Culture & Society

Assimilation and Struggle Maghrebi Immigration and French Political Culture Catherine Wihtol de Wenden

The story of the French state’s relationship with North African C atherine Wihtol de Wenden is Pro- im m i g r ation is both turbulent and complex. Migration from fessor at the Center for ’s former colonies in the into the Fren c h International Studies and Research, Sciences metropole has affected myriad aspects of the French political Po, . calculus, from the two world wars, the internal conflicts of the working class, and the mobilization in the French homeland for Algerian independence to integration policies and . Moreover, these flows of North African peoples have played a crucial role in the framing of public policy and in the socialization of immigrant cultures in Fran c e . Yet, North African (Maghrebi) immigrants form neither a homogeneous political group, nor an isomorphic cultural community. Indeed, the North African immigrant commu- nity continues to diversify with newcomers, elites, middle classes, and refugees from the Maghreb, as the second and th i r d generations acquire French citizenship and, occasionally, br eak their links with their countries of origin. While a sec- tion of Maghrebis maintains invisibility in the social and political sphere, others fight for recognition. Most now play an ambiguous part, mixing traditional French republican val- ues with Muslim community belongings. To elucidate the role of Maghrebis in French political culture, this article will first review the history and then explore the impact of Maghreb i s

Summer/Fall 2003 [6 9] AS S I M I L ATION AND STRUGGLE on French politics, as well as the con- im m i g r ant groups. Until 1974, Maghreb i flicts emerging from their participation. wo r k ers had a high rate of turnover, sending remittances to their families and Hi storical Background. France has organizing their existence around their been a recipient of massive overseas places of work, hostel accommodations, im m i g r ation, particularly compared with tr ade unions with home country organi- its European neighbors. Approximately zations (official or dissident), and visits 3.3 million immigrants live in Fran c e , to the coffee shop. Since 1974, the socio- including 650,000 Algerians, 550,000 political situation of the Maghrebis has , 200,000 Tunisians, and slowly changed. First, family reu n i f i c a - 500,000 “harkis” (natives of tion in France has tended to accelerat e who helped France during the Algerian because workers have feared that Fran c e war and were French citizens), and would close its borders. Consequently, approximately one million second or from 1975 until 1982, non-European th i r d generation French-born citizens of i m m i g rants, a majority of them Ma g h r ebi origin. Much of the first gen- Ma g h r ebis, for the first time outnum- er ation was recruited after both world be r ed European immigrants. Second, wars to support the reconstruction of th e r e has been an increase in migrat i o n France, mainly through work in mining from and , much of it and industry. The “thirty glorious years” illegal, due to the decrease in labor (1945–1975) marked a period of heavy m i g ration from southern Europe. reliance on cheap, migrant labor to fuel a Th i r d, as a result of family reu n i f i c a t i o n , resurgent domestic economy. Employers a second generation has begun to di r ectly recruited in many of the former appear—many of whom were born in colonies (particularly in Morocco) for France. A proportion of the so-called wo r k ers in the agricultural and industri- “ M a g h reb” population has there f o re al sectors. During the economic contrac - neither migrated nor ever had the legal tion and recession of 1974, however, the status of a foreigner. state gradually moved towards a policy of By the end of the 1970s, immigrat i o n tightened border control that reached its emerged as a political issue in which height in 1985–2000. During this time, North African immigrants and their chil- the mass influx of North Africans dimin- dr en played the central role, especially ished and became limited to smaller through their use of hunger strikes. The groups of the population: the gentrified period 1981–1990 was a turning point for and the feminized—refugees from the immigrant issue in French politics. In Algeria and Tunisia, experts, seasonal the first half of the decade, politicians wo r k ers, workers under short term con- emphasized granting human rights and tr acts, and trainees—as well as those seek- the freedom of association to forei g n e r s . ing illegal entrance and work. But the March 1983 local elections saw the I m m i g ration to France from the nationalist and xenophobic National Ma g h r eb has been a gradual process Front gain significant electoral backing, throughout the twentieth century. The revealing that immigration had become a diverse social, economic, and political politically-charged issue. Social move- pr esence of North African immigran t s , ments in 1983–1984 rose in res p o n s e , however, has made them unique among stimulating new forms of political partic-

