Whistleblower Laws in the 21st Century: Greater Rewards, Heightened Risks, Increased Complexity
March 20, 2014 Lewis Katz Hall Carlisle, Pennsylvania
WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: GREATER REWARDS, HEIGHTENED RISKS, INCREASED COMPLEXITY
Thursday, March 20, 2014 — 1:00 to 6:00 p.m. Apfelbaum Family Courtroom & Auditorium, Lewis Katz Hall, Carlisle, PA Simulcast to Greg Sutliff Auditorium, University Park, PA
Table of Contents
AGENDA ...... 1 BIOGRAPHIES ...... 3 INTRODUCTION ...... 9 WHAT IS A WHISTLEBLOWER, by Lance Cole ...... 9 Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013) ...... 11 Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998) ...... 23 Sarbanes-Oxley Criminal Whistleblower Protection Provision (18 U.S.C.A § 1513(e)) ...... 43 The SEC’s Corporate Cooperation Policy: A Duty to Correct or Update? ...... 45 PANEL ONE: WHISTLEBLOWER POLICY ISSUES ...... 87 WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A WHISTLEBLOWER, by Stanley M. Brand ...... 89 Whistleblowing in the 21st Century ...... 89 WORKING WITH GOVERNMENT WHISTLEBLOWERS, by Scott H. Amey ...... 93 Whistleblower Laws in the 21 Century ...... 93 PANEL TWO: BUSINESS AND CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWER ISSUES ...... 113 PLAINTIFFS PERSPECTIVE, by Joseph E. B. “Jeb” White ...... 115 Recent Improvements to the False Claims Act: Back to the Future for the Government’s Primary Fraud-Fighting Weapon ...... 115 CORPORATE/DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE, by Claudia M. Williams ...... 139 Whistleblower Reporting ...... 137 Ethical Conduct and Governance ...... 141 Procedures for the Submission of Complains or Concerns Regarding Financial Statement Disclosures, Accounting, Internal Accounting Controls, Auditing Matters or Violations of the Code of Ethics for Senior Executive and Financial Officers or Code of Business Conduct and Ethics ...... 143 Whistleblower Policy ...... 145 Whistleblower Procedure ...... 147 WHO SHOULD “BENEFIT” FROM SETTLEMENT OF WHISTLEBLOWER CASES?, by Katherine Pearson ...... 153 Fraud Statistics – Overview ...... 159 Fraud Statistics – Health and Human Services ...... 161 Fraud Statistics – Department of Defense ...... 163 Fraud Statistics – Other (Non-HHS, Non-DOD) ...... 165 COMMENTATOR NOTES, by David R. Hoffman ...... 167 The Role of the Federal Government in Ensuring Quality of Care in Long-Term Care Facilities ...... 167 Medical Necessity Review: Compliance in a New Era of Accountability ...... 177 KEYNOTE ADDRESS ...... 183 THE LAW OF WHISTLEBLOWING: AN OVERVIEW & INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, by Kathleen Clark ... 183 White Paper on the Law of Whistleblowing, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2176293 ...... 185 Confidentiality Norms and Government Lawyers, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1154245 ...... 191
WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: GREATER REWARDS, HEIGHTENED RISKS, INCREASED COMPLEXITY
Thursday, March 20, 2014 — 1:00 to 6:00 p.m. Apfelbaum Family Courtroom & Auditorium, Lewis Katz Hall, Carlisle, PA Simulcast to Greg Sutliff Auditorium, University Park, PA
1:00 p.m. Introduction
What is a Whistleblower? Lance Cole, Professor of Law and Director, Center for Government Law and Public Policy Studies, Penn State Dickinson School of Law 1:15 to 2:15 p.m. Panel One: Whistleblower Policy Issues
What Is It Like To Be a Whistleblower? Stanley M. Brand, President and Founder, Brand Law Group, Washington, D.C. and Distinguished Fellow in Law and Government, Penn State Dickinson School of Law
Working with Government Whistleblowers Scott H. Amey, General Counsel, Project on Government Oversight, Washington, D.C.
Commentators: Professors Lance Cole and Kathleen Clark 2:15 to 2:45 p.m. Audience Q&A (and Break) 2:45 to 3:45 p.m. Panel Two: Business and Corporate Whistleblower Issues
Plaintiffs Perspective Joseph E. B. “Jeb” White, Nolan Auerbach & White, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Corporate/Defense Perspective Claudia M. Williams, Associate General Counsel, Labor & Employment, The Hershey Company, Hershey, Pennsylvania
Who Should “Benefit” from Settlement of Whistleblower Cases? Katherine Pearson, Professor of Law, Penn State Dickinson School of Law
Commentator: Professor Raymond Gibney, Jr. and David R. Hoffman, Esq. 3:45 to 4:15 p.m. Audience Q&A (and Break) 4:15 to 5:15 p.m. Keynote Address (and Audience Q&A)
The Law of Whistleblowing: An Overview & International Perspective Kathleen Clark, Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law 5:15 to 6:15 p.m. Reception
1 2 Biographies
Scott H. Amey:
Scott Amey serves as general counsel for the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) and directs contract oversight investigations, including reviews of federal spending on goods and services, the responsibility of top federal contractors, and conflicts-of-interest and ethics concerns that have led to questionable contract awards. Scott testifies before Congress and federal agency panels, submits public comments on proposed regulations, educates the public by working with the media, and publishes reports, alerts, and blogs on contracting and openness issues.
Mr. Amey previously worked for POGO in the mid-nineties, but has been continuously with the organization since 2003. Scott left POGO in 1998 to attend law school, after which he clerked for the Honorable James A. Kenney, III, at the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland from 2001-2003. Mr. Amey received a J.D., magna cum laude, from the University of Baltimore School of Law in 2001, and a B.A. from the University of Pittsburgh in 1993. Scott is licensed to practice law in Maryland. He has appeared on CNN, NBC, CNBC, ABC, and NPR, and has been quoted in The New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Washington Times, and USA Today, among others, and often provides background information and leads to the media.
For more information, please visit: • http://www.pogo.org/about/board-staff/staff-profiles/scott-amey.html
Professor Stanley M. Brand:
As the founding member of the Brand Law Group in Washington, D.C., Professor Brand has enjoyed success representing corporations, trade associations, labor unions, and individuals in major justice department, grand jury and independent counsel investigations and trial proceedings including Whitewater, HUD, the savings and loan crisis and the campaign finance task force investigations.
Earlier in his career, Professor Brand served as general counsel to the U.S. House of Representatives, and was the chief legal officer responsible for representing the House, its members, officers and employees in connection with legal procedures and challenges to the conduct of their official activities. With over thirty years of experience, Professor Brand offers students a particularly sharp insight into federal
3 regulatory and legislative practice in Washington, DC. In addition to his legal work, Professor Brand serves as the Vice-President of the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues.
Drawing on his broad range of experience, Professor Brand’s practice covers all levels of state and federal courts, with an emphasis on defending the rights of witnesses involved in government investigations. He has also represented numerous individuals and organizations investigated by and/or called to testify before the US Congress. Mr. Brand has developed a particular expertise in the application of the separation of powers doctrine. His diverse litigation and counseling practice also includes representing corporations, trade associations, labor unions, and individuals in major Justice Department, grand jury and independent counsel investigations and trial proceedings, including Whitewater, HUD, the savings and loan crisis, and the campaign finance task force investigations.
For more information, please visit: • http://www.brandlawgroup.com/attorneys/stanley-brand/#sthash.BWP04Mqs.dpuf • https://law.psu.edu/faculty/brand
Professor Lance Cole:
Professor Lance Cole's research and teaching interests reflect his practice experience in white-collar criminal defense, securities regulation law, and government investigations and prosecutions. Professor Cole researches the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, government regulation of business entities, and legislative practice and procedure. His most recent publications have focused on constitutional and common law privileges and the government's ability to overcome those privileges and compel disclosure of information from private individuals and business entities.
For more information, please visit: • https://law.psu.edu/faculty/cole
4 Professor Kathleen Clark:
Kathleen Clark practices law in Washington, DC, and is an expert on ethics standards for lawyers, current and former government officials and government contractors. She serves on the D.C. Bar’s Rules of Professional Conduct Review Committee, and previously was Special Counsel to the Attorney General of the District of Columbia, writing an Ethics Manual for the District’s 32,000 employees. As a consultant for the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), she wrote a report on ethics standards for government contractor personnel that formed the basis for an ACUS recommendation and an ABA House of Delegates resolution. She previously served as Counsel to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, drafting legislation on health care fraud and working on issues of white-collar crime.
Clark is also a law professor at Washington University in St. Louis, and has taught at the University of Michigan, Cornell University and Utrecht University. Her extensive academic work on ethics and corruption has been cited in hundreds of books and articles, and she has led ethics and whistleblowing workshops in North and South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia. A graduate of Yale College and Yale Law School, she studied Russian in the Soviet Union and Spanish in Guatemala and clerked for U.S. District Court Judge Harold H. Greene.
For more information, please visit • http://law.wustl.edu/faculty/pages.aspx?id=222
Dr. Raymond Gibney, Jr.:
Raymond Gibney, Jr., PhD., is an Associate Professor of Management, in the Business Administration program at Penn State Harrisburg. His primary teaching focus is on human resource management. Prior to joining Penn State Harrisburg, Dr. Gibney was a consultant to several firms on HR related issues, including Coopers & Lybrand.
For more information, please visit: • http://harrisburg.psu.edu/faculty-and-staff/raymond-gibney-jr-phd
5
David R. Hoffman:
David R. Hoffman, Esq. is the head of David Hoffman & Associates, P.C., a healthcare consulting firm based in Philadelphia. Mr. Hoffman was an Assistant United States attorney for more than 12 years, and prosecuted healthcare fraud cases, both civilly and criminally. Among his cases were successful prosecutions of long-term care facilities under the federal False Claims Act, to address serious problems with quality of care, including adequacy of nutrition, wound care, diabetes care and pain management protocols. Mr. Hoffman wrote about the experience of using the False Claims Act to prosecute Medicare and Medicaid abuse in “The Role of the Federal Government in Ensuring Quality of Care in Long-Term Care Facilities,” 6 ANNALS OF HEALTH LAW 147 (1997). Mr. Hoffman uses his experiences to advise companies on best practices, to achieve effective regulatory compliance programs, and he speaks regularly at Health Law programs in Pennsylvania and nationally.
For more information, please visit: • http://www.dhoffmanassoc.com/biographies.php
Professor Katherine Pearson:
Professor Katherine Pearson is a scholar of legal issues facing older adults. Her recent scholarship focuses on alternative models for provision of long-term care and senior health care; integration of health and social care; protection of vulnerable populations including the elderly and legal implications of dementia. Her interest in a wide range of emerging issues is captured in her most recent role, as a co-author and editor of the Elder Law Prof Blog. She often posts on high- profile whistleblower cases in elder care.
A 2009-2010 Fulbright scholar, Professor Pearson was a scholar in residence at Queen's University Belfast in Northern Ireland. In 2013-14, she joined interdisciplinary research teams reporting on comparative systems for social care and protection from abuse for older adults in Northern Ireland. Professor Pearson’s interest in whistleblower laws actually began in Northern Ireland, when she was asked to analyze what legal protections should be available for an employee working in an adult residential-care facility, who was “sacked” after
6 reporting his concerns about unsafe staffing ratios. Looking at the protections under whistleblower laws in the U.K. and Ireland stimulated her interest in what is happening in the U.S.
