China and Zimbabwe: the Context and Contents of a Complex Relationship
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CHINA & ZIMBABWE: CONTEXT & CONTENTS OF A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP OCCASIONAL PAPER 202 Global Powers and Africa Programme October 2014 China and Zimbabwe: The Context and Contents of a Complex Relationship Abiodun Alao s ir a f f A l a n o ti a rn e nt f I o te tu sti n In rica . th Af hts Sou sig al in Glob African perspectives. ABOUT SAIIA The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has a long and proud record as South Africa’s premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent, non-government think tank whose key strategic objectives are to make effective input into public policy, and to encourage wider and more informed debate on international affairs, with particular emphasis on African issues and concerns. It is both a centre for research excellence and a home for stimulating public engagement. SAIIA’s occasional papers present topical, incisive analyses, offering a variety of perspectives on key policy issues in Africa and beyond. Core public policy research themes covered by SAIIA include good governance and democracy; economic policymaking; international security and peace; and new global challenges such as food security, global governance reform and the environment. Please consult our website http://www.saiia.org.za for further information about SAIIA’s work. ABOUT THE GLOBA L POWERS A ND A FRICA PROGRA MME The Global Powers and Africa (GPA) Programme, formerly Emerging Powers and Africa, focuses on the emerging global players China, India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa as well as the advanced industrial powers such as Japan, the EU and the US, and assesses their engagement with African countries. The programme aims to contribute towards outcomes and results that will leverage the growing engagement of the BRICS countries in Africa in support of policymaking that will deliver good, transparent governance and sustainable development on the continent, while also supporting a North–South dialogue on global governance reform challenges as they relate to Africa and its place in the world. SAIIA gratefully acknowledges support of this research by a grant from the Foundation Open Society Institute (FOSI). SAIIA’s Global Powers and Africa programme is also supported by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). Project leader: Dr Chris Alden, [email protected] © SAIIA October 2014 All rights are reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilised in any form by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information or storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Opinions expressed are the responsibility of the individual authors and not of SAIIA. Please note that all currencies are in US$ unless otherwise indicated. ABS TRA CT China’s relationship with Africa has been the subject of considerable interest and controversy. The general assumption that the continent is moving closer to China because of its generosity (in contrast with traditional Western partners) and the widespread allegation that China is using this new-found relationship to exploit Africa’s natural resources, are among the issues that have dominated headlines. However, few of China’s relationships with African countries are of as much interest as the one it has with Zimbabwe. While China’s support for the Zimbabwe African National Union in the war of liberation played in its favour and gave the country a take-off advantage in the new Zimbabwe, the African country is using China’s economic and diplomatic backing to weather criticism of its domestic policies. This paper takes a detailed look at Sino–Zimbabwean relations, examining how these have transformed over time, and concludes that the decades ahead are likely to be crucial for the relationship between the two countries, especially as Zimbabwe has to begin looking at a future without its aging president. A BOUT THE A UTHOR Abiodun Alao is a Senior Lecturer at the African Leadership Centre, Global Institutes, King’s College London. He has written extensively on African security issues. His latest book, Mugabe and the Politics of Security in Zimbabwe, was published in 2012 by the McGill Queens University Press. GLOBAL POWERS AND AFRICA PROGRAMME ABBREVIATI ONS A ND ACRONYMS ATDC Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre GDP gross domestic product MP member of Parliament MDC Movement for Democratic Change Norinco China North Industries Corporation UNSC UN Security Council ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) ZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s Union ZBC Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation SAIIA OCCASIONAL PAPER 202 4 CHINA & ZIMBABWE: CONTEXT & CONTENTS OF A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP I NTRODUCTI ON ‘The Chinese have managed to accomplish at least one impressive thing in Africa – they have made everyone else uncomfortable. The Americans are uneasy, worried about (and perhaps jealous of) China’s rapid and profitable investments throughout the continent … Europeans have only to look at trade figures: the share of Africa’s exports that China receives has shot from one to fifteen per cent over the past decade, while the European Union’s share fell from thirty-six to twenty-three per cent … Some Africans [too] have become … unhappy with unbalanced relationships in which China has taken proprietorship of African natural resources using Chinese labour and equipment without transferring skills and technology.’1 hina’s extensive relations with African countries continue to attract interest and Cconcern, especially as the category of those expressing disquiet about the possibility of this being another kind of colonialism now seems to be growing beyond the usual Western critics to include critical opinion leaders in key African countries.2 While China’s activities in Africa are of broad general interest, its relationship with specific African countries faces more intense scrutiny. Countries that come under this spotlight fall broadly into four categories: 1) those with considerable political clout and whose friendship is crucial to external countries hoping to have influence on the continent; 2) those with considerable natural resource endowments, especially those resources that are crucial to China’s strategic interests; 3) those recovering from conflict and where post-war reconstruction activities have brought in an array of external actors; and 4) those where the leadership has acquired a controversial or even pariah status that has ostracised it from the West. These divisions are, however, not sacrosanct, as there are cases where some countries fall into two or more of the broad categorisations. Although relationships with other African countries are also important to Beijing, especially since China has connections with them through its support for various regional and continental organisations,3 relations with the countries that fall within the four categories listed above are crucial to gauging different aspects of Sino–African relations. Of all the China–Africa relationships, the one that merits the most attention is Beijing’s ties with Zimbabwe. This is largely due to the controversies associated with the contents and multi-dimensional extent of this relationship. These controversies, emanating largely from Zimbabwe’s domestic politics and the international reaction to them, have placed China in situations where its diplomacy in Africa has had to be explained and sometimes readjusted to ensure that it does not lose the friendship of other African countries that view events in Zimbabwe differently. Occasionally, Zimbabwe also has had to modify its domestic politics in order to ensure that China can maintain a measure of moral high ground that would earn it (Beijing) some respectability among human rights communities. The objective of this paper is to examine Sino–Zimbabwean relations between 2003 and 2013, a decade in which the relationship between the two countries has become complicated as much for what it contains as for what it excludes. This paper consists of four main sections: the first provides a background to Sino–Zimbabwean relations, interrogating how China’s role in the Zimbabwean war of liberation became a factor in the subsequent display of camaraderie between the two countries; the second examines the ramifications of the relationship between the two countries, especially the nature and pattern of Chinese involvement in Zimbabwe during the period under study; the SAIIA OCCASIONAL PAPER 202 5 GLOBAL POWERS AND AFRICA PROGRAMME third section focuses on the reactions of Zimbabweans to China’s extensive and somewhat controversial involvement in their country; and the fourth concludes discussions. THE DETERMINA NT OF EVENTS: CHIN A’S ROLE I N THE ZIMBA BWEA N L I BERATI ON W A R ‘… we will continue to maintain and deepen our alliances with those who have been our truest friends.’4 President Robert Mugabe’s comment about China at the end of the Zimbabwean war of independence It is widely believed that the nature and extent of Sino–Zimbabwean relations since the latter’s independence in 1980 are rooted mainly in China’s contribution to the Zimbabwean liberation cause, during which it supported President Robert Mugabe’s ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union).5 Against this background, a brief discussion of this pre-independence link is crucial to any discussion of post-independence Sino– Zimbabwean relations. In a way, China’s relationship with ZANU during the Zimbabwean liberation war was a strategic gamble for both sides. While it was to be expected that Beijing would support revolutionary forces against a colonial rule that was not only feudal but also authoritarian, the preference for Mugabe over Joshua Nkomo was a risk, especially as most international observers had thought that Nkomo would be the victor in any election held among the black population in the country. This risk was all the more profound because China had earlier miscalculated in its support for the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertaçao de Angola/National Liberation Front of Angola) during the Angolan liberation struggle.