Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas

SAR STABILIZATION ASSISTANCE REVIEW

A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO STABILIZE CONFLICT- AFFECTED AREAS B 2018

B A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO STABILIZE CONFLICT- AFFECTED AREAS FOREWORD FROM SECRETARY OF STATE, USAID ADMINISTRATOR, AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ncreasing stability and reducing violence in conflict-affected areas are essential to realize America’s national security goals and advance a world in which nations can embrace their Isovereignty and citizens can realize their full potential. The United States and our allies face an increasingly complex and uncertain world in which many of our adversaries sow instability and benefit from it. Protracted conflicts provide fertile ground for violent extremists and criminals to expand their influence and threaten U.S. interests. These conflicts cause mass displacements and divert international resources that might otherwise be spent fostering economic growth and trade. The U.S. Armed Forces and our allies and partners are defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other terrorist groups on battlefields in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, but we are entering a new phase in this struggle. We must consolidate security gains, reduce levels of local instability, and work with local partners to peaceably manage change and provide legitimate and responsive governance. Our national experience over the past two decades has taught us that it is not enough to win the battle; we must help our local partners secure the peace by using every instrument of our national power. At the same time, we must resist the temptation to throw more money at these complex problems. American taxpayers are right to demand tough scrutiny of such investments. Transitioning too quickly to large-scale reconstruction and longer term development efforts can backfire without a clear strategic and political approach. Our organizations must more rigorously define stabilization missions based on national security interests and undertake institutional reforms based on hard-learned lessons. We must press our international partners to share the costs for these efforts, and hold our local partners accountable for demonstrating sustained leadership and progress. To meet these imperatives, our Departments and Agency are recommending steps to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. Government efforts to stabilize conflict-affected areas. This report outlines a framework to systematically apply lessons from the past; to strategically and selec- tively direct our resources; to increase burden-sharing with key international partners; and to improve the efficiency and impact of our efforts. We have approved this report as the first step in a process to position the U.S. Government’s defense, diplomatic, and development capabilities to meet strategic stabilization requirements. We are committed to advancing this process together. Reducing armed conflict is a perennial challenge, and there are many factors that are outside of our national control. By refining our respective organizational roles and capabilities and institutionalizing discipline and learning in our approach, we will increase our likelihood of success and improve accountability to the American taxpayer.

ii CONTENTS

FOREWORD...... II

ABOUT THE REVIEW. IV

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...... 1

INTRODUCTION...... 2

THE IMPERATIVE FOR A REVITALIZED APPROACH TO STABILIZATION . 4

LESSONS FOR EFFECTIVE STABILIZATION. 6 Set realistic, analytically-backed political goals ...... 6 Establish a division of labor and burden-sharing among international donors and local actors that optimizes the strengths of each ...... 6 . . . . Use data and evaluation systems to assess strategic progress and hold partners accountable ...... 6 . . Forward deploy U .S . Government and partnered civilians and establish local mechanisms that enable continuous engagement, negotiation, targeted assistance, and monitoring ...... 7 . . . Start with small, short-term assistance projects and scale up cautiously...... 7 Prioritize, layer, and sequence foreign assistance to advance stabilization goals ...... 8. . . Link subnational engagements with national diplomacy to advance stabilization ...... 8. . . Reinforce pockets of citizen security and purposefully engage with security actors ...... 8 . . Seek unity of purpose across all lines of effort ...... 9 . . . . Employ strategic patience and plan beyond stabilization for self-reliance ...... 9 . .

LOOKING AHEAD: A FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. STABILIZATION . 10 Establish Strategic Engagement Criteria and Priorities to Guide Stabilization ...... 10 . . Pursue a More Purposeful Division of Labor and Burden-Sharing with Multilateral Bodies, While Mobilizing Other Bilateral Donors on Stabilization ...... 11 . . . Define Department and Agency Roles and Responsibilities for Stabilization to Improve Performance...... 11 Build the Capacity of a U .S . Expeditionary Civilian Workforce to Meet Stabilization Objectives and Establish Policies to Allow for Co-Deployment ...... 12 . . . Leverage Flexible Funding to Enable Sequenced, Targeted Approaches to Assistance ...... 13 Promote Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Justice and Security Sector Assistance ...... 14. . Institutionalize Learning, Evaluation, and Accountability in Our Approach ...... 15. . .

CONCLUSION...... 15 Stabilization Assistance Review Leads ...... 16 . . . . Contributing Writers/Analysts ...... 16 . . . . Acknowledgements...... 16

iii We will give priority to strengthening states where state weaknesses or failure would magnify threats to the American homeland…Political problems are at the root of most state fragility. —National Security Strategy of the United States of America (December 2017)

ABOUT THE REVIEW The Stabilization Assistance Review was led by the Department of State’s Of- fice of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources (F) and the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO); the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), and Bureau of Policy, Planning, and Learning (PPL) in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs (SHA), and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Op- erations Institute (PKSOI). The Review was conducted through several research methods, including: 1. Literature review of more than 4. Qualitative questionnaire 300 articles and reports; completed by six DoD combatant 2. Analysis of eight cases of current commands; or past U.S. engagements in 5. Quantitative survey of more than conflict-affected areas;* 125 U.S. Government experts; and 3. Interviews of more than 250 6. Quantitative analysis of U.S. experts inside and outside foreign assistance spending in of government, including key conflict-affected areas from Fiscal international partners; Year (FY) 2009 to FY 2017.

*Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Somalia

iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

he United States has strong Over the past year, the Department ◆◆ Promote a fair, purposeful division national security and eco- of State (State), the U.S. Agency of labor with national partners T nomic interests in reducing for International Development and international donors. levels of violence and promoting (USAID) and the Department of ◆◆ Clarify agency roles and respon- stability in areas affected by armed Defense (DoD) have reviewed the sibilities to improve performance conflict, especially to consolidate significant lessons learned from and reduce duplication. security gains against the Islamic past stabilization efforts. The princi- State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and ples for effective stabilization have ◆◆ Improve the capacity of our other non-state armed groups. At been widely studied, but they have civilian workforce to address the same time, there is no appetite not been systematically applied stabilization needs in tandem to repeat large-scale reconstruction and institutionalized. The review with the U.S. military and part- efforts, and therefore our engage- has shown that the performance ner forces; and ments must be more measured in of U.S. stabilization efforts has con- ◆◆ Sequence and target our assis- scope and adaptable in execution. sistently been limited by the lack tance to conflict-affected areas The United States must be more of strategic clarity, organizational in a more measured fashion. selective and targeted about how discipline, and unity of effort in Now is the moment to focus we define stabilization missions, how we approach these missions. and revitalize how the United deploy our limited resources, In response, this report outlines States approaches stabilization. burden-share with local and inter- how the United States can improve Stabilization is a critical part of how national partners, and ultimately produce more tangible, long-term outcomes for our taxpaying public. This report defines stabilization as a political endeavor to Stabilization is an inherently political endeavor that requires create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and aligning U.S. Government efforts systems can peaceably manage conflict… —diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense —toward supporting locally legit- the outcomes of our stabilization the United States seeks to address imate authorities and systems to efforts through more efficient and conflict-affected states, as part peaceably manage conflict and disciplined bureaucratic structures, of a spectrum that also includes prevent violence. Stabilization processes and engagement with both conflict prevention and longer requires adaptive and targeted international partners. Specifically, term peacebuilding and reconcili- engagement at subnational and our proposed framework includes ation. Through these reforms and national levels. More important steps to: sustained leadership, the United than dollars spent is having a States can avoid mistakes of the ◆◆ Establish a U.S.-Government singular, agreed-upon, strategic wide definition of stabilization. past and better advance America’s approach to unify efforts in sup- national security interests in con- port of a consolidated local impact ◆◆ Develop and evaluate political flict-affected environments. executed through sequenced and strategies based on evidence contextual assistance. and rigorous analysis.

1 SAR: STABILIZATION ASSISTANCE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION espite global gains in prosperity, armed con- 140 flicts in many parts of the D 120 Global Con ict peaked in 2014-2015 world remain as complex and intractable as ever. Continued 100 INTRASTATE (NO EXTERNAL INTERVENTION) gains are by no means guar- 80 anteed. An increasing trend in internationalized and non-state 60 NONSTATE conflicts (reflected in Figure 1) 40 has resulted in crises that are 20 more protracted, violent, and INTRASTATE (EXTERNAL INTERVENTION)

difficult to solve. According to 0 data from the Uppsala Conflict 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 Database, unresolved griev- INTERSTATE ances and often a failure to Figure 1: Number of violent conflicts per year (at least 25 fatalities per year).Source: address political reform mean Uppsala Conflict Data Project that more than one-half of armed conflicts that achieve These persistent armed con- resources spent outside our peace lapse back into vio- flicts directly affect the security borders. Our taxpaying public lence—at a median of seven interests of the United States is demanding greater account- years—often introducing and our allies by creating insta- ability of our resources and new grievances and actors to bility that terrorist and criminal their impact. Moving forward, perpetuate bloodshed. More organizations and competitors our stabilization efforts must recently, the conflict landscape exploit. Recognizing this threat, be better prioritized and mea- is increasingly exacerbated by the United States and our sured and our partners must the rise of ISIS and competing Coalition partners are actively carry their fair share of the networks of non-state armed working in Iraq, Syria, Libya, burden. New ways of think- and extremist groups. Nigeria, and elsewhere around ing and operating are needed These armed conflicts have dire the world to defeat ISIS and to reduce dependencies on consequences for the people other transnational terrorist U.S. Government assistance, residing in affected countries groups. As the Coalition makes increase cost-sharing, and and impose a significant secu- security progress against ISIS, scope realistic outcomes for rity and financial burden on it is essential to consolidate stabilization efforts. We cannot American and international operational gains through continue to employ the same taxpayers as well as the global strategic political engagement approaches or tools in these economy. Over the past decade, and targeted assistance to endeavors and expect different the U.S. Government has con- establish basic security and results. sistently provided more than restore responsive, legitimate To this end, the Department of one-third of its foreign assis- governance. State (State), the U.S. Agency tance to countries with ongoing At the same time, there is no for International Development violent conflicts [see Figure 2]. public appetite to repeat the (USAID) and Department of Similarly, these same countries large-scale reconstruction Defense (DoD) have reviewed account for the vast majority of efforts of the past. The United past stabilization efforts in the peacekeeping budget of the States and other countries are conflict-affected areas and iden- United Nations (UN). scrutinizing and reducing the tified steps to more effectively

2 A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO STABILIZE CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS

UKRAINE

SYRIA AFGHANISTAN IRAQ

PAKISTAN LIBYA

MYANMAR

MALI SUDAN YEMEN

PHILIPPINES NIGERIA SOMALIA SOUTH SUDAN CAMEROON

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Figure 2: Map of select countries with more than 1000 battle-related deaths over the last five years (Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Project) where internationally-supported “stabilization” efforts have been active. leverage the U.S. Government’s with related ongoing processes essential for addressing today’s diplomatic, defense, and for- at the UN and World Bank. challenges and advancing U.S. eign assistance resources in This report outlines findings national security. The second these difficult environments. from the Review and presents section describes the core prin- The Stabilization Assistance consolidated approaches to ciples and lessons learned for Review (“the Review”) built on maximize the impact of U.S. the U.S. Government’s stabiliza- many of the findings from the engagement as well as reduce tion. The third and final section “2016 Department of Defense inefficiencies and wasteful outlines a proposed framework Biennial Assessment of Stability spending. The first section for the U.S. Government’s Operations Capabilities.” The outlines why a narrowed, revital- efforts to advance stabilization Review was also coordinated ized approach to stabilization is in conflict-affected areas.

