Immigrant Political Voice in a Comparative Perspective: New York, Paris and Barcelona

Ernesto Castañeda [email protected]

To be presented at: Comparing Past and Present, Mini-Conference of the Comparative and Historical Section of the American Sociological Association Berkeley, CA August 12, 2009

Why are Muslim immigrants in Europe commonly perceived as contentious, while Latino immigrants in the United States are often perceived as passive? What explains these different perceptions? This project uses surveys and multi-sited ethnography to study the avenues for political voice and integration of immigrants and their offspring. It takes into account the role of the sending community in individual meaning-making, as well as the socialization and institutional practices of the receiving community. It compares the transnational circuits between Latin America and New York, North Africa and Paris, Morocco and Barcelona. The results point to the importance of the state in fostering processes of belonging and exclusion that get translated into different forms of everyday citizenship, contentious politics, and pathways of inclusion.

Research Questions

Why are Muslim immigrants in Europe seen as contentious while Latino immigrants in the United States are seen as passive? Is this empirically true? How can we explain these perceptions in a systematic way, beyond clichés about the ―radicalization of Islam‖ or the ―humility of Mexican workers‖? What role do religious views play in drawing real and imagined boundaries between immigrants and locals? How do citizenship regimes shape the political identities of immigrants and their participation in collective protest? Under which categories do immigrants engage in collective action? What are the effects of institutional practices, public debates, and everyday interactions in the receiving countries? When does political contention between hosts and newcomers arise? What are the avenues that immigrants have to voice their needs and grievances in different political regimes? These are important questions that have rarely been studied empirically, in a comparative perspective, using mixed methods, as this project does. This project goes beyond normative statements made about immigrant incorporation, and looks at the way the process works in the real world. The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda

This project compares immigrant claim-making, that is, the channels available to specific groups to voice collective claims and political demands, in the United States, France and Spain. In order to do so, I will provide a background on the historical, political and social contexts shaping each flow at the sending and receiving ends, and on the differences between the first and subsequent generations in each of these cases. This study illuminates the contexts around visible events such as the riots in the French banlieues in 2005; the ―Day without Immigrants‖ marches on May 1st 2006 in the United States; the riots in El Ejido, Spain in 2000; and less visible but more common everyday forms of civil and political participation.

Relevance

Groups at both extremes of the public debate on immigration often exaggerate their statements, present distorted views of immigrant life, and rarely deploy objective, empirical information because of the intrinsic political and normative nature of their agendas. A comparative study of real life processes of migration, incorporation and political participation, and the cohabitation of different groups across different contexts can lead to a better understanding that emerges not from a purely normative framework but from empirical work that takes into account the existing conflicts, limitations, and political opportunities of real world migrants. A contextual and relational study of the social processes and mechanisms of emigration, immigration and inter-group relations is used to understand group formation, us/them distinctions, boundary making, and categorical inequality among hosts and immigrants on the ground (Tilly 1998; Tilly 2004a).

Engagement with the Literature

New immigrant groups are often portrayed by both classic liberal political theory (Beiner 2003) and anti-immigrant voices (Buchanan 2006; Huntington 2004) as an unfair burden for citizens and the welfare state; and as a threat to national unity, democratic participation and rational debate in the public sphere because of differences in language, religion or civic culture. These claims, and the resulting policy demands and legislative acts (Brettell and Hollifield 2000), are sometimes uncontested, while at other times they are followed by rebuttals, protests, and legal challenges from pro-immigrant groups, intellectuals and immigrants themselves through spokes-people or organizations. When this voicing occurs, immigrant groups are able to actively shape the political agenda- setting of a nation-state, regardless of the citizenship status of their members. Even if they rarely have direct control over the decision-making regarding their collective claims and legal status, the fact that migrants engage in claim-making vis-à-vis the state and that they impact the public agenda-setting, constitutes them as de facto political actors. Understanding how this agenda-setting works can shed light on a crucial, yet understudied, process about the actual functioning of the public sphere. There are few comparative empirical studies on how immigrant groups access and shape public debate (Soysal 1994; Weil 2005). Only recently has some literature recognized how emigrants may also shape the polity and public debates in the country of origin (Fitzgerald 2009a; Sassen 2006).

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Habermas (1989) and many others assume formal membership through citizenship as a necessary condition in order to make claims in the public sphere, which is generally bounded by the nation state (Calhoun 1992). Habermas (1998) addresses the issues of immigration, and cultural differences within a polity, but not in relation to the access of non-citizens to the public sphere but in relation to citizenship and refugee legislation. Nevertheless, in reality non-citizens engage in everyday collective action in the form of community organizations, advocacy, lobbying, or in news-making events such as: the large marches for immigrant rights in the U.S. in the spring of 2006, and the two following years even if to a lesser extent; the Chicano movement of the 1960‘s; the protests in the banlieues of Paris and elsewhere in 2005, or the March for Equality often called ―La Marche des Beurs‖ of 1983 when the children of immigrants marched to Paris to demand equal treatment. While much of the literature discusses citizenship as a top-down attribute handed down by the state, this study also looks at bottom-up mechanisms that help or inhibit cohabitation and integration and shape claim-making and political behavior. Legal and exclusionary views of citizenship frame new immigrants as de jure ―being‖ outside of the polity even while de facto these groups live in it and are part of it. This framing has the functional characteristic of allowing categorical inequality, opportunity hoarding and exploitation of new immigrants by the host society and older immigrants (Tilly 1998; Mahler 1995). If we take this legalistic exclusion at face value or as ontological, we will reproduce the confusion often found in political theory which reinforces, reproduces and justifies these boundaries.1 At the same time, a mere denunciation of these practices and concepts will not make these categorizing processes go away. One could look at a de facto citizenship, understood as political membership and cohabitation in a diverse nation. In this regard, the literature on multiculturalism tries to do away with the imperative of cultural similarity but it fails to look seriously at issues of contention, exclusion, boundary making and categorization because it often has an a priori normative commitment to tolerance and cohabitation (Kymlicka 1995) that obscures empirical mechanisms of contention and collective action to fight for inclusion/exclusion within a political community. In the same way, much of the literature on cosmopolitanism, international law, universal human rights and post-national citizenship (Soysal 1994) fails to take enough into account state practices of deportation, border militarization (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Nevins 2002), and policing of immigrants (Schneider 2008). On the other side, some react to popular rights-based claim-making by arguing the sovereignty of the state to control its borders, and put the blame on the sending states claiming that emigration functions as an escape valve for political and economic problems, arguing that sometimes migrants may have a louder voice in the receiving society than they had in their place of origin (De la Garza 2000; Fitzgerald 2005; Hirschman 1970). Besides the degree of veracity of these claims, the question of immigrant inclusion remains. In a normative sense, citizenship is the way to guarantee equal access to civil, political and social rights (Marshall 1964). Liberal theory commonly relates citizenship with homogeneity or equality in an ontological sense by claims of common racial origin (jus sanguinis), or birth in a common land (jus soli) (Brubaker 1992), or through cultural and civil homogenization to be acquired through assimilation (Alba and Nee 2003;

1 For more on the reification of folk categories by social science see Rogers Brubaker (2006:10).

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Durkheim 1893; Portes and Rumbaut 2006). In some cases the inability to gain citizenship may keep some groups at the margin, as in the case of Turkish people in Germany (Brubaker 1992) at least before the citizenship reform of 1999. But as it is the case of Maghrebis in France, access to citizenship may not necessarily guarantee total equality, integration or social mobility (Brubaker 1992). Furthermore, in the American case there are important legalistic difference between aliens, residents and citizens, or states-in-between, or in the French case between citoyenneté and nationalité, the latter meaning that belonging, cultural affinity, or legal entitlements are recognized but voting rights are not provided (Saada 2005).

Within and Between Group Differences

For all these reasons, I will not use the concept of citizenship in a binary way of either all or nothing but as a proxy to describe the political inclusion or exclusion of immigrants into their society of destination, since the concept of citizenship alone cannot describe adequately collective access to the political system, upward mobility, cultural rights or general wellbeing (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). While legalistic or normative conceptions of citizenship are not very productive empirically, I use a notion of citizenship as "a conceptual variable" as Nettl (1968) does with the concept of the state. Nettl argues that the concept of the state means different things in the United States, France, England, and in the developing world, but instead of getting rid of this concept altogether, looking precisely at what makes these cases different can teach us much about the nature of these societies. In the same manner, in practice, citizenship, understood as political participation and legal entitlements, is not total or null (1 or 0) but gradated. Understanding how it varies can teach us much about the effect of different societal and institutional arrangements. Furthermore, it is a fallacy to say that a state can respond equally to all individuals, or even to all groups, in terms of provision, attention and representation since there is a practical impossibility to deliver exactly the same quality of services to all segments of the population partly because of their different needs and characteristics. In practice, citizenship is necessarily a flexible term depending on the context. Beyond legal definitions, citizenship is an implicit relational contract based on trust and reciprocity, which can therefore cause indignation and repercussions when unfulfilled (Tilly 1996). As I will discuss, the French citizens of Algerian descent have much to teach us in this regard. Because of legalistic, differentiating mechanisms (Calavita 2005; Ngai 2004), individuals among certain immigrant groups may be recognized as citizens by the receiving state while others are not. In spite of legal residence or citizenship, individuals may be categorized and treated as if they were non-citizens if they are perceived by the majority group as members of a different ethnic group, as in the case of Muslims in France. Also American citizens of Latin American origin are sometimes treated as undocumented immigrants, e.g. by border-patrol agents, but unlike non-citizens they can sue and ask for reparations for being discriminated against (for a case in the matter see Archibold 2006). But these individual retributions do not destroy categorical boundaries. Differences amongst members of a categorical group in terms of legal entitlements assigned through state-citizenship means that some members of a given categorical group can become invested in the status quo either because they perceive the existing

