Ballou, B 2014 Why America’s Nation Building Office Failed and What stability Congress Had to Do With It. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 3(1): 30, pp. 1-17, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ec

RESEARCH ARTICLE Why America’s Nation Building Office Failed and What Congress Had to Do With It Brendan Ballou*

Since the end of the Cold War, America has led six nation-building missions. We have done none particularly well. Throughout the 1990’s, but particularly after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the U.S. government tried to improve the way it ran ‘stabilization and reconstruction’ operations. That effort produced most notably the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) within the State Department. S/CRS was charged with developing plans, coordinating their interagency implementation, and staffing a ‘Civilian Response Corps’ to deploy to countries on short notice. S/CRS largely failed in these efforts. It struggled to establish control over the interagency planning process. It failed to staff its Response Corps. And it was largely excluded from the civilian efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. This paper explains why S/CRS failed. Four reasons in particular stand out. The office never had strong backing from the Secretary of State. Itwas undercut by USAID in its congressional negotiations. It lacked a strong domestic constituency to advocate for it. And it suffered from a general bias against civilian-led foreign policy projects. Without a clear congressional mandate and enough funding, S/CRS could not control either USAID or the regional bureaus. Simply put, the office did not bring much to the table. Finally, the failure of S/CRS suggests that the Defense Department, not State, will run future stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Though the appetite for nation building in the U.S. is low, history suggests that we are not done with these projects.

Why America’s Nation Building Office for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) Failed, and What Congress Had to within the State Department. S/CRS was Do With It charged with developing plans, coordinating Since the end of the Cold War, America has their interagency implementation, and staff- led six major stabilization and reconstruction ing a ‘Civilian Response Corps’ to deploy to missions. We have done none particularly countries on short notice. well. Throughout the 1990’s, but particu- S/CRS largely failed in these efforts. It larly after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the struggled to establish control over the U.S. government tried to improve the way interagency planning process. It failed to it ran such operations. That effort produced staff its Response Corps. And it was largely most notably the Office of the Coordinator excluded from the civilian efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. * Stanford Law School, United States Much has been written about why S/CRS [email protected] failed within the foreign policy bureaucracy Art. 30, page 2 of 17 Ballou: Why America’s Nation Building Office Failed and What Congress Had to Do With It

(Bensahel et al 2009; CFR 2005; Serafino Historical background 2009; Unger et al 2010). It lost turf bat- Since 1989 America has led six ‘stabilization tles with the State Department’s regional and reconstruction’ missions: in Somalia, bureaus and with USAID. And it struggled to Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. get the support it needed from the Secretary And it participated in many more under the of State. auspices of the United Nations (Dobbins et Little, however, has been written about al 2005). Congress’s role in S/CRS’s failure. Despite The motives behind these missions varied bipartisan support for the office, Congress dramatically, as did their scope. In Somalia, gave S/CRS an inadequate mandate and Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, the U.S. inter- insufficient funding. In doing so, it more or vened for primarily humanitarian purposes. less guaranteed that S/CRS would lose its Unsurprisingly, therefore, America concen- fights within the executive branch. trated its effort in providing only essential This paper tries to explain why Congress services. These include food, water, shelter, treated S/CRS the way it did, and what security, combatant disarmament, and basic impact that had. It briefly covers America’s police training and political support.1 experience in stabilization and reconstruc- In Iraq and Afghanistan, however, the U.S. tion and the reasons for creating S/CRS. It intervened for perceived national security then addresses the challenges S/CRS faced, purposes. In the wake of the September 11 both in the bureaucracy and in Congress. attacks, many policymakers were particularly Through this, the paper attempts to answer concerned about rogue and failed states pro- three questions. First, why was an office with viding safe havens for terrorists. For this rea- bipartisan support so difficult to author- son, U.S. officials felt it was necessary not just ize and fund? Second, what impact did this to provide basic humanitarian services, but failure in Congress have on the office as a also to reshape these countries’ governments whole? And finally, what does the congres- and societies.2 Recalling the ambitious post- sional failure of S/CRS say about the kinds of war efforts in Germany and Japan, the U.S. foreign policy projects the U.S. can manage? offered enormous support helping to build To preview the argument somewhat, power, water, and telecommunications infra- Congress failed to authorize and fund S/ structure, restart agricultural sectors, intro- CRS in a timely manner for four reasons. duce new currencies, and build securities The office never had strong backing from markets (Smith 2013; The Washington Post the Secretary of State (beyond rhetoric). It 2013; Dobbins et al 2003; Michaels 2008).3 was undercut by USAID in its congressional The U.S. also attempted to construct new negotiations. It lacked a strong domestic governments, not just holding elections but constituency to advocate for it. And it suf- re-writing whole constitutions. fered from a general skepticism of civilian- The U.S. largely failed in these more ambi- led foreign policy projects. Without a clear tious missions. Iraq is not, as President Bush’s congressional mandate and enough fund- National Security Council (NSC) hoped, ing, S/CRS could not control either USAID or ‘peaceful, united, stable, and secure’ (NSC the regional bureaus. Simply put, the office 2005). Nor has Afghanistan yet ‘develop[ed] did not bring much to the table. Finally, the its own stable government’ (Bush 2002). At a failure of S/CRS suggests that the Defense very high level, this was the case for three rea- Department, not State, will run future stabi- sons. First, America didn’t have the patience lization and reconstruction efforts. Though for prolonged nation building engagements. the appetite for nation building in the U.S. History suggests that establishing