We will work to consolidate military gains against ISIS, al Qa’ida, and other terrorist organizations and stabilize liberated areas by supporting local partners that can reestablish the rule of law, manage conflict, and restore basic services. —State and USAID Joint Strategic Plan, FY 2018-2022

3 SAR: STABILIZATION ASSISTANCE REVIEW

THE IMPERATIVE FOR A REVITALIZED APPROACH TO STABILIZATION he United States and selective and targeted about access to dispute resolution, our partners need a new how we engage in stabilization deliver targeted basic services, Tand more disciplined environments to maximize the and establish a foundation for approach for conducting sta- value of American and interna- the return of displaced people bilization in conflict-affected tional taxpayer resources.The and longer term development. areas. This approach includes revitalized approach to stabili- Stabilization is distinct from analyzing risks and focusing our zation outlined here can help humanitarian assistance, which efforts on what is absolutely target diplomatic engagement the U.S. Government provides necessary to achieve stability, in these environments toward impartially on the basis of need, rather than pursuing disparate advancing a strategy connected from longer term reconstruction agendas all at once. A critical to stabilization outcomes, and development activities. first step toward more harmo- enable greater sequencing and Although context-dependent, nized stabilization efforts is layering of assistance to sup- stabilization is intended to be agreeing on the core tenets port locally legitimate actors, short-term in nature (typically of the concept itself. Despite achieve cost-saving efficiencies, between one and five years). significant international experi- and foster a better division Without first achieving legiti- ence over recent decades, the of labor between the U.S. mate political stability, longer concept of stabilization remains Government and international term development efforts are ill-defined and poorly institution- donors and institutions. unlikely to take root and can alized across government and With these lessons in mind, even exacerbate lingering multilateral structures. This lack State, USAID, and DoD have conflict dynamics. Stabilization of standardization in definition developed a refined definition starts to set the conditions for and process leads to repeated of stabilization that can guide building legitimate societal and mistakes, inefficient spending, our efforts in this regard. We governing institutions. USAID and poor accountability for define stabilization as a political defines these as institutions results. endeavor involving an inte- that are inclusive, responsive, Now is the moment to refo- grated civilian-military process and accountable to all groups, cus and revitalize the U.S. to create conditions where including minority and marginal- Government’s approach to locally legitimate authorities ized populations. The nature of stabilization. There is a clear and systems can peaceably relations among identity groups, imperative from policymakers manage conflict and prevent the capacity of civil society to to consolidate security gains a resurgence of violence. engage government, and the in ISIS-affected areas through Transitional in nature, stabili- extent of economic opportu- stabilization. At the same time, zation may include efforts to nity all affect the legitimacy of policymakers want to be more establish civil security, provide state-society relations.

We define stabilization as a political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. Transitional in nature, stabilization may include efforts to establish civil security, provide access to dispute resolution, and deliver targeted basic services, and establish a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer term development. 4 A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO STABILIZE CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS

U.S. Army civil affairs forces provide veterinarian assistance to Iraqi communities following successful operations against ISIS. Photo: USASOC

In the past, there has been a rush to initiate high-cost, sec- toral programming before there is a foundation of inclusive polit- 3.0 ical systems, basic security, and 2.8 a reliable and legitimate partner government at the national 2.6 level. A deliberate approach Economic Policy focusing planning and opera- 2.4 Education tions on stabilization outcomes 2.2 can ensure the right condi- Economic Performance tions are in place for broader 2.0 development resources to be 1.8 Peace & Security well-spent. At the same time, it is imperative that stabilization 1.6 Democracy, Human Right & Governance efforts incorporate transition 1.4 plans to economic growth, 2005 2006 2008 2008 2009 2010 2111 2012 2013 2014 private sector vibrancy, and Figure 3: The State/USAID “Country Data Analytics” index average scores for the 16 responsive governance, with conflict-affected countries identified in the previous map over the past 10 years. This an end state of self-sufficiency, figure shows a measurable decrease in peace and security scores, while health and lest any progress achieved by education have improved. those activities is not sustained and lost.

