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Nuclear Energy Policy and the National Deliberative Poll
Nuclear Energy Policy and the National Deliberative Poll Yasunori Sone Keio University, Japan [email protected] “Public Policy and Public Consultation: Deliberative Democracy in Asia” May 20-21, 2016 Nanyang Technological University, Singapore Summary The National Deliberative Poll on Energy and Environmental Policy was conducted in August 4-5, 2012. James Fishkin described it as “the first Deliberative Poll® (DP) anywhere in the world that was commissioned by a government to get input on a subject of national importance before a national decision.” This paper focuses on three aspects of Deliberative Polling in the policy making process. 1) Why the government adopted it as a tool of public consultation in the formal decision making process, 2) what were the poll results, and 3) how the government used it for their policy decisions. Interestingly, the poll shows us that the 285 randomly selected participants became more informed and changed their views on certain policy options. The public finally supported the zero nuclear option and concern for safety as a first criterion. It also shows that the public could not find any reliable authority to judge important key respects. It seems to be an “anomie” situation where there is no trust at all even in the nuclear specialists. After an ad hoc committee of specialists examined public consultation results such as from deliberative polls, public comments, town-meetings, and public opinion polls by media, Energy and Environment Council decided ‘the Innovative Strategy for Energy and the Environment’ that recommended the policy proposal “zero nuclear power by 2030s along with strong commitments to energy conservation and renewable energy.” The Cabinet finally made a decision according to the recommendation. -
Japan–China Relations
22 WebMemo Published by The Heritage Foundation No. 3027 September 27, 2010 East China Sea Flare-Up: Learning the Wrong Lessons in Beijing Dean Cheng Japanese prosecutors have reportedly decided to greater concern, however, was the fact that Beijing release the captain of the Chinese fishing boat escalated both the rhetoric and its responses over whom they arrested after he apparently rammed the following two weeks, to the point of Chinese two Japanese coast guard vessels in the waters Premier Wen Jiabao publicly snubbing Japanese around the Senkakus. The decision, a Japanese dep- Prime Minister Naoto Kan last week at the United uty public prosecutor said, was made “taking into Nations and China suspending the sale of rare earth account the impact on our citizens and Japan– minerals (essential for the production of electronics) China relations, [so] our judgment was that it to Japanese customers. For Tokyo to decide to would have been excessive to prolong the investiga- release the Chinese captain in the face of such over- tion and his detention.”1 reaction only teaches Beijing that its policies worked. The Japanese government’s comments make it This is an extremely dangerous precedent not even clearer that this decision was made due to the only for Japan but for the larger East Asia region impact of the case on Sino–Japanese relations. Japa- and, ultimately, even for the United States. nese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku It was Beijing, not Tokyo, that decided that this stated explicitly, “It is a fact that there was the pos- relatively minor incident should escalate. -
The United States and Japan in Global Context: 2015
THE EDWIN O. REISCHAUER CENTER FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN GLOBAL CONTEXT: 2015 THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY Washington, D.C. Edwin O. Reischauer October 15, 1910 – September 1, 1990 Yearbook Class of 2015 From Left to Right: Sung Hui “Sophie” Yang, Jeffrey Bond, Ju Hyung Kim, Luoxi Dao, Ji Won Kwon, Malcolm Whitehead, Michael Wakcher, Professor William Brooks, Evan Sankey, Benjamin Garton, Ian Hamilton, Michael Kotler, Waichiro Katsuda, Yiwei “Jenny” Pan TABLE OF CONTENTS The Year at the Reischauer Center 1 Reischauer Center Events, 2014-2015 7 Introduction 10 William L. Brooks For U.S.-Japan Relations, the JET Program Is a Hidden National Treasure 46 Malcolm Whitehead U.S.-Japan Cultural Exchange in a New Era of Public Diplomacy 73 Michael Wakcher New U.S.