MANAGING DISCORD IN THE AMERICAS Great Britain and the United States 1886-1896
GERER LA DISCORDE DANS LES AMERIQUES La Grande-Bretagne et les Etats-Unis 1886-1896
A Thesis Submitted
To the Division of Graduate Studies of the Royal Military College of Canada
By
Charles Robertson Maier, CD, MA
In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
April 2010
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1+1 Canada ABSTRACT MANAGING DISCORD IN THE AMERICAS Great Britain and the United States 1886-1896
Maier, Charles Robertson Ph.D. Royal Military College of Canada Dr. Norman Hillmer & Dr. Brian McKercher
From the mid-1880s through the mid-1890s, a series of disputes erupted involving Great
Britain and the United States in locales across the Western Hemisphere. The diplomatic settlement achieved earlier in the nineteenth century broke down, leading to a succession of confrontational situations that created discord between these two powers, with implications for regional security. Managing Anglo-American discord became a process, which eventually promoted a degree of accommodation, informing the foreign policies of each, and in turn facilitating a trajectory towards rapprochement.
Three analytical concepts are used to assess the events discussed in this dissertation. First of all, Anglo-American discord was based in local disturbances that were crucial in their impact on the workings of the broader relationship. Secondly, the
Western Hemisphere was an interconnected region of prime importance to the development of Anglo-American relations. Thirdly, Anglo-American discord in its various guises generated processes that ultimately moved Anglo-American relations in the direction of accommodation. The thesis examines the controversial British presence in the strategic isthmian area of Central America, especially in relation to the Mosquito Reserve, as well as the
Brazilian naval revolt and British annexation of Trinidad Island in the South Atlantic.
The thesis also considers the disputes over the North Atlantic fishery and the right to harvest seals in the Bering Sea. Some economic factors, including reciprocal trade relations are assessed, as are the relative expansion of British and American naval forces in the region. The study concludes with an examination of particular aspects of the pivotal
Venezuelan boundary dispute, and it addresses how that crisis contributed to Anglo-
American discord and reconciliation.
In an endeavour to manage the discord created by these situations and factors,
British policy-makers let it be known that the leadership role their country had enjoyed for many years in Western Hemispheric affairs, arguably by default, was one their government was prepared to relinquish. At the same time, American leaders made clear their country's determination to act as the leading power in the region. This study analyses the process by which the management of these sources of discord contributed to the transfer of hemispheric leadership from Britain to the United States, and steered
Anglo-American relations in the direction of rapprochement.
IV ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The writing of this thesis has been made easier because of the help of many people. I would like to thank the Marquesss of Salisbury for permission to access the papers of his illustrious ancestor, the third Marquess. I am most grateful to Ms. Diana Makgill for permitting me to use the surviving papers of her grandfather, Lord Pauncefote. I also received extensive assistance from the staff of the Library of the Venezuelan Department of Foreign Affairs, and I would like to express my sincere thanks to them and to Mr.
Vicken Koundakjian, who as Counsellor at the Canadian Embassy in Caracas did so much to pave the way for this aspect of my research.
I am also most appreciative for the professionalism, help and assistance I received from staff members of those great research institutions I worked at in compiling this thesis: Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa; The National Archives, Kew; the British
Library, London; the Library of Congress and the National Archives and Records
Administration, Washington; the Bodelian Library, Oxford; and Churchill College
Archives Centre, Cambridge.
I wish to thank Dr. Dwayne Winseck for reviewing an early draft of the chapter concerning cable communications and Brazil. I would like to express my gratitude to those on my supervisory team who helped to steer me through the course work and research which have contributed so much to this thesis, including Professors Brian
v McKercher, Barry Gough, and in particular I want to thank Professor Norman Hillmer, whose tireless support, consummate professionalism, and careful criticism helped to mould my historical understanding, while his encouragement ensured that this thesis reached completion.
I am also deeply obliged to family and friends without whose help the research for this thesis could not have been undertaken. I wish particularly to mention Stuart and
Meriel Cashman, and Jeremy Coke-Smyth and Melissa Morbeck, whose homes in
Isleworth, Middlesex provided supportive and ideally situated bases from which I was able to pursue my studies in Great Britain.
These acknowledgements would not, however, be complete without my attempting to express the deep and abiding debt of gratitude I owe to my wife Valerie, who has contributed to the writing of this dissertation in countless ways, most importantly by her faith in the project, which never wavered.
VI TABLE OF CONTENTS
SIGNATURE PAGE ii ABSTRACT iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v INTRODUCTION 1 I. The Return of Discord 1886-1889 21 The Ideological Ground 23 Growing Discord in Central America 27 Growing Discord in North America 33 The Forces of Discord 41 Discussing Discord in Washington 48 Conclusion 61 II. Competition and Discord 1889-1894 63 Competition and Pan-Americanism 64 Competition and Navalism 67 Discord in Chilean Waters 72 Competition and Reciprocity 76 Discord in the Bering Sea 82 Conclusion 98 III. The Struggle to Accommodate 1894-1895 101 A Background of Discord 102 The Affair at Bluefields 108 The Mosquito Rebellion 125 The Corinto Landing 131 Conclusion 148
vn IV. Cables and Confrontation in Brazil 1894-1895 151 The Brazilian Naval Revolt 153 The Annexation of Trinidad 165 Conclusion 186 V. Venezuela and the Boundaries of Discord 1895-1896 188 Confrontation Along the Boundary 193 Confrontation Between the Capitals 197 The New Year Resolution 224 Conclusion 233 CONCLUSION 238 BIBLIOGRAPHY: 251
Vlll INTRODUCTION
The decade preceding the Venezuela boundary crisis of 1895-1896, saw a series of disputes erupt involving Great Britain and the United States in locales across the Western
Hemisphere. Working through these discordant situations enabled the two powers, one with extensive worldwide interests, the other with a determination to dominate the
Americas, to develop an understanding of the extent to which they could move beyond rivalry and mutual antagonism. Managing their discordant relations became a process which itself created a degree of accommodation informing the foreign policies of each, and in turn facilitating the trajectory towards rapprochement.
The period since the signing of the Treaty of Washington in 1871 was one of relative calm in Anglo-American relations, but this changed in the mid-1880s.1 An interrelated series of disputes flared up involving access to the North Atlantic fishery, the right to harvest seals in the Bering Sea, the traditional British presence in the strategic isthmian area of Central America, and British actions in relation to the territorial integrity
1 R.B. Mowat The Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and the United States, (London: Edward Arnold, 1925). Mowat titles his chapter concerning the period between the conclusion of the Treaty of Washington and the inauguration of Grover Cleveland as President in 1885 'Inactive Relations', noting that 'After the Alabama Arbitration the relations of Great Britain and America were of an uneventful nature for twenty years.' Seepage 221. Similarly the chapter on this period in H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955) is entitled 'The Quiet Years (1872-98)', and it begins with a description of the dismissal of the British Minister, Sackville-West in 1888. Charles S. Campbell in his more detailed study of this period, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations 1865-1900, (New York: Harper Colophon, 1976), notes that the Treaty of Washington, 'made an enormous contribution. . .' and that, 'For all its imperfections . . . was an indispensable step toward the Anglo-American rapprochement that came at the end of the century.' See page 49. More recently, George C. Herring, in From Colony to Superpower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), states, 'The Treaty of Washington helped ease escalating post-Civil War tensions and laid the basis for a growing Anglo-American accord. . . [with] major implications for North America. Much of the time was spent on Canadian issues. The result was tacit U.S. recognition of Canada's new status.' See page 255.
1 2 of Brazil, Nicaragua and Venezuela. In an endeavour to manage the resulting discord,
British policy-makers let it be known that the leadership role their country had enjoyed for many years in Western Hemispheric affairs, arguably by default, was one their government was prepared to relinquish. At the same time, United States leaders made clear their country's determination to act as the leading power in the region. This study analyses these disputes, during the course of which a consensus evolved which facilitated hemispheric leadership being transferred from Britain to the United States.
The disputes themselves were connected in a way that heightened awareness among decision-makers on both sides of the Atlantic with respect to the dangers inherent in allowing situations to erupt into open conflict. This was a period when a number of states, including the United States and Great Britain, were acquiring a range of modern naval armaments, making conflict an increasingly dangerous contingency. Discord led
Britain and the United States to adjust their expectations and develop a deeper appreciation for the diplomatic and political requirements of the other, lessening the explosiveness of what was to prove the most serious confrontation of the period, the
Venezuelan boundary crisis. It was the experience gained in managing these related sources of discord that laid the groundwork for increased harmony in Anglo-American relations. The notion embraced by many historians, that the Venezuelan boundary crisis itself represents a major turning point in Anglo-American relations, will be scrutinized in this thesis.
Three analytical concepts will be employed in assessing the events discussed in this dissertation. First of all, Anglo-American discord originated in local disturbances that were crucial in their impact on the workings of the broader relationship. Secondly, the Western Hemisphere was an interconnected region of prime importance to the 3 development of Anglo-American relations. Thirdly, Anglo-American discord in its various guises, generated processes that ultimately moved Anglo-American relations in the direction of accommodation.
As the two most influential states in the region, it was on the Anglo-American relationship that the power balance in the hemisphere hinged. Britain was the heir to a rich, centuries-old legacy of investments, markets, colonies and diplomatic influence in the Americas, while the United States increasingly saw itself assuming a place of paramountcy in hemispheric affairs. As the world's leading power, Britain was not overly concerned by this apparent challenge. Unlike the United States, British strategic planning did not accord the Western Hemisphere pride of place. Nevertheless, in these years Britain operated in the Western Hemisphere from a position of great strength. As the major world power, British naval forces moved freely and in significant numbers up and down both coasts of North and South America, making both courtesy calls and less than courteous calls as situations demanded. The Royal Navy kept the routes of commerce open and its predominance actually tended to reduce the possibility of Anglo-
American hostilities arising. The extensive British naval presence provided a tool for moulding the actions of the emerging states of the Americas in their dealings with the great trading nations of the world, encouraging treaty observance and debt repayment, and respect for the lives and property of foreign nationals, including Americans.
That this role was being performed on behalf of the international community by a
European power operating in the Western Hemisphere was a cause of increasing dissatisfaction for the United States as it sought this role for itself, and signalled its growing ability to use its expanding naval assets for this purpose. It was not always fully appreciated by American leaders that Britain was generally receptive to passing the 4 mantle of hemispheric leadership, as well as the baton of hemispheric policeman to the
United States provided that country could demonstrate its ability to undertake these responsibilities. During the period of this study, the United States demonstrated just that.
The acquisition of modern naval armaments by the United States was not entirely unwelcome by Britain, as the American navy was now seen to be performing many of the same kinds of duties undertaken by the Royal Navy. As the United States moved towards acting as the hemisphere's dominant regional power, Britain required that this role be performed in a way that complemented, or at least did not oppose, Britain's substantial interests in the region. In achieving even tentative resolution of their various disputes,
Great Britain and the United States would develop a greater appreciation for each other's position. This led to mutual understanding, including the extent to which conflicting interests could divide, and mutual interests could facilitate the achievement of one another's aims.
Anglo-American power relations in the hemisphere in the late nineteenth century included a range of strategic, naval, military and economic concerns. In South and
Central America political instability was an ongoing phenomenon to be mitigated by armed force if necessary. Construction of an isthmian canal and access to the burgeoning economies of Latin America became parallel goals, especially for the United States. In
North America, Canada was particularly vulnerable along the virtually indefensible
United States-Canada border. This was counterbalanced by Britain's worldwide mastery of sea power, something which helped make contests for access to offshore resources among the most hotly disputed issues in the relationship. The rapid and tangible expansion of the economy of the United States during this period was accentuated by
Britain's relative decline as an industrial power. The development of the navies of both 5 countries saw American naval resources expand significantly in comparison to those of
Great Britain. To this must be added the United States' determination to assume a dominant place in the affairs of the hemisphere, along with Britain's tendency to view its interests in the Americas as less than paramount. Canada found itself split between its desire to remain a British state and its aspiration to participate as fully as possible in the
North American economy, along with its reluctance to expend resources on military preparedness.
The balance of power between the United States and Great Britain is most clearly illustrated in the multifaceted and evolving geopolitical situation of the Western
Hemisphere. This worked less like a scale with two pans and more like a developing chemical reaction, in which powerful and potentially volatile elements were combining.
There being no single chemist, the main players all had a role to perform in assuring the elements combined to constitute a stable solution rather than an explosive mixture.
Canada represented one of the explosive elements in the Anglo-American formula, being a state that was just as firmly rooted in the Western Hemisphere as the
United States. Canada could play the role of either a competitive neighbour or a complementary appendage to the United States. With regard to Britain, it could assume the part of the dutiful offspring or errant prodigal. The United States did not relish direct negotiations with its assertive neighbour, and the failure of the United States to extend satisfactory economic overtures that might have drawn Canada more closely into the
North American economic system worked to keep Canada contained within the British political and economic orbit. Canadian-American rivalry did nothing to simplify the 6 tasks the Colonial and Foreign Office faced in their endeavours to manage discordant relations and achieve honourable accommodations with the United States.2
It was not only with respect to Canada that the United States seemed locked in a dangerous competitive struggle. Britain possessed political and economic interests across the Western Hemisphere, dating back, in many cases, hundreds of years. British colonies in the West Indies and on the coasts of Central and South America were the most obvious symbols of this legacy. More importantly, however, Britain wielded a powerful influence over large portions of Latin America, through involvement in such fields as shipping, banking, railways and cable communications. By the late nineteenth century, the United
States and Great Britain found themselves engaged in a number of local disputes that reflected their competitive rivalry, as the American productive capacity expanded, and its capitalists sought raw materials and markets in those same Latin American countries where British firms had become well established.4
Britain and the United States were linked by historic diplomatic agreements that required them to work as equal partners in the strategic isthmian area of Central America where the United States hoped to build its own inter-oceanic canal. Their existence combined with Britain's traditional, ill-defined territorial rights along the Atlantic coast of
Central America, clouded the Anglo-American relationship. Britain was generally
2 See Chapter II, 23-27 and Chapter III, 75-81 for analysis of the some of the ideological and economic factors influencing the Anglo-American-Canadian relationship. 3 In Andrew Porter (Ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. Ill, The Nineteenth Century, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), see: Alan Knight, 'Britain and Latin America', 122-145. See also: Rory Miller, Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, (London: Longman, 1993). See also: D.C.M. Piatt, Latin America and British Trade 1806-1914, (London, 1972). 4 Walter LaFeber, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations Volume II, The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). In Chapter 2, entitled 'The Second Industrial Revolution', LaFeber discusses the connections between American industrial production, the resulting need for markets and resources in Latin America and elsewhere, and the development of American fiscal and foreign policy during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. See also: Walter LaFeber's doctoral thesis, 'The Latin American Policy of the Second Cleveland Adminisration', (University of Wisconsin, 1959). 7 willing to accede to American designs in the isthmus, provided British interests and prestige were safeguarded. It would take time for the United States to appreciate that
British diplomatic activity in Latin America, while self-serving, was undertaken on behalf of the international community, including the United States, something that was often more readily appreciated by Americans working and living in the region than by those formulating American foreign policy in Washington. While British policy-makers were generally prepared to accommodate American ambitions in Latin America on a case by case basis, they were slow to recognize the extent to which Americans saw themselves entitled to play a paramount role in hemispheric affairs, to the virtual exclusion of other powers.
Most of the discordant events punctuating Anglo-American relations have drawn the attention of historians, and there is extensive, if now somewhat dated, literature examining these from various perspectives.5 In the forefront of those who have worked to tease out the intricacies of the relationship from a largely American context is Charles
S. Campbell, who published over a period of twenty years starting in the mid-1950s. The
Transformation of American Foreign Relations 1865-1900 is a single-volume culmination of his work in this regard.6 His contemporary, Charles A. Campbell, also
5 More recent studies of this subject tend to deal with early twentieth century rapprochement. For example, see: Iestyn Adams, Brothers Across the Ocean British Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Anglo- American 'Special Relationship' 1900-1905, (London: Tauris Academic, 2005); David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled British Policy & World Power in the 20th Century, (London: Longman, 1991), and; D. Cameron Watt, Succeeding John Bull America in Britain's Place 1900-1975, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). There is also the collection of studies edited by B.J.C. McKercher and Lawrence Aronsen, The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 1902-1956, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996). 6 Charles S. Campbell's The Transformation of American Foreign Relations 1865-1900, is a comprehensive account that ties together the themes of manifest destiny and rapprochement with Britain. Campbell takes this study beyond the Americas to include events in Samoa, Hawaii and the Far East. His Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,1957), deals with the period following the Venezuelan boundary dispute when rapprochement was consolidated. Campbell also wrote the more 8 contributed to rapprochement literature, analysing some of the same events from a British perspective.7 Some years earlier, Charles Tansill produced volumes containing detailed accounts of Anglo-American diplomatic dealings, including Canadian-American relations. His encyclopaedic study, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911, contains extensive quotations from original documents.8
Several later studies concerning rapprochement have a tendency to fall within the broader category of British 'decline-and -fall' history, in that they attempt to explain the loss of British power in the world, and view major events as being related to this loss.9 In these works Anglo-American relations are usually viewed as being determined either by
America's growing strength, or Britain's relative weakness. In The Great
Rapprochement, Bradford Perkins concludes that it was the 'mushrooming of American power' that caused British foreign secretaries to 'follow conciliatory policies.' Other historians, including Bernard Porter, describe Britain's 'decline, in material terms, relative to certain other countries, with the implications this has had for her power to influence events abroad.'11 Aaron Friedberg, in The Weary Titan, views rapprochement as
sweeping if less detailed From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783- 1900, (New York: John Wiley, 1974). 7 Charles A. Campbell, Great Britain and the United States 1895-1903, (London: Longmans, 1960). 8 Charles Callan Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), and The Foreign Policy of Thomas F. Bayard, 1885-1897, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1940), are particularly relevant in this regard. 9 Max Belloff, Imperial Sunset Volume I: Britain's Liberal Empire 1897-1921, (New York: Alfred A. Knopff, 1969) is an example of this type of writing. Piers Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire 1781-1997, (London: Jonathan Cape, 2007), is a more recent work in this genre. Expanding this type of analysis to the broader international context is Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, (New York: Random House, 1987). 10 Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914, (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 9. 11 Bernard Porter, Britain, Europe and the World 1850-1986, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1987), 1. 9 a symptom of decline, of which the 'informal. . . policy of appeasing the United States,' was a reflection.
Somewhat related to the decline-and-fall literature are works concerned with power relations in the Americas, and these tend to focus on the military dimension of the equation. Kenneth Bourne states in his study, Britain and the Balance of Power in North
America 1815-1908, that his is 'not a history of Anglo-American relations;. . . rather an attempt to follow one particular theme in British policy ... the problems raised by thinking about and planning for the possibility of a future war with the United States.'13
Complementing Bourne's work is Richard Preston's The Defence of the Undefended
Border14, which examines war-plans and policies formulated by American, British and
Canadian planners in relation to Canadian-American defence issues. Bourne and Preston take different views as to how the balance of power worked in the 1880s and 1890s.
Bourne subscribes to the view that, following the American Civil War, 'Canadian-
American relations and British policy in relation to the New World were posited upon the assumption that the United States had the preponderance of power on the continent.'15
Preston, however, asserts that the preponderance of power was not so clear-cut, noting that, in relation to war planning in North America, 'there was for a long time no real
Aaron L. Friedbeg, The Weary Titan Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 293. 13 Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America 1815-1908, (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), vii. 14 In addition to The Defence of the Undefended Border Planning for War in North America 1867-1939, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977), Richard A. Preston's study, Canada and 'Imperial Defense' A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defense Organization, 1867-1919 (Durhamn NC: Duke University Press, 1967), contains much of relevance to the relative balance of naval and military power in North America. 15 This quotation, which Bourne repeats in Britain and the Balance of Power in North America 1815-1908, 301, is from Robin W. Winks, Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1960), 375. 10 unanimity on a strategy to be followed or on its likely success. Either side might have achieved a decisive advantage.'16
In recent years historians have tended to view the balance of power in more inclusive terms. David Reynolds points out that the notion of power is not only concerned with the relative size of a nation's armed forces, but that it is more useful to see power 'not as a possession but as a relationship - one in which A gets B to do something that B would not otherwise do.' Reynolds goes on to state that power encompasses a 'complex balance of forces in each particular power relationship.'17 These concepts can be seen working themselves out in the Anglo-American and Anglo-
Canadian-American issues analysed in this dissertation. The various power relationships can be viewed as being exposed in discordant events, and managed in a complex process moving generally in the direction of accommodation.
Assumptions advanced by the 'decline-and-fall' school were challenged in 1991, when The International History Review published a series of articles questioning many of the underlying assumptions on which such writing had been based. Two of these articles have particular relevance to Anglo-American relations in the closing years of the nineteenth century. In 'The Meaning of Power: Rethinking the Decline and Fall of Great
Britain,' Gordon Martel questions whether 'Great Britain's declining economic pre-
16 Preston, The Defence of the Undefended Border, 7-8. 17 David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, British Power and World Power in the Twentieth Century, pp. 1-2. Reynolds' definitions are very much in line with those offered by Palmerston to the House of Commons in the 1860s, 'the influence of a country depends upon other things than protocols and despatches. It depends on its power to defend itself, on its wealth and prosperity, on its intelligence and cultivation of mind, on the development of the arts and sciences, and on all those things which made a nation truly great and powerful.' Quotation from Kenneth Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), (Hansard, 8 July 1864, 3rd series, clxxvi), 379-380. 11 eminence made her position in the western hemisphere untenable.'18 He argues that we must 'cease to regard power as consisting of those components that appear to lend themselves to weighing and measuring. . . . Doing so will enable us to see that, just as the greatness of Victorian Great Britain had been inflated, so has the decline of Great
Britain in the twentieth century been exaggerated.'19 Martel argues that 'accommodations between states do not necessarily signal the strength of one and the decline of the other....
If the British did retreat from the Americas, it was a retreat of a very odd kind: Canada,
Argentina, and the United States itself became the favourite sites for British investors in the generation before the First World War.'20 In a similar way, Keith Neilson asserts that
Britain chose to treat the United States 'the same as any other power, and Great Britain had the means to do so. Great Britain was not a 'superpower' in the modern sense, but it is both accurate and fair to say that in 1914 she was the pre-eminent great power and certainly the only global power.'21 Brian McKercher's article underscores this point by discussing how, as recently as the Second World War, 'because of her empire [Britain] was the only truly global power.'22
Most general works concerning Canadian-American relations tend to be written from a Canadian perspective and focus on the development of Canada's national institutions and distinctive international personality. The most comprehensive and detailed in relation to the late nineteenth century, is Robert Craig Brown's Canada's
Gordon Martel, 'The Meaning of Power: Rethinking the Decline and Fall of Great Britain' The International History Review, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (November 1991), 675. 19 Martel, The Meaning of Power, 679. 20 Martel, The Meaning of Power, 683. 21 Keith Neilson, 'Greatly Exaggerated': The Myth of the Decline of Great Britain before 1914', The International History Review, Vol. XIII No. 4 (November 1991), 725. 22 B.J.C. McKercher, 'Our most Dangerous Enemy': Great Britain Pre-eminent in the 1930s', The International History Review, Vol. XIII No. 4 (November 1991), 751. 12
National Policy 1883-1900. He associates the operation of the National Policy with the development of Canada as an independent, modern state. Other important studies dealing with the relationship during both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries include J.L.
Granatstein and Norman Hillmer's For Better or for Worse,24 and John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall's Canada and the United States.25 The relationship is considered from an American perspective by D.F. Warner in The Idea of Continental Union26, and in
Gordon Stewart's The American Response to Canada Since 1776. The Anglo-Canadian connection is the subject of Norman Penlington's Canada and Imperialism 1896-189? , which includes two chapters dealing with the period preceding the Venezuelan crisis.
Penlington relates the rise of imperial sentiment in Canada to anti-Canadian policies emanating from the United States. He also wrote The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A
Critical Reappraisal, which contains insightful information on Anglo-Canadian-
American relations in the 1890s.
Subsidiary to the theme of the North Atlantic Triangle is that of the Irish question, which played a role in the domestic politics of Britain, Canada and the United States.
Anti-British sentiment among Americans was very much a reality at this time, and the deepest reservoir of this enmity resided in the Irish-American population, a fact
Robert Craig Brown, Canada's National Policy 1883-1900 a Study in Canadian American Relations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964). 24 J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or for Worse Canada and the United States to the 1990s, (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1991). See also Norman Hillmer, J.L. Granatstein, Empire to Umpire, (Toronto: Irwin, 1994) is mainly concerned with Canada's foreign relations in the twentieth century containing two chapters tracing events from 1867-1914. 25 John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994). 26 D.F. Warner in The Idea of Continental Union: Agitation for the Annexation of Canada to the United States, (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1960). The study is not, however, always reliable. 27 Gordon T. Stewart, The American Response to Canada, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1992). 28 Norman Penlington, Canada and Imperialisml896-1899, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965). 29 Norman Penlington, The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1965). 13
politicians in that country ignored at their peril. The Irish question held implications for
Canadian politics and deeper implications for British politics. The historical literature of
all three countries contains fine studies exploring how the Irish struggle affected the
internal and foreign relations of each state.30 Alan J. Ward addresses these issues in
Ireland and Anglo-American Relations 1899-1921, while David Shanahan discusses the
role of Irish Catholics in Canadian politics in his doctoral thesis, 'The Irish Question in
Canada.'32
Of the many historians who have written on the subject of British diplomatic
relations in this period, the work of J.A.S. Grenville is particularly worthy of mention.
His Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy places the events of the period within the
broader British setting, while Politics, Strategy and American Foreign Policy,34 written jointly by Grenville with George Berkeley Young, analyses many of the same diplomatic
events of the period within their American context. An American diplomatic historian
who merits particular mention for his contribution to an understanding of these events is
Walter LaFeber. His doctoral thesis concerning the diplomacy of Grover Cleveland's
second administration launched his career over fifty years ago. Lafaber's study seeks to
This dissertation is primarily concerned with Anglo-American relations in the Western Hemisphere. The Irish question was mainly relevant to the internal political calculations of policy-makers in Great Britain and the United States, and to a lesser extent Canada. The studies noted in this paragraph should be consulted for further background in this regard. 31 Alan J. Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American Relations 1899-192, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969). See also Charles C. Tansill, America and the Fight for Irish Freedom, 1866-1922, (New York: Devin Adair, 1957). There are many studies of the Irish Question in relation to British politics including Nicholas Mansergh, The Irish Question 1840-1921A Commentary on Anglo-Irish Relations and on Social and Political Forces in Ireland in the Age of Reform and Revolution, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1975). 32 David Shanahan, 'The Irish Question in Canada: Ireland, the Irish and Canadian Politics 1880-1922', Ph.D. Thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1989. In the case of Canada the 'Orange' influence was also substantial, and this is covered in Cecil J. Houston & William J. Smyth, The Sash Canada Wore: A Historical Geography of the Orange Order in Canada, (Toronto, 1980). 33 J.A.S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy the Close of the Nineteenth Century, (London: Athlone Press, 1964). 34 John A.S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy and American Diplomacy Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). 14 explain events by placing them within the context of American industrial expansion and the disruptions created by the business cycles of the period. His subsequent, and sometimes controversial writing has helped to focus attention on ethical questions in
American diplomatic relations.35
Late nineteenth century Anglo-American Western Hemispheric diplomacy has thus inspired a wide range of historical writing. The differing views scholars take of the
Venezuelan boundary crisis of 1895-1896 provide an important indication as to how they assess the events preceding this crisis, and the sense in which it served as a turning point at which the United States asserted and Britain accepted American dominance in the region. Historians do not agree about the forces engaged in steering this apparent turnabout. There are different interpretations as to whether the turn was abrupt, or merely part of a much longer and gradual bend along the highway of international relations. Did the United States impose its dominance on a relatively weak and otherwise preoccupied
Great Britain, or is it possible to show that British policy had for some time aimed at facilitating an accommodation with the United States, thus making the seeming assumption of American dominance more apparent than real?
Bourne asserts that American military ill preparedness at the time of the crisis was balanced by British preoccupation with events in the Far East and in Africa. Nevertheless,
Bourne states, 'England had bowed before the American assertion of the Monroe
Doctrine, as she had never avowedly done before.' In a similar vein, Grenville points to
Walter LaFeber, 'The Latin American Policy of the Second Cleveland Administration', Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1959. 36 Kenneth Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902, 171. In The Balance of Power in North America, Bourne states 'To the realists the dominating factor was that Great Britain's resources were now stretched beyond their limit by the effects of increasing expansionist and naval activity among the European powers as well as in the United States.' See page 340. 15 the British cabinet meeting on 11 January 1896 as the turning point for Great Britain. It was there that Britain's previously hard line policy towards the United States was overturned, and Grenville notes that for the cabinet, the 'blunder of the Jameson Raid
[which had occurred two weeks previously in South Africa], the hostility of Germany and of the continental states, the impending crisis in Turkey - all weighed heavily on them ... and Salisbury's policy of refusing to negotiate with the United States concerning
Venezuela was abandoned.'37
Bradford Perkins states that Britain was the first to budge, once the crisis broke in the final days of 1895, and that Britain ' receded, spurred by the criticism surrounding Dr.
Jameson's raid on the Transvaal and the Kaiser's telegram of support to President
Kruger.' And Perkins goes on to write, 'Salisbury's government had retreated from its insistence that a dispute with Venezuela was no concern of the United States.'38
Friedberg also sees the episode as one in which the British government 'decided to give way before American pressure.' Like Perkins, Friedberg credits this to the fact that 'this crisis coincided with the Kruger telegram incident.'39
Penlington also views the Venezuelan crisis as a diplomatic defeat for Britain brought on by the indifference of the British people and by the fact that 'the Kaiser's telegram of congratulation to Kruger turned Britain's attention to matters of greater moment.' Penlington states that the 'subsequent history of the negotiations was marked by a series of British diplomatic retreats. Lord Salisbury was forced by the threat of war to recede from his original contention that the Venezuelan affair was no concern of the
J.A.S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, 68. B. Perkins, The Great Rapprochement, 18. A. Friedberg, The Weary Titan, 162. 16
United States. He was also unable to compromise by playing for time: the United States would not budge.'40
Charles S. Campbell is rather more hesitant to identify winners and losers in the
Venezuelan dispute. Less concerned with what transpired in British cabinet meetings, he focuses on the actual negotiations that occurred in the wake of the events of December and January 1895-96, when the Foreign Office was adamant that disputed areas inhabited by British subjects should not be included in the proposed arbitration. Campbell notes that it was Secretary of State Richard Olney who, by 'abandoning his hitherto unbending refusal to exclude settled districts,'41 made the substantial concession that facilitated a diplomatic settlement. Charles Tansill describes the minutiae of these negotiations, and notes that the formal terms of arbitration were not concluded until November 1896, under conditions consistent with British demands. Tansill concludes, 'Lord Salisbury had read the situation with his usual astuteness. He perceived that there was little danger in postponing negotiations until after the American elections. When he learned Mr.
McKinley had been returned ... he decided to put an end to the dispute which had been for so long a cause of friction.'42
There is a suggestion offered by Young and Grenville that the changes brought about by the Venezuelan boundary crisis might be part of a larger picture. They refer to
Anglo-American difficulties with the Mosquito Indians and suspected British involvement in the Brazilian naval revolt, and they assert that, 'seen within this context, the old quarrel between England and Venezuela over the Guiana frontier was one among
Norman Penlington, Canada and Imperialism, 29. 41 Charles .S. Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 216. 42 Charles C. Tansill, Bayard, 775. 17 several problems, any one of which might lead to serious complications.'4 In a similar vein, Walter LaFeber argues that events including the 'startling growth of the American battleship navy, the Hawaiian, Brazilian and Nicaraguan incidents, and the Venezuelan boundary troubles' should be 'examined in a comprehensive view.'44
This dissertation has employed primary records both to augment understanding of the better-known occurrences and to throw fresh light on those less known. Extensive use has been made of Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Admiralty records held in The
National Archives, Kew. The papers of foreign secretaries, particularly those of Lord
Salisbury and Lord Kimberley, were found to contain important private communications from diplomats relating frank appraisals of international developments. Other British documents consulted included the papers of Sir Cecil Spring Rice and Lord Balfour.
The papers of American secretaries of state, including Thomas Bayard and Richard
Olney, were found to contain many helpful insights, as were State Department records held at the National Archives in Maryland. In Canada, the papers of Sir John A.
Macdonald, Sir Charles Tupper and Sir John Thompson were examined to provide background and detail relevant to the working of the embryonic machinery for directing
Canada's external relations. Due to the importance of the Venezuelan boundary crisis to this study, research was also undertaken in the Library of the Venezuelan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in Caracas.
The observations of diplomats on the spot play a large part in this dissertation.
Local events are shown to be integral to policy formulation. Policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic often had little firsthand knowledge of the areas where events were
Grenville and Young, Politics, Strategy and American Diplomacy, 117. 44 Walter LaFeber, 'United States Depression Diplomacy and the Brazilian Revolution, 1893-1894', The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 40, No.l (Feb. 1960), 117-118. 18 occurring, making diplomatic reports prepared at the scene key to informing the decisions taken. The contents of these reports could inspire either the confidence or suspicion of successive foreign secretaries and secretaries of state, facilitating or confounding the achievement of accommodation.
A detailed examination of the various discordant local occurrences of this period shows how they worked together to influence the decisions made in Washington and
London. In Chapter I, the lineage of the longer-lived disputes is summarized, along with an assessment of the new and disruptive influences infecting Anglo-American relations in the late 1880s, particularly in relation to the North Atlantic fishery, the growing problem of pelagic sealing in the Bering Sea, and the traditional role of Britain on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua. Hopes that the 1887-1888 Joint High Commission could provide a forum in which to resolve these and other issues is examined, including the failure of this diplomatic mechanism to achieve significant results.
