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How to Explain the Issue of Exiled Tibetans in Teaching the History of Sino-Indian Relations

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How to Explain the Issue of Exiled Tibetans in Teaching the History of Sino-Indian Relations Proceedings of SOCIOINT 2018- 5th International Conference on Education, Social Sciences and Humanities, 2-4 July 2018- Dubai, U.A.E. HOW TO EXPLAIN THE ISSUE OF EXILED TIBETANS IN TEACHING THE HISTORY OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS Peng Zhu1, Moda Hu2, Lin Pan3* 1 Associate Prof. Dr. Mr., Jinan University, PR China, [email protected] 2 Graduate Student. Mr., Jinan University, PR China, [email protected] 3Assistant Prof. MS., Jinan University, PR China, [email protected] [11-point, centered] *Corresponding author Abstract In the teaching of the history of Sino-Indian relations, the issue of exiled Tibetans is an unavoidable question. However, how to explain to the students the influence of the issue of exiled Tibetans on Sino-Indian relations has long been a difficult problem for many teachers. The reason is that as a political issue, China and India have great disputes on it. They all stick to their own positions and views and it has been difficult for them to form a consensus in the past sixty years. In the current Internet era, the information sources of college students are very extensive. It is hard to convince them to explain the influence of the issue of exiled Tibetans on Sino-Indian relations simply following the textbook's standpoint. Therefore, to enable students to fully understand it, we must first systematically review the formation reason and development course of the issue of exiled Tibetans, then objectively state the influence that has been caused by the issue of exiled Tibetans on Sino-Indian relations and finally give an reasonable explanation on why the issue of exiled Tibetans must be solved. In a word, to successfully explain the influence of the issue of exiled Tibetans on Sino-Indian relations, we must make students realize that the issue of exiled Tibetans is the stumbling block impeding the normalization of Sino-Indian relations. Failure to find an effective resolution to this issue is likely to trigger new confrontations and conflicts which would bring great negative impact on world peace and development. Keywords: Sino-Indian Relations; Exiled Tibetans; security dilemma; history teaching 1 INTRODUCTION In the classroom teaching of the history of Sino-Indian relations, many college students believe that border dispute is the main reason for the discord and long-term enmity between China and India. As a matter of fact, the border dispute is, instead of the crux of the matter, merely a superficial phenomenon for the underlying shortage of Sino-Indian strategic mutual trust. Both history and reality eloquently demonstrate that the culprit for the long-term enmity between China and India is none other than the harboring of exiled Tibetans seeking Tibetan Secession by the Indian government, which sticks obstinately to the national security policy of regarding China as its imaginary enemy and taking Tibet as a “buffer state”. The issue of exiled Tibetans not only led to an almost complete loss of strategic mutual trust generated in the honeymoon stage in Sino-Indian relations between 1954 and 1958, but also made it difficult for the successive governments of these two countries to get out of the vicious circle of mutual suspicion and vigilance. At ISBN: 978-605-82433-3-0 50 Proceedings of SOCIOINT 2018- 5th International Conference on Education, Social Sciences and Humanities, 2-4 July 2018- Dubai, U.A.E. present, with both China and India at a critical stage in their socio-economic development, the Tibetan separatist forces are also undergoing substantial changes. Failure to find an effective resolution to this issue is likely to exacerbate their mutual suspicion and thus trigger new confrontations and conflicts. With these two BRICS countries, each of which has a larger population more than one billion and plays a leading role in global economic development, peace brings benefits while fight courts disaster. If they were trapped in an enduring strife of “security dilemma”, not only would their respective socio-economic development be arrested, but global peace and development would also be negatively impacted. Therefore, it is urgent that both China and India should attach great importance to, reach a consensus on, and come up with a workable solution to, the issue of exiled Tibetans so that the stumbling block impeding the normalization of Sino-Indian relations can be removed once and for all. However, in order to enable students to correctly understand the influence of the issue of exiled Tibetans on Sino-Indian relations and agree with the above views, we must first make them understand its formation reason and development course. 