Gettier and the Problem of Induction by Ean Maloney Introduction (4) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Fifty-four years have passed since Edmund Barcelona. Gettier’s short treatise undercut philosophers’ Let us ignore the fact that the “either…or” formulation complacent confidence in the justified true belief seems to neglect the possibility that Jones could own (JTB) definition of knowledge. Subsequent attempts a Ford and Brown could be in Boston, as we could to redeem, modify, or replace JTB have made easily reformulate (4) to account for this. Gettier tells progress towards these goals but are still inadequate. us that Smith is mistaken that Jones owns a Ford, but I propose that the reason for these deficiencies lies in in fact Brown is in Barcelona. an overestimation of the human capacity to possess The SJB cases reveal that the JTB model fails propositional knowledge. Accordingly, a theory of to account for “epistemic luck,” instances where a knowledge not subject to Gettier problems must conclusion is true for purely coincidental reasons assume a more limited scope of knowledge than not initially considered by the subject (or at least usually considered. Specifically, it is necessary to not believed to exist). These reasons in the SJB reconsider our implicit trust in the possibility and Cases are, respectively, that Smith has ten coins in accessibility of inductive knowledge. his pocket and that Brown is in Barcelona. Though the obvious option for amending the JTB model is Gettier’s Dilemma to explicitly exclude epistemically lucky cases from being considered instances of knowledge, this seems Though I will present several scenarios for 1 consideration in this paper, we ought to keep in a rather ad hoc approach. Thus, we might with more mind the original two Gettier cases, or the Smith- intellectual integrity look for more fundamental Jones-Brown (SJB) cases (Gettier, 1963). In Case I, problems inherent to JTB. Smith and Jones apply for the same job, and Smith believes the proposition: Necessary Conditions for Justification (1) Jones is the man who will get the job, and The truth and belief conditions of the JTB model Jones has ten coins in his pocket. seem prima facie conditions for knowledge and This leads him to the conclusion: unable to be further differentiated. By definition, (2) The man who will get the job has ten coins in “knowledge” concerns propositions that correspond his pocket. to reality, i.e., are true. Furthermore, “knowledge” denotes propositional material that a subject Gettier assures us that Smith’s evidence for believing epistemically possesses and considers true, i.e., is (1) is sound, so Smith is justified in believing (1). believed. If one of the conditions of the model is However, as the example goes, Smith is hired instead controversial or needs to be further elaborated, it of Jones, yet Smith has ten coins in his pocket as well. must be justification. What is required, then, is a So, did Smith actually have knowledge of (2)? Gettier movement from JTB to (J’)TB. I propose that the and many JTB revisionists answer negatively, but (J’) condition concerns the property of veracity. differ on the reasons for why Smith does not know By veracity, I mean a “no-false grounds/premises” (2). condition, an idea Goldman associates with Michael In Case II, Smith once again finds himself in an epistemic mire when he believes with “strong 1The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article, “The evidence” the proposition: Analysis of Knowledge,” creatively refers to this as (3) Jones owns a Ford. Smith then arbitrarily draws the conclusion: “degettiering” (Ichikawa & Steup, 2016). Aisthesis 35 Volume 8, 2017 Gettier and the Problem of Induction Clark (1967, p. 358).2 If we could have empirical cases can be explained in terms of causality and/or knowledge, a causality condition would arise as veracity. well. Goldman famously proposes a “causal theory SJB-1 fails to be causally coherent because the fact of knowing,” which holds that for a proposition to that Smith has ten coins in his pocket does not cause be considered knowledge, a “causal connection” him to believe (2). It fails the veracity condition must exist between what makes the proposition in because (1) is false; Jones will not get the job. SJB-2 question true and a subject’s belief in that proposition fails in similar ways because Brown’s location is not (1967, p. 358). However, causality is not a necessary causally linked to Smith’s believing (4), and because condition for deductive or a priori knowledge, as (3) is a false premise.5 these beliefs cannot rightly be said to be ultimately caused