For more information, please visit: • https://law.psu.edu/faculty/pearson • http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/elder_law/
Joseph E. B. “Jeb” White:
Joseph (Jeb) E. B. White is a Partner at Nolan, Auberach, and White and is also the former President and CEO of Taxpayers Against Fraud (TAF) and TAF Education Fund, a public interest organizations dedicated to combating fraud against the government through the promotion of the False Claims Act and its qui tam provisions.
A graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and the Georgetown University Law Center, Mr. White is widely recognized as one of the country’s leading authorities on the False Claims Act. He regularly works with government and private attorneys, detailing the emerging case law through regular legal publications, educational seminars, and individual consultations. Mr. White launched the first legal website devoted to the False Claims Act case law; established a moot court program; reinvigorated an amicus curiae brief program; and coordinated various educational programs, including the nation's largest annual conference on False Claims Act litigation.
Mr. White has also filed amicus curiae briefs in state and federal courts across the country, including briefs in every U.S. Supreme Court case from the past five years involving the False Claims Act. In addition, he is regularly asked to lecture to a wide variety of audiences, including the American Bar Association, the American Health Lawyers Association, the American Law Institute, state assemblies, training sessions for state prosecutors, and the George Washington University Health Care Corporate Compliance Program. With over a dozen published articles, he has written extensively about fraud enforcement and whistleblower protections. A member of the BNA Health Care Fraud Report's Board of Advisors, Mr. White has been recognized as one of the nation's leading authorities on healthcare fraud and abuse. In addition, as the long-time Editor of the False Claims Act & Qui tam Quarterly Review, Mr. White managed the overall production of a 150+ page law journal devoted to False Claims Act litigation.
7
For more information, please visit: • http://www.whistleblowerfirm.com/who-we-are/partners/ • http://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Biographies/Pages/WhiteJeb.aspx
Claudia M. Williams:
Ms. Williams serves as Associate General Counsel, Global HR & Litigation. Reporting directly to the General Counsel, she leads the Law Department's Global Labor & Employment team to support the global legal needs of the Human Resources organization. She also leads the Law Department's Global Litigation team, with responsibility for managing the Company's global litigation portfolio. Ms. Williams serves as the key legal partner for the Chief HR Officer, the HR Leadership Team and Risk Management, providing support and advice on organizational HR initiatives, goals, processes and procedures and enterprise risk management. Ms. Williams also supports the General Counsel with her guidance/information to the Global Leadership Team, Board of Directors, Audit Committee, and the Ethical Business Practices Committee regarding global labor & employment and litigation matters. She assists with due diligence in the context of M&A and a target company's organizational integration.
Ms. Williams, a 2003 graduate of Penn State Dickinson Law, began her legal career as an Associate at Morgan Lewis. As an Equity Partner at Rhoads & Sinon, Ms. Williams assisted employers with the nuts and bolts of the employment relationship in both union and non-union work environments.
A former Adjunct Faculty Member at the Pennsylvania State University, she taught Labor-Management Relations from 2005-2008 at the Harrisburg Campus. She is active in the PBA Labor and Employment Law Section and currently is Immediate Past Chair. She was selected for inclusion in the 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2012 issues of Philadelphia Magazine Pennsylvania Super Lawyers - Rising Stars Edition, and she received the 2011 MS Society Leadership Award. She was selected by the Central Penn Business Journal as one of 2012's 25 Women of Influence.
8
INTRODUCTION
WHAT IS A WHISTLEBLOWER?
Lance Cole, Professor of Law and Director, Center for Government Law and Public Policy Studies, Penn State Dickinson School of Law
9 10 620 720 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
3. Statutes O1108 Khaled ASADI, Plaintiff–Appellant, If the statutory text is unambiguous, the inquiry into its meaning begins and v. ends with the text. G.E. ENERGY (USA), L.L.C., 4. Statutes O1151 Defendant–Appellee. In construing a statute, a court should No. 12–20522. give effect, if possible, to every word and every provision Congress used. United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. 5. Statutes O1155 If possible, the court interprets provi- July 17, 2013. sions of a statute in a manner that renders Background: Employee filed complaint them compatible, not contradictory. alleging that energy company violated the 6. Action O3 whistleblower-protection provision of the O Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Con- Securities Regulation 11.22 sumer Protection Act by terminating him The Dodd–Frank whistleblower-pro- after he made an internal report of a possi- tection provision creates a private cause of ble securities law violation. The United action only for individuals who provide in- States District Court for the Southern Dis- formation relating to a violation of the trict of Texas, Houston, Nancy F. Atlas, J., securities laws to the Securities and Ex- 2012 WL 2522599, dismissed complaint. change Commission (SEC). Dodd–Frank Employee appealed. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec- tion Act, § 922(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u–6. Holding: The Court of Appeals, Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge, held that 7. Securities Regulation O11.22 employee was not a ‘‘whistleblower’’ under Energy company’s employee did not the Act. provide any information to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) when he Affirmed. made internal report of a possible securi- ties law violation, and thus employee was 1. Statutes O1111 not a ‘‘whistleblower’’ under whistleblower- protection provision of the Dodd–Frank When faced with questions of statuto- Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec- ry construction, the court must first deter- tion Act. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Re- mine whether the statutory text is plain form and Consumer Protection Act, and unambiguous and, if it is, the court § 922(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u–6. must apply the statute according to its terms.
2. Statutes O1102, 1153 When construing statutes, the plain- Ronald Edward Dupree, Jr. (argued), ness or ambiguity of statutory language is Esq., Houston, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellant. determined by reference to the language Linda L. Addison, Esq., Fulbright & itself, the specific context in which that Jaworski L.L.P., New York, NY, Darryl language is used, and the broader context Wade Anderson, Fulbright & Jaworski, of the statute as a whole. L.L.P., Houston, TX, Jonathan Saul
11 ASADI v. G.E. ENERGY (USA), L.L.C. 621 Cite as 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013)
Franklin (argued), Fulbright & Jaworski agreement. Asadi, concerned this alleged L.L.P., Washington, DC, for Defendant– conduct violated the Foreign Corrupt Appellee. Practices Act (‘‘FCPA’’), reported the issue Appeal from the United States District to his supervisor and to the GE Energy Court for the Southern District of Texas. ombudsperson for the region. Shortly fol- lowing these internal reports, Asadi re- Before ELROD and HIGGINSON, ceived a ‘‘surprisingly negative’’ perform- Circuit Judges, and JACKSON, District ance review. GE Energy pressured him Judge.* to step down from his role as Iraq Country Executive and accept a reduced role in the JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, region with minimal responsibility. Asadi Circuit Judge: did not comply and, approximately one Plaintiff–Appellant Khaled Asadi (‘‘Asa- year after he made the internal reports, di’’) filed a complaint alleging that Defen- GE Energy fired him.1 dant–Appellee G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C. (‘‘GE Energy’’) violated the Dodd–Frank Asadi filed a complaint alleging that GE Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec- Energy violated Dodd–Frank’s whistle- tion Act of 2010 (‘‘Dodd–Frank’’), 15 blower-protection provision by terminating U.S.C. § 78u–6(h) (the ‘‘whistleblower-pro- him following his internal reports of the 2 tection provision’’), by terminating him af- possible FCPA violation. GE Energy ter he made an internal report of a possi- moved to dismiss Asadi’s complaint under ble securities law violation. The district Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis that it failed to court granted GE Energy’s motion to dis- state a claim because, inter alia, (1) Asadi miss for failure to state a claim. Because does not qualify as a ‘‘whistleblower’’ un- Asadi was not a ‘‘whistleblower’’ under der the whistleblower-protection provision, Dodd–Frank, we AFFIRM. and (2) the whistleblower-protection provi- sion does not apply extraterritorially. The I. district court dismissed Asadi’s whistle- In 2006, Asadi accepted GE Energy’s blower-retaliation claim with prejudice, offer to serve as its Iraq Country Execu- concluding that the whistleblower-protec- tive and relocated to Amman, Jordan. At tion provision ‘‘does not extend to or pro- a meeting in 2010, while serving in this tect Asadi’s extraterritorial whistleblowing capacity, Iraqi officials informed Asadi of activity.’’ Having reached this conclusion, their concern that GE Energy hired a it declined to decide whether Asadi quali- woman closely associated with a senior fied as a ‘‘whistleblower’’ under the whis- Iraqi official to curry favor with that offi- tleblower-protection provision. Asadi filed cial in negotiating a lucrative joint venture a timely notice of appeal.
* Chief Judge of the Middle District of Louisi- 2. Asadi later amended his complaint to in- ana, sitting by designation. clude a breach-of-contract claim. After the 1. Asadi learned of his termination by an email district court dismissed Asadi’s Dodd–Frank that specified, in part: ‘‘GE is exercising its whistleblower-protection claim, it declined to right to terminate your employment as an at- exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Asa- will employee, as allowed under U.S. law and di’s breach-of-contract claim and dismissed it as described in your expatriate assignment without prejudice. Asadi has not challenged letter. As a U.S. based employee you will be the district court’s dismissal of his breach-of- terminated in the U.S.’’ contract claim on appeal.
