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Leveraging of Religious Diplomacy by Pakistan

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Leveraging of Religious Diplomacy by Pakistan scholar warrior Leveraging of Religious Diplomacy by Pakistan KJ SINGH Introduction Three terms, religion, faith and theology are used inter-changeably but are seldom analysed for their nuances and subtle variations. The first two, religion (dharma) and faith are used frequently as synonyms, and relate to the practice of a particular religious order and cover outward expression and rituals. On the other hand, theology (dharma shastra) encompasses analytics and detailed reasoning. Religion and faith have always been potent drivers in national politics and increasingly even in international diplomacy and power politics. Despite articulations and pretensions of secularism, and assertions of keeping politics insulated from religion, propelled by a wave of nationalism, religion has become a potent instrument in international diplomacy. The tendency is more apparent in monotheistic or theocratic states like our neighbour Pakistan, which is an early proponent of this, and of late, has tried to leverage it for sinister purposes. American and International Context This trend further gained traction after the 9/11 terrorist attack, though the USA had created a special office with designated an Ambassador at Large for ‘International Religious Freedom’ in 1999 consequent to the proliferation of Islamist extremism. Out of five incumbents, only one has been a non-Christian, Jewish rabbi. The current Ambassador, Senator Sam Brownback, was appointed after the casting of a vote by the Vice President, reflecting the ironic polarisation 36 ä SPRING 2020 ä scholar warrior scholar warrior for an appointment mandated to promote consensus. Pakistan has He recently visited Dharamshala for parleys with the misused theocracy Dalai Lama. The biggest current theological challenge in conjunction with is to evolve a more moderate form of Islam, containing other drivers and the designs of caliphates and groups like Al Qaeda interests. and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The king of Jordan and Saudi royalty are also engaged in this effort, without much success. It appears that outsourcing of the Wahhabism and Salafi strains to the extended neighbourhood, specially the Indian subcontinent, has run its course and radicalism is already back in the Middle East. Hence, it is more of a compulsion to roll back radicalisation or at least keep it within manageable limits. The American prodded initiative for moderate Islam is not free from internal contradictions and has naturally led to coalescing of radical states. Malaysia recently led an initiative outside the traditional body, the Organisation of Islamic States (OIC) as an alternative platform with Indonesia, Turkey and Qatar as prominent participants in the meeting. The platform has been seen as an alternative and challenge to the traditional Saudi-led theological Islamic block. Pakistan pulled out at the very last minute, forced by the relentless pressure of the Saudis and the Gulf nations. It is also pertinent to take note of the fact that radicalisation promotes counter-radicalisation and, consequently, it has spawned neo-conservative movements and hardening tendencies in other religions like Buddhism and now even Hinduism and Sikhism. All these malevolent strands are dangerous and need to be curbed. Manifestations in Pakistan India has been at the receiving end of the malevolent forays of Pakistan’s religious diplomacy, which has acquired fasaadi overtones. The use of the term fasaad in preference to the incorrectly used jihad is theologically validated. The Pakistan Army chose to call its anti-terror operations Raad-ul-Fasaad. Even the American cultural education discourages misuse of the term jihad. It is hardly logical to have different terms for indigenous and exported versions of fasaad. The Pakistan Army’s hypocrisy was first exhibited in the early 1950s, when it colluded with Naga militant groups, despite these groups openly striving for a Christian regime and Nagaland for Christ. The Army under Tikka Khan indulged in the rape and massacre of fellow Bengali Muslims, disregarding the concept of ummah (Islamic brotherhood), leading to East Pakistan breaking away. This, in effect, negated the very raison d’être for the two-nation theory and the rationale scholar warrior ä SPRING 2020 ä 37 scholar warrior for a separate Islamic nation. Giving primacy to religion, it disregarded other equally relevant factors like lack of geographical connectivity, and cultural and linguistic disparities between the two wings of Pakistan. Hypocrisy is currently seen in the silence of Pakistan and the ummah on the rampant persecution of Uighurs in Xinjiang by the Han Chinese. Hence, Pakistan and other Islamic nations have misused theocracy as per their convenience and in conjunction with other drivers and interests. Pakistan, created as a homeland for Muslims, got the initial thumbs down, when 35 million Muslims chose to cast their lot with secular India despite the partition riots. Compared to this, Hindus and Sikhs deserted Pakistan in droves, despite Jinnah’s assurance that the