On the Necessity of Individual Forms in Plotinus

The International

Journal of the Platonic Tradition Th e International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 3 (2009) 138-153 brill.nl/jpt

On Th e Necessity of Individual Forms in Plotinus

James Sikkema Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles

Abstract Each particular possesses its own form by virtue of its rational principle by which it expresses its universal in its unifi ed and intelligible individuality. Logos is able to express its form uniquely because of the infi nite possibilities inherent within and among the perfect, immutable Forms (eidos); all of the possibilities of formal expression exist within the intelligible cosmos. Insofar as this is the case, particular forms can be identifi ed qua individual, by virtue of their intrinsic unity; the oneness of each individual thing, by which it is distinguished from all others, is owing to the One, in which and by which all things have their being and intelligibility.

Keywords Plotinus, individuals, forms, intelligibility, the One

I. A Particular Problem In Ennead V.7 Plotinus makes a brief and somewhat obscure argument for the ideas or forms of particulars within the sensible cosmos. One wonders how Plotinus, avowedly engaging Platonic philosophy, could posit such an argument. After all, Form or Idea for Plato is what causes a thing to be the kind of thing it is by virtue of its participation in the universal identity of its Form. It is the universal, the Form of a thing that makes it intelligible; it is the eternal, immutable Form that allows the ephemeral, extended thing to be and to be intelligible to the rational soul of man. Th e Platonic doctrine of Forms necessarily precludes a Form for each particular as this would merely double the indeﬁ niteness and indistinctness of the realm of sense-perception. What shall we say then? Is Plotinus dismissing his Par- menidean foundation that ‘to be’ means to be intelligible? Or what is more, is he dismissing the Platonic Form that makes such an ontology explicitly © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009 DOI: 10.1163/187250809X12474505283540

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 02:37:47PM via free access J. Sikkema / Th e International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 3 (2009) 138-153 139 manifest? In a word, no. It will be the purpose of this essay to show, from within the “Neo-Platonic” system, that forms of individuals must be asserted for there to be any meaningful application of the doctrines of Parmenides and Plato. Our task thus enunciated, the essay will be conducted as follows: the essay will begin with a hermeneutic of Ennead V.7,1 followed by a hermeneutic of Ennead V.9.12, the ambiguous passage cited as directly opposing V.7.2 Th ese expositions will serve as the catalyst for an apology of Plotinus’ argument in Ennead V.7 in view of the larger corpus and content of Ploti- nus’ philosophy. Th e ﬁ nal section will be dedicated to some concluding remarks on the signiﬁ cance of Plotinus’ theory of individual forms.

II. Ennead V.7 on the Question Whether Th ere Are Ideas of Particulars Plotinus answers this question with a hypothetical, “Yes, if I and each one of us have a way of ascent to the intelligible, the principle of each of us is there.” (V.7.1)3 Plotinus takes as an example the person of Socrates, saying that the particular existent being named Socrates cannot exist in the intelligible cosmos in his particularity, but his soul may exist in perpetuity, now in Pythagoras, now in another, and so on. In other words, Socrates is not to be considered constitutive in his own formal structure for other men; the soul animating Socrates, however, can be constitutive of the animated existence of other men, but this is to say something entirely diﬀ erent. Th us, says Plotinus, “men are not related to their form as portraits of Socrates are to their original.” (V.7.1) Insofar as particular objects within the sensible cosmos are, they cannot all participate in the same Form, even though it is from the Forms that they derive their being. However, Plotinus wishes to