Chapter II assesses the expanding role of the United States as a regional power, a development that involved an important naval building programme, along with changes in that country's diplomatic and economic orientation. The chapter assesses American attempts to use reciprocal tariff concessions as a tool to assert American power in the hemisphere. The ongoing Bering Sea fur seal dispute is examined as a controversy touching on the exploitation of the region's natural resources, leading to confrontation on the high seas and agreement on an arbitral process jointly enforced by the navies of both
Britain and the United States. The growing ability of the United States to influence hemispheric affairs at the time of the Chilean Civil War, sometimes with surprising results, is also assessed in this chapter. 19
A frequently underemphasized element in the Anglo-American relationship during these years concerns Britain's historical role as a quasi-suzerain power along the strategically significant Atlantic coast of Nicaragua. British disentanglement there was a prerequisite for Anglo-American accommodation to occur, and this was not easily achieved. The events in Nicaragua between 1894-1895 did much to influence American perceptions of Britain's real intentions towards the Americas, and the various crises that occurred there are analysed in some detail in Chapter III.
In Brazil, events unfolding between 1893-1896 contributed a range of ups and downs along the road to Anglo-American accommodation, and these are discussed in
Chapter IV. In Rio de Janeiro harbour, where a naval revolt was underway, the newly minted American naval forces first proved their capacity to influence hemispheric affairs in a significant way. This occurred with a degree of British concurrence and German interference only partly appreciated by decision-makers in Washington. This was followed by an occurrence largely overlooked by historians involving the British annexation of an island for cable-laying purposes, later conceded to belong to Brazil.
Both acts would influence American perceptions of Britain's hemispheric aims.
The Venezuelan boundary crisis of 1895-1896 is the subject of Chapter V. It constitutes the culmination of this series of discordant events that characterized Anglo-
American relations. Secretary of State Olney and President Cleveland used the crisis to assert the entitlement of the United States to be recognized by Great Britain as a power capable of playing the dominant role in the affairs of the Americas, a role Britain had largely conceded by the time this crisis occurred. In Great Britain, Colonial Secretary
Joseph Chamberlain's part, both in precipitating and in de-escalating the crisis, will be scrutinized in a way that sheds new light on this important moment in Anglo-American 20 relations. The dramatic events of the crisis heightened the need for Britain to ascribe priorities to its worldwide interests. The crisis also provided a context in which Britain could accord public recognition to the role the United States was determined to assume as the paramount power in hemispheric affairs, particularly in the Caribbean and Latin
America. This was accomplished in a way that did not unduly compromise Britain's global position, and in fact tentatively involved the United States in according a degree of support to certain of Britain's interests in the Western Hemisphere.
The Venezuelan crisis concludes a chain of discordant events based in local disputes, in which the hemisphere's two great powers contested for leadership in the
Western Hemisphere. The process that unfolded revealed that one of the contestants was willing to pass the torch under certain conditions, and the other was anxious to grasp it.
Diplomatic differences existed between Britain and the United States before and after these events. Even so, the experiences gained over the decade that culminated in the
Venezuelan crisis provided both sides with invaluable tools for managing discord in a variety of contexts, creating a climate conducive to future, increasingly amicable relations. I. The Return of Discord 1886-1889
The 1880s were characterized by a general deterioration in Anglo-American relations in the Western Hemisphere. A series of diplomatic settlements entered into earlier in the nineteenth century proved incapable of preventing the growing discord. In some cases, the earlier settlements themselves became caught up in the disputes they were intended to resolve. This was particularly so in relation to the North Atlantic fishery, the Bering Sea fur seal controversy, and with respect to British interests in Central America, where moves to build an isthmian canal were underway. The decade saw the restrained use of intimidation and armed intervention employed in North American waters, as each side sought to underscore the seriousness of these disputes.
In Central America, the United States and Great Britain were bound by a treaty concluded in 1850 that called on them to work together should either attempt to construct an isthmian canal, something which seemed absurdly outdated by the 1880s, when de
Lesseps was endeavouring to build a canal in Panama with French backing, and interests in the United States were clamouring for an American built and controlled waterway to link Atlantic and Pacific. Centuries of British activity along Central America's Atlantic coast, particularly in Nicaragua, had created a range of formal and informal British commitments in relation to the English-speaking aboriginal and Creole communities there. Americans came to view Nicaragua as a preferred site for building an isthmian canal. The combination of restrictive treaty obligations and the quasi-colonial British
21 22 presence along Nicaragua's Atlantic coast became the cause of considerable discord in
Anglo-American relations.
In North America, Anglo-American discord tended to be rooted in economic and resource-based disputes that concerned Canada. The Treaty of Washington had been concluded in 1871, but the United States considered many of its provisions to be unfair.
Access to Canada's inshore fishery was sought, but the price demanded by Canada and enshrined in the treaty was thought too high. Canada sought to bargain fishing rights for reciprocal access to the American market, but with little success. Enforced exclusion of
American fishing boats followed. Adding to Anglo-Canadian-American friction was a further dispute that erupted in the 1880s on the West Coast. There, Canadians based in
British Columbia became engaged in the lucrative harvesting of seals, which migrated annually to American-owned islands in the Bering Sea. American attempts to put an end to this practice created a prolonged three-way diplomatic dispute.
Contributing to the danger inherent in this deteriorating situation was the fact that the 1880s were a decade in which the United States commenced the construction of a modern naval fleet, and chose to redeploy army units from duty on the western frontier to locations closer to the Canadian border. Similarly, Great Britain commenced a programme to enlarge and modernize its navy, creating a hemispheric armaments race at the same time that diplomacy seemed to be failing.
For the most part, it was diplomacy and not force that was employed in seeking to resolve the various sources of friction. In 1887-1888, a joint high commission was convened in Washington in an attempt to remove as many of the causes of discord as possible. In the end, only the Atlantic fishery dispute was addressed, and sessions proved 23 more acrimonious than expected; the draft treaty that the high commission negotiated failed to obtain Senate approval.
While there were undoubtedly conflicting interests disrupting Anglo-American relations, there were also factors, including ideological ones, working to affect amicable relations. In Central America, the decade ended with a clear expression of British willingness to accommodate the United States in an area of considerable strategic significance.
The Ideological Ground
For most of the nineteenth century, the Anglo-American relationship was an uneasy one.
Offsetting this to some degree was a common body of principles inspiring the foreign relations of both countries, a fact that helped prevent their differences from erupting into open conflict.
Both Britain and the United States perceived themselves to have passed through different kinds of revolutions, in both cases deeply influenced by enlightenment thinking.
In the case of the United States, its revolution had been mainly political and military, deposing a tyrannical regime and establishing a new kind of state whose example Thomas
Jefferson said would enhance the 'reason and freedom of the globe.'45 In Great Britain, on the other hand, its 'revolution' was one that combined technological, fiscal and political elements, leading to the dawning of an innovative social, economic and
Bradford Perkins, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations Vol. I, The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 47. 24 industrial order. The British state was perceived as the defender of reason and freedom in international affairs.4
For Americans, these values were expressed primarily in political and governmental terms, and in international affairs this usually involved opposing monarchical and colonial regimes and advocating republican institutions, in the belief that this would assure the spread of the democratic principles on which peace and freedom depended. From a British perspective, political institutions were thought much less relevant to the spread of peace and freedom. Within the liberal tradition, these values were linked to the extension of international trade and commerce, which could occur within a wide range of political systems, aided by very liberal sweeps of Adam Smith's invisible hand. Both nations were thus heirs to different ideological strains envisaging the dawning of a new age in which freedom and reason would bring an end to militarism and war.
George Washington uttered what came to be revered as the cornerstone of
American foreign policy for more than a century when, in his farewell address, he called on Americans to 'Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; to cultivate peace and harmony with all.' He reminded his successors that 'the nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave.'
Alliances with European nations were particularly to be avoided, as their conflicts led them to ' be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns.' Rather, the former revolutionary commander argued, the United Sates should maintain 'a respectable defensive posture', and it should 'trust to temporary
46 Bernard Porter states that, by the mid-nineteenth century, 'Britons felt more distinct from foreigners than at any time in their history', due to 'bounding prosperity. . .and a quality they called "freedom."' Bernard Porter, Britain, Europe and the World 1850-1986: Delusions of Grandeur, 1. 25 alliances for extraordinary emergencies.' 7 This advice to avoid European entanglements increasingly assumed the character of an article of faith for those involved in formulating
American foreign policy.48
For most of the nineteenth century, statements of British foreign policy expressed similar themes. Lord Palmerston, for example, spoke of Great Britain as 'the champion of justice and right,' and a nation that was 'a Power sufficiently strong, sufficiently powerful, to steer her own course, and not to tie herself as an unnecessary appendage of any other Government.' Palmerston also stated that no country was to be 'marked out as eternal ally or the perpetual enemy.'49
President James Monroe articulated the classic formulation of American foreign policy in relation to the Western Hemisphere. This policy, developed in the 1820s, had a decidedly Anglo-American pedigree. The Monroe Doctrine was a response to the fact that Spain, with the possible support of European allies, seemed likely to embark on the re-conquest of its former American colonies. On the Pacific Northwest coast, Russia was attempting to exclude Americans from the highly lucrative Pacific fur trade. Restoration of colonialism in Latin America was contrary to the economic interests of both the United
States and Great Britain. Both were, moreover, wary of Russian attempts to extend its empire in Alaska, thereby closing the Northwest to any but Russian traders. It was the
British foreign secretary, George Canning, who first floated the idea of a joint Anglo-
American declaration opposing the domination of the newly independent Latin American
47 George Washington's farewell address, 17 September 1796 quoted in Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 346. 48 Bradford Perkins notes with respect to this period in American diplomatic history that it is 'easy to overstress the strength of isolationism or at least to give this spirit the same form that it had a century later.' See: Bradford Perkins, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Vol. /, 46. 49 Hansard, 1 March, 1848, 3rd series, xcvii, quoted in: Kenneth Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902, 292. 26 states by outside powers. In the end, Monroe rejected this British proposal, opting instead to go it alone. Monroe's December 1823 presidential message re-stated the main points proposed by Canning, though it was issued as a purely American policy. With respect to the Pacific Northwest Coast, Britain and the United States made nearly identical settlements with Russia, defining territorial boundaries and maritime rights in the vicinity of Alaska.
The Monroe Doctrine was a general statement that defined American policy for the whole of the Western Hemisphere and beyond, and inspired American foreign policy for many years to come. It declared that 'The American continents, by the force and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.' Referring to the supposed alliance of European states contemplating the re-conquest of the newly independent Latin American republics, Monroe continued, 'The political system of the allied [European] powers is essentially different. . . from that of America . . . We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.' Monroe added an exclusionary phrase, noting that,
'With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere.' And as for extra-hemispheric affairs, Monroe stated,
'In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so.'50
Questions concerning the expansion of European colonialism and the exploitation of the resources of the North Pacific region would resurface during the period of this
50 President James Monroe's annual message of 2 December 1823 quoted in Morison, The Oxford History of the American People, 414. 27 study as significant irritants in the Anglo-American relationship. In asserting their contrasting positions, those charged with drafting the various cases for each side had to acknowledge the common diplomatic and ideological lineage their countries shared.
While British and American interests very often did not coincide, both subscribed to elements of an enlightened school of diplomacy that saw war as a last resort, and envisaged a more rational and peaceful world.
Nevertheless, the significance of shared Anglo-American foreign policy traditions should not be overstated. Both espoused ideologies that evinced a certain naive idealism which some three generations later was being discarded in favour of late nineteenth century real politick. Both countries aspired to avoid entanglements on the European continent, but this was often easier for American secretaries of state, far from the courts of Europe, than for British foreign secretaries. Both sought to avoid long-term, binding alliances. However, in the case of Great Britain, this was the legacy of the country's relative strength, while for the United States, this policy was rooted in its relative weakness, a condition from which that country was rapidly emerging.
Growing Discord in Central America
Although numerous treaties had been concluded at mid-century with the express purpose of reducing sources of friction, Anglo-American diplomacy was tested across the western hemisphere in the 1880s and 1890s. In Central America as elsewhere, conditions seemed to make the clauses of these treaties the stuff of further conflict. There was certainly no shortage of treaties, conventions and arbitral awards in existence anticipating the construction of an inter-oceanic canal. The strategic importance of this region ensured 28 that events, which might otherwise have been regarded as purely local, came to assume a greater international significance than would otherwise have been the case.
British settlement along the Caribbean coast of Central America dated back to the seventeenth century when buccaneers used the area as a base for raiding and trading illegally with Spanish America. English speaking Creole communities grew up along the less than hospitable Caribbean coast of Nicaragua and Belize as well as on the Bay and
Corn Islands. In the eighteenth century, Spain reluctantly recognized the British settlement at Belize, and a British protectorate was negotiated with the 'King' of the
Mosquito Indians whose people, it was claimed, occupied the coastal areas of Nicaragua and parts of Honduras.51 Following the achievement of independence by the states of
Central America, British commercial interests developed, taking the usual form of banking, government loans, and railway building.52
By the late 1840s, and particularly following the discovery of gold in California,
American expansionists focussed their attention on Central America in the hope of developing a transportation link that could facilitate communications with the Pacific
Coast. American diplomats despatched to the quarrelling republics of Central America discovered that Britain had spent the years since the demise of Spanish colonialism forging a network of what appeared to be dependencies, protectorates and vassal states
51 For a more detailed treatment of the seventeenth and eighteenth century histories of Belize and Mosquito, see R.A. Humphreys, The Diplomatic History of British Honduras 1638-1901, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961) 1-19, and Robert A. Naylor, Penny Ante Imperialism, (Rutherford: Associated University Press, 1989), 19-72. 52 British financial, commercial, and political interests in the Central American republics are discussed in: Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure of Union, Central America, 1824-1960, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 60-65, 96-125. 29 that seemingly hobbled American expansion and ensured a dominant role for Britain in any trans-isthmian link.53
A key source of friction was the British claim to exercise a protectorate over the
Mosquito Kingdom. The aboriginal inhabitants of this region had never accepted Spanish rule, though Spain had succeeded in expelling Britain from the region in the late eighteenth century. The Mosquito people intermarried with British adventurers and runaway slaves over the years to produce an English speaking, pro-British and anti-
Hispanic Creole population, to which Britain again extended protection following the collapse of Spanish colonial rule. The lands of this kingdom, sometimes referred to as
Mosquitia, were expanded to include the mouth of the San Juan River. This position controlled the entrance to one of the best routes for building a canal. From the Caribbean, ships entered the San Juan River which, with much dredging and lock building, could connect to Lake Nicaragua. From there, more work was needed to link Lake Nicaragua with the Pacific.54
Although Palmerston at first tended to dismiss American objections to British
Central American policy, negotiations were eventually opened which contributed to a realization by both sides that they could do more to achieve the objective of an isthmian link by working together than by operating as rivals. These talks culminated in the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, which contained ambiguous language that each side interpreted in ways that best suited their purposes. Phrased in the future tense, the treaty
53 For a discussion of this period in Central America, see: Mario Rodriguez, A Palmerstonian Diplomat in Central America, Frederick Chatfield, Esq., (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1964), and Mary Wilhelmine Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy 1815-1915, (Washington: American Historical Association, 1916) 26-66. 54 The re-establishment of British protection over Mosquito was affected largely by the extension of interests based in Belize. See: Naylor, Penny Ante Imperialism, 131-167, and Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 54-56. 30 was intended to facilitate the joint building of a canal across the isthmus that would be open to all maritime trading nations. Neither Great Britain nor the United States would exercise exclusive control over any future canal. The treaty also stipulated that neither country was to 'fortify a canal, or colonize any part of Nicaragua, Costa Rica or the
Mosquito Coast.' The treaty further stated that neither country was to offer 'any protection which either affords or may afford ... to or with any State or People for the purpose of erecting or maintaining any fortifications, or of occupying, fortifying or colonizing...Nicaragua, Costa Rica or the Mosquito Coast.'55 Palmerston and the
Foreign Office believed the treaty called on Britain eventually to withdraw support for the strategically located Mosquito Kingdom, though the treaty's loose wording and concern for the welfare of the Indian inhabitants meant that this was only half-heartedly implemented. The withdrawal would take many years to realize.56
Despite its peaceful aims, the fifty years that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was in force saw a succession of Anglo-American disputes in Central America. When, following its signing, the two countries failed to agree on the conditions for British withdrawal from the Mosquito protectorate, Britain opened negotiations directly with the
Central American states.57 This led to the Treaty of Managua in 1860, by which Britain agreed to abandon its protectorate over the Mosquito people. British withdrawal, however, proved more apparent than real. The Anglo-Nicaraguan Treaty re-designated the former Mosquito Kingdom the newly constituted Mosquito Reservation. The king was now a chief, and his territory was defined to exclude the bank of the San Juan River.
55 Humphreys, The Diplomatic History of British Honduras 1638-1901, 52-58, Rodriguez, A P aimerstonian Diplomat in Central America, 323-326, and Naylor, Penny Ante Imperialism., 197. 56 Humphreys, The Diplomatic History of British Honduras, 54. ' Humphreys, The Diplomatic History of British Honduras, 57-58 31
The treaty also provided that Greytown, at the river's mouth (San Juan del Norte to the
Nicaraguans), was to operate as a free port where some elements of English law were to apply.58 The continuing presence of an English speaking population along Nicaragua's
Atlantic coast, traditional political and cultural ties, and a speculative interest in a future canal, made British authorities reluctant to abandon the Mosquito Indians and the region's
English speaking settlers. Disputes arose with Nicaragua over the treaty's interpretation, and these were eventually referred to the Austro-Hungarian Emperor for arbitration. The
Emperor's 1881 decision recognized the de facto fiscal and territorial autonomy of the
Mosquito people. Mosquitia was under technical Nicaraguan sovereignty, but operated as a state within a state. This set the stage for future confrontation in the region.59
While the Nicaraguan route through Mosquito territory was used as a corridor for traversing the isthmus at the height of the California gold rush, it fell into disuse following the building of the hemisphere's first 'transcontinental' railway across Panama by American interests between 1850 andl855. Always regarded as an unhealthy place,
Panama's notoriety as a location rife with disease was confirmed during the building of this line, which claimed the lives of an estimated 6,000 workers. The railway nonetheless proved a phenomenally successful business venture for its American owners, whetting the international appetite for an engineering work that could permit ships to cross the isthmus from Atlantic to Pacific. Many believed that Nicaragua was a preferable location for a canal because of health and engineering reasons.
Naylor, Penny Ante Imperialism, 197. 59 Naylor, Penny Ante Imperialis., 200-201. 60 David McCullough, The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal 1870-1914, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), 35-37. 32
In 1879, Ferdinand de Lesseps' Societe Civile Internationale du Canal
Interoceanique was organized to build a sea-level canal across the Isthmus of Panama, under the terms of a concession granted by Colombia the previous year. American discomfiture with the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was heightened as the French began work on their canal without an international partner, something Clayton-Bulwer precluded the
United States from doing. Engineering difficulties required the French plan to be revised in 1887 to incorporate locks, an undertaking that exceeded the considerable resources of the company.61 Thus, by the late 1880s, engineering difficulties and the high death toll inflicted by the notorious health conditions of Panama caused American canal building energies to be directed towards Nicaragua.
In 1880, President Hayes addressed a special message to Congress in which he called for 'a canal under American control' and for the renegotiation of the 'existing treaties [that] stand in the way of this policy,' a clear reference to Clayton-Bulwer.62
Secretary of State James Blaine initiated an exchange of diplomatic correspondence on the subject with Lord Granville, asserting that the treaty's provisions were a source of misunderstanding and controversy. In 1884, the Garfield administration chose to ignore
Clayton-Bulwer and negotiate a treaty with Nicaragua providing for an American-built canal, under American control, owned jointly by Nicaragua and the United States. This treaty was under consideration by the United States Senate when President Cleveland assumed office in 1885.63
61 Richard H. Collin, Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean, the Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine and the Latin American Context, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990)127-162. 62 'Special Message of President R.B. Hayes to Congress', 8 March, 1880, quoted in: Williams, Anglo- American Isthmian Diplomacy 1815-1915, 275. 5 Humphreys, The Diplomatic History of British Honduras, 154. 33
The plethora of diplomatic instruments negotiated between Britain, the United
States and the states of Central America, had done little to reduce friction in the region.
The most important of these was Clayton-Bulwer, which had been intended to facilitate the possibility that Britain and the United States might work together to build the trans oceanic link both desired to see traverse the isthmus. By the 1880s, in the face of unilateral French canal building and lingering evidence of British imperialism there, these hopes collapsed. Americans increasingly scrutinized British activity in Central America, and the diplomatic agreements that mandated co-operation were roundly condemned or ignored.
Growing Discord in North America
As in Central America, Canadian-American relations were the subject of a range of diplomatic instruments which both countries found less than satisfactory. Canada, a comparative newcomer on the international scene, tended to take a practical approach to international relations and was less ready to subscribe to diplomatic platitudes. Canada was often viewed by American expansionists as suitable territory for inclusion in that country's manifest destiny. From a military perspective, this presented near insurmountable problems to British strategic planners, a predicament made abundantly clear during the turbulent years of the American Civil War. Part of the answer was to be found in the creation of the confederated and self-governing Dominion of Canada in
1867. Those involved in Canada's creation intended that it would in time expand, assume responsibility for the various exposed British territories of North America, and take up a fair share of the burden for continental defence, though time would show this to be a burden Canada tended more often to shirk than to shoulder. Nevertheless, Canada 34 exercised the right to play a major role in diplomatic decisions touching on the country's interests.64
Parsimony in regard to security issues coexisted with a somewhat duplicitous approach to the country's international economic relations. Canada's leaders could not forget that for ten years the reciprocity treaty concluded with the United States in 1854 had brought prosperity to British North America. The undoing of this treaty by the
United States in 1866 disrupted North American economic integration and spurred the union of Canada's four founding provinces. Fond memories of the prosperity Canadians enjoyed during the years of reciprocity remained deeply imprinted on the Canadian consciousness.65 For more than forty years after confederation, Liberal and Conservative governments worked to see some version of reciprocity revived, but to no avail.66
A joint commission met in Washington in 1870 primarily to settle outstanding
American war claims, particularly the destruction inflicted by the British-built confederate commerce raider Alabama. The wider range of Anglo-Canadian-American economic and boundary issues was also included on the agenda. At least one American senator had suggested that Canada should be annexed by the United States as compensation for the Civil War claims. Canada, which was represented on the commission by its prime minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, hoped to see reciprocity restored as a condition for allowing American fishing fleets to access Canada's territorial waters in the North Atlantic. Americans, however, were reluctant to forego customs
64 The intimate relationship between confederation, autonomy, and defence issues is discussed with varying emphases by Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada, (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1990), 82-91. 65 See: J.M.S. Careless, The Union of the Canadas, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967), 132-139. 66 William L. Marr and Donald G. Paterson, Canada: An Economic History, (Toronto: Gage, 1980), 379. Marr and Paterson note that: 'On no less than four occasions in the eight years after the end of reciprocity Canadian representatives made pilgrimages to Washington. In 1866, 1869, 1870 and 1874 the pleadings for a renewal of the reciprocal-trade agreement fell on unsympathetic ears.', 377. 35 revenues, which were required for the reconstruction of their war-torn country. The
Treaty of Washington allowed American access to the Canadian fishery. Canadians were allowed to import fish to the United States, while the broader monetary value of allowing
Americans to fish in Canadian waters was referred to arbitration. In denying any further application of the reciprocal principle, the treaty served as the prelude to a period of rising protectionism in North America, and ushered in an uneasy calm in Canadian-American relations.67
In the face of American rejection of Canada's reciprocity overtures, Sir John A.
Macdonald had little choice but to steer Canada on an alternative course of economic independence, which he laid out in a speech delivered in the Canadian House of
Commons in 1878. The practical Macdonald defined Canada's 'National Policy', a less- than-preferred option created only after appeals for reciprocity with the United States had failed and North America was hit by deepening economic depression. On 4 March 1878,
Macdonald pointed out that, 'we have no manufacturers here. We have no workpeople here; our workpeople have gone off to the United States.' For Macdonald, the answer lay in 'a judicious system of taxation' 68 that would include protective, and arguably retaliatory, tariffs, combined with provision for public spending to facilitate transcontinental railway building and the encouragement of western settlement and immigration. Nevertheless, the dream of North American reciprocal trade remained the favoured option of the major parties operating within the Canadian political system.
The negotiation and implementation of the Treaty of Washington is analysed in some detail in Charles S. Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 1865-1870, 25-49. Campbell is reluctant to view the famous treaty as an Anglo-American panacea, entitling his chapter concerning it 'The Quasi Settlement with Great Britain.' 68 Marr and Paterson, Canada: An Economic History, 379. 36
American protectionism and nation-building policies precluded Canada from securing a reciprocity agreement with its southern neighbour. Macdonald's National
Policy heightened the extent to which the Canadian and American economies developed along competitive, rather than complementary, lines. 9 This had implications for British policy-makers who accepted this situation, along with the necessity it imposed on them to respond to Canada's need for diplomatic intervention in relation to disputes that more often than not involved access to the resources of a shared continent. Rules for the exploitation of such resources spanning boundaries and continental shelves were often ill defined. In the various discordant situations that developed during these years, it proved impossible to disguise the growing competitiveness inherent in the Canadian-American relationship, creating localized friction and inciting domestic political pressures in both countries. A lesson only partly learned by those framing American policies at this time was that confrontational strategies including annexationist rhetoric, protective tariffs and aggressive natural resource policies, tended to leave Canada within the economic orbit of the British Empire, rather than pull the Dominion onto the continental stage where the
United States was the principle actor.
Canadian-American reciprocal trade can be seen as a disputatious cloud casting its shadow over Anglo-Canadian-American relations, with the most obvious storm of discord precipitating from it being the North Atlantic fishery dispute. Canadians insisted that reciprocal trade with the United States should serve as compensation for allowing
American access to the valuable fishing stocks of Canada's inshore waters, as had been conceded in the treaty of 1854. During the 1870 treaty negotiations in Washington,
69 Robert Craig Brown,The Nationalism of the National Policy', in Peter Russell (ed.) Nationalism in Canada, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 155-163. 37
Americans refused this as a basis for going forward. They agreed instead that the monetary compensation due Canada for the fishery should be determined by an arbitral committee. When the arbiters met at Halifax in 1877, they awarded Canada what
Americans deemed the astronomical sum of $5.5 million. The United States grudgingly paid, but in 1883 the United States Congress directed the president to provide the two- years' notice required to abrogate the treaty's fisheries provisions. From 1885, Canada could exclude American fishing crews from Canadian waters, and Canadians lost the limited right to import their fish into the United States free of duty. Attempts by Canada to convince the departing Republican administration of Chester Arthur to delay the imposition of duties on Canadian fish in return for Canada allowing Americans continued access to Canadian territorial waters were unsuccessful.70
The Democratic administration of Grover Cleveland assumed office in March,
1885. The idealistic Thomas Bayard filled the office of secretary of state, and seemed determined to pursue a more conciliatory course in Anglo-Canadian-American affairs. It was agreed that Canada would temporarily allow American fishing crews access to inland waters on the basis of an undertaking by Bayard to convene a commission to examine the fishing dispute in addition to a full range of other issues related to reciprocal trade between the two countries.71 In the spring of 1886, however, the American Senate passed a resolution stating that the commission was unnecessary and should not be established.
Sir John A. Macdonald's cabinet responded by excluding Americans from entering
Canadian waters to fish and purchase bait, hoping this would break the diplomatic
70Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911, 11-120. For a Canadian interpretation, see: Brown, Canada's National Policy, 13-41; and H.A. Innis, The Cod Fisheries, The History of an International Economy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954). For an American interpretation, see: Stewart, The American Response to Canada since 1776, 85-89. 71 Brown, The Nationalism of the National Policy, 13-19. 38 deadlock. Fisheries legislation was strengthened and appropriations passed by Canada to resurrect the country's Fisheries Protection Service, which by the end of 1886 had expanded from only one ship to some nine lightly armed vessels, charged with intercepting Americans fishing illegally.72
The flames of discord were fanned in 1886, when the Canadian fisheries service seized the American vessel, David J. Adams, for taking on bait illegally within Canadian waters.73 The Canadian cabinet requested support from the Royal Navy to assist in fisheries protection work, though there was considerable reluctance in London to do this.
Canada and the Colonial Office did not see eye-to-eye on interpreting how the
Dominion's inland waters should be defined or in deploying the navy. The governor general, Lord Lansdowne, was in London during the summer of 1886, and he reported back to Prime Minister Macdonald that he had 'pressed' the Colonial and Foreign Offices
'as hard as I could' to obtain the 'support of H.M. Ships', but that this had 'been met by very determined resistance on the grounds that the sudden appearance of one of H.M.
Ships would add to the already existing exasperation, and lessen the prospect of the negotiations now in progress leading to a satisfactory result.' The best Lansdowne could do was to obtain a tentative commitment for fleet support for the following year in the event the negotiations were unsuccessful. Lansdowne was not sorry that the 'U.S.
Marc Milner, Canada's Navy: The First Century, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 8. Milner states here that 'the Fisheries Protection Service became a permanent feature on the east coast and the kernel from which the navy would ultimately spring.' See also Brown, The Nationalism of the National Policy, 91-125. 73 Tansill, Canadian American, 29-35, and Brown, The Nationalism of the National Policy, 29-33. 74 Lansdowne to Macdonald (Secret), 20 Aug. 1886, Macdonald Papers, MG26-A, Reel C1517, 33876- 33883 Library Archives Canada. See also: CO to FO, 16 July 1886. CO/807, North America, The National Archives, Kew. 39 should have [been] shewn that we are not the only peoples in the world who mean to insist on what we receive to be our rights.'75
Adding to Anglo-Canadian-American discord was a new dispute unfolding in the
North Pacific which in some senses mirrored the quarrel over the North Atlantic fishery.
At stake was the right to exploit the large herds of fur seals that congregated on Alaska's
Pribilof Islands in the Bering Sea during the summer months. There they would mate, give birth and rear their young before returning to southern waters. The American claim to harvest seals on these islands and within coastal waters was generally not contested. In the 1880s, however, the rising price of seal products encouraged entrepreneurs based in
Victoria, British Columbia, to hunt the seals migrating through the open seas in the vicinity of the Pribilofs. This became known as pelagic sealing,76 and the number of
Canadian ships engaged in this practice grew from only one or two in 1884-1885, to over a dozen in 1886. Native peoples of the Northwest Coast had long hunted migrating seals with spears from their canoes. These and other hunters were now recruited to join the crews of large commercial vessels equipped with lighter craft from which the seals would be speared or, in some cases, killed with shotgun blasts.
The United States derived significant revenues from the Pribilof Island seal harvest and, in the 1870s, American authorities arrested some of their own citizens for pelagic sealing in the waters of the Bering Sea. At first a blind eye was turned to the small number of Victoria pelagic sealers plying northern waters in the 1880s, but this situation changed dramatically in 1886. Four months after the David J. Adams had been apprehended near Digby, Nova Scotia, word arrived at the Admiralty in London that three
75 Lansdowne to Macdonald (Secret), 28 Sept. 1886, Macdonald Papers, Reel C1517, 33888-33894. 76 This is derived from the Latin noun pelagus, meaning open sea. 40 pelagic schooners from Victoria had been seized by American revenue cutters and their masters charged for sealing some seventy miles outside the three mile limit that normally defined inshore and international waters at this time. News of these actions was quickly relayed through diplomatic channels. For Americans, the dispute expanded beyond its commercial implications. Conservation advocates came to see the fur seals as a species threatened by uncontrolled sealing activity, and they sought to protect the seal herds from extinction. For Britain and Canada the fur seal dispute involved the principle of the freedom of the seas and the right to access and exploit natural resources found in international waters.7
In London, additional distinctions were to be made between the Atlantic and
Bering Sea. Because the North Atlantic dispute was thought mainly to concern American rights in Canada's inland waters, British officials argued that Canada was responsible for taking the lead role in developing the Anglo-Canadian position. On the other hand, the fur seal dispute was well outside Canada's inland zone and related to the status of the
Bering Sea as an international body of water. For Britain, the economic motives for continuing pelagic sealing were in some ways incidental to the need to defend the principles of maritime law, and it therefore became primarily an imperial responsibility.78
Exacerbating matters on both coasts was the absence of mutually accepted international principles for regulating the exploitation of the rich marine resources and the delineation of inland and international commercial zones. The use of armed maritime forces in both
77 Between 1870 and 1893 it was stated that the U.S. Treasury received more than $11 million from the various duties and royalties paid on fur seals. See: Charles S. Campbell, Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903, 80. 78 The issues concerning this early phase of the Bering Sea dispute are examined largely from the viewpoint of American documents in: Tansill, Canadian American Relations 1875-1911, 266-295. For a Canadian perspective, see: Brown, Canada's National Policy, 1883-1900, 42-54. 41 disputes to detain ships and arrest crews served as an indicator of the importance each side attached to these resource-based disputes.
The Forces of Discord
Following a period of reconstruction in the South, and Indian Wars in the West, some units of American land forces were moved closer to Canada, and the United States began to focus on enhancing its naval capabilities.79 British defence planners also became more conscious of the need to increase their country's naval and military preparedness.
Nevertheless, the last twenty years of the nineteenth century witnessed a relative shift in the balance of hemispheric military and naval power towards the United States.