12 622 720 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
II. [4, 5] The parties’ arguments in this We review de novo a district court order case implicate several additional principles granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss of interpretation. In construing a statute, for failure to state a claim and may affirm a court should give effect, if possible, to on any basis supported by the record. every word and every provision Congress Torch Liquidating Trust ex rel. Bridge used. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 Assocs. v. Stockstill, 561 F.3d 377, 384 (5th U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d Cir.2009) (citation omitted). We ‘‘accept[ ] 251 (2001) (‘‘[A] statute ought, upon the all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them whole, to be so construed that, if it can be in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’’ prevented, no clause, sentence, or word In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant’’ F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.2007) (internal quo- (citation and internal quotation marks tation marks omitted). The only issues on omitted)). But see, e.g., Corley v. United appeal are interpretations of Dodd–Frank, States, 556 U.S. 303, 325, 129 S.Ct. 1558, which we review de novo. Rothe Dev., 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (Alito, J., dissent- Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 666 F.3d 336, 338 ing) (‘‘Like other canons, the antisuperflu- (5th Cir.2011). ousness canon is merely an interpretive aid, not an absolute rule.’’ (citing Germain, III. 503 U.S. at 254, 112 S.Ct. 1146)); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 611, 109 [1–3] When faced with questions of S.Ct. 2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989) (‘‘We statutory construction, ‘‘we must first de- respect these [general canons of statutory termine whether the statutory text is plain construction], and they are quite often and unambiguous’’ and, ‘‘[i]f it is, we must useful in close cases, or when statutory apply the statute according to its terms.’’ language is ambiguous. But we have ob- Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387, 129 served before that such interpretative can- S.Ct. 1058, 172 L.Ed.2d 791 (2009) (cita- on[s are] not a license for the judiciary to tions omitted); see also BedRoc Ltd. v. rewrite language enacted by the legisla- United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183, 124 S.Ct. ture.’’ (citation and internal quotation 1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004) (‘‘The preem- marks omitted)). Also, if possible, we in- inent canon of statutory interpretation re- terpret provisions of a statute in a manner quires us to ‘presume that [the] legislature that renders them compatible, not contra- says in a statute what it means and means dictory. See FDA v. Brown & William- in a statute what it says there.’ ’’) (quoting son Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 120 Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (‘‘A 249, 253–54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d court must TTT interpret the statute as a 391 (1992)). ‘‘The plainness or ambiguity symmetrical and coherent regulatory of statutory language is determined by scheme, and fit, if possible, all parts into reference to the language itself, the specif- an harmonious whole.’’ (citations and inter- ic context in which that language is used, nal quotation marks omitted)). With these and the broader context of the statute as a principles in mind, we turn to the question whole.’’ Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 presented in this appeal. U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). If the statutory text is unam- IV. biguous, our inquiry begins and ends with the text. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 183, [6] Congress enacted Dodd–Frank in 124 S.Ct. 1587. the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Sec-
13 ASADI v. G.E. ENERGY (USA), L.L.C. 623 Cite as 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013) tion 922 of Dodd–Frank, as one component play between two of these subsections—(a) of the Act’s comprehensive reform of the and (h)—is the focus of the statutory-inter- U.S. financial regulatory system, encour- pretation question presented in this case.4 ages individuals to provide information re- Subsection (a) provides definitions for cer- lating to a violation of U.S. securities laws tain terms used throughout § 78u–6. In- to the Securities and Exchange Commis- cluded in this list of terms defined for sion (‘‘SEC’’ or ‘‘Commission’’). Section purposes of § 78u–6 is ‘‘whistleblower.’’ 922, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6, encour- Specifically, ‘‘[t]he term ‘whistleblower’ ages such disclosures through two related means any individual who provides, or 2 or provisions that: (1) require the SEC to more individuals acting jointly who pro- pay significant monetary awards to indi- vide, information relating to a violation of viduals who provide information to the the securities laws to the Commission, in a SEC which leads to a successful enforce- manner established, by rule or regulation, ment action; and (2) create a private cause by the Commission.’’ § 78u–6(a)(6) (em- of action for certain individuals against phasis added). This definition, standing employers who retaliate against them for alone, expressly and unambiguously re- 3 taking specified protected actions. We quires that an individual provide informa- must answer a relatively straightforward tion to the SEC to qualify as a ‘‘whistle- question relating to the latter provision in blower’’ for purposes of § 78u–6. See, e.g., this case: whether an individual who is not Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Read- a ‘‘whistleblower’’ under the statutory defi- ing Law: The Interpretation of Legal nition of that term in § 78u–6(a)(6) may, in Texts 226 (1st ed. 2012) (‘‘When TTT a some circumstances, nevertheless seek re- definitional section says that a word lief under the whistleblower-protection ‘means’ something, the clear import is that provision. For the reasons that follow, we this is its only meaning.’’ (emphasis in hold that the plain language of the Dodd– original)). Frank whistleblower-protection provision creates a private cause of action only for Subsection (h), titled ‘‘Protection of individuals who provide information relat- whistleblowers,’’ provides whistleblowers a ing to a violation of the securities laws to private right of action against employers the SEC. Because Asadi failed to do so, his who take retaliatory actions against the whistleblower-protection claim fails. whistleblower for taking certain protected actions. § 78u–6(h). Subsection (h) in- A. cludes three paragraphs. Only paragraph [7] We start and end our analysis with (1), titled ‘‘Prohibition against retaliation,’’ the text of the relevant statute—15 U.S.C. is relevant to this appeal. Paragraph (1) is § 78u–6. That section is titled ‘‘Securities divided into three subparagraphs. Sub- whistleblower incentives and protection’’ paragraph (A), the specific focus of this and contains ten subsections. The inter- appeal, provides in its entirety:
3. For clarity, we refer to the award provision if the information provided to the SEC leads as the ‘‘whistleblower-incentive program,’’ to a successful enforcement of a judicial or and the provision protecting whistleblowers administrative action under the securities from retaliation as the ‘‘whistleblower-protec- laws. Also, subsection (j) provides the SEC tion provision.’’ with the authority to issue necessary or ap- propriate rules and regulations that are con- 4. The other subsections in § 78u–6 relate to sistent with the purposes of § 78u–6. the whistleblower-incentive program that pro- vides for monetary awards to whistleblowers
14 624 720 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
No employer may discharge, demote, any other law, rule, or regulation subject suspend, threaten, harass, directly or in- to the jurisdiction of the Commission. directly, or in any other manner discrim- § 78u–6(h)(1)(A). inate against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment be- B. cause of any lawful act done by the Asadi concedes that he is not a ‘‘whistle- whistleblower— blower’’ as that term is defined in section 78u–6(a)(6) because he did not provide any (i) in providing information to the Com- information to the SEC. Asadi maintains, mission in accordance with this section; however, that the whistleblower-protection (ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assist- provision should be construed to protect ing in any investigation or judicial or individuals who take actions that fall with- administrative action of the Commission in section 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (i.e., the third based upon or related to such informa- category of protected activity), even if they tion; or do not provide information to the SEC. He bases this construction of the statute on a (iii) in making disclosures that are re- perceived conflict between the statutory quired or protected under the Sarbanes– definition of ‘‘whistleblower’’ in section Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et 78u–6(a)(6) and the third category of pro- seq.), the Securities Exchange Act of tected activity, which does not necessarily 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), including require disclosure of information to the section 10A(m) of such Act (15 U.S.C. SEC.5 Asadi has some case law,6 as well as 78f(m)), section 1513(e) of Title 18, and the SEC regulation on this issue, in his
5. Notably, however, Asadi does not maintain do not require reporting to the SEC.’’ Egan, that the definition of ‘‘whistleblower’’ in 2011 WL 1672066, at *4; see also Nollner, § 78u–6(a)(6) is ambiguous. Similarly, he 852 F.Supp.2d at 994 n. 9 (approvingly citing does not contend that the categories of lawful Egan and explaining that ‘‘the plain terms of actions by a whistleblower in § 78u– anti-retaliation category (iii), which do not 6(h)(1)(A) are ambiguous. Nevertheless, he require reporting to the SEC, appear to con- asserts that individuals who take actions that flict with the [Dodd–Frank Act’s] definition of fall within the third category of lawful actions ‘whistleblower’ at § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii), which are protected, whether or not they qualify as a defines a whistleblower as anyone who re- ‘‘whistleblower’’ as defined in § 78u–6(a)(6). ports securities violations ‘to the Commis- sion’ ’’ (emphasis in original)). In Kramer, 6. District courts that have considered this the district court focused on the same inter- question have concluded that the whistle- play between § 78u–6(a)(6) and § 78u– blower-protection provision, as enacted, is ei- 6(h)(1)(A)(iii) and concluded that it was not ther conflicting or ambiguous. See, e.g., ‘‘unambiguously clear that the Dodd–Frank Kramer v. Trans–Lux Corp., No. 3:11CV1424 Act’s retaliation provision only applies to (SRU), 2012 WL 4444820, at *4 (D.Conn. those individuals who have provided informa- Sept. 25, 2012); Nollner v. S. Baptist Conven- tion relating to a securities violation to the tion, Inc., 852 F.Supp.2d 986, 994 n. 9 Commission.’’ Kramer, 2012 WL 4444820, at (M.D.Tenn.2012); Egan v. TradingScreen, *4. Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL Each district court, after concluding that 1672066, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). the statute was conflicting or ambiguous, con- For instance, in Egan, the court explained cluded that the Dodd–Frank whistleblower- that ‘‘a literal reading of the definition of the protection provision extends to protect cer- term ‘whistleblower’ in 15 U.S.C. § 78u– tain individuals who do not make disclosures 6(a)(6), requiring reporting to the SEC, would to the SEC. See Nollner, 852 F.Supp.2d at 994 effectively invalidate § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii)’s n. 9; Kramer, 2012 WL 4444820, at *4–5; protection of whistleblower disclosures that Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *4–5.