1) Th is exposition will not include Plotinus’ allusion to the Stoic doctrine of world periods, for, with Armstrong, I believe it is simply Plotinus’ way of placing the Stoic doctrine of unique particulars from which he obtains a clue for his own proposal of unique particulars; Plotinus’ theory is within a distinctly Platonic tradition. 2) I have H.J. Blumenthal’s essay “Did Plotinus Believe in Ideas of Individuals?” in mind here. He answers his question with a ‘no’. 3) Although Armstrong maintains that the safest interpretation of Ennead V.7 is to con- ceive Plotinus as asserting only individual (human) selves in participation with the form of Man (Introductory Note on Ennead V.7 pg. 220), I will maintain that Ennead V.7 can be considered constitutive of the principle of individuation in general that would be a necessary conclusion of Plotinus’ Parmenidean and Platonic metaphysics.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 02:37:47PM via free access 140 J. Sikkema / Th e International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 3 (2009) 138-153 assert that insofar as a particular thing qua that particular thing exists, or has being, within the sensible cosmos, it must, of necessity have its own principle of intelligibility. Socrates must be able to be identifi ed in contradistinction to all other men participating in the form of Man. Th e succes- sive animation of a single soul, says Plotinus, must possess its own rational forming principle or logos (V.7.1). Yet the logoi of existent beings within the sensible cosmos would have to be infi nite in order to constitute all that is within the everlasting All. “We ought not to be afraid of the infi nity which this introduces into the intelligible world”, says Plotinus, “for it is all in the indivisible unity and, we may say, comes forth when it acts.” (V.7.1) Soul contains the entire universe and the Soul possesses all of the rational forming principles that constitute this All in the present now. Th e logos or rationally forming principle is the means by which Form is brought to be upon matter within the sensible cosmos. Th e distinct Forms existing within the eternal and unextended intelligible cosmos, are in their perfection, immutable. Th is is not to say that they are inactive, but that their action is immanent and, insofar as logos is form qua production, the productive action of the logos propels the movement of diff erentiation made manifest in the objects within the sensible cosmos. Th e All (viz. the sensible cosmos) is contained within the intelligible cosmos, but only in potentia. Th e Forms within the intelligible cosmos are the models that each particular thing in the sensible cosmos refl ects. Th is refl ection is also a defl ection, in which all things in the universe possessing rational forming principles are made into numerous manifestations of their model. Yet this should not imply that the single model (Form) itself is the cause of all that is in refl ection of it. On the contrary, says Plotinus, “there cannot be the same forming principle for diff erent individuals [. . .] (because they are) diff ering from each other not only by reason of their matter but with a vast number of special diff erences of form.” (V.7.1) Th e composite particulars are contained within the soul that possesses all things insofar as it is their constitutive power (V.1.2). Th is is merely to say that the sensible cosmos is not to be considered an atomistic pastiche of haphazardly thrown together principles cohering together by blind fate. Th e unity in diff erence of the intelligible cosmos is mirrored in the sensible cosmos imperfectly, but is still a coherent unity as possessed by soul. But how can it be that, “diff erent structures must result from diff erent forming principles?” Th at is, if the sensible cosmos mirrors the intelligible,

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 02:37:47PM via free access J. Sikkema / Th e International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 3 (2009) 138-153 141 then it would seem that the particulars here would individually mirror their universal forms there. Indeed particulars mirror their forms, but do so diff erently. One simply needs to consider what would happen if this was not the case: if all men participated in the form of Man in the same way, then there would be no recognizable distinction in their appearance, and with no distinction in look (eidos) their would be no means of rendering such men intelligible. Plotinus therefore asserts that the formative principle whereby a thing comes to participate in its primary form is essential to the way in which it participates in said form.4 Plotinus cannot say with Aristotle that it is matter that gives each individual thing its particular look (eidos), for objects are not composites of form and matter. On the contrary, matter is the substrate receiving the forms, allowing a luminosity of color, shape and any other defi ning feature in distinction to all others (II.4.4). No, matter, says Plotinus, “will be exactly as the making principle wills it to be in every way, tractable to everything [. . .] So when the form comes to the matter it brings everything with it; the form has everything [. . .] all that goes with and is caused by the formative principle.” (II.4.8) Th at form brings everything may mean “that the principles have been granted as wholes” (V.7.2). Logos constitutes the qualities a particular body will have upon matter and, although presenting a particular within a specifi c class (form), it will do so in contradistinction to all other members of this class, and therefore in contradistinction to all other members of any of the other classes (of forms). Each forming principle can be said to be sent forth from its distinct universal (form), but in such a way that its “dominant principle will be diff erent”5 from all other logoi. What is posterior (logos) can be sent forth from what is prior (form) and, although what is posterior is the active actuality of what is prior, it is so only insofar as it is contained in what is prior.6

4) By primary form I am referring to the fundamental class (form) a thing can be identiﬁ ed as being a part. For example, each person is fundamentally of the idea of man, but participates in this basic form in multifarious formal ways. Th e essay will develop this point fur- ther. 5) J.M. Rist, “Forms of Individuals in Plotinus,” from Th e Classical Quarterly. New Series, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Nov., 1963), pp. 223-231; pg. 226. 6) Dominic J. O’Meara, “Th e Hierarchical Ordering of Reality in Plotinus,” in Th e Cambridge Companion to Plotinus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pg. 72. Cf. Also Ennead VI.7.2 p. 91; 14 p. 133.

