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Colgate Academic Review

Volume 2 (Fall 2007) Article 8

6-29-2012 : A Response to the Jennifer Geffner

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Recommended Citation Geffner, Jennifer (2012) "Reliabilism: A Response to the Gettier Problem," Colgate Academic Review: Vol. 2, Article 8. Available at: http://commons.colgate.edu/car/vol2/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Digital Commons @ Colgate. It has been accepted for inclusion in Colgate Academic Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Colgate. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Geffner: Reliabilism: A Response to the Gettier Problem

Reliabilism: A Response to the Gettier Problem

Jennifer Geffner ‘09

PHIL 335

Edmund Gettier, author of Is Justified True ?, poses a problem to the contemporary epistemologist: he objects that knowledge is not justified true belief. His problem has left either to develop further criteria for knowledge or to defend the traditional definition of knowledge—justified true belief.

Alvin Goldman, author of What justified and true.1 Since the of the is Justified Belief?, responds to a certain agent’s belief may be disconnected from type of Gettier case by providing a new its justification, Gettier claims that account of justification. While knowledge requires something more. Goldman’s efforts are laudable, I argue Goldman tries to solve one of the that his theory of justification fails to problems posed by Gettier through answer the problem raised by Gettier. reliabilism: the theory that an agent’s Gettier reveals that justified, true belief is justified if it was caused by a belief is not sufficient for knowledge. cognitive process that tends to produce Even though a belief may be justified true beliefs.2 For example, and true, Gettier seems to worry that the generally produces true beliefs and thus truth or justification of the agent’s belief is a reliable mechanism that can justify may be a matter of luck. For example, an agent’s belief. Reliabilism is an suppose that an agent is driving a Ford externalist theory of justification because through a town filled with barn-like the facts about a process’s reliability are structures. The agent stops the car in not available to the agent’s immediate front of what appears to be a barn and consciousness. Consequently, for a forms the belief that there is a barn in the belief to be justified, Goldman claims town. This belief seems justified because that the agent need not know the it was caused by the agent’s perception. reliability of the process that caused his The town that the agent is in, however, is belief.3 Rather, Goldman claims that a actually one filled with barn facades. belief is sufficiently justified if it was Ironically, the agent’s belief is true caused by a reliable process. Because because the agent stopped in front of the justification is a result of a process that only real, three-dimensional barn in the produces beliefs that tend to be true, town when he formed his belief.

Because the agent holds a true, justified 1 Edmund, Gettier. Is Justified True Belief belief, the agent seems to know that Knowledge?. In Contemporary Debates in there is a barn in the town. Gettier, , ed. Matthias Setup and Ernest however, argues that the agent’s true, Sosa, (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 126 justified belief is not knowledge because 2 Alvin, Goldman. What is Justified Belief. In it is coincidental that his belief is Reading Epistemology, ed. Sven Bernecker, (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 33 3 Goldman, 32