15 ASADI v. G.E. ENERGY (USA), L.L.C. 625 Cite as 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013) corner. Our examination of the statutory whistleblower’’ that falls within one of the language of Dodd–Frank, however, leads three categories of action described in the us to reject Asadi’s construction of the statute. See id. whistleblower-protection provision. As ex- The statutory text describing these plained below, the perceived conflict be- three categories of protected activity is tween § 78u–6(a)(6) and § 78u– also unambiguous. The text of § 78u– 6(h)(1)(A)(iii) rests on a misreading of the 6(h)(1)(A)(i) protects whistleblowers from operative provisions of § 78u–6. employer retaliation for the action that C. made the individual a whistleblower in the first instance, i.e., providing information Under Dodd–Frank’s plain language and relating to a securities law violation to the structure, there is only one category of SEC. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(i) (‘‘No employer whistleblowers: individuals who provide may discharge TTT a whistleblower TTT information relating to a securities law violation to the SEC. The three categories because of any lawful act done by the listed in subparagraph § 78u–6(h)(1)(A) whistleblower—(i) in providing information represent the protected activity in a whis- to the Commission in accordance with this tleblower-protection claim. They do not, section.’’). The text of § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(ii) however, define which individuals qualify protects whistleblowers from retaliation as whistleblowers. for their participation in the investigation, and possible judicial or administrative ac- This construction of the whistleblower- tion of the SEC, that follows on the heels protection provision follows directly from of the information initially provided to the the plain language of § 78u–6(h)(1)(A): SEC.7 § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(ii) (‘‘No employer ‘‘No employer may discharge TTT or in any may discharge TTT a whistleblower TTT other manner discriminate against, a whis- because of any lawful act done by the tleblower TTT because of any lawful act whistleblower TTT (ii) in initiating, testify- done by the whistleblower’’ in taking any ing in, or assisting in any investigation or of the three categories of protected ac- judicial or administrative action of the tions. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A). This statutory Commission based upon or related to such language clearly answers two questions: information.’’). (1) who is protected; and (2) what actions by protected individuals constitute protect- Congress’s description of the final cate- ed activity. First, and most critically to gory of protected activity is similarly plain this appeal, the answer to the first ques- and unambiguous. The text of § 78u– tion is ‘‘a whistleblower.’’ See § 78u– 6(h)(1)(A)(iii) protects whistleblowers from 6(h)(1)(A) (‘‘No employer may discharge retaliation for making disclosures that are TTT a whistleblower TTTT’’ (emphasis add- required or protected under any law, rule, ed)). Second, the answer to the latter or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of question is ‘‘any lawful act done by the the SEC. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (‘‘No em-
7. Section 78u–6 directly envisions informa- gress determined that protection from retalia- tion provided by ‘‘whistleblowers’’ to result in tion was appropriate not only for the initial an investigation and, if appropriate, the SEC’s disclosure by the ‘‘whistleblower,’’ but also initiation of a judicial or administrative ac- for the whistleblower’s continued partic- tion, leading to the potential of monetary ipation in the subsequent investigation and awards for the ‘‘whistleblower.’’ See § 78u– any resulting judicial or administrative ac- 6(a), (b). The inclusion of this category of tions. protection from retaliation indicates that Con-
16 626 720 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES ployer may discharge TTT a whistleblower read the three categories of protected ac- TTT because of any lawful act done by the tivity as additional definitions of three whistleblower TTT (iii) in making disclo- types of whistleblowers. Under that read- sures that are required or protected under ing—which, as described above, the plain the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. text of the statute does not support—indi- 7201 et seq.), the Securities Exchange Act viduals could take actions falling within the of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), including third category of protected activity yet fail section 10A(m) of such Act (15 U.S.C. to qualify under the more narrow defini- 78f(m)), section 1513(e) of Title 18, and any tion of whistleblower. other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.’’). The language and structure of the whis- Although Asadi does not contend that tleblower-protection provision, however, the language used in § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii) does not support Asadi’s construction. is, by itself, ambiguous, he maintains that Importantly, the placement of the three it conflicts with the definition of ‘‘whistle- categories of protected activity in subsec- blower.’’ The basis for his contention is tion (h) follows the phrase ‘‘[n]o employer that an individual can take actions falling may discharge TTT or in any other manner within this category and, if he does not discriminate against, a whistleblower TTT report information to the SEC, fail to qual- because of any lawful act done by the ify as a ‘‘whistleblower’’ under § 78u– whistleblower TTTT’’ § 78u–6(h)(1)(A) (em- 6(a)(6). While it is correct that individuals phasis added). The use of the term may take protected activity yet still not ‘‘whistleblower,’’ as compared with terms qualify as a whistleblower, that practical such as ‘‘individual’’ or ‘‘employee,’’ is sig- result does not render § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii) nificant.8 If Congress had selected the conflicting or superfluous. As discussed terms ‘‘individual’’ or ‘‘employee,’’ Asadi’s below, under the plain language and struc- construction of the whistleblower-protec- ture of Dodd–Frank, there are not conflict- tion statute would follow more naturally ing definitions of ‘‘whistleblower,’’ and because the use of such broader terms § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii) is not superfluous. would indicate that Congress intended any First, the definition of ‘‘whistleblower’’ individual or employee—not just those in- and the third category of protected activity dividuals or employees who qualify as a do not conflict. Conflict would exist be- ‘‘whistleblower’’—to be protected from re- tween these statutory provisions only if we taliatory actions by their employers.9
8. We also note that the heading of subsection statute.’’ (citations and internal quotation (h) is ‘‘[p]rotection of whistleblowers.’’ § 78u– marks omitted)). 6(h) (emphasis added). While this heading 9. GE Energy maintains that the legislative cannot limit the plain meaning of the text, it history indicates that Congress specifically re- lends support to the conclusion that the whis- jected a broader description of individuals tleblower-protection provision applies only to eligible to raise claims under the whistle- those individuals who qualify as ‘‘whistle- blower-protection provision. Specifically, blowers’’ as defined in § 78u–6(a)(6). See GE Energy explains that the bill initially Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, passed by the House did not use the term Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47, 128 S.Ct. 2326, 171 ‘‘whistleblower’’ in describing the individuals L.Ed.2d 203 (2008) (‘‘To be sure, a TTT head- protected from employer retaliation; instead, ing cannot substitute for the operative text of it used the phrase ‘‘employee, contractor, or the statute. Nonetheless, statutory titles and agent.’’ Wall Street Reform and Consumer section headings are tools available for the Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a Cong. § 7203(g)(1)(A) (as passed by House,
17 ASADI v. G.E. ENERGY (USA), L.L.C. 627 Cite as 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013)
Congress, however, used the term ‘‘whis- but, instead, on that individual’s other pos- tleblower’’ throughout subsection (h) and, sible required or protected disclosure(s). therefore, we must give that language ef- § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii). An example illus- fect. trates the effect of this third category of protected activity for whistleblowers: Accordingly, § 78u–6(h)(1)(A) does not provide alternative definitions of the term Assume a mid-level manager discovers a ‘‘whistleblower’’ for purposes of the whis- securities law violation. On the day he tleblower-protection provision. Instead, makes this discovery, he immediately re- the text of § 78u–6 clearly and unambigu- ports this securities law violation (1) to his ously provides a single definition of ‘‘whis- company’s chief executive officer (‘‘CEO’’) tleblower.’’ Therefore, the whistleblower- and (2) to the SEC. Unfortunately for the mid-level manager, the CEO, who is not protection provision does not contain con- yet aware of the disclosure to the SEC,10 flicting definitions of ‘‘whistleblower.’’ immediately fires the mid-level manager. Second, the interplay between § 78u– The mid-level manager, clearly a ‘‘whistle- 6(a)(6) and § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii) does not blower’’ as defined in Dodd–Frank because render § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii) superfluous. he provided information to the SEC relat- Importantly, the third category of protect- ing to a securities law violation, would be ed activity has effect even when we con- unable to prove that he was retaliated strue the protection from retaliation under against because of the report to the SEC. Dodd–Frank to apply only to individuals Accordingly, the first and second category who qualify as ‘‘whistleblowers’’ under the of protected activity would not shield this statutory definition of that term. Specifi- whistleblower from retaliation. The third cally, this category protects whistleblowers category of protected activity, however, from retaliation, based not on the individu- protects the mid-level manager. In this al’s disclosure of information to the SEC scenario, the internal disclosure to the
Dec. 11, 2009) (‘‘No employer may discharge 546, 568, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 TTT or in any other manner discriminate (2005) (‘‘[T]he authoritative statement is the against an employee, contractor, or agent TTT statutory text, not the legislative history or because of any lawful act done by the em- any other extrinsic material.’’); Khalid v. ployee, contractor, or agent in providing in- Holder, 655 F.3d 363, 371 (5th Cir.2011) (de- formation to the CommissionTTTT’’). The clining to ‘‘recite legislative history given the Senate’s subsequent version of the bill re- clarity of the statutory text’’ (quoting Freeman placed the use of the phrase ‘‘employee, con- v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 626 F.3d 799, 804 n. 9 tractor, or agent’’ with ‘‘whistleblower’’ and (5th Cir.2010))). restructured the format of the provision to resemble the enacted version. Restoring 10. Under 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–9(a), ‘‘[t]o be American Financial Stability Act of 2010, considered a whistleblower TTT, you must H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 922(h)(1)(A) (as submit your information about a possible se- passed by Senate, May 20, 2010). According curities law violation by either of these meth- to GE Energy, the enactment of the Senate ods: (1) Online, through the Commission’s TTT bill, which predicates eligibility for protection Web site ; or (2) By mailing or faxing a TTT from employer retaliation on qualifying as a Form TCR (Tip, Complaint or Referral) to TTTT ‘‘whistleblower,’’ demonstrates that Congress the SEC Office of the Whistleblower ’’ Re- eventually rejected the broader description of gardless of which of these two methods a individuals eligible for protection used in the whistleblower utilizes to submit information initial House bill. to the SEC, the whistleblower’s employer will not necessarily immediately be aware of the We do not rely on this legislative history in disclosure, unless of course, the whistleblow- our analysis of this case. See, e.g., Exxon er informs her employer that she has made Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. such a disclosure.
18 628 720 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
CEO, a person with supervisory authority every word is to be given effect. See, e.g., over the mid-level manager, is protected TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31, 122 under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, the anti-retalia- S.Ct. 441, 151 L.Ed.2d 339 (2001) (‘‘It is a tion provision enacted as part of the Sar- cardinal principle of statutory construction banes–Oxley Act of 2002 (‘‘the SOX anti- that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be retaliation provision’’). Accordingly, even so construed that, if it can be prevented, though the CEO was not aware of the no clause, sentence, or word shall be su- report to the SEC at the time he terminat- perfluous, void, or insignificant.’’ (citations ed the mid-level manager, the mid-level and internal quotation marks omitted)); manager can state a claim under the Duncan, 533 U.S. at 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120. Dodd–Frank whistleblower-protection pro- Accordingly, even if the whistleblower-pro- vision because he was a ‘‘whistleblower’’ tection provision were ambiguous, we and suffered retaliation based on his dis- would be reluctant to read the provision as closure to the CEO, which was protected suggested by Asadi because such a con- 11 under SOX. struction would treat ‘‘to the Commission’’ As this example demonstrates, under as mere surplusage. the plain text of Dodd–Frank, the third category of protected activity is not super- D. fluous. It protects those individuals who qualify as whistleblowers from retaliation Asadi’s construction of the whistleblow- on the basis of other required or protected er-protection provision is problematic for disclosures. Accordingly, we decline to another reason. Specifically, construing adopt Asadi’s construction of the whistle- the Dodd–Frank whistleblower-protection blower-protection provision on the basis provision to extend beyond the statutory that § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii) is superfluous. definition of ‘‘whistleblowers’’ renders the Moreover, it is Asadi’s suggested con- SOX anti-retaliation provision, for practical struction of the whistleblower-protection purposes, moot.12 Such a construction has provision that arguably renders statutory this impact because an individual who text superfluous. Specifically, Asadi’s sug- makes a disclosure that is protected by the gested statutory construction would read SOX anti-retaliation provision could also the words ‘‘to the Commission’’ out of the bring a Dodd–Frank whistleblower-protec- definition of ‘‘whistleblower’’ for purposes tion claim on the basis that the disclosure of the whistleblower-protection provision. was protected by SOX. It is unlikely, how- Construing the statute in this manner ever, that an individual would choose to would violate the surplusage canon, that raise a SOX anti-retaliation claim instead
11. In this scenario, the mid-level manager larly odd. Specifically, § 922—which con- could also raise a claim under the SOX anti- tains the securities-whistleblower program— retaliation provision. The Dodd–Frank whis- also amended the applicable statute of limita- tleblower-protection provision, however, as tions for the SOX anti-retaliation provision. discussed infra, provides greater levels of pro- Dodd–Frank § 922(b)(1) (amending 18 U.S.C. tection. Accordingly, there is an incentive § 1514A(c)(2)). Section 922 extends the stat- not only to report such violations internally, ute of limitations for SOX anti-retaliation but also to inform the SEC of the securities claims from 90 days after an employer’s viola- violation. tion of the anti-retaliation provision to 180 12. Given the language in § 922 of Dodd– days after such a violation or 180 days after Frank, construing the whistleblower-protec- the date on which the employee becomes tion provision to have this impact is particu- aware of the violation. Id.