new nation would be inclusive, allowing minorities their fair share. Soon after Jinnah’s death, the Islamic nation, which had Karachi as the capital, chose to make Islamabad, a suburb of Rawalpindi, the new seat of power. With this naming, it also chose to carry the cross or (crescent) of Islam. Manifestations were seen in kabayali lashkars in Kashmir under Colonel Akbar (anointed as General Tariq) and razakars in Hyderabad, albeit the religious aspect was subdued. More sinister was the contrived misplacing of the maue muqqadas (holy hair relic of the Prophet) to whip up emotions in the Kashmir Valley in 1963. Despite failure to achieve its diabolic designs, Pakistan launched Operation Gibralter in 1965. Infiltration by Mujahideen Task Forces, named after mostly infamous Muslim raiders, Salahuddin, Ghaznavi, Tariq, Babur, Qasim, Khalid, Nusrat and Khilji were organised under General Musa. The provocative tendency of using Islamic symbolism, particularly, for the raiders, continues in the naming of missiles as Ghaznavi, Babur and Ghauri. In this dangerous lurch from subcontinental Sufi/Barelvi to Deobandi, Wahabbi and Salafi forms of Islam, Khuda Hafiz has become Allah Hafiz and Ramazan replaced by the Arabic Ramadan. Pakistan seems to have linked its socio-cultural and theological moorings westwards, choosing Arabic influences over traditional linkages. Another major milestone was Bhutto’s articulation of resolve to manufacture the Islamic bomb. Sadly, competitive radicalism under Zia-ul-Haq and later the Taliban accounted for the death of both Zulifkar, his daughter Benazir and probably even Zia. The very dream of an Islamic bomb is getting reduced to a Sunni bomb because Shia Iran doesn’t trust the Sunnis. In Talibanised Pakistan, Jinnah’s Shias and Nobel Physicist Abdus Salaam’s Ahmediyas are being targeted and eliminated. Former Army Chief General Raheel is now leading a coalition of Sunni forces against the Shia 38 ä SPRING 2020 ä scholar warrior scholar warrior Houthi rebels. Pakistan also provides troops to guard A radicalised sheikhdoms and royalty in many Gulf countries like Pakistan army in Saudi Arabia. It has also been training pilots and control of foreign other specialists, including veterans engaged in the and security policies maintenance of equipment. is a danger to the neighbourhood. Zia’s Decade and Rise of ISI This dangerous course had been defined by Zia’s decade of 1978 to 1988, which catalysed the Pakistan Army’s Shariasation, committing itself to Nizam-e-Mustafa (rule of the Prophet) and taking upon itself the guardianship of the ideological frontiers. The traditional motto of “ittehad, yaqeen, tanzeem” (unity, faith and discipline) was changed to “imaan, taqwa, jihad-fi-sablillah” (faith, righteous and holy war in the path of Allah). How do minorities reconcile to such exhortation? Zia also made “The Quranic Concept of War” by Brigadier S K Malik, which legitimises use of terror, mandatory text for the forces. An interesting quote from the Pakistan Army’s official website (reading like the objective of extremist groups), states, “The mission and aim of a Momin is martyrdom”. American compulsions of tackling the Afghan imbroglio gave Pakistan an opportunity to emerge as the vanguard in this misplaced campaign, which was legitimised as a theological necessity. Since then, turmoil in the Middle East and plans of a caliphate with Khorasan, which includes India, has enabled Pakistan’s terror assembly line to remain active. A radicalised Army in control of the nation and its foreign and security policies, including nuclear weapons, is, indeed, a dangerous warning for the neighbourhood. Kartarpur Challenge The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) having probably realised that Kashmir is proving to be case of diminishing marginal returns, has come up with the diabolic K2 plan to exploit the latent sub-nationalism of the Sikhs. The timing of the Kartarpur corridor, and the initial offer by General Bajwa are indicative of the Pakistan Army’s ownership of this move. This apart, anchoring of the construction by the Field Works Organisation and timing with SFJ 2020 are all ominous indicators of the shape of things to come. While nobody doubts the loyalty of the Sikhs, fringe groups can be potential prey. It is also pertinent that the Punjabis defeated extremism and are cognisant of the state being put back by a couple of decades. Nobody is even remotely suggesting that the Sikhs are so naive that they will be brainwashed by a couple of posters and the display of scholar warrior ä SPRING 2020 ä 39 scholar warrior remains of a bombshell with a provocative placard blaming India for attacking a gurudwara. Yet, it does open up possibilities for profiling and long drawn psychological warfare. Combating the Pakistan aided druggistan designs remains a major challenge for the Punjabis. While proxy war in Kashmir may be on a lower level, there are attempts by the ISI to fish for trouble spots and establish linkages with splinter groups in the hinterland to foment trouble. This has been coupled with attempts to raise the Kashmir issue at various international bodies, notably the United Nations, including the Security Council.
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