Cooperatives, Corporatism and Politics – Agrarian Organisations and the Swedish Right during the 1940´s

Dr. Fredrik Eriksson Södertörns University ([email protected])

Rural History Conference 2010 at the University of Sussex, Brighton September 13-16.

Introduction Few groups in society have been as politically successful as farmers. They have been able to promote an agricultural policy on their own accord. At the turn of the century the farmers till amounted to roughly half of the population. Since then most farms have disappeared, but at the same time this does not mean that the political influence of agriculture has diminished proportionally. I use the Swedish Right Party as the example in this essay, for several reasons.1 Firstly, the Right has a past as being a partly agrarian party, but this has been quite unnoticed in research. Neither has the party appeared as a farmers´ party during the post war era. But during the early years of the 20th century agrarians created internal structures to defend their position were created. These structures continued to influence policy within the party. In 1942, during World War II, the most comprehensive agricultural commission ever appointed. The purpose was to investigate the pricing of agricultural products during the crisis, and also to investigate how to organise agriculture after the war. It has been called the Magna Charta of Swedish agricultural policy. The commission consisted of 27 members, all belonging to different organisations (agrarian cooperatives, other agrarian organisations, consumer cooperation, trade unions and industry). The purpose of this essay is to illustrate the paths of influence of farmers and agrarian organisations within the political system, through studying the Right. Corporative ties to organisations are common traits of the agricultural policy system. Much of the previous research on the field of corporatism in has focused on the Social Democratic Workers Party (henceforth Social Democrats). They have had an unequalled influence on Swedish politics in the post war era (in government 1936–1976). Therefore much of the previous research concerning Swedish political history has focused on the Social Democrats and their

1The Right party was founded in 1904 as Allmänna valmansförbundet and was from 1935 called Högern (The Right), and finally from 1969 Moderata Samlingspartiet (The Moderate Coalition Party). relations to the Swedish Trade Union Council (Landsorganisationen, LO).2 There is also research concerning the relationship between Swedish Employers´ organisation (Svenska arbetsgivarföreningen, SAF), business and the parties on the right.3 So we know quite a lot about the influence of organisations on the labour market. But, we know a lot less about the influence of agrarian organisations pertaining agricultural policy and the political system. There are two distinct periods in this paper: contested agriculture 1867–1930 and the farmers´ own agricultural policy from around 1930.

Historical background One of the most important political factors in Sweden was the Representation reform (Representationsreformen) in 1866. The Swedish went from a parliament of four estates, to a two-chamber parliament with an upper house (första kammaren) and a lower house (andra kammaren). The system introduced in 1866 built on traditional values about representation and the character of politics. It was a reform with conservative traits4 (samhällsbevarande) as well as moderate liberal.5 Through the electoral system farmers benefited and soon dominated the lower house. Another central aspect concerning the formation of agricultural policy and Swedish politics was the tariff question of the 1880´s. In 1888 the protectionists managed to enforce grain tariffs and this can be seen as the expression of the active opinion of the farmers. But this was in no way a uniform political action of the farmers, as the majority were liberal free traders. Instead it shows the power of the minority: grain producing manor owners of the plains. The tariff question also saw the development of the first modern political parties. Yet another important agrarian political factor was the Farmers´ March (Bondetåget) of 1914. The march as such was a manifestation for national defence and the King, against the liberal government.6 It showed, yet again, not a uniform political action, but the strength of conservative manor owners. Strong national defence could easily be translated into a defence of Swedish agriculture. In the aftermath of the Farmers´ March a new agrarian party emerged. The process of forming an agrarian party had started in 1910 and the founding

2 Hans Haste (1988/1989), Det första seklet: människor, händelser och idéer i svensk socialdemokrati, del 1 och del 2. : Tidens förlag. 3 Niklas Stenlås (1998), Den inre kretsen: den svenska ekonomiska elitens inflytande över partipolitik och opinionsbildning 1940–1949. Lund: Arkiv förlag. 4 In this case it was not a conservative ideology per se, but more a kind of preserving of the traditional structures, maintaining the influence of the elites while still allowing reform. 5 Göran B. Nilsson (1969), ”Den samhällsbevarande representationsreformen”, in Scandia 1969, p. 253. 6 It led to the resigning of the liberal government, as the King sided with the marchers. was quite complicated, but around 1914 the Farmers´ Union (Bondeförbundet) was founded.7 All of these cases show that agriculture was contested, as was the struggle for winning the farmers. The majority of the farmers belonged to and voted for the liberal party, the minority being conservative. Agrarian ideology in Sweden was in many ways defensive as it aimed at defending a rural lifestyle, agriculture and the power position of the farmers against city dwellers, workers and socialists. Up until the 1920´s agricultural policy was a function of the grain tariff battle of 1888: grain producing manor owners from the plains stood against smallholders in the forest areas. Liberals8 and Social Democrats raised arguments based on free trade against the protectionism of the conservatives and the Farmers´ Union. Up until the introduction of agricultural regulations around 1930 agrarian political influence can be described as contested. Workers and other groups fought their way onto the political arena. The regulations and the Crisis Agreement (Krisuppgörelsen) of 1933, between Social Democrats and the Farmers´ Union created a specific reserve in politics.9 Through this the farmers initiated a system in which they fully could control agricultural policy and could create whatever systems they wanted to support their trade. One could say that the political influence of the farmers, when restricted to agriculture, had become uncontested, or at least accepted. Swedish farmers have been successful exerting influence but the decrease in the number of farmers has not decreased in relation. The first factor behind this kind of influence was tradition, the Right had ever since the founding incorporated strong and powerful agrarian groups. The other factor behind the influence was the existence of the regulations and the connection to strong “apolitical” organisations Swedish Union of Agriculture, (Sveriges lantbruksförbund or SL) and National Organisation for the Countryside (Riksförbundet landsbygdens folk, RLF). These organisations gave farmers the opportunity to exercise influence and acted as a power base outside the political parties. The third factor behind agrarian political influence was preparedness. The food situation in Sweden during World War II was quite unproblematic, as the regulations of the 1930´s worked just as well to keep production up and prices down, as vice versa. Hence there were no food shortages during

