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This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/ War on its Head An Oral History of the Helmandi Conflict 1978-2012 Martin, Michael Peter Awarding institution: King's College London The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work Under the following conditions: Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above. Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 29. Sep. 2021 War on its Head An oral history of the Helmandi conflict 1978–2012 ABSTRACT: War on its Head demonstrates that the public understandings of the last thirty-four years of conflict in Helmand province, Afghanistan, have been poor descriptors and predictors of the conflict’s dynamics. Examples of these public understandings include the holy mujahidin defeating the atheist Soviets, or the United States and Britain attempting to support a transition to democracy whilst being resisted by a fundamentalist insurgency: the Taliban. Drawing on extensive experience in Helmand province, one hundred and fifty anonymous interviews with Helmandi notables and Taliban commanders, and detailed secondary research in English and Pushtu, this thesis explores the Helmandi view of the last thirty-four years of their conflict, through three eras of external influence: Soviet, Pakistani and Western. It clearly shows that the same Helmandi private actors, feuds and narratives are driving the conflict, rather than the changing era-specific public narratives. The evidence presented here shows that this is because external actors have failed to understand the local, interpersonal nature of conflict in Helmand. The consequences for policymakers and scholars are discussed in the conclusion. Michael Peter Martin MA(Oxon) KCL Candidate Number: 1070992 Supervisors: KCL Doctoral Thesis Prof Theo Farrell War Studies Department Dr Alex Alderson Jan 2013 © Michael Peter Martin 2013 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this thesis may be made without permission of the author. No portion of this thesis may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with the author’s permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London, EC1N 8TS. Any person or organisation who does any unauthorised act in relation to this thesis may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 1 © Mike Martin 2013 for Chloe 2 © Mike Martin 2013 Contents 3 List of figures and maps 5 Note on referencing and footnotes 8 Acknowledgments 6 Maps 10 Chapter 1: Introduction 20 1.1 - Insurgency and civil war 23 1.5 The thesis: the logic of violence in 54 1.2 - Pushtun society at war 43 civil war 1.3 - Pre-1978 Helmandi history 47 1.6 - Methods 60 1.4 - Post-1978 Helmandi history: 50 1.7 - Caveats and limitations 67 the public sphere 1.8 - Thesis outline 69 Chapter 2: The Saur revolution until the Soviet withdrawal, 1978–1989 71 2.1 - Revolution! 72 2.9 - Nahr-e Saraj 89 2.2 - Land Reform 73 2.10 - Nad-e Ali: a plethora of groups 91 2.3 - Anti-Islamic abuse 75 2.11 - Nawa and Garmsir 95 2.4 - Government collapse: local 76 2.12 - Government infighting 97 reassertion 2.13 - Heavy fighting and a massacre 98 2.5 - Mujahidin patronage 78 2.14 - Najibullah: a new policy 101 2.6 - Amin and the Soviet 80 2.15 - Khad and Nasim 103 intervention 2.16 - The militia programme 106 2.7 - Inter-‘mujahidin’ group conflict 83 2.17 - The Soviet swansong 108 2.8 - Papaver Somniferum 87 2.18 – Conclusions 109 Chapter 3: The Soviet withdrawal until the US intervention, 1989–2001 111 3.1 - Finance 112 3.10 - Rasoul’s calm 130 3.2 - Government weakness 113 3.11 - The students 131 3.3 - The death of Nasim 116 3.12 - Taliban provincial-level control 134 3.4 - The population’s response 117 3.13 - Taliban district-level control in 137 3.5 - No more cash 120 central Helmand 3.6 - Deal-making 121 3.14 - Taliban district-level control 138 3.7 - ‘Hizb’/‘communist’ cooperation 124 outside central Helmand 3.8 - ‘Jamiat’/‘communist’ 