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But if Intellect or the intelligible cosmos contains soul and logos, then there must be a principle of division within the Forms themselves; but how can this be if the Forms are unextended, eternal and immutable? Plotinus off ers a clue toward an answer of this question in the fi nal sentence of Ennead V.7 when he states, “in Intellect, as in Soul, there is again the infi n- ity of these principles which come out ready for use in Soul” (V.7.3). Each form contains within it every conceivable possibility of its expression through logos and is also the condition for the possibility of being acted upon by logos. What is more, Intellect “has each and every reason why of the things in it; but it is itself individually all the things in it [. . .] all the things each individual has are each individual reason why [. . .] the reason why is contained in its existence” (VI.7.2). Th e existence of any particular thing brings with it, all at once, its intelligibility itself-as-itself in contradistinction to all others. Th e reason why this is so is contained in the existen- tial question is this (viz. this All) so (is it?)? If something is, insofar as it is, it is as it is and, therefore, diff erent from all other things that are. Plotinus is not yet content in his exposition at this point, for what of the case of twins, animals born in a litter, or the productions of craftsmen; cases in which their seems to be no recognizable distinction between two ostensibly identical productions of a rational forming principle? To this Plotinus replies, “what prevents there being diff erent forming principles even when the individuals are not diff erent?” (V.7.3) To which he skepti- cally appends “supposing, that is, there are any individuals at all totally without diff erence.” (V.7.3 emphasis mine). Th e reason for such skepti- cism stems from the clue Plotinus gleans from his consideration of the production of the craftsman. Th e craftsman, says Plotinus,

even if he is making things which do not diff er from each other, must apprehend the sameness by means of a rational diff erence, according to which he will make the thing another by bringing some diff erence to its sameness, so in nature, where the other thing does not come into being by reasoning but only by rational forming principles, the diff erence must be linked with the form; but we are unable to grasp the diff erence. (V.7.3)

It is evident from this that Plotinus wishes to assert that in order for a thing to be the thing that it is it must, as such, have a distinct rationally forming principle. Th us, even if there is no recognizable distinction between two ostensibly identical objects, that they are two objects giving the look of

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 02:37:47PM via free access J. Sikkema / Th e International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 3 (2009) 138-153 143 similarity speaks of their diff erence, even if the diff erence is numerical. J.M. Rist correspondingly declares, “nothing can prevent two so-called identical objects from being diff erent existents.”7 Th at one thing exists as a unifi ed and therefore identifi able thing speaks of its own rational forming principle whereby it exists as that particular unifi ed thing. What makes this thing unifi ed is the unique participation in its form (eidos), but what is more, it is its being constituted as a diverse, yet identifi able unity. As unique expressions of the infi nite possibilities contained within universals, particular ideas imperfectly share in the ideals from whence they derive their being through diff erent logoi. Th us, even though there exists a potential infi nity of possibilities regarding the rationally forming principles, “we have no need to be afraid [. . .] since Soul contains them all.” (V.7.3) and the One contains Soul and is its power of production insofar as it is pure production itself (VI.9.3, cf. V.5.9). To wit, Plotinus declares, “it is by the one that all beings are beings, both those which are primarily beings (the forms/ideas) and those which are in any sense said to be among beings (sensibles).” (VI.9.1 parenthetical terms mine). Th e infi nity attributed to logoi is contained in germinal form in its corresponding idea(s), which in turn is contained in the One, giving to the forms their unity, identity and multiplicity both in the intelligible and the sensible cosmoi.