The ability to influence events in the hemisphere was closely related to the capacity to deploy naval and military forces to deal with routine and more dramatic situations as they arose. Britain's resources in this respect were substantial. On land, garrisons of imperial regiments provided protection to naval bases and were available to supply forces in the event of emergencies, civilian unrest, or natural disaster. For most of the period of this study, some twelve to fourteen warships were assigned to the Royal
Navy's North American and West Indian stations, operating mainly out of bases located in Halifax, Bermuda, and Kingston, Jamaica. The much smaller South Atlantic Station boasted about four ships sailing out of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The Pacific station comprised seven or eight ships based in Esquimalt, British Columbia.80
7 Robin W. Winks goes so far as to state that, 'The Northern victory destroyed any remaining possibility of a restoration of the balance of power in North America. Thereafter, Canadian-American relations and British policy with respect to the New World were posited upon the assumption that the United States had the preponderance of power on the continent.' Winks, Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years, 375. 80 [Great Britain] The Navy List, corrected to the 20,h June 1885, HMSO, 1885, also 1890, 1895. 42
The Admiralty stood ready to despatch ships in response to needs identified by foreign and colonial secretaries as well as colonial governors in some cases. The navy could be asked to intervene in quarrels with Latin American republics, suppress riots or respond to situations where peace, stability, investment, life or property might be threatened. A constant presence was maintained, with the summer months seeing ships from Halifax and Esquimalt operating mainly in northern waters. In the winter, warships would often sail for more southerly locations in the Caribbean or the Pacific coasts of
Central or South America, protecting British lives, property, commerce and investments.
If Americans perceived themselves to be surrounded by British interests and armaments, it was not without foundation.
In contrast to Britain's nearly two dozen warships assigned for service in the
Americas, the United States secretary of the navy stated frankly in his annual report for
1885 that, 'we have nothing which deserves to be called a Navy.'81 The United States
Navy had been built largely with a view to port protection and blockade duty during that country's civil war, and it had been allowed to fall into disrepair as Americans concentrated on reconstruction and nation building. Its weakness was highlighted in 1873 when the Spanish intercepted the Virginius, an American flagged steamer running guns to
Cuban rebels. There was no American warship in the area, and the Spanish proceeded to execute forty-nine of those on board by firing squad, including several American citizens.
It was only through the timely arrival of HMS Niobe from Jamaica that further executions were prevented.
81 Secretary of the Navy, 'Annual Report, 1885', quoted in: John A.S. Grenville and George Berkely Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 10. 82 The Virginius episode is described in Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 57- 59 and Kenneth Hagan, This People's Navy, (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 180-181. 43
United States experience in its war with Mexico, in its Civil War, and in the
Indian wars that accompanied the opening of the West emphasized the country's continental nature, and this was thought to necessitate land-based forces as opposed to an expensive battleship navy. In addition, ideological concerns relating to the proper relationship between a free people and a heavily armed state caused some to oppose the expansion of both land and naval forces.83 Nevertheless, by the late-1880s, frontier skirmishes were becoming less frequent, and American troops were being redeployed.
Smaller posts in the West were closed, while larger, more strategic posts along the
Canadian border were used to garrison troops returning from the West. With the suppression of the Plains Indians, the United States Army faced no serious land threat other than Great Britain in a Canadian guise. Although British and American strategists feared the likely outcome if their respective forces came to blows, planners generally believed that the Royal Navy's ability to wreak havoc on the port cities of the United
States gave the British a presumed advantage, though a clash would undoubtedly inflict considerable suffering on Canada as well.84
The events of the 1880s highlighted the strategic liability of the Canada-United
States border, always considered a weak spot in Britain's defensive posture. Canadian politicians were reluctant to make any but the most nominal provision for their country's defence and British authorities were equally hesitant to fill the strategic inadequacies.
This situation had been a factor since 1871, when Britain withdrew the garrisons from
Quebec City and the other Canadian land bases, though land forces remained to protect
83 Grenville and Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, 9-10. 84 Richard Preston provides detailed analysis of these factors in The Defence of the Undefended Border, especially Chapters 3 & 5. Preston suggests that the military balance of power was much less one-sided than stated by Robin Winks, showing that up to and including the Venezuela Boundary Crisis, strategists on both sides were insecure as to their ability to repel their opponents. 44 the naval stations of Halifax and Esquimalt. In these years reductions were also made to the number of imperial troops in the West Indies.85
A first action of the Dominion parliament had been to negotiate a British guaranteed loan to fortify the highly vulnerable city of Montreal, as well as other population centres. Although in future years the amount of the loan was trebled, in the end it was expended on building the Canadian Pacific Railway, and not on Montreal's defence.86 In 1883, when the strength of the United States army exceeded 20,000, a new
Militia Act authorized the establishment of a permanent Canadian force that was not to exceed 750 officers and men, entrusted with responsibility for training the volunteer militia.87 The important responsibility for maintaining law and order in the West, on the other hand, was given to the paramilitary North-West Mounted Police which had a strength, in 1888, of around 1,000.88 While some decried the decision to expend the money intended to defend Montreal on railway building, this was not as misguided as it might first appear. The only serious military challenge Canada faced during this period occurred in the West, where Louis Riel defied Canadian authority in 1869 and again in
1885. An important factor in quelling Riel's second insurrection was the existence of the nearly completed Canadian Pacific Railway, which provided transportation for the relieving forces.89
British lack of concern for Canadian defence was related to the fact that, by the
1880s, Britain's diplomatic energies were more focused on Europe and Asia. The
85 The hemispheric implications of the Cardwell Reforms are discussed in Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 295-296. 86 C.P. Stacey, Canada and the British Army, (London: Longmans Green & Co., 1936) 167-169, 200, 255. 87 J.L. Granatstein, Canada's Army, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 27. 88 [Canada] Report of the Commissioner of the North-West Mounted Police Force, 1888, (Ottawa: 1889), 135-140. 89 Granaatstein, Canada's Army, 27-30. See also, George F. G. Stanley, The Birth of Western Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,1975), 126-143, 350-379. 45 potential riches of Africa, especially South Africa, became a focus for increased British diplomatic and military attention, particularly following the development of new gold discoveries there after 1886.90 Nevertheless, Britain's diplomatic, colonial, naval, and military resources deployed in the Americas were sufficient to exercise considerable sway there. Geographically, the British Empire comprised the largest political entity in the hemisphere. A network of colonial governors, professional diplomats and honorary consuls provided London with an incomparable source of intelligence regarding the region's political and economic affairs. By contrast, American representatives tended to be sparser on the ground and the American penchant to link diplomatic appointments and political patronage did not always aid the achievement of international objectives.
The 1870s and 1880s would see a new school of 'imperial defence' arise in
Britain and the colonies, which made a virtue of the need for self-governing colonies to look after their own defence, relieving British forces of this responsibility. There was also an expectation that, should the need arise, countries like Canada might contribute to the defence of the Empire as a whole. While a small Canadian force of regulars gradually evolved during these decades, questions concerning the relative priority to be accorded economic development, as opposed to national, continental or imperial defence remained.91 The land defence of Canada remained a largely insoluble problem, though the tables were turned much more in Great Britain's favour when naval resources were considered, however even this was beginning to change.
See for example Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians, The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1961), for their famous study of the interrelationship of these military, diplomatic and geopolitical factors. 91 Stephen J. Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 22-39. 46
In the 1880s the United States began its meteoric rise to become a naval power.
Contributing to this development was the realization that the new age of steam-powered battle cruisers left the United States far more vulnerable to attack from a superior naval power able to cross the Atlantic without regard to prevailing winds, than had previously been the case. Arguments were also advanced asserting that if American trade were to expand, there needed to be an American navy to provide the necessary protection.
In 1883, the Republican administration of Chester Arthur obtained funds for the construction of three warships and a small despatch boat. Three modern 4,000 ton sail/steam-propelled ships were built. Named Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago, they became known as the ABC cruisers. They were partially armoured and equipped with modern, rifled, breech-loading guns.93 This would prove the first of many programmes aimed at building modern warships for an expanding American fleet. The fact that both political parties embraced this programme was underscored when, following the defeat of the
Republicans in 1884, Grover Cleveland's Secretary of the Navy, William Whitney, authorized the building of the Baltimore, a faster version of the ABC warships, and the cruisers Maine, Texas, New York, and Olympia.
As Americans moved to modernize and expand their naval assets, a similar process was occurring in Great Britain, though on a far grander scale. Since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain seemed somewhat content to rest on its maritime laurels as the world's greatest sea power, and this continued following the Crimean War as
92 The subject is covered in some detail in Walter R. Herrick, Jr., The American Naval Revolution, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966). A more popular treatment is contained in Kenneth J. Hagan, This People's Navy, (New York: Free Press, 1991). An excellent chapter in Politics, Strategy and Diplomacy by J.A.S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, entitled 'The Admiral in Politics: Stephen B. Luce and the Foundation of the Modern American Navy' 1-38, describes the political context in which American naval rearmament came to be adopted as national policy during these years. 93 Hagan, This People's Navy, 186. 94 Hagan, This People's Navy,1ST. 47 complacency and parsimony permeated British attitudes towards fleet development.
Expensive ship building programmes were avoided at this time when technology was changing rapidly, with the introduction of various types and thicknesses of armour plate, advances in steam propulsion, as well as new developments in gunnery and torpedoes.
In September 1884, the journalist William Stead published in his Pall Mall
Gazette a series of articles using powerful language to convey the idea that the Royal
Navy was dangerously close to losing its pre-eminence.95 The articles discussed the implications of Britain facing more than one opponent in the strategic Mediterranean, and they created a sensation.96 The 1880s had seen an intensification of capital ship construction by other European powers. Some feared that, should a Franco-German combination materialize, Britain would be outnumbered in battleships and nearly equalled in cruisers.97 In response, the first lord of the admiralty announced that British expenditure on new ship construction would be nearly doubled to produce two first-class ironclads, five armoured cruisers, six torpedo cruisers, and fourteen torpedo boats. This proved the first of several naval scares, which generated irresistible public pressure to
Concern was generated by Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1882, which had created serious diplomatic difficulties between Britain and France. Britain's inability to extricate itself from Egyptian affairs led to talk of a Franco-German combination in the Mediterranean. For an appraisal of the depth of British involvement in Egypt and the Sudan, see: Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians particularly Chapters V and VI. For an appraisal of the diplomatic repercussions in 1884, see pages 143-144. A key element in deepening British involvement in Egypt was the despatch of Gordon to the Sudan, a step taken largely as the result of a press campaign instigated in January 1884, by the same Pall Mall Gazette which, a few months later, in September, would shock the country with revelations concerning the relative weakness of Britain's naval resources. 96 Inspiring W.T. Stead was a young and committed H.O. Arnold-Forster who was convinced of the danger facing Britain given the relative decline of the navy. Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Power in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905 (London: Frank Cass, 1964) 121-122. 97 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy, (London, Unwin Hyman,1989), 11. 98 Marder, Anatomy, 122. In contrast to the 5,000 ton displacement ABC cruisers constructed by the United States, the Admirals Class battleships, built as a result of the Naval Scare of 1884, displaced over 10,000 tons. 48 modernize and expand the Royal Navy. Both Britain and the United States now found themselves embroiled in the international naval armaments race.
Discussing Discord in Washington
On assuming office in 1885, Grover Cleveland's administration endeavoured to approach the disputes in the North Atlantic and Bering Sea in a conciliatory fashion. This approach, moreover, seemed also to apply to that administration's early dealings where British interests in Central America were concerned. Cleveland's secretary of state, Thomas
Bayard, refused to subscribe to the theory that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was a dead letter and he withdrew the controversial bilateral treaty with Nicaragua which his predecessor had submitted for Senate approval." This provided a respite in the impending diplomatic sparring match over the future of Nicaragua's Caribbean coast.
Secretary of State Bayard's first eighteen months had seen the seizure of an
American fishing boat in Canadian waters, the arrest of Canadian sealing vessels in the
Bering Sea, and the strict enforcement of Canadian fishing regulations. During the 1887 fishing season, Canadian patrol vessels continued to board American fishing boats.
Seizures and charges laid were few, the aim being to exclude Americans from taking bait from Canadian inland waters, thereby making it difficult for them to participate in the lucrative deep-sea cod fishery. Macdonald quipped to Lord Lansdowne that it was 'just as well, that the American Government and fishermen should know we are still on the alert.'100 The summer of 1887 also saw Americans detaining Canadian sealing vessels from Victoria in the Bering Sea. Bayard recognized the weakness of the American case.
At the State Department, legal opinions were less than unanimous as to the United States'
99 Tansill, The Foreign Policy of Thomas F. Bayard, 676. 100 Macdonald to Lansdowne, 27 July 1887, Quoted in H.A. Innis, The Cod Fisheries, 419. 49 right to interfere with sealing activity outside the three mile limit surrounding the Pribilof
Islands. President Cleveland nevertheless showed considerable reluctance to abandon the
Alaskan seals to Canadian spears and shotguns.101
Bayard's solution had been to convene a joint commission to resolve the range of issues, including the pivotal North Atlantic fishery quandary. This plan was opposed in the Republican dominated Senate, which passed a variety of resolutions and bills opposing the commission idea as well as any settlement that would reduce tariffs on
British North American products.102 In May 1887 Sir Charles Tupper, then serving as
Canada's minister of finance, travelled to Washington to meet with Bayard, and the various problematical conditions seemed to melt away. In subsequent correspondence with Tupper, Bayard played to Canadian nationalism, commenting on 'the embarrassment arising out of the gradual and practical emancipation of Canada from the control of the mother country.' Bayard thought he saw Canada assuming the 'attributes of autonomous and separate sovereignty,' noting that the United States regretted that it could not have
'formal relations with Canada.' He believed that 'unimpeded Canadian-American negotiations' might alleviate some of the 'awkwardness of this imperfectly developed sovereignty.' Referring to the complications of Anglo-Canadian-American diplomacy, he suggested a solution. 'The commercial intercourse between the inhabitants of Canada and those of the United States has grown into too vast proportions to be exposed much longer to this wordy triangular duel, and more direct and responsible methods should be resorted to.' There was only one way, according to Bayard, to achieve a permanent settlement of the outstanding questions, and that was to address it in the context of 'a
Tansill, Canadian American Relations, 279-280. Tansill, Canadian American Relations, 52. 50 straight forward treatment on a liberal and statesmanlike plan of the entire commercial relations of the two countries.' In encouraging Tupper to stretch the diplomatic conventions of the day, Bayard added that he was not proposing that discussions include
'the political relations of Canada and the United States, nor to effect the legislative independence of either country.'103
Armed with an opinion that the executive branch need not heed the ultra vires blusterings of the Senate, Bayard again renewed the offer, suggesting in July 1887, that a joint commission be convened. Those responsible for Canadian affairs in Ottawa and
London alike were pleased with the invitation and the prospects for less confrontational relations it heralded. Scheduled to begin meeting in Washington in November 1887, questions soon arose in relation to the range of issues to be included on the agenda. Sir
John A. Macdonald insisted that the admission of natural products free of duty must be discussed. Sir Charles Tupper and the provincial government of British Columbia wished to see the Bering Sea seals included, though Macdonald and Lord Salisbury opposed this on the grounds that it was so explosive that it might cause the discussions to break down entirely. The Colonial Office further maintained that the freedom of the seas was a matter to be insisted on, not negotiated. Bayard, somewhat embarrassed by the whole sealing affair, hoped it could be handled through normal diplomatic channels. 104 Lord
Lansdowne, ever conscious of the wider diplomatic context, urged that the agenda include
'every outstanding dispute between Great Britain and the United States, including even
103 Bayard to Tupper (Personal & Unofficial), 31 May 1887, Macdonald Papers, Reel C1583, 71992-71995 Library and Archives Canada. The letter was printed, likely for circulation to members of the Canadian Cabinet. 104 Brown, Canada's National Policy, 60-61, 92. 51 such questions as that of the Nicaraguan isthmus.' In the end, a vague formula was agreed upon that provided maximum scope for the talks. The commissioners were to
'consider and adjust all or any questions relating to rights of fishery in the seas adjacent to
British North America and Newfoundland, . . . and any other questions which may arise, and which may be authorized by their respective Governments to consider and adjust.'10
The commission comprised three commissioners representing the British and three the American side. Bayard headed the American contingent, and was joined by
James Angell, a moderate Republican and president of the University of Michigan, and
William L. Putnam, an international lawyer. Heading the British panel was the charismatic Joseph Chamberlain.107 Also on the British side were Sir Lionel Sackville-
West, the British minister to Washington,108 and Sir Charles Tupper, who had seen service in the Canadian cabinet and as his country's first high commissioner in London.
Assisting the British team were John Thompson, the Canadian minister of justice, and the attorney general of Newfoundland, James Winter.109
Chamberlain carefully considered the various issues at stake before leaving
Britain. As one who believed in the merits of liberal economics, he could support some
105 Lansdowne to Macdonald 26 Sept. 1887, Macdonald Papers, Reel C1583, 72070-72074. 106 Bayard to Sackville-West, 14 Sept. 1887, Tansill, Canadian American Relations, 58. 107 Chamberlain had served in Gladstone's second cabinet as president of the board of trade, 1880-1885, and was appointed president of the local government board when Gladstone formed his third cabinet in February 1886. Chamberlain soon resigned from the latter office over the contentious issue of Home Rule for Ireland which he bitterly opposed, contributing to the fall of Gladstone's third, short-lived government. He then played a key role in the formation of the Liberal Unionist movement. When the joint commission was formed inl887, it was the Unionist Government of Lord Salisbury who selected Chamberlain, then seen as a charismatic and influential politician with an interest in domestic reform and international affairs, whose support was worth courting. Chamberlain's role in the fall of Gladstone's third Government and the formation of the Liberal Unionist movement are dealt with in some detail in Peter Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain Radicalism and Empire, ]868-1914, (London: Cassell, 1966), 81-111 and 130-145. 108 Bayard's letter book contains correspondence from him to Phelps in London regretting West's appointment, referring to the British Minister in Washington as a 'mere postage stamp.' See:Tansill, Bayard, 277. 109 Tansill, Bayard, 56-62. 52 form of reciprocity in Canadian-American trade, but he drew the line at commercial union, which he described as 'free trade between America and the Dominion, and a protective tariff against the mother country. If Canada desires that, Canada can have it... knowing perfectly that [it] means political separation from Great Britain.'110
Chamberlain's arrival in the United States created a sensation. From a security point of view, the fact of his well-known opposition to Irish home rule necessitated
Bayard arranging a Pinkerton bodyguard for his safety. Socially, the arrival of this dashing widower created a sensation of a very different kind. His presence in
Washington became the event of the season and, during the course of his visit, he met and courted Mary Endicott, the daughter of Cleveland's secretary of war.111 The two married, thus adding to the list of prominent late Victorian British politicians taking American spouses, a factor, historians have claimed, in the diplomatic rapprochement achieved in succeeding years.112
Joseph Chamberlain speech, 11 October 1887. Quoted in Peter T. Nash, Joseph Chmberlain Entrepreneur in Politics, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 284-285. 111 The social side of the commission's meetings is discussed in some detail in Sir Willoughby Maycock, With Mr. Chamberlian in the United States and Canada, 1887-88, (Toronto: Bell & Cockburn, 1914). 112 Chamberlain's was only one of several prominent Anglo-American marital unions consummated during these years. By 1895, Lord Playfair, Sir William Harcourt (leader of the Liberal party), Sir Michael Herbert, who succeeded Pauncefote as ambassador at Washington, Lord Randolph Churchill, George Curzon, a future viceroy of India and foreign secretary, and the Duke of Marlborough, also had American wives. Campbell notes that such 'trans-Atlantic unions doubtless had wide influence on policy.' Charles S. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783-1900, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974,) 203. Furthermore, in Anglo-American Understanding, Campbell remarks 'Here was an extraordinary galaxy of American women married to British governmental leaders. One might almost stop with that in explaining the rise of friendly feelings between America and Britain.' See: Campbell, Anglo-American Understanding, 7. D.C Watt observed that 'Anglo-American rapprochement' rested on the fact that political control resided in both countries in men belonging to social groups that 'had become increasingly linked by intermarriage and the prevailing freedom of travel. Increasingly, the 'season' in London was a 'must' for socially ambitious Americans, while a small...number of the British elite were beginning to include America in a special Grand Tour.' D.C. Watt, Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century .(London: Longmans, 1965), 25-26. 53
Publicly there was considerable hope for the commission's success. Bayard wrote to prominent journalists and businessmen in New York to garner support for 'establishing a well-considered and just and generous policy toward British America', with a view to curtailing the practice of 'dealing in small personal and party methods with such a vast and palpable public interests.'113 In a letter to Edward Phelps, the United States minister representing his government in London, Chamberlain stated his 'respect and admiration for your country' and his belief that 'the closer union of all English-speaking nations is, I am convinced, of far-reaching importance to the civilization and happiness of the world.'114 In subsequent conversations, Chamberlain suggested that he saw his position to be more that of 'an arbitrator between the United States and Canada, than that of an advocate.'115
In a private letter written to Lord Salisbury shortly after arriving in New York,
Chamberlain showed his more realistic side. After meeting with a number of prominent citizens he observed that, for Americans, the fishery question was one bearing on a relatively small number of 'fishmongers & fishermen in the Eastern States.' He did not believe that it could 'give rise to war or even serious dispute.' His concern was that the fishing issue would become the stuff that 'politicians play with,' particularly in the
Senate. He noted how, in establishing the commission over the objections of Congress,
'Mr. Bayard has in fact put up the back of the Senate.' Chamberlain expressed the hope that 'Sir Charles Tupper and myself may be able to exert influence on some of the
113 Bayard to Horace White, the editor responsible for the financial and economic sections of the New York Evening Post and NewYork Nation, 21 Oct 1887, Tansill, Bayard, 272-273. 114 Chamberlain to Phelps, 31 August 1887. Quoted in: Tansill, Bayard, 276-277. 115 Phelps to Bayard, 29 October 1887. Quoted in: Tansill, Bayard, 278. 54
Senators ... on behalf of a fair arrangement.' Still, he realized that 'party feeling' was likely to carry more weight than 'any representations of ours.'116
Commencing in late November, negotiations showed only limited success until mid-December. Chamberlain, however, explored means for achieving a breakthrough in private meetings. With the support of his fellow commissioners, Chamberlain suggested that both sides terminate the contentious terms of the Treaty of 1818, with Canada selling licences to Americans wishing access to Canadian waters. Bayard was reluctant to see the historic treaty cancelled, but offered Canadians the right to import fish to the United
States free of duty. Some mix of these options seemed assured of being approved.
Chamberlain was invited to Ottawa for the holidays to stay with Lord Lansdowne at
Government House, but first he met with Bayard, followed by an 'extremely frank and cordial' meeting with President Cleveland. Cleveland asked Chamberlain 'What did the
Canadians want?' Chamberlain replied, 'Reciprocity on the terms of the Treaty of 1854.'
The president declared that this was 'impossible in the present state of American feeling.'
Cleveland nevertheless endorsed the general terms of the agreement arrived at, and suggested that Chamberlain 'press this settlement' on the American commissioners.117
Assuming a role anticipatory to that of the shuttle diplomat, Chamberlain travelled to
Ottawa where he had discussions with Lansdowne, Macdonald, and others. After some difficult discussions, the Canadian leaders approved the solution of selling licences to individual American vessels.
Chamberlain to Salisbury, 18 Novemberl887, Chamberlain Papers, University of Birmingham, Library and Archives Canada, microfilm reel A310. 117 Chamberlain to Salisbury, 22 Decemberl887, Chamberlain Papers, Library and Archives Canada, microfilm reel A310. 55
Twenty-nine meetings of the commission were held in Washington between 21
November 1887 and 15 February 1888. The rapturous phrases in the earlier Bayard-
Tupper correspondence were soon forgotten, as the commission got down to hard bargaining and confrontational exchanges. In spite of the president's assurances to the contrary, after the Christmas break, Bayard withdrew the basis for settlement agreed to previously. Any thought of expanding the commission to include the wider range of hemispheric issues was also set aside. Bayard was anxious to see the rights of the New
England fishing fleets addressed first and foremost. He had to admit that Canadian desires to see a wide range of reciprocal tariffs lowered were unachievable due to congressional opposition. Chamberlain threatened to break off negotiations, leading
Bayard to return to the rough consensus reached before Christmas. In February 1888, the
Bayard-Chamberlain Treaty, which was concerned only with the North Atlantic fishery, was finally signed.118
The treaty provided for a mixed commission to delimit the coastal waters of
Canada and Newfoundland following agreed-upon guidelines, and made provisions for
American ships to enter Canadian harbours to purchase the fishing supplies, ice and bait they required. It also allowed the free entry of Canadian fish into the United States.
These provisions were dependent on ratification of the treaty by the American Senate, and congressional action to remove duties on the importation of Canadian fish and fish oil.
Anticipating Senate rejection, negotiators had included a further provision for a modus
118 An excellent assessment of the commission's deliberations from a Canadian perspective is provided in Brown, Canada's National Policy, 66-80, while the American perspective on the joint commission is to be found in: Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 21-86. Further assessment based largely on Bayard's extensive papers appears in: Tansill, Bayard, 272-321. Peter Marsh relates the events from Chamberlain's viewpoint, including his courting of Mary Endicot, in: Peter Marsh, Joseph Chamberlain, Entrepreneur in Politics, 285-299. 56 vivendi that could come into force in the event the required American legislation was not enacted. It stipulated that Americans could enter Canadian waters to purchase fishing supplies, provided they purchased a licence at the rate of $1.50 per ton based on the displacement of their ship.
Consideration of the treaty in the Republican-dominated Senate led to an outcry of partisan Anglophobia. In August, the Senate not only rejected the treaty, but there were calls for retaliatory measures against Canada. Cleveland appreciated that the Senate's action, coming only three months before the 1888 elections, was calculated to appeal to the anti-British elements in the electorate. Rather than succumb to these tactics, he called for even stronger legislation to penalise not only Canadian exporters, but the American railways carrying goods to Canada. None of these measures was in fact imposed, though this proved to be one of a range of measures taken by Cleveland in the dying days of his administration aimed at dispelling the largely accurate impression that he wished to establish closer relations with Britain and the neighbouring Dominion to the north.
Bayard ensured that the modus vivendi permitting American fishing fleets licensed access to Canadian waters was implemented, and this interim solution remained in force for more than a decade.11
The joint commission of 1887-88 and the resulting Bayard-Chamberlain Treaty did not deal with the difficult Bering Sea fur seal dispute. Nevertheless, a vague and informal truce was arranged, with Bayard proposing an international agreement to recognize a large zone from which the pelagic sealers would be excluded for about half the year. While Salisbury found this a reasonable offer, it was not well received in
119Tansill, Canadian American Relations, 86-90. 57
Ottawa. Perhaps because 1888 was an election year in the United States, Canadian sealers were left unmolested as the diplomatic discussions continued.120
The joint commission also avoided any discussion of the British presence in
Nicaragua, where the continued existence of the Mosquito Reserve was causing problems. Nicaraguans were gradually working to assert their power in relation to the authority of the chief of the Mosquito Indians. Acting on the advice of his Creole advisers, the chief did not hesitate to register his objections to Nicaraguan incursions with the Foreign Office. The Mosquito authorities asserted that Nicaragua was contravening the treaty that established the reserve by encroaching on its ill-defined borders, stationing police and military personnel inside these, and opening a post office.
Following the conclusion of the meetings of the joint high commission in
Washington, and as de Lesseps canal building enterprise was sliding into bankruptcy, Dr.
Horacio Guzman, the Nicaraguan minister in Washington, began directing complaints to
Thomas Bayard. He asserted that British interests were interfering with his government's attempts to exercise Nicaragua's sovereign rights on the Mosquito shore. At first, Bayard urged restraint on the Nicaraguans. In a memorandum of his conversation with Guzman in February, he noted that he thought it would 'not be wise of the Nicaraguan government to make any show of organized force against these people just now.' Anticipating future construction of an American-backed canal and expansion of American interests in the area he foresaw the day when 'Americans got down there in force, and this Canal was well underway, that there would be recognition of it along the whole seacoast upon which
120 Brown, Canada's National Policy, 95-96. 121 Chief Hendy to Salisbury, 1 June 1888; J.P.H. Gastrell to Senor Zavala 10 September 1888, FO 53/63, Mosquito, 1888-1889, The National Archives, Kew. 58 these Mosquito Indians live, which would affect the state of things very much, and I thought their better way would be to let matters progress as they were now.'
Bayard also expressed surprise that the Austro-Hungarian emperor had been placed in a position to adjudicate on the fine points of Nicaraguan sovereignty flowing from the Treaty of Managua. Bayard believed the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty gave the
United States the right to pronounce on such matters, noting that the Austrian arbitral decision of the emperor had 'very seriously impaired the degree of sovereignty which was supposed to have been given to Nicaragua.' Bayard questioned what 'the State
Department of that day had been about in not insisting upon having that question brought into their consultation.'123
Guzman's complaints continued intermittently through 1888 and, as the election campaign in the United States developed, critics lambasted Cleveland's administration for its warm relations with Great Britain. This climaxed in October when a private letter from the British minister in Washington, Sir Lionel Sackville-West, was made public.
The letter seemingly endorsed Cleveland as a preferable candidate from a British point of view, over his Republican rival. Bayard responded by demanding the recall of Sackville-
West only a few days before voting took place. His dismissal did not prevent Cleveland's loss at the polls, though the incident must have impressed on Cleveland the domestic political danger of appearing too friendly with Britain. Salisbury learned from this extraordinary faux pas, the importance of ensuring that Her Majesty's Government was
Memorandum, written by Bayard of a conversation with Guzman on 10 Feb. 1888 in Tansill, Bayard, 669. 123 Tansill, Bayard, 670. 59 represented in Washington by a diplomat of the highest ability, something Sackville-
West's successor would possess.124
Following the election, in the closing days of the administration, Guzman passed to Bayard further information suggesting improper British influence in Nicaragua-
Mosquito affairs. In a diplomatic note, the British representative in Central America had objected to the government in Managua setting up a Nicaraguan post office in the main settlement of the Mosquito Reserve, Bluefields, on the grounds that this act was
'intervening in the domestic affairs of the [Mosquito] reservation.' The British note went on to complain that any 'exercise of military or police authority by Nicaragua within the territory' would be inconsistent with the treaty establishing the reservation.125 Bayard's patience had reached its limit. In an instruction to the American ambassador in London he stated,
The President cannot but regard the continued exercise of the claim on the part of Great Britain to interfere in behalf of these Indians as the assertion of a British protectorate in another form; more especially when this effort is directed to prohibiting Nicaragua from exercising military jurisdiction in the immediate neighbourhood of the Atlantic mouth of the projected canal.
The United States can never see with indifference the re-establishment of such a protectorate. Not only would the extension of European influence upon this continent be contrary to the traditional and frequently expressed policy of the United States, but the course of Great Britain . . . would be in violation of the express stipulations of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.... I should be wanting in my duty ... should I fail to bring the matter directly and frankly, and in a spirit of sincere friendship, to the notice of Her Majesty's Government.1
Sackville-West's dismissal is analysed in Charles S. Campbell, 'The Dismissal of Lord Sackville, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 4 (March 1958). 125 Bayard to Phelps, 23 November 1888, British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. LXXXI, 1888-1889, 746. 126 Bayard to Phelps, 23 November 1888, British and Foreign State Papers, 1888-1889, 757. 60
The Foreign Office was clearly displeased that a remote group of Central American
Indians were capable of creating this degree of friction in Britain's international relations.
An influential official at the Foreign Office, Francis Bertie, stated that 'it would be a very good thing if this country could rid itself of all responsibility in connection with the
Mosquito Reserve.'127
The wave of anti-British sentiment that was affecting the American electorate was also reflected in Bayard's failure to de-escalate the Bering Sea seal controversy. In
February and March 1889, Congress passed legislation asserting American authority over extensive stretches of Alaskan waters. One of Grover Cleveland's last actions as president was to approve this bill authorizing his successors to make regulations to protect fur-bearing animals in the Bering Sea. The president was also directed to send vessels there to arrest violators. "
Salisbury was at least able to demonstrate a degree of largesse in relation to the dispute over the Mosquito Coast. He replied on March 7:
[The British government] have no desire to 'assert a Protectorate' in substance or in form, or in anything in the nature of a Protectorate, and it would give them the greatest possible satisfaction if the Nicaraguan Government and the Indians would come to an amicable arrangement. . . and thus relieve this country from any further responsibility in regard to their affairs. Certain advantages were by the Convention of 1860 secured to the Indians of the Mosquito Reserve, and Her Majesty's Government felt themselves duty bound to bring to the notice of the Nicaraguan Government the cases specified. . . . Mr. Bayard is, however, under a misapprehension as to the extent of the intervention exercised by Her Majesty's Government. They do not claim 'to intervene in every dispute between the Mosquito and their Sovereign.'129
127Francis Bertie, Minute, 11 February 1889, FO 53/63. 128 The Act applied to 'the dominion of the United States in the waters of the Behring Sea.' The statute is quoted in Tansill, Canadian American Relations, 293. 129 Salisbury to Edwards, 7 March 1889, British and Foreign State Papers 1888-1889, 761-762. 61
This conciliatory note arrived as the first Cleveland administration was leaving office. In agreeing in principle to the future withdrawal of Britain's traditional claims to the
Mosquito Coast, Salisbury demonstrated his country's willingness to acknowledge the
United States' understandable interest in an area of potential strategic value.