5 SAR: STABILIZATION ASSISTANCE REVIEW

USAID is helping to bring community leaders together in northeastern Nigeria to build trust and restore stability in areas affected by Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa. Photo: USAID LESSONS FOR EFFECTIVE STABILIZATION esigning and pursuing about which specific legitimate donor’s comparative advantage. stabilization are com- political systems and actors Multilateral approaches to sta- Dplex tasks involving we will support, why and how, bilization, particularly by the UN many context-specific factors and associated tradeoffs. This and World Bank, can mobilize that are outside of a single strategy should be based on a contributions by other bilateral actor’s control. Our approach clearly articulated and achiev- partners. Multilateral partners must be flexible and adjust as able political end state. It should bring different strengths and non-state armed groups adapt, include a realistic assessment weaknesses, and the U.S. and address the political chal- of the level of commitment and Government should engage lenges of possible spoilers to risk tolerance required to imple- when they have a comparative stabilization. Yet even as we ment the strategy. With a clear advantage. For example, the remain agile, we must apply political strategy and defined end World Bank has mobilized funds evidence-based lessons to state, we can delineate a phased for Yemen, but turned to the UN increase the chances of suc- approach to target and sequence for implementation. cess. The Review identified the our engagement and assistance following set of core principles programs—as well as those of Use data and evaluation systems that undergird effective stabili- others— in a unified fashion. to assess strategic progress and zation efforts. hold partners accountable Establish a division of labor Although stabilization requires Set realistic, analytically-backed and burden-sharing among flexible and adaptive mecha- political goals international donors and local nisms, teams should identify actors that optimizes the strengths clear strategic-level political Stabilization is inherently politi- of each cal, which means it must focus objectives at the outset to track on local, national, and/or regional There needs to be a clear and analyze impact on an itera- societal and governing dynam- understanding at the outset tive basis. This approach should ics, agents, and systems that of a stabilization effort of what comprise metrics to ensure that lead populations toward inclu- the partner nation govern- the host-nation partner is follow- sive, non-violent settlement and ment is willing and expected ing through on commitments agreement. Its success depends to deliver in terms of political and fully embracing mandated on having a goal-oriented political and financial commitments. anti-corruption and transpar- strategy that aligns with local There should also be a clear ency efforts. Tying diplomatic interests. Through analysis and division of labor among inter- engagement and assistance deliberate iterative planning, national donors, based on to local qualitative impacts stabilization requires decisions analysis that accounts for each rather than solely quantitative 6 A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO STABILIZE CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS

activity outputs and using strategic level analysis will enable Conflict senior policymakers to consider Mitigation & Stabilization whether policy adjustments are Humanitarian 13% Other required to achieve objectives. Peace & The Review’s case study in 26% Security Afghanistan found that using 11 % consistent data tied to specific Governing Justly political objectives—and sharing Economic & Democratically Growth relevant information across U.S. Investing Government Departments and 15% in People 15% (e.g., Health, Agencies—would have enabled Education) better review and analysis by policymakers. 20% Figure 4: State/USAID foreign assistance to the 16 conflict-affected countries identified Forward deploy U.S. Government in the previous map from Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 to FY 2016, by designated program goals/ and partnered civilians and areas. Analysis of spending trends in case-study countries reinforced the need for establish local mechanisms that greater flexibility, sequencing and/or integration of non-humanitarian assistance in enable continuous engagement, conflict-affected areas. negotiation, targeted assistance, and monitoring programs and strategy to keep achieve local outcomes and pace with the evolving politi- build momentum. Smaller proj- Deploying civilian stabilization cal dynamic. For example, the ects driven by host-government experts on the ground to work Review’s case study analysis and communities in support of with and alongside deployed showed that State and USAID a unified political strategy and military elements is essential have worked closely with the diplomatic engagement are to success because it enables UN and third-party contractors best suited to achieve short- a unified approach and helps in Somalia and Syria to improve term stabilization objectives ensure the overarching political our monitoring of local dynam- and to set the stage for even- strategy is driving all mission ics that informs and connects tual management, financing, components. The “2016 DoD programming to overall politi- and ownership by national Biennial Assessment of Stability cal objectives. Still, significant governments or regional Operations Capabilities” cited security limitations on U.S. administrations. For exam- as a critical shortfall the lack Government civilian presence in ple, the Review’s case study of institutionalized DoD mech- conflict and post-conflict areas showed that in northeastern anisms to enable regular impede our ability to identify Nigeria, the U.S. Government collaboration with interagency and respond to emergent polit- has worked effectively at the and international partners. It is ical opportunities and quickly community level to develop imperative to have civilians with adapt our programs. a nuanced village-by-village the appropriate knowledge and understanding of stabilization skill sets on the ground and able Start with small, short-term challenges and political dynam- to engage with citizen groups, assistance projects and scale up ics fueling violent extremists. analyze local dynamics, iden- cautiously Such a focused understanding tify the right local partners to According to multiple studies, enables the United States to advance the political strategy, targeted and smaller programs target assistance to support and routinely monitor and adjust are better at the outset to stability and diminish the appeal

If we are to achieve our strategic objectives in a conflict, American policymakers must accept that the political dimension is indispensable across the spectrum of conflict. —Dr. Nadia Schadlow, Deputy Assistant to the President of the United States, War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory (2017) 7 SAR: STABILIZATION ASSISTANCE REVIEW

