa/04/04/libya.rebel.leader/. 37. Neil A. Lewis, “350 Libyans Trained to Oust Gaddafi Are to Come to U.S.,” New York Times, 17 May 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/17/world/350 -libyans-trained-to-oust-qaddafi-are-to-come-to-us.html. 38. Lewis, “350 Libyans.” 39. Clyde R. Mark, “Libya,” crs Issue Brief, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service Reports for Congress (Washington dc: Library of Congress, 19 December 1996), http://fas.org/man/crs/93-109.htm. 40. Mark, “Libya.” 41. Lewis, “350 Libyans.” 42. Todd et al., “Khalifa Haftar.” 43. Todd et al., “Khalifa Haftar.” 44. Todd et al., “Khalifa Haftar.” 45. Todd et al., “Khalifa Haftar.” 46. World View from Off the Strip, “Maj Gen Suleiman Mahmoud Al- Obeidy Offi- cially Defects,” 23 February 2011, http://www.sandraoffthestrip.com/2011/02/23/ maj-gen-suleiman-mahmoud-officially-defects/. 47. Suleiman Mahmoud Obeidi, “Rommel in Libya,” http://rommelinlibya.com/. 48. Wehrey, “Hidden Story of Airpower in Libya.” 49. Wehrey, “Hidden Story of Airpower in Libya.” 50. Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Inside Libya’s Rebel Movement,” The Daily Beast, 4 March 2011, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/03/04/inside-libyas -rebel-movement.html. 51. Dehghanpisheh, “Inside Libya’s Rebel Movement.”

260 Notes to pages 154–158 52. Richard Adams, Paul Owen, David Batty, and Matthew Taylor, “Gaddafi Speech and Libya Turmoil,” The Guardian, 24 February 2011, http://www.theguardian .com/global/blog/2011/feb/24/gaddafi-speech-libya-turmoil-live-reaction. 53. Adams et al., “Gaddafi Speech.” 54. O’Brien and Sinclair, “Libyan War,” 11. 55. Bobby Ghosh, “Gaddafi’s Last Stand,” Time, 7 March 2011, http://content.time .com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2055193,00.html. 56. Hooper and Black, “Libya Defectors.” 57. Hooper and Black, “Libya Defectors.” 58. Ali al-Essawi, “Nations’ Feedback on Libyan Uprising,” Tripoli Post, 23 Febru- ary 2011, http://www.tripolipost.com/articledetail.asp?c=1&i=5463. 59. Al Jazeera, “Libyan Diplomats Defect en Masse,” 22 February 2011, http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201122275739377867.html. 60. Hooper and Black, “Libya Defectors.” 61. “un Vote Approves Libya No- Fly Zone; China, Russia Abstain,” Inter national Business Times, 17 March 2011, http://www.ibtimes.com /un -vote-approves-libya-no-fly-zone-china-russia-abstain-276107. 62. “un Vote Approves Libya No- Fly Zone.” 63. Taylor Owen and Anouk Day, “r2p: More than a Slogan,” Toronto Star, 5 April 2011, http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2011/04/05 /r2p_more_than_a_slogan.html. 64. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, “The Lopsided U.N. Security Council Vote on Libya,” The Daily Beast, 19 March 2011, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/03/19 /un-security-council-vote-on-libya-why-bric-countries-abstained.html. 65. Severin Weiland and Roland Nelles, “Germany Has Marginalized Itself over Libya,” Spiegel Online, 18 March 2011, http://www.theguardian.com /commentisfree/2011/mar/18/libya-germany-un-security-council. 66. Richard Rosseau, “Why Germany Abstained on un Resolution 1973 on Libya,” Foreign Policy Journal, 22 June 2011, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal .com/2011/06/22/why-germany-abstained-on-un-resolution-1973-on-libya/. 67. Owen and Day, “r2p.” 68. Gates, Duty, 518. 69. Jeffery M. Jones, “Americans Shift to More Negative View of Libya Military Action,” Gallup.com, 24 June 2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/148196/amer icans-shift-negative-view-libya-military-action.aspx. Interviews conducted as part of Gallup Daily tracking, N = 999 adults nationwide and margin of error ±4. 70. Gates, Duty, 519. 71. Gates, Duty, 512. 72. Gates, Duty, 512. 73. Power, Problem from Hell, outside cover page.

Notes to pages 158–162 261 74. Terry Atlas, “Power Brings Passion to Stop Genocide as Obama’s un Pick,” Bloomberg, 5 June 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-05/power -brings-passion-to-stop-genocide-as-obama-s-un-pick.html. 75. Atlas, “Power Brings Passion.” 76. Joy Lin, “McCain Rejects Idea That U.S. Can’t Afford No- Fly Zone in Libya,” Fox News, 2 March 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/03/02 /mccain-rejects-idea-that-us-cant-afford-no-fly-zone-in-libya/. 77. Gates, Duty, 521. 78. nato, “Operation Unified Protector: Protection of Civilians and Civilian- Populated Areas,” fact sheet, Public Diplomacy Division, June 2011, http://www .nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_06/20110608_Factsheet-UP_Protec tion_Civilians.pdf. 79. Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis, “nato’s Success in Libya,” New York Times, 30 October 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/opinion/31iht -eddaalder31.html. 80. Kim Willsher, “Sarkozy Opposes nato Taking Control of Libya Operation,” The Guardian, 22 March 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/22 /sarkozy-nato-libya-france. 81. Clinton, Hard Choices, 371– 72. 82. Clinton, Hard Choices, 376. 83. Lindström and Zetterlund, “Setting the Stage,” 26. 84. Jay Carney, “Press Briefing,” 25 March 2011, 1336 hours edt, The White House, Washington dc, http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video /video/2011/03/25/press-briefing. 85. United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1973,” 17 March 2011, http:// www.jfcnaples.nato.int/resources/24/Documents/UNSCR_1973.pdf. 86. Justin Elliott, “Will Obama Violate the Arms Embargo in Libya?” Salon, 28 March 2011, http://www.salon.com/2011/03/28/obama_libya_arming_rebels/. 87. Rod Nordland, “Libyan Rebels Say They’re Being Sent Weapons,”New York Times, 16 April 2011. 88. Philippe Gelie, “La France a parachute des armes aux rebelles libyens,” Le Figaro, 28 June 2011, http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2011/06/28/01003 -20110628ARTFIG00704-la-france-a-parachute-des-armes-aux-rebelles-libyens. php. 89. Reuters, “Italy to Supply Libyan Rebels with Arms: Spokesman,” 7 May 2011, http:// www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/07/us-libya-italy-idUSTRE74620K20110507. 90. James Risen, Mark Mazzetti, and Michael S. Schmidt, “U.S.- Approved Arms for Libya Rebels Fell into Jihadis’ Hands,” New York Times, 5 December 2012. 91. Wesley K. Clark, “Gen. Wesley Clark Says Libya Doesn’t Meet the Test for U.S. Military Action,” Washington Post, 11 March 2011.

262 Notes to pages 162–166 92. Caspar Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power,” Remarks Prepared for Delivery by the Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, to the National Press Club, Washington dc, 28 November 1984. 93. Colin Powell served as the senior military assistant to Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger in 1984. In this role, he helped Weinberger with the speech and adopted a similar mindset as outlined in the speech when serving as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President George H. W. Bush. 94. Nielsen and Snider, American Civil- Military Relations, 310. 95. Clark, “Gen. Wesley Clark Says Libya.” 96. Jake Tapper, “Where Is Romney on Libya?” abc News, 20 October 2011, http:// abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/10/where-is-mitt-romney-on-libya/. 97. David Remnick, “Behind the Curtain,” New Yorker, 5 September 2011, http:// www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2011/09/05/110905taco_talk_remnick. 98. Clinton, Hard Choices, 376. 99. Richard Adams, Warren Murray, and Jo Adetunji, “Libya Attacks under Way,” The Guardian, 19 March 2011; Alan Cromwell and Steve Erlanger, “France Becomes First Country to Recognize Libyan Rebels,” New York Times, 10 March 2011; Patrick J. McDonnell, “British, French Attack Helicopters en Route to Libya,” Los Angeles Times, 24 May 2011; Mail and Guardian [Africa], “nato Uses Apache Helicopters to Strike Libya Targets,” 4 June 2011, http://mg.co .za/article/2011-06-04-nato-uses-apache-helicopters-to-strike-libya-targets. 100. Walter J. Boyne, “Operation El Dorado Canyon,” Air Force Magazine, 82, no. 3 (1999), 56– 62. 101. Boyne, “Operation El Dorado Canyon,” 58. 102. Boyne, “Operation El Dorado Canyon,” 62. 103. Peter Walker, “Gaddafi’s Daughter Hana Dead,”The Guardian, 26 August 2011. 104. Patrick Muller, “Gaddafis Kinder— Totgesagte Leben Länger,” Die Welt, 8 June 2011, http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article13530021/Gaddafis-Kinder- totgesagte-leben-laenger.html (translated from German to English by Google Translate). 105. Muller, “Gaddafis Kinder.” 106. Ruth Styles, “Gaddafi’s Love of Late Night Plastic Surgery Revealed: Doctor Tells of Operations Done in a Bunker without the Use of Anesthetic because Despot Was Afraid He Would Be Murdered,” The Daily Mail, 2 February 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2550473/Gaddafis-plastic-surgeon -tells-operations-bunker-WITHOUT-anaesthetic-despot-afraid-murdered.html. 107. Mad Dog: The Secret World of Muammar Gaddafi, dir. Christopher Olgiati (London: British Broadcasting Company, 2014). 108. Mad Dog.

