Central and Eastern Europe
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Central and Eastern Europe Federal Republic of Germany National Affairs NI, ATIONAL POLITICS IN the latter half of 1996 and 1997 continued along the path set for the Federal Republic by Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Under his leadership, the coalition government made up of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) made the changes in fiscal policy that it deemed necessary to bring the fed- eral deficit below the 3.0 percent level set as a criterion for monetary union in the Maastricht Treaty. The final decision on which countries would participate in the Euro, the new European currency, was slated for March 1998. Unemployment continued to rise, topping 4 million—a new high in the post-World War II era. After having pledged to cut that figure in half by the year 2000, Chancellor Kohl acknowledged toward the end of 1997 that such a goal was not realizable. Over the 18 months covered by this article, the major political parties began preparations for the 1998 federal elections. As a result, aside from a watered-down version of health-care reform, virtually no progress was made on such pressing issues as tax reform, the restructuring of state-funded pension plans, and educa- tional reform. Coalitions in five of 18 state governments (Hesse, North Rhine- Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein, Saxony-Anhalt, and Hamburg) of the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens, a leftist environmental party, fueled specula- tion that such a "red-green" coalition could displace the ruling federal govern- ment. Indecision within the SPD as to their candidate for chancellor also re- mained a major source of speculation. Party chief Oskar Lafontaine continued to control the party machinery, but centrist Gerhard Schroder, the minister pres- ident of Lower Saxony, enjoyed greater popular support. No decision was ex- pected until after the March 1998 state elections in Lower Saxony. Both the SPD and the CDU emphasized internal security, their rhetoric play- ing on public perceptions of insecurity at a time of high crime rates and sustained and increasing unemployment. Schroder demonstrated the willingness of even the traditionally civil liberties-oriented SPD to capitalize on popular anxiety when he announced that foreigners who proved to be a risk to the security of Germans 308 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY / 309 would not be tolerated. In an effort to provide law-enforcement officials with in- creased means to combat organized crime, the federal government proposed a measure that would legalize the tapping of phones belonging to suspected crim- inals, with court approval. The primacy of civil liberties in postwar and unified Germany made this issue a topic of heated public debate. Against this national backdrop, the Republikaner, an extreme right-wing po- litical party, attempted to make themselves respectable, echoing those themes of the mass-based parties that meshed with their ideology. Their efforts proved largely unsuccessful, though, as the CDU/CSU and the right wing of the SPD were already satisfying the mainstream public's socially conservative inclinations. The German People's Union and the National Democratic Party of Germany, meanwhile, surpassed the somewhat more moderate Republikaner in importance on the extreme right, aiming their messages at the socially disaffected. Taken to- gether, the membership of these three parties increased 5-6 percent in 1997 from the 1996 figure of 45,300. The profile of right-wing voters had shifted in recent years from elderly veter- ans and former members of the Hitler Youth to young men with little education. Experts placed the potential right-wing vote on the national level between 10 and 20 percent. Israel and the Middle East Diplomatic relations between Israel and the Federal Republic were strained by developments in the Middle East peace process. Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel's tenure in office had been marked by cordial relations with Israel and, in deference to the historical relationship between the two states, a reluctance to give advice to his Israeli counterparts. Developments in late 1996 and 1997, how- ever, frustrated his efforts both to maintain a common foreign policy with his partners in the European Union (EU) and to achieve a balanced Middle East policy. The Kohl government defended Israel on the international stage at a time when even the United States had become critical of Israeli policy. Kinkel blocked an attempt within the EU to impose sanctions against Israel in early 1997 in reac- tion to the settlements policy of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On two separate occasions in the same year, in March and July, Germany voted against a United Nations resolution condemning the Netanyahu policy as con- trary to the spirit of the Oslo accords. As these stands in defense of Israeli pol- icy threatened to