of extremists. Operating within of development and security study of Mali showed that fail- and in cooperation with local sector assistance should be ure to achieve a durable political communities allows increased considered through that lens. settlement at the national level local support and the ability to In some cases, certain types can undermine local stabiliza- build legitimacy from the bot- of assistance should be delayed tion efforts. Assistance targeted tom up by strengthening local or sequenced if they cannot be at the subnational level is most political and social systems. This accountable or implemented effective when it is informed by approach is true not only of bilat- successfully without adequate national-level policy reforms. eral funding, but multi-donor stability.This process includes However, in other cases such as efforts as well. Large-scale proj- being deliberate and precise Syria today, subnational engage- ects run a higher risk of creating about how and when we seek ment will need to begin first, perverse incentives, distorting to promote private sector while national-level dynamics the local economy, and being investment, taking into account are still being resolved. This manipulated by corrupt actors the risks and challenges. process requires a flexible who benefit from the conflict. Greater consideration of the approach, recognizing that Often a country’s absorptive exact role of the private sector subnational dynamics can vary capacity after conflict remains as well as the appropriate ratio radically from one geographic low and realistic expectations for immediate versus long-term region to another. are needed about the time it will funding needs (including inter- take to strengthen local and/or national donors) is necessary. If Reinforce pockets of citizen national ownership. engaged effectively, the result security and purposefully engage would be cost-savings in the with security actors Prioritize, layer, and sequence short-term and enable better Stabilization is most likely to foreign assistance to advance overall development outcomes be successful where there is stabilization goals in the long run. Unfortunately, in basic security on the ground. If stabilization is a top goal for many cases, this lack of prioriti- Basic security is defined as international engagement in a zation has resulted in disparate minimum conditions where country, then the full range of and competing assistance U.S. assistance partners can non-humanitarian assistance efforts that made engagement operate and monitor activities, the U.S. Government allo- ineffective. access appropriate local stake- cates to that country should holders, and where security be considered in terms of how Link subnational engagements with actors can engage in building it can advance the established national diplomacy to advance trust with local communities. political and diplomatic strategy stabilization Furthermore, focusing on pre- without creating dependency. Both national and subnational cise subnational areas where Stabilization assistance is not engagements are needed to there are pockets of security is an entitlement, and continued advance stabilization, and need more likely to succeed because U.S. Government assistance to be eventually nested together there will be an ability to work should depend on results. to achieve optimal effect. For consistently with local actors, Program planning and design example, our Review’s case including local security forces.

Stability gains are not sustainable without citizen-responsive governance. Early transition work lays the foundation for long-term development by promoting reconciliation, jumpstarting local economies, supporting emerging independent media, and fostering lasting peace and democracy through innovative programming and evidence-based approaches. —USAID Administrator Mark Green, speaking to the House Appropriations Committee, November 1, 2017 8 A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO STABILIZE CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS

Young activists attend a peace rally in Ansongo in northern Mali where local actors demanded rebels to sign the Algiers Peace Deal. Photo: USAID

The Review’s case study of operations may have destabiliz- generalizable to all cases, but Afghanistan showed that most ing effects. Stabilization cannot in no case should it be open- experts, including the U.S. be an afterthought. Rather, it ended. While stabilization Special Inspector General for needs to be fully integrated efforts are intended to create Afghanistan Reconstruction, and elevated across lines of targeted short-term effects, it concluded that prioritizing effort. It should be incorpo- usually requires time to achieve U.S. stabilization programs in rated into campaign planning durable and legitimate political areas without local-level com- as early as possible to help settlements at local and national mitments to reduce violence shape operational design and levels. Strategic and resource and increase physical security strategic decisions. The “2016 planners should take this reality negatively affected overall DoD Biennial Assessment into account to build realistic, momentum toward stability. Operations Capabilities” rec- flexible, and achievable mile- Alternatively, tailored place- ommended that civil-military stones and enable consistent based assistance strategies annexes be drafted for all funding. Effective stabiliza- that marry violence-reduction Combatant Command con- tion efforts also intentionally and citizen security efforts with cept plans and operations incorporate linkages to longer targeted law enforcement have plans, with interagency input. term development efforts into proven successful in stabilizing Close civilian-military planning planning. Multilateral develop- some of the most at-risk locales and coordination has been a ment banks, other donors, and in Central America. key determinant in effective the private sector should be stabilization outcomes across part of the process as early as Seek unity of purpose across all all cases examined. For possible, while being realistic lines of effort example, in Pakistan, close about the challenges and risks One of the greatest challenges synchronization of stabilization in post-conflict investment cli- to stabilization is that different programming with security mates. Stabilization should also U.S. Departments and Agencies operations facilitated targeted, include strategic communica- have different priorities, and impactful programming. tion strategies that emphasize regional and international actors host-nation ownership from the often have other agendas that Employ strategic patience and outset to avoid creating depen- work at competing purposes. plan beyond stabilization for self- dencies or local resentment. Counterterrorism operations reliance are prioritized in many conflict There is no single set time environments today, but some frame for stabilization that is

9 SAR: STABILIZATION ASSISTANCE REVIEW

LOOKING AHEAD: A FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. STABILIZATION revitalized approach to regions, and then conduct how the United States deliberate strategic planning Aworks to stabilize rel- to contend with stabilization evant conflict-affected areas challenges. Key criteria for 89% —an approach that takes into determining whether, when, of surveyed USG experts account the current imperatives and how to pursue a stabiliza- Support development of a and past lessons—needs orga- tion mission should include the defined interagency strategy and nizational structures, budgets, assessed U.S. national interest; implementation plan for places processes, capabilities, and national and local partner own- where U.S. policymakers determine personnel that are fit for this ership; risks, constraints and that the U.S. has a vital national purpose. Most of the above opportunities in the operating interest in pursuing stabilization. findings are not new, but they environment; the level of risk have not been systematically we are willing to assume; and a political strategy for the sta- applied or institutionalized in the level of sustained resources bilization mission. how we approach stabilization we are willing to commit. Key elements to address in the in conflict-affected areas. State, As noted above, success- political strategy include: part- USAID, and DoD have identified ful stabilization begins with ner nation goals and capacity; the following areas to improve developing an outcome-based the defined U.S. Government how our Departments and political strategy that outlines interests and areas in which Agency work individually and our core assumptions and interests may compete; map- together to advance stabiliza- achievable end states and ping key actors; desired political tion goals. guides all lines of effort—dip- end states and objectives; the lomatic engagement, defense, interests and goals of partners; Establish Strategic Engagement foreign assistance, and private anticipated resource require- Criteria and Priorities to Guide sector engagement where ments; the role of different U.S. Stabilization appropriate—to ensure unity Government actors and inter- The U.S. Government should of purpose within the U.S. national donors; mechanisms institutionalize a process by Government. In those places for civil-military coordination; which we identify conflict-af- of highest priority for stabiliza- assessment of risks; and stra- fected countries/regions that tion, State, USAID, and DoD tegic analytics to track over warrant increased attention, should work with the relevant time and measure progress. assess the U.S. interests and U.S. Embassy, regional bureau, The strategy must then be insti- priorities for advancing sta- Combatant Commands, and tutionalized into Department bilization in these countries/ other stakeholders to develop and Agency plans and reviewed