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ipation among the second generat i o n , mobilization and segmentation of the who claimed both equal rights and the Ma g h r ebi community, particularly in the right to be different. Meanwhile, the economic and political spheres. Socio- ex t r eme right hinted at the inability of the political mobilization by Maghre b i ch i l d r en of Maghrebis to integrate into im m i g r ants and their children has gone society. Political debates focused on through distinct trends. Three are par- whether there could be an allegiance ticularly important: between French and Muslim culture. 1) Immigrants as For e i g n e r s . Mi g r ant work- Some activists, such as the leaders of ers first became organized in relation to France Plus and SOS Racisme, gained their country of origin in the 1960s and access to the “Summits of the State,” while 1970s, with a focus on home country

Mo st Maghrebi immigrants mix trad i t i o n a l republican values with Muslim community be l o n g i n g s .

middle class elites emerged as mediators issues, sometimes with strong links to between the immigrant suburban groups French or foreign unions. “Amicales,” and the beurgeoisie.1 official organizations headed by forei g n The structure of the Maghrebi immi- governments, attempted to control their gr ant population, meanwhile, had been nationals abroad, such as the well-known tr ansformed into two readily distinguish- Amicale des Algériens en Europe, which able categories: an older and a younger di s a p p e a r ed only in the 1990s. Other ge n e r ation. The older group, although examples include associations dedicated still active, was increasingly threatened by to the defense of foreign workers’ rights unemployment in the automobile, steel, in France and opposed to the Moroccan and mining industries. The younger regime, such as the Association des ge n e r ation consisted mostly of Fren c h Travailleurs Marocains en Fra n c e citizens, who, in spite of many difficul- ( ATMF). Today, the situation has ties—among them delinquency, unem- changed, with a re-centering of some ployment, insufficient vocational trai n - formerly opposing associations, which ing, relative failure at school, and gender have now built more links to their coun- conflict—was more disposed to econom- tries of origin. The ATMF (now AMF), ic, socio-cultural, and political self- for example, is involved in co-develop- organization and integration into Fren c h ment programs with Morocco. cu l t u r e than the older. This diversity also 2) Immigrant Children (“”). In the led to the confrontation of two other sec- 1980s, the movement of the second gen- tions of North Africans in Fra n c e : er ation of Fran c o - M a g h r ebis generat e d Between the marginalized second gener- new forms of struggle and participation. ation and the largely-professional cadre The fight against racism, the struggle for of newcomers and ref u g e e s . civic rights and for a new definition of The diversity of interests among citizenship stressing socialization based im m i g r ant groups has caused increa s e d on plural belongings, the promotion of

Summer/Fall 2003 [ 7 1] AS S I M I L ATION AND STRUGGLE so c i o - c u l t u r al integration in the sub- call for a citizenship of residence, disso- urbs, and the mobilization against police ciated from nationality. The associations and judicial discrimination all rose to asserted that it was possible to be both prominence. Many Fran c o - M a g h re b i s French and Muslim. In the meantime, became involved in local political life, this public debate led many Muslim and have been elected to municipal posts im m i g r ants to embrace the dominant since 1989, when the civic association Socialist party in the presidential elec- France Plus ran 550 “beurs” as candi- tions of 1988 (according to exit polls, dates in municipal elections. About 150 mo r e than 80 percent of the “beurs” succeeded in 1989, 1995, and 2001, but voted for François Mitterrand). In the none achieved the rank of MP and only a process, the "beurs" transformed them- few went to the European Par l i a m e n t . selves into a potent political force not to 3) Immigrants as Mediators. Groups using be ignored. the socio-political traditions of leader- Ma g h r ebi immigrants have also chal- ship from the colonial past, while lenged the place of Islam in French insti- exhibiting republican and secularized tutions. This issue gained widesprea d values, rea p p e a r ed with the new urban attention during the “headscarf affair” of policy of the 1990s. Characterized by 1989, in which there was an intense their use of social and religious institu- debate over the legality of wearing trad i - tions for social peace, members of these tionally “Muslim” garb in secular locales, groups are both more social and more such as public schools. With four million local than the former civic associations, Muslims, France has the largest number and are less covered by the media. of Muslim residents in Europe. Most of them practice a quiet Islam: rural, popu- No rth African Immigration as a lar, with little obedience to the five pillars Political Stake. The emergence of of the religion, in addition to staunch North African immigrant activism has opposition to practices imposed from brought several challenges to the Fren c h abroad, especially Wahabi or Salafi fun- political game. Most importantly, it has damentalism. made citizenship one of the central But Muslim identity in France is plu- issues in French politics. The theme of a ralistic indeed. For immigrants or new citizenship emerged in 1986 in “beurs” of North African origin, hard response to the democratic crisis caused and fast identity boundaries do not exist. by the rise of individualism and the For example, although most Muslims growth of collective identities contrar y ce l e b r ate Ramadan as a symbol of com- to the traditional French rep u b l i c a n munity belonging, few observe other approach. Since 1985, Le Pen has led obligations. Mixed marriages are fre- the charge against those he believes “do quent, especially among Algerians. As a not deserve to be French”—spurring a result, one would have difficulty discern- national debate on the reform of the ing the signs of a strictly “Islamic” vote in nationality code in 1987, as well as a France. Neither during the Gulf War , reexamination of the link between nor during the present conflict with Iraq nationality, citizenship, and loyalty. has there been distinct “Islamic-only” For the “beurs” associations, Le Pen’ s political mobilization. The 1,000 instigation provided an opportunity to Islamic associations officially reg i s t e re d