19 ASADI v. G.E. ENERGY (USA), L.L.C. 629 Cite as 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013) of a Dodd–Frank whistleblower-protection vide information relating to a violation of claim. the securities laws to the SEC to qualify Three separate, but important, distinc- for protection from retaliation under tions between the SOX anti-retaliation and § 78u–6(h). Dodd–Frank whistleblower-protection claims lead to this practical result. First, V. the Dodd–Frank whistleblower-protection Finally, Asadi maintains that we should provision provides for greater monetary defer to the SEC’s recent regulation con- damages because it allows for recovery of struing the Dodd–Frank whistleblower- two times back pay, whereas the SOX anti- protection provision. Asadi correctly retaliation provision provides for only back notes that the SEC’s final rule adopts his pay. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(C), suggested construction of the whistleblow- with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2). Second, in- er-protection provision and expands the dividuals who bring a SOX anti-retaliation meaning of a ‘‘whistleblower’’ beyond the claim must first file a complaint with the statutory definition. The language of the Secretary of Labor and, only if the Secre- regulation provides: tary of Labor has not issued a final deci- (1) For purposes of the anti-retaliation sion within 180 days, may then proceed to protections afforded by Section file a claim in a United States district 21F(h)(1) of the Exchange Act (15 court. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1). Alterna- U.S.C. 78u–6(h)(1)), you are a whistle- tively, individuals may bring a Dodd– blower if: Frank whistleblower-protection claim with- out first filing their claim with a federal (i) You possess a reasonable belief that agency. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h). Third, the information you are providing re- the applicable statute of limitations is sub- lates to a possible securities law viola- stantially longer for Dodd–Frank whistle- tion (or, where applicable, to a possible blower-protection claims. Compare 15 violation of the provisions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (between six U.S.C. 1514A(a)) that has occurred, is and ten years after the violation occurs), ongoing, or is about to occur, and; with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (between (ii) You provide that information in a 180 days after the violation occurs and 180 manner described in Section days after the employee becomes aware of 21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act (15 the violation). U.S.C. 78u–6(h)(1)(A)). Accordingly, if we were to accept Asadi’s 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–2(b)(1). Simply put, construction of the whistleblower-protec- this regulation, instead of using the stat- tion provision, the SOX anti-retaliation ute’s definition of ‘‘whistleblower,’’ rede- provision, and most importantly, its admin- fines ‘‘whistleblower’’ more broadly by pro- istrative scheme, for practical purposes, viding that an individual qualifies as a would be rendered moot. whistleblower even though he never re- ports any information to the SEC, so long E. as he has undertaken the protected activi- Based on our examination of the plain ty listed in 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A). language and structure of the whistleblow- See id. Moreover, the regulation unques- er-protection provision, we conclude that tionably defines whistleblower more broad- the whistleblower-protection provision un- ly for the prohibition against retaliation ambiguously requires individuals to pro- than it does for eligibility for an award.
20 630 720 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
The plain language of § 78u–6 does not sible securities law violation to the SEC. support this distinction. Specifically, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–9 pro- As discussed above, Congress defined vides: ‘‘whistleblower’’ in § 78u–6(a)(6), and did To be considered a whistleblower under so unambiguously. Congress specified Section 21F of the Exchange Act (15 that a ‘‘whistleblower,’’ not merely any in- U.S.C. 78u–6(h)), you must submit your dividual, is protected from employer re- information about a possible securities taliation on the basis of the whistleblow- law violation by either of these methods: er’s protected activities. The statute, (1) Online, through the Commission’s therefore, clearly expresses Congress’s in- Web site TTT; or tention to require individuals to report in- (2) By mailing or faxing a Form TCR formation to the SEC to qualify as a (Tip, Complaint or Referral) (referenced whistleblower under Dodd–Frank. Be- in § 249.1800 of this chapter) to the cause Congress has directly addressed SEC Office of the WhistleblowerTTTT the precise question at issue, we must Id. The SEC’s inconsistency in defining reject the SEC’s expansive interpretation the term ‘‘whistleblower’’ for purposes of of the term ‘‘whistleblower’’ for purposes the Dodd–Frank whistleblower-protection of the whistleblower-protection provision. provision does not strengthen Asadi’s posi- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. tion that the SEC’s interpretation ‘‘reason- Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44, 104 ably effectuate[s] Congress’s intent.’’ Tex- S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); id. at as v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 506 (5th 842–43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (‘‘If the intent of Cir.2007). Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the VI. agency, must give effect to the unambigu- ously expressed intent of Congress.’’); see We conclude that the plain language of also Khalid, 655 F.3d at 371 (‘‘ ‘Congress § 78u–6 limits protection under the Dodd– has directly spoken to the precise ques- Frank whistleblower-protection provision tion at issue,’ and thus there is no room to those individuals who provide ‘‘informa- for the agency to impose its own answer tion relating to a violation of the securities to the question.’’ (quoting Chevron, 467 laws’’ to the SEC. § 78u–6(a)(6). Asadi U.S. at 842–44, 104 S.Ct. 2778)). did not provide any information to the SEC; therefore, he does not qualify as a Moreover, the SEC’s regulations con- ‘‘whistleblower.’’ 13 Accordingly, we AF- cerning the Dodd–Frank whistleblower- FIRM the district court’s dismissal of Asa- protection provision are inconsistent. di’s Dodd–Frank whistleblower-protection While 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–2(b)(1) appears claim. to adopt a broader definition of ‘‘whistle- blower,’’ as described above, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–9, which governs the proce- dures for submitting original information , to the SEC, explicitly requires that an individual submit information about a pos-
13. Because Asadi’s claim fails on the basis Co., 343 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir.2003) (declin- that he is not a whistleblower, we need not ing to address issues that were not necessary reach the remaining issues on appeal in this to affirm the district court’s ruling on a mo- case. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Doe v. Dow Chem. tion to dismiss).
21 22 BOHATCH v. BUTLER & BINION Tex. 543 Cite as 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998) Hatley’s sole point of error in the court of and breach of partnership agreement. The appeals stated: 234th District Court, Harris County, Scott A. The District Court erred by dismissing Brister, J., awarded partner actual damages plaintiff’s claims on the basis that the Con- and punitive damages. Appeals were taken. stitution of the State of Texas does not The Houston Court of Appeals, 14th District, provide an independent cause of action r 905 S.W.2d 597, reversed and rendered. Ap- netar relie and because state sover- plication for writ of error was filed. The eign immunity shields liability for viola- Supreme Court, Spector, J., held that: (1) as tions of the state constitution. matter of first impression, partner in law (Emphasis added.) Hatley’s brief in the firm could be expelled from partnership for court of appeals argued for a constitutional accusing, in good faith, another partner of cause of action for monetary damages and overbilling without subjecting partnership to asserted that sovereign immunity does not tort damages for breach of fiduciary duty, bar his claim. A fair construction of Hatley’s but (2) law firm’s undisputed failure to give brief in the court of appeals reveals that notice to partner that firm was reducing her Hatley did not argue his present assertion tentative distribution rendered law firm lia- for equitable relief. Although he pleaded a ble for damages for breach of partnership cause of action for equitable relief in the trial court, Hatley did not raise his claim for agreement. equitable relief in the court of appeals until Affirmed. his motion for rehearing. Hatley’s sole point of error before this Hecht, J., filed a concurring opinion. Court is that sovereign immunity does not Spector, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in bar his claim for equitable relief arising from which Phillips, C.J., joined. A & M’s alleged violations of his state consti- tutional rights. This Court cannot consider a point not assigned as error in the court of appeals and raised for the first time in a 1. Partnership O70 motion for rehearing. ee at n len Relationship between partners is fiducia- all n , 505 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex. ry in character, and imposes upon all partici- 1974). For these reasons, I concur with the pants the obligation of loyalty to their joint Court’s order withdrawing the order grant- concern and of utmost good faith, fairness, ing Hatley’s application for writ of error as and honesty in their dealings with each other improvidently granted and denying Hatley’s with respect to matters pertaining to enter- application. prise. , 2. Partnership O224 Partners have no obligation to remain partners; at heart of partnership concept is principle that partners may choose with Colette BOHATCH, Petitioner, whom they wish to be associated. v. BUTLER & BINION, et al., Respondents. 3. Partnership O224 No. 95–0934. Fiduciary duty that partners owe one another does not encompass duty to remain Supreme Court of Texas. partners or else answer in tort damages. Argued Nov. 20, 1996. Decided Jan. 22, 1998. 4. Attorney and Client O30 Partner in law firm can be expelled from Expelled partner brought suit against partnership for accusing, in good faith, an- law firm, alleging breach of fiduciary duty other partner of overbilling without subject-
23 544 Tex. 977 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES ing partnership to tort damages for breach of Bohatch was made partner in February fiduciary duty. 1990. She then began receiving internal firm reports showing the number of hours each 5. Attorney and Client O30 attorney worked, billed, and collected. From Law firm’s undisputed failure to give her review of these reports, Bohatch became notice to partner that firm was reducing her concerned that McDonald was overbilling tentative distribution, as required by part- Pennzoil and discussed the matter with Pow- nership agreement, rendered law firm liable ers. Together they reviewed and copied por- for damages for breach of partnership agree- tions of McDonald’s time diary. Bohatch’s ment. review of McDonald’s time entries increased her concern. On July 15, 1990, Bohatch met with Louis H. Victor Thomas, Eliot P. Tucker, Hous- Paine, the firm’s managing partner, to report ton, for petitioner. her concern that McDonald was overbilling Richard N. Countiss, David W. Holman, Pennzoil. Paine said he would investigate. Larry D. Knippa, Houston, for respondents. Later that day, Bohatch told Powers about her conversation with Paine. ENOCH, Justice, delivered the opinion of The following day, McDonald met with Bo- the Court, in which GONZALEZ, OWEN, hatch and informed her that Pennzoil was BAKER, and HANKINSON, Justices, join. not satisfied with her work and wanted her work to be supervised. Bohatch testified Partnerships exist by the agreement of the that this was the first time she had ever partners; partners have no duty to remain heard criticism of her work for Pennzoil. partners. The issue in this case is whether we should create an exception to this rule by The next day, Bohatch repeated her con- holding that a partnership has a duty not to cerns to Paine and to R. Hayden Burns and expel a partner for reporting suspected over- Marion E. McDaniel, two other members of billing by another partner. The trial court the firm’s management committee, in a tele- rendered judgment for Colette Bohatch on phone conversation. Over the next month, her breach of fiduciary duty claim against Paine and Burns investigated Bohatch’s com- Butler & Binion and several of its partners plaint. They reviewed the Pennzoil bills and (collectively, ‘‘the firm’’). The court of ap- supporting computer print-outs for those peals held that there was no evidence that bills. They then discussed the allegations the firm breached a fiduciary duty and re- with Pennzoil in-house counsel John Chap- versed the trial court’s tort judgment; how- man, the firm’s primary contact with Penn- ever, the court of appeals found evidence of a zoil. Chapman, who had a long-standing re- breach of the partnership agreement and lationship with McDonald, responded that rendered judgment for Bohatch on this Pennzoil was satisfied that the bills were ground. 905 S.W.2d 597. We affirm the reasonable. court of appeals’ judgment. In August, Paine met with Bohatch and told her that the firm’s investigation revealed I. FACTS no basis for her contentions. He added that Bohatch became an associate in the Wash- she should begin looking for other employ- ington, D.C., office of Butler & Binion in 1986 ment, but that the firm would continue to after working for several years as Deputy provide her a monthly draw, insurance cover- Assistant General Counsel at the Federal age, office space, and a secretary. After this Energy Regulatory Commission. John Mc- meeting, Bohatch received no further work Donald, the managing partner of the office, assignments from the firm. and Richard Powers, a partner, were the In January 1991, the firm denied Bohatch only other attorneys in the Washington of- a year-end partnership distribution for 1990 fice. The office did work for Pennzoil almost and reduced her tentative distribution share exclusively. for 1991 to zero. In June, the firm paid