A wise approach to reform [of stabilization and reconstruction operations] would aim at producing a unified system that plans and executes operations integratively, averts significant waste, increases the likelihood of tactical success, and better protects U.S. national security interests. —Final Report of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Learning from Iraq, March 2013

10 A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO STABILIZE CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS

on a regular basis to assess its missions. Similarly, the United Define Department and Agency effectiveness and make adjust- States should actively engage Roles and Responsibilities ments as needed. with the World Bank and the for Stabilization to Improve regional development banks as Performance Pursue a More Purposeful Division it considers significant expan- Clear lines of authority of Labor and Burden-Sharing sions in its engagement and between and within U.S. with Multilateral Bodies, While funding in conflict-affected Government departments and Mobilizing Other Bilateral Donors areas. agencies would improve effec- on Stabilization At an operational level, we tiveness, reduce duplication Engaging in stabilization should continue to engage and confusion, enable greater missions means the U.S. pooled donor mechanisms in accountability, and fully opera- Government must advocate some cases to mobilize other tionalize a whole-of-government that our partners co-invest with partner resources. We should approach. The U.S. Government purpose in line with mutually press that donor coordination should formally define lead agreed strategic outcomes. bodies approach these pooled agency roles for stabilization Developing coordinated donor financing mechanisms strategi- missions, with State as the over- approaches toward fragile and cally, building on best practices all lead federal agency for U.S. post-conflict contexts based on for risk-mitigation, local govern- stabilization efforts; USAID as lessons learned has increased ment support, accountability the lead implementing agency significantly over the past and monitoring, as well as for non-security U.S. stabiliza- decade and spurred new inter- flexible structures. We should tion assistance; and, DoD as a national frameworks such as also actively engage with these supporting element, to include the New Deal for Engagements pooled funding mechanisms providing requisite security and in Fragile States, but these to ensure they reinforce our reinforcing civilian efforts where efforts have not yet resulted political objectives, and mobi- appropriate. DoD is refining its in standardized or efficient lize donors to take on greater stabilization policy to incorpo- approaches adaptable across costs. The U.S. Government rate the concept of “Defense conflicts. Effective donor coordi- and international community Support to Stabilization.” Other nation includes pressing donor should be clear on our expec- Departments and Agencies, partners to develop systematic tations of the financial and including members of the approaches and share the bur- political responsibilities of each Intelligence Community, can dens and risks of stabilization. partner-nation government. also play critical supporting At a policy level, State and Financing mechanisms should roles. USAID should seek dedicated reflect the capacity level at the With clear roles, State, USAID, dialogues with the Organization outset with clear guidance on and DoD should then ensure for Economic Cooperation and measuring progress over time. that we each have the appro- Development (OECD), UN, In some cases, other donors priate structures and staff in World Bank, and other regional could want to build on our place to perform these roles in and international organiza- implementation mechanism. tions to press for coordinated Through targeted agreements reforms in how they approach bilateral donor funding can and invest in conflict-affected flow through existing U.S. areas. The U.S. Government Government procurement 86% of surveyed USG experts should encourage the UN mechanisms. One example is to adopt a single common the United Kingdom’s recent Are not clear which U.S. Government approach to stabilization that contributions to a USAID-led agencies have lead responsibility for different elements of stabilization. can integrate efforts across stabilization program in Libya. its peacekeeping and political

11 SAR: STABILIZATION ASSISTANCE REVIEW

an efficient, coordinated fash- Build the Capacity of a U.S. deploy and have the support ion. For example, State should Expeditionary Civilian Workforce systems to do so. to Meet Stabilization Objectives institutionalize a structure that Specifically, the START frame- can lead and coordinate inter- and Establish Policies to Allow for Co-Deployment work for both Washington and agency stabilization analysis, abroad should streamline roles policy formulation, and strategic To advance stabilization suc- and procedures; establish an planning as well as diplomatic cess, the United States requires enduring human resources, engagement. At the same time, a mechanism to rapidly deploy training, and operational sup- USAID should designate and civilian-led stabilization teams port platform; provide expanded empower an entity to serve as into conflict-affected areas to authorities to deploy civilians its technical lead for stabilization assess local conditions, engage with and alongside DoD oper- to engage with the interagency local authorities, and direct ational and tactical elements; and support relevant regional and monitor programs. We and, when necessary, recruit bureaus and Missions in coordi- have faced delays in the past and deploy further qualified nating, planning, implementing, in deploying civilian experts surge personnel. The teams can and monitoring non-security alongside U.S. military ele- be tailored to specific planning stabilization assistance in con- ments —despite overwhelming and implementation objectives flict-affected environments. policy consensus—because of based on the directive and This process would help ensure a lack of standing authorities needs of the relevant Chief of coherent management and and structures, missing critical Mission. implementation of this type of opportunities to address over- U.S. assistance. DoD should lapping civilian and security Establishing interoperable, assign stabilization planners objectives. State, USAID, and co-deployable capabilities throughout the Department, DoD should work together depends on instituting more especially at the Geographic to develop a framework for flexible security and risk-man- Combatant Commands, and Stabilization, Transition, and agement standards and making ensure professional military Response Teams (START) that strategic investments in human education prepares future lead- can support Chiefs of Mission resources and training. State ers to operate effectively with and Combatant Commands to and USAID should review and civilian partners at the strategic, coordinate, plan, and implement adapt existing risk-management operational and tactical levels. a U.S. Government stabiliza- standards and processes to Recognizing the interlinkages tion response in conflict areas. provide leaders and employees between our organizations, This approach would build on with accepted approaches to these respective entities must lessons from, and address defining and making decisions be prepared to train, exercise, shortcomings of, the previous in the face of challenging, fluid, and work closely together to Civilian Response Corps, by and unclear circumstances. advance integrated stabilization setting up a much smaller and These mechanisms must efforts before a contingency dedicated set of stabilization take into account the central occurs. specialists who can rapidly issue of Departments’ and Agencies’ unique authorities

