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PRISM Vol. 2 No 1 FEATURES 3 The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening by Najim Abed Al-Jabouri and Sterling Jensen 19 From Idea to Implementation: Standing Up the Civilian Response Corps by Samuel S. Farr 27 Third-generation Civil-military Relations: Moving Beyond the ndupress.ndu.edu Security-Development Nexus by Frederik Rosén 43 Supporting Peace: The End by William J. Durch 57 Nonstate Security Threats in Africa: Challenges for U.S. Engagement by Andre Le Sage 79 Shock and Awe a Decade and a Half Later: Still Relevant, Still Misunderstood by Harlan K. Ullman 87 A Tale of Two Manuals by Raphael S. Cohen 101 Post-9/11 Stability Operations: How U.S. Army Doctrine Is Shaping National Security Strategy by Corri Zoli and Nicholas J. Armstrong FROM THE FIELD 121 Building Police Capacity in Afghanistan: The Challenges of a Multilateral Approach by William B. Caldwell IV and Nathan K. Finney LESSONS LEARNED 131 Pakistan Earthquake Relief Operations: Leveraging Humanitarian Missions for Strategic Success by William J. Bowers INTERVIEWS 145 An Interview with Jim Webb 151 An Interview with Martin E. Dempsey PRISMPRISM 2, no. 1 FEATURES | 1 BOOK REVIEWS 156 The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era Reviewed by John Coffey 161 Why Vietnam Matters: An Eyewitness Account of Lessons Not Learned Reviewed by R. Scott Moore 165 Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military Reviewed by Samuel A. Worthington 2 | FEATURES PRISM 2, no. 1 The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening BY NAJIM ABED AL-JABOURI AND STERLING JENSEN fter the coalition forces invaded Iraq in 2003, Sunnis revolted against the idea of de-Sunnifying Iraq. Partnering with the United States in 2006 was mainly an attempt A to recoup Sunni losses once the United States had seemingly changed its position in their regard. This happened as the Sunni community increasingly saw al Qaeda and Iran as bigger threats than the U.S. occupation. The Sunni Awakening had two main parts: the Anbar Awakening and the Awakening councils, or the Sons of Iraq program. The Anbar Awakening was an Iraqi grassroots initiative supported by the United States and paid for by the Iraqi government. The Sons of Iraq program was a U.S.-led and -funded initiative to spread the success of the Anbar Awakening into other Sunni areas, particularly heterogeneous areas, and was not fully supported by the Iraqi government. If not for al Qaeda’s murder and intimidation campaign on Sunnis, and its tactic of creating a sectarian war, the Anbar Awakening—a fundamental factor in the success of the 2007 surge—most probably would not have occurred, and it would have been difficult for the United States in 2006 to convince Sunnis to partner with them in a fight against al Qaeda. Anbar Awakening and Sons of Iraq Program: What’s the Difference? The Sunni Awakening is the Iraqi revolt against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in which Sunni Arabs partnered with U.S. forces to fight a common enemy. American accounts generally have the Sunni Awakening starting unofficially in February 2005 when men from the Albu Mahal tribe in al-Qaim fought against al Qaeda and solicited U.S. help to do so. However, this attempt and others Major General Najim Abed Al-Jabouri (Ret.) is an International Fellow in the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He was a major general in the new Iraqi police and mayor of Tal Afar, Ninevah, from 2005 to 2008. Sterling Jensen is a Research Associate at NESA and Ph.D. candidate at King’s College London. PRISM 2, no. 1 FEATURES | 3 Al-JABOURI & JENSEN quickly lost steam through al Qaeda’s murder is important to make this distinction because and intimidation campaign against tribal leaders there were different factors involved in the and anyone, regardless of sect, associated with Iraqi roles before and after the surge. However, receiving U.S. help. The Sunni Awakening to understand the Iraqi and AQI roles in the then officially started in September 2006 with Awakening, it is important to first put Sunni the announcement of the Anbar Awakening in thinking after the invasion in the right context. Ramadi under the leadership of Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha. American accounts then Reasons for the Sunni Insurgency morph the Anbar Awakening into the Sons of Misunderstanding between the United Iraq program where Sunni tribesmen and for- States and Iraqi Sunni Arabs fed the insurgency. mer resistance fighters were paid by the United When coalition forces invaded Iraq in March States to man security checkpoints in areas 2003, the predominantly Sunni provinces of infested by al Qaeda and other militant jihadist Anbar, Ninevah, and Salah al-Din did not