24 BOHATCH v. BUTLER & BINION Tex. 545 Cite as 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998) Bohatch her monthly draw and told her that cluded that Bohatch was entitled to recover this draw would be her last. Finally, in $35,000 in lost earnings for 1991 but none for August, the firm gave Bohatch until Novem- 1990, and no mental anguish damages. at ber to vacate her office. 606–07. Accordingly, the court rendered By September, Bohatch had found new judgment for Bohatch for $35,000 plus $225,- employment. She filed this suit on October 000 in attorney’s fees. at 608. 18, 1991, and the firm voted formally to expel her from the partnership three days later, II. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY October 21, 1991. [1, 2] We have long recognized as a mat- The trial court granted partial summary ter of common law that ‘‘[t]he relationship judgment for the firm on Bohatch’s wrongful between TTT partners TTT is fiduciary in discharge claim, and also on her breach of character, and imposes upon all the partici- fiduciary duty and breach of the duty of good pants the obligation of loyalty to the joint faith and fair dealing claims for any conduct concern and of the utmost good faith, fair- occurring after October 21, 1991 (the date ness, and honesty in their dealings with each Bohatch was formally expelled from the other with respect to matters pertaining to firm). The trial court denied the firm’s sum- the enterprise.’’ it – eral H ll, 150 mary judgment motion on Bohatch’s breach Tex. 39, 237 S.W.2d 256, 264 (1951) (quota- of fiduciary duty and breach of the duty of tion omitted). Yet, partners have no obli- good faith and fair dealing claims for conduct gation to remain partners; ‘‘at the heart of occurring before October 21, 1991. The the partnership concept is the principle that breach of fiduciary duty claim and a breach partners may choose with whom they wish to of contract claim were tried to a jury. The be associated.’’ el er e r e jury found that the firm breached the part- er, 41 N.Y.2d 680, 394 N.Y.S.2d 867, 870–71, nership agreement and its fiduciary duty. It 363 N.E.2d 573, 577 (1977). The issue pre- awarded Bohatch $57,000 for past lost wages, sented, one of first impression, is whether $250,000 for past mental anguish, $4,000,000 the fiduciary relationship between and total in punitive damages (this amount was among partners creates an exception to the apportioned against several defendants), and at-will nature of partnerships; that is, in this attorney’s fees. The trial court rendered case, whether it gives rise to a duty not to judgment for Bohatch in the amounts found expel a partner who reports suspected over- by the jury, except it disallowed attorney’s billing by another partner. fees because the judgment was based in tort. At the outset, we note that no party ques- After suggesting remittitur, which Bohatch tions that the obligations of lawyers licensed accepted, the trial court reduced the punitive to practice in the District of Columbia— damages to around $237,000. including McDonald and Bohatch—were pre- All parties appealed. The court of appeals scribed by the District of Columbia Code of held that the firm’s only duty to Bohatch was Professional Responsibility in effect in 1990, not to expel her in bad faith. 905 S.W.2d at and that in all other respects Texas law 602. The court of appeals stated that ‘‘ ‘[b]ad applies. Further, neither statutory nor con- faith’ in this context means only that part- tract law principles answer the question of ners cannot expel another partner for self- whether the firm owed Bohatch a duty not to gain.’’ Finding no evidence that the firm expel her. The Texas Uniform Partnership expelled Bohatch for self-gain, the court con- Act, TEX.REV.CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701b, ad- cluded that Bohatch could not recover for dresses expulsion of a partner only in the breach of fiduciary duty. at 604. How- context of dissolution of the partnership. ever, the court concluded that the firm ee i §§ 31, 38. In this case, as provided breached the partnership agreement when it by the partnership agreement, Bohatch’s ex- reduced Bohatch’s tentative partnership dis- pulsion did not dissolve the partnership. Ad- tribution for 1991 to zero without notice, and ditionally, the new Texas Revised Partner- when it terminated her draw three months ship Act, TEX.REV.CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701b– before she left. at 606. The court con- 1.01 to –11.04, does not have retroactive ef-
25 546 Tex. 977 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES fect and thus does not apply. ee i art. executive committee meetings and because 6701b–11.03. Finally, the partnership agree- one, as state senator, made speech offensive ment contemplates expulsion of a partner to major client). Finally, many courts have and prescribes procedures to be followed, but held that a partnership can expel a partner it does not specify or limit the grounds for without breaching any duty in order to re- expulsion. Thus, while Bohatch’s claim that solve a ‘‘fundamental schism.’’ ee aite, she was expelled in an i r er a is 560 A.2d at 623 (concluding that in removing governed by the partnership agreement, her partner as managing partner ‘‘the partners claim that she was expelled for an i r er acted in good faith to resolve the ‘fundamen- rea n is not. Therefore, we look to the tal schism’ between them’’); Heller Pill common law to find the principles governing r a i n tr , 50 Cal.App.4th 1367, Bohatch’s claim that the firm breached a 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 336, 348 (1996) (holding that duty when it expelled her. law firm did not breach fiduciary duty when Courts in other states have held that a it expelled partner who was not as productive partnership may expel a partner for purely as firm expected and who was offensive to business reasons. ee t J e e l some of firm’s major clients); e a Healt tr n , 326 Ark. 605, 934 a Q een e r , 102 A.D.2d 845, 476 S.W.2d 192, 197 (1996) (holding that partner’s N.Y.S.2d 613, 614 (1984) (concluding that ex- termination of another partner’s contract to pelling partner because of ‘‘[p]olicy disagree- manage services performed by medical part- ments’’ is not ‘‘bad faith’’). nership was not breach of fiduciary duty because termination was for business pur- [3] The fiduciary duty that partners owe pose); aite l e ter, 131 N.H. 663, 560 one another does not encompass a duty to A.2d 619, 622–23 (1989) (holding that removal remain partners or else answer in tort dam- of partner as managing partner of limited ages. Nonetheless, Bohatch and several dis- partnership was not breach of fiduciary duty tinguished legal scholars urge this Court to because it was based on legitimate business recognize that public policy requires a limit- purpose); ei re ent are, t , 80 ed duty to remain partners—i e , a partner- Ohio App.3d 231, 608 N.E.2d 1166, 1170 ship must retain a whistleblower partner. (1992) (‘‘Taking into account the general They argue that such an extension of a part- partners’ past problems and the previous ner’s fiduciary duty is necessary because per- litigation wherein Leigh was found to have mitting a law firm to retaliate against a acted in contravention of the partnership’s partner who in good faith reports suspected best interests, the ouster was instituted in overbilling would discourage compliance with good faith and for legitimate business pur- rules of professional conduct and thereby poses.’’). Further, courts recognize that a hurt clients. law firm can expel a partner to protect rela- tionships both within the firm and with [4] While this argument is not without clients. ee a li i tlin er ra , some force, we must reject it. A partnership 562 N.E.2d 435, 442 (Ind.App.1990) (holding exists solely because the partners choose to that law firm did not breach fiduciary duty place personal confidence and trust in one by expelling partner after partner’s success- another. ee H l an, 522 P.2d at 524 (‘‘The ful struggle against alcoholism because ‘‘if a foundation of a professional relationship is partner’s propensity toward alcohol has the personal confidence and trust.’’). Just as a potential to damage his firm’s good will or partner can be expelled, without a breach of reputation for astuteness in the practice of any common law duty, over disagreements law, simple prudence dictates the exercise of about firm policy or to resolve some other corrective action TTT since the survival of the ‘‘fundamental schism,’’ a partner can be ex- partnership itself potentially is at stake’’); pelled for accusing another partner of over- H l an ie, 11 Wash.App. 195, 522 P.2d billing without subjecting the partnership to 515, 523 (1974) (finding no breach of fiduciary tort damages. Such charges, whether true duty where law firm expelled two partners or not, may have a profound effect on the because of their contentious behavior during personal confidence and trust essential to the
26 BOHATCH v. BUTLER & BINION Tex. 547 Cite as 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998) partner relationship. Once such charges are difficult decisions, as when a lawyer suspects made, partners may find it impossible to overbilling by a colleague. The fact that the continue to work together to their mutual ethical duty to report may create an irrepa- benefit and the benefit of their clients. rable schism between partners neither excus- We are sensitive to the concern expressed es failure to report nor transforms expulsion by the dissenting Justices that ‘‘retaliation as a means of resolving that schism into a against a partner who tries in good faith to tort. correct or report perceived misconduct virtu- We hold that the firm did not owe Bohatch ally assures that others will not take these a duty not to expel her for reporting suspect- appropriate steps in the future.’’ 977 S.W.2d ed overbilling by another partner. at 561 (Spector, J., dissenting). However, the dissenting Justices do not explain how III. BREACH OF THE PARTNERSHIP the trust relationship necessary both for the AGREEMENT firm’s existence and for representing clients [5] The court of appeals concluded that can survive such serious accusations by one the firm breached the partnership agreement partner against another. The threat of tort by reducing Bohatch’s tentative distribution liability for expulsion would tend to force for 1991 to zero without the requisite notice. partners to remain in untenable circum- 905 S.W.2d at 606. The firm contests this stance—suspicious of and angry with each finding on the ground that the management other—to their own detriment and that of committee had the right to set tentative and their clients whose matters are neglected by year-end bonuses. However, the partnership lawyers distracted with intra-firm frictions. agreement guarantees a monthly draw of Although concurring in the Court’s judg- $7,500 per month regardless of the tentative ment, Justice Hecht criticizes the Court for distribution. Moreover, the firm’s right to failing to ‘‘address amici’s concerns that fail- reduce the bonus was contingent upon pro- ing to impose liability will discourage attor- viding proper notice to Bohatch. The firm neys from reporting unethical conduct.’’ 977 does not dispute that it did not give Bohatch S.W.2d at 556 (Hecht, J., concurring). To notice that the firm was reducing her tenta- address the scholars’ concerns, he proposes tive distribution. Accordingly, the court of that a whistleblower be protected from ex- appeals did not err in finding the firm liable pulsion, but only if the report, irrespective of for breach of the partnership agreement. being made in good faith, is proved to be Moreover, because Bohatch’s damages sound correct. We fail to see how such an ap- in contract, and because she sought attor- proach encourages compliance with ethical ney’s fees at trial under section 38.001(8) of rules more than the approach we adopt to- the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, day. Furthermore, the amici’s position is we affirm the court of appeals’ award of that a reporting attorney must be in good Bohatch’s attorney’s fees. faith, not that the attorney must be right. In short, Justice Hecht’s approach ignores the * * * * * question Bohatch presents, the amici write about, and the firm challenges—whether a We affirm the court of appeals’ judgment. partnership violates a fiduciary duty when it expels a partner who in good faith reports HECHT, Justice, filed a concurring suspected ethical violations. The concerns of opinion. the amici are best addressed by a rule that SPECTOR, Justice, filed a dissenting clearly demarcates an attorney’s ethical opinion, in which PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, duties and the parameters of tort liability, joined. rather than redefining ‘‘whistleblower.’’ We emphasize that our refusal to create an HECHT, Justice, concurring in the exception to the at-will nature of partner- judgment. ships in no way obviates the ethical duties of The Court holds that partners in a law lawyers. Such duties sometimes necessitate firm have no common-law liability for expel-