If you take good people and good ideas and you match them with bad processes, the bad processes will win nine out of ten times. —General James N. Mattis USMC (ret.) interview with Peter Robinson at the Hoover Institution, March 6, 2015

12 A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO STABILIZE CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS

U.S. Special Operations Forces engage in Shura discussion with Afghan elders about security and governance. Photo: DoD and regulations governing secu- bolster these efforts, DoD is State and USAID to assess rity responsibility. reviewing whether to request and respond to emergent sta- At the same time, State, USAID, new authorities to support the bilization requirements, while and DoD should pre-identify and deployment of civilian advisors bilateral and regional funds can prepare a pool of civilians with for stabilization on a non-reim- provide consistency over time. requisite experience who can bursable basis. The new Counter-ISIS Relief deploy on short notice to sup- and Recovery Fund provided port joint stabilization missions, Leverage Flexible Funding to Enable by Congress is another good Sequenced, Targeted Approaches drawing heavily from existing example of the kind of flexible to Assistance State staff with experience funding that is useful. The U.S. working in conflict environ- Stabilization does not require Government should continue to ments and incorporating lessons extremely high funding levels; engage with Congress to build from their experience. State rather, stabilization depends confidence and support for this and USAID will need to max- on consistent, flexible funding goal to increase our flexibility to imize and expand agile hiring accounts unencumbered by respond quickly to stabilization mechanisms of non-tenured Congressionally-directed ear- needs. staff to fill critical gaps that marks, that can enable agile, State and USAID should also can incentivize expeditionary targeted, and sequenced engage with other donors to missions and enhance reten- approaches to stabiliza- better coordinate their dedi- tion. State, USAID, and DoD tion programming. Existing cated funds for stabilization should reinforce and formalize funding accounts, such as and associated efforts in con- existing joint training efforts to “Peacekeeping Operations” flict-affected areas. The UN meet minimum and prerequi- and “Transition Initiatives,” Peacebuilding Fund and World site deployment standards. To provide critical authorities for Bank’s State and Peacebuilding

13 SAR: STABILIZATION ASSISTANCE REVIEW

throughout all efforts. A sim- ilar effort is needed to align and adapt justice and security sector assistance programs in these environments. In support of counterterrorism objectives, the international community is providing high volumes of security sector training and assistance to many conflict-affected countries, but our programs are largely discon- nected from a political strategy writ large, and do not address the civilian-military aspects required for transitional public USAID is supporting communities in the wake of Colombia’s civil war to solidify and citizen security. More focus the peace process and promote reconciliation PHOTO. Photo: Juan Carlos Sierra/USAID needs to be placed on helping security forces to secure population centers and restore Fund as well as the United function in challenging environ- trust with local communities. Kingdom’s Conflict, Stability, ments. Where we are pursuing This approach is true not only and Security Fund are important stabilization programming in for U.S. programs, but also for models for operational reform conflict-affected areas, State other donor efforts. in support of stabilization. and USAID should work to In addition, more efforts and We should seek to promote adapt and align procurement resources need to be tailored greater alignment and ratio- tools for security and non-se- to address trauma and psy- nalization of how these funds curity assistance and delegate chosocial well-being within are deployed along with the authorities closer to the field. conflict-affected communities, relevant U.S. accounts, based promote local justice and the on their respective strengths Promote Conflict-Sensitive rule of law, and address local Approaches to Justice and and limitations. grievances related to access Security Sector Assistance At the same time, State, to justice and corruption con- USAID, and DoD need to put The U.S. Government and cerns. The ability of the state in place appropriate structures other donors need to carefully to re-establish order, security and mechanisms to better use tailor all assistance and training and the rule of law will greatly our existing flexibilities and programs in conflict-affected influence the extent of popular resources. We should be more environments to ensure they support for stabilization and disciplined in assessing the mutually advance stability and longer term reform. USAID risks of prematurely providing do not inadvertently exacer- experience in conflict-affected certain types of assistance in bate conflict dynamics. Over environments suggests that conflict-affected environments the past decade, USAID has three areas are paramount before there is a foundation developed important guidelines for immediate engagement: of legitimate political order, for conflict-sensitive democracy access to justice, particularly basic security, and appropriate and governance, education, and for marginalized populations; anti-corruption controls. Flexible economic growth programming mechanisms that promote and adaptive procurement in conflict-affected areas, which peaceful, fair, and transparent mechanisms are also crucial to the Agency should streamline