Notes to pages 167–170 263 109. Guy Walters, “The Terrible Truth about Gaddafi’s Harem: How Libyan Dictator Kidnapped and Raped Dozens of Women to Fulfil His Perverted Desires,”Mail Online, 23 October 2013, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2474533/The -terrible-truth-Gaddafis-harem.html; and Annick Cojean,Gaddafi’s Harem: The Story of a Young Woman and the Abuses of Power in Libya, trans. Marjolijn de Jager (New York: Grove Press, 2013). 110. Walters, “Terrible Truth about Gaddafi’s Harem.” 111. Ben Quinn and Jonathan Haynes, “Gaddafi Speech and Libya Unrest— As It Happened,” The Guardian, 22 February 2011, http://www.theguardian.com /world/blog/2011/feb/22/libya-gaddafi-speech-reaction-live-updates. 112. Cojean, Gaddafi’s Harem, 76. 113. Quinn and Haynes, “Gaddafi Speech.” 114. nato, “nato Ready to Support International Efforts on Libya,” 15 March 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_71446.htm. 115. Gates, Duty, 516. 116. U.S. africom Public Affairs, “Transcript: Update by Admiral Locklear on Operation Odyssey Dawn,” 22 March 2011, http://www.africom.mil/newsroom /article/8109/transcript-update-by-admiral-locklear-iii-on-opera. 117. Tirpak, “Lessons from Libya,” 35. 118. United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1973,” 17 March 2011. 119. Boyne, “Operation El Dorado Canyon.”

7. Bombing Libya 1. nato, “Operation Unified Protector Final Mission Stats,” Fact Sheet, Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels, 2 November 2011, http://www.nato.int/nato_static /assets/pdf/pdf_2011_11/20111108_111107-factsheet_up_factsfigures_en.pdf. 2. Fox News and the Associated Press, “Obama’s Pledge to Scale Back U.S. Military Role in Libya Opens Leadership ‘Vacuum,’ ” 22 March 2011, http://www.foxnews .com/politics/2011/03/22/obama-pledge-scale-military-role-libya-opens-leadership -vacuum/. 3. Nicolas Sarkozy, “Paris Summit for the Support of the Libyan People— Statement by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic” (Washington dc: Embassy of France, 19 March 2011), http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article2241; Ian Traynor, “Turkey and France Clash over Libya Air Campaign,” The Guardian, 24 March 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/24 /turkey-france-clash-libya-campaign. 4. Clinton, Hard Choices, 375. 5. Clinton, Hard Choices, 375. 6. Brad Knickerbocker, “U.S. Leads ‘Odyssey Dawn’ Initial Attack on Libya,” Christian Science Monitor, 19 March 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA /Military/2011/0319/US-leads-Odyssey-Dawn-initial-attack-on-Libya.

264 Notes to pages 170–176 7. Tirpak, “Bombers over Libya.” 8. Tirpak, “Bombers over Libya.” 9. Woodward and Morrison, “Responsibility to Protect,” 23. 10. Tirpak, “Bombers over Libya,” 37. 11. bbc, “raf Man Killed in Italy Road Crash,” 21 July 2011, http://www.bbc .com/news/uk-14241272. 12. Spencer Ackerman, “f-15 Crew Ejects over Libya after Mechanical Fail ure,” Wired, 22 March 2011, http://www.wired.com/2011 /03/f-15-pilots -eject -over-libya-after-equipment-malfunction/. 13. bbc News, “Libya Crisis: U.S. Warplane Crew Rescued after Crash,” 22 March 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12816226. 14. Brian Adam Jones, “Marine Aviator of the Year Recalls Historic Mission in Libya,” Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point nc, 24 April 2012, http://www .cherrypoint.marines.mil/News/NewsArticleDisplay/tabid/4890/Article/66500 /marine-aviator-of-the-year-recalls-historic-mission-in-libya.aspx. 15. Jones, “Marine Aviator.” 16. Jones, “Marine Aviator.” 17. cbs News, “U.S. f-15 Fighter Jet Down in Libya, Crew ‘Safe,’ ” 22 March 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-f-15-fighter-jet-down-in-libya-crew-safe/. 18. Clinton, Hard Choices, 376. 19. cbs News, “U.S. f- 15 Fighter Jet.” 20. cbs News, “U.S. f- 15 Fighter Jet.” 21. Clinton, Hard Choices, 376. 22. Clinton, Hard Choices, 376. 23. McCullough, “The Libya Mission,” 31. 24. Tirpak, “Bombers over Libya,” 39. 25. Tirpak, “Bombers over Libya,” 38– 39. 26. Tirpak, “Bombers over Libya,” 39. 27. Tirpak, “Bombers over Libya,” 39. 28. Clinton, Hard Choices, 377. 29. Anders Rasmussen, “nato Secretary General’s Statement on the No- Fly Zone,” nato, 24 March 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71763 .htm. 30. Bill Gortney, Director of the Joint Staff, “DoD News Briefing with Vice Adm. Gortney from the Pentagon on Operation Odyssey Dawn,” Department of Defense Press Operations (Washington dc: Pentagon, 24 March 2011), http:// www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4798. 31. McCullough, “The Libya Mission,” 32. 32. Steven Komarow and Bob Drummond, “Libya Mission Cost at $550 Million for U.S. Forces So Far,” Bloomberg, 29 March 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news / articles/2011-03-29/libya-mission-cost-at-550-million-for-u-s-forces-so-far-1-.

Notes to pages 177–182 265 33. Gates, Duty, 520. 34. Anders Rasmussen, “nato Takes Command in Libya Air Operations,” 31 March 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71867.htm. 35. Fredrik Doeser, “Sweden’s Libya Decision: A Case of Humanitarian Inter- vention,” International Politics 51 (14 February 2014), 196– 213, http://www .palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v51/n2/full/ip20143a.html. 36. At least one awacs or jstars was on station around the clock for the duration of the operation. 37. The Serbs proudly display the Predator they shot down over Bosnia in 1995 at the Museum of Aviation in Belgrade. See Trip Advisor, “Things to Do in Belgrade,” http://www.tripadvisor.com/LocationPhotoDirectLink-g294472-d324034 -i84945940-Museum_of_Aviation-Belgrade.html. 38. Boyne, “How the Predator Grew Teeth.” 39. C. J. Chivers and Kareem Fahim, “nato Expresses Regret for Airstrike,” New York Times, 8 April 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/09/world /africa/09libya.html. 40. Chivers and Fahim, “nato Expresses Regret.” 41. Russell Harding, “Press Briefing on Events concerning Libya by Oana Lun- gescu, the nato Spokesperson and Rear Admiral Russell Harding, Deputy Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force Operation Unified Protector,” 8 April 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_72150.htm. 42. Gaub, “North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya,” 23. 43. Chivers and Fahim, “nato Expresses Regret.” 44. John Reed, “France Dropping Concrete Bombs in Libya,” Defense Tech, 29 April 2011, http://defensetech.org/2011/04/29/france-using-concrete-bombs-in-libya/. 45. Jones, “Americans Shift to More Negative View.” 46. Mark Urban “The Task of Forming a More Effective Anti- Gaddafi Army,”bbc News, 15 April 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/markurban/2011/04 /the_task_of_forming_a_more_eff.html. 47. @LibyaInMe ( ), tweet, 16 April 2011, https://twitter.com /LibyaInMe. 48. Pollock, “People Power 2.0.” 49. Pollock, “People Power 2.0.” 50. Pollock, “People Power 2.0.” 51. Andy Carvin, “Munitions in Misurata: A Virtual Investigation by @ acarvin’s Twitter Followers,” Storify, 6 May 2011, https://storify.com/acarvin /munitions-in-misurata. 52. C. J. Chivers, “Land Mines Descend on Misurata’s Port, Endagering Libyan City’s Supply Route,” New York Times, 6 May 2011, http://www.nytimes .com/2011/05/07/world/africa/07libya.html. 53. Chivers, “Land Mines Descend.”

266 Notes to pages 182–187 54. “Anthony Bourdain Parts Unknown: Libya,” cnn, dir. Tom Vitale, air date: 19 May 2013. 55. Matthew Humphries, “Twitter Now Limits Tweets to 117 Characters If You Include a Link,” Geek.com, 20 February 2013, http://www.geek.com/news/twitter-now -limits-tweets-to-117-characters-if-you-include-a-link-1540340/. Based on global communications standards, depending on the alphabet configured on the handset, text messages can contain a maximum of 160 (7-bit), 140 (8-bit), or 70 (16- bit) characters. Also see “Twitter sms faqs” at http://support.twitter.com /articles/14014-twitter-via-sms-faqs. 56. Clark, Waging Modern War, 362. 57. “Results for #Libya,” Twitter, 19 January 2014, https://twitter.com /search?q=%23libya&src=typd. 58. Sam Biddle, “Libyan Rebels Call in nato Airstrikes via Twitter,” Gizmodo, 10 June 2011, http://gizmodo.com/5810777/libyan-rebels-call-in-nato-airstrike-via-twitter. 59. For example, on 9 March 2011, Walid A. Shaari tweeted, “#Gaddafi in Maya 15kms away from #Zawyia,” https://twitter.com/search?q=libya%20 coordinates&src=typd. 60. @nato, Twitter Account Profile Summary, https://twitter.com/NATO. 61. “Libyan Youth Movement,” Facebook Page, https://www.facebook.com/Libyan YouthMovement (accessed 15 February 2014). 62. Omar Amer, “Libyan Youth Movement Interview on abc,” abc News, 28 February 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UCKpiiREhyo. 63. Graeme Smith, “How Social Media Users Are Helping nato Fight Gadhafi in Libya,” Globe and Mail, 14 June 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world /africa-mideast/how-social-media-users-are-helping-nato-fight-gadhafi-in-libya /article2060965/. 64. Smith, “How Social Media Users.” 65. Smith, “How Social Media Users.” 66. @antireb, “List of Tweets Sent to and Used by nato to Bomb Targets in Libya,” Storify, https://storify.com/antireb/list-of-tweets-sent-to-and-used-by-nato-to-bomb-ta. 67. Adam Gabbatt, “Nato, Twitter, and Airstrikes in Libya,” The Guardian, 15 June 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/help/insideguardian/2011/jun/15 /nato-twitter-libya. 68. Gabbatt, “Nato, Twitter.” 69. Oana Lungescu and Mike Bracken, “Press Briefing on Libya,” Naples, Italy and Brussels, Belgium, updated 20 June 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en /natohq/opinions_75263.htm?selectedLocale=uk. 70. @hms_Nonsuch, tweet, 1207 hours Zulu time, 11 June 2011, https://twitter .com/HMS_Nonsuch/status/79444679065731072. 71. @hms_Nonsuch, Twitter account profile summary, https://twitter.com /HMS_Nonsuch.