4 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda categorization as legitimate or because they have a better position than others from a similar background (Mahler 1995), thus legitimizing forms of exclusion that may partially benefit them (Bourdieu 1991; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Tilly 1998). This leads us to the idea of stratified citizenship as developed by Yoav Peled (1992) who claims that while Arab citizens of Israel do not have the same status as Jewish citizens, they still have more political voice than non-citizens. As Peled puts it, ―Israel‘s Arab citizens are by no means satisfied with the place accorded to them in Israel‘s political system (…) However, the limited, liberal citizenship status they enjoy has endowed them with sufficient rights and privileges to both enable and induce them to conduct their struggle within the constitutional framework of the state, rather that (sic) against it. This has been a key factor in allowing Israel to maintain a stable democratic regime in the context of an acute ethnic conflict‖ (Peled 1992). Peled claims that this still holds after the start of the first Intifada in 1987 since most contention comes from non-citizens. This analysis of stratified citizenship, where rights differ for different groups and subgroups, illustrates how differences in legal status among ethnic minorities and non-citizens can affect political incorporation and avenues of political voice. In the same manner that citizenship as a concept cannot be null or total, ―assimilation‖ does not have to mean cultural literacy in only one culture (Zolberg 1999). As Portes and Rumbaut (2006) show, it is the immigrants who are more engaged in transnational politics and in issues in their country of origin who later become the most involved in political participation in the host-society. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) propose the concept of segmented assimilation to account for different pathways of acculturation depending on reception practices. Among other groups, Portes and Rumbaut compare the prospects for social mobility of Cubans, who gain legal residency immediately when they touch U.S. soil, with that of Mexican immigrants, many of whom face barriers to obtain legal residency. This has repercussions for their integration in certain sectors of the labor market and for the stratification of later generations as well as in leading to different pathways for claim-making. While there are some comparative studies on immigration, citizenship, assimilation and economic mobility (Calavita 2005; Hoerder and Moch 1996; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008; Lucassen 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Reitz 2003), and even some literature on comparative political integration (Alba and Foner 2009; Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001) there is not enough comparative research on how non-citizen residents access and participate in the public sphere of the receiving country, or on how immigrant groups behave politically when their members lack voting rights (exceptions are Giugni 2004). This project examines the specific processes and mechanisms that construct differences between groups, and the dynamics that may favor different types of political voice and claim-making. As Brubaker (2004) proposes, ethnicity is a contingent form of political participation that is socially constructed under specific historical circumstances, in the same way coordinated collective action based on country of origin is contingent. For example, given important regional differences, certain conditions are needed for someone from Southern Mexico (e.g. an indigenous Mixtec from Guerrero) to find common cause with someone from Central or Northern Mexico (e.g. someone from Jalisco with ―Caucasian‖ features). Important salient divisions among co-nationals could be region, dialect, class, gender, or perceived race. But if the host regime places them in the same category, this can result in

5 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda real consequences such as racial profiling or deportation; these individuals may perceive a common threat. After these processes occur it is more likely that they will engage in coordinated action under a common collective self-identification (Roy 1994). In many circumstances nationalism is ―reactive‖ in that it forms in relation to an ―Other‖; historically, members of a town or locality inside a weak nation-state only identified as members of that nation after their arrival into another society which lumped them together, actively tried to convert them into citizens, or questioned their loyalties in times of war (Daniels 2004; Massey 2007; Zelizer and Tilly 2006). In this sense it would be interesting to analyze how the findings on the behavior of immigrant groups may or may not be different from the predictions from work on nationalism, citizen-social movements, and identity politics. Categories and political identities can change through time as the social ecology changes. As the result of coalition formation and classificatory struggles, national categorizations may be superseded by newer ones such as ―Latino‖, ―Asian‖ or ―Arab‖ pan-categories, an integration process changing groups ―from immigrants to ethnics‖ (Hoerder and Moch 1996; Portes and Rumbaut 2006).

Boundary Making and Inequality

A preliminary theory would state that the larger the degree of ―similarity‖ of an immigrant group to a host society along a characteristic deemed as necessary to establish equivalence and worth (Boltanski and Thevenot 1999) such as language, religion, physical appearance, or any other condition that is constructed as socially meaningful, the less opposition the group will face (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Putnam 2007; Rumbaut and Portes 2001); this appears to be the case for today‘s Canadians in America, Belgians in France and Mexicans in Spain. This theory would also assert that the size of the immigrant inflow would be important; this is why looking at ―atypical‖ immigrant groups is also important to test this hypothesis. Normally, the more visible and intrusive an immigrant group is framed or perceived to be, the more negative reactions it will face (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Interestingly, this opposition may create a dialectical response. Analyzing the criminalization and policing of undocumented immigrants in New York and the sans-papiers in France, Cathy Schneider proposes that the greater ―the reinforcement of racial/ethnic or religious boundaries paradoxically increases the likelihood of mobilization against such boundaries‖ (Schneider 2006). Thus the likelihood of collective action based on self-identification around a common place of origin will be partly a function of visible opposition by sectors of the host society based on underlined differences. It is important to notice that these differences are not innate but result from a classificatory struggle determined by the history of the relationship between places of origin and destiny, economic conditions, political opportunism, and categorical struggles. For example, Mexicans in the U.S. have been framed as problematic around times of economic crisis in California in the 1930‘s and then again in the 1990‘s, similar processes have taken place in other states (Almaguer 1994; Daniels 2004). The larger the perceived and constructed differences, the larger the opposition to immigration and incorporation, and the higher the likelihood of the creation of social

6 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda boundaries and self-identifications based on culture and place of origin. The more vocal the opposition, the more vocal the pro-immigrant groups will be (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). In this self-reinforcing mechanism, the extremes will tend to dominate the debate in the public sphere with the potential to polarize or alienate the general public, as well as the internal members inside each categorical group who hold moderate views or different sets of legal attributes or privileges (Peled 1992). Since multiple interests co- exist in both pro and anti-migration camps, there will likely be important disagreements and different strategies espoused within immigrant and host groups (Castañeda 2006). The media portrayal of immigrants is likely to be a factor in the construction of new social boundaries (Chavez 2001; Deltombe 2005). Public intellectuals, academics, and opinion leaders are strategic in moderating different sides, shaping the debate, creating new categorizations, and influencing policy makers. The success of the claim-making camps will depend in part on their ability to construct bridges to institutionally influential actors, to control the terms of the debate and, to an extent, influence the academic research-agenda regarding the issues in question (Brubaker 2004). Historical legacies and relations also affect the dynamics of incorporation. Institutional settings matter as well; a federal system, like the United States, will offer different niches for immigrant claim-making which can target the local level, while a centralized system, like France, will make immigrant groups target bureaucracies and politicians in the capital (Kriesi 1995). Advocating for changes in the French system is harder and requires more resources. For example, if an immigrant rights march wants to be heard it has to happen in Paris or towards Paris as was the case of the March for Equal Rights in 1983 which went from Marseille to Paris. The U.S. federal system provides spaces for the accommodation of local approaches and for grassroots organizing around local issues thus having many local for a that act as a training ground for local and activists and immigrants activists and organizers. Despite claims by proponents of post-national citizenship (Soysal 1994), the nation- state strongly matters regarding the manner in which immigrants may be welcomed, or not, into a polity. Internal migration, migration from developed countries, or the migration of professionals, scholars and scientists is not problematized in the same way as labor migration from poor to rich countries is. While historical cases of rural to urban migration caused alarm among state officials and parts of the bourgeois society due to the appearance of ―social problems‖ such as poverty, slums and unhealthy conditions, these concerns were magnified by the presence of migrants (Ward 1989). While migration regulation used to be an issue dealt with at the ports of entry (Zolberg 2006), in the last decades international low-skilled labor migration has been discouraged by national laws that have created the categories of ―legal‖ and ―illegal‖ migrants (for the tautology and reproduction of the illegal condition see Calavita 2005; Lucassen 2005; Ngai 2004; Zolberg 2006). In this context, most of the international migrants lacking visas and permits live in a subordinate and disadvantaged position in the host society. They come, nonetheless, due to colonial and trade links, family networks, and cultures of migration (Cohen 2004; Sayad 2004). Undocumented migrants normally are paid less than locals and migrants with work permits. Employers and employees justify this pay-differential because of the immigrants‘ status as unauthorized workers and immigrants initially consent because comparatively these wages are still higher than those in their country of origin. Migrants often accept a low position in the social order at the country of