-Japan Partnership in Disaster Management and Japan’s Role 95 Waichiro Katsuda India and the US-Japan Alliance 113 Evan Sankey Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Central Asia Strategy: Is it Effective? 129 Ian Hamilton Trilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia 157 Ju Hyong Kim Japan’s Trade Agreement Strategies: Three Case Studies 172 Ji Won Kwon Changing Trade Patterns among the U.S., Japan and China: Does Politics Trump Market Forces? 205 Jenny Iwei Pan Impact of “Abenomics” on Mergers and Acquisition Trends in Japan 222 Luoxi Dao Japan’s Long Road to Corporate Governance Reform 240 Ben Garton Building Japan’s Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 258 Jeff Bond Class Research Trip to Tokyo, March 2014: Photo Album 281 1 THE YEAR AT THE REISCHAUER CENTER The 2014-2015 academic year, during which the Reischauer Center celebrated its thirtieth anniversary, was a historic one--for the Center, SAIS, and for trans-Pacific relations. -
Getting the Triangle Straight: China, Japan, and the United States in An
Getting the Triangle Straight: China, Japan, and 1 the United States in an Era of Change Gerald Curtis Compared with South Asia, the Middle East, and other parts of the world plagued by political instability, violence, pervasive poverty, death, and destruction, East Asia offers a stark contrast as a region that is the dynamic center of the world economy and that is at peace, or at least not at war. This reality is rendered all the more remarkable by the fact that this is an area where the interests of three great powers—China, Japan, and the United States—intersect. There are dangers of course. North Korea and Taiwan in particular are potential triggers for armed conflict, which, were it to occur, would in one way or another involve all three of these countries. Perhaps even more worrisome is the fragility of the global financial system, posing as it does the ever-present danger of renewed economic turmoil, increased protectionism, and the weakening of a relatively free trade regime that makes it possible for China, Japan, Korea, and the countries of Southeast Asia to pursue successful export-led growth policies. China, Japan, the United States, and other countries in East Asia face the same essential strategic question of how to keep the region at peace and sustain the economic vitality that not only is raising the living standards of people in East Asia but, in the globalized system in which we live, is con- tributing to improving the lives of people around the world. Successfully responding to this strategic challenge is no easy task, to be sure, but it is far preferable to the alternative faced in other parts of the world where there is still a need to figure out how to bring about political stability, economic growth, and the termination of war. -
Resume: Den Indenrigspolitiske Situation
Statskonsulentrapport Tokyo Ambassaden Tokyo 5. november 2010 Resume: Indenrigspolitisk har starten af tredje kvartal været præget af en intern magtkamp mellem siddende Premierminister Naoto Kan og partifællen Ichiro Ozawa, som mange frygtede ville blive ikke bare premierministerens, men også regeringens endeligt. Denne frygt viste sig imidlertid ubegrundet, idet Premierminister Kan ikke alene formåede at fastholde formandsposten, men tillige endte med at gå ud af opgøret med et styrket politisk mandat. Dette styrkede mandat blev dog hurtigt sat på en prøve i den såkaldte "fiskeskippersag", som har skabt en alvorlig splid mellem Kina og Japan, der endnu ikke er bragt helt til ende. Sideløbende hermed synes det japanske værtskab for APEC at have fungeret som en katalysator for en intens debat om Japans fremtidige internationale handelspolitik, og helt specifikt et eventuelt japansk medlemsskab af Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) frihandels- aftalen. Mens Premierminister Kan synes at være en tilhænger af et sådant medlemsskab, har andre medlemmer af regeringen imidlertid stillet sig mere skeptiske, og det er derfor endnu usikkert hvad den endelige beslutning vil blive. Den indenrigspolitiske situation I kølvandet på DPJ’s (Democratic Party of Japan) nederlag ved Overhusvalget den 11. juli, annoncerede DPJ’s tidligere Generalsekretær Ichiro Ozawa, at han ville udfordre den siddende Premierminister og partiformand Naoto Kan på DPJ’s partikongres den 14. september 2010. Dette skabte stor uro i det politiske landskab, og en frygt for at interne stridigheder ville splitte partiet, og føre til nyvalg kun godt et år efter at DPJ kom til magten. Denne frygt viste sig dog at være ubegrundet, idet Naoto Kan genvandt formandskabet, og faktisk endte med at gå styrket ud af opgøret takket være en massiv folkelig opbakning i tiden op til partikongressen. -