Notes to pages 187–190 267 72. @hms_Nonsuch, Twitter account profile summary. Scroll to the date range between March and October 2011 of hms_Nonsuch on Twitter to see multiple retweets of nato’s daily press update. For example, the nato operational media on 4 September 2011 (available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive /news_71994.htm) was retweeted by hms_Nonsuch. This update indicated the following “key hits” for the previous twenty- four hours of operations: in the vicinity of Bani Walid, one ammunition storage facility; in the vicinity of Hun, one command and control node, six armed vehicles, two military barracks, three military supply vehicles, two engineer support vehicles, one multiple rocket launcher. Most of the mobile targets, along with some of the fixed sites, correspond with location data sent by tweets from rebel fighters. 73. @hms_Nonsuch, Web site data from March to October 2011. 74. Tim Bradshaw and James Blitz, “nato Draws on Twitter for Libya Strikes,” The Washington Post, 15 June 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world /nato-draws-on-twitter-for-libya-strikes/2011/06/15/AGLJpTWH_story.html. 75. Suhaib @libyaunit, tweet, 0652 hours Zulu time, 11 June 2011, https://twitter .com/libyaunite (accessed 16 February 2014). 76. @LibyanDictator ( ), tweet, 22 March 2011, https://twitter.com/ LibyanDictator. This user is followed by the “Libyan Youth Movement” and “hms_Nonsuch.” Another tweet from @Libyanandproud indicated the fluid nature of ground maneuvers, stating: “negative negative, Coordinates changed!! fluid!” This particular tweet was cited in the following article: Tim Bradshaw and James Blitz, “nato Draws on Twitter for Libya Strikes,” Washington Post, 15 June 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nato-draws-on-twitter -for-libya-strikes/2011/06/15/AGLJpTWH_story.html. 77. @libyans_revolt, tweet, 9 July 2011, 0504 hours, https://twitter.com /libyans_revolt?original_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fstorify.com%2Fantireb%2Flist -of-tweets-sent-to-and-used-by-nato-to-bomb-ta&tw_i=89636021104410625&tw _p=tweetembed. 78. @diceylee808, tweet, 1 July 2011, 1232 hours, https://twitter.com /diceylee808?original_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fstorify.com%2Fantireb%2Flist-of -tweets-sent-to-and-used-by-nato-to-bomb-ta&tw_i=86849724732284928&tw _p=tweetembed. 79. @k_thos, tweet, 19 June 2011, https://twitter.com/k_thos. On 19 June 2011, @k_thos tweeted the link to his article: Kyle McInnes, “Free gps App Gives Full gps Functionality for BlackBerry,” 25 May 2009, http://www.blackberrycool .com/2009/05/25/free-gps-app-gives-full-gps-functionality-for-blackberry/. 80. @FromJoanne, Twitter account profile summary, https://twitter.com /FromJoanne. 81. Twitpic, image tweeted at 1215 Zulu time, 25 July 2011, and associated with the following message: “#Tripoli More Geographic Coordinates of Gaddafi Forces

268 Notes to pages 190–191 Targets for @nato . . . #Libya,” photo available at: http://twitpic.com/5vmi96 /full. Tweet available at: https://twitter.com/FromJoanne. 82. Twitpic, “#Tripoli More Geographic Coordinates.” 83. “Comments on Twitpic from ‘navyjoc1655,’ ” 25 July 2011, http://twitpic .com/5vmjm9. 84. Shane Smith, The Rebels of Libya (vice Media, 2011), http://www.vice.com /video/the-rebels-of-libya-full-length; part 5. 85. Smith, “Rebels of Libya,” part 5. 86. Smith, “Rebels of Libya,” part 5. 87. Smith, “Rebels of Libya,” part 5. 88. Smith, “Rebels of Libya,” part 5. 89. Graeme Smith, “General’s Family Drives Wedge of Suspicion into Libya’s Rebellion,” Globe and Mail, 2 August 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world /africa-mideast/generals-family-drives-wedge-of-suspicion-into-libyas-rebellion /article2117751/. 90. Clay Claiborne, “The Assassination of General Abdul Fattah Younis,”Daily Kos, 7 August 2011, http://m.dailykos.com/story/2011/08/07/1002918/-The -Assassination-of-General-Abdul-Fattah-Younis. 91. Smith, “General’s Family.” 92. Smith, “General’s Family.” 93. David D. Kirkpatrick, “Killers of Libyan Rebel General Were among His Own Forces,” New York Times, 29 July 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/30 /world/africa/30libya.html. 94. Tony Birtley, “Libya,” Al Jazeera, 30 July 2011, http://blogs.aljazeera.com /topic/libya/libya-jul-30-2011-2038. 95. Brian Todd, Tim Lister, and Katie Glaeser, “Khalifa Haftar: The Man Who Left Virginia to Lead Libya’s Rebels,” cnn, 4 April 2011, http://www.cnn .com/2011/WORLD/africa/04/04/libya.rebel.leader/. 96. Associated Press, “Officer Accuses Fellow Rebels in Libya Killing,” usa Today, 29 July 2011, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-07-29-libya -rebel-chief-slain_n.htm. 97. Claiborne, “Assassination.” 98. Rami Al- Shaheibi, “Officer Accuses Fellow Rebels in Libya Killing,” Associated Press, 29 July 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/officer-accuses-fellow-rebels-libya -killing-154937968.html. Although this article has the same title as the usa Today version of the story, and likely the same author, it is worded differently, including more details on the account of Younis’s assassination. 99. Al- Shaheibi, “Officer Accuses Fellow Rebels.” 100. Quilliam, “Libya after General Younis’ Murder: Q and A with Noman Benot- man,” 3 August 2011, http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/press-releases /latest-libya-briefing/.

Notes to pages 191–195 269 101. Mahmoud had kept in close contact with Manfred Rommel, Erwin Rommel’s son. As part of his research on Erwin Rommel, Mahmoud first met Manfred in 1975 in Stuttgart, Germany, where he was the mayor. In 1999 Mahmoud sent a copy of his second book on Rommel to Manfred as well. Manfred replied to the gift: “Please accept my sincere thanks for the book about the desert war which you have sent me. Again, I have to regret, that I did not learn Arabic. But now at the age of seventy it is too late.” Manfred Rommel, “Letter to Brigadier S. M. Sueiman,” 24 February 1999, http://rommelinlibya.com/manfredrom mel1999.jpg. 102. Associated Press, “U.S., Allies Formally Recognize Libya Rebels,” 15 July 2011, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-07-15-libya-diplomacy - rebels_n.htm. 103. Stefan Talmon, “Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council,” Insights, 15, no. 16 (2011), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/16/recog nition-libyan-national-transitional-council#_edn1; Wikipedia, “International Recognition of the National Transitional Council,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki /International_recognition_of_the_National_Transitional_Council (accessed 2 July 2014). 104. bbc News, “UK Expels Gaddafi Diplomats and Recognises Libya Rebels,” 27 July 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/uk-politics-14306544. 105. cnn Wire Staff, “U.S. Recognizes Libyan Rebels’ Authority,” 16 July 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/07/15/libya.us.recognition/. 106. Associated Press, “Libyan Rebels Take Fight to Tripoli,” cbs News, 20 August 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/libyan-rebels-take-fight-to-tripoli/. 107. Associated Press, “Libyan Rebels.” 108. Associated Press, “Libyan Rebels.” 109. Asharq Al-Awsat, “Gaddafi Flees Tripolihq Ransacked by Rebels,” Asharq Al- Awsat, 24 August 2011, http://www.aawsat.net/2011/08/article55245357. 110. Netto, Bringing Down Gaddafi, 235. 111. Netto, Bringing Down Gaddafi, 236. 112. Dominique Soguel and Charles Onians, “Libya Fights to Restore Services in Besieged Tripoli,” Al Arabiya, 28 August 2011, http://www.alarabiya.net /articles/2011/08/28/164384.html. 113. Netto, Bringing Down Gaddafi, 235. 114. Ben Farmer, “Gaddafi’s Final Hours: nato and the sas Helped the Rebels Drive the Hunted Leader into Endgame in a Desert Drain,” The Telegraph [London], 22 October 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews /africaandindianocean/libya/8843684/Gaddafis-final-hours-Nato-and-the -SAS-helped-rebels-drive-hunted-leader-into-endgame-in-a-desert-drain .html.