Conclusion
The decade of the 1880s witnessed increasing disconnectedness in the relations of the
Western Hemisphere's two strongest powers. Earlier diplomatic, economic and resource sharing agreements had broken down. Naval and military factors figured in the calculations of those charged with managing the various discordant situations this generated. The pre-eminence of British naval assets remained the main controlling factor, though this was changing. Those seeking explanations for the resurgence of discord often look to the remarkable growth in American industrial production and the relative decline of Great Britain as the world's dominant industrial producer. Anglo-American friction flowed in part from the United States' need to find international markets for goods and
1 or) capital in a hemisphere where, for some time, these had been supplied by Britain. Yet the actual issues generating discord were local ones, and these were mainly concerned with obtaining access to natural and strategic resources such as fish, seals, and rights to territory where an isthmian canal could be built. American failure to do more to embrace
Canada in the creation of a continental economy contributed to the existence of two rival and competitive systems. In Central America, Britain's traditional trusteeship
130 Walter LaFeber's famous 1959 thesis, while dealing primarily with the 1890s, discusses late-nineteenth century American economic conditions and the perceived need to develop international trade as a means to restore prosperity, Walter Fredrick LaFeber, 'The Latin American Policy of the Second Cleveland Adminisration', (University of Wisconsin, 1959), p. v and passim. For a description of the extent of British trade and investment in the region vis-a-vis that of the United States, see: Anthony Steele, 'The British Empire and the United States, 1870-1914' CHBE Vol. HI, 299-300; and: Alan Knight, 'Britain and Latin America, OHBE Vol. Ill, 134-144. 62 responsibilities heightened concerns in the United States that British and American interests there were competing and working at cross-purposes. Bayard's endeavour to bend diplomatic conventions in order to encourage more direct discussions with Canada only highlighted the existence of these competitive forces. At the joint high commission convened in Washington, differences were bridged largely by the British commissioner,
Joseph Chamberlain, not the hard bargaining Canadian, Sir Charles Tupper. On the other hand, Bayard's protest, that Britain was maintaining a foothold in Nicaragua, fell on highly attentive ears in Whitehall. Salisbury's disavowal of any wish to take steps to prolong unnecessarily Britain's treaty responsibilities for the Mosquito Indians, would serve as a reference point for British Foreign policy-makers as the situation in Central
America deteriorated in the 1890s. In coming years, diplomacy would be repeatedly tested in a hemisphere where discord was fed by rival competitive systems. II. Competition and Discord 1889-1894
Achieving peace and prosperity in the Western Hemisphere proved elusive in the early
1890s, as events unfolded under the shadow of depression and the competing economic and political systems of Great Britain and the United States. The United States took a variety of unilateral steps in the direction of consolidating its control of hemispheric trade and security, while confronting Britain's historic and ongoing role in the region.
Important initiatives were taken by the United States administration to organize the Latin
American republics so as to encourage hemispheric trade and the peaceful resolution of local disputes. Tariff policies were initiated to draw these states, the British dependencies of the Caribbean, and even Newfoundland, into the economic orbit of the United States.
Yet it proved politically impossible to extend these concessions to Canada, and the period is remembered primarily for the heightened duties imposed under the McKinley tariff.
Relations with Newfoundland and Canada were inextricably connected with the still contentious North Atlantic fishery issue, and in the early 1890s, Britain and Canada also confronted the United States in a deepening crisis over access to the fur seals of the
Bering Sea. The United States involved itself more deeply in matters touching on hemispheric security, as it continued its programme of naval building, and the gospel according to Alfred Thayer Mahan gave greater volume to the voices of those seeking to expand that country's fleet.
63 64
United States foreign policy in the 1890s was moving from moralistic isolationism to policies favouring practical activism. This was a period when the world's industrialized states competed intensely for markets, resources and territories abroad, and
Anglo-American hemispheric relations were not, moreover, immune to these impulses.
Where Canada's interests were concerned, Anglo-American competition was reinforced by the fact that Americans and Canadians were competing for access to the economic resources of a shared continent and its sea-beds, without either a shared economic system or the benefit of mutually acknowledged international law to regulate some of these resource-based disputes. In the Caribbean and Latin America, the United States sought the resources and markets of an area that Britain had, since the collapse of Spanish colonial power, dominated. Britain remained relatively calm in the face of initiatives emanating from the United States aimed at integrating the economies of the southern portions of the region into a hemispheric system. It was more difficult for the British to show such restraint when Canada was excluded from some of the beneficial aspects of the new hemispheric structures and economic agreements, particularly when Canada's access to maritime resources were concerned. Different patterns are discernible in relation to
American engagement in the two major regions of the hemisphere, though both areas generated negotiations and diplomatic activity, through which Britain, the United States, and Canada gained knowledge of the others' expectations.
Competition and Pan-Americanism
A Republican administration led by Benjamin Harrison replaced that of Grover Cleveland in 1889, with James G. Blaine taking up the appointment of secretary of state. Blaine had been the unsuccessful Republican candidate for the presidency four years earlier. His 65 family had been long-term residents of the capital and were popular with the diplomatic corps. The new secretary of state was described as being possessed of 'winning charm', yet Blaine's biographer describes his attitude in relation to Britain and Canada as 'always suspicious, sometimes hostile,' and never 'entirely friendly.' In seeking to explain these predelictions, she notes that he was of revolutionary stock, and had lived in Maine for twenty years, representing that state in Congress. These experiences, she argues, gave him firsthand knowledge of Canadian-American disputes and made him 'not always entirely unbiased in his attitude toward England and her daughter, Canada.' The new administration, showing little concern with reducing Anglo-American friction, chose to direct attention to strengthening relations with the republics of Central and South
America, where they believed American interests had been sacrificed by the inattention and inaction of Cleveland and Bayard.131 To extend American political and economic influence in the Western Hemisphere and exploit its riches, U.S. officials needed to promote stability in a region where states were operating at various levels of political maturity. Consequently, augmenting the American naval fleet became a priority for the
United States in the century's final decade. In the shorter term, however, James Blaine sought to use diplomatic means to achieve stability.
Blaine had served briefly as secretary of state in 1881 during the short-lived administration of President James Garfield, which was cut short by the president's assassination. During his four months in office, Blaine sought to convene an international congress of the independent nations of the Americas.132 The cabinet changes following
131 Alice Felt Tyler, The Foreign Policy of James G. Blaine, ("Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1927), 19-21. 132 Garfield's inauguration took place on 1 March 1881, though he was assassinated in July of that year. The vice president appointed Frederick T. Frelinghuysen to serve as secretary of state on assuming the 66
Garfield's assassination disrupted these plans. Blaine's successor, Frederick
Frelinghuysen, cancelled the congress because of growing tension between Peru, Chile, and Bolivia. Grover Cleveland's secretary of state, Thomas Bayard, re-issued the invitation during his final year in office. The conference, to which Canada and the various colonial possessions of European powers were not invited, finally met in
Washington in October 1889, with Blaine presiding. There were representatives from every independent American state except the Dominican Republic. The countries attending formed themselves into the International Union of American Republics, later known as the Pan American Union, the predecessor of the Organization of American
States.133 Blaine had high hopes that this forum would succeed in preserving peace in a volatile region, thus facilitating the expansion of American trade.134
Blaine was, furthermore, the heir to a Republican tradition that had come to view the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty as a diplomatic fiction. Frelinghuysen had persevered in attempts to revise it and even argued for the treaty's abrogation. Pointing out the fact that the Settlement of Belize had been erected into the formal Crown Colony of British
Honduras in 1862, and that its borders had expanded since Spanish days, Frelinghuysen argued that these actions were in violation of the treaty, and as a consequence the treaty was voidable. While the Foreign Office succeeded in deflecting these assertions,135 the
office of president. James Blaine was selected as the Republican candidate for president to run against, and be narrowly defeated by, Grover Cleveland in 1884. 133 The International Union of American Republics was reorganized at a meeting held in Buenos Aires in 1910, at which time the name of the group's permanent organization was changed to the Pan American Union. The name would be changed again following the Second World War to the Organization of American States. 134 Tyler, The Foreign Policy of James G. Blaine, 170-173. 135 Lord Granville replied that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty had never been intended to apply to British Honduras, and that the United States had recognized the colony's constitutional status by a postal convention entered into in 1869. See: R.A. Humphreys, The Diplomatic History of British Honduras 1683- 1901, 153-154. 67 years that followed witnessed a tendency by American administrations to treat many of the treaty's provisions as not requiring observance, while continuing to seek its revision.
Competition and Navalism
The new inter-American organization did not fulfil the high expectations set for it by
Blaine. Blaine feared that continuing friction and instability would invite European intervention, particularly if the United States was unable to intervene, itself.137 An augmented American fleet was called for to add bite to the country's diplomatic bark. As the fleet expanded, so did the inclination to employ it. United States involvement in events related to the Chilean Revolution, moreover, demonstrated to all parties how the reactive use of naval forces by the United States could immerse that country in local hemispheric disputes with very serious consequences.
The expansion of American and British naval power at this time was one aspect of a global armaments race taking hold in the late nineteenth century. This was inspired in part by a number of writers in Britain and the United States who developed an intellectual rationale for actions that would fuel this competitive build-up and inspire policymakers in both countries. In the 1890s, interest in the study and application of the principles of sea power and in the importance of imperialism took on something of a religious fervour. It was Alfred Thayer Mahan, an American, who worked to develop the first comprehensive, historically based appreciation of sea power and how it was to be practised. The publication in 1890 of The Influence of Sea Power Upon History represented a landmark
136 Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy 1815-1915., 275-285. 137 Blaine wrote 'If our Government does not resume its efforts to secure peace in South America some European Government will be forced to perform that friendly office. The United States cannot play between nations the part of dog in the manger.' Blaine is quoted in Grenville and Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, 92. 68 in the study of naval strategy, and provided a template for the naval development of several countries, including Great Britain and the United States, in the years leading to the
First World War.138
Without specifically naming Great Britain, Mahan espoused a view suggesting that other states could do no better than to follow the British example, building up their national wealth and influence by employing those key ingredients that had made Britain great. Seeking to inspire American policy-makers, while keeping the British experience firmly in mind, Mahan reminded his readers that an extensive coastline was a strategic advantage, as it ensured that such a country possessed a reserve of trained seamen for naval duties. Mahan also believed a state would enhance its power if it developed extensive sea-borne trade, acquired colonies and coaling stations, and built substantial naval forces.139
Well before the publication of Mahan's famous study, in fact as early as 1867, Captain (later Sir) John Colomb began agitating for a far more thoughtful and strategic approach to the range of defence issues facing Great Britain. He argued that the greatness of the nation depended on security of homeland, empire, and the routes of communication and commerce. Even if the homeland could be secured, the loss of trade and communications routes would surely lead to the destruction of all that made Britain great. Colomb pushed for inter-service and inter-imperial co-operation. A close working relationship between army and navy was required to provide land defence for naval stations so that the navy could have secure bases from which to re-fuel, re-fit and operate. Imperial co-operation was required because overseas bases were located in distant colonies which benefited from, and could contribute to, the defensive equation. See: D.M. Schurman, The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval and Strategic Thought, 1867-1914, (London: Cassell, 1965) 15-35. For assessment of Colomb's contribution to the debate over the defence of Esquimalt, at the time of the 1877 Russian war scare, see Glynn Barratt, Russian Shadows on the British Northwest Coast of North America, 1810-1890, 91-93. Many of these ideas were also put forward by John Colomb's brother, Vice-Admiral Philip Colomb. Their concerns played a role in the appointment of Lord Carnarvon's 1879 Royal Commission on 'The Defence of British Possessions and Commerce Abroad', which acknowledged the link between trade and security, and the navy's need for secure bases around the world. See: Peter Boroughs, 'Defence and Imperial Disunity' in Porter (Ed.), Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. Ill, 334-335. During the same period Donald Schuman notes, 87, that Sir John Laughton, working out of the Royal Naval College in Greenwich, advocated the academic study of maritime history as a means of solving practical problems facing the navy. 139 Mahan clinically describes a world in which geography, demography and government direction could coalesce to assist nations with properly motivated populations to become great maritime, and by extension economic, powers. A state with a coast-line, enough sailors, good harbours, and an interest in international trade, could develop into a sea power if its government chose to support and develop the nation's naval capacity. A sea power would seek out colonies to facilitate its citizens' trading efforts, and would seek to acquire large naval forces, as such concentrations were the key to success in the application of sea power. 69
In an age of unprecedented technological change, Mahan found little of significance in the recent past to help him compile his strategic principles. Instead, he harkened back, mainly to the days of sail and mercantilism, and the naval wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Writing at a time of economic depression, he described a direct relationship between sea power and national wealth. Sea power is a tool, he stated, 'To secure to one's own people a disproportionate share of such benefits.'140
Yet English writers like Sir James Froude and Sir John Seeley, writing a little earlier, were already questioning this classic British recipe. In analysing the contemporary world, they perceived the insularity of the British Isles not as a strategic advantage, but as a factor limiting national potential. As early as 1871, Froude compared
Britain to the new, expanding continental empires, asking his readers to 'contrast the enormous area of territory which belongs to Russia, to the United States, or to Germany, with the puny dimensions of our own island home, prejudice itself cannot hide from us that our place as a nation is gone among such rivals unless we can identify the Colonies with ourselves.' To Froude, the strength of a country like the United States lay not in its ports and coastline, but in its transcontinental interior, its 'increasing populousness' and its 'imperial energy.' Britain would need to use the vastness of Canada and the other
It was argued that the whole process is based on geography, peaceful trade, and healthy democratic and commercial aspirations. Mahan's description encompasses many of the conditions and actions that allowed Britain to achieve unprecedented wealth and power by virtue of achieving command of the seas. An un stated inference of Mahan's writing is that these conditions and actions should be capable of empowering other nations in search of wealth and power. His supposedly universal theories suggest that a good people following admirable commercial and political objectives will be able to acquire the status of a great sea power, and that national prosperity will follow. Mahan's study included analysis as to how sea power is most successfully deployed, arguing that maritime force needs to be strategically concentrated in such a way as to assure victory over smaller concentrations, as he believed that larger concentrations would eventually prevail. In so doing, his book would inspire the creation of navies comprising great fleets containing many big ships, adding fuel to the ensuing naval armaments race. 140 Barry M. Gough, 'The Influence of History on Mahan' in John B. Hattendorf (ed.) The Influence of History on Mahan, (Newport, R.I.: The Naval War College Press, 1991), 10. 70 colonies of settlement in order to unlock the 'unexhausted vigour of our people, with boundless room in which to expand.' In this way, 'English character' and 'English strength' would be spread 'over an area of a hundred Britains.' The United States itself, he continued 'do not possess a more brilliant prospect.'141
Writing in the early 1880s, Seeley also described factors favouring continental states, including their ability to host large populations and operate at a scale that promised to reduce a country like Great Britain to second-class status. He envisaged a future in which, 'Russia and the United States would be on an altogether higher scale of magnitude, Russia having at once, and the United States perhaps before very long, twice our population. Our trade too would be exposed to wholly new risks.'142
Froude and Seeley saw imperial federation as the solution to the limits imposed on
Britain by the country's insular position.143 As British intellectuals contemplated the weakness of their maritime isolation and the geopolitical advantages of continental states,
Americans tended to minimize their role as a land-based power, focussing instead on the relative advantages of naval forces.
Some months before the publication of Mahan's famous book, the United States
Navy suffered an embarrassing loss in Samoa, a group of islands in which the United
J.A. Froude, Short Studies on Great Subjects, Vol. II (London: Longmans, 1906 ed.) 500-501. For an analysis of Foude's thinking, see: G.R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971), 10-12. 142 J.R Seeley, The Expansion of England, (London: Macmillan, 1883, 1902 ed.), 16. 143 Sir Halford Mackinder, writing in the early twentieth century, saw no simple solution. Mackinder built on the ideas of Froude and Seeley to formulate a more fatalistic intellectual framework for explaining British decline in the face of the rising power of Russia and the United States. He asserted that the impact of new technologies, particularly roads and railways, favoured large continental states able to operate free from dependence on coastal shipping, thereby lessening the influence of naval forces in world affairs. Mackinder did not publish his theories until 1904, so that in the 1890s, Mahan's navalist analysis was more widely understood and readily embraced by those charged with responsibility for defence issues, particularly in the United States. For a formulation of these views see: Halford Mackinder, 'The Geographical Pivot of History', Geographical Journal, xxiii, no. 4, April 1904. His and Mahan's impact on the naval/military armaments race are analysed in Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, (London: Penguin, 2004), 177-202. 71
States had an intense territorial interest. A diplomatic and naval stand-off had developed in Samoa's Apia harbour between three German warships, three American ones, and a single British warship. On 15 March 1889 a savage tropical storm lashed Apia, destroying the German and American ships moored there. The bulk of the aging, wooden hulled American Pacific squadron comprising U.S.S. Trenton, Vandalia, and Nipsic, was wrecked, killing forty-nine American sailors. Only the state of the art HMS Calliope was able to use her larger, more powerful steam propulsion and highly skilled crew to escape the ravages of the storm. Talks on the future of Samoa followed, establishing the structure for a satisfactory settlement. Nevertheless, the devastation inflicted by the storm in Apia harbour underscored to both the United States and Germany the need for reliable naval vessels to participate in the quest for overseas possessions.144
The American naval building programme was accelerated following the destruction occurring in Samoan waters. President Harrison's secretary of the navy,
Benjamin Tracy, used the weakness of the Pacific squadron as justification for the development of more powerful, steam-powered, armoured battleships. The Naval Act of
This stage of the Samoan Crisis is discussed from an American standpoint in Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 73-83, and from a more British perspective in Steel, 'The Empire and the United States' in E.A. Benians, et.al. (ed.) Cambridge History of the British Empire Vol. III. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959) Steel points out that in its early stages, 'the interests of the Empire as a whole conflicted with those of a particular Dominion [New Zealand], for 1884 was also the year of the first Berlin Conference on the Congo, in which, as it happened, the Imperial Government felt bound to support German claims not only in West Africa but also in the South Seas, in return for German sympathy and aid against France over the Egyptian question. This decision caused dismay in New Zealand, Samoa and the United States alike, and, whatever its merits on the larger issues, helped to bring about the state of civil war in Samoa . . . fought with more or less open American support on one side to balance German pressure on the other, and by the spring of 1889 had brought the two great powers to the verge of war between themselves. During it, British sympathies gravitated rapidly back to the American, or legitimist native, side; but it was perhaps neither this nor the famous hurricane of March 1889, which sank several of the rival warships in Apia Harbour, so much as Bismark's reluctance to embark on a naval struggle with America, that led to the tri-partite Berlin conference in April-June.' 324-325. Germany lacked the naval resources required to enforce their will when it came to imperial expansion overseas. Within five years, the German naval building programme would be announced in a speech delivered by Kaiser Wilhelm II, a keen disciple of Mahan. See; Marder, Anatomy, 288. 72
1890 called for the building of two cruisers, a torpedo boat, and three battleships of more than 10,000 tons displacement. The latter approached in size the largest British battleships.145 Like earlier ships, they were named for American states and came to be regarded as the most powerful battleships then afloat.146
Discord in Chilean Waters
An early test of the new United States Navy's ability to facilitate national diplomatic objectives in the Western Hemisphere took place in the harbour of Valparaiso, Chile, in late 1890 and early 1891. Ten years before, Chile, Bolivia and Peru had been locked in a three-way war concerning mineral rights in a disputed area rich in nitrate deposits. Great
Britain was, in the eyes of many Americans, thought to support Chile, whose greater naval and military power assured ultimate victory over the two smaller republics. Then, in the early 1890s, civil war erupted in Chile, further complicating matters. Chile's congressional forces, considered by some to be influenced by British interests, took control of the government and the country's substantial navy. The deposed president, furthermore, came to be identified with the anti-British faction. Into this mix, in 1891, the United States appointed Patrick Egan to serve as its minister in Valparaiso, a man whose dislike for things British was well known. Before immigrating to the United
States, Egan had worked as treasurer for the Irish Land League. At the time of his diplomatic appointment, he had no diplomatic experience, and had only been an
Until 1887, the largest ships in the British fleet were the Camperdown, Benbow and Anson, each of 10,600 tons. In 1887 and 1888, Trafalgar and Nile were launched at 11,940. It would be 1891 before the first of the Royal Sovereign class battleships would be launched at 14,150 tons. See: Marder, Anatomy, 547. 146 Cecil Spring Rice to Ronald Munro Ferguson, Apr 1892. Quoted in: Stephen Gwynn (ed.), The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice A Record Vol. I, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1929), 118. 73
American citizen for three years. Once in Santiago, he threw his weight behind the deposed president.147
Chileans perceived that the United States was supporting their former president, and this was reinforced when, in May 1891, a confrontation erupted over an American arms shipment to aid the congressional faction in the Chilean civil war. The dispute arose when Blaine was ill and President Harrison was himself involved in directing American foreign policy. Orders were given that the relatively new but lightweight and under- gunned U.S.S. Charleston should be sent to intercept a merchant ship attempting to deliver arms and ammunition to the congressional forces.148 A larger Chilean cruiser, the
Esmerelda, was escorting the arms shipment off Mexican waters when she and
Charleston met and cleared for action off Acapulco. No shots were fired due to the fact that the vessel carrying the stash of arms passed well to the seaward of the two warships.
Nevertheless, Charleston reached the port in Chile ahead of the arms shipment and prevented it from being unloaded.149 In the end this had little bearing on the outcome of the civil war, which was won by the congressional faction, a fact that was recognized by the United States in August.150
Tyler, The Foreign Relations of James G. Blaine, 128-133. 148 The Charleston was commissioned in December 1889, but displaced only 4,000 tons., At the time of her completion she was outfitted with ten 6 inch guns. See: John D. Alden, The American Steel Navy, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 371. 149 An American court later ruled the action of the Charleston in seizing the arms was illegal. 150 Charles S. Campbell provides an account of this occurrence in: Campbell,The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 169. There is another interesting account of this event in John Foster's memoirs. He represented the Chilean presidential faction in court in California in their attempt to prevent the arms leaving the United States. In so doing he seems to have been acting in accord with the wishes of President Harrison, but not Secretary of State James Blaine. In 1892, Foster would replace the ailing Blaine as Secretary of State. See: John W. Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs, Vol. II, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), 289-290. 74
Another of the new generation of American warships became the focal point of
Chilean hostility following the congressional victory. The cruiser Baltimore was in
Valparaiso to monitor events after the civil war.151 Many Chileans resented the role the
United States had played in their country's recent history, and when, on 16 October, the
American commander gave his crew shore leave, rioting broke out leaving two of his men dead and several badly injured. Baltimore was then relieved by the smaller gunboat
Yorktown,152 which maintained an American naval presence in the harbour in spite of taunts from Chilean torpedo boats. Americans were well aware that the Chileans possessed a new warship, the Captain Pratt,153 which had a greater displacement than the
Baltimore and Yorktown combined and was equipped with 12-inch armour plating, three times that of the Baltimore. The Chilean situation was exacerbated by the fact that the
American minister was providing asylum to members of the former government. A number of very frank diplomatic exchanges passed between Washington and Santiago, and the crisis remained unsettled for several months. In January 1892, the Chileans demanded the recall of Minister Egan. The United States replied, demanding a complete apology or the cessation of diplomatic relations. Cecil Spring Rice, who was serving at the British legation in Washington, noted that 'the President and the Secretary of the
Navy wish for war; one to get re-elected, the other to see his new ships fight and get more votes for more.' 154 As the crisis unfolded, the president's private secretary, Elijah
151 Baltimore displaced 4,600 tons and had been commissioned in January, 1890, Alden, The American Steel Navy, 372. 152 Yorktown displaced only 1,700 tons and had been commissioned in April, 1890, Alden, The American Steel Navy, 372. 153 Captain Pratt displaced 6,900 tons, Hagan, This People's Navy, 200. 154 Spring Rice to Ferguson, April 1892, Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, I, 118. 75
Halford recorded in his diary that 'the President stated that all members of the Cabinet are for War.'155
The president's assessment of cabinet solidarity was, however, inaccurate. A split developed within the administration, with Harrison leading a faction favouring aggressive retaliation for the disgraceful treatment of the Baltimore crewmembers, and
Blaine, who sought de-escalation. Cecil Spring Rice believed the United States was 'on the verge of a war' because of 'inconceivable stupidity' on the American side and
'trickery on the other.' He observed that Blaine had 'prevented war with Chile so far, and may do so still; but the President and the navy are bent on it.'156 The president and Blaine disagreed on the wording of various notes that had to be drafted. Harrison sent a message to Congress on 25 January, asking for authority to engage in hostilities, though Chile capitulated before a vote could be taken.157
Cecil Spring Rice's observation concerning the president's electoral motivation in pressing the Baltimore incident was tested when Benjamin Harrison lost the election of
1892. Nevertheless, naval development continued to enjoy bipartisan support in the
United States. During the four years that followed, five new battleships, an experimental submarine, as well as various cruisers and smaller vessels were authorized for construction by the Cleveland administration.158
Historian A.T. Volwiler states that Halford's diary was shown to him by the writer who had it destroyed before his death. See: A.T Volwiler, 'Harrison, Blaine, and American Foreign Policy', 1889- 1893, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 79, No. 4, November 1938, 643. 156 Spring Rice to Ferguson, (?) 1892, Gwynn (ed.), The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, I, 118. 157 Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 172-175, and Volwiler, 'Harrison, Blaine, and American Foreign Policy', 647. 158 Hagan, This People's Navy, 209. 76
Competition and Reciprocity
Blaine's hope that the Pan-American organization would itself serve as a structure to promote inter-American trade was not fulfilled. The Latin American leaders rejected the notion of a customs union, though they did make a strong recommendation to expand commerce through the negotiation of reciprocal trade treaties.159 The early 1890s were years of depression and industrial unrest in the United States. Expanding international trade was increasingly seen as a means of solving the economic dislocation of the times.160 Lowering tariffs, however, represented a special challenge for the Blaine administration, given the Republican Party's high tariff policies. In the dying days of the
Cleveland regime, Republicans had defeated the Bayard-Chamberlain Treaty on the grounds that the trade concession allowing Canadian fish entry to the United States free of duty represented an unacceptable chink in the essential armour of American trade protection.
Under Harrison's presidency, still higher tariff levels were proposed in the 1890
McKinley bill, though this included a small exception that would permit raw sugar to enter free of duty. Blaine opposed this, urging instead that a structure for reciprocal tariffs be created to operate within the hemisphere. An amendment was put forward in the
Senate to enable the administration to negotiate the removal of tariff duties on the
'products of any nation of the American hemisphere', provided similar tariff concessions were granted to admit 'such products of the United States as may be agreed upon.'1 ' In
159 J. Laurence Laughlin & H. Parker Willis, Reciprocity, (New York: Baker and Taylor, 1903), 134. 160 This issue is addressed in some detail in various portions of LaFeber's, 'The Latin American Policy of the Second Cleveland Administration', iii-x. 161'Congressional Record, 51st Congress, lsl Session', Quoted in J. Laurence Laughlin & H. Parker Willis, Reciprocity, 191-192. Blaine's support for reciprocal trade within the Americas was largely an extension of his work with the Pan-American Congress, and his conviction that trade agreements needed to be two - sided. Tyler, Blaine, 185-187. 77 its final form, the McKinley act eliminated duties not only on sugar, but also on hides, coffee and most tropical staples. The president was, however, required to cancel this concession if it were thought that a particular exporting country was not giving comparable tariff concessions to the exports of the United States. These provisions were available to states outside the Americas, and came to be known as 'tropical reciprocity.'
They were accorded congressional approval largely because they related to items that were not generally produced in the United States, and they promised to provide new markets for American goods at a time when over-production was thought to be the cause of that country's economic problems.1
Canada was offered no relief from the punishing provisions of the McKinley tariff. In the face of closing markets in the United States, the dominion sought to extend commerce with the British possessions of the hemisphere. Beginning in 1889, the
Canadian government offered subsidies to shipping lines linking Canada and the West
Indies. ' The Canadian finance minister, George Foster, visited the West Indies in 1890 and proposed tariff concessions along the same lines as those being embodied in
American legislation, though no agreements were concluded. Canada was only able to offer reduced duties on imported sugar, while the United States eliminated sugar duties altogether. Nevertheless, beginning in 1892, Foster succeeded in having Canadian
Commercial Agents appointed in Antigua, Barbados, British Guiana, St. Kitts, and
Trinidad, to operate as a nascent consular service to promote Canadian trade relations with these colonies.
162 Laughlin & Willis, Reciprocity , 209-211. 163 Brian Douglas Tennyson, Canadian-Caribbean Relations Aspects of a Relationship, 15. 164 The trade discussions and appointment of Commercial Agents are discussed in Douglas, Canadian- Caribbean Relations Aspects of a Relationship, 15-16. Robin W. Winks describes the enthusiasm for 78
The United States required that negotiations be conducted with the tropical states of the Americas to ensure that they made the necessary reciprocal tariff concessions.
Placed in charge of these negotiations was John Watson Foster, who would play an important role in hemispheric affairs under successive Republican administrations. Often referred to as the 'handy man' by his colleagues, his formal sway at the State Department was significant, though his informal influence may have been even greater. Foster's involvement in Republican politics secured him the appointment of United States ambassador to Mexico in 1873, and to Russia in 1880, but he served in St. Petersburg for only a year, after which he opened a law office in Washington specializing in international affairs. Following President Benjamin Harrison's election in 1888, Foster's abilities were again called on, particularly where trade matters were concerned. He filled the office of secretary of state in the last months of the Harrison administration. After that, Foster served on a number of international bodies, and his law firm represented such clients as the governments of China, Mexico, and Chile.165
In his memoirs, Foster describes how, in the autumn of 1891, he handled the reciprocity negotiations with various British Caribbean dependencies which 'required special treatment on account of their nominal dependence on Great Britain.'1 The
Colonial Office was prepared to support these moves, which were strongly supported by the West India Committee, and promised relief to the growing poverty of these
Canadian-Caribbean trade, noting: 'Between 1885 and 1910 the British West Indies became to Canada what China was to the United States: a source for constant visions of "unrivalled trade opportunities.'" Robin W. Winks, Canadian-West Indian Union: A Forty-Year Minuet, (London: Athlone Press 1968), 21. 165 Michael J. Devine, John W. Foster: Politics and Diplomacy in the Imperial Era, 1873-1917, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981), 86-99. Also see Devine's article on Foster in American National Biography, which traces the main developments in his career. Michael J. Divine, 'John W. Foster', American National Biography, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs, 9. 79 territories.167 Foster recalled that 'delegations from the Barbadoes, the Leeward and
Windward Islands, Trinidad and British Guiana began to arrive singly in Washington to seek an arrangement for their respective peoples.' The meetings occurred at the State
Department where, usually, 'a secretary of the British Legation, Mr. Spring-Rice, was present, but he took no part in the discussion and did not worry his brain with the array of statistics and the controversies.'168 Spring Rice was in fact more concerned with the thrust of these negotiations than Foster thought, observing that by them the United States offered 'the bait of their great market in order to put the colonies in the dilemma of choosing between differential duties against the Empire and commercial ruin.' Spring
Rice feared that the 'only way out is annexation.'1 9
Blaine's State Department saw the potential of using the combined impact of the
McKinley tariff and the promise of reciprocity as a stick and carrot for wooing British colonial dependencies into the economic and political sphere of the United States. These techniques were not restricted to tropical territories. In Robert Bond, the colonial secretary serving in the Newfoundland government of Sir William Whiteway, Blaine had a willing candidate with whom to utilize these economic tools. In October 1890, Blaine and Bond met in an effort to resolve aspects of the North Atlantic fishing controversy.
The Bayard-Chamberlain modus was up for renewal, and Newfoundland obtained permission from the Colonial Office to make their own arrangement with Blaine with a view to improving Newfoundland's own grim economic prospects. The Blaine-Bond agreement provided for broad reciprocity, including the free importation of
167 Quintin Hogg (West India Committee) to Foreign Office, 10 August 1891, Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt (gen. eds.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 110. 168 Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs II, 10. 169 Spring Rice to Ferguson, 6 November 1891, Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, I, 116. 80
Newfoundland seafood and other raw materials into the United States, and the free importation of American manufactured goods into Newfoundland. American fishing crews were, furthermore, permitted to purchase bait and to land and trade in
Newfoundland waters without purchasing the licences demanded by Canada.170
The draft Blaine-Bond Treaty was dated 18 October 1890, and Canadian politicians were astounded when news of it reached them. Sir John A. Macdonald sent off a telegram to Sir Charles Tupper, Canada's high commissioner in London, stating he could 'scarcely believe' that Newfoundland had been allowed to make 'separate arrangements respecting fisheries', given the fact that the 'relations of all the North
American provinces to the United States and to the Empire' were affected. Tupper was directed to 'represent urgently how the fishery and commercial interests of Canada might be injured . . . and how disastrous from a national point of view it would be for a separate colony to effect an arrangement . . . more favourable than would be given the confederated provinces.' Macdonald concluded his plea by noting that Canada's
'difficulties' under the McKinley tariff 'are sufficiently great now.'171 Although the
Imperial government agreed to suspend the Newfoundland negotiations until concurrent
Canadian negotiations could be arranged, Blaine's willingness to engage in talks with the relatively weak island colony did not include a comparable inclination to deal with a more powerful Canada.
Macdonald wished to use his government's involvement in reciprocity talks with the Americans as a means to garner public support in the forthcoming election of 1891.
170 The negotiations and Canadian protest are recounted in: Brown, Canada's National Policy]883-1900, 197-200, and in Tyler, The Foreign Policy of James G. Blaine, 349-351. 171 John A. Macdonald to Charles Tupper, 27 October 1890, Thompson Papers, Reel C9521, Library and Archives Canada. 81
Foster recalled in his memoirs that he was 'informed by prominent members of the
Liberal Party of Canada that the object of the Conservative Government in holding [the trade negotiations] was for its effect on the Canadian election.'172 Blaine had agreed to future private talks, but early in the Canadian election campaign let it be known that no talks were in fact underway. Thus the Conservatives were unable to argue that they were involved in working to obtain relief from the McKinley tariff. Macdonald had to shift gears, and was forced to fight the election on the loyalty question. 'The Old Man, the Old
Flag, and the Old Policy' won the March 1891 election, a victory for Canadian nationalism and for the forces of competitiveness in North American affairs.