7 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda destination because by doing so, they increase their status at the sending community. Furthermore, migrants accept their subordinate status in the host society because they see it as a temporal situation before they become legalized, leave voluntarily or are deported. This is specially the case amongst recent Mexican immigrants in New York City (Hellman 2008; Thompson 2007). Thus unequal relations between natives and immigrants are based on legal distinctions, segmented markets, stigmatization, social boundaries, surveillance and policing (Schneider 2008). Collective action is contingent upon opportunity structures that allow immigrants to question existing power relations and change categorical understandings. The questioning and reconfiguration of social boundaries problematizes these unequal power relations. While sometimes immigrants consent to their exploitation, at other times they engage in protests, and contentious politics. This was the case with the large pro-immigrant marches of 2006 in the U.S; and in France with La Marche pour l’Egalité et contre le Racisme of December 1983. But most often the contestation against exclusion happens in everyday arenas. Conversations and interviews with hosts and immigrant communities are required in order to understand when and how social boundaries between immigrant groups and hosts appear, and the consequences of the resulting categorizations in the creation of political inequality (Lamont 2000; Tilly 2005). As Rogers Brubaker writes, ―From a distance, it is all too easy to ‗see‘ bounded and homogenous ethnic and national groups, to whom common interests, perceptions, intentions, and volition can be attributed‖; therefore, there is a need to look at these groups up-close, while keeping in mind larger social structures that shape local understandings (Brubaker 2006). This project looks at how political participation is affected by different citizenship regimes and national conceptions as they are perceived and understood by local groups, drawing on the literature on citizenship, nationalism, immigration, categorical inequality, social boundaries, and contentious politics published in English, French, and Spanish. The contentious politics of immigrant vary across regimes. Examples of some visible cases are the riots in the French banlieues in 2005; the ―Day without Immigrants‖ marches on May 1st 2006 in the United States; and the riots in El Ejido, Spain in 2000 (Majuelos 2000). These contentious events show instances when cohabitation and the negotiation of implicit consent are disrupted by the perception of intolerable abuses and the voicing of claims. In all these events, the actors were reacting to a perceived attack from members across a categorical boundary, which in the process became more salient, and which was further reinforced following these events (for an example of these dynamics and their stakes see Roy 1994).

Methodology

The aim is to understand how citizenship regimes shape and are shaped by local, social dynamics as observed and reported by field visits, ethno-surveys, in depth interviews, local expert discourses, the media, and secondary sources. The comparative design, mixed methods, and multi-level approach is meant to problematize two very common but also too "easy" explanations: a) that the culture of the immigrants alone explains their socio-economic position and the manner in which they voice their claims, regardless of the social, political, and economic context in which they are embedded; b) that the general political culture of the receiving state, its citizenship regime, immigration

8 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda legislation, and the preferred mode of incorporation totally determine immigrant integration and political participation without the mediation of institutions and actors. This project elaborates an alternative and more complex interactive model which simultaneously looks at: I The context of emigration in the sending country, including whether and how relations are maintained between emigrant communities and communities "back home"; II The relations with the host society, and other minorities and immigrants groups; III The dynamic interaction between immigrants and state policies, mediated by the institutional context of incorporation (formal state channels, but also what I call "de-facto citizenship‖) including interactions with local authorities, schools, clinics, unions, social workers, the police, etc. A series of ethno-surveys with over 70 questions were conducted at receiving and sending communities in order to gather original data on 1) the reasons and characteristics of migration flows, 2) how immigrants solve their daily problems (access to jobs, education, healthcare, negotiation with the law); 3) open-ended, self-reported perceptions of identity and social boundaries; 4) political activity and relations with the host state. The data from these surveys and from participant observation illuminates how citizenship regimes affect everyday interactions between groups. A set of general mechanisms that explain the formal relation between immigration, incorporation and political participation can only emerge from in-depth comparative study in order to make generalizations that go beyond the singularities of a case (Stinchcombe 2005). I will propose general mechanisms and processes that are applicable among different cases without proposing universal laws that ignore local contexts and peculiarities (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly 2003). The surveys, interviews, and multi-sited fieldwork allow me to look carefully at a number of empirical cases which I will report here using a broad comparative perspective as leverage to test and refine hypotheses from sociological and migration theories. Furthermore, this project disentangles causation between the intrinsic differences of distinct migratory flows, different social and institutional mechanisms of reception, while taking into account within-group differences of class, gender, race, nationality, age, and immigrant generation. The use of a small purposive sample of ethno-surveys allows for the quantification and visual representation of certain differences while staying close to the qualitative differences and meanings of the results presented. In contrast to regression models that look for correlations and the effects of a few variables, detailed comparative case studies, informed by surveys, and fieldwork allow the researcher to describe the processes and mechanisms that create significant different arrangement in distinct settings allowing others to falsify the proposed mechanisms and to test their replicability in other settings with more than regression values.

Towards a Global Ethnography

Ethnographic fieldwork, interviews and participant observation among migrant groups is crucial to collect context-rich data. Collective action and claim-making are contingent, thus I interviewed community leaders, and members of immigrant associations but specially unorganized migrants in order to hear their concerns and views about the perceived need or lack thereof for political self-organization and collective action. These views will probably depend on the reason of their migration. Thus I visited

9 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda migrant-sending areas in Mexico, Algeria and Morocco in order to get a sense of whether they view migration as a temporal strategy to increase household income through remittances or whether they would have a desire to settle and become incorporated abroad. I compare my field notes with those of other scholars to revisit previously studied ethnographic sites, to test present and past results (Burawoy 2003). As Sayad (2004) reminds us, every immigration entails an emigration and thus it is a mistake to separate these two phenomena, this is why fieldwork in both the countries of origin and destiny is necessary (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Levitt 2001; Levitt and Waters 2002; Smith 2006b; Thomas and Znaniecki 1927). Describing dynamics at sites of high emigration in Mexico, Morocco, and Algeria will shed light on the relationship between economic rationales and the culture of migration (Cohen 2004) to see whether the idealization of the place of destiny, incomplete information about economic prospects after migration, remittance behavior, and ―the myth of return‖ hold across countries (Sayad 2004; Smith, Castañeda, Franco, and Martino 2004). This information does not take away from the issues of claim-making and political incorporation but actually supports them, since understanding the causes for migration and settlement can help us understand the most burning political concerns of migrants and their prospects for assimilation (Alba and Nee 2003). This project compares Latino immigrants in the U.S. (Alba and Nee 2003; Almaguer 1994; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Smith 2006b; Smith, Castañeda, Franco, and Martino 2004), with immigrants from North Africa in Europe. Each flow has an interesting and important body of academic literature; unfortunately the findings and theories proposed for each migratory circuit have not been fully or systematically compared thus preventing beneficial cross-pollinations. Comparing these migratory flows can illuminate the processes leading to the criminalization of immigration, and the militarization of borders which are only partly explained by security concerns after 9/11 and other terrorist attacks. This project benefits from a systematic comparison of these two cases, as well as from a third and distinct case, Spain, raising comparative questions like: why is migration of Mexicans and Algerians to Spain not greater? Are the lack of social networks and migratory traditions enough to explain this? The common prediction would be that Algerians, or Moroccans, being Arabic, have a harder time in European countries than Mexicans in the United States since they are Christians; since the United States is ―a country of immigrants‖ it should be easier for Christian Latinos to merge with the receiving society, while it would be ―naturally‖ harder to incorporate Arabs arriving to France and Spain, which are Christian countries and are not ―countries of immigration.‖ But as I will discuss in detail these series of assumptions do injustice to the historical record and current facts. It is important to compare these flows and immigrant experiences besides hypothesis around the importance of religious affiliation. The attitude towards immigrants is an empirical question that should not be answered with these broad comparisons a priori without talking to migrants themselves.

Citizenship Regimes and the Political Voice of Immigrants and Minorities

Small purposive samples were surveyed; the samples represent different experiences, levels of education, immigrant generations and professions, and show a representative

10 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda picture of immigrant groups while taking into account the many differences within groups (Tilly 2002). The survey respondents were not pulled at random from published lists, telephone directories, or census tracks since the populations of interest are heavily underrepresented in these data bases. The samples were limited by time, resources, gender roles, and political climate but the answers reached saturation for most variables. The description of the samples gathered is presented in the table below.

France Algeria Morocco Spain Mexico U.S.A. Total Maghrebis Algerians Moroccans Moroccans Mexicans Latinos n 65 63 9 33 49 181 400 Age 32.3 29 38.2 30 45.8 32 34.55 Men 75% 71% 100% 85% 90% 49% 78% Women 25% 29% 0% 15% 10% 51% 22%

The final analysis of the survey results are calibrated by data collected through participant observation, expert interviews, informal and in-depth interviews (not included in these sample numbers), as well as from secondary sources.

Immigrant Generation

In order to analyze issues of racial discrimination, identity formation, and boundary making it is important to consider not only new immigrants but also their children and grandchildren in order to be able to assess the extent of social mobility and structural integration into the host society (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008). For these reasons I surveyed immigrants of different generations. Since Moroccan migration to Spain is a relatively new phenomenon we have few members of the second generation in the population and so too in our sample. Since Latinos have been in New York City for a long time, starting with Puerto Ricans followed by Dominicans, and then by Mexicans and others from Central and South America (Jones-Correa 1998; Smith 2006b), New York has the largest proportion of second and third generation immigrants, followed by Maghrebis in France.

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The first immigrant generation refers to those individuals arriving as adults; the 1.5 immigrant generation refers to those arriving as minors; the second immigrant generation refers to those born in the U.S., France and Spain –and in these cases, because of jus soli laws, all of them are citizens. Most of the second and subsequent immigrant generations disappear statistically, in France because of the ban against collecting ethnic statistics, in Spain because of their small numbers, and in the U.S. because the U.S. census relies on self-reporting and many respondents are confused by the questions and/or disagree with the census options for race and ethnicity provided (Passel and Taylor 2009). Because of the small sample of ethno-surveys, the crossing of different questions, and qualitative observations, I have achieved a better sense of the self-classifications in the sample, and at the same time can impose different ―objective‖ heuristic classifications when needed given the variable, theory, or concept under study.

