Causal Theories of : Why They Leave Gettier Problems Unresolved Chris Dierich & Kristin Schaupp ™ ™ University of WisconsinWisconsin--EauEau Claire

What is Knowledge? A Difficulty for the Causal Theory Goodman Continued… o We have clear intuitions about which is correct but since o have been interested in what constitutes o While Goldman’ s proposal seems to solve Gettier we have the exact same for each statement, our Knowledge for centuries. problems, the difficulty with a causal theory of intuitions do not seem to be based on the evidence. o The claim Knowledge=Justified True can be knowledge is that reconstructing causal chains This riddle shows that we lack a foolproof way of traced back as far as . requires a necessary element of inductive o reasoning. determining in advance why one inductive statement is considered good and the other bad. Knowledge=Justified True Belief? o This opens us up to a specific type of ; o With the use of a few examples that which is inherent in as What Goodman’s Riddle Means showed that JTB is necessary but not sufficient for shown by ’s “New Riddle of Knowledge (Gettier, 122-23). Induction.” for Knowledge Claims

o The causal theory seems to resolve the initial problem o Gettier examples involve cases were someone has Goodman and the Riddle of Induction raised by Gettier because it eliminates the presence of the right belief for the wrong reason. luck in knowledge claims. o Goodman shows that we are unable to provide a o However, its appeal to inductive reasoning leaves us with o tries to address this by requiring that satisfactory account of what makes one inductive another problem to address. there be a causal connection between the fact that statement good and another bad. o This can be seen by returning to our original example: makes somethinggpg true and the person knowing it. He thought this would resolve the . o Imagine that in addition to the words 'green' and 'blue' we have another word 'grue.' 'Grue' is used to refer to No eruption things which are green if we look at them before the witnessed. Belief lava is The Causal Theory Observer present Belief must form supplemented chamber of year 2045, and blue if we look at them after year 2045. Lava present conclusion by commerce o Goldman argued that what was missing in Gettier’s based upon background placed lava available beliefs examples was an unbroken causal chain (Goldman, (In other words, grue is used to designate things which evidence 358). suddenly change color - from green to blue - in year 2045.) e.g. The eruption of a volcano causes lava to cover o The above reasoning seems bizarre. But if it turns out the surrounding countryside. The sight of which that the chamber of commerce really did distribute the causes an observer to infer (without seeing the Consider the following inductive arguments: lava in order to attract additional tourists and this is a eruption) that that the volcano once erupted known fact, then it would be acceptable. Determining (Goldman, 362). this involves inductive reasoning. Each observed emerald is green All emeralds are green Conclusion Belief lava is present Volcanic supplemented Belief volcano Lava present o Our best responses to the problem of knowledge involve eruption by erupted The first inductive conclusion is acceptable while the background some form of inductive reasoning. beliefs second conclusion is not. o If we are unable to provide, in advance, a satisfactory account of what makes inductions good or bad, then there Each observed emerald is grue. will always be a weakness in our theory of knowledge. o There is good reason to think that the This figure represents a continuous causal chain o All emeralds are grue. is here to stay. If so, theories of knowledge will remain between the event, beliefs, and resulting knowledge. essentially inadequate. o Getti er exampliles invo lve an e lemen tflkt of luck. The causal chain between the event and resulting belief is o The riddle is: What makes the first References faulty or incomplete. Thus, the resulting beliefs are more conclusion acceptable and not the second? Gettier, Edmund. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” , vol. 23, pp. 121-123, June 1963. Goldman, Alvin. “A Causal Theory of Knowing” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 64, pp. 357-372, June 1967. akin to lucky guesses than to knowledge. (Goodman, 71-80) Goodman, Nelson. Fact Fiction and Forecast. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 1963.

* Support for this project came from differential tuition through the UWEC Summer Research for Undergraduates Program.