Blaine was in no hurry to convene meetings with the Canadians whom, he was sure, would request a watered-down version of reciprocity that he could not accept. As far back as September 1891, he had written to President Harrison, stating his belief that it was of the 'highest possible importance' that there be 'no treaty of reciprocity' with
Canada, at least until the Liberals were in power. Blaine was content to see Canadian trade subject to a tariff, so that Canada had 'a hard row to hoe and will, ultimately, I believe, seek admission to the Union.'174
The talks finally took place in February 1892, after Canadian-American relations had been further embittered by the deepening controversy over Bering Sea fur seals. The
1892 talks collapsed on every subject discussed. With respect to reciprocity, the
American negotiators, led by John Foster, demanded not only that manufactured goods be
172 Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs, 181. 173 Donald Creighton observed that Macdonald won the election on 'the loyalty cry', noting that this was 'loyalty in part to England with which Canada was closely associated and consciously dependent; but it was loyalty mainly - predominantly - to Canada and the idea of a transcontinental nation in northern North America.' Donald Creighton, Canada's First Century 1867-1967, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970), 78. 174 Blaine to Harrison, 23 September 1891, quoted in: Gail Hamilton, Biography of James G. Blaine, (Norwich: Henry Hill, 1895), 693-694. 82 included but that tariff concessions had to be exclusive, ensuring that British imports paid a higher rate than those imposed on goods from the United States. During the talks,
Americans rejected out of hand the Canadian proposal to drop the North Atlantic fishery licensing provisions of the 1888 modus vivendi in return for the free importation of
Canadian fish into the United States.
At these meetings a further question arose concerning fees charged on the canals of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence system. Canadian canal fees were identical for American and Canadian shippers, in keeping with the requirements of the 1871 Treaty of
Washington. The Americans, however, pointed out that Canada was rebating most of the fees charged to grain ships that passed through the Welland Canal, provided they unloaded their cargoes at Montreal. Following the conference, rather than rescind this arrangement, Canada reiterated its provisions, making the canal fees issue a symbol of the degree of animosity infecting Canadian-American relations. The United States responded by levying its own tolls on Canadian ships using its canal at Sault Ste. Marie. In the face of this retaliation, Canada finally withdrew its toll structures favouring Montreal, and the
United States followed suit. This episode, while in some respects petty, showed the level to which relations had deteriorated and the extent to which brinksmanship had entered the
Canadian-American aspect of Anglo-American hemispheric relations.175
Discord in the Bering Sea
It is no wonder that President Harrison would later sum up his impressions of the events of these years by stating that, 'in the fisheries on the Atlantic, the sealing interests on the
Pacific and the canal tolls, our negotiations with Great Britain have continuously been
Tyler, The Foreign Policy of James G. Blaine, 357-360. 83 thwarted or retarded by unreasonable or unfriendly objection and protests from
Canada.'176 Perhaps more than any other single issue, the Bering Sea seal question demonstrated how the disputes of this period between the United States and Canada spoiled the broader Anglo-American relationship and threatened the peaceful development of the hemisphere.
President Harrison and Secretary Blaine had attempted to develop a joint approach to seal management with the Russians in 1889, in the early days of the administration.
The Russians had their own reasons for discouraging pelagic sealing, as their territory included, on their side of the North Pacific, the seal breeding rooks known as the
Commander or Komandorskiye Islands. Russian seals, like those on the Alaskan
Pribiloffs, were also being depleted by the actions of pelagic sealers. Blaine clearly saw this as an area of mutual interest and worked with Baron Rosen, the Russian diplomat in
Washington, to frame an agreement for the joint naval policing of the Bering Sea. The draft was forwarded to Moscow where, however, the Tsar's government refused to endorse the proposal, apparently on account of objections emanating from that country's naval department.177 Fear of a naval confrontation with Britain in the Pacific led the
Tyler, The Foreign Policy of James G. Blaine, 359. 177 In his memoirs, the Russian Charge d'Affairs in Washington describes how, after sending the proposal for joint enforcement to Moscow, he was 'greatly annoyed by the failure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to reply to my cable, which had all the appearance of a disavowal of my action, although it had been undertaken solely in consequence of and in obedience of their instructions.' Rosen goes on to state that it was some years later that he discovered the proposal had been withdrawn as a result of conflicting legal advice from Frederick Martens, on behalf of Russia's Foreign Office who favoured the proposal, and a newly appointed legal advisor in the country's Naval Department who feared 'complications with leading maritime Powers.' See: Roman Romanovich, (Baron) Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy, Vol. I, (London: Unwin, 1922), 80. 84
Russians to exercise caution in the matter, though Russian reluctance may also have been based on fears of pushing Britain further into the arms of Germany.178
While the Russo-American agreement was still under active consideration,
President Harrison proceeded to issue unilateral proclamations authorized by Congress and signed by his predecessor, Grover Cleveland, prohibiting pelagic sealing in the vicinity of Alaska. Seizures of five Canadian sealers followed in the summer of 1889, though the vessels managed to escape being impounded, presumably by American design, in an endeavour to reduce tensions in the troubled waters of the Bering Sea.179 Although the foreign office protested the seizures, Lord Salisbury gave assurances that Britain would participate in the development of jointly agreed regulations for the fur seal industry, including what came to be called a 'close season.' This was the term used to define a period of months during the summer when seal pups were being reared on the rookeries, and during which pelagic sealing should be forbidden. The matter was entrusted to the new British minister accredited to Washington, Sir Julian Pauncefote, to explore.
Pauncefote arrived in Washington, following on the heels of Sackville-West, who had been unceremoniously relieved of his duties in the dying days of the Cleveland administration for interfering in the election campaign. Pauncefote played an ever-
The early 1890s were a period when positive Anglo-German and negative Anglo-Russian relations were peaking. See for example, C.J. Lowe, Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy, 1878-1902, 155 179 The practice of American revenue officials was to board an offending sealing vessel, charge the ship and crew, and place a revenue seaman aboard who was to ensure that the offending skipper sailed his vessel to Sitka where legal proceedings to formally arrest the ship and crew were to take place. During the summer of 1889, British Columbia sealers refused to follow these directives after being boarded, usually returning to Victoria where the revenue seaman would then be released. Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 14-15. 180 In so doing, Salisbury softened the more stringent demands being put forward by Canada for opening discussions. See Salisbury to Pauncefote, 7 Dec 1889; Pauncefote to Salisbury, 9 and 17 Dec 1889, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Pt. I, Series C, Vol. 10, 13-14. Female seals swimming into international waters were particularly vulnerable, and if killed by pelagic sealers their pups also died. 85 expanding role in Anglo-American relations, never forgetting the necessity of including dominion and colonial considerations in the formulation of policy. His strengths included knowledge of colonial administration and international law. He trained as a barrister, and spent seven years in Hong Kong as attorney general, less than a year as chief justice of the Leeward Islands, and then two years as legal assistant undersecretary at the Colonial
Office. He was appointed the first incumbent of a similarly titled position at the Foreign
Office in 1876, where he was much involved in matters concerning the international law of the sea and the navigation of the Suez Canal. His expertise, therefore, put him in good stead in Washington, where an isthmian canal and access to the maritime resources of the
North Atlantic and Bering Sea were hotly debated subjects. In 1882, Pauncefote was promoted to permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Office, the top civil servant post in that department. He earned the confidence of Lord Salisbury, who selected him for the challenging post of British minister in Washington.181 At first lacking the prestige of an ambassadorial appointment, he was given that status in 1893, and remained ambassador until his death in 1902. His determination to work through problems, regardless of the breadth or depth of the diplomatic issues involved or the complexity of the negotiations required, played a large part in the improvement in Anglo-American relations during this
i on period.
Zara Steiner describes Pauncefote as 'one of the ablest men in the Service; he had gone from the Foreign Office to Washington with an already established reputation as an international jurist. He played a key role in cementing the Anglo-American "connection" and ... did manage to settle a number of irritating disputes.' See: Zara S. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1891-1914, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 177. 182 Leigh Wright examines Pauncefote's career up to the time of his appointment to Washington. See: Leigh Wright, Julian Pauncefote and British Imperial Policy 1855-1889, (Lanham: University Press of America, 2002). The biography by R.B. Mowat, The Life of Lord Paucefote, is based largely on secondary sources but includes many interesting anecdotes concerning Pauncefote's career. In relation to Pauncefote's appointment, Mowat comments that it was 'not only a compliment to the United States, it was a wise administrative act. If the relations of Great Britain and the United States were a little strained, a man 86
The Bering Sea seal question proved a formidable first test of Pauncefote's considerable diplomatic skills, as he endeavoured to balance American, British and
Canadian interests against the undoubted, though much disputed, conservation values the seals represented. There were also economic interests. The United States Treasury derived significant royalties from sealing operations carried out by a company to which the American government had conceded the sole privilege to harvest no more than
100,000 seals each year on the breeding rookeries. The price of seal products had risen, along with the company's profits. The increasingly lucrative industry also fuelled a rise in the number of interloping vessels and crews based in Victoria, whose livelihoods depended on this resource. In 1890, a new company understood to have close links to the
Republican Party, known as the North American Commercial Company, was granted the valuable sealing concession.183
Pauncefote began by analysing this difficult subject and, in so doing, received constant input concerning the Canadian viewpoint from Charles Hibbert Tupper, the minister of fisheries whose father, Sir Charles Tupper, was still Canada's high commissioner in London. The younger Tupper was often in Washington advising
of the greatest experience and judgement would have the best chance of relieving the situation.' See: R.B. Mowat, The Life of Lord Paucefote First Ambassador to the United States, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1929) 118. The author has been in contact with Lord Pauncefote's granddaughter in connection with the small number of documents that have survived in the family. These are largely letters of thanks and congratulatory in nature. 183 In From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783-1900, Charles S. Campbell describes the work of the Alaska Commercial Company, authorized to engage in sealing from 1870, and also analyses the make up of the North American Commercial Company, which took over sealing on the islands in 1890, 'it is significant that two of the new company's five or six shareholders were closely connected with Secretary of State Blaine. One of these, Stephen B. Elkins, had been the secretary's campaign manager in the presidential election of 1884 and was to be his Cabinet colleague as Secretary of War in 1892. The other was Darius Ogden Mills, a man of great wealth and father-in-law of Whitelaw Reid, owner of the influential New York Tribune and one of Blaine's most intimate associates over many years.' The new lease reduced the size of the kill to 60,000 in the first year with the allowed kill in future years to be determined. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement, 154-157, 166. 87
Pauncefote and promoting an aggressive policy in defence of Canada's pelagic sealers.184
Tupper was not prepared to accede to Blaine's insistence on the need for a close season as a precondition for negotiations and pressed for compensation for Canadian sealers whose vessels had been seized.
Pauncefote returned to England in the summer, and in late September crossed the
English Channel to join Salisbury at his French residence near Dieppe, 'Chalet Cecil.'
1 QC
Salisbury believed it 'desirable we should talk over the Behring sea question.' On his return to Washington in mid-October, a more resolute Pauncefote met with Blaine to discuss the seizures of Canadian sealers that had occurred during his absence. Blaine explained that the seizures were authorized by an 'Act of Congress and the Proclamation of the President.' Pauncefote observed that this appeared like 'an assertion of the mare clausum doctrine,' which he 'could hardly believe would be revived at the present day.'186 Pauncefote and Blaine were both well aware that it was Russian attempts to close the North Pacific to British and American maritime traffic earlier in the century that had led to their joint protests and the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine.
Proposals and counter-proposals were drafted and rejected, eliciting some less than diplomatic exchanges through the winter of 1889-1890. With spring and the approach of the sealing season, pressure to achieve a basis for settlement intensified.
Attempts to reach a compromise were made more difficult for Pauncefote by virtue of the need to keep Canada involved and generally satisfied with the direction negotiations were
184 After working with Tupper, Pauncefote commented to Salisbury 'He is a remarkably able & clear headed man - cool headed also, & with an excellent manner - He does not look more than 30.' Pauncefote to Salisbury, 7 March 1890, Salisbury Papers, Hatfield House 3M A/77. 185 Salisbury to Pauncefote, 26 September 1889, Pauncefote Papers, privately held. 186 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 1 November 1889, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Pt. I, Series C, Vol. 10,11-12. 88 taking. At one stage, the governor general, Lord Stanley, wrote directly to Pauncefote, pointing out that, while he had no wish 'unduly to hamper your action but concession to
United States if carried too far would produce most serious consequences in the
Dominion.'187
As the tortuous negotiations proceeded, Pauncefote confided privately to
Salisbury that he found Blaine exhibiting a 'depressed & black humour' and that he thought him 'a very dangerous man to deal with, for he '"gushes" one day & blacks out the next.'188 On 22 May 1890, as the sealing season approached, Pauncefote sent a telegram informing Lord Salisbury that 'it has been decided to reject the British counter proposal.' The commanding officer of the revenue cruiser Bear was being despatched to
'dismantle all vessels found sealing in Behring's Sea, and to seize their log-books and
1 RQ skins as evidence in case of judicial proceedings being taken.' It seemed Blaine and
Harrison were prepared to push the limits of Anglo-Canadian resolve.
Seven days later Lord Salisbury replied, stating that he had submitted 'to the
Queen and the Cabinet' the news concerning 'the instructions issued to the United States'
Revenue cruisers in Behring's Sea for the approaching fishery season', noting that Her
Majesty's Government viewed such interference with British vessels on the high seas as
'contrary to international law and the practice of civilized nations.' Furthermore,
Salisbury continued, there was 'no alternative . . . but to protest formally and solemnly against any interference on the part of United States' cruisers with British vessels
187 Stanley to Pauncefote, 11 April 1890, John A.Macdonald Papers, 32, Reel C1497. Robert Craig Brown discusses the extent to which the Bering Sea Fur Seal controversy was able to 'disrupt Imperial Amity' between Great Britain and Canada. See: Brown, Canada's National Policy, 91-125. 188 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 25 April 1890, Salisbury Papers, Hatfield House. 189 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 22 May 1890, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 26. 89
navigating outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.' In so doing he was
leaving 'to the United States' Government the responsibility of the consequences if that protest is disregarded.'190 Seeking to maintain a balance between striking an assertive
and conciliatory stance, Salisbury veered to the assertive, while leaning heavily on
Pauncefote's discretion and diplomatic instincts, fully aware that twenty-three Canadian vessels had already left Victoria to search for seals and that 'stopping them, even if Her
Majesty's Government considered it expedient to do so' was now impossible. Salisbury
suggested to Pauncefote that he should be letting Blaine know this and in so doing, 'find some means of letting it transpire that four of Her Majesty's vessels of war have been placed under orders to protect British ships in Behring's Sea. And that they will proceed to those waters as soon as certain intelligence has reached Her Majesty's Government of the departure of the United States' cruisers.' Salisbury stressed the heavy responsibility resting on Pauncefote:
Her Majesty's Government must leave wholly to your discretion whether and in what manner Mr. Blaine should be made aware of this. The matter is of great delicacy, and the announcement, if made, should bear the appearance of an incidental remark rather than of a formal communication.191
The Admiralty for its part responded to the request from the Foreign Office and issued secret orders to the warships Severn and Leander of the China Station based at
Yokohama, and the Amphion and Champion sailing out of Esquimalt, to be held in readiness to respond in the event British sealers were arrested in the Bering Sea.192 Any assessment of the comparative naval strength of Britain and the United States on the
190 Salisbury to Pauncefote, 29 May 1890, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 27. 191 Salisbury to Pauncefote, 3 June 1890, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I Series C, Vol. 10, 27. 192 Evan MacGregor, Admiralty to Foreign Office, Sept. 11, 1890, F.O. 5/2111, Seizure of Sealing Vessels in Behring Sea, September-November 1890, The National Archives, Kew. 90
Pacific Coast at this time showed the Royal Navy holding a considerably stronger and longer hand. At Esquimalt alone, a fully modern armoured cruiser, the Warspite, served as the admiral's flagship, while other ships included the Amphion, Champion, Daphne,
Respiege, Nymphe, and Melpomene. While some of these, like Nymphe and Daphne, were only sloops, the others were designated second and third class cruisers. Their average age was about six years. The main American naval assets on the West Coast were the wooden steam sloops, Iroquois, Adams, Mohican, and Swatara. In addition there were the aging ships of the United States revenue marine, which in 1890 included the Corwin,
Rush, and Bear.193 Pauncefote wrote privately to Salisbury, confiding to him that, 'the despatch of the ships of war' proved to be 'a great success .... It has forced Blaine to detain his Revenue Cutters - he is "check-mated" now.' Pauncefote, moreover, was providing a face-saving offer by giving Blaine 'a chance of escape from an untenable situation.'194 And so the summer of 1890 passed with only a single major incident. The secretary of the treasury issued orders that pelagic sealers should not be apprehended.
When the Canadian sealer Mattie Dyer was detained following a call at the port of
Unalaska for repairs, the Deputy U.S. Marshall was directed to release her.
The summer of 1890 did witness a visit to the seal islands by the American naturalist and leading authority on fur seals, Henry W. Elliott, who had devoted much of his career to studying and preserving the species from extinction. Elliott wrote a scathing report condemning the government-sponsored killing of the seals on the islands as well as the depredations of the pelagic sealers. Furthermore, he insisted that both methods of killing seals needed to stop for a period of years if the herd was to survive. Elliott met
193 Gerald O. Williams, The Bering Sea Fur Seal Dispute, pp. 14-17. 194 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 27 June 1890, Salisbury Papers, Hatfield House. 91 with Blaine in November 1890 to discuss his controversial report. Blaine requested that it be kept secret because its release would seem to endorse the British claim that the killing of the animals on land as well as at sea needed to be controlled in the interests of conservation. Elliott agreed on the condition that killing on the islands cease if Britain were to agree to end killing at sea.195
In March 1891, two proposals for a modus vivendi were made to Pauncefote, one of which was drafted by President Harrison himself. They called for a moratorium on all forms of slaughtering seals. It was assumed that Canadian pressure would preclude acceptance of this offer, so, within days of proposing this, the United States Treasury
Department issued a secret permit for the politically powerful North American
Commercial Company to kill 60,000 seals in the quickly approaching season. Canada, however, acting under considerable pressure, tentatively agreed to the moratorium proposal. Pauncefote relayed this message, something Blaine and Harrison were not
196 expecting.
News of plans to slaughter 60,000 seals reached Henry Elliott and, following a meeting with Pauncefote, the naturalist wrote a letter to the New York Evening Post revealing the government's secret strategy. In follow-up press interviews, he made clear his professional conviction that for conservation reasons, the killing of seals on land and sea needed to halt for at least seven years. A public outcry ensued, compelling the
American administration to back down.
195 Charles S. Campbell, Revolution to Rapprochement, 159, and Williams, The Bering Sea Fur Seal Dispute, 49-50. 196 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 27 April 1891, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Pt. I, Series C, Vol. 10, 99-100. 197 Elliott's unsigned letter appeared in the Evening Post on 24 April 1891 and was entitled 'Some Seal History.' It referred to Blaine's 'sharp trickery' in the matter. See: Tansill, Canadian-American, 323, especially fn. 68. 92
Finally on April 30, Harrison, reacting to the public opprobrium generated by
Elliott's revelations, rescinded the order to kill the seals.198 Two weeks later, as the season was due to begin the modus vivendi was signed ending all sealing for the year, though an exception was made for 7,500 seals to be taken for the subsistence of the natives of the area.199 Although Canada had wanted the details of an arbitration process in the fur seal matter concluded before agreeing to the ban on killing seals, the government reluctantly accepted the settlement. Negotiating the terms for the arbitration treaty was not finalized until December. The final agreement included provision for experts to investigate the various natural scientific conditions relevant to preserving the seals, and to report their findings to the arbitration tribunal.200 Lord Stanley did not think much of the American proposals. Writing to Sir John A. Macdonald, he expressed doubt as to 'the good faith of the representations which have been made to Pauncefote', though he thought that,
we should reluctantly acquiesce in the proposal of H.M. Govt, provided they will give some compensation to the sealers who are sent back, and with the further reservation that we cannot be held answerable for those who may not be duly warned.
The modus vivendi stipulated that the Royal Navy and the United States Revenue
Marine Service co-operate in policing the ban on sealing. Ships found in violation were to be handed over to the authorities of the country to which the vessels and crews
Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 325. 199 Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 326. 200 Pauncefote to Salisbury, in F.O to CO. 19 December 1891, CO. 42/809, Canada, FO Correspondence, July-December 1891, The National Archives. 201 Stanley to Macdonald, 24 May 891, Stanley was forwarding Pauncefote's telegram (Private & Confidential which read: 'I earnestly hope Canadian Government will consent to B Sea proposal. Secretary of State was forced into it by public clamour. Its rejection would give him a signal triumph & alienate our supporters, who are already irritated by the knowledge that the sealing fleet is mainly equipped by American crews and capital. The Canadian government were prepared for legislation at this season last year. We cannot consistently reply that it is too late now. I anxiously await result of further representations from London and trust you will excuse this message.' Macdonald Papers Reel C1497. 93 belonged. Many sealers had left their home ports before the modus was announced, and a number of American and Canadian sealers were intercepted during the 1891 season. In most cases, however, warnings sufficed to discourage further pelagic operations on the
Bering Sea. At this time, however, a new pattern emerged in which sealers excluded from the Bering Sea made their way farther west to the waters surrounding the Russian seal rookeries. Accounts of the punishments meted out by Russian authorities, which sometimes included the burning of interloper vessels, made the legal proceedings initiated in the United States and Canada seem mild by comparison.202
The expanded role assigned to the United States Revenue Marine Service required it to be re-structured along more professional lines, paralleling those of the United States
Navy. These measures anticipated the service being re-christened the United States Coast
Guard in 1915. Construction of modern warships for the United States Navy was also well underway, including the steel cruisers San Francisco, Baltimore, Charleston,
Boston, and Yorktown which, by 1892, were to be found on the West Coast, as part of a much enhanced U.S. Navy Pacific squadron.203
Though it covered only that 1891 season, the modus vivendi brought relative peace to the waters of Alaska and new hope for survival to the seals of the Pribilof rookeries. It was intended as a stopgap measure until the entire issue could be studied and submitted for arbitration. The winter of 1891-1892 was spent developing the questions to be arbitrated and the process for compensating Canadian sealers charged in earlier years in American courts. This process was finally completed in February and
Williams, The Bering Sea Fur Seal Dispute, 19-22. Williams, The Bering Sea Fur Seal Dispute, 27. 94
Senate approval was accorded the following month.204 While this set in motion a process that would promise to resolve the various international legal and conservation issues, the treaty did not include provisions to regulate fur seal practices in the short-term. Thus,
Secretary of State Blaine requested that the modus of 1891 be extended for an additional year to cover the forthcoming 1892 season.205
London at first resisted attempts to impose limitations for a second year on what was held to be the perfectly legal activities carried out by British subjects in international waters. Throughout the Bering Sea dispute a precarious balance needed to be struck between the various Anglo-Canadian-American interests involved. The Foreign Office on the one hand, did not wish unnecessarily to alienate the United States, particularly over a matter that involved the survival of a wildlife species that also happened to be a valuable natural resource. On the other hand, Canada was adamant that it was engaged in a lawful activity on the high seas and that it was the duty of the British government to defend
Canadian ships and crews sailing under the British flag. The Colonial Office was responsible for communications with Canada and defended Canada's position with the
Foreign Office and at cabinet meetings. Canada had opposed the imposition of the modus in 1891, and the Foreign Office was reluctant to force this on Canada for a second year.
Salisbury replied to Pauncefote's request to renew the diplomatic agreement by pointing
Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 327-328. 205 In reporting the American position to Salisbury, Pauncefote observed 'The risk of serious complications would doubtless be avoided by a renewal of the modus vivendi, and that measure would be of benefit, owing to the limitation of the killing of seals on the islands ... the United States are willing to make the sacrifice [and] our refusal to do the same may place us in an invidious position, and I would suggest, if I may venture to express an opinion on so grave a question of policy, that it is hardly worth while to hold out on such a point, and thus imperil the settlement of the whole question.' Pauncefote to Salisbury, 10 March 1892, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Pt. I Series C Vol. 10,117. 95 out the 'necessity of consulting the wishes of the Dominion. It is the tripartite nature of this negotiation that has made it so anxious and difficult a matter.'206
A political dynamic of its own was at work in the United States in 1892, a presidential election year. Benjamin Harrison was well aware of how unpopular presidents could make themselves in the eyes of the electorate by appearing to pander to
British interests. To further complicate matters, Blaine was ill during the critical months of February-March 1892 when the renewal of the modus was being negotiated, and the president assumed his secretary of state's duties. Blaine could only dictate a letter to
Harrison from his sickbed telling the president not to 'to get up a war cry and send naval vessels in Behring Sea.' Harrison, however, framed his own note, informing
Pauncefote that if the ban on sealing were not extended, the United States would walk away from the arbitration process. To do otherwise, argued Harrison, would deprive the
United States of the 'body of the contested property.'208 The matter reached the newspapers. The usually imperturbable Pauncefote reported that the 'frantic ravings of the press on the subject... exceed anything I have yet seen in this country.'209
Salisbury, for his part, remained unmoved, and Harrison drafted a further note drawing attention to the 'gravity of the present situation' and stating categorically that the need to cease pelagic sealing was 'no longer one of pecuniary loss or gain, but one of honor and self respect.... The Modus of last year is the least that this Government can
Salisbury to Pauncefote, 11 March 1892, British Documents on Foreign Affairs Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 117. 207 Sidney Y. Smith to Elijah W. Halford, 6 March 1892, quoted in Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 135. 208 Wharton to Pauncefote, 8 March 1892, Foreign Relations of the United States 1892, 621-624. 209 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 22 March 1892, Salisbury Papers. 96 accept.' Everard Tibbott, a member of Harrison's staff described in his diary the dramatic events of 22 March, when his chief 'finished his reply to Lord Salisbury's note refusing to renew the modus in Bering Sea matter and the outcome means a backdown on the part of G.B. or war.' Tibbit continued, 'this may be the beginning of a "War" diary.'211
Blaine returned to his duties at the end of March, and he and Pauncefote managed to cement a diplomatic solution that resolved the matter. Canadians had long been asking when they would be compensated for the earlier seizures of their sealing vessels on the high seas, in some cases dating back several years. Americans had avoided dealing with this matter until the arbitral process rendered a decision. Blaine and Pauncefote agreed to insert a clause in the treaty renewing the previous year's modus, which stipulated that, should the outcome of arbitration favour Great Britain, the United States would compensate the Canadian sealers. In turn, Britain agreed to compensate the North
American Commercial Company if the decision favoured the United States. Three days after Salisbury agreed to these provisions, the American Senate, on 29 March 1892, approved the treaty. While the compromise was not entirely to the satisfaction of the
Canadian government, confrontation in the Bering Sea was once again averted.212
James Blaine resigned as secretary of state in June 1892. His health was failing, a number of family members had died, and his partisans had involved him inappropriately in the politics of the forthcoming Republican Convention. John Foster was named to fill the office for the remaining nine months of Harrison's term. Throughout his career Foster
210 Wharton to Pauncefote, 22 March 1892, Foreign Relations of the United States 1892, 626-627, and Ibid. 25. 211 Notation by Everard Tabbott, 22 March 1892, in A.T. Volweiler, 'Harrison, Blaine and American Foreign Policy, 1889-1893', Proceedings of American Philosophical Society, LXXIX (1938), 647-648 . 212 Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 135-136. 97 would maintain a high interest in Bering Sea affairs, though the full depth and nature of his interest has never been fully revealed. Press reports would later allege he was secretly on the payroll as legal advisor to the North American Commercial Company, which held the concession to harvest the Bering Sea seals.213 There can be little doubt that he was one of the most aggressive defenders of the necessity to exclude pelagic sealers from
Alaskan waters. In 1892, Secretary of State Foster was appointed agent, with responsibility for preparing the case for the United States in connection with the arbitration tribunal scheduled to convene in Paris the following year. This kept him involved in the fur seal dispute for several years to come, whether or not his Republican
Party was in power.214
In 1893 the arbitration tribunal met in Paris. The tribunal's decision was crafted in an attempt to uphold the high ground occupied by both parties to the dispute. On questions of the freedom of the seas, the British interpretation was endorsed. This fact required that sealers whose vessels had been seized in the early years of the confrontation were entitled to compensation. The tribunal also recognized that the preservation of the seal herd required there be a protected zone around the Pribilofs and a close season that would apply to taking seals across the whole of the North Pacific. Canadian sealers at first complained that the tribunal's proposals were too restrictive. For the decision of the
Campbell, Anglo-American Understanding, 82-83. 214 Foster includes an interesting anecdote in his memoirs in which he defends the role he played in the near scandal that occurred in the wake of the discovery of pertinent historical state department documents fraudulently translated from the Russian for that tribunal. It appeared that the department's translator, one Ivan Petroff, in response to his understanding of Foster's request, had overstated the American case in his interpretation of certain historic Russian language documents. 'I at once brought Petroff before me in the presence of witnesses.... He quietly acknowledged his guilt.... Before he began his labors I had explained to him the character of our contention, and it is supposed he made the interpolations in order that I might be the better pleased with his work. I immediately asked the British Charge to come to the Department, and explained to him the imposition practiced on me.... This act of perfidy would have given me more annoyance, if I had not shown my good faith in publishing the facsimiles, and made such timely discovery of the imposition.' See: Foster, Memoirs II, 41. 98 tribunal to come into force, however, both Britain and the United States had to enact facilitating legislation, and the maritime services of both nations had to work to enforce
01 S the regulations on behalf of the ships and crews of their respective countries.
Conclusion
The dispute over fur seals, like the competition for markets and resources in Latin
America, demonstrated the determination of American leaders of this period to ensure that access to markets and resources could be unlocked under conditions largely dictated by the United States. The readiness of President Harrison and certain members of his administration to threaten war, is reflective of the country's diplomatic maturity. British unflappability in the face of occasional demonstrations of United States' inflexibility was facilitated by the presence in Washington of the consummate diplomat, Sir Julian
Pauncefote. James Blaine's vision of a Western Hemisphere drawn together by commercial ties and international political structures represented the less assertive side of his policy agenda. In Chile and the Bering Sea a more aggressive and militaristic aspect of his policies was evident. Blaine's vision of hemispheric co-operation did not include
Canada.
If late-nineteenth century American foreign policy seemed to vacillate between moralistic isolationism and more engaging activism, it was apparent by the early 1890s
215 Lord Hannen of the British High Court of Appeals and Canadian Attorney General John Thompson were the British representatives on the arbitral committee. The United States was represented by Supreme Court Justice John Harlan and Senator John T. Morgan. A former Italian Foreign Minister and the Minister of State of Sweden and Norway were the other members. Charles S. Campbell speaks of the 'bad taste left in America' by the decision of this arbitral award, which 'went against the United States on all accounts.' Campbell nevertheless maintains that 'the Paris arbitration and the modus vivendi of 1891 and 1892 were remarkable instances of the growing British and American propensity to settle their quarrels reasonably and peacefully.' He goes on to state that despite 'bickerings over the Canadian claims, relations between the United States and Great Britain were more amicable after the arbitration of 1893 than at any other time since the Civil War.' See: Charles S. Campbell, The Transportation of American Foreign Relations, 136- 139. 99 that it was activism in a particularly competitive form that was winning the day. Similar trends can be seen in the development of British foreign policy at this same time, when liberal 'Little Englandism' was falling out of favour and imperialism was gaining ground.
In dealings with the Western Hemisphere, however, British policy-makers exhibited a remarkable degree of laissez-faire sang-froid in responding to the competing voices emanating from Washington and Ottawa. This was in part a function of Britain's naval might, which was nearly unassailable. The British posture was also attributable to the economic realities which prescribed that conflict killed trade, and British trade with the
Western Hemisphere remained substantial. British policy aimed to engage the United
States diplomatically, much like one great power to another, a status the United States was coming closer to achieving. The often abrasive response of the United States was to be tolerated, so long as no great harm was done and diplomatic lessons were being learned. Cecil Spring Rice contemplated the possibility of engaging the United States with armed force at the time of the Chilean crisis, when the United States was exercising its newly developed naval muscle. He observed that, 'the moral for us is: what will the
U.S. be like when their fleet is more powerful, if the administration acts in a similar way?'216 One answer was to ensure that American administrations discovered through diplomatic discourse a range of alternative methods of conflict resolution.
During Harrison's period in office, the American navy increased in size significantly. The elevation of British and American diplomatic representatives to ambassadorial rank, as was the practice among the great powers of Europe, reflected the
216 Spring Rice to Ferguson, Apr 1892, Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, I, 118. 100 increased seriousness with which these two countries regarded their relations. The discord generated over the course of these competitive years was substantial, providing ample work for these diplomats and contributing to a process, already underway, that continued to move both countries away from policies aimed at avoiding international entanglements, in favour of more intense levels of mutual engagement.
217 A.T. Volwiler, writing in 1938, stated that 'when Harrison left the White House ... the American navy ranked seventh among the navies of the world, instead of twelfth as it had when he took office.' Volwiler 'Harrison, Blaine, and American Foreign Policy', 648. III. The Struggle to Accommodate 1894-1895
Grover Cleveland defeated James Blaine, the Republican candidate for the presidency, in the 1892 election. The new administration began by endeavouring to pursue a foreign policy more restrained, more isolationist, and also more moralising than that of Blaine and Harrison.218 On the economic front, the second Cleveland administration tried to undo the punishing McKinley tariff with legislation that held out the possibility of reciprocity in natural products with Canada. This initiative, however, went down to defeat in the face of opposition from special interest groups.219 Attempts to add to the list of
South American products accorded reciprocal treatment was also thwarted, and pressure from the sugar trust led to duties being re-imposed on that staple, causing the entire system of tropical reciprocity to collapse.