Legal Status

The ―problem of illegal immigration‖ is often discussed in the media because it is widespread - around 11.9 million people in the U.S. were ―illegal immigrants‖ in 2008, around 4 percent of the U.S. total population (Passel and Cohn 2009). Aside from the constant fear of deportation, life as an undocumented immigrant in the U.S. is possible. Through personal networks, niche markets, and also mainstream means, undocumented immigrants can access housing, credit, cell phones and most importantly employment. The same was the case in Spain in the 1990‘s and early 2000 (or at least it was before the economic crisis), but not so in France, where documents are required at every turn, for every bureaucratic process as well as when dealing with private companies and civil landlords. Thus it is not surprising to have a lower percentage of undocumented respondents amongst the Maghrebi sample in France. There, I talked to immigrants without papers but for the most part the undocumented came from other areas. Lately a contingent from sub-Saharan Africa have gotten a lot of attention in the political movement of the sans-papiers (Castañeda 2009; Siméant 1998).

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Despite the many regularization campaigns that the Spanish government has carried out, a large number of Moroccans there are undocumented yet the data shows that this does not have a large impact on their access to employment, education for their children, or general government services and overall gradual social integration (Rius Sant 2007).

Employment Status

The number one reason to migrate is to work; the wellbeing of the immigrant starts with access to jobs. For the most part this is not an issue in the U.S. and Spanish markets but as seen in the tables below it is relatively more difficult in France, where there is a chronic problem of underemployment and relatively high instability in the form of short- term contracts in a society where long-term contracts and job security are paramount.

Sample % U.S. Spain France Fully Employed 91.72 91 86 Unemployed 3.31 6 6 n.a. 4.97 3 0 Total 100 100 92

The missing 8 percent in the French sample represents an important number of grossly underemployed immigrants. Who despite having experience and educational credentials are only given unstable temporary contracts or jobs well below their capacity.

13 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda

Occupation U.S. France Algeria Morocco Spain Manual 10 5 39 22 15 Service 25 47 19 45 43 Professional 28 16 21 11 0 Business Owner 3 9 12 0 18 Retired 1 2 2 11 0 Student 26 12 0 0 9 Unemployed 3 9 7 0 3 n.a. 5 0 0 11 12 Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %

The needs of undocumented migrants in the U.S. are many, and they have to overcome family separation and the occasional job abuses but my findings indicate that the employed first generation has a relative lower level of depression than their counterpart in France, since they knew that they came here to work as they say ―venimos aquí a trabajar‖ and they are allowed to do so. In contrast, in France the effect of high access to welfare and job discrimination leads to feelings of uselessness, ennui, and low self-efficacy for the immigrants there. Frank Bean et al. demonstrate Mexican immigrants have lower welfare dependency rates than other native and immigrant groups even when controlling for immigrant status and other variables (Van Hook and Bean 2009). Mexicans work more than others partly because of employment preference and because they do not see the welfare state as a valid substitute. It seems that being able to work, even when the jobs are low paid, undesirable, or low status, helps Mexicans have relatively better relations with the host society. Central and South Americans face similar dynamics while some Puerto Ricans and Dominicans may be racialiazed as black and discriminated against in hiring processes (Fuentes 2007) thus raising their welfare dependency as the Maghrebis in France It is after the second generation that their children, especially in the cases where they may face structural discrimination, will organize political and act more contentiously; yet the avenues for inclusion and cooptation make them appear much less radical than the stereotype of the ―Arab terrorist‖ who resort to violence as way of political expression (Tilly 2004b) or having to resort to riots and car burning as is the case in France. But most interestingly, I would argue that even despite an unfortunate stigmatization of Muslims during the presidency of the George W. Bush, the same applies to Muslims living in the United States, and indeed Muslim Americans report being happier than their European counterparts (Pew Research Center 2007).

Associations and Community

When I arrived in France, many academics there suggested I contact immigrant associations; they felt this would be the only way to access immigrants. I decided against this since, while I am familiar with many Mexican associations in New York, I know that the average Mexican immigrant worker is not an active member of any. As I had thought, when I actually asked immigrants and their families if they were part of an association (club, HTA, cultural organization, etc.) most respondents answered in the negative. The

14 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda

Moroccan sample has the highest participation with most of the membership being to trade associations of vendors and not to political ones. Given the generally small participation of immigrants (and locals) in civil associations it would have been problematic to have interviewed only members of associations, as many other studies do.

Associations% Fr65 Sp33 US181 Alg63 Ma9 Yes 9 6 23 22 56 No 88 91 69 73 44 n.a. 3 3 8 5 0 Total 100 100 100 100 100

To the question, ―do you feel part of a community?‖ respondents answered in this way:

Community U.S.A. Spain France Yes 59% 64% 18% No 32% 9% 79% n.a. 9% 27% 3% Total 100% 100% 100%

Not surprisingly immigrants in France have the lowest levels of communitarianism while the U.S. has high levels. The percentage is even higher for Moroccans in Spain and while many reported feeling part of the umma, a transnational Muslim community, many also reported feeling part of a Spanish, Catalan, or cosmopolitan community.

Contentious Politics and Exclusion

Racial Profiling U.S.A. Spain France Yes 13% 33% 48% No 77% 58% 49% n.a. 10% 9% 3% Total 100% 100% 100%

Maghrebis in France report the highest degree of police harassment. When asked if they have had any problems with the police or the judicial system in general, the majority of them answered in the negative. But when asked if they had been stopped and searched by the police for no apparent reason, the majority responded in the positive. Many of them even justified this, by saying that they were used to these searches, or that they thought they were OK. This is an example of the widespread nature and the normalization of this practice, which translated in an underreporting of police abuse in France. The surveys provide many other indicators of widespread discrimination and racism against ―Arabs‖ in France [discussed in further detail in the corresponding

15 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda chapters]. Given the many affronts that the Maghrebis face, their engagement in contentious politics is relatively high in relation to their counterpart in Spain or the U.S. but it is still relatively low given the high level of political contention typical in France (Bréchon and Tchernia 2009). Furthermore much of the reported participation in contentious politics entails participation in pro-democracy and minority rights movements in Morocco and Algeria, as well as in marches in France against the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine.

Protest U.S.A. Spain France Yes 20% 9% 28% No 71% 91% 68% n.a. 9% 0% 4% Total 100% 100% 100%

The French immigrant second generation gained much attention after the riots in 2005 but these riots reflect the lack of political representation in government and the lack of avenues for a collective political voice as I discuss in the following section [and on the respective chapters].

Case Studies:

France

Since the revolution of 1789, the normative concepts of popular sovereignty2 and secularism (laïcité) aim to create a unified republic in the French hexagonal territory, where the state actively proposes, and enforces, a common civil culture to bring unity to a diverse set of peoples and classes and make them into one nation (Weber 1976). This feeling is exemplified by Emile Durkheim‘s call for a common civil culture and a shared love of the French Republic that would substitute local, religious, and family ties for a ―political religion‖ or feelings of solidarity, social cohesion, and order across atomized individuals in an increasingly industrialized, cosmopolitan, and urban France (Durkheim 1893). The French Republican model has as its permanent implicit comparison the French Monarchy, which at many points used religious premises such as Royal divine right to justify its rule.3 French history has also been marked by bloody and divisive religious wars following the Protestant Reformation, the Enlightenment, popular revolts, social movements that often turned anti-religious, radical republicanism (Jacobins), Vichy, and the Algerian War. These bloody precedents help understand the current passions around the ideas of a secular Republic seen as the synthesis of a contentious past.

2 Popular sovereignty as the idea that sovereignty, or the right to rule, laid in the ―people‖ and not in the person of the ―sovereign‖ or monarch. 3 I would argue that despite the French Revolution many of France‘s highly developed mechanisms to demarcate class and rank distinction are still in operation Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984 [1979]. Distinction: a Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. I would also argue that the royal and Napoleonic dreams of Empire and strong rule are still evident in the strongly centralized and Presidentialist French political system.

16 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda

For a while France‘s referential ―Other‖ was Germany (Brubaker 1992; Fassin 2006; Tilly 2008). But after the formation of the European Union, the United States has become the most common frame of reference for the French elites and the general public (Lacorne 2003; Todd 1994). These implicit and explicit comparisons lend themselves to academic comparative projects that test and improve folk comparisons based on stereotypes of the other. France has a ―republican citizenship regime‖ (Lainer-Vos 2006). The French Republican ideal is to forge a strong and unified nation-state out of different fragments and diverse subjects; the process was long, but a perceived unity was created (Weber 1976). This model of a supposedly culturally homogenous nation-state has been copied abroad and legitimized due to its association to the liberal ideas of democracy, liberty, equality and universal human rights. Nonetheless, what resulted in France was not a neutral egalitarian society but one in which the values of the Parisian elite became dominant (Bourdieu 1996), what Eugene Weber calls ―the official culture‖ (Weber 1976). While aiming to be secular, the implicit religion of the French state and society is Catholicism (or in a broader sense Christianity, leaving behind the old ―irresolvable‖ feuds between Catholics and Protestants; Sarkozy‘s election has solidified a vision of France as part of a Judeo-Christian tradition). This Catholic tradition can still be seen in the national holidays celebrated, in many of the buildings, museums, and objects which form part of the national patrimony, etc. This may pass unnoticed by the average French but not so by residents of other religions. The belief in a common origin, cultural homogeneity and equal rights is strong amongst a large part of French society. Therefore, the arrival of observant Muslims, who may use traditional clothing, headscarves, and other visible religious objects (used either as identity markers or as cultural artifacts), is seen as an affront to the French polity, which, in order to keep its perceived homogeneity (and power relations) intact, imposes a strong ―assimilation program‖ on its immigrants. However, as ―the burning banlieues” show, many of the arriving migrants and their children are not completely happy with this strong program, and the heavy assimilationist expectations, which would require them to, for all practical purposes, change who they are, in order to be accepted as French. This is further complicated when access to jobs is not the same for individuals who may show an ―Arab phenotype‖ (for data on this please see survey results in section below). In this context, religious and racial differences create fault lines (Almaguer 1994). As a French railway technician in Clichy told Michèle Lamont, ―We have to be honest. The problem is that North African immigrants don‘t have the same education, the same values as we do. We have a general Christian education that regulates our relationships. But in the Muslim world, the Koran does not have the same values at all…‖ (Lamont 2000). Here the interviewee starts from an abstract categorization about different values in order to express his general dislike for Muslim immigrants. Many of my French informants expressed similar views. What is behind this- an empirical reality, an ignorance of the other, or both? The extreme right has capitalized on these xenophobic perceptions through the National Front party and its perennial presidential candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen for whom immigration is the cause of all problems.4 The rise of the National Front has been such an