III. Ennead V.9.12: Are Individual Forms in the Intelligible Universe? Individual forms do not exist, as such, in the intelligible cosmos, but they are contained there in potentia; that is, individual forms of ideas exist in the intelligible cosmos as possibilities of the forms from which they will draw to create (via soul) a particular composite within the sensible cosmos, and do not exist independently of the universals to which they primarily belong (VI.7.11). Plotinus explicitly states in V.9.12, “the Forms of universals are there, not of Socrates but of man.” (V.9.12) Th is seems to be in direct opposition to his statement at the beginning of V.7 quoted at the beginning of the previous section, but it is not. Directly following the statement that the forms of universals are there, Plotinus adds, “but we must enquire about man whether the form of the individual is there” (V.9.12). Although

7) J.M. Rist, “Forms of Individuals in Plotinus,” from Th e Classical Quarterly, pg. 226.

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Plotinus does not develop his theory at this point, he opens the door for his exposition in V.78 when he declares, “there is individuality, because the same is diff erent in diff erent people” (V.9.12). What we can glean from this is that Plotinus holds that there is indeed no form of Socrates from which other men obtain their identity, but that there exist diff erences within the class (viz. individuals participating in a particular and primary form) of men that make them identifi able as individuals within the species Man. It is here that a more robust explication of the possibility of diff erences possessed within the unity of the Forms is required. It will be important for us to recall Plotinus’ words at the end of Ennead V.7 quoted earlier in this essay, “in Intellect, as in Soul, there is again the infi nity of these principles…” (V.7.3). Th e Forms are distinct and intelligible in relation to all other Forms, yet remain unifi ed in their perfection (II.6.3). It is the individual unity of each form that permits interpenetration between the Forms, allowing for fecund possibilities of individuation; possibilities now seen as within and between the distinct Forms in-themselves. Th e infi nite possibilities contained within each Form are due therefore both to its own self-enclosed determinateness and the interpenetrating unity between other such Forms.9 Th rough the active actuality of logos then, each sensible thing will be made up of the expressions of distinct possibilities contained within the form it primarily participates in. Plotinus propounds this phenomenon succinctly in Ennead VI.5.6:

For the intelligibles are many and they are one, and, being one, they are many by their unbounded nature, and many in one and one over many and all together, and they are active towards the whole with the whole, and active towards the part again with the whole. But the part receives into itself the ﬁ rst activity as that of a part, but the whole follows; as if [the Form of] Man came to a particular man and became a particular man though being on the other hand [the Form of] Man. For the man in the matter made from the one man according to the Idea many men, all the same, and the same thing is one in the many in a way like that in which there is one seal-imprint in many things.

8) Although V.7 appears earlier in the Enneads it is chronologically later. H.J. Blumenthal, “Did Plotinus Believe in Ideas of Individuals?,” in Phronesis, 11 (1966) pp. 61-80, pg. 62. 9) Insofar as a form is a form, it is constituted to be in a certain way; the fundamental unity of the forms as form is due to their being forms at all; the why-less is.

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But the thing itself, Man, and each thing itself, and the [intelligible] All as a whole are not in many in this way, but they are many in the thing itself, or rather around it.

Each thing is intelligible in itself as the particular and unifi ed thing it is, distinct from all others, but in the class of Man, each man is the same insofar as he is the expression of this primary Form, but diff erent in how he expresses one of the possibilities of this form through logos. Th us a thing is intelligible in itself by virtue of the way in which it participates in its Form, but insofar as it participates uniquely, it has the particular look (eidos) of its Form and can therefore be classifi ed as such (e.g. as a human being). Plotinus is propounding a systematic means by which a thing can be identifi ed according to its unique formal principle. Earlier in this treatise, Plotinus indicates what makes a substance (ousia) substantial when he states, “all the things that are said to exist are compounds, and not a single one of them is simple” (V.9.3). Each thing that is said to exist must necessarily have particular composition in order to be identifi ed as that one thing in the distinction from all others. Substance as hupokeimenon is an apt characterization of what Plotinus is here referring to as things that are said to exist. I believe this is what Plotinus has in mind when he gives his somewhat odd example of classes of men with snub or aquiline noses. Because one man has a snub nose and another an aquiline nose, one must assume aquilinity and snubness to be specifi c diff erences in the form of man, just as there are diff erent species of animal (V.9.12). It is important to note that Plotinus is here not making the impossible claim that there exists a dissemblance within the universal Form of Man itself, but that there exist diff erences in the way this universal is expressed. Th at diff erences occur in the Form of Man, giving to one class an aquiline and to another a snub nose, speaks to the rational forming principle (logos) giving to a thing its particular look within the Formal class of participation, in this case, of Man. Th us one can speak of a form of Socrates insofar as there is a formal intelligibility that accords to the particular, extended person Socrates; a person defi ned by having various and sundry formal character- istics whereby he is identifi ed as Socrates and no one else. Th us Plotinus is not contradicting himself by stating that there are forms of universals, “not of Socrates but of man” (V.9.12) for he is referring to