In the arena of Anglo-American relations, the peaceful objectives of the respective sides during these years remained largely unrealised. Discord ranged across the hemisphere, highlighting differences rather than shared interests. The fact that events
Herring describes Cleveland as 'stubborn, unimaginative, and insular in his thinking' and 'anti- expansionist and anti-annexation, Cleveland had a strong sense of right and wrong in such matters' including the annexation of Hawaii 'which he scuttled.' See: George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 278, 305-306. 219 In debate on the Wilson bill, Senator Gallinger asserted that it was 'a virtual attempt to obtain by co ordinate legislation in the two countries, the revival of the provisions of the reciprocity treaty of 1854.' See: Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 440. The bill in its final form reduced the McKinley tariff by between 1% and 8% on rates that stood in the 22% to 49% range. See: Brown, Canada's National Policy, 241. 220 In addition to the reintroduction of sugar duties, Democratic legislators took issue with the constitutional issues raised by which the McKinley legislation had permitted the President a role in the levying of import tariffs. See: Laughlin & Willis, Reciprocity, 230-269. 101 102 occurred with a high degree of synchronicity enhanced the significance of events, which individually might have caused less disruption. The United States had increased its ability to influence events in the hemisphere through the construction of a growing and powerful naval fleet during the period since Cleveland last occupied the Executive
Mansion, while many of the issues he had faced in the 1880s remained unresolved.
Cleveland named Walter Q. Gresham his secretary of state, while Thomas Bayard, who held that office in his earlier administration, was named American Ambassador in
London.
Anglo-American discord was complex and multi-layered, and included the crisis that unfolded in 1894-1895 on the coasts of Nicaragua. This is among the most significant and least analysed of the various crises affecting the relationship around this time. It occurred as the Venezuelan boundary crisis was entering the headlines and as the contest for access to the renewable, but increasingly depleted resource of the Bering Sea fur seals was being bitterly contested. The crisis in Nicaragua was concerned with the crucially important question of strategic access to the site for building an isthmian canal.
It is a case study that highlights the intimate relationship between diplomats and naval commanders on the spot, and those making policy in London and Washington.
Furthermore, it demonstrates how policies emanating from the governmental level can be distorted by local circumstances, undoing the very objectives the policies are intended to achieve.
A Background of Discord
Questions relating to the seals of the Bering Sea remained contentious, plaguing the triangular, North American dimension of the Anglo-American relationship throughout 103
Gresham's period in office. The Paris tribunal had rendered its decision over the summer of 1893, largely upholding the position of Great Britain and Canada. Considerable wrangling followed, concerning the mechanics required to implement the tribunal's findings. In January and February 1894, Gresham complained of British delaying
221 tactics.
Lord Rosebery was serving as British foreign secretary in these, the final months of William Gladstone's government. In March 1894, Gladstone would resign, handing over to Rosebery the reins of prime ministerial office. Rosebery replied to Gresham's complaints about the delays inherent in Bering Sea diplomacy by pointing out that this was because of the 'repeated references' to Canada required on account of the 'magnitude of the Canadian interests involved.' At the same time, he assured Gresham of his willingness to get enabling legislation passed at Westminster to control sealing 222 operations.
Still contentious was the question of compensation for Canadian sealers whose vessels had been seized over the years for activities that the Paris tribunal determined were entirely legal. Bayard agreed to compensate Canadian sealers, but Congress refused to vote the necessary funds. Disagreement also arose about whether talks for framing detailed sealing regulations should be held in Washington or London. Gresham preferred
London because it would be easier for the highly knowledgeable Bayard to be involved and because London was far from Ottawa. The Foreign Office preferred Washington 221 After sending a note to Rosebery on this subject, he followed this with a further note expressing disappointment on behalf of the President for the 'unexpected and regretted delay in coming to an agreement.' See: Pauncefote to Rosebery, 25 January 1894, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I Series C, Vol. 10, 225-226; and Bayard to Rosebery, 23 February 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States,, 1894, App. I, 149-150. 222 Rosebery to Pauncefote, 24 February 1894, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 226-228. 104 because it was more accessible to Canadians, whose interests were implicated in the talks.223
Far from being too restrictive, the 1894 season demonstrated that the limitations on pelagic and land-based sealing prescribed by the Paris tribunal, were ineffective in preventing the massive slaughter of seals. This realization led to outcries in Congress that
American authorities should destroy what was left of the Pribilof seal herd, unless more restrictive regulations were agreed to by both countries. It was argued that pelagic sealers were slaughtering mainly nursing females, cruelly leaving pups to die. Destroying the herd was promoted as a form of mercy killing that would also incidentally ruin the pelagic interlopers.224 The fact that damages due Canadian sealers remained unpaid did nothing to encourage Britain or Canada to speed up the laborious process of revising the sealing regulations. To some extent, the outcome of this stalemate proved self-corrective.
The continuing slaughter of seals reduced stocks to the point that pelagic sealing increasingly became a declining industry during the course of the 1890s.
There was also a naval dimension to the sealing controversy. The Paris tribunal directed that enforcement of the minimally effective sealing regulations would be a joint responsibility of the Royal Navy and the United States Navy and Revenue Service.
Because of the lax regulations and declining numbers of seals and pelagic sealers, maritime enforcement became a task of increasingly dubious utility. Moreover, it had the
The details of these negotiations are covered in Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 339-350. 224 On 28 February 1895 the House of Representatives passed Resolution 8909, authorizing the president to institute a programme of mercy killings of seals if a satisfactory modus vivendi to save the seals could not be agreed upon through international discussions. The bill did not, however, pass the Senate. United States House of Representatives, 'Resolution 8909', Congressional Record, 53rd Congress, 3rd Session, 2361. See also Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 348. 105 effect of tying up American naval vessels at a time when they were in demand in other parts of the world, including the Caribbean.225
While the most dangerous phase of the Bering Sea controversy had passed, niggling aspects created an atmosphere of distrust as serious issues unfolded elsewhere in the hemisphere. Gresham died in May 1895 just as the Venezuela boundary dispute was escalating. Nevertheless, his successor, Richard Olney, took time in June to protest formally the lax approach of the Royal Navy. Though Canadian vessels seized for sealing infractions were being handed over to British naval commanders to be tried in
Admiralty courts, the trials were not taking place. Olney complained that 'the action of
British naval authorities is not in accord with the evident intent and spirit of . . . the Paris
Award.'226
While the Bering Sea controversy played in the background, events in the
Caribbean were working to intensify Anglo-American rivalry. The Mosquito Coast of
Nicaragua provided the setting where strategic, commercial and naval factors presented a potentially explosive mix. Here the United States found itself supporting a military regime and confronting British power, at times employing outdated diplomatic shibboleths, at times employing force, and at times even working against Americans on the spot where they shared common interests with local British nationals.
In the closing days of the first Cleveland administration, Bayard had dealt with this region. At that time, American canal building had not yet begun and American naval power was in its infancy. Bayard had taken up the cause of the Nicaraguans who complained of British transgressions of their country's sovereign rights along the
225 The formation of the U.S. Navy's Bering Squadron in 1892 is discussed in: Walter R. Herrick, Jr., The American Naval Revolution, (Baton Rouge, 1966), 145-148. 226 Olney to Roosevelt, 18 June 1895, Foreign Relations of the United States 1895, Part 1, 1895, 647-649. 106
Caribbean coast.227 While he had to limit himself to a diplomatic defence of Nicaragua's interests then, Bayard confessed that he looked forward to the day when, 'Americans got down there in force, and this Canal was well underway.' Bayard was convinced the
American presence would be felt along the entire 'seacoast upon which these Mosquito
Indians live, which would affect the state of things very much.'228 By 1893, the United
States was very much 'down there in force.' American canal construction had begun, and the ability to deploy modern warships was a reality.
The American-backed Maritime Canal Company had been created in the dying weeks of the first Cleveland administration, and received support from the Harrison administration. The company was committed to building an isthmian canal following the
Nicaraguan route. December 1888 saw the rival French company building in Panama placed in the hands of a receiver, and its construction efforts suspended. This was something not altogether regretted by those wishing to see an American waterway built,
99Q traversing the isthmus.
The neglected Nicaraguan port of San Juan del Norte, still usually referred to by
English speakers as Greytown, saw a renaissance, as it became the main centre for
American canal construction. This resurgence was abetted by the fact that the Anglo-
Nicaraguan Treaty of Managua gave the town the status of a free port, even though it lay outside the Mosquito Reserve which had its status confirmed by the same treaty. The
Maritime Canal Company created their own townsite a short distance up river from
227 See Chapter I. 228 Bayard's memorandum of conversation with Guzman on 10 February 1888 is quoted in: Tansill, Bayard, 669. 229 For an assessment of the catastrophic impact of the bankruptcy of the French canal building company, see: David McCullough, The Path Between the Seas, particularly 204-341. Benjamin Harrison's Latin American policies are covered in: Grenville and Young, Politics Strategy and American Diplomacy, 74- 101. 107
Greytown, which they somewhat dramatically named America. The town's future looked increasingly dismal as canal construction costs soared. The work was probably in violation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which the Harrison administration was inclined to ignore. Canal construction slowed to a near halt in 1892, as the company teetered on the brink of bankruptcy, finally becoming a victim of the Panic of 1893 which swept
American stock markets days before the Cleveland Administration assumed office.
Nevertheless, maintenance of the concession entitling an American company to construct a canal across Nicaragua remained an American foreign policy objective in succeeding years.230
The Harrison administration's aggressive stance in the Bering Sea, its attempts to attract Caribbean and Latin American states into the American orbit, along with its programme of naval construction and canal building, were all indications of its determination to make the Western Hemisphere an environment increasingly dominated by the United States. Under the auspices of President Grover Cleveland and his secretaries of state, Walter Q. Gresham and Richard Olney, the Caribbean region became a principal stage on which the United States' new role in the hemisphere would be tested.
In London, Lords Rosebery, Kimberley and Salisbury would successively serve as foreign secretaries, directing British policy in a surprisingly consistent fashion. In
Canada, where Caribbean issues played a small part, leadership issues plagued a tired
Conservative Party, as the office of prime minister passed quickly from Sir John
Thompson to Sir Mackenzie Bowell to Sir Charles Tupper, until the Liberal victory of
Wilfrid Laurier at the polls in 1896.
Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 226-227. 108
The Affair at Bluefields
A precarious peace reigned in Central America, while the construction work of the
Maritime Canal Company was carried out and the American-backed tropical fruit trade expanded on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast. This began to break down when, in April 1893, coffee planters in the highlands of Nicaragua rebelled against the conservative regime that had dominated the country's affairs for thirty years. General Jose Santos Zelaya was swept to power, and installed as Nicaragua's president in July 1893. Zelaya was committed to a programme of nationalist objectives aimed at minimising foreign influence and drawing together the states of Central America. A quarrel with the neighbouring conservative president of Honduras followed. Zelaya formed an alliance with the leader of the Honduran liberals, Policarpo Bonilla, and, by the end of the year, brutal fighting was taking place between these forces, primarily on Honduran soil.231
Zelaya was offended by the existence of the Mosquito Reserve, which for him represented an intrusive foreign presence. He also coveted a share of the potential revenues he believed could be tapped from this newly prosperous region of his country.
Zelaya was determined to see the Mosquito Reserve reincorporated in the Nicaraguan state, even as he dreamed of the reunification of the various states constituting Central
America.232 Zelaya appointed General Lacayo, a fluent English speaker who had lived several years in London, as his commissioner. Lacayo was charged with the task of
For an account of these events, see: Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure of Union Central America, 1824- 1960, (Chapel Hill, 1961), 167-168. & Craig L. Dozier, Nicaragua's Mosquito Shore, The Years of British and American Presence, (University of Alabama Press, 1985), 157-161. 232 Robert Scheina, Latin America's Wars : The Age of the Caudillo,1791-1899, (Washington: Brassey's, 2003), 258-259. 109 seeking to convince the Mosquito Indians to accept Nicaraguan authority. As 1893 drew to a close, the situation remained largely unchanged.233
In January 1894, the military situation between Nicaragua and Honduras rapidly deteriorated. Rumours of a possible Honduran invasion swept the Mosquito Coast.
Zelaya responded by despatching more than one hundred troops to the Honduran border by way of Bluefields, the principle settlement of the Reserve, where the troops were garrisoned for about ten days in mid-January aboard a steamboat, awaiting a more suitable vessel to transport them to the scene of fighting. The Mosquito Chief, Robert
Henry Clarence, protested their unwelcome presence. The American consul at Bluefields reported on the situation to Washington, noting that Commissioner Lacayo had dismissed the chiefs concerns because 'Nicaragua was then at war with Honduras, and that the necessity had arisen for placing the coasts and frontier ... in a state of defense.' As for the chief, Lacayo considered he had no 'diplomatic recognition' or 'international responsibility', and Lacayo denied the chief's right to 'interpret for himself the treaty obligations' and also denied the right of 'England to interfere in any way whatever.'234
British and American nationals, concerned with the deteriorating situation, appealed to their respective governments to send a warship. The Americans were the first to respond, ordering the venerable U.S.S. Kearsage to sail from Haiti to Nicaragua on 30
January. Kearsage was a veteran of the Civil War, having earned high praise thirty years earlier for being the Union ship responsible for sinking the Confederate commerce raider,
Alabama. Kearsage encountered a reef a few days after setting sail, and had to be
Naylor, Penny Ante Imperialism, 204. Seat to Braida, 22 January 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix I, 235. 110 scuttled. The absence of an American naval presence on the Mosquito Shore in the next several crucial weeks would significantly compromise the ability of the State
Department to influence outcomes. After the loss of the Kearsage, the more recently constructed San Francisco was ordered to Nicaragua. Because it was stationed in Brazil, the San Francisco did not arrive at Bluefields until mid-April.
The British Admiralty ordered H.M.S. Cleopatra to the scene, with orders to report on the situation. Her Captain, the Honourable Assheton Curzon-Howe, was to consult with British diplomatic representatives and take steps to protect British interests and subjects.236 A man in his mid-forties and descended from a famous aristocratic family, Curzon-Howe did not hesitate to take control of what he saw as a deteriorating chain of events.237 His promotion to commodore came through at the conclusion of his assignment to deal with the troubles at Bluefields. To Curzon-Howe, the affair at
Bluefields involved a Nicaraguan violation of the treaty provisions governing the
Mosquito Coast. He assumed the quasi-diplomatic role not unfamiliar to senior officers of the Royal Navy, seeking to maintain peace and security and uphold international agreements. In Greytown, Curzon-Howe picked up the British consul, F.H. Bingham, and
Described as a sloop, the Kearsage was built in 1861 and displaced 1,550 tons. By contrast the San Francisco was one of the new generation of American warships. Commissioned in 1890, it had a displacement of more than 4,000 tons. Hagan, This People's Navy, 175, and Alden, The American Steel Navy, 372. 236 Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hopkins (C-in-C N.A. & W.I. Stn) to Admiralty, 10 February 1894, and Hopkins to Admiralty, 6 March 1894, F.O. 420/14, Confidential Print 6547, Mosquito Reserve Part V, January to June, 1894, The National Archives, 2, 11. A document will frequently be found in the volumes of original Foreign Office and/or Admiralty correspondence, as well as in the series of Foreign Office Confidential Print prepared for circulation within the Department and Cabinet. In these cases, footnotes will generally reference the document as it appears in Confidential Print. 237 Bernard Burke, Dictionary of the Peerage and Baronetage, (London, 1889). A Curzon had held a peerage since 1308 as Baron Zouche, one of the ten oldest extent baronies in the Realm. Capt. Curzon- Howe's brother had married into the family of the Duke of Grafton, and his sister was married to the Duke of Abercorn. The future Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon of Kedlestone, was a distant relation. Capt. Curzon-Howe went on to serve as Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean Fleet and at Portsmouth. His article in the Dictionary of National Biography asserts that 'he averted civil war in Nicaragua, 1894.' Born in 1850, Admiral the Hon. Sir Assheton Gore Curzon-Howe, GCVO, KCB, CMG died in 1911. Ill landed at Bluefields on 25 February 1894. He was met there by the acting British vice- consul, Edwin Hatch, and was informed that the Mosquito chief had fled. Hatch described how the arrival of Nicaraguan troops, which he numbered at 126, had 'naturally alarmed the Mosquitos.' After some bickering the Nicaraguans 'took charge of the place
. . . proclaimed martial-law and declared Bluefields in a state of siege.' They then
'deposed all the Mosquito officials, and hoisted the Nicaraguan flag at the Mosquito flag staff ... at variance with the Treaty of Managua and the Award of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria.'
Curzon-Howe arranged a meeting ashore with Nicaraguan Commissioner Lacayo, after which he was introduced to General Cabezas, whom he thought 'an officer of very doubtful reputation, but the brains and real worker of this affair.'238 He then convened a meeting aboard the Cleopatra with Lacayo and Cabezas, whom, he noted, were 'very good natured.' A degree of intimidation was implied as Curzon-Howe let his guests witness 'the ship's company at drill for landing parties and general quarters.' The
Captain found, after this demonstration, that 'General Lacayo met my wishes in the handsomest way, signing a letter in which he promised to raise the state of martial law, and to hoist the Mosquito flag alongside the Nicaraguan.' Lacayo also agreed to reconstitute the Mosquito Council, to organize civil policing for the settlement, and to move some of his troops across the lagoon to the village of Rama. Curzon-Howe then escorted his guests ashore, where they 'landed under a salute and accompanied by
Capt. Curzon-Howe to V. Adm. Hopkins 1 March 1894, F.O. 420/149, 11-14. Capt. Curzon-Howe to VAdm . Hopkins 1 March 1894, F.O. 420/149, 11-14. 112
Captain Curzon-Howe continued his informal diplomacy, meeting privately with
Lacayo, away from General Cabezas. They discussed the recently lifted declaration of martial law and state of siege, and the captain 'ventured to point out . . . how such ridiculous behaviour must alienate the good-will of the very people he wished to conciliate.' He warned Lacayo that once the Nicaraguans 'touched the pockets of these merchants they would bring a hornet's nest about his ears,' and that 'all his talk about rebellions, invasions, &c, was utter nonsense between men of our age, and that it was perfectly evident to me that the Nicaraguans thought this a favourable moment for incorporating the Reserve, and that [Lacayo] had been sent to arrange the affair, Cabezas being the . . . working man.' Lacayo, on the other hand, 'with his popularity and English proclivities,' had been sent 'to smooth over the English and Americans.' Lacayo replied frankly that Curzon-Howe was 'perfectly correct. . . that he had been several times much annoyed by the infringement of the military on his prerogative.' To this the captain stated how unwise it had been to permit 'the declaration of martial law, as by doing so he surrendered his power to the General and troops. Lacayo then showed Curzon-Howe 'the staff the Mosquito Flag was to be hoisted on, and we parted on excellent terms.'240
Curzon-Howe was under orders to report on events and, while seeking to de- escalate matters, was aware that he was dealing with a potentially explosive situation. He realized the peaceful undertakings he had received from Lacayo and Cabezas were 'liable to be broken.' He left an armed party of some 70 officers and men at 'the Bluff,
Bluefield's main port facility just within sight of the town, and proceeded to Greytown, and then Colon, in a less than totally successful attempt to telegraph reports and receive instructions. Bluefields did not possess a telegraph station, the nearest being at
240 Capt. Curzon-Howe to VAdm . Hopkins 1 March 1894, F.O. 420/149, 11-14. 113
Greytown, though the ciphered messages sent from there were routinely intercepted by
74-1
Nicaraguans, jeopardizing secure communications. Curzon-Howe sent his paymaster to Jamaica with his lengthy written reports which arrived in London in late March. In the absence of orders to the contrary, he endeavoured repeatedly to work with the
Nicaraguans, Americans, Creoles and Mosquito Indians of the Reserve, to develop a political solution that would be conducive to peace and order in the troubled region.
On returning to Bluefields on 3 March, Captain Curzon-Howe was told that during his absence an attempt had been made on the life of Clarence, the Mosquito chief.
Thereafter, Chief Clarence was advised to reside with the British landing party. Curzon-
Howe noted that 'little or no progress has been made towards the re-establishment of the legitimate status of the Mosquito Reservation.' The captain worked with British Consul
Bingham and Commissioner Lacayo to develop a modus vivendi that reflected local political realities. It called for a municipal council composed of two persons nominated by the American consul and three others named by Lacayo. The American consul was not, however, a party to the modus. The agreement also obliged Lacayo to withdraw his
Because the telegraph connection at Greytown was vulnerable to interception by Nicaraguans, Curzon - Howe and British Consul Bingham proceeded to Colon where on 2 March they attempted to make contact with the British minister in Guatemala, Audley Gosling. Even these telegrams seem to have been tampered with, and the Cleopatra returned to the Mosquito coast without receiving further guidance from the Foreign Office or Admiralty on to how to proceed. Curzon-Howe to Hopkins, 18 March 1894, F.O. 420/149, 32. The essence of the telegrams sent by Bingham and Curzon-Howe on 1 March eventually arrived in London two days later, but in the absence of more detailed information, the Foreign Office was reluctant to provide detailed advice. Curzon-Howe and Bingham to Gosling, 1 March 1894, Confidential Print, F.O. 420/149,, 27, Gosling to Rosebery 2 March 1894, and Rosebery to Gosling 3 and 5 March 1894, F.O. 420/149, 4- 5.These communications problems were reported to the Foreign Office by Gosling, who lodged a formal complaint with Nicaragua's Minister of Foreign Affairs, stating that 'for several weeks cipher telegrams addressed to me ... have in every instance arrived in so mutilated a state as to be completely unintelligible.' See: Gosling to Madriz 13 March 1894, F.O. 420/149, 31. 114 troops from the town and the Mosquito Reserve, and to organize a civilian police force.
949
Within twenty-four hours, events were spinning out of control.
On the night of 5 March, rioting erupted in Bluefields.243 Acting British Vice-
Consul Hatch, apparently on behalf of the American consul, Cabezas and Lacayo, requested the British naval landing party at the Bluff to intervene, as 'two of the Spanish police have been shot on the street since dark, and an uprising of the negroes is feared on other persons.'244 In the early hours of 6 March, Lieutenant Colmore arrived at the town's wharf where he was met by Lacayo who, 'after a hurried consultation . . . acceded to my request, and ordered his troops at once to the barracks.' Colmore's men then 'fixed swords and marched through the town to the British Consulate.' Colmore reported that the 'effect was magical; the crowd, on hearing of our arrival, almost all vanished with the exception of a few people who remained behind out of curiosity.'245
Colmore took steps to restore the peace by closing liquor shops and prohibiting the carrying of firearms, thereby quelling the disorder that had resulted in the deaths of two men and the wounding of several others. For nearly a fortnight, personnel from
Cleopatra remained on patrol in Bluefields. This was carried out at the request of the
British and American consuls, but with less than enthusiastic approval from the
Nicaraguan authorities. When Colmore asked Lacayo about forming a council and The agreement was dated 4 March 1894. F.O. 420/149,39. A later attempt to develop a governmental structure apparently called for 'A Commission of eight, two of each nationality, to organize public safety, and carry out a system of rules until then.' Curzon-Howe to Hopkins, 18 March 1894, F.O. 420/149, 35. 243 Curzon-Howe described the incident that sparked the riot in his report to the Commander-in-Chief. 'Senor Lacayo's own servant took his master's revolver and saying that he was bound to kill a nigger before dark, proceeded to commence independent firing into a number of coloured men in the street; fortunately the weapon was too much for him and he missed; but they set upon him, and would have killed him but for some American citizens. He declared he was ordered to do this on purpose to make a riot, and it certainly looks like it. Later on, the police began making arrests of coloured men who had walking-sticks; they plucked up courage and retaliated. Shots began to fly.' Curzon-Howe to Hopkins, 18 March 1894, F.O. 420/149, 34. 244 Acting Vice-Consul Hatch to Lt. Colmere, 5 March 1894, F.O. 420/149, 40. 245Lt. Colmore to Capt. Curzon Howe, 6 March 1894, F.O. 420/149, 39-40. 115 organizing a police force for Bluefields as had been previously agreed, the commissioner made it clear 'he was not prepared to carry out any of the changes,' and went on to threaten that 'he had written to his Government, requesting them to dispatch 1,000 troops and two gatling guns to clear the Negroes out of the place.' Colmore records that he
'made a suitable answer to him.'246
Curzon-Howe was well aware that his time at Bluefields was drawing to a close.
His ship was required for fishery patrol work in Newfoundland waters and needed a re-fit in Bermuda before taking up her new duties. H.M.S. Canada, under the command of
Captain William Wilson, arrived to relieve Cleopatra on 16 March 1894. Curzon-Howe briefed his successor on the momentous events of the past three weeks, explaining how his first inclination as the crisis broke had been to ' clear out the Nicaraguans, to make the chief and the council come back and declare everything restored to its original status, but how long would it last?'247 At the height of the crisis, when he met with the old council, its members became adamant that they would not resume office without British protection, as they feared for their lives. The departing captain acknowledged that for some time there had been 'growing discontent with the Mosquito Government, never- ceasing complaints and protests . . . that nothing whatever was done to improve the harbour or mercantile facilities; and that it was impossible to obtain justice or satisfaction in the Court.' These complaints came mainly from the forty-seven or so prominent
Americans who controlled most of the Reserve's property. The balance of the
246 Curzon-Howe obtained written requests from British Vice-Consul Edwin Hatch and American consular agent B.B. Seat that the police services performed by the Cleopatra personnel be continued during the unsettled conditions in Bluefields. See: Hatch to Curzon-Howe and Seat to Curzon-Howe, 10 March 1894, F.O. 420/149, 42. Colmere reported on events in Bluefields during the time he was responsible for security there, including his interview with Lacayo, Colmore to Curzon-Howe, 18 March 1894, F.O. 420/149, 43- 44. 247 Curzon-Howe to Hopkins, 18 March 1894, F.O. 420/149, 34. 248 Minutes of Meeting of Executive Council of the Mosquito Reserve, 8 March, 1894, F.O. 420/149, 41. 116 community consisted of only 'three Englishmen of any standing ... a considerable sprinkling of Nicaraguans, quantities of Jamaicans, Creoles and a few Indians.' Curzon-
Howe admitted that the Indians, 'for whom the Treaty was made, really care for very little, provided they are left alone.' He observed that,
authority has been gradually acquired by a few educated Jamaica coloured gentlemen, who have ruled the country as Mosquito Indians, with the Chief at their head as a show-piece and puppet. The young Chief is very amiable, and, provided he has some good clothes and some few luxuries, is quite happy and content; but he has received no sufficient education for his duties . . . The whole arrangement was admirably suited when the Treaty and Constitution were originally formed for the wants and happiness of the Indians, and the country has been most prosperous and happy. But the increased trade and development of business with the United States has caused an invasion of exploiters (some of most doubtful character), and with whom this mild and patriarchal kind of Government was quite unable to cope or keep in order.249
The Mosquito government had been deposed, and Curzon-Howe wished to see
British forces remain in place until a working provisional government could be put in place through negotiations between the Nicaraguan commissioner and the British and
American consuls. Captain Wilson looked at these same facts and reached very different conclusions. Unlike Cuzon-Howe, Wilson arrived apparently aware that the Foreign
Office was reluctant to become embroiled in Mosquito affairs.
Rosebery had contacted Pauncefote in Washington in the early stages of the affair, reiterating the policy Salisbury had pronounced in 1889, which asserted the British government's wish to 'promote a direct arrangement between the Government of
Nicaragua and the Mosquito Indians, which would relieve Great Britain from all further responsibility in regard to the affairs of the Indians.' Rosebery went on to express the
Curzon-Howe to Hopkins, 18 March 1894, F.O. 420/149, 32-37. 117 hope that 'differences which may arise should, as far as possible, be settled by direct negotiations between the Nicaraguan government and that of the Mosquito Territory.'
Curzon-Howe had been working largely outside the reach of telegraphic communications, and in the absence of directions to the contrary had taken his full share of initiative.251 To streamline communications, Wilson was authorized to report directly to the Admiralty without going through the naval officer commanding in the West Indies.
Wilson sent a landing party from the Canada to take over responsibility for security ashore on an interim basis while being briefed by Curzon-Howe, though he soon concluded that policing the settlement was counterproductive. As Wilson saw it, 'law was at a standstill, no Government existed, and I found cases were being brought to
Lieutenant Tower, with which of course he had no power to deal.' Wilson believed that
British forces were hardly 'conducing to the formation of a Provisional Government.' He believed the 'increased demands of the American residents' were creating the opposite effect, for as long as British forces remained these residents were 'getting their police duty done for nothing, and were paying no taxes at all.' Wilson determined to 'turn the
Government of the town over to the Nicaraguan commissioner, and remove any foreigners that might wish to go.'
Several Creoles had already left for Jamaica, and Curzon-Howe had taken Chief
Clarence to the more remote settlement of Pearl Lagoon. Wilson was aware that
Bluefields was a community dominated by Americans and American business interests, and he believed that this made it all the more inappropriate for Britain to be too deeply
250 Rosebery to Pauncefote, 5 January 1894, F.O. 420/149, 1. 251 In reporting that the Canada was being sent to relieve the Cleopatra, Vice-Admiral Hopkins noted, somewhat defensively, that 'my orders to Captain Wilson are that his stay in those waters should be no longer than he considers necessary (after consultation with the local Representatives of the British Government) for the protection of British interests and subjects, observing that I inserted a similar clause to this in Captain Curzon-Howe's orders.' Hopkins to Curzon-Howe, 6 March 1894, F.O. 420/149, 11. 118 involved. He observed that 'the Americans expect a man-of-war of their own, till whose arrival they are likely to be fairly patient.' Whether 'the ultimate destiny of the Mosquito
Reserve is to be incorporated with Nicaragua, or to form an independent Republic under the protection of America' did not really matter to Wilson, who was convinced that the outcome was not one 'to be settled by British arms.'252 After just a week at Bluefields, the Canada weighed anchor on 20 March to sail to Colon to report proceedings by telegraph to a very interested outside world.253
The Admiralty and Foreign Office were not alone in craving information concerning the troubled Central American coast. Most of the information received in
Washington from the State Department's diplomatic channels came from the American consul in Bluefields, who had participated in arrangements to provide local alternatives to
Nicaraguan rule, and made no secret of his pro-Mosquito, anti-Nicaraguan sympathies.
Press reports of the events at Bluefields led to an awkwardly worded resolution being passed on 8 March in the American Senate requesting that the president inform that body of details concerning the presumed British occupation of the 'Mosquito Reservation in the
State of Nicaragua.' The resolution made no attempt to hide the senators' anti-Mosquito, pro-Nicaraguan, anti-British leanings.
Wilson added that 'So long as my men remained on shore, their presence necessarily tended to the latter result.' i.e. the formation of an independent Republic under the protection of America. See: Wilson to Admiralty, 25 March 1894, F.O. 420/149, 47-49. 253 Wilson's telegram read, 'Nicaraguan Commissioner Blewfields having undertaken formation Provisional Government, party from Canada for preservation good order re-embarked 20th March. Americans, Indians and negroes dread annexation by Nicaragua. Please let me know when American man-of-war may be expected. Waiting reply.' Wilson to Admiralty, 26 March 1894. Wilson's more lengthy despatch quoted above arrived 13 April 1894. F.O. 420/149, 47-49, 22. 254 Pauncefote forwarded an extract from the Congressional Record for 8 March 1894 recording the debate and the passage of this resolution which was moved by the expansionist Senator John Tyler Morgan who was Chairman of that body's Foreign Relations Committee. Pauncefote to Kimberley, 9 March 1894, F.O. 420/149, 7. 119
Gresham was determined that United States diplomatic staff should follow orders and carry out their duties in accordance with State Department policy. In mid-April he sent a terse telegram to the American minister in Managua, Lewis Baker, stating that his
'failure to send full information in regard to Bluefields incident has been embarrassing here. You should go there at once.' He added that 'no officer of this Government was authorized to participate with Nicaraguan authorities and British consul in organizing provisional administration.'255 Baker had difficulty making his way from Managua to the remote Mosquito Coast, but succeeded in contacting the commander of the San
Francisco. He was able to board that ship in Greytown, and finally arrived at Bluefields a little more than a week after receiving orders to do so.
In reporting on the Mosquito situation, Baker did not disguise where his sympathies lay. He believed the area around Bluefields was the most prosperous within the five Central American states, and he described the town as 'American to the core.'
He referred to recent encroachments by Nicaraguan authorities over the adjacent areas north and south of the town and on the Corn Islands to the east of Bluefields, asserting that these areas were 'formerly prosperous communities under the mild rule of the authorities of this reserve.' This had now changed. These areas 'now have their military governors and are ruled by autocratic military power.' Their prosperity was also gone and 'their former enterprising citizens have been driven out, their business ruined by crushing taxation and the lack of security to life and property.'256 Nevertheless, the official position of the State Department remained unaltered. The secretary of state replied that Baker should 'take care to say nothing tending to disparage Nicaragua's
255 Gresham to Baker, 17 April 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States 1894, Appendix 1, 271. 256 Baker to Gresham, 2 May 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States 1894, Appendix I, 21A 120 rightful claim to paramount sovereignty or to encourage pretensions to autonomous rights inconsistent therewith.'
The British minister accredited to Nicaragua, Audrey Gosling, was normally resident in Guatemala, but he travelled to Managua in June to gain a better insight from the Nicaraguan authorities into the situation at Bluefields. He became convinced that the
Nicaraguans had not yet settled on a policy, but that 'the existing state of things in
Bluefields cannot long continue.' Gosling was satisfied, however, that the troubles at
Bluefields 'were concocted and fostered by the Commissioner [Lacayo], General
Cabezas, and Dr. Guzman, the Nicaraguan diplomatic representative at Washington.'
