Rethinking the Meaning of the Holodomor: ‘Notes and Materials” Toward A(N) (Anti) (Post) Colonial History of Ukraine1
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Mark von Hagen Rethinking the Meaning of the Holodomor: ‘Notes and Materials” toward a(n) (anti) (post) colonial history of Ukraine1 I offer these reflections on the holodomor in the spirit of a conversation that started in Toronto in September and will continue in Cambridge next week. In Toronto, I didn’t have the opportunity to offer my own contribution to the “contextualizing;” this is my belated contribution. I will talk about famines and atrocities, but leave discussion of what we have learned specifically about the holodomor to other authors and panels. I will also focus on the period of war, revolution, and civil war (1914-1923) when historians have identified the emergence of an anti-colonial critique across the imperial worlds and which included an important site in Ukraine and the broader Russian empire. What I’m offering here is based on teaching, thinking, reading and sometimes writing about the history of empire, nation, and colonialism. In the end it is not based on extensive research in archives, though I have done some of that and that is reflected herein, but above all it is a new spin on some new writing and a lot of old classics that have been viewed in the past from other perspectives from the ones I sketch here briefly. Famines and Colonialism “Esquimaux and New Zealanders are more thrifty and industrious than these people who deserve to be left to their fate instead of the hardworking people of England being taxed for their support.” Quote from Lord Lt of Ireland during Irish famine in 18472 1 This essay is inspired by and in gratitude for the work of many of my more “literary” colleagues and a writer or two: Marko Pavlyshyn, from whom I first learned about Yuri Andrukkhovych (with whom I had the honor to drink beer in Warsaw after a reading marking the Polish translation of his latest novel!), Lena Kostenko, Yohan Petrovsky-Shtern, from whom I learned about Moshe Fishbein (who I had the honor to meet), Ivan Dziuba (also had honor of meeting him), Sasha Etkind and Rory Finnin; and my colleagues and former graduate students at Columbia University, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and the late Edward Said, as well as Michael Stanislawski, my first teacher in Jewish history; Adriana Helbig and Maria Sonevytsky in ethnomusicology and Peter Holquist and Amir Weiner in history; by my friends at Ab Imperio and Kritika journals; also Pavlo Khrystiuk (who I never met, yet have felt some strange connection to and to whom the first part of my subtitle is a tribute), and another Social-Revolutionary from Ukraine, the late Pavel Dotsenko, who waged his struggle for justice in Siberia; and Roman Serbyn, (who I met very appropriately for the first time in Kyiv in the party archives), and who led me to Raphael Lemkin, who, it appears, knew all of this long before most all of us did. Many more sources of inspiration are mentioned in footnotes. In the tradition of the usual caveat, I am responsible for the interpretations of the work of my colleagues, some of whom might not recognize themselves in my versions, though I hope that is a rare case. 1 On the eve of the famine, known in Irish as the Gorta Mor, Ireland was a “breadbasket of Britain,” and exported sufficient grain to feed the two million people of Britain as well as the population of Ireland. By the 1840s, over two-thirds of the labor force depended on agriculture; a majority of the peasants had no or little land The Gorta Mor, which lasted from 1846-1851, is considered by Irish historians to be a truly “great famine;” one million people perished as a result of the potato failures of the 1840s and another million immigrated. Within the six years of the famine, the Irish population had fallen by 25 percent through a combination of death and emigration. And here an interesting footnote, the memory of the suffering “was taken overseas by thousands of emigrants, many of whom viewed their flight as exile, and the decades that followed the Famine, its remembrance was a painful reminder to nationalists of British misrule. It was not until the 1970s that Ireland’s demographic decline was to reverse.”3 Accurate records were not kept of those who died and led to accusations that the Whig government was trying to keep the information secret. A Tory politician noted ironically that the British state “was able to provide accurate statistics on the number of pigs and poultry consumed, yet it did not attempt to keep a record of the deaths of its people.” The controversial Irish singer Sinead O’Connor questioned the use of the word “famine” in a rap song, arguing that massive quantities of food left Ireland on a