Armies of Africa?: the British Military Advisory And
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THE ‘NEW MODEL’ ARMIES OF AFRICA?: THE BRITISH MILITARY ADVISORY AND TRAINING TEAM AND THE CREATION OF THE ZIMBABWE NATIONAL ARMY A Dissertation by BLAKE HUMPHREY WHITAKER Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Chair of Committee, R.J.Q Adams Committee Members, Arnold Krammer Larry Yarak D. Bruce Dickson Head of Department, David Vaught May 2014 Major Subject: History Copyright 2014 Blake Humphrey Whitaker ABSTRACT The British Army provided military assistance missions for friendly nations throughout the 20th century. The majority deployed to Africa during the decolonization process. By 1980 London had thirty-five years of institutional knowledge on how to train armies in newly independent nations. Most notably in Kenya and Zambia, where the transition to independence was fraught with racial and economic difficulties. In 1979, after the conclusion of the Lancaster House Conference the British government was called upon to provide newly independent Zimbabwe with military training assistance. The British Military Advisory and Training Team helped combine three former belligerent armies into the Zimbabwe National Army. London intended to create a military force that reflected Britain’s own army and maintained a distance from domestic politics while serving as a bastion for Western military values and interests. While the British had both Kenya and Zambia to draw from as models, policymakers in London overestimated the cache of British power in a changing world. Rather than facilitating an effective transition to representative government in Zimbabwe, the British enabled the creation of a one-party state under Robert Mugabe. The fundamental misunderstanding on the part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence as to the expectations of developing nations and military assistance handicapped British policy goals in Southern Africa for the next two decades. ii DEDICATION This project is dedicated to those who provided so much support throughout the process; my family and friends, but mostly my beautiful wife Danielle. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. RJQ Adams for his guidance and patience during this process. His sound advice has helped bring this project from being a simple tentative idea to a completed research project, and I cannot thank him enough. I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. Krammer, Dr. Yarak, and Dr. Dickson for their guidance and support throughout the course of this research. Thanks also go to my friends and colleagues in the Department of History at Texas A&M for their support and advice during my tenure here. I also want to extend my gratitude to the Melbern G. Glasscock Center for Humanities Research, and the Texas A&M University Department of History for providing travel and research funds which made my archival trips possible. I also must thank Jeff Crane for his constant encouragement since I was a Master’s student at Sam Houston State University. His insistance that I could be a successful historian has helped lead me to where I am today. Finally, thanks to my mother, Terry Humphrey and my father, the late Neal Whitaker, for their encouragement and love. iv NOMENCLATURE 2IC Second In Command AFZ Air Force of Zimbabwe ANC African National Congress BSAP British South Africa Police CAF Central African Federation CIO Central Intelligence Organization CMF Commonwealth Monitoring Force FRELIMO (Frente de Libertaçao de Moçambique) Liberation Front of Mozambique EAC East Africa Command GOC General Officer Commanding KAR King’s African Rifles NRR Northern Rhodesia Regiment OAU Organization of African Unity OC Officer Commanding PATU Police Anti-Terrorist Unit PSU Police Support Unit RAF Royal Air Force RAR Rhodesian African Rifles v RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) Mozambican National Resistance RhAF Rhodesian Air Force RLI Rhodesian Light Infantry RNR Rhodesia Native Regiment RSF Rhodesian Security Forces RSM Regimental Sergeant Major RR Rhodesia Regiment SADF South African Defence Force SAP South African Police SAS Special Air Serivce TTL Tribal Trust Land UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union ZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s Union ZIPA Zimbabwe People’s Army ZIPRA Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army ZRP Zimbabwe Republic Police vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ……………………………………………………………………….. ii DEDICATION …………………………………………………………………….. iii ACKNOWLEDEMENTS …………………………………………………………. iv NOMENCLATURE ……………………………………………………………….. v TABLE OF CONTENTS ………………………………………………………….. vii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………… 1 Historiography ………………………………………………………. 4 Kenya ………………………………………………………………... 13 Zambia ………………………………………………………………. 