7 The initial Farmers´ Union was founded in 1910, but it took several years to gather the many different groups into a party. The union mainly took over the farmers from the liberals while the conservatives maintained their influence. 8 The liberal parties were initially founded in 1902 as Frisinnade landsföreningen; the party was divided concerning the sobriety issue in 1923. The two parties were called Frisinnade Peoples´ Party and the Swedish Liberal Party. They merged again in 1934 founding the Peoples´ Party. 9 In short the Crisis Agreement meant that the Social Democrats accepted and supported the agricultural policy of the farmers while the Farmers´ Union accepted and supported the labour policy of the Social Democrats. Its enemies called the Crisis Agreement the ”Cow Trade” (Kohandeln). World War II, as there had been during the First World War. The concept of preparedness meant the interests of farmers coincided with the interests of the consumers. Therefore political parties forged an alliance during the post war era of maintaining agricultural regulation systems benefiting the farmers.

Contested Agriculture 1867–1930 When the Swedish Right was founded in 1904 it was as a reaction to developments in society. On the political level the liberal franchise movement who, together with the labour movement, challenged the establishment threatened the Right. Allmänna Valmansförbundet (AVF) was a compromise between moderate conservative forces and more staunch elements and this heritage came to influence the history of the party during the 20th century.10 There were strong ideological tensions depending on the strengths and weaknesses of different groups. Farmers were numerous but not a uniform group and a substantial part of the heritage came from the Farmers´ Party (Lantmannapartiet)11 in the lower house. The Farmers´ Party was in fact a very broad proto-party, without internal solidarity or uniformity. The agricultural policies of AVF was not contested at the time of the founding but rested firmly on the heritage of protectionism.12 But protectionism pitted the farmers within the party against powerful liberal industrial interests. But using the term protectionist to distinguish between different groups is not entirely safe, as there were examples of free trade conservative farmers as well as protectionist industrialists. AVF was a national election organisation, gathering several parties with the Riksdag. In the lower house there were initially two rightwing parties (both dominated by farmers). Free Trader Hans Andersson i Skifarp (previously Nöbbelöv)13 was the leader of the National Progress Party (Nationella framstegspartiet). Protectionist Carl Persson i Stallerhult was the leader of the Farmers´ Party (Lantmannapartiet).14 The division between the two parties was not ideological as such but

10 Niklas Stenlås (2002), ”Kampen om högern –uppbyggnaden av Allmänna valmansförbundet 1904–1922” (The Struggle for the Right), in Torbjörn Nilsson (red.), Anfall eller försvar? Högern i svensk politik under 1900-talet. Stockholm: Santérus förlag, pp. 56. 11 The translation is not exemplary, as Lantman is not only a farmer. The name also incorporates other ideological traits, as self owning, independent and hard working. 12 Fredrik Eriksson (2004), Det reglerade undantaget. Högerns jordbrukspolitik 1904–2004. (The Regulated Exception. Agricultural Policies of the Swedish Conservatives). Stockholm: Santérus förlag, p. 58. 13 A word on he names of Swedish parliamentarians is perhaps in order. Many Swedish names are patronymicons like Andersson. To distinguish people from each other it was common to use the name of the farm like Skifarp. 14 The Farmers´ Party within AVF was not the same as the large Farmers´ Party of the 1880´s and 1890´s but a fraction using the same name. was more an effect of personal animosity.15 It is vital to understand the character of AVF to understand how the farmers created their own reserve within politics

Farmers in the Political Parties The Swedish Right was dominated by farmers during a large part of the 20th century, at least when it came to the composition of the parliamentarians. Initially farmers were strongly represented in all parties, as many smallholders supported the Liberals. Later on the Farmers´ Union they became the strongest agrarian party.

Table 1: Farmers among the parliamentarians of the Right, both houses 1918–1958 (number and percentage)

Year Upper house % Lower house % Total % 1918 33 28 35 63 68 48 1928 22 46 36 55 58 51 1938 20 49 22 50 42 59 1948 8 33 16 41 24 38 1958 7 44 18 40 25 41

Source: Bengt Ulfbringe (1960), “Jordbrukarinslaget i riksdagen och inom riksdagspartierna åren 1918, 1928, 1938, 1948 och 1958”, in Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 1960, pp. 177-199.

The table shows that the Right had a strong representation of farmers among its parliamentarians. It was partly because of this that agricultural policy was extremely vital for the party. Because of these numbers the party internalised a very positive view on agriculture and no other group ever came close to this kind of representation. Within the Farmers´ Union the numbers were even higher, as 89-100 percent of the parliamentarians were farmers. In 1918 the farmers of the Right numbered 47 percent of all farmers in both houses. In 1958 they amounted to 31 percent. Manor owners and owners of large farms were most common within the Right and in 1918 these groups amounted to 2/3 of the parliamentarians, in 1958 it had

15 Stenlås (2004), p.68. See also Lars I Andersson (2004), Tradition och förändring. Den skånska högern i dess borgerliga omgivning 1928–1936 (Tradition and Change. The Right of Skåne in its Bourgeois Surroundings). Lund, p. 331. increased to 4/5. The smallholders were also represented with 1/3 in 1918, falling to 1/5 in 1958. In the upper house the manor owners was the most important group and in 1910 35 of 42 representatives were manor owners. In 1930 there were 8 manor owners of 42 representatives.16 The most vivid change in the composition of the lower house during the 1910´s and 1920´s was the diminishing number of farmers representing the liberals. Between 1912 and 1922 the number of liberal farmers was halved while the Right more or less maintained their share.17

The Agrarian Ideology The strength of the farmers within the party was seconded by an ideology that did not see agriculture as a business. Instead it was a specific form of life and the most distinguishing feature was the concept of inheritance. Agriculture built on the work of previous generations and the now living were the custodians of the land for future generations. The general conservative concept of society as an organism fitted well into this ideology. However, concepts of society as an organism were not uncommon, but existed in all political ideologies and parties at the time.18 The conservative concept of heritage was complemented with concepts of tradition and traditionalism. This was most commonly seen in the franchise question. The Right and the establishment tried to activate the farmers politically during the late 19th century and early 20th century, to form an alliance against franchise. The lifestyle of the farmers was seen as landed and traditional and therefore they ought to be against any reforms. The Farmers´ March of 1914 was perhaps the most visible effect of the effort of “new” to muster the farmers against the threats to traditional society. This conservative renaissance also brought social reforms as a means to combat franchise. The inspiration came primarily from Wilhelmine Germany.19 The march of 1914 was seen by the Right as very positive when it concerned national defence, but there were different opinions within the party of how to deal with it. The party leader was positive to national defence and the ideology of the march in that respect. At the same time he was worried that it might develop into a class based agrarian

16 I.N. Sandström (1936), ”Första kammaren 1870–1930”, in Axel Brusewitz (red.). Den svenska riksdagens sociala sammansättning (The Social Composition of the Swedish Riksdag). , pp. 111 17 Gunnar Hesslén (1936), ”Andra kammaren efter den allmänna rösträttens införande.”, in Brusewitz (red.), p. 191. 18 Andersson (2004), p. 273. 19 Eriksson (2004), pp. 42 party.20 This was in fact what happened and it brought a severe threat to the agrarian profile of the AVF. From the early 1920´s the agricultural policy of the Right was always conducted with a nervous eye towards the Farmers´ Union. Yet another trait of the agrarian ideology was a romantic notion of agriculture and the farmer. Besides the reverence of the traditionalism of the farmer, there was also the imagery of National Romanticism. The farmers became a symbol of security in an age of dramatic change, urbanisation and industrialisation.21 These ideological factors were all central to the formulation of conservative agricultural policy. It built on protectionist and nationalist concepts. Agriculture was deemed too important to work on a normal liberal economic market. For the AVF grain tariffs became synonymous with defending Swedish civilisation, i.e. the agrarian pillar of Swedishness. Therefore agriculture was referred to as the mother trade.

Farmers and Party Leadership The strength of farmers within the party together with the strong agrarian ideology gave the Swedish Right several peculiar traits. There was a tradition up until the 1980´s that one of the three positions as chairmen had to be filled by a farmer. In the party archives there are ample examples of this tradition and the importance of it. Between the years 1904 and 1981 there was always a farmer in the party presidium.

Table 2: Farmers in the presidium of the AVF/Right/ 1904–1981. Chairman First Deputy Second Deputy Hans Andersson i Skifarp 1904–1918 Johan Nilsson i Kristianstad 1918–1924 J.B. Johansson i Fredrikslund 1924–1935 Martin Skoglund i Doverstorp 1935–1956 Fritiof Domö 1944–1950 1935–1944 Leif Cassel 1956–1965 Rolf Eliasson 1961–1965 Yngve Nilsson i Trobro 1965–1970

20 Eriksson (2004), pp. 65 21 Birger Hagård (1976), Nils Wohlin – konservativ centerpolitiker (Nils Wohlin – Conservative Centre Politician). Linköping, p. 193; Cecilia Stam (1985), ”Bonden i 1900-talets konst” (The Farmer in 20th century Art), in Bo Lindvall (red.), Bonden i konsten och bondens bildvärld, Stockholm, pp. 70; Sverker Sörlin (1993), ”Bonden som ideal” (The Farmer as an Ideal), in Bo Larsson (red.), Bonden i dikt och verklighet. Stockholm, p. 23. Eric Krönmark 1970–1981

Source: Party Annual Congress 1904–1981

Other farmers seated central posts in the party hierarchy, for example Carl Persson i Stallerhult, chairman of the Farmers´ Parry in the lower house until the founding of Farmers´- and Bourgeoisie Party (Lantmanna- och borgarepartiet) in 1912. Per Nilsson i Bonarp was one of the most influential farmers´ during the 1920´s, he was the deputy chairman of Farmers´- and Bourgeoisie Party and one of Arvid Lindman´s confidents. Another farmer, Olof Jonsson i Hov, was chairman of AVF when Lindman was Foreign Minister in the government of in 1917. At certain moments in history the power position of the farmers was challenged. One example is the controversy over who would replace Arvid Lindman as party chairman in 1935. In the discussions two names were common, Ivar Anderson (Chief editor of Svenska Dagbladet) and Professor Gösta Bagge. The farmers preferred Ivar Anderson, as a more solid friend of agriculture. The party leadership and industrialists preferred Gösta Bagge. During the period 1940–1970 the tradition of farmers in the party leadership was maintained and after 1981 other principles were enforced. After that the chairman of the Central Farmers´ Council of the Right (Högerns centrala jordbrukaråd) were given a seat on the party board.

Alliance between Industry and Agriculture The strong influence from agriculture was questioned from time to time as the relatively mild controversies of 1935 had been preceded by more severe. When party leader Arvid Lindman formed government after the electoral victory of 1928 it was in a time of agrarian depression. The traditional way for the Right to manage low agricultural prices was to raise the tariffs, particularly on grain. The farmers within the party demanded raised tariffs while several of the industrialists believed that this was an unnatural way to influence an otherwise natural process. In the midst this stood Arvid Lindman, himself an industrialist from the forest industry, but at the same time a strong agrarianist. The crisis within the party was extremely serious as central industrialists refused to accept raised tariffs. Minister for Foreign Trade Vilhelm Lundvik (Manager of the Industry Association, Industriförbundet 1926–1940), Minister for Social Affairs Sven Lübeck (engineer and chairman of the Swedish Hydropower Association, Svenska vattenkraftföreningen 1930–1941) and Consult Minister Nils Vult von Steyern. They meant that the situation in agriculture was not as bad as it was portrayed and certainly not as serious as to demand raised tariffs.22 Their suggestion was that agriculture directed itself more towards animal production. The industrialists were important men in the party, as they often financed it. The farmers instead threatened to leave the party for the Farmers´ Union, a very serious threat to the party. In the end Arvid Lindman managed to persuade the industrialists into accepting raised tariffs to keep the party together.23 In this case the farmers used their capital, strength by numbers, against the industrialists who conceded. This forged an informal alliance within the party between industry and agriculture, meaning that the farmers governed agricultural policy, and the industrialists would be silent. This was also strengthened by the regulation systems of the 1930´s creating even stronger links between private organisations, political parties and the state. It also meant the creation of an agricultural policy outside market control. No liberal or economic developments would be allowed to influence Swedish agriculture. In general, the Right nurtured a liberal ideology when it came to economy. This however would not be allowed to influence agriculture. The reasons for this system built on the political strength of the farmers, something they used against other groups. The government of Lindman 1928–1930 resigned loosing a parliamentary vote on raised grain tariffs.

The Agricultural Policy of the farmers In previous research Political scientists have maintained that a corporative state was formed in Sweden, more precisely on June 10th 1932.24 It was the initiation of the Swedish dairy regulation that was the final step. Through this a comprehensive system was created that regulated all forms of agriculture in Sweden. It brought strong connections to private agrarian organisations, governed by the farmers. It was a process in which farmers could create the policy they wanted, through their influence in the political parties. But the regulations of the 1930´s also created even stronger influence on policy from private organisations.25 From around 1930 the state supported the reorganisation of the agrarian cooperative movement in Sweden. In general this was weak, due to several reasons. One of the most convincing interpretations is that the farmers in Sweden already had a political position (through being the fourth estate in the old Riksdag, and dominating the lower house after 1866). The farmers

22 Gunnar Hellström (1976), Jordbrukspolitik i industrisamhället med tyngdpunkt på 1920- och 1930-talen. Stockholm pp. 187. 23 Riksarkivet, Lindmans samling, vol. 1, Brev från Arvid Lindman till Sven Lübeck 7/12 1929. 24 Bo Rothstein (1992), Den korporativa staten. Intresseorganisationer och statsförvaltning i svensk politik. Stockholm, p. 110. 25 In the Swedish systems private organisations have always had strong influence through the system of government commissions. that had a political position where primarily owners of large farms or manors. They were used to acting on a public arena and had the relations with the state that they needed. They could handle the market themselves and did not need any cooperative movement. Therefore, the farmers without the need for a cooperative movement did not form any, but the smallholders in need of one, couldn’t create it.26 The organisation that would become the most important in relation to agricultural regulations was the Swedish Common Agricultural Society (Sveriges allmänna lantbrukssällskap, SAL, changed name in 1940 to Swedish Union of Agriculture, Sveriges lantbruksförbund or SL). At the time SAL was working to reform itself, as it was a first generation type of organisation. This meant that it was hardly cooperative at all as it was based in individual membership of farmers. The number of members was decreasing and a reform was proposed that SAL and the state would strengthen local cooperatives. These would then become members of SAL thereby strengthening it. The dairy regulation of 1932 created a model of regulations to come. The initiative came from SAL and its managing director Ludvig Nanneson, to the liberal Minister for Agriculture Bo von Stockenström. The depression had been brought to bear and Swedish butter exports to Britain were decreasing. SAL proposed a system where they would control production and prices on the Swedish dairy market. The state would guarantee the role of the organisation, more or less through granting it a monopoly.27 What SAL demanded was the creation of a system where they got the right to arbitrarily tax all milk producers in the country. SAL together with the state would control the pricing for dairy products on the national market. Funds raised would be used to support the export of butter. The idea was that SAL´s representatives should put a price on the milk of non-members that would make it unprofitable to sell milk directly. This would force all producers to become members in the cooperative dairies.28 SAL meant that all producers had to understand and participate in the common economic interest and this demanded total and complete cooperation on the market to avoid competition. There could be only one organisation, these so-called “dairy unions” would control all aspects of production, selling and marketing. When joining a union, farmers

26 For instance Fredrik Eriksson (2008), ”Modernity, Rationality and Citizenship: Swedish Agrarian Organizations as Seen Through the Lens of the Agrarian Press, circa 1880–1917”, in Piotr Wawrzeniuk (ed.), Societal Change and Ideological Formation among the Rural Population of the Baltic Area 1880–1939. Flemingsberg: Studia Baltica II:2, p. 141-167. 27 Hellström (1976), p. 357. 28 Rothstein (1992), p. 112. could no longer compete with each other and had to accept the prices set by the union. Complete and utter loyalty was demanded.29 The funds that were raised through the taxes should not go to the state, but to SAL with the expressed purpose of strengthening the organisation and support butter export. SAL collected the tax directly. Thereby the state allowed a private organisation the right to tax. It was a system that would force producers to become members and if they refused it would cost them. SAL intended to use the state as leverage to forcefully organise farmers. The free riders (friåkare or pytsåkare) could receive better prices selling milk directly to consumers, and the system would force this trade to cease.30 The government was positive to the suggestions from SAL and a proposal was put to parliament on June 10th 1932. The concept that a private organisation used the state to force private actors into joining it came from the fact that the Swedish cooperative movement was weak. Many of the producers saw themselves as businessmen and not as farmers or bearers of cooperative ideology. They had their own interests and working distribution systems.31 Producers did not need this form of organisation, since their businesses were strong enough on their own. As said previously, the prosperous farmers did not need organisation, and the smallholders needing it, could not create it.32 The comprehensive proposal put to parliament was that the state introduced a tax (prisutjämningsbidrag) on milk, collected by the organisations. It hinged on that the national organisation had to request this tax. The same system was introduced on local level, where a local organisation would collect and use the tax. The organisations and organisational development was the key. The organisations, mentioned in the proposal, had to encompass the majority of the producers, and the national organisation had to include at least 60 percent of the total amount of milk in the country. Only then could they request the tax. This meant that there was an extremely strong incitement to join, and also pressure from other producers. The local organisation had to include at least 70 percent of the amount of milk sold in the area. A majority of the members in both organisations had to support the decision to require the introduction of the system from the state. In parliament the proposal gained support from the

29 Ludvig Nanneson, ”Jordbrukets avsättningsproblem.” (Sales Problems of Agriculture), in Landtmannen – Tidskrift för landtmän, 1932:13, p. 267-269. 30 Rothstein (1992), p. 113. See also Per Thullberg (1974), ”SAP och jordbruksnäringen 1920–1940. Från klasskamp till folkhem.” (Social Democracy and Agriculture 1920–1940. From Class Struggle to Peoples´ Home), in Arbetarrörelsens årsbok 1974, p. 161. 31 Johansson & Thullberg (1979), p. 53. 32 H. Juhlin-Dannfelt (1917), Föreningsväsendet bland de mindre jordbrukarna. (The Cooperative Movement among the Smallholders). Stockholm: Svenska andelsförlaget, p. 6. Liberals, Farmers´ Union and the majority of the Right. The most sceptical was the Social Democrats.33 The central thing is that the private agrarian organisations (and the farmers) had the ear of the state and the political parties. The state used the organisations to regulate agriculture to counter the depression and the organisations used the state to force farmers into joining. The interests of the organisation joined with the interests of the state, the result being a comprehensive regulation. The stronger and more efficient organisations became a power resource for the politicians/farmers. It meant that they could control the political sphere through their position within the political parties, and control the regulations and organisations through their leading political positions. It was the same politicians from the parties and Riksdag who also led the agrarian cooperative movement, i.e. the elites. The first national cooperative organisation, founded in 1905, was The Yeomen (Lantmännen, SLR), a national purchasing organisation. SAL itself was founded in 1917. Both organisations were dominated by the agrarian and political elites among manor owners and owners of large farms.

Table 3: Chairmen of SLR and SAL until around 1960. SLR SAL Hugo Hamilton 1905–1923 Fredrik Wrangel 1917–1921 Gustaf Lagerbjelke 1923–1930 Johan Beck-Friis 1922–1924 Gustaf Tidholm 1930 Hjalmar Hammarskjöld 1924–1926 Einar Sjögren 1930–1958 Johan Nilsson i Kristianstad 1927–1939 Gerhard Strindlund 1939–1941 Reimer Johansson 1941 Bo von Stockenström 1941–1942 Gösta Liedberg 1942–1946 Axel Pehrsson-Bramstorp 1947–1949 Sam B Norup 1950–1951 Gösta Liedberg 1951–1961

Sources: Sveriges lantbruksförbund (1957), Sveriges lantbruksförbund 1917–1957. Stockholm. Stig Osterman (1982), 100 år av samverkan. Lantmännen 1880–1980. Stockholm.

33 Eriksson (2004), pp. 114-115.

The leaders of the organisations is a virtually a who’s who in Swedish agriculture and politics (incorporating several nobles and one party leader – Bramstorp who led the Farmers´ Union). The table also shows the strong influence of the Right. Count Hugo Hamilton was the first chairman of SLR followed by Gustaf Lagerbjelke (upper house for the Right 1909–1930). Einar Sjögren was the SLR Chairman during the creation of the regulations. He also represented the Right in the lower house 1937–1941. At the same time he was managing director of SAL. In SAL the Right had the position of Chairman between 1917 and 1939 and again between 1951 and 1961. For example Johan Nilsson i Kristianstad represented the Right in the upper house between 1909 and 1955. Gösta Liedberg was in the lower house for the Right between 1933 and 1948. From the Farmers´ Union came Gerhard Strindlund, Axel Pehrsson-Bramstorp and Sam B. Norup. The cooperative movement became a central actor within agricultural policy through the regulations. SLR and SAL both belonged to the first generation of organisations in which the landed elites held strong positions. Often they already belonged to the County Agricultural Societies (Hushållningssällskapen).34 Here was one of the reasons to the establishment of the National Organisation for the Countryside (Riksförbundet landsbygdens folk, RLF) in 1928. It was a trade union for farmers with a distinct from below approach as opposed to the top-down of first generation organisations. Previous research has shown that the reorganisation of SAL and the establishment of RLF both were aspects of the need for better and more efficient organisations.35 The creation of the regulation systems by the organisations meant the founding of a corporative state. It also meant the annexation by the organisations of agricultural politics and the political parties. The farmers established a reserve in politics were normal rules did not apply, thereby negating the influence of other groups. The administration of the regulations also meant the establishment of a bureaucracy in which people from the organisations or with similar education, for example agronomists, filled positions.36 The systems can be described as group thinking, people from the same environments, with the same backgrounds, education. All involved usually knew each other and had family ties to agriculture.

34 Reine Rydén (1998), ”Att åka snålskjuts är icke hederligt”. De svenska jordbrukarnas organisationsprocess 1880–1947. Göteborg, p. 61. 35 Per Thullberg (1977), Bönder går samman. En studie av Riksförbundet Landsbygdens Folk under världskrisen 1929–1933. Stockholm, p. 309. 36 Agronomists belonged to the agrarian right wing environment. Andersson (2004), p. 148.

Rational Agriculture and World War II During the war one of the most comprehensive agricultural commissions was initiated. It was called the 1942 Commission on Agriculture or the Committee of 27. The purpose was twofold, firstly to investigate the question of the levels of economic compensation for farmers during the war. The second purpose was to investigate the foundations for the agricultural policy of the future. In 1947 parliament decided on a new agricultural policy building on the Commission report. The principles of 1947 have been called the Magna Charta of Swedish agriculture.37 The foundation for the policy was preparedness, i.e. Swedish agriculture should be able to support the entire population with food in times of war or distress. The background was the food shortages of World War I contrasted by the relatively good situation during World War II. To achieve this, an income goal for farmers was introduced, i.e. that farmers should have an income in parity with comparable workers. This was in turn connected to a rationalisation goal, i.e. that the guaranteed income only applied to rational farms. In effect this was a decision meaning that large groups of farmers would be forced to seek other means of employment. But it was not the owners of large or family farms that were affected. But the Commission of 1942 also showed an interesting fact of Swedish politics, bureaucracy and tradition as it was entirely populated by private interest organisations. The chairman was Bo Hammarskjöld (also chairman of the Government Food Board 1942–1945). The national agrarian organisations and agriculture had 15 members in the Commission (many were at the same time MP´s). Industry had 3 representatives (several were also MP´s), 3 people represented science and bureaucracy, labour movement and the consumer cooperative had 4 representatives (see appendix 1). The extremely strong representation of external interests also shows a concept of weighting different interests against each other. The representation of the Right is quite interesting as it mirrors the divide between agriculture and industry within the party. Gösta Liedberg and Ernst Wehtje represented two different parts of the organisational influence within the party. Liedberg was the foremost representative of agriculture, and had been chairman of SAL. Wehtje on the other hand was chairman of the Swedish Federation of Industries (Industriförbundet). Both opposed different parts of the Commission’s findings. Wehtje together with other industrialists opposed the self-sufficiency of the system. Liedberg opposed the more technical aspects of rationalisation (i.e. expropriation). He was attacked by

37 Iréne A. Flygare & Maths Isacson (2003), Det svenska jordbrukets historia Band 5: jordbruket i välfärdssamhället 1945–2000. Stockholm: Natur och kultur. other agrarians within party for being too socialist and tolerant towards socialist solutions.38 The critique centred on Liedberg, being a manor owner, not understanding the problems of family farms. He was said to be too focused on economic arguments and did not understand traditional agriculture. But, in 1947 the same kind of alliance as within the Right of 1929 occurred. Industry opposed parts of the new agricultural policy but in general accepted that the organisations and farmers decided the agricultural policy. The consumers had more or less no influence as the Social Democrats (who had previously focused on consumer issues) supported the agricultural policy system. From this time until 1967 (when a new policy decision was taken that partly changed policy) there were no voices against the strong organisational interests in agricultural policy. The organisations had also taken over the political parties, as all the political representatives also were leading figures within the organisations. Therefore the same kind of dilemma that occurred within the Right in the 1920´s existed on national level in the 1940´s. Why then did this occur? Firstly, the organisations were seen as promoting legitimate interests as the leadership within agrarian organisations were members of the elites. The legitimacy of the organisation came from the fact that it was already interlocked with the state and/or semi-state organisations mainly through individuals being active on all arenas. These connected interests were quite institutionalised and institutionalisation being one of the definitions of corporative structures.39 Secondly, the Swedish political system incorporated ample possibilities and channels for private organisations to influence policy-making. For example, American sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset has maintained that the ideology of Labour movements was shaped in the interaction between the movement and the bourgeois elites governing the state. His argument being that a rigid class system generated a more radical and revolutionary Labour movement. Another factor was how long the working classes were excluded from political influence and the level of the repression. In repressive conditions the Labour movement becomes hostile to collaboration with the oppressive state.40 This is of course wrong, as Bo Rothstein has shown. Sweden was the last country in Scandinavia to implement universal franchise; Norway was one of the first. Therefore, according to Lipset would the

38 Eriksson (2004), pp. 160 39 Norman Lewis (1990), ”Corporatism and Accountability: The Democratic Dilemma”, in Colin Crouch and Ronald Dore (eds.), Corporatism and Accountability: Organized Interests in British Public Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 64. 40 Seymour Martin Lipset (1983), ”Radicalism and Reformism. The Sources of Working-class Politics”, in The American Political Science Review, vol. 77, no. 1, pp. 1-18. Swedish labour movement be radical and the Norwegian more reformist. But the case is the opposite. The Swedish labour movement was consequently reformist. The reason being that some of the interests of the labour movement was seen as legitimate and incorporated into the system of government commissions in the 1880´s.41 Within the commissions, interests from labour unions were brought in, and this meant that the state gave the movement a role. Therefore the Swedish labour movement saw no need for a violent revolution, and instead became reformist, as the system actually worked. The same kind of commission system led to the creation of the regulation system. Agrarian organisations were brought in to organise agriculture and make it prosperous. At the same time they received state support to force farmers in becoming members. Thirdly, the system of government commissions meant that private interests were given a task within the political system. The commission system started already in the 17th century but the largest expansion took place during the 20th. The committee system led to the creation of channels for organisational influence. The state needed expertise, something often found in private organisations. It was seen as a legitimate process, where groups were given influence over policy-making and policy enforcement. The committees would normally encompass different interest groups and the decisions being a compromise.42 The private interest groups brought specific knowledge through their interests; the parliamentarian’s role was to stand for common sense.43 Fourthly, the depression of the 1920´s and 1930´s was a formative stage both for politics, social policy and agricultural policy. The regulations of the 1930´s spilt over into World War II and became important means to support the Swedish population. The regulations from World War II spilt over into the Cold War, where preparedness for war was the crucial factor in Sweden. The same kind of systems existed all over Europe, and when the common market was introduced, agricultural policy became increasingly important. Therefore the national regulations spilt over into the EU and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) from the 1960´s. But everything started in the 1930´s when the state needed partners to combat the

41 Bo Rothstein (1991), ”State Structure and Variations in Corporatism: The Swedish Case.”, in Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 14, no. 2, p. 156. 42 Kent Zetterberg (1990), ”Det statliga kommittéväsendet” (The State Committee System), in Att styra riket. Regeringskansliet 1840–1990 (To Govern the Empire, the Chancellory). Stockholm: Allmänna förlaget, pp. 284- 309. See also Jan Johansson (1992), Det statliga kommittéväsendet: kunskap, kontroll, koncensus (The State Committee System: Knowledge, Control, Consensus). Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in Politics. 43 Gunnar Hesslén (1927), Det statliga kommittéväsendet intill år 1905. Dess uppkomst, ställning och betydelse (The State Committee System: Its Origins, Standing and Importance). Uppsala: Lundequistska bokhandeln, pp. 358-359. depression, and chose a few cooperative organisations. This created a system of agricultural policy where organisations have maintained their influence.44

Appendix 1: Representatives in the 1942 Commission on Agriculture Chairman Bo Hammarskjöld (also chairman of the Government Food Board 1942–1945). The national agrarian organisations and agriculture had 15 members: Einar Sjögren (Managing Director SL, chairman of SLR 1930–1958 and represented the Right in the lower house 1937– 1941), manor owner Gösta Liedberg (previously and also later chairman of SL, he was the foremost agrarian politician of the Right during this period), farmer Bernhard Ekström i Alsterfors (chairman on RLF 1940–1955, board member of SL, belonged to the Farmers´ Union), director A. Axel H. Stensgård (SL), farmer Bror Blomqvist i Troxhammar (one of the initiators of RLF), farmer Reimer Johansson (chairman of SL 1941), Supreme director R. Ytterborn (head of the SL Organisational Bureau 1930–1938), farmer Ferdinand Fregardh (chairman of Skånes lantmän, i.e. Skåne regional organisation of SLR, board member of SL), farmer Åke Gullander (first deputy of RLF), farmer Johan Helmer Johansson i Norrfors (SL), farmer Ernst Själander (SL), farmer K. Abel M. Andersson i Löbbo (board member of the County Agricultural Society in Jönköping and social democrat), farmers Nils Jönsson i Rossbol (among other things, chairman of Jämtlands lantmäns centralförening, Farmers´ Union), farmer Emil August Gustafsson i Vimmerby (among other things, chairman of the Swedish Dairy Union Administrative Council 1940–1953, previously liberal but now Farmers´ Union) and farmer H. Ringborg. Initially the later party leader of the liberals Bertil Ohlin was a member of the Commission but was replaced in 1944 by liberal MP Waldemar Svensson i Ljungskile (also chairman of the Swedish Smallholders Association). Industry had 3 representatives in the Commission: director Ernst Wehtje (chairman of the Swedish Federation of Industries 1943–1945 and MP for the Right), director Torsten Hèrnod (Forest Industry and SCA) and director Gustaf Sahlin (forest industry). All the industrialists had strong links to the Right since they also belonged to circles that had financed the Right and the Liberals.45

44 Fredrik Eriksson (forthcoming), ”the Swedish Dairy Regulation of 1932 – Forced Organization from Above?”, in Paulina Rytkönen (ed.). 45 Stenlås (1998). Science and bureaucracy had 3 representatives in the Commission: docent Erik F. Lundberg (national economist at the Institute for Conjuncture Studies and it’s director 1946–1955), docent Ingvar Svennilsson (director Industrial Institute for Investigion IUI), hovrättsaccessor Olof Söderström (at the Government Trade Board). The labour movement and consumer cooperative organisations had 4 members on the Commission: Mauritz Bonow (Consumer Cooperative), Gunnar Sträng (chairman of the agricultural labourers´ trade union), ombudsman Gösta Eriksson (Swedish LO, TUC) and ombudsman Einar Norrman (Swedish LO, TUC). In the Commission there were also secretaries Knut Larsson, C.H. Nordlander and Rodhe (RLF).