daily basis during the famine. She sees the heavy legacy of colonialism in the separating of the Irish people from their history, memory, and cultural identity. Until the 1990s, the Famine was not taught; it was argued that the Famine was not an important event in Irish history; moreover, it was depicted as inevitable and that the British government could have done little more than they did to save lives. And an Irish historian concludes, “The Irish poor did not starve because there was an inadequate supply of food within they country; they starved because political, commercial and individual greed was given priority over the saving of lives in one part of the United Kingdom.” Kinealy sees a paradox in Ireland’s being part of the United Kingdom and British Empire yet was treated as a separate entity when in the midst of a humanitarian catastrophe. She also reminds us that the famine occurred “within the jurisdiction of not only the richest empire in the world, but one of the most advanced parliamentary democracies of the time. At each stage of the Famine, relief policies were discussed and debated both within parliament and within the press. .The various relief policies—with the partial exception of the soup kitchens—were inappropriate and inadequate. The defects of policy formulation were compounded by the government’s refusal to intervene at certain key times—to restrict food exports, to curb eviction, to regulate emigration, or to prevent proselytism.4 Attitudes similar to those expressed by the Lord Lieutenant above were widespread. An economist defended the policies that were reducing the Irish 2 Quoted in Christine Kinealy, The Great Irish Famine: Impact, Ideology and Rebellion (Palgrave, 2002), p. 23. 3 Cormac O Grada, Black ’47 and Beyond: The Great Irish Famine in History, Economy and Memory (Princeton, 1999) 4 Kinealy, 17, 116. 2 peasants to starvation with the “conviction that overgenerous relief would demoralize the Irish poor and merely postpone the reckoning.” Many in high places took comfort in the thought that the famine was nature’s response to Irish demographic irresponsibility, and “that too much public kindness would obscure that message.” Incidentally, similar attitudes would also constrain famine relief in India, on the advice of Thomas Malthus.5 A sharp increase in evictions of debt-laden peasants contributed to the misery and the prevalence of lethal diseases. In 1849 the crisis and the evidence of extensive suffering brought a secret appeal from a new Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Lord Clarendon, to the Prime Minister, “Surely this is a state of things to justify you asking the House of Commons for an advance, for I don’t think there is another legislature in Europe that would disagree that such suffering as now exists in the west of Ireland, or coldly persist in a policy of extermination.” The government, however, chose not to intervene.6 The Duke of Wellington, hero of Waterloo and the defeat of Napoleon, was charged with preparing militarily for a threat from opposition in the wake of the famine and ordered a significant increase in British troops; by the summer of 1848, Dublin was “protected” by 100,000 soldiers. Similar to the Soviet famine of 1932- 33, the British famine was experienced with differential suffering. In the Scottish Highlands, for example, the same potato blight led to far fewer fatalities; relief was provided more promptly and with fewer restrictions.7 The closest the British have ever come to an apology to the Irish people for the famine was a controversial statement by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1997 that the famine “was a defining event in the history of Ireland and of Britain. That one million people should have died in what was then part of the richest and most powerful nation in the world is something that still causes pain as we reflect on it today. Those who governed in London at the time failed their people through standing by while a crop failure turned into a massive tragedy.”8 In 1995 a famine genocide committee was established in New York and enlisted the expertise of Notre Dame law professor Charles Rice. The Committee brought a retroactive charge of genocide against the British government. Some Irish historians go so far as to see the famine as the beginning of modern Irish history in its legacy of “long-standing and deep-rooted hatred of the English connection.. [thanks to the Irish emigration and its hatred, bitterness and resentment’ the Irish question became and remained an international question.” It 5 O Grada, pp. 6 Christine Kinealy, in Hungry Words: Images oF Famine in the Irish Canon, ed. George Cusak and Sarah Goss (Irish Academic Press, 2006), chapter one, “The stricken land: the Great Hunger in Ireland.” 7 Kinealy, 20. 8 Kinealy, p.