270 Notes to pages 195–198 115. Farmer, “Gaddafi’s Final Hours.” 116. Terence P. Jeffrey, “DoD Had ‘Assets Pre- Positioned’ off Libya— In Case It Needed to Rescue Hillary Clinton,” cbs News, 3 May 2013, http://www.cnsnews.com/news /article/dod-had-assets-pre-positioned-libya-case-it-needed-rescue-hillary-clinton. 117. Jeffrey, “DoD Had ‘Assets Pre- Positioned.’ ” 118. Steven Lee Myers, “In Tripoli, Clinton Pledges U.S. Help to a ‘Free Libya,’ ” New York Times, 18 October 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/19/world /africa/clinton-in-libya-to-meet-leaders-and-offer-aid-package.html. 119. Noah Shachtman, “Listen: Secret Libya Psyop Caught by Online Sleuths,” Wired, 20 March 2011, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/03/secret-libya-psyops/. 120. Shachtman, “Listen.” 121. “Libya: psyop War— nato to Gaddafi— ‘We Will Kill You,’ ” radio messages transmitted by ec-130 j #01- 1935, Call Sign “Steel 74,” transmitted 6 June 2011 on frequency 10404.0 kHz, http://libyasos.blogspot.com/2011/10/nato-tape -warns-gaddafi-we-will-kill.html. 122. Book, “nato’s Air War in Libya,” 67. 123. Google Maps, “Query of Location: 31.195556,16.521389,” https://maps.google .com/maps?ll=31.195556,16.521389&q=loc:31.195556,16.521389&hl=en&t=m&z=18. Also see “Death of Gaddafi,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death _of_Muammar_Gaddafi (accessed 21 January 2014). Using the algorithms such as the one developed at Montana State University, which is available at http:// www.rcn.montana.edu/resources/tools/coordinates.aspx, the widely used civilian latitude/longitude location data can be converted to the Universal Transverse Mercator (utm) coordinate system. From there, full grid references can be converted to the truncated grid references typically used by the military by simply adding a “0” to the first digit after the three digit zone code. After this, digit 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 for the northing and easting represent the same digits understood by nato as part of the Military Grid Reference System (mgrs) in a ten-digit grid coordinate. In communicating with the rebel forces using lat/long coordinates, these sorts of conversions are necessary for effective targeting. 124. Craig Silverman, “The Story of the Gaddafi Story: How News of the Libyan Leader’s Demise Spread on Twitter,” Columbia Journalism Review, 20 October 2011, http://www.cjr.org/the_news_frontier/the_story_of_the_gaddafi_ story.php. Also see “Libya: Unconfirmed News of Gaddafi’s Capture,”Libya Uprising 2011, 20 October 2011, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/10/20 /libya-unconfimed-news-of-gaddafis-capture/. 125. Corbett Daly, “Clinton on Qaddafi: “We Came, We Saw, He Died,” cbs News, 20 October 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/clinton -on-qaddafi-we-came-we-saw-he-died/.

Notes to pages 198–200 271 126. Daly, “Clinton on Qaddafi.” See cbs News video footage embedded in the online article. 127. James Stavridis, Facebook post, 21 October 2011, https://www.facebook.com /james.stavridis/posts/296128250397443 (accessed 28 April 2014). 128. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “We Answered the Call—The End of Operation Uni- fied Protector,”nato , 31 October 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive /news_80435.htm. 129. nato, “Operation Unified Protector Final Mission Stats,” Fact Sheet, Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels, 2 November 2011, http://www.nato.int/nato_static /assets/pdf/pdf_2011_11/20111108_111107-factsheet_up_factsfigures_en.pdf. 130. James Stavridis, “It’s Time for nato to Get Involved in Syria and Iraq,” Atlan- tic Council, 30 June 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource /it-s-time-for-nato-to-get-involved-in-syria-and-iraq. 131. Parker, “Western Way of War,” 6. 132. Wehrey, “Hidden Story.” 133. Wehrey, “Hidden Story.” 134. Wehrey, “Hidden Story.” 135. Wehrey, “Hidden Story.” 136. Pollock, “People Power 2.0.” 137. Wehrey, “Hidden Story.” 138. Pollock, “People Power 2.0.” 139. Wehrey, “Hidden Story.” 140. Pollock, “People Power 2.0.” 141. Spencer Ackerman, “General fail: The Military’s Worst Tweeters,” Wired, 28 December 2010, http://www.wired.com/2010/12/general-fail-the-militarys -worst-tweeters/; Spencer Ackerman, “On Facebook, nato Chief Announces End to Libya War,” Wired, 21 October 2011, http://www.wired.com/2011/10 /nato-libya-war-facebook/. 142. rma is an acronym for “Revolution in Military Affairs.” As opposed to the notion of a “military revolution,” which implies a distinct military-related turn of events with wide- ranging societal implications, the term rma refers to a significant change in the conduct of war, yet one that does not necessarily generate widespread impacts on societal structure. The role of social media in intelligence collection deserves further study. 143. Clinton, Hard Choices, 377. 144. Panetta, Worthy Fights, 382. 145. Panetta, Worthy Fights, 382. 146. Jomana Karadsheh, “Libya’s Transitional National Council Hands over Power,” cnn, 9 August 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/08/world/meast /libya-power-transition/.

272 Notes to pages 200–204 147. “Libyan Prime Minister Mustafa Abushagur Dismissed,” The Guard- ian, 7 October 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/07 /libyan-prime-minister-abushagur-dismissed. 148. Kevin Casey, “Oil, Libyans’ Bargaining Chip,” Carnegie Endowment for Interna- tional Peace, 11 February 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2014/02/11 /oil-libyans-bargaining-chip/h0lu. 149. Ulf Laessing and Feras Bosalum, “Libya Threatens to Bomb North Korea Tanker If It Ships Oil from Rebel Port,” Reuters, 8 March 2014, http://www .reuters.com/article/2014/03/08/us-libya-oil-idUSBREA2709K20140308. 150. Laessing and Bosalum, “Libya Threatens to Bomb.” 151. Casey, “Oil, Libyans’ Bargaining Chip,” fig. 1. 152. Vandewalle, “Libya’s Revolution Revisted.” 153. Ashraf Abdul-Wahab, “General Hafter Announces Coup; Politicians React with Scorn, Order His Arrest,” Al- Arabiya Television, 14 February 2014, http:// web.archive.org/web/20140221182322/http://www.libyaherald.com/2014/02/14 /general-hafter-announces-coup-politicians-react-with-scorn-order-his -arrest/#axzz2tIQINLHq. 154. bbc News, “Can Libya’s Election End the Fighting?” 25 June 2014, http://www .bbc.com/news/world-africa-28003421. 155. Associated Press, “Libyan Prime Minister Ousted by Parliament,” The Guardian, 11 March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/11 /libya-prime-minister-ousted. 156. Laessing and Bosalum, “Libya Threatens to Bomb.” 157. Laessing and Bosalum, “Libya Threatens to Bomb.” 158. Middle East Eye, “Former Libyan pm Announces Support for ‘Operation Dignity,’ ” 20 May 2014, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/former -libyan -pm -announces -support-operation-dignity. 159. Mary Fitzgerald, “Libyan Renegade General Khalifa Haftar Claims He Is Winning His War,” The Guardian, 24 June 2014, http://www.theguardian .com/world/2014/jun/24/libyan-renegade-general-khalifa-haftar-war.

8. Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars 1. Clark, Waging Modern War, 334– 36. 2. Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare,” iv. 3. Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare,” 4. In addition, Secretary of Defense Donald Rusmfeld stated, “It’s hard for me to imagine another Afghanistan. If you think about that situation, it is kind of distinctive. Now it doesn’t mean that some of the things that are working there won’t work elsewhere, but the totality of it is distinctive. I don’t think we’re going to run around with a cookie mold and repeat this.”

Notes to pages 204–208 273 4. Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare,” viii. 5. Kuehn, “Thoughts on Clausewitz,” 101. 6. Joint Chiefs of Staff,Joint Operational Planning, xxi. 7. Massimo Calabresi, “Obama Refines Talk of Libya Intervention,”Time , 4 March 2011. 8. Calabresi, “Obama Refines Talk.” 9. “Libya: psyop War— nato to Gaddafi— ‘We Will Kill You,’ ” radio messages transmitted by ec-130 j #01- 1935, Call Sign “Steel 74,” transmitted 6 June 2011 on frequency 10404.0 kHz, http://libyasos.blogspot.com/2011/10/nato-tape -warns-gaddafi-we-will-kill.html?m=1. 10. Haave and Haun, a- 10s over Kosovo, 300. 11. Haave and Haun, a- 10s over Kosovo, 300. 12. Boyne, “How the Predator Grew Teeth.” 13. Haave and Haun, a- 10s over Kosovo, 300. 14. Haave and Haun, a- 10s over Kosovo, 300. 15. Haave and Haun, a- 10s over Kosovo, 300. 16. Haave and Haun, a- 10s over Kosovo, 300. 17. Haave and Haun, a- 10s over Kosovo, 300. 18. MacPherson, Roberts Ridge, 70. MacPherson describes the “soda straw” aspect of viewing the Predator’s narrow field of view in Afghanistan. The same applied over Kosovo. 19. Priest, “United nato Front Was Divided Within,” a1. 20. Brigford et al., “bcd Targeting,” 11. 21. Boyne, “How the Predator Grew Teeth,” 43. Also the laser designator guided the Hellfire missiles. 22. Boyne, “How the Predator Grew Teeth,” 43. 23. C. J. Chivers and Kareem Fahim, “nato Expresses Regret for Airstrike,” New York Times, 8 April 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/09/world /africa/09libya.html. 24. Van Creveld, Age of Airpower, inside cover. 25. Hosmer, “Psychological Effects.” 26. Hosmer, “Psychological Effects.” 27. Hosmer, Conflict over Kosovo, 104. 28. Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, 263. 29. Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, 263– 64. 30. Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, 264. 31. Ben Farmer, “Gaddafi’s Final Hours.” 32. The game of Jenga is played with fifty- four wooden blocks that are stacked in a tower formation eighteen stories high. After building the tower, players take turns pulling out one block at a time, attempting to cause the tower to fall at the turn of the next player.