Gosling was particularly critical of Guzman, whom he believed was relaying 'purposely incorrect and misleading information,' which was causing his government 'to count upon the protection of the United States in any dispute which might arise between Great Britain and Nicaragua in respect to the Mosquito question.'258
During the next several months, as their governments sought to obtain accurate intelligence, American as well as British naval vessels called regularly at Bluefields, where they monitored conditions and reported on events. Captain Clake of HMS
Magicienne recalled that American officers had 'invariably been most courteous and most anxious to work in combination.' He nevertheless believed that it was undesirable that the 'duty of protecting life and property should be for any length of time divided between the ships of war of Britain and America.' The increased American naval presence had led to an altered power dynamic on the coast. New forcefulness was observed on the part of
American residents who had previously been willing to work with the British Caribbean
257 Gresham to Baker, 12 May 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States J894, Appendix I, 290. 258 See: Gosling to Kinberley, 4 June 1894, F.O. 420/150, Confidential Print 6585, Mosquito Reserve Part VI, July to December, 1894, The National Archives, Kew, 8. 121 community to resolve the country's political problems. Clarke observed that, 'On the arrival of the San Francisco this ceased, their demands became more exorbitant and there occurred the strange spectacle of the two nationalities with identical interests working in diametrically opposite directions.'259
The inability of American and British nationals at Bluefields to work in tandem was reflected at a higher level on the diplomatic stage. In March, Lord Kimberley took over responsibility for the Foreign Office from Lord Rosebery, who had been called on to form a government following the retirement of Gladstone. Towards the end of May the
American minister in London, Thomas Bayard, met with him for a 'frank and friendly interchange of views in relation to the Bluefields incident.'
In describing this meeting to Gresham in Washington, Bayard indicated that 'Lord
Kimberley gave me clearly to understand that Great Britain was contemplating no extension of her influence in Nicaraguan territory,' and that 'the renunciation of any protectorate by Great Britain over the Mosquito Indians and their territory was clear, distinct, and unquestionable.' Kimberley expressed a 'strong desire to learn what the
United States Government considered it advisable should be done in the present status of affairs at Bluefields.'
He said the United States are, as it were, 'on the spot' and could judge what line of action was necessary to produce requisite and reasonable security for persons and property in that region ... He appeared to be disposed to follow in the line which should be approved and adopted by the United States, so that a coincidence of view and action should be arrived at by the United States and Great Britain.
The discussion touched on the potentially more significant issue of the isthmian canal.
Here, too, Kimberley employed an open and co-operative approach. He understood that
Clarke to Hopkins 2 July 1894, F.O. 420/150, 36-37. 122 the canal had generated 'increased interest' in the 'region of the contemplated work,' and that the 'condition of affairs was no doubt much better understood in the United States than in Great Britain.' Kimberley was also 'desirous of knowing the opinion to which the
[American] Government might come in order that Great Britain might be better prepared to act in line with them.' As for the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, Kimberley led Bayard to believe that, while 'Great Britain has no desire to have the Clayton-Bulwer treaty abrogated,' Britain also did not wish to 'do anything inconsistent with its provisions . . . nor to interfere in any way with the plans or works of the United States in relation to the projected canal.'260
Gresham did not respond formally to this overture until after another wave of violence had engulfed the Mosquito Coast. However, when he did, it was to reject any suggestion of employing a joint Anglo-American approach to settle the disturbances at
Bluefields. His reply to Bayard was written on 19 July, and began by asserting that an alien presence on the Mosquito Shore was contrary to stated American foreign policy going back half a century. In spite of shared interests in the economic and political stability of the region, Gresham dismissed suggestions for developing co-operative solutions. He was not impressed by Kimberley's desire 'to act in accord with the United
States.' Gresham maintained that accepting the 'implied invitation of Lord Kimberley' for the United States to join in 'devising a solution of the problems growing out of the
Bluefields incident' might imply a willingness to depart from long standing American foreign policy where Central America was concerned.
The situation at Bluefields, and elsewhere in the strip, presents no question difficult of solution. The sovereignty of Nicaragua over the whole of the national domain is unquestionable ... An alien administration . . . notoriously exists,
260 Bayard to Gresham, 22 May, 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix I, 291-292. 123
particularly at Bluefields ... No matter how conspicuous the American or other alien interests which have grown up under the fiction of Indian self-government, neither the United States nor Great Britain can fairly sanction this colorable abuse of the sovereignty of Nicaragua. So far as American rights of person and property in the reservation are concerned, this Government can not distinguish them from like rights in any other part of Nicaragua . .. .261
To Gresham, the dramatic events of the spring suggested that Britain was interfering in the internal affairs of Nicaragua. Strikingly, this had occurred largely to protect American commercial interests. To some American diplomats, including Bayard in London and those on the spot in Central America, Anglo-American co-operation seemed to be a reasonable and acceptable way of proceeding, though Gresham found this intolerable. He reacted in April by seeking to define more clearly American foreign policy in the area. He sent a strongly worded despatch to Bayard informing him that he was not to accept the 'provisional plan formulated ... for the appointment of American,
Indian, and Creole representatives on the proposed governing commission,' precisely because it was based on the assumption, 'that "Mosquitia" is a territorial entity with sovereign rights.'262
In May, Minister Lewis Baker in Managua had to be warned repeatedly to 'take care to say nothing tending to disparage Nicaragua's rightful claim to paramount sovereignty or to encourage pretensions to autonomous rights inconsistent therewith.'
Dealing with the realities of the local situation, Baker found these injunctions almost impossible to accept. With an air of defiance, his official correspondence continued to reflect the opinions of the American planters, frustrated with ineffective Creole administration and fearful of Spanish dictatorial rule, who were calling for the United
261Gresham to Bayard, 19 July 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix I, 311-312. 262 Gresham to Bayard, 30 April 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix I, 272. 124
States to secure for them 'a local government which shall protect them and their families in their persons and property.' Baker's entreaties fell on deaf ears. In June, Gresham found it necessary to remind him of his earlier instructions 'enjoining you to refrain from doing or saying anything tending to disparage Nicaragua's paramount sovereignty, or to encourage pretensions to rights inconsistent therewith.'264
Gresham was dealing within a wider diplomatic context, the centrepiece of which was the building of an isthmian canal a few miles further south on the San Juan River.
This encompassed a range of strategic issues that made the concerns of Bluefield's
American banana planters pale by comparison. Following the installation of President
Zelaya, Nicaragua began confiscating American canal building equipment on various legal pretexts. Then in April, with the political situation on the Mosquito Coast continuing to reflect poorly on British and American nationals alike, the Nicaraguan minister in Washington was instructed that the American canal building concession was to terminate on the grounds of non-fulfilment. In such a climate it was important for the
United States to appear as the ally of Nicaragua in seeking to remove foreign interlopers and to support Nicaragua's legitimate national rights, which would, it was hoped, include the building of an isthmian canal. The American naval commander monitoring events in the area was instructed in May that United States interest 'transcends that of individual
American citizens and lies in the direction of ultimate sovereignty of Nicaragua especially as against any foreign protection or intervention.' The United States would support
Nicaraguan attempts to assert control in the Mosquito region, provided Nicaragua would
263 Baker to Gresham, 2 May 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894 Appendix I,, 275. 264 Gresham to Bayard, 13 June 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix I, 296. 265 Walter Lafaber, 'The Latin American Policy of the Second Cleveland Adminisration', 98-99. 266 McAdoo to Watson, 14 May 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix I, 97-98. 125 allow American canal builders to carry out their important work. In June, Baker informed
Zelaya and his Foreign minister, Jose Madriz, of his expectation that the canal contract would continue in operation and that the 'offensive notice of forfeiture' would be dropped. By the end of the month, it was.267
The Mosquito Rebellion
In the absence of an imposed solution, the situation on the Coast continued to drift towards anarchy from April to July 1894.268 In early May, it was reported that Lacayo was plotting to assassinate the chief of the Mosquito Indians and replace him with his more pliable uncle. On a periodic visit, Captain Clarke collected Clarence from Pearl
Cay, arranged accommodations for him in the home of Edwin Hatch, the British vice- consul in Bluefields, and charged Lacayo with responsibility for the chief's safety.
Clarke felt himself increasingly manipulated by the Nicaraguans, and decided to withdraw H.M.S. Magicienne from Bluefields to Jamaica at the end of May. U.S.S. New
York was anchored at Bluefields, and it was Clarke's opinion that, 'as long as the
American and British ships are here, the Nicaraguan commissioner has hopes of playing one against the other.' By withdrawing his ship, 'the Nicaraguans will realize that the game is up.' American commercial interests predominated on the Coast, and Clark
Baker to Gresham, 3 June 1894 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix I, 462-463. 268 Writing on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities, Captain A.C. Clarke of H.M.S. Magicienne seemed to be of the opinion that Nicaraguan authorities were prepared to bide their time, relying on diplomatic and their quasi-military occupation to tip the scales in their favour. Clarke observed that it 'is certain that the Nicaraguans will remain as long as there is no proper Council; that their hope is that it will not be formed until people have given up expecting to see them leave; that they will meanwhile have opportunities of placing small bodies of troops at vantage points in the interior, and by this means bring to pass the openly- stated conviction of the Commissioner 'that in two years' time the Reserve will be incorporated with the Sovereign Power.' Clarke to Admiralty, 2 July, 1894, F.O. 420/150, 36-37. 269 Clarke to Admiralty, 14 May 1894, F.O. 420/149 155. 126 believed his presence was preventing Nicaragua from making moves to accommodate them.270
Nicaragua had established an interim governing council, but American residents with few exceptions refused to support it, seeing it as an attempt to interfere in their commercial affairs. Collecting taxes in Mosquito country had never been popular, and a new crisis began to unfold when Cabezas demanded that duties be paid in gold instead of the paper script issued by the Mosquito Treasury.271 Besides taxation and currency, there were complaints that the wages for the civilian police had fallen in arrears. Cabezas found
Americans strangely restrained when it came to celebrating their country's Independence
Day, concluding that it was 'the omen of the crime that was being hatched.' An altercation related to unpaid wages erupted between Nicaraguan soldiers and the mainly
Creole police on 5 July 1894. Cabezas eventually ordered the police paid, but as darkness fell on Bluefields the discharge of rifles was heard, and the 'Mosquito Rebellion' had begun.272
The office and home of Cabezas were fired on. During the night, the flag of
Nicaragua and the Mosquito flag bearing the Nicaraguan emblem were torn down and an undefaced Mosquito flag was hoisted. In the morning, a proclamation announced that
Robert Henry Clarence had resumed the office of hereditary chief of Mosquito. A public meeting was convened and a new council appointed.
2/u Clarke to Admiralty, 21 May 1894 F.O. 420/149, 159-160. 271 Clarke commented on the commercial and fiscal situation: 'The state of trade is not promising. The Provisional Council (all, with one exception, nominated by the Commissioner) refuse to take "Mosquito scrip" as heretofore was the custom in payment for taxes, &c, and require such to be paid in gold. This is a serious question and may be safely left to the care of the United States' man-of-war.' Clarke to Hopkins, 2 July 1894, F.O. 420/150, 36-37. 272 'Report of the Commisary [sic] of the Republic', F.O.420/150, 251-254. 127
The majority of Nicaraguan troops were encamped on the southern end of the
Bluefield lagoon at Rama. They were unable to reinforce Cabezas, however, as the insurgents controlled the only vessels for transporting them. A mob made their way to the Bluff on the oceanfront side of the lagoon where a small Nicaraguan force guarded a
Nicaraguan artillery piece. Shots were exchanged and two Nicaraguan soldiers were killed. Seven or eight were taken captive, and the insurgents acquired the gun and significant stores of arms and ammunition.273
The only naval presence at Bluefields was the U.S.S Marblehead commanded by
Captain Charles O'Neil, who met with the various factions. Cabezas was now a virtual hostage of the Mosquito insurgents, and he agreed to hand over all archives and records pertaining to the government of Mosquito if he and the other Nicaraguans being held in
Bluefields were allowed to go free. Before leaving, however, he issued an ominous warning, that 'his men would return in a few day [sic] and not even the babes at the breast would be respected.' A month would pass before the Nicaraguans returned in full force to Bluefields to assert sovereignty over the troubled district. American naval and diplomatic personnel assisted Nicaragua in this, though many American residents on the
Mosquito Coast had sympathised or been implicated in expelling the Nicaraguans in the first place.
There are several accounts of the so-called Mosquito rebellion printed confidentially by the Foreign Office. One was written by Acting British Vice-Consul Edwin Hatch: Hatch to Bingham, 9 July 1894, F.O. 420/150, 20-21 et seq. Another account entitled 'The Chief of the Mosquito Indians to the President of the Republic of Nicaragua' is dated 20 July 1894, enclosed statements from witnesses, F.O. 420/150, 33-36. Another was prepared by Cabezas for the Minister of Government, Managua: 'Report of the Commisary [sic] of the Republic', F.O.420/150, 251-254. There is additionally an account by the United States Consular Agent B.B. Seat: Seat to Braida, July 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix I, 303-304. ™ Hatch to Bingham, 9 July 1894, F.O.420/150 21. 128
The next month, as the Nicaraguans marshalled their forces to reoccupy
Bluefields, an important question arose with respect to what assistance, if any, might be provided by Americans. Nicaragua required ships to carry troops from Greytown to
Bluefields. The best vessels were registered in the United States and owned by
Americans engaged in the banana export trade. In an attempt to maintain American neutrality, the commanding officer of U.S.S. Marblehead warned the owners of these ships not to permit them to be used for hostile purposes.275 Nevertheless, Nicaraguan officials approached Minister Baker with a request from President Zelaya that these orders be countermanded. With considerable hesitation Baker authorized a telegram asking O'Neil to re-consider his decision in the matter.276
The re-occupation of Bluefields was planned for early August. The Americans resolved to strengthen their naval presence by sending U.S.S. Columbia to join the
Marblehead off Nicaragua's Atlantic coast. The Royal Navy was represented by
Commander Stuart aboard H.M.S. Mohawk. When it came time for Nicaraguan forces to be transported to the troubled settlement, it was the American banana boats they boarded.
Stuart reported that, 'General Cabezas with 500 troops seized American river steamers and barges and came down to the Bluff. I believe a mild kind of protest was made against the seizure??[s/c.]' Another American ship brought even more men from Greytown, and
Stuart observed that all had 'the American flag flying.' An American warship was present as well, assisting in the landing operation that followed. Once ashore, Captain
Stuart had a forceful interview with General Cabezas, warning him of the 'grave
275 Order of Commander O'Neil, 14 July 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix I, 321. 276 It is interesting to note that Baker's despatch informing Gresham of his action is dated after the reoccupation of Bluefields by Nicaraguan forces had been accomplished. See: Baker to Gresham, 8 August 1894, (enclosing Baker to O'Neil, 2 August 1894), Foreign Relations of the United States, 7S94,Appendix 1,321. 129 responsibility' he would incur if 'a single shot is fired on the town.' Stuart informed
Cabezas that he had gathered the British nationals 'under the protection of the officers and men of Her Majesty's Ship Mohawk near the Court-house, and an English ensign is placed over my head-quarters to point out to you the position I have selected, and for no other reason.'277
Nicaraguan troops entered Bluefields peacefully the morning of 3 August.278 A few days later, as the British and American forces withdrew, with 'a band playing at their head, the Nicaraguans marched up and occupied the Court House.'27 Carlos Lacayo was assisted in efforts to assert Nicaraguan sovereignty by Jose Madriz who had recently been relieved of his duties as Nicaraguan foreign minister. Madriz requested Stuart to withdraw British forces, and observing Nicaraguans apparently taking control, Stuart explained to the British group that, 'if any of them mistrusted the Nicaraguan
Government, and were in fear of their lives, I would receive them on board and take them to Limon [Costa Rica].' Stuart stayed ashore during the evacuation in order to gauge 'the attitude of the Nicaraguans after our men had left.' He wrote:
I had not long to wait, for soon about 300 of them with two field-guns, headed by four of the junior Generals, came down the hill and passed the Consulate where I was. A more disorderly rabble I never saw: the Generals and some few others in uniforms of different sorts, and the greater part in any sort of rig. They then proceeded to the flag pole where the Mosquito flag (with the emblem) was flying, and with great difficulty (as the halyards were nailed and had numerous knots in them) hauled it down, with shouts of 'Viva Nicaragua;' then the Nicaraguan flag was hoisted in its place, and the field-guns went on firing for half-an-hour.
277 Stuart to Cabezas, 1 August 1894, F.O 420/150, 52. 278 Stuart to Admiralty, 3 August 1894, F.O 420/150, 42. 279 Stuart to Admiralty, 8 August 1894, F.O 420/150, 59-60. 280 Stuart to Admiralty, 8 August 1894, F.O 420/150, 59-60. 130
Stuart went on to report that 'all the British subjects wanted to come at first, but only 140
981 came after all.' Among those seeking refuge was the Mosquito chief, who was landed later in the month at Jamaica. Arrangements were eventually made for him to be maintained there at government expense.282
The pseudo-state of Mosquitia was being abolished, and with it one of the odder vestiges of Britain's traditional, patchwork hegemony over a region increasingly aligned with the emerging power of the United States. The brash assertion of Nicaraguan sovereignty in Bluefields belied the real transfer of power that was taking place. As the
United States increasingly sought to assert American influence over a region once loosely aligned with Britain, the one-time Mosquito Kingdom ruled by a puppet chief and controlled by Creole officials, had fought for its continued existence and lost. Britain's
Foreign Office emphasised over a period of several years that such a move would not be opposed by Her Majesty's Government. More remarkable than British acquiescence in the abolition of Mosquitia was the fact that so much violence and discord characterized its final demise, some of which might have been avoided had the United States been more open to the co-ordinated withdrawal suggested by Kimberley. In the months that followed the Mosquito Reserve's last chaotic days, the formal use of force would be applied to drive home Britain's expectation that such events need be conducted in an orderly fashion without compromising the honour and prestige of a great power.
281 Stuart goes on to observe: 'I could then see why the Jamaicans, when I tried to persuade them that they would be safe under the guarantee said, "We no like them." I was very much vexed to see this ending. I had been on very friendly terms with these people during the ten days I was on shore; and although they did not show it, I have an idea that they thought I had to a certain extent deserted them.' See: Stuart to Admiralty, 8 August 1894, F.O 420/150, 59-60. 282 Foreign Office to Treasury, 27 August 1894, F.O 420/150, 41. 131
The Corinto Landing
On the way to Jamaica to deliver his cargo of refugees, Captain Stuart of H.M.S. Mohawk stopped in Costa Rica to inform the Admiralty of events and to obtain telegraphic instructions. He was directed not to become involved in any 'actual engagement' and he was to 'warn British subjects that if they continue to fight they must take the consequences.' He was also told to use his 'best endeavours to induce Nicaraguan authorities to behave with moderation towards the Mosquito chief and his council.'283 The
Mosquito chief was then aboard the Mohawk bound for exile, and the councillors still in
Bluefields were about to find Nicaraguans exhibiting less than moderate behaviour towards them.
Shortly after resuming Nicaraguan authority, Madriz let it be known that the British consular representative in Bluefields, Edwin Hatch, had never had his appointment approved. He was directed to refrain from exercising his duties. Then in mid-August,
Hatch was summoned to the town's government building. He requested Sub-Lieutenant
Travers, whose ship H.M.S. Mohawk happened to be paying a visit, to accompany him and wait nearby while he met with the Nicaraguans. As time passed, Travers became concerned. When he inquired about Hatch, a Nicaraguan responded with a threat. Then,
Hatch called to him from an upper window and threw down a message written in pencil on the back of an old letter. 'Am under arrest, but do not know why; not allowed to communicate with any one; must go to Managua.'284
Stuart to Admiralty, 15 August 1894, F.O. 420/150, 77. Travers to Stuart, 16 August 1894, F.O. 420/150, 81. 132
Over twenty individuals with connections to the old regime had been apprehended under similar circumstances. Among those rounded up were the key Creole advisors to the Mosquito chief, a wealthy Canadian, and the editor of the English-language Bluefields newspaper. Two Americans were also arrested, one of whom had served as a Mosquito police magistrate, the other as a member of the short-lived Mosquito Council, appointed following the 'rebellion' in July. Some were expelled on the spot, while Hatch, the two
Americans, and the senior Mosquito officials were taken to Managua, presumably to stand trial.285
In October, in response to American representations on their behalf, Nicaraguan officials relented and allowed the Americans to return to their families and business interests on the Mosquito Coast.286 It would not be so for the British detainees. Edwin
Hatch's quasi-diplomatic status gave his detention international overtones. Five days after the telegram arrived stating that Hath had been arrested, Kimberley considered proposals from the Admiralty to extract reprisals. The favoured option involved
285 Louis Mallet, Memorandum Respecting the Affairs of the Mosquito Reserve, 9 October 1894, Confidential Print 6541, F.O.420/151, The National Archives, Kew. 286 LaFeber, 'The Latin American Policy of the Second Cleveland Adminisration', 102. 287 Several questions surrounded Hatch's appointment and status. Hatch generally represented himself as the Acting Vice-Consul in Bluefields, while in fact the position was that of Pro-Consul, being appointed by the British Consul in Greytown to attend to the interests of British subjects resident in Bluefields during the absence of J.A. Belanger, the Canadian who normally looked after British consular duties there. The position was unpaid. Hatch operated a hotel. In June 1894, there was some question of Hatch being relieved when Belanger returned from New Brunswick. This did not occur but, anticipating Hatch being relieved, Captain Clarke wrote to the Admiralty praising Hatch: 'when danger of risings of the Mosquito Indians . . . seemed imminent, he, by careful watching and timely advice, probably prevented it; when similar dangers arose from the irritation and disquiet of the Jamaican residents in the Reserve, he gave me instant information which enabled me to send for the leaders and show them the folly of such proceedings, and to inform them of the consequences they would entail.' Clarke to Admiralty, 25 June 1894, F.O. 420/150, 26. 133 despatching warships to occupy the customs house at Corinto, the principal port on
Nicaragua's Pacific coast.288
In the weeks and months that followed, the Foreign Office pressed relentlessly for explanations in the matter of Hatch's detention. Once Hatch and the other detainees completed the gruelling trip from Greytown to Managua, President Zelaya decreed that they should not be tried, but expelled from Nicaragua, perhaps hoping Britain would then drop the matter.289 Kimberley refused to deal with Nicaragua on any other business until the question of the arrest, detention and expulsion of Hatch and the other British subjects had been satisfactorily resolved. British officials on the spot compiled statements from those forced to flee Mosquitia, with a view to substantiating claims for monetary compensation due from the Nicaraguan government.290
A gap was developing between the British and American positions in relation to their detainees. The Nicaraguan government did not respond to British demands for explanations concerning the expulsion of British subjects, while American authorities seemed content to accept Nicaragua's offer to allow their country's citizens to return to their businesses and families in the former reserve. The United States had consistently worked to see Nicaraguan sovereignty asserted and to end Creole government there. With its overthrow, American residents were given prominent roles in the new Nicaraguan
The telegram from Commander Stuart to the Admiralty informed both of the challenge to Hatch's credentials and of his arrest. It was dated 20 August 1894, F.O.420/150, 27. Reports for Lord Kimberley dated 25 August 1894 by Francis Bertie and Admirals Bridge and Richards discuss various sites for landings and the seizure of Nicaraguan merchant shipping, F.0.53/68, 22-31 August, 1894, The National Archives, Kew. 289 The telegram from Minister Gosling in Guatemala was received at the Foreign Office on 30 August and stated that 'by Decree of the President, Pro-Consul Hatch and other foreigners have been expelled from the Republic .... This step, they hope, will not be objected to by Her Majesty's Government who, they trust, will recognize its necessity and justice. Throughout their telegram humble and polite language is employed.' Gosling to Kimberley, 29 August 1894, F.O. 420/150, 48-49. 290 Several Statements are enclosed in: Admiralty to Foreign Office, 11 October 1894, F.O.420/150, 166- 172. 134 regime for Mosquitia, while the Foreign Office feared for the lives of any dissident
British residents who might return. Britain had for some time indicated its willingness to facilitate the orderly transfer of responsibility for Mosquito affairs to Nicaragua, but the events of 1894 were far from orderly and had been punctuated by an affront to a British consular official. The irregular changes also flew in the face of binding diplomatic agreements between the Nicaraguan and British governments.
There were further issues clouding Anglo-Nicaraguan relations. The British minister, Audrey Gosling, reported to London that large numbers of Britons and other foreigners across Nicaragua were leaving the country in the wake of Zelaya's seizure of power. Gosling observed that a 'reign of terror seems to exist.' He went on to state that if Zelaya were successful in abrogating the Treaty of Managua, he might succeed in prolonging his tenure in office, with further negative implications for foreigners. If, on the other hand, 'the status quo ante or something akin to it, be restored in the Mosquito
Territory, then, I believe, a revolution would remove from power the worst Government which has, perhaps, ever discredited any of the Central American States.' While regime change in Nicaragua was not pursued as a serious option, the Foreign Office seemed determined that the cavalier treatment of Hatch and the other British subjects required a resolute response.292 The matter was referred to cabinet where it was
291 Gosling to Kimberley, 12 September 1894, F.O. 420/150, 162. 292 In the October precis on Mosquito Affairs prepared for the Foreign Office by Louis Mallet and others in the Foreign Office, the list of grievances against the Nicaraguan government included the fact that evidence for the charges against Hatch and the other British subjects apparently accused of rebellion had not been received, the suppression by Nicaraguan authorities of telegrams emanating from British diplomats based in Nicaragua, the compulsion of individuals claiming to be British subjects to serve in the Nicaraguan army, and the ill-treatment of an English engineer serving on one of the vessels used to transport Nicaraguan forces to Bluefields. F.O. 420/151. 135 determined that reparations should be demanded from Nicaraguan authorities. In mid-
November, Gosling informed Nicaragua's Foreign minister that the British government could not recognize the validity of decrees issued by the Nicaraguan commissioner at
Bluefields, because these were at variance with the Treaty of Managua. Nicaragua passed on to Washington this apparent challenge to Nicaraguan authority, raising further
American suspicions about British intentions.294
Modesto Barrios arrived in London in September 1894, as the diplomatic representative of the Republic of Nicaragua. His English and French were limited, and he had to prevail upon the Salvadorian minister to accompany him to meetings at the Foreign
Office and assist with translation. There had not been a Nicaraguan minister acccredited to the Court of St. James since 1889. Barrios hoped to revive the stillborn attempts of his predecessor to renegotiate the Treaty of Managua, particularly in view of the many recent changes that had occurred in Mosquitia.295 When, shortly after his arrival, Barrios presented himself at the Foreign Office, he was informed that Lord Kimberley would not discuss the wider range of Anglo-Nicaraguan issues until the matter of the expulsion of the British subjects was settled.296 For most of October and November the Foreign Office pressed Barrios to provide documentation as to the charges and legal proceedings that had
' A 29 March 1895 minute of Francis Bertie states: 'In the autumn when it seemed probable that we should have to extract reparation from Nicaragua for the arrest & expulsion of British subjects the cabinet decided that some communication should be made to the United States just before taking action.' Memorandum (Bertie), 29 March 1895, F.O. 53/74, February-March, 1895, The National Archives, Kew. 294 Gosling to Baca, 19 November 1894, F.O.20/150, 344. In December, Second Secretary David Wells of the United States Embassy in London called at the British Foreign Office to inquire about a rumour that the Royal Navy was plotting to restore Chief Clarence, and also expressed concern in relation to British non- recognition of Nicaraguan authority in Mosquito. Kimberley endeavoured to reassure Wells that there was no basis to the rumours surrounding Clarence and that questions concerning Nicaraguan control of Mosquito were being postponed pending a resolution of the arrest and expulsion of British subjects there. Also see: Kimberley to Pauncefote, 20 December 1894, F.O.420/150, 347. 295 Barrios to Kimberley, 22 September 1894, F.O. 420/150, 133-134. 295 Memorandum (Bertie), 28 September 1894, F.O. 420/150, 145. 136 led to the expulsions. Barrios was finally able to provide these in the form of a bound volume of over a hundred pages, almost entirely in Spanish.
The Treaty of Managua, which had created the quasi-state of the Mosquito Reserve, included a process for legally dissolving Mosquitia. This required convening a meeting at which the Mosquito Indians expressed their consent to integrating the reservation with
Nicaragua. On 20 November 1894, the Nicaraguan authorities in Bluefields staged a convention of Mosquito Indians at which a 'Decree of Reincorporation' was passed, effectively terminating the Mosquito Reserve. The document abolishing Mosquitia included a final article expunging its traditional name, stating that as a mark of gratitude to the president of the Republic, 'the "Mosquito Reservation" shall henceforth be named
Department Zelaya.'298 The Canadian, Joseph Belanger, who was filling the office of vice-consul at Bluefields, questioned the authority of those assembled by the Nicaraguans to make such a momentous decision, noting that, 'a great many inducements were offered
... to influence them to accept the incorporation.'299
The convention concluded, Andrew Hendy was installed as titular chief at a ceremonial banquet held in one of the town's hotels.300 The actions taken by the convention seemed capable of being construed as meeting the requirements of the Treaty of Managua, releasing Britain of responsibility for the Mosquito Indians. The United
States certainly gave this interpretation to events, believing they finally gave legitimacy to the year-long campaign by Nicaragua to exercise full sovereignty over their Atlantic
297 Barrios to Kimberley, 22 November 1894, F.O. 420/150, 245. 298 F.O. 420/159, Confidential Print 6666, Mosquito Reserve Part VII, January to June 1895, 93-96, The National Archives, Kew. 299 Belager to Bingham, 30 November 1894, F.O. 420/159, 60-61. Accounts of the Mosquito convention of November 1894 tend to state that many of the Indians assembled by the Nicaraguans were for this meeting were drawn from Nicaraguan territory, not from reserve lands. 300 The Bluefields Sentinel, 23 November 1894, preserved in F.O. 420/159, 78-79. 137
Coast.301 On hearing news of the abolition of Mosquitia, Gresham immediately wrote to the Nicaraguan minister in Washington to state the 'gratification it affords this
Government to see the voluntary and orderly accomplishment of this important step by the native Mosquito Indians themselves.'
The Foreign Office responded more reservedly. As sketchy reports of the convention began to arrive in mid-December, the need for accurate diplomatic intelligence grew. With Hatch exiled and few suitable local consular candidates to choose from, it was thought essential to have a reliable representative of British interests in the troubled region. Herbert Harrison, fluent in Spanish and serving in the British Consulate in New York, was selected for the sensitive post. Briefed by naval personnel and provided with detailed instructions before his arrival in Central America, Harrison was directed to 'abstain from any interference in political matters . . . your action should be confined to the protection of British subjects.' Arriving at Bluefields on 31 December
1894, Harrison was mandated to report on the confusing situation and recommend a course of action.303 His comprehensive reports provided invaluable information not only to the Foreign Office, but also to future scholars researching the multi-faceted economic, political, ethnic and anthropological phenomena he encountered on the Mosquito
Shore.304
301 In reporting privately on the convention, Bingham, the Consul in Greytown observed, 'I think there is no doubt Cabezas picked men for the Mosquito Convention, and then frightened them into doing anything he wished. The whole of the documents have undoubtedly been made up by Cabezas, and it would appear that he has been assisted by the United States Consular Agent (possibly acting under instructions), or, at least that gentleman has certified to a thing that he must have known was not correct.' See: Bingham to Gosling, 7 December 1894, F.O. 420/159, 63-64. 302 Gresham to Guzman, 31 December 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States 1894, 363. 303 Foreign Office (Francis Bertie) to Harrison, 12 December 1894, F.O.420/150, 340-341. 304 Most of Harrison's reports are reprinted in: Eleonore von Oertzen, Lioba Rossbach, and Volker Wunderich (eds.) The Nicaraguan Mosquitia in Historical Documents 1844-1927, Dietrich Reimer Verlag, (Berlin, 1990), 402-427. 138
American Ambassador Bayard was anxious to receive from the Foreign Office 'an emphatic denial of all reports or rumors' in relation to British intentions to 'mingle in the local political struggles and disorders in Nicaragua and the province of Mosquito.' He reported back to Washington, overly optimistically, that there was, 'the most open expression of satisfaction . . . upon the reported voluntary incorporation of the Indians with the rest of Nicaragua, for it was a consummation devoutly to be wished, and they were glad to be free from the subject.'305 Kimberley later objected, and asked that this passage be corrected after it appeared in a congressional paper.306
The Foreign Office, for its part, worked at carefully amassing its own evidence. It compiled statements of injury and accounts of losses incurred by Britons who had been banished. In late November when the long awaited explanations concerning the expelled
British subjects finally arrived from Barrios, it was Permanent Under-Secretary Francis
Bertie who was assigned the unenviable task of translating and drawing up a precis of the
Nicaraguan case. It took him nearly two months to complete this work, and the resulting summary filled twenty-four printed pages. The compendium of documents included a number of confessions written in Spanish, which most of those accused maintained they could neither read nor write, though they were forced to sign nevertheless. Kimberley
Bayard to Gresham, 22 December 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States 1894, Appendix I, 359. 306Kimberley objected to another phrase contained in a Bayard despatch dated 22 May 1894 published by congress at the same time. In this Bayard stated that Kimberley 'said the United States are, as it were, "on the spot" and could judge what line of action was necessary to produce requisite and reasonable security for persons and property in that region.' See: Kimberley to Pauncefote, 23 February 1895, F.O.420/159, 52, and Bayard to Gresham, 28 May 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States 1894, Appendix 1, 291-292. The corrections promised by Bayard do not seem to be contained in future publications of the United States Government. 307 Memorandum by Mr. Bertie on Proceedings of the Nicaraguan Government in the Mosquito Reserve, January, 1895 F.O. 420/159, 9-34. 139 believed there was no 'adequate or reliable evidence' produced to justify Nicaragua's
'arbitrary and violent action taken against the Queen's subjects.'308
At this important juncture, Nicaraguan authorities again demonstrated their capacity to give offence. In spite of efforts in London to ensure that Vice-Consul Herbert
Harrison received full diplomatic recognition from the moment he arrived at Bluefields, two embarrassing weeks expired before this was forthcoming.309 The Nicaraguan
Government decreed that British diplomats could not transmit telegrams in cipher, a situation Gosling described being 'as arbitrary as it is absolute.'310 The Nicaraguans also issued a decree requiring all vessels engaged in Nicaragua's Atlantic coasting trade to have Nicaraguan registry, disrupting many small traders based out of Belize, Cayman and
Jamaica.311
In January 1895, the Foreign Office asked the Law Officers of the Crown to provide a legal opinion on perhaps the thorniest Anglo-Nicaraguan issue. Had the Nicaraguan government taken possession of Mosquito legally, and in accordance with the obligations imposed by the various diplomatic agreements with Great Britain? The legal advice was that Nicaragua probably had not. If not, the Foreign Office asked, could Britain intervene and demand new diplomatic agreements? To this the response of the Law Officers was positive. And could Britain demand compensation from Nicaragua for the arrest and expulsion of Hatch and the other British subjects? To this question the Law Officers were more equivocal. Individual British subjects had no right to riot against Nicaragua or to seek to revive the Mosquito government. Only the British government could do this.