the rule is low, history suggests that we are not done of law, building rich civil society, and decen- with these projects. tralizing government control usually takes Ballou: Why America’s Nation Building Office Failed and Art. 30, page 3 of 17 What Congress Had to Do With It around 50 years (North et al 2009: 27).4 No for future crises a coordinating Executive U.S. President, certainly not one hoping to be Committee, a political-military implemen- reelected, sought missions approaching even tation plan, rehearsals, and an after-action a fraction of this length. Second, America review (Presidential Decision Directive 56 didn’t have the expertise for conducting stabi- 1997). The institutions the Directive estab- lization and reconstruction projects. From the lished reportedly led to much-improved chaos of post-invasion Iraq to the slow civilian operations for President Clinton’s last stabili- surge in Afghanistan, the U.S. demonstrated zation and reconstruction mission, in Kosovo that it lacked the bureaucratic knowledge to (Forman 2013: 4). carry out such missions. Third, fundamental In contrast, President Bush was initially changes in government necessarily create skeptical of the Clinton administration’s temporary power vacuums. In this vacuum reforms and its efforts at ‘nation building.’ there is often a considerable spike in violence, During the 2000 campaign, then-Governor as the government lacks the capacity to exert Bush stated that, ‘I don’t think our troops control over looters and rebels (North et al ought to be used for what’s called nation- 2009: 264). This spike, when it occurred in building’ (The American Presidency Project Iraq and Afghanistan, undercut domestic U.S. 2000). Condoleezza Rice commented that, ‘we support for these missions. don’t need to have the 82nd Airborne escort- But even America’s less ambitious stabili- ing kids to kindergarten’ (Dobbins 2014). zation and reconstruction projects after the But September 11 changed President Cold War were mixed successes. Somalia and Bush’s perspective on nation building in Haiti today are both classified as failed states general. And three years later, the chaos of (The Fund for Peace 2013). Only Bosnia and post-invasion Iraq spurred all of Washington, Kosovo are relatively violence-free. These fail- including the Bush administration, to rethink ures, both large and small, spurred the Clinton the government’s stabilization and recon- and Bush administrations to reform the U.S.’s struction bureaucracy specifically. Several stabilization and reconstruction programs. prominent think tanks published proposals After the 1993 debacle in Somalia that on the subject (Serafino 2009: 5–6).5 They resulted in eighteen American deaths, clustered around four broad ideas: President Clinton pushed two reforms through the foreign policy bureaucracy. First, • Opening an office (most likely in the he opened the Office of Transition Initiatives State Department) to plan and coordi- within USAID to provide stabilization and nate stabilization and reconstruction reconstruction support services (Forman operations (Weinstein 2004: 31). 2013; Lawson 2009). The office filled a gap • Establishing a civilian response corps within the agency, which was designed to to deploy quickly into post-conflict support foreign emergency relief and foreign environments. development, but not the political stabili- • Creating a reserve fund, from millions to zation work that fell in between. Over time a billion dollars, to support such opera- the office helped build ministries in Iraq, tions Weinstein 2004: 4). organized employment programs in Haiti, • Appointing a director at the National and repaired electrical systems in Serbia- Security Council to support inter-agency Montenegro (Lawson 2009: 16–20). strategy development for prevention Second, President Clinton issued and planning (CSIS 2003: 11). Presidential Decision Directive 56, which established an interagency framework for Not long after, in February 2004, Senators coordinating in post-conflict emergencies Richard Lugar (Republican) and Joe Biden (Forman 2013: 4). The Directive mandated (Democrat) introduced legislation that largely Art. 30, page 4 of 17 Ballou: Why America’s Nation Building Office Failed and What Congress Had to Do With It mirrored the think tanks’ recommendations. It S/CRS’s successes would have established and funded an Office S/CRS’s life was a troubled one, though the for Stabilization and Reconstruction, created office had a few bureaucratic successes in its an Emergency Response Readiness Force, and lifetime. First, it established nominal intera- reserved a response fund to support their gency control over stabilization and recon- work (Serafino 2009: 7). The Senate Foreign struction coordination. In December 2005, Relations Committee approved the bill unani- President Bush issued National Security mously (Senate Report (108–247) 2004) The Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) (Serafino bill never came to a vote, however, reportedly 2009: 9). The document formalized S/CRS’s because of a hold Senator Tom Coburn put on role in coordinating interagency responses the proposal (S. 2127 (108) 2004). to stabilization and reconstruction projects. But momentum for the idea was NSPD-44 designated the Secretary of State to strong, both outside and inside the Bush lead stabilization and reconstruction activi- Administration. When the Senate failed to ties, who in turn delegated this responsibility pass the Lugar-Biden bill, Secretary of State to the Coordinator of S/CRS (NSPD-44 2005). Colin Powell created the office under his own The directive also added conflict prevention authority (Serafino 2009: 8). He named it the to S/CRS’s responsibilities, expanding the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction office’s powers beyond its initial mandate and Stabilization, or ‘S/CRS.’ The ‘S’ in the (GAO-08–39 2007). acronym was a powerful one, indicating S/CRS also successfully established an that the Coordinator sat within the Office ‘Interagency Management System’ for stabi- of the Secretary of State. He appointed lization and reconstruction crises (Smith, Jr. Carlos Pascual, a former ambassador, to be 2010). Under the system, in cases of antici- the office’s first Coordinator (Pascual 2004). pated or ongoing crisis, the President, with As will be discussed below, Congress later the Secretaries of State and Defense, would blessed Secretary Powell’s action through establish a ‘Country Reconstruction and the Consolidated Appropriations Act for Stabilization Group.’ The group would be FY2005. co-chaired by the S/CRS Coordinator, the Thus President Bush effected a dramatic N.S.C. Senior Director for the region, and turnaround, embracing ideas on nation the regional Assistant Secretary at the State building that he once rejected. In doing so, he Department. Once the group had developed pushed through changes in the foreign pol- a plan to address the crisis, an ‘Advance icy bureaucracy as large, or potentially larger, Civilian Team’ would be sent to the coun- than President Clinton had before him. Yet try to implement it. However, as will be dis- he did so without congressional approval or cussed later, S/CRS’s planning was overtaken support from the State Department bureau- by events. No such group was ever estab- cracy. He and his administration also did lished after the creation of the Interagency so without apparently questioning some Management System, and no advance team fundamental assumptions: that it was feasi- ever dispatched (Smith, Jr. 2010: 91). Crises ble for civilians to operate without military in Iraq and Afghanistan would continue to protection, that it was desirable for the State be addressed outside these formal channels. Department to have a permanent body of Finally, S/CRS created the Planning expertise that mostly ‘sat on the shelf,’ and Framework for Stabilization, Reconstruction most fundamentally, that the U.S. would and Conflict Transformation (U.S. Joint conduct more nation building mission. As Forces Command 2005). The document was will be seen, despite some limited successes, an attempt to codify stabilization and recon- for these reasons S/CRS was disadvantaged struction best practices. It gave practitioners in very serious ways from its birth. templates for plans, budgets, timelines, as Ballou: Why America’s Nation Building Office Failed and Art. 30, page 5 of 17 What Congress Had to Do With It well as tips on developing and evaluating It was within the power of the Secretary of intervention strategies. Some military train- State to assert S/CRS’s control and resolve ing schools apparently used the framework this legalistic dispute. But apparently, neither (Smith, Jr. 2010: 86). And U.S. embassies and Secretary Powell nor Rice did. Thus the docu- regional combatant commands used a com- ment, which nominally gave stabilization and plementary ‘Essential Tasks Matrix’ (Smith, Jr. reconstruction coordinating control to S/CRS, 2010: 86). virtually guaranteed a major bureaucratic turf war with the rest of the State Department. S/CRS’s failures In fighting this overlap, the regional But S/CRS’s successes were overshadowed by bureaus effectively boxed S/CRS out of a coor- the office’s failures. It lost bureaucratic turf dinating role. In 2005 Secretary Rice asked battles with the State Department’s other S/CRS to coordinate the Department’s work bureaus and with USAID. It proved unable on the growing crisis in Sudan (Bensahel et al to staff its Civilian Response Corps. And, 2009: 37). S/CRS briefly organized a Country whether because of bureaucratic politics or Reconstruction and Stabilization Group. But just event-driven pragmatics, it was pushed the Bureau of African Affairs had already aside in planning on Iraq and Afghanistan. established a competing Policy Coordinating According to one commentator, the State Committee on Sudan. The regional bureau Department’s bureaucracy had an ‘autoim- had the established contacts in the country mune response’ against S/CRS.6 Whether and a first mover’s advantage. S/CRS eventu- or not the State Department’s regional ally had to drop its Stabilization Group and bureaus had the capacity to take on S/CRS’s join African Affairs’ Coordinating Committee work, they saw the new office’s mandate as (Bensahel et al 2009: 37). S/CRS was simi- conflicting with theirs. As discussed above, larly blocked in its efforts to get involved in NSPD-44 gave S/CRS nominal coordinating Lebanon. The instability in the country after authority over stabilization and reconstruc- the assassination of Rafik Hariri seemed pre- tion. But the official Foreign Affairs Manual, cisely the sort of crisis for which S/CRS was the document that describes the functions designed to address. But both the Bureau of of the State Department, designates coun- Near Eastern Affairs and the Office of U.S. try directors, not S/CRS, as ‘the single focus Foreign Assistance Resources objected to its of responsibility for leadership and coor- involvement (Smith, Jr. 2010: 89). There, as dination…activities concerning his or [her] in Sudan, S/CRS was forced to the sidelines. country or countries of assignment’ (U.S. S/CRS’s mandate also conflicted with that Department of State). of the Department’s functional bureaus. The In other words, the mandate the President Bureau of International Narcotics and Law gave S/CRS through his Directive contra- Enforcement objected to S/CRS’s control dicted the operating documents of the State over police training (Smith, Jr. 2010: 85). Department. The problem was compounded And the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs by the fact that NSPD-44 authorized but did objected to its attempted control over coun- not mandate the Secretary of State to delegate ter-insurgency contingency planning (Smith, coordinating authority to the head of S/CRS Jr. 2010: 85). (NSPD-44 2005).7 Nor did the Presidential But the greatest area of conflict was Directive clearly announce that it controlled with USAID. There, the Office of Transition over other documents. Rather, NSPD-44 sim- Initiatives and Office of Foreign Disaster ply directed the Secretary of State to ‘Resolve Assistance, as well as the Office of Conflict relevant policy, program, and funding dis- Management and Mitigation and the putes among United States Government Disaster Assistance Response Team program Departments and Agencies…’ (NSPD-44 2005). all overlapped in various ways with S/CRS’s Art. 30, page 6 of 17 Ballou: Why America’s Nation Building Office Failed and What Congress Had to Do With It mandate (Williams and Adams 2008; Smith, reservists whose day jobs were in federal Jr. 2010: 85). Further, the State Department civilian agencies. The third, the ‘Reserve and USAID were structured in very differ- Component’ would be composed of civilians ent ways that gave advantage to the latter. from state and local government, NGO’s and The State Department was not and is not the private sector (Smith, Jr. 2010: 97–98). staffed to take on significant operational The Active Component was to have 250 tasks.8 It is organized around the work of members, and the Standby and Reserve reporting, representing, and negotiating Components 2,000 members each (Serafino with other governments. USAID in contrast, 2009: 14–15). S/CRS established the Active was created specifically to do development Component of the Civilian Response Corps and emergency response work. Though it in 2006. But two years later, the office had has lost many of its expert staff (Unger et al recruited just ten members into the Corps, 2010: 8) and has come increasingly to rely or less than 5 per cent of the original tar- on contractors to do its work,9 it is still the get (Smith, Jr. 2010: 97). And S/CRS failed default civilian office for program implemen- entirely to staff up its Reserve Component tation abroad. According to one former S/ (Smith, Jr. 2010: 98). CRS staffer, USAID really did not believe in a For those S/CRS did recruit, the office ‘whole of government’ approach to stabiliza- offered little in the way of training or prepa- tion and reconstruction. Essentially, this was ration. Its program at the