27 548 Tex. 977 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES ling one of their number for accusing another proved groundless, and her relationship with of unethical conduct. The dissent argues her partners was destroyed in the process. I that partners in a law firm are liable for such cannot, however, extrapolate from this case, conduct. Both views are unqualified; nei- as the Court does, that no law firm can ever ther concedes or even considers whether ‘‘al- be liable for expelling a partner for reporting ways’’ and ‘‘never’’ are separated by any unethical conduct. Accordingly, I concur distance. I think they must be. The Court’s only in the Court’s judgment. position is directly contrary to that of some of the leading scholars on the subject who I have appeared here as amici curiae. The I would ordinarily leave the recitation of Court finds amici’s arguments ‘‘not without relevant facts to the Court’s opinion and not some force’’, but rejects them completely. reiterate them in a separate opinion. But nte at 546. I do not believe amici’s argu- the fine points in this case are important to ments can be rejected out of hand. The me, and rather than point out my differences dissent, on the other hand, refuses even to with the Court, it is more convenient simply acknowledge the serious impracticalities in- to say what I think the facts are. The volved in maintaining the trust necessary evidence must, of course, be reviewed in light between partners when one has accused an- of the verdict and judgment favorable to other of unethical conduct. In the dissent’s Bohatch, although the reader should keep in view, partners who would expel another for mind that in many instances, the facts are such accusations must simply either get over disputed. it or respond in damages. The dissent’s view John McDonald, an attorney licensed to blinks reality. practice in the District of Columbia and man- The issue is not well developed; in fact, to aging partner of the Washington, D.C. office our knowledge we are the first court to ad- of Butler & Binion, a Houston-based law dress it. It seems to me there must be some firm, hired Colette Bohatch, also a D.C. law- circumstances when expulsion for reporting yer, as a senior associate in January 1986. an ethical violation is culpable and other The firm’s Washington office had only one circumstances when it is not. I have trouble other lawyer—Richard Powers, also a part- justifying a 500–partner firm’s expulsion of a ner in the firm—and represented essentially partner for reporting overbilling of a client one client—Pennzoil—before the Federal that saves the firm not only from ethical Energy Regulatory Commission. Bohatch, complaints but from liability to the client. who had been deputy assistant general coun- But I cannot see how a five-partner firm can sel of the FERC when she left to join Butler legitimately survive one partner’s accusations & Binion, worked for McDonald and Powers that another is unethical. Between two such on Pennzoil matters. extreme examples I see a lot of ground. In January 1989, Bohatch was made a This case does not force a choice between partner in the firm on McDonald’s recom- diametrically opposite views. Here, the re- mendation, and as a partner she began re- port of unethical conduct, though made in ceiving internal firm reports showing the good faith, was incorrect. That fact is signif- number of hours each attorney worked, icant to me because I think a law firm can billed, and collected for. Reviewing these always expel a partner for bad judgment, reports, Bohatch questioned how McDonald whether it relates to the representation of could bill as many hours as he reported, clients or the relationships with other part- given her personal observations of his work ners, and whether it is in good faith. I would habits. She and Powers discussed the sub- hold that Butler & Binion did not breach its ject on several occasions and even went so fiduciary duty by expelling Colette Bohatch far as to look through McDonald’s daily time because she made a good-faith but neverthe- diary surreptitiously and make a copy of it. less extremely serious charge against a sen- Bohatch never saw the bills to Pennzoil, ior partner that threatened the firm’s rela- which McDonald prepared and sent, so she tionship with an important client, her charge did not know what fees Pennzoil was actually
28 BOHATCH v. BUTLER & BINION Tex. 549 Cite as 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998) charged, or even what Butler & Binion’s fee plaints. Chapman discussed the matter with arrangement was with Pennzoil. Neverthe- his immediate superior and with Pennzoil’s less, from monthly internal reports consis- general counsel. The three of them reviewed tently showing that McDonald billed far Butler & Binion’s bills for the preceding year more hours than she saw him working, Bo- and concluded that they were reasonable. hatch concluded that McDonald was overbill- After Chapman’s superior discussed their ing Pennzoil. Convinced that she was conclusions with Pennzoil’s president and obliged by the District of Columbia Code of chief executive officer, Chapman told Burns Professional Responsibility governing lawyer that Pennzoil was satisfied that the firm’s conduct to report her concerns to the firm’s bills were reasonable. management, she discussed them with Butler Bohatch expected that Paine would ask her & Binion’s managing partner, Louis Paine, for additional information, and when he did on July 15, 1990. Paine assured her that he not do so, she wrote him that she believed would look into the matter. McDonald had overcharged Pennzoil $20,000 Bohatch told Powers of her meeting with to $25,000 per month for his work. In fact, Paine, and Powers told McDonald. The next in the preceding six months McDonald had day, McDonald informed Bohatch that Penn- billed Pennzoil on average less than $24,000 zoil was dissatisfied with her work. Bohatch per month for his work, so that if Bohatch feared that McDonald was retaliating against had been correct, McDonald should have her, and in fact, from that point forward billed Pennzoil almost nothing. On August neither McDonald nor Powers assigned Bo- 23, 1990, a few weeks after their initial meet- hatch any other work for Pennzoil. Mc- ing, Paine told Bohatch that he had found no Donald also insinuated to other partners that evidence of overbilling. Since he did not see Bohatch had complained of him because how Bohatch could continue to work for Mc- Pennzoil found her work unacceptable, even Donald or Pennzoil under the circumstances, though Bohatch had contacted Paine before given the rifts her allegations had caused, she was aware of any criticism of her work. Paine suggested that she begin to look for Bohatch called Paine to tell him of Mc- other employment. Donald’s retaliation, and Paine assured her For more than nine months Butler & Bin- that he was still investigating. Paine re- ion continued to pay Bohatch a partner’s viewed the firm’s bills to Pennzoil and found monthly draw of $7,500 and allowed her to that in all but one instance fewer hours were keep her office and benefits while she sought billed than were shown on internal computer other employment. So as not to impair her printouts as having been worked. However, prospects, the firm did not immediately expel since the printouts merely reflected the time her as a partner, but it did not pay her any reported by attorneys, and Bohatch was partnership distribution other than her draw. claiming that McDonald reported more time Bohatch contends that when the firm re- than he actually worked, Paine determined duced her tentative distribution for 1991 to that Pennzoil must be told of Bohatch’s as- zero in January of that year, it effectively sertions so that it could itself evaluate the expelled her from the firm, although she amounts charged. continued to accept a partner’s monthly Robert Burns, a member of Butler & Bin- draw. In April 1991, Paine told Bohatch that ion’s management committee, told John her draw would be discontinued in June, and Chapman, the Pennzoil in-house attorney in August he told her that she must vacate who dealt most directly with Butler & Bin- her office by November. Bohatch left to join ion’s Washington office, of Bohatch’s asser- another firm in September, and Butler & tions and asked him to review the firm’s bills. Binion formally expelled her as a partner in Chapman confirmed to Burns that he had October. complained to McDonald several months ear- Bohatch sued Butler & Binion, Paine, lier about the quality of Bohatch’s work, and Burns, and McDonald for breach of the firm Burns intimated that Bohatch’s assertions partnership agreement and breach of fiducia- might have been in response to such com- ry duty. A jury found both a breach of
29 550 Tex. 977 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES contract and a breach of fiduciary duty, lawyers licensed to practice in the District of found Bohatch’s actual damages to be $57,- Columbia—including McDonald and Bo- 000 in lost earnings and $250,000 in past hatch—were prescribed by the District of mental anguish, assessed $4,000,000 punitive Columbia Code of Professional Responsibility damages against the three individual defen- in effect in 1990, and that in all other re- dants, and found Bohatch’s reasonable attor- spects Texas law applies. ney fees to be $225,000. Bohatch accepted Of the three possible sources of governing the district court’s suggestion that punitive Texas law—statute, contract, and common damages be remitted to $237,141, and judg- law—only one applies here. Butler & Binion ment was rendered awarding Bohatch actual argues that it did not violate the Texas Uni- and punitive damages. form Partnership Act in effect throughout All parties appealed. The court of appeals the events of this case (but since repealed), held that defendants’ only duty to Bohatch Law of May 9, 1961, 57th Leg., R.S., ch. 158, was not to expel her in bad faith. 905 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws 289, formerly TEX.REV. S.W.2d 597, 602. ‘‘ ‘Bad faith’ in this con- CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon 1970).1 text,’’ the court of appeals wrote, ‘‘means But Bohatch responds that TUPA does not only that partners cannot expel another part- determine her claims because it spoke to ner for self-gain.’’ Finding no evidence expulsion of a partner only in the context of a that defendants expelled Bohatch for self- partnership’s dissolution. ee i art. 6132b, gain, the court concluded that Bohatch could §§ 31 & 38. In this case, as provided by the not recover for breach of fiduciary duty. partnership agreement, Bohatch’s expulsion at 604. However, the court found that Bo- did not dissolve the partnership, and thus the hatch’s tentative partnership distribution for statute does not directly answer Bohatch’s 1991 had been reduced to zero without notice claims. The partnership agreement contem- to her, and that her draw had been terminat- plates expulsion of a partner and prescribes ed three months before she left. at 605– procedures to be followed, but it does not 06. For these breaches of the partnership specify or limit the grounds for expulsion. agreement the court concluded that Bohatch Bohatch’s claim that she was expelled in an was entitled to recover $35,000 lost earnings improper way is governed by the partnership for 1991 but none for 1990, and no mental agreement, but her claim that she was ex- anguish damages. at 606–07. Accord- pelled for an improper reason is not. Thus, ingly, the court rendered judgment for Bo- the principles governing Bohatch’s claim that hatch for $35,000 plus $246,000 attorney fees. her expulsion was a breach of fiduciary duty Bohatch applied to this Court for writ of must be found in the common law. error, and defendants, to whom I shall refer We have long recognized that ‘‘ ‘[t]he rela- collectively hereafter as ‘‘Butler & Binion’’, tionship between joint adventurers, like that filed a conditional application. We denied existing between partners, is fiduciary in Bohatch’s application and dismissed Butler & character, and imposes upon all the partici- Binion’s, 39 TEX. SUP.CT. J. 725 (June 14, pants the obligation of loyalty to the joint 1996), but on Bohatch’s motion for rehearing, concern and of the utmost good faith, fair- we granted both, 40 TEX. SUP.CT. J. 14 (Oct. ness, and honesty in their dealings with each 18, 1996). other with respect to matters pertaining to the enterprise.’ ’’ it – eral H ll, 150 II Tex. 39, 237 S.W.2d 256, 264 (Tex.1951)(quot- ing 30 AM.JUR. J int ent re § 34 A ( )). But we have never had occasion to Butler & Binion argues that its expulsion apply this duty in the situation of a partner’s of Bohatch did not breach its fiduciary duty. expulsion. A few other appellate courts have No one questions that the obligations of the done so. el er e i al r e er,
