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Department of Defense Roles in Stabilization

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Department of Defense Roles in Stabilization C O R P O R A T I O N Finding the Right Balance Department of Defense Roles in Stabilization Linda Robinson, Sean Mann, Jeffrey Martini, Stephanie Pezard For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2441 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0046-8 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report comes at an important juncture for U.S. policymaking. The report evaluates the nature and appropriateness of tasks the U.S. military must be prepared to undertake in stability activities. Historically, the U.S. military has shied away from stabilization activities, only to find itself tasked with performing this role. This proved the case since 2001: The U.S. military found itself unprepared for stabilization in both Afghanistan and Iraq and then expanded its focus and spending enormously as the U.S. Department of Defense directed the military to develop proficiency in a wide range of stabilization tasks. That focus has waned as near-peer military challenges have grown and the defense budget and manpower have shrunk. At the same time, the incidence of fragile and conflict-plagued states remains high. The combined military and civilian experience of the past 15 years provides valuable insights into the tasks that the U.S. military should and should not be expected to undertake and, more generally, into how a more effective and efficient approach to stabilization might be developed. This report surveys these insights, assesses capacity and capability, and recommends adjustments to Department of Defense policy and operational approaches to stabilization efforts. This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, see http://www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp.html or contact the director (contact information is provided on the webpage). iii Contents Preface ...................................................................................................................................... iii Figures ....................................................................................................................................... vi Tables .......................................................................................................................................vii Summary ................................................................................................................................ viii Abbreviations............................................................................................................................ xv Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................. xvii 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 Purpose of the Study ............................................................................................................... 1 Research Approach and Organization of the Report ................................................................ 3 2. Understanding Stabilization .................................................................................................... 6 Defining Stabilization ............................................................................................................. 6 Proliferation of Terms and Activities....................................................................................... 6 Stability Functions .................................................................................................................. 8 3. Stabilization Lessons from Recent Experience ...................................................................... 14 Lessons from Recent Experience ........................................................................................... 14 Military Versus Civilian Core Competencies ......................................................................... 23 4. Current DoD Capacity and Capability for Stabilization ......................................................... 31 The Joint Force ..................................................................................................................... 31 Key Military Enablers for Stabilization ................................................................................. 41 5. Rescoping DoD Roles in Stabilization ................................................................................... 56 Security Function: DoD Has a Unique Responsibility to Provide Security and Build Security Capacity ............................................................................................................ 56 Military Support to Public Order ........................................................................................... 58 Immediate Human Needs ...................................................................................................... 59 Support to Governance .......................................................................................................... 60 Support to Economic Stability ............................................................................................... 61 Three Crosscutting Functions ................................................................................................ 62 Enacting a Civilian-Led Stabilization Model ......................................................................... 64 6. Gaps in DoD Capacity and Capability ................................................................................... 67 Joint Force Capacity.............................................................................................................. 67 Key Enabler Capacity or Capability Gaps ............................................................................. 68 The Ability to Regenerate or Expand .................................................................................... 71 iv 7. Conclusion: Risks, Mitigations, and Recommendations ......................................................... 74 Risks and Possible Mitigations .............................................................................................. 75 Recommendations ................................................................................................................. 78 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 78 Appendix A. Interagency Considerations for DoD Stabilization Requirements .......................... 80 Appendix B. Key International Partners’ Capacity, Capabilities, and Approaches to Stabilization ........................................................................................................................ 89 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 110 v Figures Figure 3.1. Number of Ongoing Conflicts, by Type, 1946–2015 ............................................... 16 Figure 3.2. Number of Fatalities in Intrastate Conflict, 1989–2015 ............................................ 17 Figure 3.3. Interagency Expenditures on Stabilization-Related Activities, FY 2000 to FY 2015 ............................................................................................................................ 27 Figure 4.1. Number of U.S. Military Personnel by Service and Component in FY 2009 Compared with FY 2016 ................................................................................................... 33 Figure 4.2. Number of Authorized Active Army CA Personnel by Unit/Formation in FY 2010, FY 2015, and FY 2016....................................................................................... 43 Figure 4.3. Number of Authorized CA Personnel by Service and Component in FY 2010, FY 2015, and FY 2016 .....................................................................................................
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