2 SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEW HOW THE ISSUE OF EXILED TIBETANS CAME INTO BEING Before teaching the issue of exiled Tibetans, students must understand the history of British two invasions of Tibet and its security strategy for Indian colony, because from a historical perspective, the issue of exiled Tibetans can be traced back to the British colonial invasion of Tibet in the late 19th century and the early 20th century, which drove a large number of Tibetans living overseas in exile and thus planted the seeds for long-term discord between China and India. Based on Indian geographic features and the games of hegemony between Britain and Russia in Asia, Britain developed an Indian safety strategy of “one inner lake, two concentric circles, three buffer zones” after its conquest of India in the mid-19th century. Among them, China’s Tibet is part of the inner circle as well as of the buffer zones. In order to materialize this strategic vision, Britain launched the war of aggression against Tibet twice, in 1888 and 1904 respectively, forcing the Qing government to sign a series of unequal treaties and grabbing many privileges. Besides, Britain also unscrupulously provoked clashes between the Han and the Tibetan peoples, masterminded the Simla Conference, concocted the McMahon Line, incited the Tibetan Secession, attempted to split Tibet from China, and turned Tibet into a buffer state under its wings. Thanks to the resolute resistance from the then Chinese government and people of all nationalities, Britain’s attempt did not succeed. However, after Britain was forced to evacuate from South Asia in 1947, India inherited the colonial legacy of its metropolitan state and continued to adhere to the security strategy of treating China as its potential rival and Tibet as a buffer state, and attempted to unilaterally take over Britain’s privileges and maintain its illegal border demarcation in Tibet. Upholding the “Indian centralism” left over by Britain, Nehru, the founding Prime Minister of India, and his government dreamt of developing India not only as an economic and political center both of Southeast Asia and of Central Asia but also as an important participant in the affairs of the Pacific region. Therefore, the Indian government, shortly after its independence from Britain, flatly refused the demand from the Kuomintang regime and the Local Government of Tibet to resume the sovereignty over the land south of the McMahon Line. In order to stress its continuity with Britain in the Tibet-related policy, the Nehru government directly retained Richardson, the former British-Indian consul to Lhasa, turning him into an Indian consul. Meanwhile, taking advantage of the Chinese civil war between 1945 and 1949, India instigated the Local Government of Tibet to stage an eviction of the Han people from Tibet and to seek Tibetan Secession. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, in spite of its overall friendliness towards China based on much deliberation, India was still reluctant to waive the British colonial heritage in Tibet-related privileges and its vested interests on the issue of border, and even went further than Britain. As early as in the Tibetan liberation by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), India did everything possible to obstruct the Chinese government’s resumption of sovereignty over Tibet. Indian authorities, in its diplomatic notes dated October 21, 28 and November 1, 1950, denied China’s sovereignty over Tibet by the wordings such as “China-Tibetan relations” and “Chinese suzerainty”, referred to the PLA’s military action as “Chinese invasion on Tibet”, and threatened not to support China’s restoration to its legitimate status in the United Nations (UN) and “not to persuade the Tibetan delegation to go to Beijing”. Afterwards, India wantonly encroached on China’s inherent territory while Tibet was not totally secured by the PLA. India’s “appetite” surpassed the British-Indian government’s territorial claim on Tibet in that it once put under its occupation Langjiu, an area which had never been reached by the British before. In addition, the Nehru government acquiesced in the military assistance that the United States provided to the Tibetan reactionary forces by mobilizing Indian facilities, thus becoming indirectly supportive of the Tibetan Secession activities. In 1956, after the Kangba rebellion, India once again interfered in China’s internal affairs by stealthily harboring the exiled insurgents. After the Tibetan Rebellion in 1959, India began to offer public support and large-scale harboring to insurgents, thus perpetuating and internationalizing the issue of exiled Tibetans. ISBN: 978-605-82433-3-0 51 Proceedings of SOCIOINT 2018- 5th International Conference on Education, Social Sciences and Humanities, 2-4 July 2018- Dubai, U.A.E. Under the long-term incitation and support of Britain and India, the Local Government of Tibet becomes increasingly estranged from the Central Government gradually. After the peaceful liberation of Tibet, although the Chinese government made various endeavors to maintain national unity and national solidarity, such as granting the 10th Panchen Lama and the 14th Dalai Lama an exceedingly high political status, proactively carrying out the modernization in the Tibetan area, correcting the deviations in the specific work in time and promising not to implement the reform within six years from 1956, it still could not contain the separatist activities of the Tibetan Secession forces.
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