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 02:37:47PM via free access 146 J. Sikkema / Th e International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 3 (2009) 138-153 the formal structure of particulars that participate in multiple forms through the activity of the logos which gives to each thing its own determination within its classifi catory eidos. Each thing is a unity in diversity; insofar as a thing is diversely unifi ed there exists identity and wherever real formal diff erence can be detected, individual forms are to be posited.10 And wherever individual forms can be assumed, it also ought to be assumed that the particular thing being identifi ed qua that particular, the unifi ed object is constituted for identity at all because of its fundamental unity as given to it ultimately by the One. But how is this so? And more impor- tantly why is this so? Th at is, why must Plotinus have “improved” upon Plato’s notion of Forms that were for him a means of intelligibility also? It will be the business of the rest of the essay to show why Plotinus must assert individual forms in order to maintain logical consistency within his metaphysical system.

IV: From Whence Comes the Necessity of Positing Individual Ideas? At the outset of this paper I briefl y expounded the tradition within which Plotinus is operating and I would like to briefl y return to that tradition in order to facilitate the current discussion of the necessary positing of a theory of individual ideas. I formerly mentioned the import of Plato’s theory of Ideas as the necessary means whereby an intellect lays hold of things identifi able in the sensible cosmos. Th e idea or form of a thing is the universal form in which a particular object participates and it is by virtue of this universality that the intellect is able to apprehend the true quiddity of an object. For Plato, as indeed for Plotinus, if it were not for Ideas, things, fi rstly, could not be and certainly could not be intelligible. Th e coincidence of being and intelligibility is the fundamental ontological underpinning for Plato’s (and Plotinus’) theory of forms. Indeed, the theory of Forms is supplemental to this fundamental ontology. Th e positing of a world of forms can be seen as an explanation how this foundational similitude

10) A.H. Armstrong, “Forms, Individuals and the Self,” in Plotinian and Christian Studies. London: Variorum Reprints, 1978, 56. Armstrong however goes on to say, “they (forms of individuals) should not be assumed where such diﬀ erences cannot be observed”. My brief mention of Plotinus’ allusion to the production of the craftsman as instantiating the fundamental principle of individuation and identity is in direct opposition to Armstrong’s position.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 02:37:47PM via free access J. Sikkema / Th e International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 3 (2009) 138-153 147 between being and thinking is made possible. With this in mind, I think we can see how Plotinus merely works out the Platonic theory of Forms to its logical conclusion. Th e fundamental ontological hypostasis for Plotinus is this very inex- tricability between being and thinking laid out by Parmenides.11 Th us, the cognitive activity whereby being is appropriated must be coextensive with the constitution of the things that be. Th e lowest form of consciousness, sense-perception, is an inadequate means of appropriating reality for, although it is a mode of cognitive awareness (of reality), it is an inchoate awareness (V.3.2). It is lacking substantial content because the faculties of sense mirror reality without refl ection; sense data and sense-perception are equally diff use and therefore the faculty of sense cannot lay hold of a clear, formal identity of what it perceives. Th ere is a lack of unity and a lack of distinctness; everything is a particular lacking a means of apprehending unity. Intellect must be employed as that con- templative apparatus which, says Plotinus, “needs to see itself, or rather to possess the seeing of itself [. . .] there must, then, be more than one, that seeing may exist, and the seeing and the seen must coincide, and what is seen by itself must be an universal multiplicity.” (V.3.10). It is relevant to point out that Plotinus uses a sensory metaphor, in this case ocular, to explain the necessity of intellect for appropriating reality. Whereas sense-perception sees a little more than a mere multiplicity, intellect sees “an universal multiplicity”; intellect as coextensive with Intellect (Being, Ideas, Forms) is able to identify formal distinctness within the otherwise amorphous sensible cosmos (I.6.3, V.3.2). Th e sensible cosmos is therefore given to consciousness in such a way that each particular thing, as such, must be given to intellectual apprehension in and for itself. If this were not so, there would only be proximal knowl- edge or intuition of things in themselves, or what is worse, a muddling of indistinct things into posited categories; for Plotinus this would not only be inconceivably wrongheaded, but would border profanity. Th e intellect is constitutively one with that which is intelligible; if it were not, then there would be no defi nite means of knowing; if there were no defi nite means of knowing, then nothing could be known; if nothing could be known, then there could be no access to being at all and there