National Foreign a task for which USAID believed it alone was Affairs Training Center consisted of a single prepared to manage.10 five-day course. And while participants were Thus USAID saw S/CRS as an intrusion on to return annually for additional training, this its territory, and worked to stop it. It report- requirement was not well enforced (Smith, Jr. edly refused to participate in war games 2010: 98–99). Even basic support infrastruc- with S/CRS and the military combatant ture was a struggle. When S/CRS tried to commands11 and much more seriously, tried outfit Corps members with Kevlar vests and to have the entire office killed when Carlos provide transportation for outside embassies, Pascual, the first Coordinator, stepped down the State Department’s Undersecretary for (Smith, Jr. 2010: 88–89). It drew S/CRS into Management refused to fund it.12 protracted (and in retrospect, low stakes) Finally, S/CRS was never involved in civil- fights, such as whether or not to declassify ian operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. a list of states at risk for conflict (Smith, Jr. Even after the Bush administration cre- 2010: 85). And as will be discussed in more ated S/CRS, one-off coordinating bodies detail below, it effectively redirected congres- continued to manage civilian efforts there sional funds requested for S/CRS to its own (Unger et al 2010: 29). In Iraq, civilian stabi- office. In short, USAID proved to be one of lization and reconstruction was run through S/CRS’s fiercest, most determined, and most ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams,’ mixed effective bureaucratic opponents. groups of State, USAID, Defense, and other Independent of all the bureaucratic government employees (Perito 2007). S/CRS infighting, S/CRS struggled to staff up a played no role in organizing these groups. Civilian Response Corps, the group of full In Afghanistan, S/CRS was similarly pushed and part-time staff who could deploy to con- aside. Richard Holbrooke’s office as Special flict environments on short notice. In its orig- Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan inal formulation, the Corps was to have three managed the civilian surge there.13 And tranches. The first, the ‘Active Component’ while Holbrooke expressed initial interest would be made of civilians drawn primarily in working with S/CRS, he reportedly found from the State Department and USAID. The the money to run the surge himself through second, the ‘Standby Component’ would be the South and Central Asian Affairs Bureau. Ballou: Why America’s Nation Building Office Failed and Art. 30, page 7 of 17 What Congress Had to Do With It

Holbrooke thus staffed the operation with reconstruction reform. For the most part, contractors, leaving no role for S/CRS to their efforts failed (Serafino 2009: 7–8; H.R. play.14 Not all of this was bureaucratic poli- 3996 (108) 2004). tics. Much depended on the pragmatic con- In 2004, however, Congress was able to give siderations of decisions made quickly, the S/CRS preliminary authorization through cultural fits between offices, and chance. But the Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. the result was the same: S/CRS played little 108–447: Section 408). There, Congress role in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. effectively endorsed Secretary Powell’s uni- All these failures can to some degree be lateral action to establish S/CRS earlier in understood in isolation. But in many ways, the year. The Act authorized the Office and such shortcomings in the bureaucracy are the position of Coordinator reporting to the the result of earlier challenges in Congress. Secretary of State. It also defined six func- The failure to authorize and fund S/CRS in a tions of the office around monitoring and timely manner caused many of these bureau- planning for potential crises. Importantly, cratic problems months or even years later. however, the bill did not authorize either a civilian response corps or a stabilization S/CRS’s history in Congress fund. These were critical components of S/ S/CRS’s supporters struggled to get the office CRS that would turn the office from a mere authorized and appropriated in Congress. coordinating body into an operational one. And the funds the office finally received In 2008 Representative Farr, who had sup- were in large part divided with USAID or fun- ported S/CRS since its inception, managed neled through the Defense Department. As to incorporate broader authorizing legis- a result, it was hard and time-consuming for lation into the FY2009 National Defense S/CRS to spend money on stabilization and Authorization Act (NDAA) (Serafino 2009: 8). reconstruction projects. The NDAA was ‘must pass’ legislation with a Between 2004 and 2008, four bills in the military, not domestic, focus. Through it, S/ Senate and eight in the House were intro- CRS’s advocates were able to authorize both duced to authorize an office for stabiliza- the stabilization fund and the Response tion and reconstruction (Serafino 2009). Corps, at least for two years.16 Richard Lugar and Joe Biden led the effort After authorizing S/CRS, however, in the Senate. In 2004, 2005, and 2006, they Congress similarly struggled to fund it. For introduced variations on the ‘Stabilization fiscal year 2009, President Bush requested and Reconstruction Civilian Management nearly US$250 million for the Civilian Act,’ each time with an ever-widening list of Response Corps. He received just US$140 co-sponsors (Serafino 2009: 7). In 2004 the million. For fiscal year 2010 President Obama Foreign Relations Committee, as mentioned requested US$323 million for the program. above, voted unanimously to report the bill He received less than half that (Unger et al favorably to the full Senate. Tom Coburn, 2010: 6–7). And while Congress expressed however, a deficit hawk and an eventual some willingness to fund the active and opponent of the Iraq war, put a hold on the standby components of the Response Corps, bill. In 2005 the Act never made it out of it refused to fund the reserve component committee (S. 209 (109) 2005). And in 2006 entirely (Serafino 2009: 28). In short, even it passed by unanimous consent, but died in with the statutory authority to run the Corps, the House (Serafino 2009: 8).15 S/CRS never had the stable funding to make In the House, Representatives David it anything more than a pilot operation. Dreier, Sam Farr, Henry Hyde, and Adam Congress was similarly reluctant to Schiff, along with various co-sponsors, each resource S/CRS’s stabilization fund. Instead, introduced legislation on stabilization and due to its deeper relations in Congress, Art. 30, page 8 of 17 Ballou: Why America’s Nation Building Office Failed and What Congress Had to Do With It

USAID often received money that both the But the first year of the program was lost Bush and Obama administrations requested due to lack of awareness within the State for S/CRS. For fiscal year 2006, President Department, confusion about how bureaus Bush requested US$100 million for the could apply for Section 1207 grants, and fund. Congress rejected him entirely (Smith, conflicts between USAID and State about Jr. 2010: 86). In 2008 Congress gave US$55 who controlled the money (Perito 2008). By million to the program. But importantly, it the end of the 2006 fiscal year, the Defense divided the funds between S/CRS and USAID: Department accepted only one proposal: US$30 million of the funds went to the State US$10 million dollars to assist with train- Department, and US$25 million of the funds ing Lebanese security forces and removing went to USAID (Farr 2014). S/CRS had control unexploded ordnance. US$90 million was over this latter pool. The process of dividing left unspent. In 2008, S/CRS did slightly bet- appropriations between S/CRS and USAID ter at advertising the funds within the State continued into fiscal years 2009 and 2010 Department. But bureaucratic turf battles (Farr 2014). It also continued into the next continued to cripple the project. And impor- administration. When the Obama adminis- tantly, the Section 1207 funds were author- tration specifically asked to transfer money ized but not reserved. That meant that the from a ‘Stabilization Bridge Funds’ account to Defense Department needed to decide to one that S/CRS controlled, Congress instead fund Section 1207 programs over other pro- gave the money to an account controlled by jects in its US$150 billion account for opera- USAID (Serafino 2009: 18). Perhaps if either tions and management. In fiscal year 2007, Secretary Rice or Clinton had had greater Defense held off on approving any Section control over their own bureaucracies, they 1207 applications until the end of the year, would have been able to stop this. But the in order to make sure more urgent needs did result was that when Presidents sought to not come up. This resulted in serious delays support S/CRS with stable funding, Congress for program applicants, and led to a yearlong often gave the money to the office’s strong- lag from the time a proposal was submitted est bureaucratic opponent. until it was approved and finally released to a Clearly Congress was reluctant to fund specific regional bureau (Peritor 2008: 6–7). civilian stabilization and reconstruction Thus Congress was slow to give S/CRS a full operations, especially those run out of the mandate, and even slower to fund it. When it State Department. The Bush administration did, Congress often divided funds between in response worked around this by pushing S/CRS and its bureaucratic opponents, or for authorization to transfer funds from the tied it up with the Defense Department in Defense Department to State. Section 1207 ways that dramatically slowed its operations. of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act allowed precisely that: it let the Secretary Why Congressional authorization and of Defense give up to US$100 million to the appropriations proved so challenging Secretary of State to support civilian stabili- As the above discussion should make clear, S/ zation and reconstruction activities (Unger et CRS struggled to get authorized and funded al 2010: 49). This, it was hoped, would allow by Congress. This is surprising. Congress fre- the President to circumvent Congress and quently uses bureaucratic reorganizations to finally adequately fund S/CRS. wrest some control over agencies and depart- Section 1207 funds were potentially trans- ments from the President (Cuéllar 2013).17 formative. With control over US$100 mil- Creating S/CRS would have taken power lion which it could distribute throughout away from the regional bureaus (over which the State Department, S/CRS had newfound Congress had little control) and placed it in relevance in the foreign policy bureaucracy. the Secretariat’s (over which Congress had Ballou: Why America’s Nation Building Office Failed and Art. 30, page 9 of 17 What Congress Had to Do With It more). Further, the opportunity for new could not stop infighting or undercutting on authorizations would have opened new Capitol Hill. The result, however, was that the opportunities to exert control over State office never had a higher power to protect it Department policy (Wilson 1991: 243–244). from bureaucratic and budgetary battles. To be sure, there were factors that cut in the At the same time, S/CRS was repeatedly other direction: a new Assistant Secretary outmaneuvered by USAID in congressional position would have given the President negotiations. USAID had long-established additional powers over personnel, for exam- relationships with Congress; S/CRS did not. ple, potentially undercutting Congress. But In fact, until 2008 the office did not even on the whole, the new office would have have a formally designated congressional liai- likely been a power gain for the legislative son (Smith, Jr. 2010: 96). This proved to be an branch. enormous blunder for S/CRS. As mentioned Despite these potential advantages, how- above, USAID was able to use its connections ever, there were at least four practical rea- to appropriate for itself budget requests the sons why S/CRS struggled in Congress. President made for S/CRS. It was also able The office never had the strong backing of to block funding to S/CRS entirely. Congress Secretary Rice. It was outmaneuvered and refused to fund the Reserve Corps reportedly undermined by USAID. It lacked a natural in part because of USAID’s influence over domestic constituency. And it suffered from Representative James Kolbe, the relevant a congressional bias against civilian-led for- subcommittee chair (Smith, Jr. 2010: 252). eign operations. That USAID was able to keep S/CRS from The Bush administration publicly sup- being funded in Congress gave it enormous ported S/CRS’s work. Secretary Rice spoke advantages in later bureaucratic turf wars. highly of the office, calling it an example of S/CRS also lacked natural domestic advo- what she referred to as ‘transformative diplo- cates. Representatives reported that their macy.’18 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates constituents did not care about stabiliza- similarly praised the general effort, saying tion and reconstruction (Farr 2014: 23). that there was ‘no replacement for…civilian Most Americans did not believe that nation involvement and expertise’ in post-conflict building projects were inevitable (Lamb et al environments (Gates 2007). 2013). To the extent that they did, they did But, within the State Department, S/CRS not see a problem with existing levels of civil- never had sufficient backing to overcome ian support (Lamb et al 2013; Forman 2013: bureaucratic inertia. Reportedly Secretary 1). Further, around the time of S/CRS’s formal Rice did not fight cuts to S/CRS from the authorization, experts began to question the Office of Management and Budget, nor did strategic relevance of weak and failed states she lobby senators wary of funding the office (Serafino 2009: 5). And in popular politi- (Smith, Jr. 2010: 103). According to one of cal debate, citizens increasingly questioned S/CRS’s chief advocates in the House, the America’s ability to change such countries. administration’s effort was therefore ‘insuf- In short, the intellectual underpinnings of ficient to gain momentum for Congress’ (Farr intervention, as well as popular support for 2014: 23). None of this is to suggest hypoc- them, fell apart precisely while S/CRS was risy on the part of Secretary Rice. Given the being stood up. This made it ever harder for enormous budget needs facing the State the office to find support in Congress. Department during the Iraq and Afghan wars, A related point is that shifting public opin- she may have chosen her fights wisely. And ion affected congressional perceptions of the more generally, Secretary Rice, like all her pre- Bush administration as a whole. As the war decessors, did not have complete control over in Iraq faltered, so too did congressional trust the State Department’s bureaucracy, and so in the President. In particular, Congressmen Art. 30, page 10 of 17 Ballou: Why America’s Nation Building Office Failed and What Congress Had to Do With It and women were reluctant to fund S/CRS’s Further, when Congress did finally author- stabilization account, which they feared the ize S/CRS, it did so in an ambiguous manner Bush administration would treat as a slush that overlapped with other offices’ mandates. fund.19 They were instead far more likely In 2004 Congress gave the office authority to to contribute to USAID, which had a track plan for and coordinate responses to devel- record that they could review.20 oping crises.23 This, like NSPD-44 mentioned Finally, S/CRS suffered from a bias against above, conflicted with the regional bureaus’ civilian-led and for military-led foreign mandates as established in the Foreign operations. As discussed above, advocates Affairs Manual. It also conflicted with the in Congress were only able to authorize mandate of USAID’s Office of Transition S/CRS as part of the National Defense Initiatives. Congress empowered S/CRS with Authorization Act. And they were only able a broad mandate. But by failing to make it an to fund the program by funneling money exclusive mandate, Congress ensured that S/ through the Defense Department. The result CRS would be drawn into bureaucratic fights was a significant delay in authorization and with other parts of the Executive an added layer of bureaucracy in S/CRS’s By failing to fund S/CRS commensurate funding that slowed the process by which with its mandate, Congress virtually guar- money was eventually distributed. Together, anteed that the office would lose its bureau- all these factors made S/CRS’s failure within cratic fights within State and with USAID. As the bureaucracy a near inevitability. one former S/CRS staff member put it, the mandate the office got was enormous, and What impact Congress had on S/CRS far larger than their budget could support.24 Much of the existing literature on S/CRS has The hope was that the funding would fol- focused on the bureaucratic fights it lost. low the mandate. But this never happened. Little has been said about how S/CRS’s fights As a result, S/CRS was charged with inter- in Congress affected its status in the bureau- agency policy coordination and implemen- cracy. In fact, S/CRS’s struggle for authoriza- tation, but lacked the resources to carry out tion and appropriations in Congress more or that function, or to get the respect of other less doomed it to irrelevance within the State offices. Without ability to control a signifi- Department. cant stabilization and reconstruction budget, As discussed above, Congress’s delay in S/CRS’s de jure coordination responsibilities authorizing S/CRS forced Secretary Powell offered little actual help.25 It is little wonder to act on his own authority. This strategy then that many interagency partners saw S/ had three limitations. First, the office could CRS’s planning process as ‘cumbersome’ and only be created on a temporary basis: five ‘time consuming’ (GAO-08–39: 6). And lit- years at the most.21 Second, the office’s head tle wonder too that S/CRS was often pushed could only be a Director, not a more prestig- aside by other parts of the bureaucracy. ious and powerful Assistant Secretary, which When Congress did finally fund S/CRS, it would have required Senate confirmation.22 did so in ways that significantly constrained And finally, the office could only draw on the office’s power. The Section 1207 funds general funds at the Secretary’s disposal. In funneled through the Defense Department other words, it had to compete against the provided an enormous boost to S/CRS. But it Secretary’s many other priorities. These fac- was Defense’s money to spend, and officials tors weakened S/CRS’s position relative to there were the ultimate decision-makers. This other offices within the State Department. meant less money was ultimately disbursed, Regional bureaus could reasonably see S/ and with less urgency, than if the money CRS as a temporary intruder. They were the had been appropriated to S/CRS directly. ones who were here to stay. This almost certainly constrained the office Ballou: Why America’s Nation Building Office Failed and Art. 30, page 11 of 17 What Congress Had to Do With It within the bureaucracy and reduced its lever- was replaced by a smaller, cheaper ‘Expert age over other bureaus. Corps’ of technical officials willing but not Thus delays in authorization and appro- required to deploy to stabilization crisis priations, overlapping mandates and signifi- zones (Serafino 2009: 5). S/CRS also got a cant funding constraints all hobbled S/CRS. demotion: the office was moved from the In this way, the bureaucratic fights the office Office of the Secretary and placed under fought and lost can in large part be explained the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, by its failure in Congress months or even Democracy, and Human Rights (Hall 2010). years before. It was renamed the Bureau of Conflict and There is however, one way in which the Stabilization Operations (CSO), and in prac- office could have overcome these congres- tice, it gave up on the idea of a whole-of- sionally-imposed wounds: sustained atten- government approach to stabilization and tion from the Secretary of State. Secretary reconstruction (Serafino 2012). CSO now Powell, however, created S/CRS in the last seeks to provide ‘small-scale, targeted assis- months of his tenure. And Under Secretary tance’ (Serafino 2012: 4). The office focuses of State Richard Armitage, who had been on small operational programs: community- a strong advocate for the office, left when based approaches to landmine removal in Powell did (Smith, Jr. 2010: 88). As mentioned Burma, dialogue promotion in Kenya, and above, Secretary Rice often referenced S/CRS networking and communications support for in public speeches, but according to observ- Syrian civilian opposition groups (Serafino ers within the State Department, rarely made 2012: 6). And despite these changes, funding it a priority. Never in its bureaucratic turf problems remain. CSO has regularly received wars was S/CRS speaking for the Secretary. ‘considerably less’ money than requested And so without an exclusive mandate, with- (Serafino 2012: 8). out sufficient funding, and without senior In short, while the State Department con- executive access, S/CRS was almost certain tinues to make gestures towards reconstruc- to fail. tion and stabilization, the original dream of Ultimately, however, the office was killed S/CRS—coordinated, large-scale interagency through the Quadrennial Diplomacy and civilian responses to stabilization and recon- Development Review (QDDR) process in struction—has died. It has been replaced by the Obama administration. The QDDR was something more targeted and perhaps more an attempt to develop a unified diplomatic likely to succeed, but also something far less plan for the U.S., analogous the Defense ambitious. Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review program. According to Ambassador John Conclusion Herbst, who ran S/CRS during the QDDR pro- To review, the U.S. Congress failed to cess, the new administration viewed S/CRS promptly authorize and appropriate S/CRS with a great deal of skepticism. As a holdo- for four reasons. It never had sufficient back- ver from the Bush administration, the office ing from Secretary Rice. It was undermined was perceived to have many of the problems by USAID in its congressional negotiations. It of the old regime, including an enthusiasm had no domestic constituency advocating for for foreign intervention and a preference for it. And it suffered from a bias against civilian- unilateral action.26 This was compounded led foreign operations. by a budget crunch and a general percep- By failing to authorize or appropriate S/ tion that the U.S. would not get entangled in CRS clearly or sufficiently, Congress more or another operation like Afghanistan or Iraq.27 less doomed the office to irrelevance. This all Through the QDDR process, S/CRS gave up helps to explain S/CRS’s failure within the on the Civilian Response Corps entirely.28 It U.S. government. But it also begins to answer Art. 30, page 12 of 17 Ballou: Why America’s Nation Building Office Failed and What Congress Had to Do With It a broader question, namely, what kind of dangerous environments in need of stabiliza- foreign policy projects are the U.S. willing to tion and reconstruction support. take on. At the same time, while the military has First, to the extent the U.S. will take on new been a strong advocate for civilian control foreign policy projects, they will be with the in stabilization and reconstruction, it has consent of Congress. Much has been written increasingly taken on these operations in about Congress’s abdication of responsibil- the absence of State Department capacity.30 ity on foreign affairs, particularly when it In 2005, the Defense Department issued a comes to matters of war and peace (Ornstein directive making stability operations a core and Mann 2006). True, the last time the military function (DOD 2005). It also estab- U.S. Congress declared war, it was against lished the Commanders Emergency Response Romania in 1942. But the political calculus Program: a fund for senior military leaders that has made Congress reluctant to weigh to support development and humanitarian in on combat play out differently when it activities (Dobbins 2014: 56). The Defense comes to authorizing and appropriating for- Department also began to integrate develop- eign policy programs. By necessity Congress ment and diplomacy operations into its com- must play a role in this area, unless by fail- batant commands, most notably in AFRICOM ing to pass appropriating legislation it hopes (Unger et al 2010). The military is thus build- to shut the State and Defense Departments ing the capacity to take on stabilization and down (no longer an impossibility). S/CRS’s reconstruction tasks in a way that the State initial weakness by birth through executive Department currently is not. action demonstrates that major foreign pol- Further, the military is more professional icy projects cannot be undertaken without and more insular than ever before, and that congressional authorization, at least not if has an effect on how Congress treats it. In they are going to be adequately funded. 1971, 73 per cent of Congressmen and women Second, to the extent the U.S. will take on had served in the military. In 2013, just 22 per more stabilization and reconstruction pro- cent had (Eikenberry 2013). The result is that jects specifically, we will do so increasingly Congress is reluctant to engage with, and even through the Defense Department. This is less likely to challenge, senior military leader- consistent with two larger historical trends: ship (Eikenberry 2013). Thus to the extent the gradual contraction of State Department that the military chooses to engage in stabili- power and the enlargement of Defense zation and reconstruction missions, Congress Department power. is unlikely to question that choice. Across functions, the State Department In sum, the failure of S/CRS will likely mean has proven ill-equipped for handling opera- that ever more stabilization and reconstruc- tional responsibilities, as opposed to report- tion services will be handled by the Defense ing and negotiating ones. At its core, State Department. In discussing the challenges of Department staff view their task as diplo- the Civilian Response Corps, Senator Lugar, macy, not project management, and they are one of the original architects of the office, poorly equipped to handle the latter (Wilson predicted precisely that: ‘If the problems on 1991: 243–244). This was a challenge experts the civilian side of crisis management can- recognized from the beginning of the debate not be solved, I think we will begin to see over S/CRS, but one the office was unable to a realignment of authorities between the overcome.29 Further, the State Department is Departments of Defense and State’ (Lugar also becoming increasingly risk-adverse. The 2014). This shift in power may shift the very attack on the U.S. embassy in Benghazi and nature of these missions, but that is the sub- the political crisis that it has engendered has ject for another essay. only accelerated this trend. This makes it dif- There are a few lessons for Congress in ficult to send State Department officials into this history. If an office like S/CRS is ever to Ballou: Why America’s Nation Building Office Failed and Art. 30, page 13 of 17 What Congress Had to Do With It succeed, it will need both clear authoriza- early 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld tions and sufficient appropriations. Congress rejected that the U.S. was engaged should demand a detailed implementation in ‘nation building’ in Afghanistan plan to overcome organizational resistance. (Rumsfeld 2003). And any authorizing legislation it passes 3 For a general discussion on the legal chal- should address, rather than obfuscate, ten- lenges of setting up a securities exchange, sions with existing bureaucracies. see Black 2001. But all this assumes that America will 4 There are exceptions to this. Arguably like someday conduct stabilization and recon- Japan, West Germany, South Korea and struction operations again. Is that the case? Taiwan all recovered from relationship- The perception common both to the public driven rule to impersonal, decentralized and to Congress is that the U.S. does not do government more quickly than that. nation building, and even if it was some- 5 According to Serafino 2009, these thing we did in the past, it is not something included the Center for Strategic and that we do anymore. The problem is that International Studies 2003, Murdock et this was the perception after Somalia, after al 2004, Binnendijk and Johnson 2003, Bosnia, after Afghanistan, and after Iraq. Weinstein 2004, Perito et al 2004a and As James Dobbins, another early supporter Perito et al 2004b. of S/CRS put it, ‘successive administrations 6 Interview with Robert Lamb, Director and have treated each new mission as if it were Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and the first and, more importantly, as if it were International Studies (May 14, 2014). the last.’ 7 The directive states: ‘…the Secretary of History suggests that for all its opposi- State shall be responsible for the fol- tion, the U.S. will probably conduct stabili- lowing functions and may direct the zation and reconstruction operations again Coordinator for Reconstruction and at some point in the future. The partition of Stabilization (‘Coordinator’) to assist the Syria, the collapse of eastern Iraq, the over- Secretary…’ (emphasis added). throw of the Ayatollah in Iran or the King in 8 Interview with Stephen Krasner (May 8, Saudi Arabia: all these crises could prompt 2014). U.S. policymakers to decide that stabilization 9 Interview with Robert Lamb, Director and and reconstruction operations are neces- Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and sary to protecting national interests. If they International Studies (May 14, 2014). do, despite all our best intentions, the U.S. 10 Interview with former S/CRS official (May will engage in yet another stabilization and 19, 2014). reconstruction project. It was the mission of 11 Interview with former S/CRS official (May S/CRS—a mission no government office cur- 19, 2014). rently holds—that we do such projects well. 12 Interview with former S/CRS official (May 19, 2014). Acknowledgements 13 Interview with John E. Herbst, Director, Thank you to Nora Bensahel, Mariano Center for Complex Operations, National Florentino-Cuéllar, John Herbst, Stephen Defense University (November 21, 2103). Krasner, Olivia Russell, Aparna Surendra, and 14 Interview with John E. Herbst, Director, the anonymous reviewers at Stability. Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University (November Notes 21, 2103). 1 For a general description of these ser- 15 That same year Senators Lugar and Biden vices, see Bensahel et al 2009: 14–19. attached the proposal as an amendment 2 This opinion was not universally shared, to the Foreign Relations Authorization even within the Bush administration. In Act, but it too failed. Art. 30, page 14 of 17 Ballou: Why America’s Nation Building Office Failed and What Congress Had to Do With It

16 Permanent authority for the office had to 30 General Richard Meyers said that creating wait until Congress amended the State S/CRS was ‘an important step’ (Serafino Department Basic Authorities Act of 2009: 8). 1956 (Serafino 2009: 10). 17 Congress designed the Social Security References Review Board so as to undermine Bensahel, N et al 2009 Improving Capacity Presidential control of it. for Stabilization and Reconstruction Oper- 18 Interview with former S/CRS official (May ations. Available at http://www.rand. 19, 2014); See also: ‘It is difficult to gen- org/content/dam/rand/pubs/mono- erate enthusiasm for policies that appear graphs/2009/RAND_MG852.pdf to be little more than great rhetoric with Binnendijk, H and Johnson, S (eds.) 2003 shallow follow-through’ (Farr 2014: 21). Transforming for Stabilization and Recon- 19 Interview with former S/CRS official (May struction Operations. National Defense 19, 2014). University. Available at http://www.au.af. 20 Interview with former S/CRS official (May mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/stab_rec_ops. 19, 2014). pdf 21 In announcing the office, the State Black, B S 2001 The Legal and Institutional Department gave no justification for how Preconditions for Strong Securities Mar- it was legally established. If, however, the kets. UCLA L. Rev. 781. Available at office was established pursuant to the http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. President’s 5 U.S.C. § 3161 powers, the cfm?abstract_id=182169. temporary office could only exist for at Bush, G W 2002 Bush Calls for End to most five years. Extremism. Washington Post, April 17. 22 See 22 U.S.C.A. 2651a. Available at http://www.washington- 23 See P.L. 108–447 § 408. post.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/ 24 Interview with former S/CRS official (May bushtext_041702.html 19, 2014). Center for Strategic and International 25 Interview with Robert Lamb, Director and Studies (CSIS) 2003 Play to Win. Wash- Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and ington, D.C.: CSIS. Available at http:// International Studies (May 14, 2014). csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/play- 26 Interview with John E. Herbst Interview, towin.pdf Director, Center for Complex Operations, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 2005 National Defense University (November In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post- 21, 2103). Conflict Capabilities. Available at http://i. 27 Interview with John E. Herbst Interview, cfr.org/content/publications/attach- Director, Center for Complex Operations, ments/Post-Conflict_Capabilities_final. National Defense University (November pdf 21, 2103). Cuéllar, M-F 2013 Governing Security: The 28 Interview with John E. Herbst Interview, Hidden Origins of American Security Director, Center for Complex Operations, Agencies. National Defense University (November Department of Defense (DOD) 2005 Direc- 21, 2103). tive No. 3000.05. Available at https:// 29 ‘Nation-building also requires the early www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_05. mastery of both policy and program man- pdf agement. These two types of responsibil- Dobbins, J et al 2003 America’s Role in ity do not come together in most Foreign Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq. Service careers until one reaches the Santa Monica, California: RAND. Availa- Deputy Chief of Mission level’ (Dobbins ble at http://www.rand.org/pubs/mono- 2004). graph_reports/MR1753.html Ballou: Why America’s Nation Building Office Failed and Art. 30, page 15 of 17 What Congress Had to Do With It

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How to cite this article: Ballou, B 2014 Why America’s Nation Building Office Failed and What Congress Had to Do With It. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 3(1): 30, pp. 1-17, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ec

Published: 24 September 2014

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