274 Notes to pages 208–214 33. “Records on ‘Ring around Serbia,’ ” foia Request Collection 2009- 0206-f , National Archives and Records Administration, William Jefferson Clinton Library and Museum, Little Rock ar. 34. Klajin, Past in Present Times, 195. 35. Michael Ignatieff, “Nation- Building Lite,” New York Times, 28 July 2002, http:// www.nytimes.com/2002/07/28/magazine/28NATION.html. 36. Ignatieff, “Nation- Building Lite.” 37. Donald Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2002-05-01/transforming-military. 38. Michelle Tan and Andrew Tilghman, “Obama Authorizes 1,500 More U.S. Troops for Iraq,” Defense News, 7 November 2014. 39. Keegan, “Please, Mr. Blair.” 40. Keegan, “Please, Mr. Blair.” 41. Akram Al- Gdery interviewed in “Anthony Bourdain Parts Unknown: Libya,” cnn, dir. Tom Vitale, air date: 19 May 2013.

Notes to pages 214–217 275

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Index

#Feb17, 10, 151, 171, 191 Clinton on, 200; improvised explosive devices, 143, 145–46; @BareeqBarqawi, 151 invasion of, 135; intervention in, @ChangeInLibya, 151 203; peacekeeping, 215–16; U.S. @hms_Nonsuch, 190–91 expenditures in, 162 @nato, 191 Afghan model, 208 @natopress, 190–91 Africa Command (africom), 171–72, @UKMilOps, 189, 191 176–77 agm-86c, 57 1s91 “Straight Flush,” 66 agm-88 harm, 58 2000 elections, 38 airborne command and control 250th Air Defense Brigade (Serbian), center (abccc), 92, 109, 209–10 65–66 air component commander, 4, 8, 24, 2-505th Parachute Infantry 28, 63, 172–73, 177, 182 Regiment, 89 Air Corps, 23, 168 44th parallel, 55 aircraft, by type:a -6 Intruder, 4; a-10 509th Bomber Wing, 177 Warthog, 4, 7, 109–10, 210; ale-50 towed decoy, 65; Apache helicopter, abc News, 56 5, 23, 55–56, 74, 88–92, 94, 110–12, Abrams tank, 89, 124, 127, 132, 135–37, 115, 120, 125; av-8b Harrier, 179; 139, 143 awacs, 8, 58, 60, 165, 180, 183; b-1b Abu Salim prison, 151, 157, 195 Lancer, 176, 181; b-2 Spirit, 54, 85, 103, Abuzaakouk, Aly, 156, 194, 206 119, 176–78, 181; b-52 Stratofortress, Ackerman, Spencer, 203 4, 7–9, 27, 57, 181; c-5 Galaxy, 90; Afghanistan: air campaign 3; air c-17 Globemaster, 90, 137–38, power, 207–8, 211; armored 198; c-130 Hercules, 137; ch-53e vehicles, 125; awacs, 165; Barack Super Stallion, 179; e-3a Sentry, Obama on, 221; cruise missiles, 27, 58; ea-6b Prowler, 67, 177; ea-18g 36, 122; and Germany, 160; Hillary Growler, 177; ec-130j Commando

293 aircraft, by type cont.( ) Algeria, 150 Solo, 199, 209; ef-111 Raven, 67; Algol-class vehicle cargo ships, 138 eh-60, 92–93; electronic warfare Al Jazeera, 150, 194 helicopter, 92–93; f-1 Mirage, al Qaeda, 27, 122, 158 178; f-15 Strike Eagle, 4, 58–60, Al-Shaheibi, Rami, 195 178–80, 182; f-22 Raptor, 180; f-111F Amanpour, Christiane, 63 Aardvark, 4; f-117 Nighthawk, 7, Amer, Omar, 189 65–67; jstars, 7–8, 21, 180, 183–84, Amruni, Hamid Moussa el, 179–80 201; kc-10 Extender, 177; kc-130j, Anderson, James, 26 179; kc-135 Stratotanker, 177; mh-53 a/n tqp-36, 21–22, 47–48, 93 Pave Low helicopter, 65; Mi-8 a/n tqp-37, 21–22, 91, 93, 95, 210 Hip helicopter, 60; Mi-25 attack Arab-Israeli War (1973), 131–32 helicopter, 206; MiG-29, 58–59, Arab League, 159, 196 115; mq-1 Predator, 2, 183, 211, 266; Arab Spring, 149–50, 152 mv-22b Osprey, 179; Nimrod r1, Arkansas, 34 58; rc-12 Guardrail, 92–93; rq-1 armored vehicles, 5, 23, 103, 124, 144, Predator, 183, 209–10; rq-5 Hunter, 199, 217 92; u-2, 21; uh-60 Blackhawk, 132 Army Tactical Missile System air defense: Kosovo, 23, 55, 57–62, (atacms), 90 64–66, 71, 73, 75, 84, 88–90, 104, Army Transformation, 130 106, 112; Libya, 11, 14, 163, 172–74, Arsic, Zoran, 87 175–78, 181, 181–84; U.S., 131, 132 artillery: Albanian, 93; American, 5, Air Force Magazine, 9, 105, 108, 181 19, 21, 46, 56, 88–90, 111, 128, 131, air-launched cruise missiles, 27, 57 133, 143, 145, 147; British, 22, 47–49; air power (definition), 3 decoys, 22, 91–92, 94, 113; Iraqi, 4, air power theorists, 6, 18 20–22; French, 22, 47–49; Libyan, Air-Sea Battle, 124 12, 182–84, 187, 193, 199–200, 211; air tasking order (ato), 29, 84–85, 112 Serbian, 3, 13, 40, 48, 52, 62–63, 84, air-to-air combat, 60, 180 91, 93–95, 101, 103–4, 107–10, 188, Ajdabiya, 152, 184 209–11, 213 Al Arabiya, 152, 166 The Art of War, 131 Albania: artillery, 22, 109–10; border, Ashammakhi, Nureddin, 186 3; helicopters, 55; humanitarian Aspin, Leslie, 39–40 crisis, 68, 72, 119–20; mines, 56; Assistant to the President for Task Force Hawk, 92–93, 95, 111, Economic Policy, 37 119–20; Tirana, 90 Association of the United States Albarassi, Abb-Rabbo, 205 Army (ausa), 127, 141 al-Bayda, 152 attorney general (U.S.), 37 Albright, Madeleine, 17, 37–39, 41, 56, Aujali, Ali, 157, 159 61, 99–100, 116–17, 119 automated deep operations Al-Gdery, Akram, 187–88, 217 coordination system (adocs), 92

294 index Aviano, 66, 83, 178, 180 Bouchard, Charles, 172–73 Ayala, 60 Bouckaert, Peter, 158 Aziziya, Bab al (barracks compound), Bourdain, Anthony, 187 168, 197 Bracken, Mike, 190 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, 89, Bacon, Kenneth, 69, 89 127, 132, 135–36, 139 Baghdad, 6–7, 31 Branch, Taylor, 34 Balkan Ghosts, 37 Brazil, 26, 160–61, 170 Barksdale Air Force Base, 138, 177 Brazil, Russia, India, and China block Batajnica, 57–58 of nations (bric), 161 battlefield coordination element Breaking the Phalanx, 126 (bce), 92 Brega, 158, 184–85 Belgrade: Chinese embassy in, 74, British Army, 47–48 85–87; infrastructure, 114, 212; Jesse Brussels, 72, 80, 88, 104, 171, 176, 183 Jackson visit, 70; residents, 77–80, budget surplus, 76 87; strategic targets, 9, 24–26, 55, Builder, Carl, 130 60, 116, 208; Viktor Chernomyrdin Bukhattalah, Ahmed, 195 visit, 97 Bulbuk, Kocha, 79 Beli Dvor, 78–79 Bulevar Umetnosti, 85–86 Ben Ali, Zine el Abidine, 150 Bundestag (German Parliament), 165 Benghazi, 10–11, 150–54, 168, 179–80, Bush, George H. W., 34–35, 145, 182, 184, 187, 193–95, 197, 206 156, 160 Berger, Sandy, 17, 37, 41–42, 70, 99, Bush, George W., 103, 121–22 118, 166 Byrd, Robert, 32 Berlin, 169 Berlusconi, Silvio, 164, 170–71 Cairo, 150 Biddle, Stephen, 208 Campbell, Tom (r-ca), 76 Biden, Joseph R., 33, 36–37, 75–76, 161 Cardoso, James, 65 Big Five weapon systems, 132 Carney, Jay, 165 bin Laden, Osama, 27, 158 Carpenter, Floyd L., 181 Blair, Tony, 42–43, 50, 73, 118 carrier aviation, 26–27, 73 Blinken, Tony, 35 carrots and sticks, 42 blu-114/b (“Soft Bomb”), 79 Carter, Jimmy, 96 Blue Ridge Mountains, 47 Caucasus, 44 bm-21 Grad rocket launcher, 186, centcom (Central Command), 191–93 20–21, 40 Boeing, 2, 7, 125, 141, 143, 147 center of gravity, 9, 19, 24, 208, 212–14 Booz Allen Hamilton, 147 Chad, 155–56 Bosnian Muslims, 35 Chafee, John H. (r-ri), 64 Bouazizi, Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed, Challenger tank, 90 149, 258 Chechnya, 96, 145