4 In the French Presidential race of 2007, candidate François Bayrou warned against the simplification of the migrant problematic criticizing Le Pen for believing that ―there is but a cause for all problems:

17 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda embarrassment for the French elite not only because of its open anti-immigrant discourse but because of its anti-Republicanism, open call for ethnic whites to unite in their rejection of colored immigrants thus framing France in racial terms. In contrast, the rest of the candidates for the Presidential elections of 2007 agreed on statist approaches. For example, independent/opportunist/centrist candidate François Bayrou openly expressed that the solution to the problems in the banlieues is a stronger state presence. While he admits that France should go beyond formal equality in paper to a real equality (égalité réel), pointing to the contradictions in the French model, he then proposes as a solution that French Muslim Imams should study theology in French universities in order to include a secular twist, and tacitly make Islam more compatible with French values! (Talk at Sciences Po 1/2/2007 available at http://www.bayrou.fr/). The political discourse of Bayrou shows how engrained the republican secular ideals are in the habitus of the French elite. Not surprisingly the proposals from Ségolène Royal of the Socialist Party were not that different, and she also emphasized a certain ―identité national.‖ Nicolas Sarkozy‘s campaign had certain openings for diversity and affirmative action; once in government he formed a Ministry of Immigration and National Identity which has caused alarm and disgust amongst progressive intellectuals and researchers in France. The Republican ideal of Durkheim and others is still relevant today. The State and the Parisian cultural and intellectual elites have a very strong influence on what it means to be French, leaving very little room, and symbolic power, for those deviating from the norm. For many French nationals this ideology is so embedded that it becomes unconscious, part of their habitus, in a way that makes it hard for them to distance themselves from this world-view. Interviews with immigrants and some of their descendants show the psychological toll imposed by this strong acculturation logic. The French political model includes few constructive avenues for these differences to be channeled and accepted. 5

Empirical Findings [France n = 65]

I conducted fieldwork in Paris during the academic year of 2007-2008. This included close participant observation of a small group of immigrants, as well as frequent non- participant observation in public spaces, and sociological promenades6 throughout most of Paris proper and its urban area, including the so-called banlieue. The fact that I am not French put me in a detached position and at a social distance that allowed me to see many social interactions from a different perspective than a French or Maghrebi person would have seen them.7

immigration;‖ «à toutes les problèmatiques, il n'y a qu'une seule cause: l'immigration » (Talk at Sciences Po February 1st, 2007). 5 Furthermore, it is important to note that since 1978 the French government has prohibited the systematic collection of ethnic and racial data on its population. Emmanuelle Saada notes that this practice goes back to the colonial days in the Caribbean (cited in Lamont 2000:317). 6 As Louis Chevalier from the INED and the Collège de France wrote that the street walker can compete with the statistician in understanding the diversity of Paris inhabitants (Les Parisiens 1985 [1967], 75 cited in Pinçon, Michel and Monique Pinçon-Charlot. 2009. Paris : quinze promenades sociologiques. Paris: Payot. 7 I could not have done such a set of critical sociological observations in Mexico City because of many of the clichés and preconceived ideas (idées reçues) as someone who has born, raised and socialized there.

18 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda

Given its long history, breathtaking buildings, urban landscapes, and cultural institutions it is hard for the regular tourist or the occasional visitor to have the time or inclination to venture into formerly working class neighborhoods within Paris or out into the ill-reputed banlieues beyond Paris‘ historical walls and even less likely that he or she would have the opportunity to look at the private life of immigrants. But that was precisely what I set out to do for a year (2007-2008). Furthermore, unlike a Parisian- based researcher, I lacked family, professional, or social networks to fall back on when not doing ―sociology.‖ My structural position as a visiting foreign graduate student ethnographer put me, most of the time, in an alienated, detached position not that different from the newly arrived immigrant pioneer. Indeed my phenotype, accent, and habits were different enough to be confused by ―the French‖ as an immigrant, and non- French enough for ―the immigrants‖ to be more open and critical than they might have been if they were talking to a local researcher. The ethno-survey is a detailed structured questionnaire designed to combine the best of qualitative and quantitative methods (Massey, Alarcon, Durand, and González 1987). I present here data from ethno-surveys of 65 individuals of North African origin living in France (Fr65). These surveys where part of a purposive sample across the Parisian metropolitan area [see Methodological Appendix for more details.] In order to keep a control group and to asses my findings I also conducted ethno-surveys among 24 individuals who were not from North Africa, or who were but were white (pied noirs) and/or of Jewish religion. But because of space limitations, I will not discuss this other groups at this time. The selected French sample (n65) includes 75 percent men and 25 percent women with an average age of 32, and a median age of 29 years.

Figure 1.1 Places of interviewees‘ residence within the central Parisian Metropolitan Area.

19 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda

The people interviewed included first generation immigrants, as well as their children, and grandchildren who had their origins in North Africa and were of Arabic or Berber descent and in most cases were Muslim. The results show medium levels of residential segregation (Wacquant 2008) but strikingly high levels of social distance from ―mainstream‖ French society especially amongst the first generation, and men in general. A structural cause and effect of their social invisibility and belonging to a different social field is due to discrimination and the accompanying unemployment. Unemployment rates for people of Maghrebi origin, especially those phenotypically ―Arab‖, are much higher than those for other groups. While in Paris, I spent much time with unemployed men who rarely left their apartments and who suffered high levels of depression, persecution anxiety, and reactive xenophobia. They spoke French, had papers, had lived there for a while, and despite their high education and skills were systematically denied long term employment, which, in a couple of cases, literarily drove them to desperation and paranoia. Indeed the findings that a negative migration experience can leave migrants vulnerable to mental illnesses are similar to those reported elsewhere (Grinberg and Grinberg 1989). Many of my informants identified themselves as North Africans (from here on Maghrebis) even when they had French papers. In one marginal, but still representative case, a third generation French citizen whose grandparents came from Algeria, but who has only been to Algeria once and whose Arab is very limited, told me that he identified as Algerian. When I asked him why this was so, he said ―Look at me, look at my camel face- do I look French? When I am in the street, in the subway, people do not see a Frenchman but an Arab.‖ He thus reported a racial description of the French as white. He no longer has formal employment. He used to work in a factory but stopped due to a job accident, and he receives disability. He spends his evening and nights hanging out in a bar next to some projects in a banlieue south of Paris. He says that his father, who worked in construction and as a janitor in a public school, ―worked so hard when he came to France and he sacrificed so much for me and my siblings.‖In order to complement his income and help his parents he sells ―shit‖ [drugs] and engages in other self-reported ―illegal activities.‖ When I ask him if he has friends different from himself, he first answers in the affirmative saying that people come to see him from all over Paris, but when I push him about the people he trusts and feels close to, he says he prefers to stay by himself and with other Algerians. About the blacks, he said ―I respect them but I prefer to keep my distance. I do not want any problems with them.‖ The whites he distrusts too and he is worried of people he does not know who suddenly appear, walk around, and ask questions. If they are not sociologists like me (I was accompanied that day by an Algerian man) they must be policemen trying to pass as civilians looking for people to put in jail. In Morocco I met another man of Algerian origin, born in Marseille, who was involved in the transnational drug trade and was asking for money claiming to have just gotten out of Moroccan prison. In contrast to the former informant discussed, when I pushed him on his Algerian origin, he said, ―Algeria is nothing more than [a place where I spend] a couple of weeks every year. I am French.‖ Why does one person underline his ―Frenchness‖ while another underlines its ―Algerianess‖? Identity is defined by the context and relationship, self-identification in my surveys was important but it was equally important to understand through other questions the reasons someone may identify more with the host country or the country of his/her parents.