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in France are more involved in the insti- The turning point for the expres s i o n tutionalization of French Islam than in of multiculturalism was the 1980s, thanks the exercise of political influence. to the freedom of foreign associations The political mobilization of ethnicity and to the emergence of "beurs" leaders has become a heated issue, given the gen- focusing on the right to be differen t er al lack of public support for the collec- (SOS Racisme), the legitimacy of mixed tive rights of ethnic minorities. Many identities (France Plus), and the dissoci- French are reluctant to support increa s e d ation of nationality and citizenship. mu l t i c u l t u r al programming given the Many leaders fought against racial dis- exclusivity of Jacobinist values: secular- crimination and social exclusion while ism, formal equality, legal freedom, civic aiming to recognize ethnic and rel i g i o u s values of living together (fr a t e r n i t é ), with an belongings. Others were subsidized by exclusive allegiance to the state (pa t r i o t i s m e ). the public for their civic values, while Par adoxically, this model at once guaran - they managed their associations in a mul- tees and is challenged by the right to be ti c u l t u r al manner. This contrad i c t i o n di f f e r ent, the pluralism of allegiances, the was raised by Pie r r e-André Taguieff, who

For immigrants of North African origin, ha r d and fast identity boundaries do not exist.

pl u r al citizenship model, intercu l t u ra l argues that pleading for the right to be relations, and the free expression of di f f e r ent would lead to the exclusion of groups and minorities. North African the descendants of North Africans, and communities, however, are often would convince the extreme right of the opposed to assimilation, integration impossibility of Islamic assimilation into (m o r e used today in public policies), French society.3 social cohesion (the term used by Jacques Most Islamic associations rapidly came Ch i r ac during the 2002 pres i d e n t i a l to understand the benefits to be gained campaign), republican and national citi- from accepting civic and republican val- zenship (used by Jean-Pierre ues—mainly, the achivement of social Chevènement), equality of rights (the peace. Some expressions of dissent, how- French ref e r ence to the fight against dis- ever, have begun to appear in rel a t i o n s crimination), or the social contract of with the police, as well as with the refusal of rights and duties.2 The second genera- allegiance to French symbols, such as the tion of North Africans is challenging both denial of the French flag during a friendly the republican and Muslim separat i s t French/Algerian soccer match in 2001. models, leaving some room for ethnicity while respecting the republican frame in Co nclusion. France has, for some which they and their parents have been time, managed the immigration flows socialized: a "multiculturalisme à la resulting from its colonial past with the fr ançaise"—a citizenship resulting from a complicity of ethnic and re l i g i o u s permanent compromise in a neocolonial mediators, who essentially conceded to management of differen c e s . republican values. In the generat i o n s

Summer/Fall 2003 [7 3 ] AS S I M I L ATION AND STRUGGLE following colonialism, however, ethnic This ambiguous game in which the and cultural identity came more fre- second and third generations play rep u b - quently from the rep r esentations and lican cards in their negotiation of identi- incentives of political parties and local ties is possible because Maghrebis have public powers than from association become the primary actors in shaping leaders or locally-elected youth elites: their own lives. They have been socialized they have been used to legitimize public into the French administrative culture policies such as the Arabe de service and are and they increasingly know how to work req u i r ed to stick to multicultural aims within it. Ultimately, they set the tune for in the republican frame—but not to all French integration policy in a com- apply for more ambitious and non-eth- promise that, in turn, continually red e - nic jobs or goals. fines French identity.

N OT E S 1 Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, and Rémy 2 Dominique Schnapper, La Communauté des citoyens Leveau, La beurgeoisie, Les trois ages de la vie associative (P aris: Gallimard, 1995). issue de l’immigration ( Paris: CNRS Editions, 3 Pierre-André Taguieff, La force des préjugés: Essai sur 2 0 0 1 ) . le racisme et ses doubles (Paris: Gallimard, 1988).

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