damage Germany's influence as an impartial supporter of peace in the Middle East, Kinkel traveled to the region in March 1997 and visited four Palestinian cities. When he stopped in Israel to see Foreign Minister David Levy on the same trip, officials described their meeting as "more than icy." After Kinkel warned Levy at a meeting at the UN in September that Germany could no longer protect Israel from the reproaches of the international community, Ger- 310 / AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1998 many for the first time in its history voted against Israel in the UN General As- sembly. The Israeli Foreign Ministry continued to emphasize the strength of the friend- ship between Israel and Germany and the importance of the latter's role in the peace process. Indeed, in early December 1997, just weeks after President Bill Clinton would not find time in his schedule to meet with the Israeli head of state in Washington, Prime Minister Netanyahu looked to Chancellor Kohl for diplo- matic assistance. Netanyahu traveled to Germany in December, to reaffirm the strong ties between the two countries and to capitalize on the influence Kohl ex- ercised over his Western allies and Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat. Official differences in policy toward "rogue states" in the Middle East remained an issue in German-Israeli relations. While both Israel and the United States at- tempted to isolate Iraq and Iran, the Kohl government persisted in its commit- ment to a "critical dialogue." Israel nevertheless toned down its criticism of this German policy after German and Iranian intervention led to the release in the summer of 1996 of an Israeli soldier who had fallen prisoner to Lebanese forces. A new Israeli consul general, Miryam Shomrat, took office in Berlin in Feb- ruary 1997. Shomrat accepted the task of facilitating the transition of the em- bassy from Bonn to Berlin in anticipation of the official move of the government seat to the new capital of unified Germany. Although the majority of embassies will be located in the vicinity of the government district, the proposed building for the Israeli embassy is located in Wilmersdorf, a residential area of Berlin whose zoning laws would normally bar the opening of an embassy. The area was selected in part because the district is an historical center of Jewish life in Berlin. In recognition of that history and of the special German-Israeli relationship, Berlin officials were considering making an exception to the zoning laws. A German musician touring Israel with the German Opera of Berlin provoked a public outcry when the media reported that he had signed a credit-card slip "Adolf Hitler." Apparently, Gerd Reinke used Hitler's name as a joke after hav- ing had a few drinks in a Tel Aviv hotel. The subsequent public reaction brought apologies from the German embassy and the ensemble with which Reinke was touring. Reinke himself was fired immediately and sent back to Germany; his ef- forts in the German courts to win reinstatement failed. The episode exemplified what Israeli scholar Moshe Zimmerman has referred to as the "schizophrenic" Israeli attitude: open, relatively positive relations with Germany at the govern- mental level, accompanied by more sensitive, problematic attitudes at the soci- etal level. Efforts were made to redress this discrepancy by means of academic coopera- tion, public festivals, and other activities. From April 27 to May 3, 1997, Mishkenot Sha'ananim, the guest house of the city of Jerusalem, was the site of the inaugural conference of an annual series entitled "The Mishkenot Encoun- ters for Religion and Culture." Participants in the weeklong conference, organized by the Einstein Forum in Potsdam together with the Hebrew University, explored the theme "Visions of Paradise in Religion and Culture." FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY / 311 The two largest celebrations of Jerusalem Day 1997 in Germany took place in Berlin and Cologne. The street fair arranged by the Berlin Jewish community fea- tured Israeli music, dance, and food and attracted 5,000 visitors. The 30-year anniversary of the reunification of Jerusalem was the theme of the festivities in Cologne. The participation of German officials in both Berlin and Cologne drew protests from Arab diplomats. Anti-Semitism and Extremism After decreasing in 1994 and 1995, the number of violent and nonviolent crimes committed by right-wing extremists increased in the last two years. Under the gen- eral category of punishable offenses, two-thirds of which were related to the dis- play or dissemination of neo-Nazi symbols or propaganda, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution counted 11,719 in 1997, up from 8,730 in 1996. The figure for violent crimes attributed to anti-Semitic or xenophobic mo- tives rose slightly, from 781 in 1996 to 790 in 1997. Though these numbers fall short of the peak figures reached in 1992, they do indicate a mobilization of right- wing extremist groups.