Into the Unknown Ventures on Tech and His Could’Ve Been Pop Career Placement Agents Look Beyond Sovereign Funds to Asia’S Emerging Lps Page 7 Page 15
Asia’s Private Equity News Source avcj.com April 29 2014 Volume 27 Number 15 EDITOR’S VIEWPOINT Asia-based PE firm goes public, well not quite Page 3 NEWS Ardian, Baring Asia, CDH Cerberus, China Everbright, ClearVue, CVC, Fosun, INCJ, Kedaara, KIC, Matrix, New Horizon, PEP, TPG, Sequoia, Zephyr Page 4 DEAL OF THE WEEK Second-time lucky for J-Star on auto parts Page 12 VC-backed Liepin takes the battle to LinkedIn Page 13 PROFILE Andrew Chung of Khosla Into the unknown Ventures on tech and his could’ve been pop career Placement agents look beyond sovereign funds to Asia’s emerging LPs Page 7 Page 15 FOCUS DEAL OF THE WEEK Backdoor bonanza? Marketing master China PE investors target reverse mergers Page 10 Campaign Monitor seals record Oz VC deal Page 12 15th Annual Private Equity & Venture Forum Japan 2014 26-27 June, Conrad Tokyo GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, LOCAL OPPORTUNITY avcjjapan.com Book before Prospering in the New Japan 16 May to save up to Confirmed speakers include: US$400 Shigeki Kimura KEYNOTE Kazushige Kobayashi Tatsuya Kubo Managing Executive Officer Managing Director Managing Director (Global Head of Industry CAPITAL DYNAMICS HARBOURVEST PARTNERS Finance Group) (JAPAN) LIMITED JAPAN BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION Soichi Sam Takata Kosei Terami Richard Folsom Head of Private Equity Investment Officer and Deputy Representative Partner TOKIO MARINE ASSET Representative, Tokyo Office, ADVANTAGE PARTNERS, LLP MANGEMENT CO. LTD INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION (IFC) Tamotsu Adachi Tomotaka Goji Hirofumi Hirano Managing Director, Co- Managing Partner Member and Chief Executive Representative THE UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO Officer CARLYLE JAPAN, LLC EDGE CAPITAL KKR JAPAN Megumi Kiyozuka David Lewis Anthony Miller Managing Director Partner, Transaction Advisory Partner & Chief Executive Officer CLSA CAPITAL PARTNERS JAPAN Group PAG JAPAN KK KPMG TAX CORPORATION JAPAN William Saito Yuji Sugimoto Katsuyuki Tokushima President & CEO Managing Director, Chief Pension Consultant, Hideaki Sakurai INTECUR, K.K. -
Newsletter 4
September 14, 2009 CANADA-ASIA AGENDA www.asiapacific.ca Series Editor Brian Job Issue 2 Japan’s “electoral revolution” – changes at home and abroad By Tsuyoshi Kawasaki The Japanese general election was revolutionary: it brought to power for the first time since the end of World War II a majority government not led by the Liberal Democratic Party and it saw the final transition to a two-party system brought about by the introduction of single- member electorates 15 years ago. Like any revolution, it will be some time before it is clear if the pressures of real power will allow the new government to bring about promised change. The general election of August 30, 2009 in Japan was was not in power, Japan was governed by coalition extraordinary. The Democratic Party (DP) won 308 seats governments as none of the non-LDP parties had a out of 480 in the House of Representatives, ousting the majority.) In other words, it was the first “decisive and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from power. Since its true change of power” in post-World War II Japan. Of inception in 1955, the LDP had always governed Japan, course, this type of situation -- that is, a majority of seats either alone or in a coalition, except for ten months in secured by a former opposition party after an election -- is 1993-1994. This time, it lost almost two thirds of its nothing new to Canadian politics. But for the Japanese, previous seats, down to a mere 119 from 300, which this election has ushered in a new era of politics, as it was nothing short of disaster. -
Neoliberals and the Radical Left Are in the Same Basic Income Boat: Is the Debate in Japan an Exception Or Is There a Universal Rationale Behind It?