index 295 Chernomyrdin, Viktor, 38, 78, 80, national security team, 14, 17, 35, 41, 96–97, 213 102; and nato, 120–22; objectives Chief of Naval Operations, 24, 27 for Kosovo, 9, 49; public opinion Chief of Staff to the President, 37 of, 29–30, 70, 117–18; and Slobodan China, 85–87, 142, 159–61, 167 Milosevic, 35, 78, 214; and Somalia, Chirac, Jacques, 43, 72, 80, 112 34; on target selection, 79–80; and cia (Central Intelligence Agency), Tony Blair, 73; and Wesley Clark, 34 20, 37, 62, 85, 134 The Clinton Tapes, 34 Clark, Wesley K.: and Apache close air support, 4, 24, 28 helicopters and Task Force Hawk, cnn, 57, 59, 63, 157, 187 88–91, 94, 207; assumptions of, 18, cocaine, 170 23, 45–46, 49, 61; bombing damage cockpit videos, 5, 81, 83 assessments, 104–8, 112–14; on Cody, Richard, 89 captured soldiers, 69, 71; carrier Cohen, William: and Apache request, 27; on F-117 downing, helicopters, 88; bombing damage 67–68; interactions with news assessment, 102–4, 107, 112; on media, 34, 41, 63–65, 74, 79, 81–84; Chinese embassy bombing, 87; on on Libya, 166–68; and nato, 42, ground forces, 75; and kla, 64; 62, 72–73, 80, 116; planning, 55–56; and news media, 74, 81–83, 210; on refugees, 119–20; and Russia, on prisoners, 70; vital interests, 17, 97–98; and target selection, 8–9, 24, 37, 41 61, 208–10 Cold War, 18, 37, 45, 77, 101, 125, 134, Clausewitz, Carl von, 208, 214 141, 150 clearance of airspace, 50 Colgen, 143 Clinch, Janice, 189 collateral damage, 65, 83, 112, 137, 145, Clinton, Hillary R.: on F-15 downing, 185 179; as First Lady, 10; on Libya, 161, Colombia, 138, 160 203–4, 209; and nato, 168, 196; Comanche helicopter, 128 no-drive zone, 11, 184; Tripoli visit, combined air operations center 198–200; and Turkey, 164; weapons, (caoc), 84, 92–93, 209–11 192 Command and General Staff College, Clinton, William J.: and Al Gore, 45, 133 70; and Apache helicopters, 89; Congressional Record, 32 assumptions of, 23, 34, 35–37, 39–41, Cooper, Gary, 40 119, 210; and Boris Yeltsin, 59–60, counterbattery radar, 94, 110, 201, 74–75, 77, 97–100; and Bosnia, 209 30; and China, 86; on civilian counterinsurgency, 60, 62, 125, 146 casualties, 145; on F-117 downing, Counter-Proliferation Division, cia, 67–68; and France, 41; on ground 85, 88 forces, 9, 34, 43, 56–57, 76, 115; and Creative Technologies Inc., 145 Hugh Shelton, 41; and kla, 64; Creech Air Force Base, 2

296 index critical infrastructure, 24, 52 electronic warfare, 67, 92, 110, 177 Crowley, P. J., 83 El-Hareri, Omar, 155 cruise missile diplomacy, 27 Ellis, James O., 64, 84 Crusader, 128 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 164, 176, 198 cyber power, 216 Erlanger, Steve, 79 Czechoslovakia, 39, 92, 150 Esawi, Ali, 193 Es Sider (oil terminal), 205 D’Alema, Massimo, 43 ethnic cleansing, 60, 62–63, 82, 119 Daley, William M., 161 excess sorties, 28 Dani, Zoltan, 66 exit strategy (Bosnia, Kosovo), 41, 75 Danube River, 73, 112 Danzig, Richard, 27 Facebook, 150–52, 189–90, 193, 200, Daschle, Tom (d-sd), 76 202 Day of Rage, 151 Facebook Girl, 150 Dedinje district, 78 Fattah, Esraa Abdel, 150 Defense Intelligence Agency (dia), February 17 Martyrs Brigade, 195, 205 20, 86 Finland, 186 Defense Science Board, 142 fire support coordination line, 6 de Franchi, Amadeo, 51 First Infantry Division, 65, 69–70, 144 Denmark, 50, 196 First Lady, 10 DePuy, William E., 133, 144, 184 First Squadron, Fourth Cavalry Die Welt, 170 Regiment, 69 Dini, Lamberto, 43 fm 100-5, Operations, 22, 131–32 diplomatic power, 77 fog of war, 70 Donilon, Thomas E., 161 Follow-On Forces Attack (fofa), Douhet, Giulio, 25, 122–23 5, 133 Draskovic, Vuk, 62 Fort Leavenworth, 45, 56, 133, 166 Dugberg, John, 83 forward air controller, 92, 104, 209, Duma, 75, 77–78 215 dumb bombs, 4 forward line of own troops (flot), 23, 134 Easter, 51, 55, 78 Fox News, 84, 143 East Germany, 92 France: arming rebels, 166; and echelon, second and third, 6, 23, Bosnia, 47; ground forces, 45–46, 133, 141 183; and Kosovo, 42, 50, 55, 58, 74, Egypt, 150 80; and Libya, 2, 4, 11, 14, 160, 163– Egyptian army, 132 64, 168, 178; and Turkey, 175–76, 178, eighteen month timeline (Bosnia), 41 181, 196, 198, 200 Eighth Air Force, 181 Frattini, Franco, 198 Eighty-Second Airborne Division, 89 freedom of navigation, 169 electricity (Serbia), 79, 116 French constitution, 43

index 297 French Foreign Legion, 47 58, 69, 72, 79–80, 92, 99; and Libya, French Parliament, 43 160–61, 164–65, 172, 196–97 Fuerth, Leon, 38 Ghardabiya, Libya, 178 Fulda Gap, 90 Gheriani, Mustafa, 166 Future Combat Systems: burst global positioning system (gps), 14, speed, 136; contracts, 129, 142; 46, 48, 85, 143, 145, 191 cost, 129, 139, 141, 145–47, 201; Global Reach, Global Power, 6 Excalibur 155mm rounds, 143, 145; Glosson, Buster, 7, 51 fuel, 136, 139–40; infantry carrier Gloucestershire, 57 vehicle (icv), 143; lethality, 136–37; Golobovci, 57–58 logistical requirements, 136, 139–40; Gonzales, Steven M., 69 maintenance, 146; manned ground Google Earth, 4, 158, 187–89, 191, 193, vehicles, 135; mobility, 136, 138; 200–202, 211, 216 mounted combat system (mcs), Gore, Albert, 17, 37–38, 70, 77, 80, 143; non-line of sight cannon 121–22 (nlos-c), 143; non-line of sight graffiti, 78 launch system (nlos-ls), 143; Graham, Lindsey (r-sc), 198 non-line of sight mortar (nlos-m), Gramm, Phil, 32 143; rapid deployment, 125, 128, Grange, David, 70 134–36; sensors, 125, 129, 135, Greece, 42, 44, 50, 55, 139, 169 137, 140, 143, 145–46; situational Griffin, Jennifer, 84 awareness, 125, 137; software, 140; Grossman, Elaine, 91 survivability, 136; video games, ground combat vehicle (gcv), 130 146; weight requirements, 127, Grunke, J. Eric, 179 135–37, 140 Guadalcanal, 28 Gulf Glory, 205 Gabon, 160 Gulf of Sidra, 169 Gaddafi, Hana, 169–70 Gulf War, 101, 103, 119, 145, 160, 184, Gaddafi, Muammar, 2–4, 10–11, 141, 212. See also Operation Desert 149–61, 163–71, 173–74 Storm (1991) Gall, Carlotta, 87 Gulf War Air Power Survey, 20–21 Garyounis military camp, 193, 195 gunboat diplomacy, 1, 12 Gates, Robert, 13, 129, 146–47, 161–62, 172, 175, 201, 204 Habib, Bubaker, 180 Gavotti, Giulio, 1–3, 15 Haftar, Khalifa al, 155–57, 185, 194, gbu-10, 48 205–6 gbu-28, 48 Hagel, Chuck, 33 General Dynamics, 143, 147, 247 Hague, William, 198 genocide, 9, 42, 52, 61, 116, 162 Haiti, 33 Germany: and Bosnia, 36; Cold War, Halt-Phase, 124 132–34; and Kosovo, 42–43, 50, 55, Ham, Carter F., 172, 181

298 index Hamdi, Fedia, 149, 258 Iraq: air campaigns, 3–8, 57, 135, 160, Hard Choices, 179, 203 211; Desert Fox, 27, 36, 55; Desert Harney, Kenneth, 178–79 Storm, 20–23, 59, 67; Iraqi Freedom Hatashe, Khalid, 186 (2003–2009), 111, 115, 122, 125–26, Hayes, Robin (r-nc), 75 135, 140, 143, 145–46, 162, 221; and head of the snake, 24–26 Islamic State, 201, 216; no-fly zones, heavy weapon systems, 4, 20, 108, 26–27, 34, 36, nuclear facilities, 88, 201, 210 Islamic State, 201, 216 Hellfire missiles, 2, 18, 23, 90, 111, Italian North Africa, 164 162, 183 Italy: Italo-Turkish War, 2; and Hendrix, John W., 88–91, 111, 207, 211 Kosovo, 8, 42–44, 50–51, 55, 58, History of the Balkans, 36 65–66, 80, 83–84, 105, 209–10; History of the Peloponnesian War, 45 Libya, 164, 166, 172–73, 178, 180, Hitler, Adolf, 62 196–97 hms Splendid, 57 Izmir, Turkey, 173 Hoar, Joseph, 40 Holbrooke, Richard, 45, 49, 89, 160 Jackson, Jesse, 70, 79–80 Hollywood, 83, 145 Jackson, Michael (Lt. Gen), 97–99 Holocaust, 39 Jalil, Mustafa Abdul, 154, 193–98, 204 Horner, Charles, A., 4–8, 20, 29 Jathran, Ibrahim, 205 Hosmer, Stephen T., 105, 115–16, 212 Jelavich, Barbara, 36 Hostile Artillery Locator (halo), Jibril, Mahmoud, 154–55 47–48 Jodice, Ralph, J., 173 Howell, Mike, 92 Johnson, Jay, 27 Human Rights Watch, 158 Joint Direct Attack Munitions Hussein, Saddam, 6, 22, 35, 122 (jdams), 55, 85, 215 Hutchison, Kay Bailey, 32 Joint Force Command Naples, 172 Joint Terminal Attack Controllers, 198 Imami, Lindita, 99 Jolie, Angelina, 170 India, 159–61 Jomini (Jominian), 125, 131 indigenous forces, 208, 215 Jordan, 150, 196 Indonesia, 138, 159 Joulwan, George, 49 infrared, 5, 109–10 Jumper, John P., 22, 94, 106 Inhofe, James (r-ok), 33 Inside the Pentagon, 91 Kaplan, Robert, 37 insubordination, 5, 162 Karamanlis, Kostas, 44 integrated air defense, 66, 163, 177, 183 Keegan, John, 10, 12, 14, 100, 119, 216 interagency working groups, 37 Kelly, Patricia, 59 interdiction, 64, 181–82, 189 Kentucky, 85 interim force, 127–28 Kenya, 27, 156 international law, 45, 51 Key West Agreement, 24