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Goldman seems to claim that the belief if his inputs are limited. Even so, justification of an agent’s true belief is the process is still reliable because of not a result of luck. how it transforms inputs into outputs. Critics object that reliabilism is Or, Goldman might claim that not sufficient for justification. Reliable the agent did not make full use of other processes such as sensory available processes.6 If the agent had may lead an agent to draw a false walked around the barn, for example, he conclusion. For example, suppose that would have discovered that the barn was an agent is unaware that he is driving a fake. It is unclear, however, whether through a town filled with fake barns. Goldman is willing to make this claim. The agent stops before one of the barn Goldman writes, “It seems implausible facades and forms the belief that there is to say that all ‘available’ processes ought a barn before him. According to to be used, at least if we include such reliablism, the agent is justified in his processes as gathering new .”7 belief because it was formed through a If the agent were to make full use of reliable mechanism, perception. Even other available process, then it seems though the agent’s belief was caused by that the agent would need to engage in a a reliable mechanism, the agent’s belief never-ending process to be justified. is not true. Because an agent may draw While Goldman might not want to false conclusions from a process that embrace these implications, in making tends to produce true beliefs, it does not this claim or the latter, Goldman repairs appear as though reliabilism sufficiently his argument that reliabilism is sufficient justifies one’s beliefs. for justification. Goldman could deny that this However, critics claim that the counter-example does not reveal that agent may lack knowledge even if the reliabilism is insufficient for mechanism that caused the agent’s belief justification. Goldman might claim that is operating under normal conditions and the agent’s belief may be justified by a the agent’s belief is true. To elucidate reliable mechanism, but false. critics’ objection, let us apply reliabilism Reliability, according to Goldman, is to the initial Gettier case presented. conditional; he writes, “Justifiedness Assuming the logic of reliabilism, the seems to be a function of how a cognizer agent’s belief that there is a barn in the deals with his environmental input […] town seems justified because it was that registers and transforms the caused by reliable processes. Given that stimulation that reaches him.”4 If special the agent’s belief is reliably justified and circumstances obtain, then Goldman true, it seems that the agent knows that claims that reliable causal processes may there is a barn in the town. However, generate false beliefs.5 For instance, in even with reliabilism, the connection the prior example, the agent formed his between the truth and justification of the belief through a reliable process, agent’s belief is a result of luck. perception, but the barn facades rendered Consequently, reliabilism does not seem the agent’s inputs false. Because a to provide an account of justification that function’s outputs are dependant on its can solve this type of Gettier case. inputs, the agent may generate a false

4 Goldman, 36 6 Goldman, 40 5 Goldman, 37 7 ibid. Colgate Academic Review 45 http://commons.colgate.edu/car/vol2/iss1/8 2 Geffner: Reliabilism: A Response to the Gettier Problem

Goldman could admit that of justification that causally links reliabilism permits the agent has justification and truth because of its knowledge in these Gettier scenarios. In requisite for the agent’s belief to be the prior example, Goldman might claim caused by a process that is likely to that the agent knows that there is a barn produce true beliefs. Reliabilism offers in the town because the agent’s belief is an attractive account of justification true and was caused by a reliable because justification requires a causal process. From the reliabilist’s link between justification and truth. perspective, it does not appear as though Even so, Goldman’s account of this knowledge is a result of luck. justification does not seem to provide a Rather, according to the reliabilist, the link that is strong enough to evade the agent has knowledge because of the Gettier problem. In certain Gettier type connection between the truth of the cases, it is questionable whether the agent’s belief and the reasons the agent agent has knowledge because he is has for his belief. If Goldman were to properly justified or if he holds claim that the agent does not have knowledge by accident. I argue that the knowledge, then he cedes to the contemporary epistemologist must internalist who that justification abstract from the uncertain and not is a result of what the agent can become award the agent knowledge if his aware of through reflection.8 knowledge may be a result of luck. Goldman’s intuition clashes with Rather, the agent should only be that of his critics. If the reliabilist claims awarded knowledge if it is certain that that the agent has knowledge in this type he is properly justified in holding a true of Gettier case, then critics would belief. Because reliabilism does not respond that reliabilism does not require provide a strong causal link between the right causal connection between the truth and justification when it is applied agent’s belief and its justification. Had to certain types of Gettier cases, I argue the agent stopped at any other barn, for that reliabilism fails to answer the example, the agent would not have been problem raised by Gettier. justified in his belief. Because reliabilism permits epistemic luck to account for knowledge, critics assert that there is still a disconnect between the truth and justification of an agent’s belief. Therefore, critics conclude that Goldman’s account of justification cannot solve this certain type of Gettier problem. Even though a clash of intuitions has resulted, I conclude that Goldman’s account of justification fails to solve the problem posed by Gettier: he objects that true, justified belief is not sufficient for knowledge. Goldman provides a theory

8 Sven Bernecker. Reading Epistemology. (Malden, Blackwell), 27

46 Colgate Academic Review Published by Digital Commons @ Colgate, 2012 3 Colgate Academic Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 8

Works Cited

Bernecker, Sven. Reading Epistemology. Malden: Blackwell, 2006

Gettier, Edmund. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?. In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Setup and , 125-126. Malden: Blackwell, 2006

Goldman, Alvin. What is Justified Belief?. In Reading Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker, 31-40. Malden: Blackwell, 2006

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