14 A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO STABILIZE CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS

management of disputes; and and accountability. Likewise, the conflict environment and transitional justice. we should take a balanced track them consistently over Justice sector programming approach in our reaction to time, while also allowing for in conflict-affected areas often and willingness to work with flexibility to adjust indicators focuses heavily on promoting informal and formal systems. based on what we are learning. formal national and criminal The U.S. Government should This process can facilitate more justice-focused institutions expand and strengthen its insti- rigorous reviews by policy- based on Western domestic tutional capabilities to undertake makers to determine whether experiences, missing oppor- this critical local rule of law adjustments are needed in our tunities to advance local and programming where needed political strategy and objectives. civil solutions in more fluid and ensure longer term rule of As part of this effort, we should environments. It is critical to law and justice programming use evidence and analytics to build the legitimacy of formal is coordinated and aligned with rigorously assess our polit- institutions over time, but in stabilization efforts. ical strategy and the political many conflict-affected areas, interests of our national and much of the population looks to Institutionalize Learning, local partners. If they are not Evaluation, and Accountability in local, tribal, religious, or other living up to their commitments, Our Approach non-government justice insti- we should be prepared to tutions to resolve disputes and Finally, to be successful, sta- change course. If our political assert legal rights. We should bilization requires a regular objectives are infeasible due work with international partners feedback loop that involves to misalignment with local to deepen our understanding experimentation, learning, political interests, we must of local needs in these envi- adaptation, and accountabil- be willing to adjust political ronments and consider local ity. This approach is critical at objectives. Accordingly, stabi- precedent regarding adminis- both the program and strategic lization will ultimately not be tration of justice, particularly levels. We should identify indi- successful if our partners are with respect to reconciliation cators to measure changes in not fully invested in a collective undertaking.

CONCLUSION dvancing the United and international partners to area. The challenge today is to States’ top foreign pol- achieve a fair division of labor apply that experience, talent, Aicy priorities requires and burden-sharing, and pro- and learning in a systematic a revitalized approach to how mote conditions to maximize fashion. With sustained lead- we work to stabilize con- our assistance resources and ership and dedicated, efficient flict-affected areas. We cannot promote long-term self-suffi- organizational structures and continue to take the same ciency. This approach is not easy frameworks, we can achieve approach and expect different to get right, but our Review that and thereby avoid costly results. We need a disciplined has affirmed that there is tre- mistakes, increase our likely approach to how we set our mendous talent, expertise and dividends, and do right by our strategic goals, maintain priori- willingness to succeed across taxpaying public. ties, engage with local, national, the U.S. Government in this

15 SAR: STABILIZATION ASSISTANCE REVIEW

STABILIZATION ASSISTANCE REVIEW LEADS Kristen Cordell Sara Reckless Senior Advisor (USAID/PPL) Transition Advisor (USAID/OTI) Peter Quaranto Kelly Uribe Senior Advisor, Peace and Security (State/F) Senior Policy Advisor (OSD/SHA) Patrick Quirk, Ph.D. Senior Policy Advisor (State/CSO)

CONTRIBUTING WRITERS/ANALYSTS COL Charles Anderson Kevin Melton Stability/Security Advisor (PKSOI) Transition Advisor (USAID/OTI) Monica Azimi LtCol Daniel O’Connor Foreign Service Officer (USAID/CMM) Marine Corps Fellow (State/F) Melissa Duell, Ph.D. MAJ Wes Wilhite AAAS Research Fellow Army Fellow (State/F) (State/CSO)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Stabilization Assistance Review would not have been possible without the generous time and support of many individuals and organizations. Several people from the lead organizations provided research and analytic support in the form of case studies, literature reviews and other contributions, including Toshiro Baum, Annie Bird, Jessica Bryant, Lisa Campbell, Audra Dykman, Benjamin Fisher, Tammy Fitzgerald, Bill Flavin, Jason Fritz, Lani Fuata, Kendra Helmer, Bruce Hemmer, Joel Hirst, Stephanie Hurter, Dara Katz, Amanda Kelly, Angie Kochukudy, Shadrach Ludeman, Kaleigh MacLaughlin, Adam Mausner, Nicholas Marinacci, Carolyn Mattick, Ryan McCannell, Raymond Millen, Adam O’Brien, Patrick Olson, Keith Proctor, Ian Reese, Col. Aaron Reisinger, and Ken Spear. In addition, inputs from across the U.S. Government were critical to scope the study and refine its core findings and recommendations. Special thanks go to State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Bureau of Near-Eastern Affairs, the Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to the Counter-ISIS Coalition, USAID’s Bureau of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, Bureau of Middle Eastern Affairs, and Office of Civil-Military Cooperation, and U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Special Inspector-General for Afghanistan Reconstruction for critical contributions to shape the content of this report. Special thanks also go to Frances Brown and Tess McEnery for providing critical support for the Review at the National Security Council. Representatives from multilateral organizations, international organizations, and partner government stabilization units also provided essential inputs, especially Australia, the European Union, Germany, the OECD, the World Bank, the United Kingdom, and the UN. Countless stabilization experts from academic institutions, civil society groups, and non-governmental organizations provided inputs through interviews and roundtables. The SAR team is especially grateful to the Alliance for Peacebuilding (Melanie Greenberg and Elizabeth Hume), Brookings Institution (Bruce Jones and Tarun Chhabra), Center for Strategic and International Studies (Melissa Dalton), the Empirical Study of Conflict Project (Jacob Shapiro and Radha Iyengar), the Heritage Foundation (James Carafano), RAND (Rebecca Zimmerman, Seth Jones and Charles Ries), and U.S. Institute of Peace (Beth Cole and Rusty Barber) for convening roundtables with top experts to offer insights for the Review.