Talking About a Revolution: Or Why (Most of) the West Did Not Extend the Franchise David Art Department of Political Science, Tufts University Medford MA
[email protected] 617-627-5756 Paper prepared for the 2012 APSA Conference, September 1, New Orleans Introduction Did the threat of revolution force elites in the West to extend the franchise? A number of economists and political scientists believe that it did (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000: Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Aidt and Jensen 2011; Conley and Temimi 2001; Przeworski 2008). For economists, the credible threat of violence provides a compelling solution to the puzzle of why the rich would ever peacefully agree to increases in taxation and redistribution that follow from suffrage extension (Meltzer and Richard 1981). For political scientists, works such as Boix’s (2003) framing of democratization as a high-stakes game between social classes echoes Dahl’s (1971) classic formulation of democratization as the result of the costs of suppression exceeding the costs of toleration. One could of course trace the basic idea back further: Marx, Machiavelli, and Aristotle all recognized that leaders were unwilling to make democratic concessions without the serious threat of revolt. The prima facie plausibility of the “threat of revolution” hypothesis also renders it an appealing explanation for other types of political outcomes, such as the creation of social insurance (Kim 2007). Support for the “threat of revolution” hypothesis has thus far come primarily in quantitative form. Przeworski (2008) uses Banks’ data on riots and strikes and his own dataset on suffrage extensions, though the fact that Banks’ data begins after WWI means that he is forced to exclude most cases of franchise extension in Europe from his analysis.