index 299 killing zone, 144 m74 submunitions, 90 King Irdis, 153, 159 MacArthur, Douglas, 24 Kirk, Mark (r-il), 198 Macedonia, 23, 44, 65, 68–70, 89–90, Kissinger, Henry, 33 119, 120, 139 Knecht, Thomas, 29 Macgregor, Douglas, 105–6, 126 Kok, Willem, 79 Madeleine’s War, 39 Korean War, 28 Mahmoud, Suleiman, 154, 157, 186, Koresh, David, 159 194–95, 270 Kosovo Liberation Army (kla), 33, Mali Mokri, 60 44, 51, 61–64, 92–93, 95–96, 99, 185, Malta, 152–53, 178, 189, 198 214 Manchester, England, 189 Kosovska, 68 Mandela, Nelson, 169 Krepinevich, Andrew, 19 Marine Air Ground Task Force, 28 Kurds, 34, 160 Marine Corps Commandant, 61 Kuwait, 6–8, 10, 150, 184, 196 maritime component command, 91, 173 La Belle discotheque, 169 Marshall, Andrew, 18–19 Laity, Mark, 60, 81 The Masks of War, 130 Lake, Anthony, 37–39 McCain, John, 32, 75–76, 126, 149, 162, Lambeth, Benjamin S., 59, 66, 115–16 165, 198 land component commander, 28, 91, McConnell, Mitch, 33, 64 111, 171, 207 McKiernan, Dave, 88 Leavy, David, 70 McPeak, Merrill A., 8, 47 Lebanon, 160, 167 Mediterranean Union, 161 Le Figaro, 166 Melian Dialogue, 44, 229 Lehrer, Jim, 61, 100, 121 Mexico, 36 less than vital interests, 41, 57 Military Airlift Command, 134 Libya Alhurra Television (Libyan Free military-technical revolution, 18 Television), 152–53 military transformation, 13, 103 Libyan Air Force, 153, 155, 158, 178, Milosevic, Mirjana, 78, 95 202 Milosevic, Slobodan: air campaign Libyan Youth Movement, 189–90 against, 112–17; and artillery, 3; and Link, Charles, 124 Belgrade, 24–25; and Bosnia, 9; and Lizza, Ryan, 167 decoys, 22; diplomacy, 70–81; and Los Angeles Times, 83 Kosovo, 10, 13, 32–33, 35–36, 41–43, Lott, Trent, 64 49–52, 59–62, 94–97, 100, 107, 212–14; Louisiana, 138, 177 and refugees, 119–21; relatives of, 57, Luftwaffe, 43, 78 86; sanctions against, 38–39 Lug, 60 mines, 56, 120, 136, 186–87 Lutz, Jean-Pierre, 141–42 Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova Lynch, Marc, 150 (mup), 68

300 index Mission Effectiveness Assessment Nightline, 56 Team, 104 Nis, 59 Missouri, 55, 85, 119, 177 Nixon administration, 18 Misurata, 186, 191, 202 no-drive zone, 11, 164, 174, 184 Mitchell, Billy, 18, 25 no-fly zone: Iraq, 26; Libya, 11, 159–60, Mitrovica, 68 162, 164, 166, 172, 174–76, 181–82; mobile phones, 14, 150, 187, 201 Syria, 221 Montenegro, 57–58, 68 Normandy, 130, 137, 140 Moore, Joseph H., 28 North Atlantic Council (nac), 72, Morning Glory, 205 172, 176, 200, 202 Morrison, Phillip G., 177 northern Iraq, 34, 160 mortars, 47–48, 107, 143 Northrop Grumman, 48, 143, 147 Mount Igman, 47–48 Norway, 50 Mount Pastrik, 93–94 no-strike list, 192 Mubarak, Hosni, 150 Novi Sad, 73, 79 Mullen, Michael G., 161–62, 176 nsc Principals and Deputies multiple launch rocket system Committee, 17, 38 (mlrs), 5, 89–90 Nunn, Samuel, 40 Munich, 39 Murtha, John P. (d-pa), 64 Obama, Barack: arming rebels, 165, My Life, 36 192; leading from behind, 167; and Libya, 10–11, 114, 156, 203, 209; Nabbous, Mohammed, 152 and nsc deliberations, 161–63; Naples, 65, 172–73 Operation Odyssey Dawn, 175–76, National Security Advisor, 37–39, 41, 181; and Robert Gates, 146 70, 96, 99, 118, 161 Obeidat (tribe), 153, 195 National Security Council (nsc), 17, objective force, 127–28 37, 121, 161 Obrenovac, 79 National Transitional Council (ntc), Odierno, Raymond T., 89, 91, 94, 154–55, 159, 166, 168, 185, 193–97, 203–4 111, 209 nato’s fiftieth anniversary, 73, 77 Office of Net Assessment, 18 Naumann, Klaus, 51, 72, 78 Ogarakov, Nikolai, 18 Nazis, 39, 42–43 Ohio, 85 Nedeljni Telegraf, 88 Ojdani, Dragoljub, 80, 95 Netherlands, 47, 50, 78, 196–97 Okba Ben Nafi air base, 153, 168 Neutralize, 3, 109, 182, 213 operational level of war, 22, 94 New Yorker, 167 Operation Allied Force (1999): New York Times: on Bosnia, 31; on casualties (discussion of ), 22, 23, Haftar, 156; on Kosovo, 56, 71, 29, 30–31, 49, 56, 74, 78, 116–17, 119; 79–80, 87, 103, 113; on Libya, 186 ground invasion (discussion of ), Nigeria, 156, 160 56, 73, 75; phases, 55

index 301 Operation Deliberate Force (1995), 18, Power, Samantha, 10, 161–62 26–27, 34–35, 38, 46–47, 49, 94 power transmission stations Operation Desert Fox (1998), 27, 55 (bombing of ), 79 Operation Desert Storm (1991), 4–6, 8, Prague Spring, 150 12, 18, 20, 23, 27, 29, 34, 55, 145, 207 Pratt, William, 24 Operation Horseshoe (1999), 62 precision-guided munitions, 19, 47, Operation Infinite Reach (1998), 27 147, 163, 180 Operation Linebacker (1972), 38 precision intelligence, 46 Operation Night Camel (1990), 5 Presidential Decision Directive/nsc-2, Operation Northern Watch 1993, 37 (1997–2003), 26, 160 Primakov, Yevgeny, 38, 77 Operation Provide Comfort prisoners, 59, 62, 68–71, 151 (1991–1996), 160 Pristina, 57–58, 97–99 Operation Rolling Thunder Prizen, 59 (1965–1968), 38, 45 A Problem from Hell, 162 Operation Southern Watch public opinion, 17–18, 29–31, 36, 42–43, (1992–2003), 26 70, 161 Ottoman Empire, 164 Overwatch Systems, 141 Qatar, 166, 196 p-18 “Spoon Nest,” 66 raf Fairford, 57 paramilitary forces, 51, 61–63, 65, Ralston, Joseph, 63 73–74 Rambouillet, 73 Patriot, 132 Rambouillet Accords, 51 Patton, George, 130, 140 Ramirez, Andrew A., 69 Pavkovic, Nebojsa, 57, 68, 88, 94, rand Corporation: Future Combat 104, 108 Systems, 138–39, 145; and Kosovo, 13, pbs News Hour, 61, 100; Krulak, 29–31, 39–40, 59, 66, 77–79, 93, 105, Charles, 61 108, 110–11, 115; and Libya, 201, 212 peacekeeping force, 30, 32, 50 rape, 62, 170 Pennefather, David, 47 Rapid Reaction Force (rrf), 47 Pennsylvania, 155 Raytheon, 65, 147 Perry, William, 37–38 Raznatovic, Zeljko “Arkan,” 68, 85 Phillips, James, 26 Reagan, Ronald, 156, 167, 169, 170, Pickering, Thomas R., 86 173–74, 197 pillage, 62 Reagan, Timothy, 8 Poland, 159, 196 Reagan National Airport, 156, 206 Pope John Paul II, 55 reconnaissance satellite, 21, 108, 113 Portugal, 42, 160 red zone, 143 Powell, Colin L., 20, 37, 39–40, 116–17, reforger (REturn of FORces to 122, 167 GERmany), 134

302 index Rembrandt, 78–79 Schwarzkopf, H. Norman, Jr., 4–6, 8, Renaissance Hotel (Cologne, 20, 29 Germany), 99 Science Applications International Republican Guard, 6, 21, 111 Corporation (saic), 125, 141–43, 147 requests for forces (rff), 126 Sciolino, Elaine, 31 responsibility to protect (r2p), 160–61 Scognamiglio, Carlo, 43 revolution in military affairs rma( ), Scud missiles, 63 18, 103 Secretary of the Treasury, 37 Rhodes, Benjamin J., 161 Senate Armed Services Committee, Rhodes scholar, 34, 41 17, 40, 75, 180, 194 Ribeiro, Liacya, 170 Senate Concurrent Resolution 21, Rice, Susan, 10, 160–62, 165 33–34, 75–76 Ricks, Thomas, 126 Serbian army: artillery, 40; defensive Riyadh, 6–8 preparations, 56, 213; Dragoljub Rommel, Erwin, 186, 195, 270 Ojdani, 80; genocide, 9, 35, 40, 116, Rommel in the Libyan Desert, 157 119, 126; simulations with fcs, 135; Rowley, Robert, 189 targeting, 24–25, 59, 85, 91, 104, 107, Royal Military Academy in Benghazi, 126 153 Serbian Socialist Party, 86 Royal Navy (British), 190 service culture, 17–18 Royal Netherland Marines, 47 Shajara Square, 151 Rubaa, Mustafa, 195 Shalikashvilli, John M., 37–40 Rubio, Marco (r-fl), 198 Sharia law, 206 Rumsfeld, Donald, 13, 103, 126–27, Shea, Jamie, 51, 59, 63, 69 147, 216 Shelton, Hugh: on Apache helicopters, Russia: and Kosovo, 13, 38, 59–60, 23, 88; bombing damage assessment, 73–75, 77–78, 87; and Libya, 160–61, 103–4, 107; and Drajoljub Ojdani, 166, 192, 196; peacekeepers, 95–100; 80; as member of nsc, 17, 37, 40–41, refugees, 121 and news media, 83; on prisoners, Russian Special Envoy for Kosovo, 38 70–71; on targets, 112, 114 Shinseki, Eric K., 126–28, 131, 135, 137 sa-10 (s-300), 75 Short, Christopher M., 210 sa-3, 58, 66 Short, Michael C.: on Apache sa-6, 58, 132 helicopters, 91, 111; and John sa-7, 58 Warden, 212; on targets, 24–26, Sanussi, Abdullah, 151 60–61, 63–64, 72, 84, 208–10; and Sarajevo, 38, 47–49 Wesley Clark, 8–9 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 11, 163–64, 176, 198 Short Message Service (sms), 187, Saudi Arabia, 6, 138, 166, 205 215 Scales, Robert H., 143–44, 147 signals intelligence, 66, 85, 93, 184 Schroder, Gerhard, 43–44 Simatovic, Franco “Frenki,” 68

index 303 Simpson, John surface-to-air missile (sam), 5, 58, 73, Sirte, Libya 132, 176–77 Skopje Suweiri, Khaled, 158 Skype, 186, 202 Sweden, 163, 172, 182 Slavin, Barbara, 169 Syria, 216, 221 smartphones, 4, 150, 200, 216 System-of-Systems Common Operating Smiljanic, Vlade, 87 Environment (soscoe), 140–42 Smith, Jason, 177 Smith, Rupert, 106 t-55, 184 Smith, Shane, 192–93 t-72, 136, 184 Smith Army Barracks (Germany), 36 t-80, 136 snr-125 Neva/Pechora “Low Blow,” 66 Tactical Air Control System, 28 social media, 14, 150–51, 173, 186–87, Talbot, Strobe, 77, 99, 160 194, 200, 202–3, 211 tank plinking, 4–5, 7, 9, 63–64, 113, Solana, Javier, 81, 83–84 209 Somalia, 30, 34 Tanzania, 27 sound ranging, 48 Tarbel, Fethi, 150–51 South Africa, 138, 160 Tarhouni, Ali, 155, 193, 197 South Korea, 27 Task Force Hawk: arrival and Soviet Union, 5, 90, 130, 252 deployment of, 88–96, 125; casualties Srebrenica, 35, 149 with, 74; composition of, 56; in Stabilization Force (sfor), 59, 97–98 Macedonia, 120; sensors in, 22–23, Stark, Tyler, 178–80 103, 109–11, 188, 207, 209, 216 Starry, Donn A., 133 Tenet, George, 37, 62 Stavridis, James, 172, 200, 202–3, 216 Texas, 33, 138–39, 159 Stevens, Ted (r-ak), 33 Thaci, Hashim, 99 Stone, Christopher J., 69 The Hague, 10, 95 Strategic Command, 177 Thucydides, 45 strategic bombing, 24, 100, 134 Tiananmen Square, 153, 158 strategic targets, 7–9, 144, 212, 254 Tirana, Albania, 90 Stroup, Theodore, G., 94 Tito, Joseph Broz, 42, 88 Stryker Brigade Combat Team Tobrouk, 157 (sbct), 127, 138–39 Tomahawk cruise missiles, 57, 182, 215 Stuttgart, Germany, 172, 270 Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 33 submarines, 26–27, 57 tow anti-tank missile, 89 Sudan, 27, 36 Training and Doctrine Command suppression of enemy air defense (tradoc), 111–12, 128, 133, 147 (sead), 58, 104 Trenchard, Hugh, 25 Supreme Allied Commander Europe Tuareg (tribe), 154 (saceur), 8, 9, 18, 41, 63, 105–6, Tucson, Arizona, 189 113, 171–72, 200 Tunisia, 149–50

304 index Turkey, 50, 73, 164, 173, 175–76, 181–82, efforts, 13, 124–48; sensors, 92–94, 189, 196 102, 106, 110–11, 119, 207, 209, 211 Twawa, Sifaw, 186 USA Today, 66, 169, 194 Twitter: coordination, 4, 10, 14, 151–52, U.S. Marines, 28–29, 73, 109–10, 179 158, 185–91, 193, 198–202, 208–9, U.S. Navy, 26–28, 58, 67, 73, 91, 138, 211–12, 215–16; hashtag, 10, 188–89, 169, 172, 176–78 191, 193; shortcode, 187 uss Albuquerque, 57 Tzu, Sun, 70, 114 uss America, 26 uss Barry, 176 ultra-nationalists, 78 uss Enterprise, 27 un (United Nations), 37, 51, 69, uss Gonzalez, 57 159–60, 164, 166 uss Kearsarge, 176, 179 un ambassador, 161–62 uss Miami, 57 unguided munitions, 4, 7 uss Mount Whitney, 172, 176 United Arab Emirates, 166, 196 uss Nicholson, 57 United Nations Preventive Deployment uss Philippine Sea, 57 Force (unpredep), 69 uss Ponce, 176 United States Congress: Senate, 17, uss Stout, 176 32–34, 36, 40, 64, 75–76, 180, 194; uss Theodore Roosevelt, 26, 73, 92 House of Representatives, 76 Uzicka Street, 78 University of Libya, 155 University of Pittsburgh, 155 Van Crevald, Martin, 211 University of Washington, 155 V Corps, 89, 133, 207 un observers, 21 Velika Hoca, 68 unscr 1970, 160, 165, 168–69, 172–73 Veri, Rinaldo, 173 unscr 1973, 159–62, 164, 165, 168, Viagra, 170 172–73 Vietnam: air campaigns, 38, 45–46, Urosevic, 59 49, 96, 212; bombing civilians U.S. Air Force: in Desert Storm, in, 122; Henry Kissinger on, 33; 4–8; development of, 23–26, 28; in Madeline Albright on, 39; U.S. Kosovo, 57–59, 63, 65, 67, 91, 94, Army in, 130–31, 134–35, 138, 144; 96, 110, 115; in Libya, 168, 172–73, and use of surface-to-air missiles, 177–78, 180–81, 201; and U.S. Army, 67; and William Westmoreland, 28 124, 133, 135, 138 Vinca, 88 U.S. Air Forces in Europe (usafe), Virginia, 122, 156, 180 22, 94 Vozdovac, 60 U.S. Army: and Apache helicopters, 23, 28, 55, 56, 74, 88-90; armored Waco, Texas, 159 formations, 217; in Desert Storm, Wadi Doum (battle), 156 7–8, 19, 21; doctrine, 22, 91; Key Wadi Jarif, 2, 198 West Agreement, 24; modernization Waging Modern War, 45–46, 71, 114

index 305 war crimes, 10, 35, 80 World War I, 15, 24, 48, 203, 208, 211 Warden, John, 6–7, 25–26, 123, 142, 212 World War II, 28, 35, 42–43, 69, 96, Warner, John (r-va), 40–41 130, 139, 164, 186, 212 War Powers Resolution of 1973, 76 Warrior armored personnel carrier, 90 Yefren, 186 Warsaw Pact, 125, 131 Yeltsin, Boris, 60, 74–75, 77–78, Washington Post, 33, 35, 65, 96, 107, 96–100, 121, 213 124, 141, 166–67, 190 Younis, Abdul Fatah, 153–55, 157–58, Wehrey, Frederick, 201–2 166, 184–86, 193–96, 206 Weinberger, Casper, 166–67 Younis, Moatasem, 193 Wells, Herbert George, 1, 54, 207 Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Westerwelle, Guido, 160, 164–65 Supply and Procurement, 85 Westmoreland, William, 28 Yugoslav Second Army, 74, 83 Wheelus Air Force Base, 168. See also Yugoslav Third Army, 3, 9, 57, 63, 68, Okba Ben Nafi air base 74, 94, 100, 104, 208, 213 Whiteman Air Force Base, 54, 85, 119, 177 Zafran, 198 wide-area sensors, 19 Zaire, 156 Wilby, David, 59, 81 Zeidan, Ali, 204–5 Wild Weasel, 67 Zelko, Dale, 65, 67–68 Without Hesitation, 41, 114 Zemun, 57 Woodward, Margaret, 172, 177, 182 Zentan, 152

306 index