1. The current law, the Texas Revised Partnership tive until 1994, long after the events of this case, Act, TEX.REV.CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b–1.01 to— and thus does not apply. 10.04 (Vernon Supp.1998), did not become effec-
30 BOHATCH v. BUTLER & BINION Tex. 551 Cite as 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998) 41 N.Y.2d 680, 394 N.Y.S.2d 867, 363 N.E.2d of fiduciary duty because there was a legiti- 573 (1977); Heller Pill r a i n mate business purpose); t J e e i n tr , 50 Cal.App.4th 1367, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d al Healt enter n , 326 Ark. 605, 934 336 (1996); in t n tra n al, 279 S.W.2d 192, 197 (1996) (holding that a part- Ill.App.3d 231, 215 Ill.Dec. 842, 664 N.E.2d ner’s termination of another partner’s con- 239 (1996); a li i tlin er ra , tract to manage services performed by their 562 N.E.2d 435 (Ind.Ct.App.1990); e medical partnership was not a breach of fidu- a a Q een e i al r , 102 A.D.2d ciary duty because there was a business pur- 845, 476 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1984); ei re pose). ent are, t , 80 Ohio App.3d 231, 608 At least in the context of professional part- N.E.2d 1166 (1992); H l an ie, 11 nerships, the courts have uniformly recog- Wash.App. 195, 522 P.2d 515, re ie enie , nized that a partner can be expelled to pro- 84 Wash.2d 1011 (1974), ert enie , 420 tect relationships both inside the firm and U.S. 984, 95 S.Ct. 1415, 43 L.Ed.2d 666 with clients. In H l an, a law firm expelled (1975). None has held that a partnership two partners, both sons of a retired partner, breached its fiduciary duty to a partner by because they had been contentious members expelling the partner. el er, 394 N.Y.S.2d of the executive committee, and because one at 869–871, 363 N.E.2d at 576–577; Heller, of them, as a state senator, had made a 58 Cal.Rptr.2d at 348; a li , 562 N.E.2d at speech offensive to a major client. The court 439–443; e , 476 N.Y.S.2d at 614; ei , held that while the partners remaining in the 608 N.E.2d at 1169–1171; H l an, 522 P.2d firm owed the expelled partners a fiduciary at 523–524. Only one has held that an ex- duty, pelled partner stated a claim for breach of the personal relationships between part- fiduciary duty. al, 215 Ill.Dec. at 847– ners to which the terms ‘bona fide’ and 849, 664 N.E.2d at 244–246. ‘good faith’ relate are those which have a The courts have not had much difficulty bearing upon the business aspects or prop- holding that a partnership may expel a part- erty of the partnership and prohibit a part- ner for purely business reasons. In ei , ner, to-wit, a fiduciary, from taking any for example, a limited partnership formed to personal advantage touching those sub- rehabilitate an apartment complex expelled a jects. Plaintiffs’ claims do not relate to general partner, one Leigh, for misconduct in the business aspects or property rights of connection with the partnership’s affairs. this partnership. There is no evidence the The court held that the partnership’s failure purpose of the severance was to gain any to give Leigh notice of his impending ouster business or property advantage to the re- was not a breach of fiduciary duty. The maining partners. Consequently, in that court explained: context, there has been no showing of We find that a general partner’s fiducia- breach of the duty of good faith toward ry duty applies only to activities where a plaintiffs. partner will take advantage of his position 522 P.2d at 523 (citations omitted). in the partnership for his own profit or aite, 560 A.2d at 623 (concluding that in gain. Taking into account the general removing a partner as managing partner partners’ past problems and the previous ‘‘the partners acted in good faith to resolve litigation wherein Leigh was found to have the ‘fundamental schism’ between them’’). acted in contravention of the partnership’s Likewise, in Heller, the court held that a best interests, the ouster was instituted in law firm was not liable for expelling Heller, a good faith and for legitimate business pur- partner, who was not as productive as the poses. firm expected and who was offensive to some 608 N.E.2d at 1170. aite l e ter, of the firm’s major clients. The court wrote: 131 N.H. 663, 560 A.2d 619, 622–623 (1989) ‘‘Although partners owe each other and the (holding that removal of a partner as manag- partnership a fiduciary duty, this duty ‘ap- ing partner of a limited partnership formed plies only to situations where one partner to own and operate a resort was not a breach could take advantage of his position to reap
31 552 Tex. 977 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES personal profit or act to the partnership’s alcohol has the potential to damage his detriment.’ ’’ Heller, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d at 348 firm’s good will or reputation for astute- (quoting ei , 608 N.E.2d at 1170). The ness in the practice of law, simple pru- court added: dence dictates the exercise of corrective More importantly, even with evaluating action, as in H l an, since the survival of the evidence in the light most favorable to the partnership itself potentially is at Heller, the evidence shows that the Execu- stake. tive Committee expelled Heller because of a li , 562 N.E.2d at 442 (citations omitted). a loss of trust in him. ‘‘The foundation of In e , a medical partnership claimed a professional relationship is personal con- that it expelled a partner, Dr. Levy, because fidence and trust. Once a schism devel- the partnership agreement allowed for expul- ops, its magnitude may be exaggerated sion of partners over seventy years of age. rightfully or wrongfully to the point of Dr. Levy countered that he had been ex- destroying a harmonious accord. When pelled for being critical of partnership poli- such occurs, an expeditious severance is cies. The court held that even if Dr. Levy desirableTTTT’’ were right, the partnership did not breach (quoting H l an, 522 P.2d at 524). any duty owed him. In a li , the court stressed the impor- While bad faith may be actionable, there tance of a law firm’s reputation in holding must be some showing that the partner- that the firm was not liable for expelling a ship acted out of a desire to gain a busi- partner, one Lawlis, following his successful ness or property advantage for the remain- struggle against alcoholism. The court ob- ing partners. Policy disagreements do not served that had the firm acted in bad faith or constitute bad faith since ‘‘at the heart of with a predatory purpose, it would have vio- the partnership concept is the principle lated both the partnership agreement and its that partners may choose with whom they fiduciary duty, but the court limited action- wish to be associated’’. able conduct to partners’ attempting to ob- e , 476 N.Y.S.2d at 614 (citing H l an tain a personal financial advantage from the and el er, citations omitted). expulsion. The court explained: The lifeblood of any partnership contains Despite statements in these cases that two essential ingredients, cash flow and partners cannot expel one of their number profit, and the prime generators of that for personal profit, in each instance the ex- lifeblood are ‘‘good will’’ and a favorable pelling partners believed that retaining the reputation. The term ‘‘good will’’ general- partner would hurt the firm financially and ly is defined as the probability that old that the firm—and thus the partners them- customers of the firm will resort to the old selves—stood to benefit from the expulsion. place of business where it is well-estab- It is therefore far too simplistic to say, as the lished, well known, and enjoys the fixed court of appeals held, that partners cannot and favorable consideration of its custom- expel a partner for personal financial benefit; ers. An equally important business ad- if expulsion of a partner to protect the firm’s junct of a partnership engaged in the prac- reputation or preserve its relationship with a tice of law is a favorable reputation for client benefits the firm financially, it perforce ability and competence in the practice of benefits the members of the firm. If expul- that profession. A favorable reputation sion of a partner can be in breach of a not only is involved in the retention of old fiduciary duty, the circumstances must be clients, it is an essential ingredient in the more precisely defined. acquisition of new ones. Any condition The New York Court of Appeals—the only which has the potential to adversely affect high court to have addressed the topic—has the good will or favorable reputation of a expressed hesitation in specifying whether law partnership is one which potentially and when expulsion of a partner breaches involves the partnership’s economic surviv- fiduciary duties. In el er, a surgeon, a al. Thus, if a partner’s propensity toward certain Dr. Webber, was expelled from a
32 BOHATCH v. BUTLER & BINION Tex. 553 Cite as 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998) medical partnership because his personal and might consider ‘‘bad faith going to the es- professional conduct had become abrasive sence’’ or an ‘‘evil, malevolent, or predatory and objectionable to his partners. Dr. Web- purpose’’. ee al a i le tin, ber’s psychiatrist described him as ‘‘a perfec- 394 F.Supp. 986, 992–94 (D.D.C.1975) (hold- tionist who was a ‘rather idealistic sincere, ing that merger of two law firms resulting in direct, frank individual who quite possibly demotion of the managing partner of one could be perceived at times as being some- office and his consequent resignation was not what blunt.’ ’’ 394 N.Y.S.2d at 868–870, 363 a breach of fiduciary duty); t ee al N.E.2d at 575–576. The court held that ex- ea le a ala er, i er a a t, pulsion in accordance with the partnership No. 94–8646AJ, 1996 WL 438777 (Fla.Cir.Ct. agreement was proper. The court added: July 23, 1996) (reporting a trial court’s $2.5 in , n t it t e ti n, t at million award to a partner expelled from a a ait i t li it t e t er i e a law firm as part of an office closing and l te lan a e t e a ree ent, the record reduction in size, because the purpose of the does not reveal bad faith. Embarrassing expulsion was to generate greater profits for situations developed, affecting the physi- the remaining partners, in violation of their cians and their patients, as a result of Dr. fiduciary duty). Webber’s conduct, however highly motivat- In only one case has an appellate court ed his conduct might have been. It was as confronted circumstances which it believed important, therefore, in the group’s eyes, might give rise to liability for a breach of as anything affecting survival of the group fiduciary duty in expelling a partner. In that it be disassociated from the new mem- ber’s conflict-producing conduct. Indeed, al, an attorney claimed that he had been at the heart of the partnership concept is expelled from his firm because of his insis- the principle that partners may choose tence on his right under the partnership with whom they wish to be associated. agreement to inspect firm records which he believed would show misconduct by the en i bad faith on the part of the firm’s management. The court reversed remaining partners would nullify the right summary judgment for the firm, holding that to expel one of their number, it does not Nosal’s evidence raised a fact issue that his follow that under an agreement permitting expulsion without cause the remaining expulsion was in breach of the fiduciary duty partners have the burden of establishing owed him. al, 215 Ill.Dec. at 849, 664 good faith. To so require would nullify the N.E.2d at 246. right to expel without cause and frustrate Scholars are divided over not only how but the obvious intention of the agreement to whether partners’ common-law fiduciary duty avoid bitter and protracted litigation over to each other limit expulsion of a partner. the reason for the expulsion. Obviously, There is also disagreement over the impact no expulsion would ever occur without of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act some cause, fancied or real, but the agree- (which, as I have noted, has been adopted in ment provision is addressed to avoiding Texas) on this issue. ee J. William Callison, the necessity of showing cause and litigat- lin en an le ant : i iar ing the issue. On the other hand, if an tie n er t e e i e ni r Partner expelled partners [sic] were to allege and i t, ni r i ite ia ilit a prove bad faith going to the essence, a n t, an e n , 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING different case would be presentedTTTT In BUS. L. 109 (1997); Allan W. Vestal, ‘‘ e his affidavits Dr. Webber has not shown a at er ar e at TTT : e e e even a suggestion of evil, malevolent, or Ha e a e Partner i a , 54 WASH. & predatory purpose in the expulsion. LEE L.REV. 487 (1997); Larry E. Ribstein, Hence, he raises no triable issue on this i iar t ntra t in nin r rat score. e ir , 54 WASH. & LEE L.REV. 537 (1997); el er, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 869–871, 363 N.E.2d Donald J. Weidner, re r t ree at 576–577 (emphasis added; citations omit- ntra t an i iar t : r ani in ted). The court did not suggest what it t e nternal elati n t e nin r rate
33 554 Tex. 977 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES