Statskonsulentrapport Tokyo Andet Kvartal 2010 Side 1

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Statskonsulentrapport Tokyo Andet Kvartal 2010 Side 1 Statskonsulentrapport Tokyo Ambassaden Tokyo 9. juli 2010 Resume: Den 2. juni meddelte Premierminister Yukio Hatoyama, at han trådte tilbage, som følge af utilfredshed over regeringens håndtering af det sensitive Funtenma base spørgsmål, og ikke mindst anklager om at Hatoyama selv skulle have modtaget ulovlige kampagne- midler. Samtidigt meddelte også DPJs Generalsekretær Ichiro Ozawa og Landbrugsminister Hirotaka Akamatsu deres afgang, og DPJ stod derfor overfor en større rokade i partiets absolutte top, mindre end 6 5 uger før det kritiske overhusvalg den 11. juli. Ikke uventet blev det den siddende Finans- og Vicepremierminister Naoto Kan, der den 4. juni blev valgt til ny partileder og dermed Japans nye Premierminister. Den største opgave for Kan bliver at tæmme Japans enorme offentlige gældsbyrde, der nu overstiger 200 pct. af GDP, og Kan har da også allerede advaret om, at Japan kan ende med at blive et nyt Grækenland, hvis der ikke sættes ind meget hurtigt. På det veterinære område, syntes det meget alvorlige udbrud af Mund- og Klovesyge, der siden april har hærget det sydlige Japan nu endeligt at være kommet under kontrol. Prisen har dog været meget høj, og således er godt 275.000 dyr blevet aflivet, og præfekturet har mistet en del af det genetiske arvemateriale for deres værdifulde bøfkød. Indenrigspolitisk På et ekstraordinært parlamentarisk møde den 2. juni, meddelte Premierminister Yukio Hatoyama at han trådte tilbage. I sin TV-transmitterede tale, angav en følelsesladet Hatoyama utilfredsheden over regeringens håndtering af Futenma basespørgsmålet, som kort forinden havde fået det socialdemokratiske parti (SDP) til at trække sig fra regeringskoalitionen, samt anklagerne om modtagelse af ulovlige kampagnemidler, som de primære årsager til hans beslutning om at træde tilbage. Samtidigt meddelte også DPJs Generalsekretær Ichiro Ozawa sin afgang, og dagen efter indgav også Landbrugsminister Hirotaka Akamatsu sin afskedsbegæring. Ozawa havde længe været under mistanke for at have modtaget ulovlige kampagnebidrag, og mens det var usikkert om der var beviser nok til at kunne fælde ham, var stemningen i befolkningen, at sagen under alle omstændigheder burde føre til hans afgang. For Landbrugsminister Akamatsu var det derimod regeringens fejlslagne håndtering af det alvorlige udbrud af Mund- og Klovesyge, som siden april havde hærget Miyazaki præfekturet på den sydlige ø Kyushu, der kom til at koste ministerembedet. Med mindre end seks uger til det vigtige overhusvalg den 11. juli, var timingen ikke optimal, men da DPJ allerede var blevet spået et nederlag som følge af ovenstående, var Hatoyamas afgang så tæt på valget sandsynligvis alligevel til partiets bedste. Andet Kvartal 2010 Side 1 Statskonsulentrapport Tokyo Ikke uventet blev Hatoyamas afløser den hidtidige Finans- og Vicepremierminister Naoto Kan, der den 4. juni blev valgt til ny partileder og dermed Japans nye Premierminister. Den 63-årige Kan er en erfaren politiker, der allerede to gange tidligere har været leder af partiet, herunder den første leder umiddelbart efter partiets stiftelse. Den eneste modkandidat var den 50-årige Shinji Tarutoko, men med 2/3 af partimedlemmernes stemmer var Kans sejr overbevisende. Udover den nødvendige rokade i regeringens top, fik udskiftningen kun minimale konsekvenser for regeringens øvrige ministre, hvoraf hele 11 ud af 17 bibeholdte deres embeder. De øvrige seks ministerposter blev tildelt Yoshihiko Noda (Finansminister), Masahiko Yamada (Landbrugsminister), Koichiro Gemba (Minister for Offentlig Reform), Satoshi Arai (Minister for Forbrugeranliggender, Indenrigs-, Økonomi- og Finanspolitik), Ren Ho (Minister for Administrativ Revitalisering), og naturligvis Kan som ny Premierminister. Blandt disse er Yamada interessant som ny Landbrugsminister, idet han selv er landmand, og siden 2003 har siddet som medlem af skiftende regeringers landbrugs- udvalg. I sin tid som Vicelandbrugsminister, har Yamada tillige udvist stor interesse for de danske erfaringer med vedvarende energi og biobrændsel, og det forventes at denne interesse for danske energi- og miljøløsninger vil fortsætte, nu da han er udnævnt til minister. Andre politiske mærkesager er fødevaresikkerhed og sporbarhed i fødevareproduktionen, ligesom Yamada desuden har markeret sig stærkt, som leder af regeringens indsats overfor Mund- og Klovesygeudbruddet i Miyazaki. En anden interessant nyudnævnelse er Ren Ho, som allerede inden hendes udnævnelse til ministerposten var kendt for sin fremtrædende rolle i debatter om regeringens forvaltning af offentlige midler, og som nu får mulighed for at føre nogle af hendes teorier ud i livet. Internt i partiet blev den centrale post som Chief Cabinet Secretary (regeringens øverste talsmand) tildelt Yoshito Sengoku, mens Yukio Edano blev udnævnt til ny Generalsekretær for DPJ. Begge er kendte for at være stærke modstandere af Ozawa, og dette er derfor blevet tolket som et klart signal om, at Kan ønsker at stække Ozawas magt internt i partiet. Politisk forventes Kan at ville fortsætte den hidtidige linje med fokus på økonomisk vækst, jobskabelse, en øget integration med Japans asiatiske naboer og en fastholdelse af alliancen med USA. Hertil kommer Kans nye løfter om at ville genopbygge Japan og vende den udvikling, der de sidste 20 år har trukket Japan ned, og skabt en følelse af magtesløshed og manglende tiltro til de politiske partiers evner til at skabe fornyelse. Om regeringen kan levere på disse løfter er derimod uvist, og Kan har da også advaret om, at regeringen ikke længere kan sidde Japans enorme offentlige gældsbyrde der overstiger 200 pct. af GDP overhørig, og at Japan kan ende med at blive et nyt Grækenland, hvis der ikke sættes ind meget hurtigt. Så stor en opgave kan imidlertid også meget hurtigt blive regeringens endeligt, og vælgertilslutningen er da også faldet fra 50 pct. umiddelbart efter Kans tiltrædelse til kun 45 pct. en måned senere. Et af de største fald nogensinde for en nytiltrådt Premierminister. En af årsagerne kan være Kans meget håndfaste udmeldinger om at ville hæve forbrugsskatten fra de nuværende 5 pct. til 10 pct. fremover. Et sådant tiltag har dog opbakning fra både den LDP-ledede opposition og store dele af befolkningen, som erkender at skattegrundlaget for Japan skal øges for at afhjælpe den store offentlige gældsbyrde. Andet Kvartal 2010 Side 2 Statskonsulentrapport Tokyo Problemet synes derfor snarere at være Kan selv, som ikke umiddelbart har formået at overbevise vælgerne om hans politiske styrke og lederegenskaber. En anden teori er at Japans problemer efterhånden er så store, at ingen regering vil kunne levere de nødvendige reformer, og at de japanske vælgere derfor vil blive ved med at vrage deres politiske ledere indtil de finder en ny karismatisk leder af tidligere Premierminister Koizumis format. Dette lover ikke godt for det kommende overhusvalg, og Kan har da også allerede erkendt, at det vil blive svært at opnå de 60 mandater som DPJ skal bruge for at sikre et absolut flertal. Det håbes dog, at DPJ kan opnå 54 mandater, hvilket sammen med koalitionspartnernes mandater vil være nok til at fastholde regeringens flertal i Overhuset. Udenrigspolitisk Som allerede nævnt, er det alliancen med USA og spørgsmålet om placeringen af den store amerikanske Futenma militærbase på Okinawa, som har præget den udenrigs- politiske dagsorden, og som i sidste ende førte til Hatoyamas fald. På trods af langvarige forhandlinger, er det således ikke lykkedes USA og Japan at komme til enighed om en flytning af Futenma basen, og der hersker derfor stigende tvivl om regeringens evne til at levere på dette afgørende valgløfte. Alt i alt har USA godt 74.000 soldater stationeret i Japan, og mere end halvdelen af disse befinder sig på Okinawa, som dermed huser USA's største militære tilstedeværelse i Japan. USA er imidlertid også Japans vigtigste strategiske forsvarspartner, og det er derfor tvivlsomt at regeringen for alvor vil gå i clinch med USA. Af interesse for Danmark, er også regeringens holdning til en øget internationalisering på handelsområdet, men mens udmeldingerne fra Hatoyama og Ozawa gav anledning til en vis optimisme, synes holdningen i det nye Kan kabinet at være mere tilbage- holdende. Derudover siges især Landbrugsminister Yamada at være modstander af yderligere lempelser på importområdet, hvilket kan give problemer i forhold til ønsket om en europæisk frihandelsaftale med Japan. Når dette er sagt, har den forestående frihandelsaftale mellem EU og Sydkorea skabt stor bekymring i den japanske industri, og især de japanske bilproducenter presser nu på for at starte forhandlinger om en lignende aftale for Japan. Derudover har også Kina og Taiwan netop underskrevet en Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), som især spås at ville ramme den sydkoreanske og japanske elektronik og bilindustri, og hvilket kan komme til at lægge yderligere pres på regeringen for at finde alternative markeder for japanske produkter. Frihandelsaftaler er dog ikke helt uproblematiske for Japan, og som Australien har erfaret, er det især på landbrugssiden at der kan opstå problemer. Traditionelt set har Japan derfor favoriseret frihandelsaftaler med udviklingslande, hvor Japan har tilbudt kapacitetsopbygning, teknologioverførsel og træning i stedet for adgang for landbrugs- produkter, ligesom den nye regering tillige synes at favorisere aftaler med Japans asiatiske naboer over aftaler med f.eks. USA, EU og Australien. Nyeste skud på stammen er således en mulig japansk Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)
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