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The family plays a big role for Maghrebis, and informants stated this when questioned if they are close to their family and who they ask for help or trust the most. The problem is that often many family members remain in their countries of origin, and the ones who live in France have a high probability of being marginal themselves and thus unable to help them access jobs and contact ―mainstream‖ French society. My informants often responded that they preferred to stick to themselves and to close family. They mistrust strangers including fellow countrymen and co-religionists who they said often used the socially expected solidarity and charity to fellow Muslims to take advantage of them, so they prefer not to make many friends. Their relative poverty and social marginality prevents them from being able to satisfy expectations of generosity, aid, and reciprocity.8 This common lack of resources plus the wide mistrust French society has of ethnic community life (Fassin and Fassin 2006; Lacorne 2003) results in a high fragmentation of young immigrant Arab men in the Parisian metropolitan area even among themselves.9 So, while they are many men in their same structural position, undergoing the same feelings of exclusion and disempowerment and desperation, they rarely come together. This is less so among the Kabyles, Berbers from the Algerian mountains of Kabylia, who have cultural and identity struggles of their own and prefer the term Amazigh or Imazighen (plural) to that of Berber derived from the Greek word ―barbaros‖ meaning barbaric. Many Amazigh often gather to defend their culture versus what they see as a culturally oppressive Arab majority and an Algerian excluding state (Mahé 2006). Kabyles also tend to have a more Caucasian phenotype (brown, blond, or red hair and light eyes), to be leftist, francophone, and have higher levels of education (Ruedy 2005). These elements help to make them one of the most integrated Maghrebi groups in France. Only Maghrebis of Jewish origin do better even despite a constant presence of French anti-Semitism (Noiriel 2007) [For more on the religious and ethnic differences amongst Maghrebis in France and in North Africa see the respective chapters]. The Imazighen are more organized, and the integration of many of them into well paying jobs in their host society allows them more time and resources to organize. They make claims to have their language and culture recognized. They do not make these claims so much vis à vis their host societies but more in relation to what they see as a historical and continuous ―Arab‖ cultural colonization, exacerbated by a bloody confrontation with Algerian forces in the Black Spring of 2001 (Mahé 2006).10 But with the exception of the Kabyles, most first generation immigrants from the Maghreb are not organized socially or politically, and not even religiously. While they may feel part of the umma, or global Muslim community, they do not go regularly to a Mosque and most of them prefer to confine their religious activities to the private space of the household, and around traditional familial practices such as fasting during Ramadan. One informant told me that it is only possible to follow the tradition of Ramadan when done within a community since someone, commonly a wife, sister, or

8 This is similar to the condition that Mejívar documents amongst Salvadorians in San Francisco. Menjívar, Cecilia. 2000. Fragmented ties: Salvadoran immigrant networks in America. Berkeley: University of California Press. 9 The second and subsequent immigrant generations tend to be more integrated in more diverse social networks and to have more capital depending on the social segment they have assimilated to. 10 I have also observed the same while participating in cultural events organized by the Kabyle community in New York, including the celebration of the contentious events of the Berber Spring.

21 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda mother, is needed to prepare the rich food that will be eaten by working and/or observing men in order to recover their strength after the sun sets. Thus most first generation working immigrants who are single or came alone rarely follow Ramadan. This further alienates them from each other at a time where following a collective tradition had the effect of making the community visible in their countries of origin. Given the Republican French normative and legal system that discourages the formation of associations or clubs around common nationality or religion (Smith 2006a),11 Muslim Maghrebis lack a uniform political voice. There is a dire misrepresentation of minorities within government and even slots for electoral posts (Geisser and Soum 2008). Some token figures have been appointed by Sarkozy but French minorities do not feel represented by them at all (interview with Eros Sana May 28, 2009). In the same sense the French government has established an official body in the Paris Mosque, and a Muslim Council but this are official organs that have very little contact with immigrants. The same is said about the well funded and visible organization ―SOS Racisme‖ which many criticize as an arm of the Socialist Party that lacks any contacts on the ground and is specially disconnected from youth of Maghrebi origin (L'Information Citoyenne 2006). So as a whole immigrant Arabs from North Africa lack representative organizations, legitimate spokespeople, political representation within political parties and government. The second and subsequent generations are not much better off but being more cognizant of their rights as French citizens they are more prone to ―anger‖ and disorganized semi- spontaneous demonstrations as in the riots of 2005 that were a reaction to the death of two young French citizens of Maghrebi origin (Schneider 2008). These riots were carried out mainly by a number of disenfranchised second generation French citizens. Indeed most of my interviewees spoke against them since the possessions, cars and businesses of other minorities and their neighborhoods were the main victims of these riots (more on these riots in the chapter on France).

Immigrant’s habitus

As I will discuss in detail in the corresponding chapters of my dissertation, immigrants bring with them a particular culture and world view, incorporated in their own bodies into a personal habitus that incorporates elements of a national culture, local traditions, as well as particular family and personal trajectories and experiences (Calhoun 1993). This personal habitus changes when confronted with the new host culture, and is always adapting. But it is important to take it into account because it changes slowly and it shapes the lenses through which the individual migrant may evaluate (and be evaluated) by others in their new society. This is why I will speak of many habitus (in plural) rather than of static, all encompassing, monolithic national cultures.12

11 Despite the strong discourse against funding communitarian activities, some funds are allocated at the local level around cultural issues, or programs around social class, age or disadvantaged status (see Doytcheva, Milena. 2007. Une discrimination positive à la française : ethnicité et territoire dans les politiques de la ville. Paris: La Découverte. 12 The need to write succinctly will force some generalizations and broad comparisons to create ideal types to analyze theoretically. But the reader should keep in mind that these generalizations are but ideal types which are particular in every instance of the lived world and that any particular individual nominally a part

22 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda

Great differences and misunderstanding exist around the concepts of friendship, personal space and time boundaries. While the Maghrebis ideally prefer continuous company and contact (Nydell 2006), as other urban inhabitants, Parisians tend to be relatively individualistic, [and increasingly so according to a longitudinal value survey (Bréchon and Tchernia 2009)], and tend to have a small group of family, childhood and work friends (10 on average, according to my estimates) that they see a few times a month (see chapter on France). The unspoken different expectations around ―friendship‖ make friendships between French and new arrivals difficult and infrequent. This creates a large social distance between new arrivals and the average Parisian, something that is resented by the first generation immigrants Maghrebis who immigrate alone or while still single, who feel alone and alienated (Ben Jelloun 1977). This is not so much the case for highly educated working professionals, or for members of the second and subsequent generations. Most Maghrebis in France have been able to get legal resident status through different mechanisms, and thus most of them have access to excellent social welfare protections like public housing, unemployment benefits and healthcare. Given the size and centralization of the French state, immigrants have continuous bureaucratic relations with what they see as a faceless state. Immigrants make material demands on an individual and household basis. This limits collective action and group voice for all with the exception of worker unions and political parties. French citizens and taxpayers see themselves as solidaire and favor social equality but they regard the actual implementation of this as an issue for the state and not for citizens, thus they should not be expected to help out in their everyday lives (Bréchon and Tchernia 2009); this relation mediated by the state has a strong effect on the ―solidarity‖ that immigrants experience. Islam does become a real barrier not because of intrinsic differences but because of essensializations and negative stereotypes carried out by public intellectuals, public discourse, and the media (Deltombe 2005; Geisser 2003) that draw a symbolic boundary with the ―inassimilable‖ Muslims. In response to this stigmatization, some Muslim immigrants and their children engage in a certain degree of ―reactive formation‖ (Portes and Rumbaut 2006) and reject the values of the mainstream Christian society, a cultural process over religion that may be partially replacing a process of elite reproduction and mass self-exclusion that used to form around class (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970; Willis 1981). At the same time, the importance that general moral and religious conceptions have in the habitus and everyday life of Maghrebis lead them to hold negative valuations and judgments of people who act, in ways which they may have been raised to see as sinful, disgusting, and unacceptable, including not being religious.13 Despite these symbolic boundaries, and mutual ―negative attractions,‖ religious practice and fervor is normally distributed amongst my Muslim respondents, varying in a continuum from those who became de facto agnostic to those few who have hardened their views. Most people are in-between and have certain personal preferences and beliefs but do not impose them on others by force and are thus de facto secular since they keep their religious views, preferences and practices private.

of the groups discussed may fit or not these ideal types. Here I present the data on a statistical aggregate created from the surveys and other data sources. 13 For example, for one of my informants ―atheist‖ was one of the strongest insults that he could enounce.

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In the chapters on France and the Maghreb I describe in more detail the processes and mechanisms that result in the practical exclusion and muting of political voice of Maghrebis in France [See the comparative section for comparisons with the other cases studies around certain variables and aspects].

The United States

After the end of a ―melting pot model,‖ which strongly emphasized assimilation, the United States has normally been presented as the prototypical example of ―the liberal citizenship regime‖ (Peled 1992). In the U.S., immigrants are allowed to keep their cultural practices, and integration happens gradually through generations; ethnicity does not preclude citizenship (Brubaker 2004). While not being as open as the Canadian society (Bloemraad 2006), the United States is still very close to the multicultural model (Lacorne 2003), even if after 9/11 this model has faced some criticism. Many generations of Americans have now been transformed by the legacy of the civil rights movement and the cultural practice of political correctness, which bans openly racist speech legally and especially culturally. In the United States racial inequality is reproduced mainly through historical legacies and structural arrangements that result in durable inequalities (Tilly, 1998; Massey 2007). Nonetheless, there has been a certain social mobilization from the right, and the populist left, producing a new wave of nativism at the national level, although this may be a reflection of 1) political opportunism by political entrepreneurs and/or of 2) internal ideological struggles rather than purely xenophobic outlets (Castañeda 2006). Some argue that these nativist anti-immigrant attacks are creating a reactive-formation amongst immigrants (Portes 2007), meaning that by being signaled as different, Latinos (regardless of their nationality or legal status) may seek to further differentiate themselves from the mainstream society. Some point to a downward segmented assimilation of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans who are racialized and join an African American underclass (Dávila 2004; Fuentes 2007; Smith 2006b). Immigrants from Puerto Rico the Dominican Republic have faced a racialization that pushes them into a dichotomy between black and white that is much more nuanced in the Island (Levitt 2001). The extent of the racialization of Mexicans, Central and South Americans in New York remains to be seen but if avenues for education, legalization, and higher paying jobs do not open the future of this group is uncertain (Smith 2006b). While there are many internal differences among Latinos and to a great degree independent spheres of socialization, to the non-Latino observer they share many similarities (relative geography, language, religion, and to a degree history) and are thus put together under the same social category and thus often face the same social boundaries.14 Like in France there is a social distance between natives and immigrants, especially new arrivals or stigmatized groups, but this distance in New York is often blurred by the third generation (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters 2004; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008), and is overtaken by other characteristics such as class, gender, and education. Furthermore, propinquity at work and school allow for many acquaintances

14 An extreme but illustrative example is the unfortunate case of the Ecuadorean man killed in December 7th, 2007 in Brooklyn after having been taken to be Mexican and homosexual; his death was not changed by the fact that he was from Ecuador and that he was walking close to his brother.

