Warfare As a Whole

By the same author WARFARE GANGS AND COUNTER-GANGS AS A WHOLE LOW INTENSITY OPERATIONS BUNCH OF FIVE Frank Kitson faber andfaber LONDON. BOSTON First published in 1987 by Fabcrand Fabcr Limited 3 Queen Square London WC1N3AU CONTENTS Photosct by Parker Typesetting Service Leicester Printed in Great Britain by Mackays of Chatham Kent All rights reserved ©Frank Kitsoii, 1987 INTRODUCTION 1 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Parti LIKELY ARMY COMMITMENTS 7 Kitson, Frank Chapter 1 THE INFLUENCE OF NUCLEAR Warfare as a whole. WEAPONS 9 1. Great Britain, Army Chapter 2 THE CENTRAL REGION 21 I. Title Chapter 3 THE NORTHERN REGION 35 355.4'0941 UA649.3 Chapter 4 THE DEFENCE OF THE UNITED ISBN 0-571-14693-7 KINGDOM 43 Chapter 5 ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA 60 Part 2 PREPARATION REQUIRED 83 Chapter 6 TODAY'S ARMY • 85 Chapter 7 CAPABILITIES AND COMMITMENTS 97 Chapter 8 POLICY AND RESOURCES 117 Chapter 9 ORGANIZATION, TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT 136 i Chapter 10 OFFICERS AND MEN 159 Chapter 11 FINAL THOUGHTS 175 INDEX 183 INTRODUCTION Although the time that has elapsed since the end of the war with Germany in May 1945 is only slightly longer than that which separated Waterloo from the Crimea, the technological develop ment of weapons and equipment that has taken place in that time, including the introduction of nuclear weapons and the use of space for military purposes, represents an even more funda mental advance in man's ability to wage war than the introduc tion of the stirrup and the invention of gunpowder added together. Considering this fact, the British Army would seem, on the surface at least, to be in quite good shape. But people felt the same about the army just before the Crimean War and it was only in the light of events that they discovered that there was a certain amount that needed doing in order to bring it up to date. Although great efforts have been made to keep the army up to date over the past four decades, it would not be surprising to find that the full implications of the developments that have taken place in the ways of waging war have not always been fully reflected in the way in which the army has prepared for its likely future tasks. The purpose of this book is to show how the army's many tasks fit together in order to indicate the steps which should be taken to make it ready for war. This business is intimately bound up with many of the country's main political and finan cial problems and it is part and parcel of the nation's defence policy. For this reason it can only be viewed against the needs of the other organizations closely concerned with defence, notably, but not exclusively, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. 1 But before any of these matters can be considered sensibly it is only become so when used illegally for an unconstitutional necessary to examine the nature of war itself. War can best be purpose. Subversion can also include the use of small scale defined as the use of force in pursuit of a nation's interests, or, in violence for the purpose of coercing recalcitrant members of the the case of internal strife, in pursuit of the interests of a group population into giving support. within a nation. War can manifest itself in many different forms The next step up the ladder is a state of war called insurgency some of which are hardly even recognizable as such, but they all which is what subversion becomes when armed force is used have to be considered when a country's defence policy is being against the government on a significant scale, in addition to the formulated. methods already mentioned. Further up the ladder is a state of The much quoted Mao Tse-tung once said that 'Guerilla warfare usually known as conventional war or limited war which is operations must not be considered as an independent form of held to be conflict between two or more countries limited either warfare. They are but one step in the total war.' This idea of in terms of geography or of weapons. The top step is all out war warfare being a whole recurs frequently in the writings of which is to say war which is not limited in any way and in which foreign exponents of the art, but has not been accepted very all weapons arc used or are liable to be used. readily by the British who prefer to regard the different sorts of There is, of course, no hard and fast rule as to the number of war, e.g. limited war, or general war or insurgency as being steps which go to make up warfare as a whole: this is purely a entirely separate. But unless warfare is seen as embracing all its matter of terminology. For example, some people like to des various forms there will be a great temptation to avoid preparing cribe insurgency carried out at a high operational intensity as for some of them altogether. Furthermore operations of a par civil war, whereas some like to describe limited war carried out at ticular kind, together with the preparations needed to be ready a very low level of intensity as confrontation. There are similar to undertake them, frequently interfere with operations of a opportunities for inserting an extra step between the top end of totally different sort, or with the preparations needed to be ready to undertake them, so the various aspects of warfare all interact limited war and all out war, to cover the period in which tactical on each other. nuclear weapons are used, but not strategic ones. As stated, people are entitled to work out their own terminology pro Thus, instead of thinking of the various manifestations of war viding they define their terms carefully. as being separate, it would be more sensible to regard them as Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between the steps steps on the ladder of warfare as a whole, and in order to do this or states of war on the one hand, and the various tactical it might be helpful to give names to the various steps. For methods which could be used on the other. For example, convenience sake the terms generally used in the Western world sniping is a tactical method which could be used in conjunction will be used, but anybody's terms are as good as anybody else's, with any of the states of warfare, although it is possibly most providing that they are sufficiently carefully defined. relevant to limited war and insurgency. Sabotage is a tactical So, starting at the bottom of the ladder, comes a step called method which could be used in conjunction with any of the subversion, which can be defined as illegal measures short of the stages above subversion, whereas terrorism is an important use of armed force, taken by one section of the people of a ingredient of subversion and insurgency but is less common, country to overthrow those governing the country at the time, although by no means unknown, at the higher levels. or to force them to do things which they do not want to do. Two further points are worth noticing. First, the various steps Subversion may involve the use of political and economic pres or states of warfare do not always follow each other in ascending sure, strikes, protest marches and propaganda, although this is or descending order but overlap in terms of time and place so that not to suggest that such activities are always subversive: they it is perfectly possible to have insurgency and conventional war 2 3 going along together. War may break out at the level of any of notice with a force of up to two brigades anywhere in the the steps and run up or down the ladder and then reverse its iVliddle East or Far East in accordance with the country's direction, a fact which is well illustrated by the events which interests. The then large conscript army that was needed to took place in Vietnam, or in the Boer War for that matter. implement this policy was easily capable of finding in addition Second, although the British prefer to use the security service the 55,000 men required by treaty to be maintained in Germany, and the police, rather than the army, to counter subversion but it was the needs of the overseas commitments which prin within the United Kingdom, this does not mean that either cipally affected the way in which the army was directed and subversion or the countering of it, is any less a manifestation of organized. In the mid-1960s the emphasis changed, conscription war. Subversion is a form of war and countering it, or even ceased and the commitment to NATO, and in particular to the fostering it in a hostile foreign country may, on occasion, have Central Region of NATO, became the dominant influence; to be included as part of a nation's defence policy. everything else has had to be catered for by whatever was left over from this commitment. In practice it is the diversity of the threat, and of the forms which The reason why these clear cut divisions of opinion have it may take, that makes for one of the two main difficulties in always existed is that whilst most of those responsible for preparing the army for war. The other is, of course, getting hold dealing with the country's defences have felt that it is no use of the necessary resources, which is itself closely connected with frittering away limited resources in trying to counter too many the need to balance the capability for fighting one sort of war possible threats, there has seldom been agreement as to which against another.

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