INSTITUT FRANÇAIS DE RECHERCHE SUR LE JAPON CONTEMPORAIN FRENCH INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON CONTEMPORARY JAPAN フランス国立フランス国立現代現代現代現代日本研究センター日本研究センター UMIFRE 19 CNRS- MAEE Neoliberals And The Radical Left Are In The Same Basic Income Boat: Is The Debate In Japan An Exception Or Is There A Universal Rationale Behind It? by YAMAMORI Toru (Professor at Doshisha University) Working paper - Série L : Lunch Seminar WP-L-12-IFRJC-Yamamori-09-02.pdf Presentation at the Lunch Seminar on the 15th of October 2010, with Thierry Ribault as a discussant at 日仏会館 for our フランス国立現代日本研究センター .. UMIFRE 19 CNRS-MAEE 〒150-0013 東京都渋谷区恵比寿 3-9-25 日仏会館 3-9-25, Ebisu, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo, 150-0013 Japon TEL +81 (0) 3 5421 7641 / FAX +81 (0) 3 5421 7651 / http://www.mfj.gr.jp/ Lunch Seminar on the Japanese Economy and Society October 15th 2010, at the UMIFRE 19 – CNRS -Maison franco-japonaise Neoliberals And The Radical Left Are In The Same Basic Income Boat: Is The Debate In Japan An Exception Or Is There A Universal Rationale Behind It? Toru Yamamori* (Translated by Brian Small**) Around 2009, the debate over basic income in Japan reached not only academics but also citizens, politicians, activists and the media. In spite of skepticism and opposition from all political spectrum, support of the idea has come from two different political strands: the radical left and the Neoliberals. For a decade I have been researching radical grassroots activism for BI in Europe, and a concise introduction for BI that I published a year ago emphasized these roots for BI. This book was well received among some grassroots activists. -
Regierungswechsel in Japan Sozialdemokratie Ohne Sozialdemokraten?
PERSPEKTIVE | FES JAPAN Regierungswechsel in Japan Sozialdemokratie ohne Sozialdemokraten? SVEN SAALER Juni 2010 Am 2. Juni 2010 erklärte der japanische Premierminister Yukio Hatoyama nach nur achteinhalb Monaten Regierungszeit seinen Rücktritt. Zusammen mit Hatoyama trat der mächtige Generalsekretär der Demokratischen Partei Japans (DPJ), Ichirô Ozawa, zurück. Nach ihrem überwältigenden Wahlsieg im August 2009 hat die von der DPJ geführte Koalitionsregierung eine Reihe von Wahlversprechen erfüllt und Reformvorhaben umgesetzt. Hatoyama scheiterte aber letztlich am Unvermögen, eine selbst gesetzte Frist zur Verlegung eines US-Stützpunktes auf der südlichen Inselgruppe Okinawa einhalten zu können, was ihm die Missgunst der Wähler einbrachte und zum Austritt der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Japans (SDP) aus der Regierungskoalition führte. Hatoyamas Nachfolger ist Naoto Kan – schon seit Parteigründung einer der führenden Köpfe der DPJ. Kan ist bekannt als entschlossener Reformer und für seine Bürgernähe. Er stammt selbst aus der Bürgerbewegung und begann seine politische Karriere als Unterhausabgeordneter für den »Sozialdemokratischen Bund« (pÜ~â~á=jáåëÜì=oÉåÖ∑). Auch andere Mitglieder des neuen Kabinetts haben einen sozialdemokratischen Hintergrund, weshalb die sozialdemokratische Färbung des Kabinett Kan trotz des Austritts der SDP aus der Koalition nicht zu übersehen ist. Die Handlungsfähigkeit des neuen Kabinetts könnte jedoch von parteiinternen Konflikten beeinträchtigt werden. SVEN SAALER | REGIERUNGSWECHSEL IN JAPAN 1. Das Scheitern des Kabinetts Hatoyama Eine Reihe von Versprechen, deren Ankündigung den Wahlsieg der DPJ ermöglicht hatte, konnte daher nur Am 2. Juni 2010 erklärte der japanische Premierminister eingeschränkt oder gar nicht realisiert werden. Die Yukio Hatoyama nach nur acht Monaten Regierungszeit anfangs hohen Popularitätswerte des Kabinetts (über seinen Rücktritt. Zusammen mit Hatoyama trat der 70 Prozent) sanken daher rapide, auf zuletzt 17 einflussreiche Generalsekretär der Demokratischen Prozent. -
TOKYO FIELD TRIP Dialogue with Cabinet Ministers
TOKYO FIELD TRIP Dialogue with Cabinet Ministers History Of Japan’s Environmental Policy Kenji Someno, Research Fellow, Tokyo Foundation am speaking here today in place of former ronmental pollution. From 1955 to 1965, en- IEnvironment Minister Sakahito Ozawa, ergy consumption tripled, and the industrial who unfortunately is unable to attend due to structure shifted toward heavy industries. This Diet obligations. resulted in air, water, and soil pollution, which I’ve been involved in pollution measures became serious health hazards. and climate change for over 20 years as a People’s perceptions of economic growth former official of the Environment Ministry, also changed. In the early 1970s, a majority, where I headed the government’s Team Minus for the first time, came to view growth nega- 6 Percent campaign to lower the country’s car- tively as being a threat to their health. bon dioxide emissions. The Basic Pollution Control