24 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda across ethnic lines. But it is true that many new immigrant Latinos often do not want to be noticed because they lack papers and fear deportation. Thus they rather just be left alone, and allowed to work (Hellman 2008; Thompson 2007), and for the most part they are allowed to work and conduct their lives in immigrant enclaves (Jones-Correa 1998) and transnational spheres (Levitt 2001; Smith 2006b) [see employment table below]. While the everyday pressure to conform to a mainstream culture in U.S. is much less than in France, and while most undocumented Latinos were able to find employment (specially before the crisis), their access to social services, housing, leisure time, and ability to save is rather limited because of the lack documents and the associated low wages, difficult working conditions, and lack of benefits. Thus their marginality is mainly an economic one, and sometimes a racial one. In cultural terms, incorporation is somewhat left to the immigrant (Bloemraad 2006) and is to a great extent voluntary given the attractiveness of American popular culture, an increasing pre-acculturation process which precedes migration due to television, Hollywood, the global American music industry, as well as a culture of migration, social remittances, and transnational spheres that provide a certain superficial familiarity with the U.S. before migrating (McMurray 2001; Quinones 2001).15 Given its history and tolerance for religious and ethnic communities, the political culture of the United States provides formal and informal avenues of political voice to immigrants first through voluntary associations such as hometown associations, local community organizations, local boards, and through elected office and political appointments inside government (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters 2004). The access is not perfect, automatic, or without conflicts and competition but it can channel energies to certain political avenues (Marwell 2007). As generations of black politicians and spokesmen have showed in the United States, it is allowed, even expected and required, to have representatives, caucuses, and institutions to speak on behalf of minorities and children of immigrants (NAACP, MALDEF). Lately the Hispanic media and the Catholic Church have become large and explicit supporters of undocumented immigrants‘ rights and supported their campaigns and marches for legalization (Fitzgerald 2009b). Thus in the United States migrants, including undocumented ones, act as de facto citizens in the sense that they contribute to the host country through their labor, taxes, consumption, food, music, culture, and as political actors (even when their activities may often escape the national public sphere or the local news).

New York Sample [NY181]

Given that in New York ―Mexican‖ is sometimes still consider a dirty word and that the term Latino historically denotes Puerto Ricans, and more recently Dominicans (in contrast with California and the southwest where most immigrants have been of Mexican origin), I have decided to conduct surveys in New York amongst immigrants from the Spanish speaking Caribbean as well as from Mexico, Central and South America from

15 So too Maghrebi youth in North Africa have a lust for French, and Western culture in general, and have been pre-acculturated. The problem with this mediated contact is that it presents idealized versions of Western culture, which underline attractive aspects. Furthermore, the reception abroad is mediated through local habitus and local cultural lenses with local dubbing at the extreme of the domestification of global cultural products.

25 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda where important number of immigrants have arrived in the last couple of decades (Jones- Correa 1998). I have conducted most of my fieldwork amongst Mexicans; for descriptions of other Latino groups in New York I rely on the rich literature produced in the last years (Aranda 2008; Bourgois 2003; Dávila 2004; Fuentes 2007; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Jones- Correa 1998; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters 2004; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008; Loveman 2007; Marwell 2007). I review this literature and discuss the findings in the chapter on New York. Studying different kinds of Latinos allows for an archeological layering of the different stereotypes and conceptualizations that the host society has imposed into a group, and lends itself better to the way that Arabs in Europe are seen from afar, or as North Africans are seen from inside France. Interestingly, as in the U.S., Latinos are also seen as a more or less uniform group in Spain.

Spain

In contrast to the U.S., the Spanish national identity is highly parochial, partly since historically it was formed in reaction to the exclusion of the Moorish, Jewish, and colonized indigenous peoples (de Zayas 2006). The Spanish distrust foreigners to different degrees as expressed in this comment from a person in Almería, Spain16, ―Look, nobody would want to have immigrants as their neighbors…one would always prefer Spaniards…but if you had a choice, better they be Latin Americans, who are more like us, or black Africans, who are good people, better than Moroccans or Algerians who are the dirtiest and most problematic…this is not just my opinion, it‘s the facts‖ (quoted in Calavita 2005:127). In this phrase we see how a broad and unfair generalization is taken as common sense or a ―social fact‖ due to its widespread currency inside the informants‘ social network. While older generations‘ habitus are still shaped by General Franco‘s strong republican and ethno-national discourse emphasizing the Spanish as a united people fighting against communists and outside influences, the younger generations are more tolerant and have a high participation in civil society‘s efforts to embrace immigrants. Despite frequent, openly racist statements from the Spanish, the survey results show that Moroccans are quite at ease in Spain. In general they feel happy to be there and like it very much. They work hard, and they hope their children will profit from being raised and educated in Spain. This was also the case where the young male immigrants have the highest contact with locals, and where we recorded many cases of many recently-arrived Moroccans dating local women. This shows that in Barcelona, and now even more so in Madrid, the Spanish are in practice quite open to new foreigner arrivals. Despite racist stereotypes and sometimes quite open negative public discourse, Moroccans face a de facto accommodation in Barcelona. Furthermore when I asked Moroccans about their identity, they showed a cosmopolitan tendency, underlining their humanity and the equality of all people. They also showed they were eager to perfect their Spanish, and it is indeed quite common for their children to be fully fluent in Spanish and Catalan. The global financial crisis that started in 2007 will make the relative easy integration occurring so far in Spain harder as the large sources of employment drain. Interviewed

16 Southern Spanish province where El Ejido is located.

26 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda migrants said they were telling the family and friends not to come anymore since it was hard to find new jobs, still very few of the migrants currently abroad will return home. Most of them will try to weather the storm, they report, since the conditions at home are even worse, and in the long term things stills relatively look better abroad.

Barcelona Sample [Sp33]

A number of ethno-surveys were conducted in Spain. Here I limited my discussion to the sample of 33 surveys of Moroccan immigrants in Barcelona. The results were quite consistent and appeared to reach saturation, that is, after a while the answers starting being repetitive. This is understandable given the relative newness of the immigration and the relative homogeneity of those immigrating. They typically followed a common immigration pattern: first young men who are then followed by their brothers, wife and children like in many other cases (Massey, Alarcon, Durand, and González 1987; McMurray 2001). I do not report on the findings of this case alone for reasons of space but I discuss this in detail in the respective chapter.

Apparent Differences

The United States has often portrayed itself as country of immigrants, especially after the 1960‘s (Gabaccia 2008). The United States is an example of a ―nation by design‖ made out of different immigrant groups. But according to Aristide Zolberg (2006) the state‘s implicit and/or direct immigrant control was used as a nation-building tool. He further notes that the U.S. declared itself no longer a country of immigrants as early as 1930 (2006:9), so the recurrent nativist movements have not been so ―abnormal‖ since the U.S. is constantly successful in promoting a common ethno-national and ideological identity despite its real internal diversity. There is ample room for immigrant groups and subcultures to exits in the American social panorama without threatening the future of the U.S. as a political nation. On the other side people tend to underemphasize the immigrant history of France and Spain, although both were populated by a large number of ethnic groups (Calavita 2005; Hoerder and Moch 1996). France has been for more than a century the number one country of immigration (Noiriel 2001; Weil 2002). The history and national identity of Spain has been widely marked by centuries of Muslim reign that produced a true melting pot (Gaïd 2008), as well as by the French invasion of 1808 (Carpentier, Pérez Galdós, and Blanco White 2008). Spain includes a large number of immigrants from other European countries to the point where many small towns have significant populations of Germans and English - some of these towns even have mayors from those groups elected to represent them. European countries have not only been receptors of immigrants but also senders. Large European emigrations include the large colonizing missions after the discovery of the Americas, and an even larger wave of 52 million who left Europe between 1824 and 1924 (Hoerder and Moch 1996).17 Both Spain and France used to be colonial rulers of Morocco. Algeria was, for decades, a French colony (1830-1954) (Smith 2006a; Stora

17 Indeed, France was one the only European country with a net immigration rate in the period of 1850- 1940 (Schnapper 1991:64 quoted in Lamont 317: fn. 24).