11) Parmenides declares, “. . . for the same things can be thought of and can be.” In Early Greek Philosophy 2nd Ed., edited by Jonathon Barnes. London: Penguin, 2001. p. 81.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 02:37:47PM via free access 148 J. Sikkema / Th e International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 3 (2009) 138-153 would properly be no content to thought, indeed no thinking at all, there would properly be nothing. Simply by virtue of existing, things are posited by Plotinus to be intelligible, but how? Insofar as a thing is intelligible it has a particular shape or form of intelligibility because its formal constitution (logos) includes within it the composite of sameness and diff erence. To apprehend a particular in its determination is to do so in distinction from all others. Th e rational forming principle produces a thing as unique, in contradistinction to all other things. It is “working within them and giving them form” (VI.7.11). To be therefore, is to have identity. What makes a things identity identifi - able at all, is its being a complex, yet unifi ed whole. Th at is, a particular thing qua individual may have aspectual polyvalence within itself (i.e. belonging to its particular eidos as constituted by its logos), but, by virtue of its participation with the world of Forms, it is identifi able as the thing that it is, negating all others. For example, let us suppose we came across a large number of monarch butterfl ies. Although they all have similar markings, no two can be considered absolutely identical, for upon closer observation, one could pick out a number of distinguishing attributes (e.g. size, hue, marking confi guration, etc.) inherent in each one that would make it unlike all the others. Although each share in the universal form of Butterfl y, each shares in it unlike any other by virtue of its unique rational forming principle. A thing mirrors its Form, but does so in particularity. Insofar as it is particular and many, it is not purely universal, even though it possesses the universal in its look (eidos). Th us we come to a seemingly obvious point regarding the diff erence between the sensible and the intelligible cosmoses: the sensible cosmos is an imperfect refl ection of the intelligible. In the intelligible cosmos, the Forms are distinct in their perfection, but are without separation; each has its own pure shape, but have a commonal- ity of perfection due to the perfect material substrate in which they exist and have their light (II.4.4). Th e sensible cosmos is, in relation to the intelligible a second order cosmos (V.8.7). Th at is to say, it is, or the things in it are, by virtue of their participation in the Forms. And the means, by which the things in it are at all, are due to the rational forming principles constituting their particular being. Th ings in the sensible cosmos are united by their Form and are distinguished by their particular intelligibility in which they appear in space and time (II.4.3). It is for this reason that the