groups opposed to the Iraqi government. This want to confront the invading forces militar- ily. As Sunnis in the north saw the destruction and looting taking place in the south as coali- Sunnis assumed it was not in the U.S. tion troops entered, a number of tribal leaders interest to give the majority of the who had been in contact with U.S. military next government to Shia and Kurdish and intelligence personnel prior to the inva- opposition groups, most of which were sion convinced the Iraqi military and Ba’ath connected to Iran party leadership in Anbar, Ninevah, and Salah al-Din to meet with the Americans upon their arrival. The reigning U.S. assumption at the program started in mid-2007 under the leader- time was that the political vacuum created by ship of General David Petraeus and was sup- the fall of the former regime would strengthen ported by the surge of U.S. troops. The roles the position of the tribal leaders.1 Therefore, Iraqis and al Qaeda played in the Awakening brokering with the tribes was a means to com- varied and have often been misunderstood and municate with civil-military leaders and in misrepresented in the American accounts. For turn to influence the populace. Meanwhile, example, Americans often fail to differentiate Sunnis—in particular those without deep ties between the Anbar Awakening and the Sons of to the former regime—assumed that the United Iraq program connected with the surge, assum- States would broker with them, since Sunnis ing that the Sunni Awakening was mainly due had more government experience than any of to deft U.S. counterinsurgency tactics, a surge the other ethnic or sectarian groups. Sunnis also in U.S. troops, and promises of personal secu- assumed it was not in the U.S. interest to give rity and financial gain to convince Sunnis to the majority of the next government to Shia leave the resistance and fight alongside the and Kurdish opposition groups, most of which United States against al Qaeda. Yet the Anbar were connected to Iran. Giving the Shia and Awakening and the Sons of Iraq program were Kurds responsibility for the government would two different initiatives, the former an Iraqi increase Iranian influence in Iraq. With estab- initiative and the latter an American one. It lished U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 4 | FEATURES PRISM 2, no. 1 ROLES IN THE SUNNI AWAKENING Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab first two orders were the de-Ba’athification Emirates (all Sunni countries), changing the laws and disbanding the Iraqi security services. regional balance of power would be a tectonic While many in the security services were not policy shift the Sunni establishment did not working after the invasion, these surprising think the United States would make. Also, the mandates agitated the Sunni community and tribes talking with the United States assumed increased the momentum to organized insur- the invading forces would work within the estab- gency. However, many of the tribal elite con- lished sociopolitical system, as had been the case tinued trying to convince the now-unemployed with British forces after World War I. Moreover, and de-Ba’athified Sunnis to wait and see the modern Iraqi history suggests an asymmetric next U.S. move. While there were occasional relationship between the power of the state attacks against U.S. forces in Sunni areas, such and the influence of the tribes. Tribal leaders as the Fallujah killings of April 2003, these were saw an imminent U.S. invasion as an oppor- limited and conducted by al Qaeda and small tunity to increase their influence. Thus, the jihadist and resistance groups. The tribal elite tribal elite gave the United States the impres- and the Sunni moderate majority still expected sion that they could be relied upon in a politi- the United States would give Sunnis a reason- cal power vacuum. able share of power in the next government, In the early days of the post-invasion, the even though the Bremer laws were confusing tribes convinced military and political leaders to them. in Anbar, Ninevah, and Salah al-Din to negoti- Enter al Qaeda. After the United States ate an arrangement until the next government started its war in Afghanistan in 2001, many took shape. Military and Ba’ath party leaders al Qaeda and jihadist fighters fled the country, were chosen as interim governors and police mainly to Pakistan, Iran, and Iraqi Kurdistan. chiefs through temporary elections in Ninevah Abu Musab Zarqawi was one of them. He and through appointment by tribal leaders in went to Kurdistan through Iran and met with Anbar and Salah al-Din.2 The Sunni leaders in fellow fleeing jihadist fighters from Ansar these provinces thought that doing so would al-Sunna, and after the U.S.
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