27 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda

1991). A large part of the American Southwest used to be Mexican territory (Gómez 2007). Therefore a colonial past has meant bidirectional influence and population flows in all the circuits studied. Contrary to popular belief, European emigration is not a thing of the past. For example, there are more than 300,000 French citizens living in England today (The Economist 2007), and there is also a considerable number of French academics and professionals living in the United States: 151,155 French-born people were living in the U.S. ,according to the 2000 U.S. census, with yearly enrolments of a little over 500 French nationals pursuing their Ph.D. in the U.S., and around 1,000 post-docs. There were 31,400 permanent residents living in the U.S who were born in France (NSF 2000). Despite apparent differences all the United States, France and Spain are countries of immigration, with around a tenth of their residents being foreign born. What is different is the ways the state and society frame this history and the expectations, demands, opportunities, and avenues of political voice given to immigrant groups.

Commonalities across Cases

Immigrants often internalize the public discourse and media discussion about their arrival in the host society. Talking with a group of Mexican immigrants in Queens, New York after a basketball game (summer of 2005) I noticed how they made fun of each other, marking their worth based on their legal status. One would tell me, pointing to his cousin and teasing him saying ―that one is a pinche [swear word] illegal.‖ The immigrants who were residents and citizens take pride in their status and feel superior to their undocumented compatriots and make fun of them, even when their paper regularization may have happened as a result of a policy change outside of their control. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note how immigrants themselves internalize and reinforce symbolic boundaries, despite the fact that they are friends from the same town, with common acquaintances, and from the same socio-economic background. While immigrants internalize citizenship regimes, the exclusive nature of these regimes may make them organize to engage in protests and other political displays, often forming alliances with local activists and members of the second generation, who tend to be more ―culturally literate‖ and familiar with the rights discourses of the receiving society, more ―integrated‖ and more ―politicized‖. These social movements may highlight the injustices and inequalities in opportunities and income which are perceived as a lack of social rights. While, in general, the first generation of immigrants will be busy working and getting adjusted to the new system (Hellman 2008), the second generation, being used to the benefits and ideas of the host society, will tend to be more vocal about the abuses and negative experiences that their parents or co-ethnics face; this is the case in the U.S. and France and it will probably be the case in Spain when a larger second generation comes of age. In the same way, the state may react to popular protest for migrant rights in a way that alters the nature of the citizenship regime. For example, after the use of Mexican flags in the immigrants‘ rights marches of May 1st 2006, many observers in right and centrist media outlets, and even some organizers, pointed towards the divisive nature of this action. This response underlines a further sacralization of the American flag, and the underlining of the importance of unity, homogeny and ideological similarity, more like

28 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda the French Republican model. This may represent the move of the American polity towards a more republican attitude after 9/11. At the same time, as a reaction to the events of 2005 in France, many observers noted that the French ―integrationist‖ secular model was not going according to theory, and that a more multicultural and tolerant model was necessary (e.g. NYT Tuesday, November 8, 2005); if these suggestions were put into effect this would move the citizenship regime closer to the liberal American model. For example, The Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences-Po) has started a modest ―affirmative-action‖ type of program (more on this later). But still the French political discourse and common personal habitus exercise enough symbolic violence on the non-French to create enough friendly spaces for ethnic cultures. The youth in the banlieue is creating a new urban culture inspired by an idealized view of New York street life with a distinctively French take. Kenza Farah, an Algerian Kabyle singer who was raised in Marseille, and her generation has appropriated hip hop and brought it closer to the French pop tradition; the video of a recent single (―Ce qu’il faut”) features iconic images of New York City; it is a French song, with an English chorus. Banlieue youth culture uses the global influence of American hip hop to create a counter-culture in France. Inspired by American popular culture, this movement cannot help being French. This reflects a de facto acculturation of minorities in France, who despite their acculturation feel the need to create an alternative space to express themselves because of their distance from the ―French mainstream‖ culture. This is also the case for minorities in America whose economic segregation has make them produce original cultural gems which are afterwards incorporated into the mainstream. In contrast, in France most of the hip hop audience is reduced to underprivileged members of the second and third immigrant generations.18

Comparative Study of the Mechanisms for Claim Making and Political Inclusion of Immigrant Groups

The following table shows different criteria and preliminary observations for the comparison across cases. Its purpose is not to determine a single causal mechanism but to inform the contextual differences and similarities. This table does not aim to exhaust possible variations but to provide basic information on aspects to compare.

18 Few sub-Saharan artists like Abd Al Malik and McSolaar have made successful crossovers; Zebda is one of the few examples of Maghrebi groups succeeding in the French pop market.

29 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda

Table 1.1: Similarities and Differences

Mexico/U.S. Mexico/Spain Morocco/Spain Algeria/France

Proximity, New migration, Proximity, Proximity, Migratory context 100 years of Former Colony Former Colony Former Colony, immigration 100 years of immigration Economic, Economic Economic Economic, Rational for Aspirational, Expected Cultural Aspirational Political, Migration Networks, Culture of Affinity Aspirational, Migration Networks, Culture of Migration Relationship Slightly above Low remitting Slightly above Above subsistence, between subsistence behavior subsistence good among Remittances & Kabyles Development Majority Religion of Catholic/ Catholic/ Muslim/ Muslim/ Origin/Destination Protestant Catholic Catholic Catholic Language of Spanish, Indigenous / Spanish/ Arabic, Berber, Arabic, Berber, Origin/Destination English, Spanish Spanish, Catalan, French/ Spanish, French/ Basque Catalan, Basque French Legality, Racial and Racial and religious Strong preference Ideological Ethnic/Racialization, religious homogeneity, for cultural and Preferences of the Liberal homogeneity, Recently Tolerant religious Receiving State Multiculturalism Recently Tolerant Multiculturalism homogeneity towards Political Unity Multiculturalism (secularism), (E Pluribus Unum) Monoculturalism Inclusive Discourse Positive to Negative, Positive Neutral to Negative Negative in Public Sphere Extreme Path to Citizenship Short [IRCA 1987] / Short / Long / Short/ Before/ Now Long Short Short Long Policing Medium Low Medium High Access to Yes, when legal; Yes, when legal; Yes, when legal; Yes, when legal; Government Partial access for the Private and Catholic charities, Minimum services Services, including undocumented professional and civil society for the uninsured Healthcare, depending on city and channels organizations Education, Housing state and Welfare Easy access to low Adequate access Easy access to low Easy access to low Access to Job status jobs / to high status jobs status jobs / status jobs; little Markets and Social Little access to high / Little access to high access to secure Mobility of the status jobs Easy access to high status jobs jobs / Little access First / Second status jobs to high status jobs; Generations Easy access for the highly skilled Sporadic, reactive, Limited to Low High but local grassroots, professional Deemed as fragmented, done Political transnational associations and to secondary and at the individual Participation learning the unnecessary level vis-à-vis the system rules national (functional government / lack integration) of ethnic political clubs

30 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda

Conclusion

Multisite fieldwork allowed for the study of specific mechanisms of us/them boundary-making, and the resulting racism and xenophobia, framed as inherent and irreconcilable cultural differences that block integration (Balibar and Wallerstein 1988; Brubaker 2004). Field visits contributed to the understanding of the functioning of agenda-setting in the public sphere in general, and about practices of citizenship and political incorporation of newcomers. All these are pressing issues for most societies, contemporary and historical. This project studies how different immigrant groups voice their demands in the United States, France and Spain; looking at the specific processes and mechanisms that construct differences among groups, and the dynamics that may favor different types of political voice and claim-making. The proven hypotheses: The political inclusion of immigrants depends on the social and institutional contexts of reception, immigration policies, racial understandings, and citizenship regimes of the host country. The more institutional avenues available, the more integrated the immigrant population will feel, and the more it will act within institutionalized channels; the less institutional collective avenues are open for immigrants and minorities, the more contentious the immigrants will be and the less integrated they will feel. These hypotheses are reasonable but the interesting part is how they work, the general process and mechanisms that foster and inhibit successful immigrant assimilation. So why are Muslims in Europe seen as contentious while Latinos are seen as docile and apolitical in the U.S.? The final answer is that it is actually the other way around. In the U.S. it is acceptable even expected to organize politically and socially around ethnic, cultural and even racial lines, thus one sees the appearance of racial and ethnic representatives (Jesse Jackson, Charles Rangel) what allows for individual inclusion in the political system. This diffuses many of the collective claims and may actually moderate the claims and advancement of disadvantaged groups (Marwell 2007; Venkatesh 2008) but it allows for individual mobility and certain patronage and clientelism; politicians of ethnic origin can also become city, state, or nation-wide representatives as part of multi-ethnic (and one should say multi-class) coalitions under an inclusive universalistic discourse (e.g. Antonio Villaraigosa, Fiorello LaGuardia, Barak Obama). In contrast, in France it not legitimate or even acceptable to organize around ethnic or cultural lines (social class was seen as the most legitimate form of political representation) thus disadvantaged and disenfranchised groups have a hard time getting representatives elected, which interestingly marks their collective exclusion and makes them voice their claims through non-traditional channels e.g. sans papiers marches, hunger strikes, squatting and even sometimes riots. Thus the political actions of the migrants currently from North and Sub-Saharan Africa is most visible and worrisome because of its disruptive effect on symbolic power, and because there is no space in the current Republican habitus open expressly for them. The American system works in the opposite way; it is a priori open to representativeness and cultural difference once groups and individuals are able to overcome racist exclusions and economic difficulties by themselves. Spain is at an early stage of immigration and it shows elements of both systems‘ inclusive policies at the government level and republican aspirations of many of its citizens. Spain‘s policy makers and cultural entrepreneurs still have the room and time

31 The Political Voice of Immigrants Ernesto Castañeda to consciously learn from other experiences and choose their own model to follow in the middle and long term.

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