by anything other than their a priori status. Strange Knowledge and the Problem of Induction Especially in light of Levin’s paper (2006), which Though adding veracity to JTB improves the identifies false premises even in examples claimed model immensely, a fundamental problem remains: to be “non-false,” the veracity condition seems the problem of strange knowledge. What strange highly useful in resolving Gettier-type problems. knowledge shows is the weakness of “knowing” Causality remains an important factor in analyzing by induction. An instance of strange knowledge empirical knowledge, however, because of the close can be seen in the following example, call it SK-1.6 link between causality and induction based on sense Erin wakes up one morning and, looking out the data. For example, the belief that a cup of coffee window, sees that the ground is covered in snow. She sits on my desk is based on my seeing it, which is infers that it snowed last night—an inference that presumably caused by the presence of the cup in my Goldman would call “highly warranted” (1967, p. field of vision. In other words—and as considered 361). However, though it did in fact snow last night, by Goldman—a causal connection exists between the snow all melted before she woke that morning. objective facts and sense data, which is the grounds The reason for the snow on the ground is actually for empirical belief (1967). Although causality can that her husband, Gary, who owns a chain of snow be represented as a special instance of the veracity condition—we can consider the former as a set of cone shops, had decided to dispose of a truckload of propositions about causal relations, perception, and extra crushed ice by dumping it on their front lawn belief3—it seems much simpler to consider the two between the time the snow melted and when his wife conditions separately for many cases. woke up. Though Erin’s conclusion that it snowed Both Goldman’s and Clark’s assessments can the previous night is true, she cannot be said to have be viewed as diagnoses of what goes wrong in the knowledge of this, since, like in the Gettier cases, her SJB cases to prevent Smith from having knowledge. inference is true purely by luck. Yet, imagine that the Though Goldman (1967) and Clark (1963) interpret snow had not melted and Gary had not dumped a their conditions as being in addition to the three truckload of powdered ice on their lawn. In that case, proposed by JTB (thus making the working model if she had drawn the same conclusion, many would JTB+X), I argue that they should be considered say that she had knowledge that it had snowed the specific components of justification.4 Both SJB previous night. Is it not strange that from the same sense data—the presence of powdery ice crystals on 2 Goldman at least seems to consider justification to mean the lawn—and the same inference—that if the lawn that the move from premise to conclusion is warranted or is covered with powdery ice, it must have snowed reasonable. Also see Clark’s “Knowledge and Grounds: A recently—there can be one case in which Erin is said Comment on Mr. Gettier’s Paper.” to have knowledge and one in which she is not? 3 We might hold the propositions “X causes Y, therefore when X, then Y” and “When P(X), then X,” where P(X) represents that a subject perceives X. ⁵ The only of these conclusions explicitly addressed is ⁴ Clark states that his condition goes beyond “no-false Goldman’s interpretation of SJB-2 (1967). grounds,” but I believe that the simplification is adequate ⁶ Based on an example given by Goldman (1967, pp. 361- for my purposes (1963, pp. 46-47). 62). Aisthesis 36 Volume 8, 2017 Gettier and the Problem of Induction Another example, call it SK-2.7 Ellen goes in to both Levin and I believe that “Probably X” is most work one morning and sees keys for new cars on usefully stated as something like, “In most cases X” the desks of her friends Greg and Grover. She infers (2006, p. 388). Construed as such, both (SK-1’) and that Greg and Grover have both recently bought (SK-2’) are usually good grounds for justification. new cars. Greg and Grover have indeed bought However, we lack a way to determine whether they new cars recently, but Grover’s new car is still at his can provide sound justification in any particular house. He had driven his old car to work and has a situation. If we accept that these—and in fact all— different reason for his new key. He had lost his old inferences are essentially probabilistic, then in any car key, and the one Ellen saw on his desk is merely a real-world scenario involving empirical knowledge, replacement key, albeit one identical to a new car key.