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S. Serry/ICRC S. Abuku/ICRC J. Bamidele/ICRC G. A. Shaffa/ICRC SUPPORTING NIGERIAN HEALTH RESPONDING TO THE IMPROVING ACCESS TO WATER, WORKING WITH THE NIGERIAN FACILITIES TREATING DISPLACED CONSEQUENCES OF ARMED SANITATION AND SHELTER RED CROSS SOCIETY PERSONS AND VICTIMS OF ARMED VIOLENCE VIOLENCE In cooperation with the Ministry of Health, the ICRC The ICRC provides displaced persons with basic The ICRC renovates or upgrades water points and The NRCS and the ICRC work together to help people cares for displaced persons and people wounded by household necessities, such as cooking utensils, sanitation in communities affected by armed violence affected by armed violence and to re-establish contact weapons who need emergency surgery. We also train hygiene items, bedding and mosquito nets. We also and in camps and sites for displaced persons. To ensure between separated family members. With the support Nigerian medical staff from selected hospitals who distribute shelter materials, food and clothing to help that displaced persons have safe drinking water, we of the ICRC, NRCS volunteers also provide first aid, treat victims of armed violence. In addition, the ICRC them cope during the most vulnerable period of their carry out emergency water distributions and improve evacuate casualties and collect dead bodies and hand supplies first-aid and surgical materials and equipment displacement, when they often lack basic essentials. water supply systems. them over to the authorities, ensuring that relevant to hospitals when they receive an influx of casualties in The ICRC also provides agricultural implements, seed information is recorded to help people looking for the aftermath of a bomb blast or violence. and fertilizer, so that they can start working their land The ICRC builds emergency shelters for displaced missing relatives. again. In other instances, we may help them to start persons and provides communities in violence-prone The ICRC supports primary health-care centres and small-scale income-generating activities. areas with housing materials. The ICRC supports NRCS capacity building in general, in hospitals that serve the wounded and internally particular with regard to its communications activities displaced persons, by supplying them with medicine We provide this assistance in cooperation with the and first-aid training in remote communities where and equipment and by repairing or upgrading their Nigerian Red Cross Society (NRCS). there are no health personnel. buildings. R. Waudo/ICRC M. Das/ICRC Present since 1988, the ICRC also worked in Nigeria during the civil war 1967-1970. ICRC Abuja PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL RESTORING CONTACT BETWEEN 31 Pope John Paul II Street, Maitama District, Abuja HUMANITARIAN LAW AND SEPARATED FAMILIES P.M.B. 7654, Wuse III INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS IN T: +234 810 709 5551/2 LAW ENFORCEMENT [email protected] ICRC Gombe The aim of international humanitarian law (IHL) is to When families have to leave their homes to seek refuge T: +234 706 545 3493 prevent suffering during armed conflict. As the guardian elsewhere, it often happens that children get separated ICRC Jos 1 Rest House Road, off D. B. Zang Road of IHL, the ICRC provides legal expertise to support from their parents. People who leave the country may GRA Jos lose contact with their families. So the ICRC and the T: +234 813 353 6501 THE ICRC the efforts of the Nigerian authorities to ratify and [email protected] implement IHL treaties. We help train personnel of the Nigerian Red Cross Society work together and with ICRC Kano Nigerian armed forces, law lecturers and law students other Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies to help 4 Maiyango Road GRA Kano in IHL. In addition, officers of the Nigerian Police Force separated family members find and contact each other, T: + 234 64 91 27 33 [email protected] IN NIGERIA receive ICRC training in humanitarian principles and and be reunited if possible. ICRC Maiduguri international law enforcement standards. 7 Bifam Road, off Circular Road (Damboa junct.) GRA Maiduguri PROMOTING DETAINEE WELFARE T: + 234 810 713 9438 Together with the Economic Community of West African [email protected] States (ECOWAS), the ICRC promotes respect for the ICRC Port Harcourt 46b Orogbum Crescent, Ayaminma Street provisions of IHL in West Africa and we are working With the agreement of the Nigerian authorities, ICRC GRA II T: + 234 84 46 02 70/1 to ensure that ECOWAS Member States sign up to the delegates visit detainees to check their conditions of [email protected] major IHL treaties. detention. Their findings are discussed with the Nigerian ICRC Yola 5 Girei Street, Jimeta authorities and are not shared with a third party or made Yola public. If needed, the ICRC can help improve general T: + 234 903 781 1043 T: + 234 903 781 1011 conditions in a detention facility. [email protected] www.icrc.org © ICRC, April 2015 2015 0064/002 04.2015 15,000 Cover photo: A. Shaffa/ICRC IN BRIEF.
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