16 Rhodesia/Zimbabwe ………………………………………………… 24 CHAPTER II FROM ASKARIS TO GENERALS: TRANSFORMING THE KING’S AFRICAN RIFLES INTO THE KENYA ARM…………………………. 33 Origins of the Kenyan Military Establishment ……………………… 33 Post-1945 Colonial Military and the rise of Mau Mau ……………… 42 Africanization and the foundation of the Kenyan Army ……………. 52 “National consciousness is a political fact” …………………………. 59 The Kenya Army from the KAR …………………………………….. 70 The army is tested: The East African Mutinies ……………………… 77 Conclusion …………………………………………………………… 88 CHAPTER III NORTHERN RHODESIA BECOMES ZAMBIA: CREATING A DEFENCE FORCE OUT OF SCRAPS …………………………………………… 92 The Federal Period …………………………………………………… 95 The end of the Federation …………………………………………..... 103 Dividing the assets ………………………………………………….... 107 Conclusion …………………………………………………………… 146 vii CHAPTER IV THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE ZIMBABWE NATIONAL ARMY: THE RHODESIAN ARMY AND THE LIBERATION FORCES ……….. 150 Rhodesian Security Forces …………………………………………….. 151 Tactical success, strategic failure ……………………………………… 176 Volunteers from abroad ……………………………………………….. 181 The end is near …………………………………………………………. 188 The expansion and decline of the security forces ……………………… 195 The liberation armies …………………………………………………… 201 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………… 210 CHAPTER V HOW DO YOU CREATE AN ARMY?: BRITISH PLANNING FOR THE END OF THE ZIMBABWE CONFLICT ………………………………. 212 Planning for a new army ……………………………………………….. 214 Negotiating an army .…………………………………………………... 222 Introducing the Commonwealth Monitoring Force …………………… 229 Training a new force …………………………………………………… 234 Crisis of command ……………………………………………………... 243 Playing the game ……………………………………………………….. 250 A plan takes shape …………………………………………………….... 254 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………… 265 CHAPTER VI THE RISE OF ZANLA DOMINANCE IN THE ZNA AND THE BIRTH OF 5th BRIGADE …………………………………………………………… 268 Planning for 1981 ………………………………………………………. 269 Chaos in Bulawayo ……………………………………………………... 275 Too many actors on the stage …………………………………………... 284 5th Brigade takes shape …………………………………………………. 301 BMATT moves into a new phase ………………………………………. 308 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………… 321 CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION: MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS A DIPLOMATIC WEAPON ……………………………………………………………………………. 325 REFERENCES ………………………………………………………………………. 342 viii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION An independent Zimbabwe first appeared on the world’s stage fifteen long years after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Rhodesian Front in 1965. Robert Gabriel Mugabe’s new government held great promise for the future. After all, Mugabe was a highly educated man, holding no fewer than four Bachelors and two Masters degrees. The Commonwealth Monitoring Force (OP AGILA) supervised the elections and deemed them free and fair. After the conclusion of Operation AGILA, a British military training team tasked with creating the new Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) deployed to Zimbabwe. By February of 1981, elements of the newly created army mutinied against the government and were defeated at the Battle of Bulawayo by what had formerly been the Rhodesian Army’s 1st Battalion, Rhodesian African Rifles.1 Only a few months later Mugabe’s regime began training a new brigade of the Zimbabwean military. Unlike other units of the ZNA, it operated outside of the normal chain of command and reported directly to Mugabe. The unit, trained by the North Korean Army, had the express purpose of suppressing political opposition to the Shona-dominated Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government. This notorious unit, simply called the Fifth Brigade, was deployed to the ethnic minority homeland of Matabeland in 1 Luise White, “‘Whoever Saw a Country with Four Armies?’: The Battle of Bulawayo Revisited,” Journal of Southern African Studies 33 (September 2007), 619-631. 1 January of 1983 to stamp out political opposition.2 What followed, Robert Mugabe called the Gukurahundi, “the early rain that washes away the chaff before the spring rain.” The Fifth Brigade and other elements of the ZNA killed, raped, and burned their way through Matabeland until 1988. In the process, they killed at least 10,000 civilians and secured a one-party state for Robert Mugabe and ZANU.3 The use of military power in an African state to secure control is not, in itself, unusual. In this case not only was the British government actively involved in training the ZNA, but they were attempting to create a professional, Western-style army that remained aloof from domestic politics. The reliance of the Mugabe regime on the military to maintain power demonstrates that this mission ended in failure. The British