126 3.15 - Stability 141 cooperation 3.16 - Taliban weaknesses 144 3.9 - The flight of the ‘communists’ 128 3.17 – Conclusions 146 Chapter 4: The US intervention until the return of the Angrez, 2001–2006 147 4.1 - Taliban exit 147 4.5 - Sher Mohammad and the 155 4.2 - American arrival 149 ‘Taliban’ 4.3 - The population takes stock 151 4.6 - The ‘police’ thieves 157 4.4 - Mir Wali’s militias 153 4.7 - Mujahidin unity 159 3 © Mike Martin 2013 4.8 - The specialporce & 161 4.15 - The collapse 180 Guantanamo 4.16 - The ‘Taliban’ franchise and the 182 4.9 - The Ishaqzai 164 mahaz system 4.10 - Bounties & manipulation 166 4.17 - Nad-e Ali 185 4.11 - Inter-commander conflict 168 4.18 - Nahr-e Saraj 187 4.12 - The Kharoti in Nad-e Ali 171 4.19 - Northern Helmand 192 4.13 - Hijacked development 176 4.20 - Sher Mohammad’s game 193 4.14 - The Gereshk merry-go-round 177 4.21 – Conclusions 196 Chapter 5: The return of the Angrez until US re-engagement, 2006–2009 197 5.1 - Why Helmand? 197 5.9 - The British reassessment 215 5.2 - Collapse 199 5.10 - Abdul Rahman Jan’s poppy 217 5.3 - Quetta Shura 203 5.11 - De Shin Kalay Maktab 220 5.4 - The accords 205 5.12 - The British in Nad-e Ali 223 5.5 - Central Helmand calm 207 5.13 - A new approach 227 5.6 - The three Mullah Salams 209 5.14 - British expansion 229 5.7 - Persona non grata 212 5.15 - The ‘retaking’ of Malgir 230 5.8 - Taliban structures 212 5.16 – Conclusions 233 Chapter 6: US re-engagement until the present—‘Counterinsurgency’, 2009–2012 234 6.1 - ISAF operations 234 6.9 - Politics 258 6.2 - The Kajaki dam 236 6.10 - Withdrawal and more militias 260 6.3 - Afghan operations 238 6.11 - The three transitions 265 6.4 - Capture or kill 239 6.12 - The British are supplying the 267 6.5 - Taliban consolidation 241 Taliban 6.6 - Dollar, dollar, dollar 249 6.13 - ‘Of course they are working with 272 6.7 - The Gereshk model 251 the Taliban!’ 6.8 - Governor Mangal 256 6.14 – Conclusions 273 Chapter 7: Conclusions 275 7.1 – Thesis and approach 275 7.4 – Implications for theory 287 7.2 – Summary of findings 275 7.5 – The future of conflict in Helmand 289 7.3 – Implications for policy 284 Appendices 293 1 - Interviewee descriptions 294 5 - Lists of Helmandi provincial, district 316 2 - Glossary of terms and people 301 .and military officials 3 - Timeline of key events affecting 308 6 - Selected Helmandi Guantanamo 320 .Helmand .prisoners 4 - Tribal diagrams and family trees 311 7 - Selected bibliography 333 4 © Mike Martin 2013 List of figures and maps No Figure Page 1 Spectrum of the etymologically based connotations of the words ‘insurgency’ 24 and ‘civil war’ 2 Table setting out the differences between the public and private sphere 58 3 Rabbani-era land document 124 4 Sher Mohammad in 2012 156 5 The Taliban mahaz system 185 6 Children’s graffiti in Lashkar Gah, 2008, depicting UK involvement in Helmand 203 7 Shin Kalay school in December 2008 222 8 The hybrid mahaz-nezami system 245 9a The Gereshk model 252 9b The Gereshk model (i2 modelling) 255 10 Diagram of the major tribes in Helmand 311 11 Diagram of the Kharoti sub-tribes in Nad-e Ali 312 12 Noor Mohammad Khan’s family tree (Kharoti/Mughokhel) 312 13 Diagram of the Noorzai sub-tribes in Helmand 313 14 Shah Nazar Helmandwal’s family tree (Noorzai/Gurg) 313 15 Khano’s family tree (Noorzai/Aghezai) 314 16 Israel’s family tree (Noorzai/Darzai/Hassanzai) 314 17 Abdul Rahman and Haji Lal Jan (Noorzai/Darzai/Parozai) 315 No Map Page 1 Afghanistan showing Helmand 10 2 Helmand indicating District Centres 11 3 District boundaries of Helmand 12 4 The canal projects 13 5 Soviet defensive cumberbands around Lashkar Gah and Gereshk 14 6 Tribes and clans in Sangin—simplified 15 7 Central Nahr-e Saraj 16 8 Central Nad-e Ali 17 9 Loy Bagh 18 10 Haji Kadus’ militia CPs 19 5 © Mike Martin 2013 Acknowledgements This thesis could not have been completed, or even started, without vast amounts of help from a wide variety of people.