Law was en- Japan experienced high economic growth acted in 1967. The business community was from the late 1950s to early 1970s. People opposed to the law, as it feared that the higher became more affluent, the material symbols of costs for pollution countermeasures would such prosperity being purchases of the “three hurt their competitiveness. They called for sacred treasures,” namely, the black-and-white balance between business growth and pollu- TV, washing machine, and refrigerator. Later, tion measures. as the country grew richer, the color TV, au- If you replace the word “pollution” with “cli- tomobile, and air conditioner emerged as the mate change,” I think it pretty much sums up “new sacred treasures.” the attitude of the business community today. -
From Rhetoric to Reality: Japanese Foreign-Policy Making Under The
From Rhetoric to Reality Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan April 2012 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis From Rhetoric to Reality Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan April 2012 Weston S. Konishi A publication of The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Contents Introduction and Acknowledgments iii Executive Summary v Main Findings v From Rhetoric to Reality: Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan 1 Internal Challenges 4 Intra-party Divisions 4 The Complexities of Coalition Politics 7 Institutional Reforms: Toward Politician-Led Decision-Making 11 The DPJ’s Foreign Policy: Competing Visions 15 Realists 16 Pacifists 17 Centrists 17 Neo-Autonomists 18 Caveats 20 Prime Minister Hatoyama: An Agenda for Change 23 External Constraints on the Hatoyama Administration 27 The Kan Administration: Political Transition and Crisis Management 30 The Noda Administration: Shifting to the Center? 40 Findings and Implications 45 The Impact of Structural Obstacles on DPJ Foreign-Policy Making 45 Continuity versus Change 46 The DPJ: A Hawkish Party? 47 Bilateralism vs. Multilateralism 49 Competing Schools of Thought 51 Conclusion 54 APPENDIX A: Impact of Major Events on Cabinet Approval Ratings 56 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY I APPENDIX B: The 2010 NDPG Process 59 APPENDIX C: Survey Data of DPJ Foreign Policy Viewpoints 62 APPENDIX D: Profiles of Key DPJ Politicians 63 APPENDIX E: Chronology of Major Events under DPJ Governments 79 Bibliography 86 About the Author 103 II FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY Introduction and Acknowledgments After more than fifty years of one-party dom- ister Kan Naoto, presided over Japan’s most chal- inance under the Liberal Democratic Par- lenging crisis since World War II—the March ty (LDP), Japan’s political landscape changed 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake—before dramatically with the victory of the Democratic succumbing to his own political fate as a result Party of Japan (DPJ) in parliamentary elections of his inconsistent leadership. -
Press Conference by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda
Top > Speeches and Statements by Prime Minister Press Conference by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda Friday, September 30, 2011 [Provisional Translation] JAPANESE CABINET PUBLIC RELATIONS SECRETARY: We will now begin the press conference by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. Prime Minister, your opening statement please. Opening Statement by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda PRIME MINISTER NODA: I am sorry to keep everyone waiting. Today marks one month since I was selected by the Diet to become Prime Minister. I have taken on the great responsibility of this role, giving everything I have to this job. In this time, the Government has come together for rapid responses to the damage caused by heavy rains resulting from Typhoon No.12 and Typhoon No.15. I myself have visited the areas affected by these disasters and worked on various efforts including gaining an accurate understanding of the current situation. I want to express once again my heartfelt condolences to the people harmed by the disasters. There are still 23 people missing due to Typhoon No.12 and Typhoon No.15. We will continue to exert every effort to search for the missing, and additionally, I hope to do everything possible to prevent the occurrence of secondary disasters and support the victims of these typhoons. I have also attended the General Assembly of the United Nations. In addition to expressing the gratitude of Japan for support received from each country in the General Assembly and at the High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security, I also explained the initiatives of Japan and our efforts for recovery, reconstruction, and toward the conclusion of the nuclear accident.