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 02:37:47PM via free access J. Sikkema / Th e International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 3 (2009) 138-153 149 intellect is able to group particular things into universal categories of similar ideas. What makes each thing intelligible at all is the individual form (viz. qualities) each possesses, but individual form is a composite of various universal forms creating a distinct compound dominated by a particular universal (in order to facilitate classifi cation). Th is is evident if we consider what Plotinus states at the outset of Ennead V.9.10, “all the things, then, which exist as forms in the world of sense come from the intelligible world” coupled with a brief line in section 13 of the same treatise, “those very forms themselves existing here in a diff erent mode” (V.9.13). And they exist here in diff erent modes by being a composite of “many in the thing itself” (VI.6.5). For example, I participate in the universal form of Man, but insofar as I am a participant and not the universal itself, I participate in this form distinctly (i.e. I participate in the dominant form by virtue of my distinct composition of other sundry forms). I am a composite of other forms subsisting in the primary form of Man by which I am classifi ed. I can be identifi ed in my particularity by virtue of the logos constituting my person, but I subsist within the eidos of humanity as a whole. Yet what are we to make of things that are virtually indistinct; things of which “we are unable to grasp the diff erence” (V.7.3 p. 229)? Th at is, what do we make of the previously cited case of the craftsman in Ennead V.7? Plotinus posits that a logical diff erence regarding individual form must be posited for seemingly identical objects in order that each may be intelligible in and of itself. But his conclusion that, “the diff erence must be linked with the form; but we are unable to grasp the diff erence,” (V.7.3) seems unsatisfactory in light of the principles of intelligibility this essay has heretofore laid out. Plotinus does not specifi cally address this dissatisfaction, but approximates to it in his skeptical supposition that individuals totally without diff erence cannot exist. Let us imagine two identical pencils that have just emerged from the factory where they were produced; outside of numerical dissimilarity, how would someone distinguish between the two? Plotinus says, “in the cases where the off spring are indistinguishable, there is one forming principle,” but also declares in the same breath, “what prevents [there being diff erent forming principles] even when the individuals are not diff erent?” (V.7.3). I interpret this paradoxical pair of statements to mean that the forming principle of two ostensibly identical things is the same, but is manifest

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 02:37:47PM via free access 150 J. Sikkema / Th e International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 3 (2009) 138-153 distinctly (i.e. uniquely) through numerical distinctness. For there to be a declaration of two (or more) things to be identical at all, each must be identiﬁ ed in their particularity as such, only after such identiﬁ cation can equality of identity be posited at all. Th us, one cannot in all honesty equate two seemingly identical things, for a thing, insofar as it is, can only be said to be identical with itself. To wit, Plotinus posits, “if it is going to be itself, all its parts must tend to one, so that it is itself when it is one in some way” (VI.6.1). Th us, we may also look to something more fundamental to solve this puzzle. Th e previous question was biased in that it did not consider numerical distinctness to be a qualitative determination, but I think Ploti- nus would consider this to be the most fundamental aspect of identity. It is by the One that all exists (V.1.7), for it is by unity that a thing is said to be and be thought. A case in which two things have an identical look (viz. the two pencils) the most obvious form of distinguishing between the two is simply that they are two and not one. Insofar as a thing is said to be it exists by virtue of its unity. Since it exists by this unity it is intelligible as such, and intelligibility inexorably involves distinction and therefore negation. Th us numerical distinction is the fundamental form of intelligibility because by it logos is able to perform its act of giving particular things their formal identity. In Ennead VI.6.1 Plotinus says,

the multiplicity is uniﬁ ed and not allowed to be altogether multiplicity, being a one-multiple. And because of this it is less than the One, because it has multiplicity, and so in so far as it is compared to the One, it is worse; and since it does not have the nature of that One, but has gone out from it, it has been diminished, but it keeps its majesty by the one in it, and it turned back its multiplicity to one and there it stayed.

Th at is, it is with numerical distinction that the intellect can grasp this particular one while negating all of the other ones. Each one has its own shape and therefore its own principle of intelligibility. Consider what Plo- tinus says in Ennead V.5.9:

Th e last and lowest things, therefore, are in the last of those before them, and these are in those prior to them, and one thing is in another up to the First, which is the Principle. But the Principle, since it has nothing before it, has not anything else to be in; but since it has nothing else to be in, and the other things are in those which come before them, it encompasses all the other things.

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Coupling this with what he says in Ennead V.1.7 we come to a full realiza- tion of the One in relation to intelligibility by numerical identity through the rational forming principle:

For this reason that the One is none of the things in Intellect, but all things come from him. Th is is why they are substances (hupokeimenon); for they are already defi ned and each has a kind of shape. Being must not fl uctuate, so to speak, in the indefi nite, but must be fi xed by limit and stability; and stability [. . .] is limit and shape, and it is by these that it receives existence.

