Ministry of Defence: Control and Use of Manpower
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Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General NATIONAL AUDIT GCE Ministry of Defence: Control and Use of Manpower Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 27 April 1989 Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London E5.60 net 342 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: CONTROL AND USE OF MANPOWER This report has been prepared under Section 6 of the National Audit Act, 1983 for presentation to the House of Commons in accordance with Section 9 of the Act. John Bourn Comptroller and Auditor General National Audit Office 24 April 1989 . The Comptrollerand Auditor Generalis the head of the National Audit Office employing some 900 staff. He, and the NAO, are totally independent of Government. He certifies the accounts of all Government depariments and a wide range of other public sector bodies; and he has statutory authority to report to Parliament on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which departments and other bodies use their resources. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: CONTROL AND USE OF MANPOWER Contents Pages Summary and conclusions 1 Part 1: Introduction 6 Part 2: The System of Manpower Control 8 Part 3: Organisation of the Services 13 Part 4: Service Manpower Requirements 18 Part 5: Manpower Options 24 Glossary of Abbreviations 31 Appendices 1. The Higher Organisation of the Ministry of Defence 32 2. The Army Command Structure 33 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: CONTROL AND USE OF MANPOWER Summary and conclusions Background 1. At 1 April 1988, the Ministry of Defence employed 326,300 Service personnel and 175,100 civilians, of whom 9,400 Service personnel were Locally Entered and 31,800 civilians were Locally Engaged. They could also call on some 326,000 reservists. The total cost of pay and allowances for this manpower in 1987-88 was nearly E6,OOOmillion, some 32 per cent of the Defence budget, of which Service personnel, including the reservists, accounted for nearly B,OOO million (paragraphs 1.3-1.4). 2. The Ministry are divided into five management areas, the Central Headquarters and the Procurement Executive, which are predominantly civilian staffed, and the three Services which employ a mix of military personnel and civilians. Contract staff are also employed. The National Audit Office (NAO) examined the Ministry’s control, organisation and use of manpower, primarily within the three Services, to determine whether, having regard to their Defence commitments: - the Ministry have established an effective system of manpower control; - the organisation of the Services has been adapted to take account of changes in circumstances; - there was scope for reducing identified manpower needs; and - there was scope for meeting identified manpower needs more cost-effectively. The NAO did not consider, as part of this study, the impact of demographic trends on the availability of Servicemen or other forms of manpower. 3. The NAO found that in many respects the Ministry have successfully controlled manpower in what is a very complex area. Taking this into account, the NAO’s main findings and conclusions are: On the system of [a) Manpower ceilings have achieved significant savings, particularly manpower control in the numbers of civilians directly employed by the Ministry. They have also had some adverse effects on value for money and operational capability. In future, however, there will be more emphasis on control of manpower through operating budgets, instead of numbers (paragraphs 2.3-2.7). (b] All three Services have undertaken some form of wide ranging review over and above the normal process of scrutinies, either to meet manpower ceilings or to increase hont-line numbers, but these reviews were not co-ordinated, did not cover the whole field, were not intended to form a part of the Services’ regular monitoring arrangements, and not all the recommended savings were pursued (paragraph 2.12). 1 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: CONTROL AND USE OF MANPOWER (c) The Office of Management and Budget was established in 1985 to provide stronger central determination of expenditure priorities and control of resources. Initially its scrutiny of the requirements was concerned mainly with variations arising from changed circumstances. The Ministry told the NAO that since the cessation of rigid manpower ceilings, procedures have been further developed and more meaningful decisions are now possible on the efficient use of available and funded manpower (paragraphs 2.14-2.16). (d) Because of the difficulty in matching manpower resources to commitments, the NAO considered that a regular, comprehensive programme of reviews of activity should be undertaken in appropriate areas over and above the normal process of scrutinies. They also considered that the Ministry should develop their central capability for forward looking manpower planning and control linked with the Ministry’s New Management Strategy and budgetary systems (paragraph 3.4-3.6). (e) Comparison of the Ministry’s four manpower audit groups showed differences in their level and mix of staffing, the period of the audit cycle and the percentage of Service posts inspected, with only some 159,000 out of a total of 287,000 Service posts subject to manpower audit. The NAO concluded that there should be greater consistency between the audit groups, that more tri-Service audits could be beneficial and that good practice in one Service should be reflected, where possible, in the other two (paragraphs 2.18-2.24). On the organisation (f) The Royal Navy (RN) have responded positively in recent years to of the Services changes in their responsibilities by modifying their command structure (paragraph 3.3). (g) The Army’s command structure, which is more complex than those of the other Services, has remained relatively unchanged in the United Kingdom (UK) since 1973. Currently the Ministry have no plans to carry out a review of the district structure of the Army (paragraphs 3.4-3.6). (h) The NAO noted that the Army’s regimental and corps structures have changed little since the mid-1960s, although numbers have reduced since then by 18.5 per cent. The NAO therefore believe that the Ministry should consider undertaking a review in this area (paragraphs 3.11-3.12). (i) There are significant differences between the Services in the way they man and organise their support functions. Unlike the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the predominantly civilianised RN support organisation, the Army maintain 19 uniformed support corps. The Ministry considered that the savings from having a single support corps were unlikely to be great as compared with the impact on morale and the problem of controlling the disparate elements within the corps. However, the NAO concluded that there might be some scope for savings from changes in the corps structure, particularly among the smaller corps, and that the benefits and disadvantages of such changes should be considered as part of the review proposed at (h) above (paragraphs 3.13-3.22). 2 (j) In general the RAF have reduced their command structure in line with their reduced resources and roles, but to a lesser extent in Germany. The Ministry acknowledged that there was scope for some rationalisation in Germany with the corresponding Army Command (paragraph 3.24). On Service (k) The Service manpower requirements for regular personnel for manpower transition to war and war are assessed at unit and other levels. requirements Although peacetime complements may be separately identified, the transition to war and war requirements form the basis for them, together with a margin for indirect activities. The margins for each of the Services differ significantly in size and content. The NAO consider that the methods of calculation of manpower margins should be put, as far as possible, on a common basis (paragraphs 4.14.4 and Table 5). (1) The Services aim to ensure that all complemented posts can be filled by people of the required quality and with the appropriate skills and experience. Within certain constraints, career structures for both officers and other ranks are shaped to facilitate recruitment and retention; and it seemed possible to the NAO that this could result in more managerial posts than would otherwise be necessary. They noted that, for a number of reasons, the UK might have a higher ratio of senior officers to troops than many other countries. The NAO concluded that the Ministry should consider the scope for reducing further the number of career specialisms (paragraphs 4.54.9 and Tables 6 and 7). (m) All the Services state that where shortfalls in manning exist, they are placing excessive demands on personnel. The NAO examination suggested that there is, nevertheless, some scope for further reductions in requirements in some areas in all three Services and this should be examined further (paragraph 4.30). (n) The NAO were not able to establish that there was a clearly defined war role for all Service personnel but noted the progress being made by all three Services to identify the numbers, ranks and skills of servicemen required during transition to war and war. Once the information is available, the peacetime requirement for Servicemen should be re-assessed and the scope for viable alternatives to Service manpower be explored further (paragraph 4.31). On manpower (0) Servicemen are generally more expensive to employ than the options alternatives of servicewomen, civilians, contractors’ staff or reservists, but the Services have to have regard to operational considerations in their choice of manpower. The NAO noted that the use of servicemen in support areas varies significantly between the Services. They concluded that, in some areas, there is prima facie scope for increased use of the other options (paragraphs 5.1-5.3 and Table 8). (p) The NAO identified some 3,300 servicewomen posts which, prima facie, could be occupied by civilians or contracted out, with potential savings of some ,614 million a year, although they recognised the Ministry’s view that there were wider factors to be taken into 3 account.