Th e formative principle of Soul is the outward expression of the intelligible cosmos and gives a thing its shape or composite formal structure, but its limit and stability as that particular shape is the gift of unity, the things’ being this one and none of the other ones. So the things that be, are by virtue of their expression of Intellect (i.e. Intellect gives content to things formed by logos), but even more fundamentally by virtue of the productive power of the One. Lloyd P. Gerson succinctly articulates this point and what it would be to deny the intelligibility of particulars as such. He declares, “Plotinus’ fi rst principle, through the instrumentality of Intellect, reaches down to the existence of every individual. To deny all intelligible content to the individual as such would seem to block the creative activity of the One.”12 Th e self-unity of individuals is not to be viewed as a conglomeration of self-contained, self-suffi cient and isolated noumena as regards their fundamental intelligibility. Reality is unifi ed in its diff erence by virtue of the productive power of the One. Plotinus states, “now each thing [. . .] has a kind of distinctive character of its own; but, being in the form of good, all of them have in common what runs over them all” (VI.7.16). Only when intellect’s gaze is fi xed on this fact is it possible to revert back to the sensible cosmos and understand the principle of individual forms (VI.7.17). As Plotinus says, “the Good [. . .] is neither the real beings nor intellect but cause of these, giving its own light thinking and being thought to the real beings and to intellect. Intellect came to be by being fi lled, and when it was fi lled it was, and simultaneously it was perfected and saw” (VI.7.16). Intellect becomes intellect in and by returning to the One and in so doing it is fi lled with the content of this All in its multitudinous particularity.

12) Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus. New York: Routledge, 1994. pg. 228.

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Th e content of this all is seen as a unity of distinct, particular unities inclined toward intelligibility in that they are constituted by the One to be rationally formed ones. Insofar as it is given its distinctive look by the formative action of logos as distinctive participations in the intelligible cosmos, this All is a contemplation of that world of Forms and the One. Plotinus declares that since, “there is nowhere where it (the Good) is not” (III.8.9), then “all other things to aspire to this state (of contemplation), granted that their originative principle is, for all things, the goal” (III.8.7). And how would this All contemplate the One from whence it came? It certainly would not do so as an indistinct, amorphous and contentless whole, but as a diverse, determined and individual multiformity; as a unifi ed diversity, being themselves intelligible for the One from whence they derive these traits. Had Plotinus not posited individual forms, there could be no means for appropriating this All in its determined intelligibility. Th at is, there would be no ground for appropriating each thing as intelligible. Plotinus realizes the insuffi ciency of a doctrine of Forms limited to universality. Th e universality of forms is apt for general categorization of existent objects, but is insuffi cient for laying hold of the particulars that make up these classes. Plotinus must posit ideas of particulars or abandon his Parmenidean metaphysics. In lieu of the latter, he posits the former, thus staving off nihilism and working out Plato’s Ideas to their logical conclusion. To reiterate, this conclusion is simply that each particular possesses its own form by virtue of its rational principle by which it expresses its universal in its unifi ed and intelligible individuality. Logos is able to express its form uniquely because of the infi nite possibilities inherent within and among the perfect, immutable Forms; all of the possibilities of formal expression exist within the intelligible cosmos. To wit, Plotinus succinctly declares, “since the intellect appropriate to any particular being does not [. . .] cease to be the intellect of all [. . .] for instance, granted that each part [. . .] is all things, but per- haps in diff erent ways. For it is actually one thing, but has the power to be all; but we apprehend in each what it actually is.” (VI.7.9) Finally, this leads to the conclusion that each particular form can be identifi ed qua that one individual at all, by virtue of the intrinsic unity inherent to particulars; the oneness of each individual thing, by which it is distinguished from all others, is owing to the One, in which and by which all things have their being and intelligibility.

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Bibliography

Armstrong, A.H. “Forms, Individuals and the Self,” in Plotinian and Christian Studies. London: Variorum Reprints, 1978. Blumenthal, H.J. “Did Plotinus Believe in Ideas of Individuals?,” in Phronesis. 11 (1966) pp. 61-80. Gerson, Lloyd P. Plotinus. New York: Routledge, 1994. O’Meara, Dominic J., “Th e Hierarchical Ordering of Reality in Plotinus,” in Th e Cam- bridge Companion to Plotinus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Parmenides. Early Greek Philosophy 2nd Ed. Edited by Jonathon Barnes. London: Penguin, 2001. p. 81. Plotinus. Enneads (Loeb Classical Library). Translated by A.H. Armstrong. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995. Rist, J.M. “Forms of Individuals in Plotinus,” in Th e Classical Quarterly. New Series, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Nov., 1963), pp. 223-231.

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