308 Kimberley to Barrios, 26 February 1895, F.O. 420/159, 115-117. 309 Harrison to Kimberley, 17 January 1895, F.O.420/159, 52. 310 Gosling to Kimberley, 23 January 1895, F.O.420/159, 52. 311 Bingham to Gosling, 26 December 1894, F.O. 420/159, 102. 140
Nevertheless, if British nationals were arrested and expelled and were 'innocent of any interference in [these] proceedings', then Britain would be correct in claiming compensation.
Now with the Nicaraguan evidence before him and the opinion of the Law Officers in hand, Kimberley was finally in a position to see Barrios, the Nicaraguan diplomat who had sought a meeting since his arrival in London some months previously. Barrios, however, had left London for Paris. He informed Kimberley he would be continuing from there home to Nicaragua.313 The foreign secretary fired back a reply stating that he desired to relate to him 'the views of Her Majesty's Government as to the question of the treatment of the British subjects arrested in the Reserve.' If, however, Barios chose not to meet, 'the consequences will rest with you and the Nicaraguan Government.' 14 Barios altered his plans and returned to London for the frosty meeting that followed.
Kimberley had prepared a diplomatic note for Barios, portions of which he proceeded to read. The British government could not accept the explanations offered by
Nicaragua. An indemnity of £15,000 was demanded to provide compensation for the arrest, imprisonment, and expulsion of Hatch and certain other British residents of
Mosquito. A further £500 was demanded for the seizure of a British schooner and for the
312 The Foreign Office referred their questions to the Royal Courts of Justice, with a request that an opinion should be provided 'at your earliest convenience', See; Bertie to Law Officers of the Crown, 19 January 1895, F.O. 420/159, 65-67. The report is dated 31 January 1895. Reid and Lockwood to Foreign Office, 31 January 1895, F.O. 420/159, 67-68. 313 In announcing his departure, Minister Barios expressed 'great regret that causes foreign to my wish, and the desire that I have repeatedly expressed, have deprived me of the honour of receiving an audience of your Excellency as I asked more than four months ago, and have thus prevented me from contributing to the establishment of an understanding, perhaps more perfect, between Nicaragua and her Britannic Majesty's Government.' Barrios to Kimberley, 2 February 1895, F.O. 420/159, 70. 3,4 Kimberley to Barrios, 4 February 1895, F.O.420/159, 71-72 141 mistreatment of certain other British residents. Barios stated that he presumed this was meant as an ultimatum, to which Kimberley replied that 'this was so.'315
Barrios pleaded that Nicaragua was a weak state that could not oppose the force
Britain might bring to bear, and inquired as to what action his country could expect if the ultimatum were not accepted. Kimberley refused to answer, but did agree to extend the time for Nicaragua to reply from six to seven weeks." Following the interview with
Barrios, the Queen was sent a copy of the ultimatum to keep her informed of the deteriorating situation.317 Barrios made arrangements to leave London on 2 March.
Instead of travelling directly to Central America, however, he booked passage to the
United States. Before the month was out, the American press had begun printing details of the British ultimatum to Nicaragua.318
As early as the autumn of 1894, the Admiralty had placed the ships of the Pacific
Station on alert to seek reprisals from Nicaragua. Rear-Admiral Stephenson in H.M.S.
Royal Arthur steamed into Acapulco on 15 November, accompanied by the Nymphe,
Champion and Satellite. Later that month, when the Nicaraguan government finally provided its lengthy explanation for the Mosquito arrests and expulsions, the Foreign
315 Two notes were delivered to Barrios. They discussed the circumstances surrounding the arrest, detention, and expulsions from Mosquito. The first note was mainly concerned with those arrested and sent to Managua for whom a claim for £15,500 was demanded. The other concerned the expulsion of a Cayman Island resident of the Corn Islands for whom an additional £500 was demanded. Kimberley particularly condemned the Nicaraguans for their treatment of Hatch, noting that, 'although Mr. Hatch was not strictly speaking an officer in Her Majesty's consular service, it might have been expected that the Nicaraguan authorities in the reserve, who carried on a correspondence with him and made use of his services in a consular capacity whenever and so long as it suited their convenience to do so, would, as a matter of ordinary courtesy, have communicated with Her Majesty's Government before resorting to so extreme a measure as the arrest of that gentleman.' See: Kimberley to Barrios, 26 February 1895, F.O.420/159, 115- 118. 316 The account of the interview between Barrios and the Foreign Secretary was drafted as a despatch to be sent to Gosling in Central America. The draft was substantially revised by Lord Kimberley, and appears in F.O.53/74. The printed final version comprises Kimberley to Gosling, 26 February 1895, F.O.420/159, 113- 114. 317Kimberley to Gosling (Minute by Francis Bertie attached to draft), 26 February 1895, F.O.53/74. 318 Pauncefote to Kimberley, 10 March 1895, F.O.420/159, 134. 319 Admiralty to Foreign Office, 8 December 1894, F.O. 420/150, 336. 142
Office decided to postpone the possibility of naval intervention in the belief that 'the matter may possibly be settled without recourse to coercive measures,' though the ships should be 'available at short notice if no settlement is arrived at.'320 Then, in the absence of a satisfactory response from Nicaragua, a telegram was sent to Stephenson on 9 March, directing him to steam to Panama where he was to hold himself in readiness to 'leave that port on the 16th April, with such force as you may consider necessary, for the purpose of seizing the Custom-house and shipping at Corinto.'321
The Zelaya government hoped that, by pardoning the expelled British subjects and by offering to refer the question of financial reparations to arbitration, offensive action against Nicaragua could be avoided. Gresham considered the British terms harsh, but resisted attempts by Nicaraguan diplomats to draw him more deeply into the dispute, stating that it was a matter for Nicaragua and Britain to resolve. Gresham responded to
Guzman's pleas by pointing out that the United States 'exercised no protectorate over his country,' stating that he was not going to take Nicaragua's quarrel with Britain 'off their hands.' Although Gresham seemed prepared to let the crisis work itself out, he believed there was 'conclusive evidence' of Hatch's role in the July Mosquito rebellion, and was fearful that British occupation of Nicaraguan territory could precipitate a declaration of war by Congress.
Early in April, American newspapers began reporting that British naval forces, led by H.M.S. Royal Arthur, 'one of the new monsters of the British navy,' were en route to
320 Foreign Office to Admiralty, 8 December 1894, F.O. 420/150, 337. 321 Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Stephenson, 9 March 1895, F.O.420/159, 127. 322 Guzman to Greshman, 13 April 1895, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895, Part II, 1029. 323 Notes dated 31 March and 23 April 1895 from Gresham to Bayard, and a Gresham note filed with Baker to Gresham on 15 April 1895 are quoted in: Charles W. Calhoun, Gilded Age Cato, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988), 211-212. 143
Nicaragua to 'enforce British demands.'324 By 12 April there were press reports that commanders of the armed American vessels bound for the Bering Sea, would be given orders to 'shown no mercy.'325 The front pages of several papers reported that the
American cruiser Olympia, stationed on the West Coast, was under sealed orders to 'go to
Corinto,'326 and that the "Monterey is bound for the same place, and that when the British war-vessels arrive at Corinto to collect England's bill against Nicaragua they will find two American men-of-war waiting for them in the harbor.'327 These reports proved unfounded.
Secretary Gresham, whose health was failing, was apprehensive that Britain might misinterpret American intentions in the region.328 Gresham was also suspicious of the motives of the new British foreign secretary, Lord Kimberley, who assumed office in
TOO
March. Gresham thought him 'somewhat of a jingoist.' There is evidence that, in an attempt to de-escalate the situation, Gresham conferred with Cleveland, and wrote secretly to Lord Rosebery, extending to the prime minister the 'thorough friendship of the
American people and Government,' and providing assurances that the United States would not oppose British naval action. 'We are perfectly willing for you to do what you please with all South American republics' wrote Gresham, 'as even if we wished to resist you, we have not the necessary fighting force at command.' Gresham wanted Rosebery to be aware that American ship movements were not an 'indication of a hostile attitude,
324 St. Paul Daily Globe (St. Paul, Minnesota) 6 April, 1895, 6. 325 The Morning Call (San Fraqncisco, California) 12 April, 1895, 1. 326 The Record-Union, (Sacramento, California) 11 April, 1895, 1. 327 St. Paul Daily Globe (St. Paul, Minnesota) 12 April, 1895, 1. 328 There had been an incident growing out of the Cuban revolution, in which an American merchant ship had been fired on. As a result, Gresham issued a demand of his own to the Spanish government in March, 1895. Calhoun, Gilded Age Cato, 213-214. 329 Calhoun, Gilded Age Cato, 211. 144 and they are not likely to interfere with the plans of the British government having received no orders to that effect.'330
Kimberley found the real opposition to his hard-line towards Nicaragua lay within
Lord Rosebery's short-lived and fractious government. As the deadline for acceptance of the ultimatum passed and the time for intervention approached, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Lord Harcourt, wrote to Kimberley expressing his 'repugnance to using force in a case of small indemnities like the present.' Harcourt went on to point out the hypocrisy of 'making loud professions of our readiness to adopt arbitration in place of force ... if we refuse it in a case of this kind.'331 Kimberley vented his annoyance at such faint heartedness in a letter to the prime minister on 16 April 1895, complaining that 'the insolence of these wretched little states is beyond bearing, and Nicaragua is perhaps the worst of them.'332
" Gresham to Rosebery [sic] 12 April 1895, Spring Rice Papers, 1/57, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge. The letter is a copy, presumably acquired by Spring Rice while on the staff of the British Embassy in Washington. It states 'of course this is all a strictly private matter between us two. I write this with the full consent, nay by the direction of the president and cabinet, but of course in affairs of this kind no publicity is possible. The movements of British ships have seemed to us so belligerent of late that it has been deemed proper by this government in its solicitude for the country to take such steps as will avoid all risks to us...and the best way to accomplish this purpose is no doubt by a private note.... You understand of course that a display of vessels of war such as we have, is a necessary part of the equipment of every government, but our demonstrations in the various ports of the world...is only to inspire a certain sense of our national dignity, but not to incur any danger or risk to ourselves.' It is not easy to assess the significance or even the veracity of this letter, which was presumably written by Gresham, who was seriously ill. It does not appear to have survived in the files of either the State Department or Foreign Office. 331 Kimberley to Rosebery 16 April 1895. The letter stated: 'It is all very well for Harcourt to treat this matter by off hand platitudes about arbitration- The question is not so easy to dispose of. If whenever one of these petty South American countries ill treats British subjects we submit the question of redress to arbitration, we shall have no end of trouble. The insolence of these wretched little states is beyond bearing, and Nicaragua is perhaps the worst of them. Nothing but a sharp lesson from time to time will keep them in order, or secure decent treatment for foreigners .... We have an arbitration going on in Colombia but we cannot get anything done. We have another question as to the ill treatment of our police on the Venezuela border, which must be dealt with shortly. Even the United States government shows no sympathy with the Nicaraguans in their ill treatment of British subjects. Bayard has never in our conversations said a word in their favour. On the contrary he speaks of them as an unbearable set of people.' See: John Powell (ed.) Liberal by Principle, (London, Historians' Press, 1996), 238, and Harcourt to Kimberlley, ibid., note 53. 332 Kimberley to Rosebery, 16 April 1895, John Powell (ed.) Liberal by Principle, 238. 145
On 22 April 1895, three British warships of the Pacific Station, the Royal Arthur,
Satellite, and Wild Swan steamed into Corinto harbour, a port significantly located on the west coast of Nicaragua, nowhere near the Mosquito Shore. The ships moored in line off the customs house. The indemnities demanded and other terms stipulated by Lord
Kimberley had not been met. The next morning, coincidentally St. George's Day,
Commander Stokes went ashore and travelled by rail to Managua to meet with Senor
Matus, Nicaragua's Foreign Minister. There he delivered the terms of the ultimatum approved by the Foreign Office, including a message from Admiral Stephenson, stating that if the indemnity was not paid within three days, 'I shall at once land an armed force and take military possession of Corinto by occupying the custom-house and other
Government buildings, and appointing Capt. Frederick Percival Trench governor of the port.'333
Stokes waited in uniform in his hotel room in case President Zelaya wished to see him. He was warned of strong anti-British sentiment in the capital, and was told that his
Admiral's letter had been 'telegraphed in full to Washington.' The correspondent of the
New York Herald confirmed that he had 'wired it in full to that paper.' Stokes was not summoned to see Zelaya.334
The Nicaraguan garrison withdrew from Corinto and offered no opposition to the landing of British forces on the morning of 27 April. The American minister telegraphed to Washington, describing how the 'Nicaraguan Government stopped railway communication with that port. Pacific Mail steamers have been ordered not to touch
Stephenson to Nicaraguan Government, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1896 Part II, 1032. 334 Stokes to Stephenson, 4 May 1896, enclosed in, Stephenson to Admiralty, 8 May 1895, Report of the Occupation of Corinto ADM. 1/7252. 146 there, thus completely isolating town. British seized Government building and archives.
Hoisted British flag at that place.'335
The British occupation was unwelcome by the other states of Central America, which worked to defuse matters. The Guatemalan envoy in London had for some weeks endeavoured to mediate in the affair. The Salvadorian envoy, who had been appointed to represent Nicaragua's interests in London in Barios' absence, urged authorities in
Managua to accede to Britain's demands. Admiral Stephenson received a visit from Senor
Constantine Fiallos, Honduran minister to Guatemala, who had been specially accredited to Nicaragua to confer on the subject of the ultimatum. They discussed a plan that would involve the other states of Central America depositing funds to pay the indemnity in
London on behalf of Nicaragua. The next day Stephenson received word by telegraph from London that 'the Nicaraguan Government accepting the terms . . . and undertaking under a guarantee from the Republic of San Salvador, to pay the indemnity of 15,500 /. within a fortnight, you are hereby authorized to re-embark . . . and leave Nicaraguan waters.'336
In his account of the occupation and negotiations, Stephenson observed that
Fiallos had asserted that 'the conduct of Nicaragua throughout this affair had been dictated by the United States Government, and that Mr. Secretary Gresham had, up to the last moment, advised the Nicaraguan Government not to pay the indemnity.' Fiallos told
Stephenson that the United States had encouraged the Nicaraguans to expect American assistance, 'which hopes not having been fulfilled, have caused the Nicaraguan
Government great disappointment and deep humiliation.' Fiallos believed Nicaragua's
Baker to Gresham, 29 April 1895, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1896 Part II, 1033. Admiralty to Stephenson, 2 May 1895, F.O. 420/159, 155. 147 leaders would never have acted in the way they had, without explicit assurances of support from the United States.
The American minister in Managua presented a very different interpretation of events. He recounted that the 'first impulse of the Nicaraguan Government was to resist the landing of the British marines.' Minister Baker was aware that the Nicaraguan authorities thought 'the United States would uphold them in this attitude,' but this came from 'their own sources.' He observed that it was only as the 'prospect for interference on the part of the United States faded away' that the other states of Central America became involved in brokering a settlement.338 Gresham had hoped to maintain a polite distance and treat the dispute as a bilateral matter requiring a bilateral solution. In so doing, he underestimated the political and journalistic storm that the Corinto Landing gererated.
Several newspapers, including the New York Sun, were highly critical. Early in the crisis, the paper reprinted a speech by retired Republican Senator Anthony Higgins linking Britain's action at Corinto with American plans to build an isthmian canal.
According to Higgins, the British diplomat in Managua told the Nicaraguan Foreign
Minister that 'Britain is taking these proceedings "because they do not propose to let the
Yankees control the canal.'"339 Later, after the British had withdrawn, the Sun praised the
Salvadorians, and asked why a 'problem so difficult for the Cleveland Administration to handle' was capable of being so 'easily solved through the Salvadorean Minister in
London.' A majority of state legislators in Missouri, Connecticut, and New York remained unconvinced that the Monroe Doctrine was inapplicable, and passed resolutions
'Report of the Occupation of Corinto', Stephenson to Admiralty, 8 May 1895, ADM. 1/7252. Baker to Uhl, 3 June 1895, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1896 Part II, 1034. Sun (New York), 1 May 1895. 148 condemning the British landing on Western Hemispheric soil. Viewing this as a distortion of the Monroe Doctrine, the State Department printed a pamphlet containing the actual wording used by James Monroe, in an endeavour to show that it hardly applied to the landing at Corinto.341 Nevertheless, Bayard's lack of action in Central America was construed by many to constitute passive support for British aggression in an area that was key to American interests, a factor that would bear heavily on American decisions affecting the future development of the Anglo-American relationship.
Conclusion
The Anglo-American experience in Nicaragua unfolded in the shadow of the Bering Sea controversy and other causes of friction. These events showed how the geopolitics of the hemisphere could draw Britain and the United States together, and yet create friction between them. At one level, both countries seemed to have so much in common. Both were committed to maintaining the basic conditions necessary for the operation of international trade and commerce. Both countries espoused different versions of a more or less common liberal economic and political ideology. Both sought to avoid entanglements on a war-torn European continent. And even in Nicaragua, each seemed to be pursuing policies aimed at accommodation. British policy was to withdraw from the
For an assessment of political and press reaction, see: Nelson M. Blake, 'Background of Cleveland's Venezuelan Policy', American Historical Review, January, 1942, 259-267. Blake states that the New York resolution referred to the 'the supineness, dilatoriness and lack of National and patriotic spirit which has characterized the Administration in dealing with this complication.' Blake comments that 'In almost every issue on which jingoes and anti-jingoes clashed, Anglo-American relations were involved. When American expansionists agitated for the annexation of Hawaii, it was asserted that Great Britain was about to seize it; when the same group advocated a great navy, America was menaced by British naval supremacy; when they demanded an American-controlled Isthmian canal, England was intending to dominate the proposed waterway. Editorial writers, like politicians, found baiting England easy and popular.' See also: Daily Journal (Kansas City), 30 April 1895, describing debate in Missouri legislature including the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine. 341 Extracts from the Seventh Annual Message of James Monroe, December 2, 1823, The State Department, Washington, 1895. 149
Mosquito Coast, a policy the United States welcomed and which the presence of an invigorated United States Navy facilitated. American naval resources reduced the need for the Royal Navy to protect lives and property and to keep the area open to trade and investment, much of which was American in any case. British prestige required, however, that British withdrawal be undertaken with order and dignity, and with no hint of retreat or abandonment. When Nicaragua chose to insult a British consular official, the
United States showed a degree of complicity in allowing Britain to seek compensation for the affront, leaving Nicaragua to face the Corinto landing without support from the
United States. Reaction to the landing in the American press dmonstrated the passion that could be aroused when an American administration failed to oppose an assertion of
British authority in the Western Hemisphere. Inherent in the traditional foreign policies of each was an element of splendid isolation, and moving away from this in a direction that suggested mutual support for the other country's policies, could be portrayed as heretical.
Accommodation remained a distant goal, though the process by which the hemisphere's two dominant powers were working through their difficulties meant that at least they were learning the basic demands of the other, even if they were not coming much closer to meeting them.
Within two months of the landing at Corinto, Lord Kimberley and the Rosebery government were swept from office, and Walter Gresham was dead from the sudden onset of pleurisy. The death of Gresham came just as the dispute over the British Guiana-
Venezuela boundary was heating up. Richard Olney assumed the helm as the new secretary of state in June 1895. His appointment was seen to mark a new assertiveness in 150
American foreign policy.342 On succeeding Rosebery, Lord Salisbury appointed Joseph
Chamberlain to be colonial secretary, giving the British colonies, including those in the
Americas, a strong and eloquent voice in cabinet. The experiences in Nicaragua, in the
Bering Sea, and elsewhere, combined to heighten the fractious and confrontational tone of
Anglo-American hemispheric affairs. British attempts to facilitate orderly and seamless change in the power relationship were being met by American efforts to assert dominance and to have their enhanced status recognized. Events in Brazil would add another layer of complexity to the unfolding process.
342 Following Gresham's death, Cleveland nominated his attorney general. Following Senate approval, Olney was sworn in on 10 June 1895. See: Gerald G. Eggert, Richard Olney Evolution of a Statesman, (Pennsylvania University Press, 1974), 170. Nelson Blake states that, 'The naming of Olney as [Gresham's] successor was interpreted at once as evidence that the President intended to pursue a more vigorous foreign policy.' 268. IV. Cables and Confrontation in Brazil 1894-1895
At a time when Anglo-American relations in the Western Hemisphere were already complicated by such events as the naval landing at Corinto, the boundary dispute between
British Guiana and Venezuela, the confrontation over Bering Sea fur seals, North Atlantic fish and Canadian tariff questions, a pair of triangular disputes erupted involving Brazil,
Britain and the United States. One of these involved foreign participation in a naval revolt, which occurred mainly in the harbour of Rio de Janeiro. The other concerned the
British annexation of the uninhabited island of Trinidad in the South Atlantic. The disputes involved large business interests seeking access to the Brazilian market, including American petroleum exporters and the strategic and profitable operation of telegraphic services in Latin America.
The Brazilian economy held a particular attraction for British and American businesses. An economic boom or 'encilhamento' had commenced in the late 1880s.
British investment in the country increased fivefold in that decade and, by the 1890s,
Brazilians were seeking alternatives to their traditional reliance on British capital. For
343Steven C. Topik, Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the Age of Empire, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 56-60. 151 152 those Americans who believed trade with Latin America was the antidote to their country's economic woes, Brazil served as an example of the success that could be achieved.344 Brazil embraced the reciprocity provisions in the McKinley tariff legislation, and between 1890 and 1895 American exports grew from $12 to $15 million.345 During this same period, British exports to Brazil declined from £7.5 to £7.3 million.346 The tariff agreement facilitating this growth of trade between the United States and Brazil was unpopular with many Brazilians in and out of government, and was a factor in the revolution that erupted in the country in the early 1890s. The agreement was similarly a factor in American support for the central Brazilian government in its civil war against the rebel elements.347
The Brazilian boom was seriously disturbed when the British banking house of
Barings moved perilously close to collapse in 1891. Brazilian currency, which at one time had been interchangeable with Sterling, had to be devalued, causing prices to rise by over 50 per cent in a single year. Rio witnessed a crime wave and the failure of a number of established businesses. The ensuing economic instability contributed to political unrest.348
A naval revolt erupted in Rio de Janeiro harbour and it proved an early test for the recently expanded United States fleet, a test it easily passed. Outside interest in Brazil's
344 Brazilian participation in the American programme of tropical reciprocity was formalized in the Blaine Mendoca Accord of 1891. Its approval implied American support for the central government and its territorial claims, particularly in the south where the revolution was later based. Hopes that the agreement would give Brazil something like exclusive access to the United States sugar market were subsequently disappointed when access was accorded Cuba, the British West Indian colonies, and even Germany and Austria-Hungary. See: Topik, Trade and Gunboats, 1-10. 345 J. Laurence Laughlin and H. Parker Willis, Reciprocity, (New York: Baker and Taylor, 1903), 258. 346D.C.M. Piatt, Latin America and British Trade 1806-1914, 316-319. On the role of Germany as a competitor for Brazilian markets, see 99-103. 347 Topik, Trade and Gunboats, 103-105. 348 Topik, Trade and Gunboats, 94. 153 expanding economy meant that this revolt, which involved factions in the country's armed forces, drew interest not only from the United States and Great Britain, but from other European powers, including Italy and Germany. The United States had a solution of its own, breaking with the European states seeking to develop a co-ordinated approach to control the use of force in the heavily populated environs of Rio's busy harbour.
Doubt was cast on British motives, due in part to intelligence of questionable authenticity passed by Brazil to the United States.
The settlement of the naval revolt was brought about in part by pressure applied by American corporate interests eager to gain access to Brazilian markets. Not long after, executives of the main British cable companiess approached their government to annex an apparently unclaimed island in the South Atlantic to assist in the delivery of telegraphic services to Latin America and avoid Brazilian government constraints. The resulting
British action detracted from Britain's reputation in Brazil and gave further grounds for
American suspicions about Britain's territorial ambitions in the Western Hemisphere.
The Brazilian Naval Revolt
In 1889, Brazil's imperial regime headed by Dom Pedro collapsed in the face of a military revolt. Marshal Manuel Deodoro da Fonseca seized power, which he exercised autocratically until 1891, when he resigned in favour of Marshal Floriano Peixoto. Naval and military rivalries played a part in each of these events. The empire had favoured the navy, and the sons of aristocrats were well represented in its officer corps, so it was not surprising that disgruntled elements within the army played a part in the revolt that 154 unseated Dom Pedro. The resignation of Deodoro, on the other hand, was something demanded by the navy.349
Then in September 1893, a revolt broke out spearheaded by a group comprising both naval officers and disgruntled elements in the army. While not at first particularly successful on land or at sea, the insurgency gained momentum in December 1893, when the previously neutral Admiral Saldanha da Gama issued a manifesto and joined the uprising. The British minister, Hugh Wyndham, noted that his American counterpart,
Thomas Thompson, was 'somewhat concerned' by a paragraph in a manifesto issued by da Gama, 'which foreshadows the possibility of a Monarchical restoration.'350
The principal tactic of the rebellious naval forces was to control the Bay of Rio, preventing merchant ships from landing armaments and paying customs duties on cargoes, thereby starving the Peixoto government of the essential arms and resources it needed to survive. The sympathies of the American minister, Thompson, and United
States secretary of state, Walter Gresham, were with the republican government of Brazil, which reciprocated by looking favourably toward expanding trade relations with the
United States.351 As traffic in Rio harbour was thrown into chaos, Gresham warned the
American ambassador in London, Thomas Bayard, to watch for any sign that Britain might recognize or lend support to the rebels.352 Gresham observed that the necessity to
349 Topik, Trade and Gunboats, 125. 350 Hugh Wyndhamn to Rosebery, 11 December 1893, F.O. 420/152, Confidential Print 6602, Revolution in Brazil, January to March, 1894, The National Archives, Kew, 30. 351 Walter LaFeber notes that 'if the insurgents, encouraged directly or indirectly by British elements, eventually overthrew the Peixoto government, American trading interests would be in serious danger. Many of the insurgent leaders could not see advantages for Brazil in the 1891 reciprocity agreement.' Walter LaFeber, 'United States Depression Diplomacy and the Brazilian Revolution, 1893-1894', The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 40, No. 1 (February 1960), 112. 352 Bayard had served in the first Cleveland administration as secretary of state. His tenure of office as American ambassador in London would include accusations that he was too favourably disposed to Anglo- 155 do so was in keeping with American policy to ensure 'non-intervention of the powers of
Europe in the domestic questions of the American hemisphere.'353
British policy-makers found themselves caught in a dilemma created by the fact that non-intervention proved difficult in the chaotic conditions created by the naval revolt.
Even before the blockade was imposed, the Foreign Office had obtained an opinion from the law officers, stating that until such time as the two parties involved were given recognized belligerent status, British warships would be justified in resorting to force if a blockade were erected.354 British naval commanders on the spot, however, proved most reluctant to interpose their forces in this way
The various foreign naval commanders and diplomatic legations, including the
Americans, endeavoured at first to work together in a spirit of careful neutrality, a move endorsed by the Foreign Office.355 As the rebel blockade was enforced, violence increased and the situation became increasingly volatile. It became more difficult for
British naval forces to assist merchant vessels seeking to unload their cargoes without becoming embroiled in the hostilities. Complaints poured in from British shipping companies. The rebels began asserting the right to search ships for arms, while the
Brazilian government installed artillery pieces capable of firing on incoming ships. The senior British naval officer in Rio harbour, Captain Lang, described the danger in
American accommodation, and not sufficiently assertive in his promotion of American interests. This period is covered in considerable detail in: Tansill, Bayard, 650-781 353 Gresham to Bayard, 18 December 1893, quoted in Grenville and Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, 118. 354 Joseph Smith, 'Britain and the Brazilian Naval Revolt of 1893-4', Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 1970) 355 Kimberley did not believe the insurgents had legal authority to enforce a blockade, and he thought that it came down to 'a question of the prudent exercise of might against might. All action should if possible be the result of concert between the Foreign Naval Commanders.' Rosebery to Weyndham, 29 September 1893 quoted in: Smith, Britain and the Brazilian Naval Revolt, 183. 156 allowing British merchant vessels to become pawns in the dangerous civil war being fought along the city's jetties. He used the example of the Lord Templemore, which was being towed by a tug into a wharf, 'when fire was suddenly opened between the
Government and insurgent forces.' The crew of the tug 'hit the deck' causing both vessels to drift out of control. The British vessel 'had to anchor under a shower of bullets', and Lang considered the ship's master 'fortunate in having none of his crew killed or wounded.'356
The Foreign Office continued to endorse a policy of strict neutrality, a policy that
Minister Hugh Wyndham communicated to the British community in Rio de Janeiro, explaining that neither the British government nor the Royal Navy could, 'depart from this attitude of complete non-interference.' It was, Wyndham noted, 'unreasonable to expect that business and trade generally can be carried on without any risk or interruption in the midst of an armed insurrection.'357 The American naval commander had been instructed to assist American ships to land their cargoes, while avoiding lines of fire. He expressed to his superiors the impossibility of doing this without 'affording aid materially to the side of the Brazilian Government and interfering with the operations of insurgents.'358 The diplomatic community for its part were increasingly concerned with the impact the rebellion was having on innocent civilians. The diplomatic representatives of Britain, Italy, the United States, France and Portugal added to the conflicting priorities of these naval commanders, reminding them of the danger created by the 'firing on the town by the insurgents, whereby numbers of innocent persons are killed and wounded,'
356 Lang to Admiralty, 17 December 1893, F.O. 420/152, 58. 357 Wyndham to British Residents at Rio, 30 December 1893, F.O. 420/152, 95. 358 Picking to Herbert, 23 December 1893, quoted in: Walter LaFeber, 'United States Depression Diplomacy and the Brazilian Revolution, 1893-1894', The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 40, No.l (February 1960) 111. 157 pointing out at the same time the consequences for foreign trade 'should the insurgent commander attempt... to prevent the landing of all goods at Rio de Janeiro.' 359
Complaints from British shipping companies poured into the Foreign Office as a result of ships being prevented from entering Rio harbour.360 In January 1894 the
Standard published an account of an English apprentice from the Crown of India being shot and killed while unloading cargo.361 The correspondent claimed the insurgents were preventing 'eighty British ship-masters with 2,000 men, representing 3 millions of money' from landing.362 Captain Lang endeavoured to work with the officers of the other navies operating in the Bay of Rio to develop a common approach. The task was thankless, drawing criticism from shipping companies, the Brazilian insurgents, and government officials. To make matters worse, Rio de Janeiro was suffering from an outbreak of yellow fever, and Lang himself was invalided back to England at the height of the difficulties.363
The situation in the harbour was continuing to deteriorate when Wyndham met with the German charge d'affairs, Count Luxburg. The German diplomat described with apparent satisfaction the insurgents' recent military successes in the south of the country and their plans to transport the victorious troops by ship northwards to take possession of
iiV Wyndham to Rosebery, 20 December 1893, F.O. 452/152, 50. 350 The Liverpool ship-owners wrote to the Foreign Office on 31 January 1894 stating their 'considerable disappointment . . . that Lord Rosebery does not see his way to receive a deputation [concerning] the serious amount of the loss which is being suffered by those whom they represent.' F.O. 420/152, 115. 361 The incident was reported to the Foreign Office by way of a letter, Jas. Pope to H. Sturl, M.P., 17 January 1894, enclosing a letter from Thompson, Dickie and Co. published in the Standard 17 January 1894 including a letter dated 24 December 1894 from the master of their ship the Arranmore reporting on the situation in the Rio de Janeiro harbour. This was only one of many complaints received by the Foreign Office in relation to the inaction of the Royal Navy to assist British ships to land their cargoes. F.O. 420/152, 77-79. 362 Letter dated 24 December 1894 printed in the Standard from the master of their ship the Arranmore, F.O. 420/152, 78-79. 363 Admiralty to Foreign Office 19 January 1894, F.O. 420/152, 95. 158 the railway line into Rio de Janeiro, an action that would likely herald the break up of
Brazil, parts of which contained extensive German settlement. Count Luxburg bragged that he had been 'honoured with the rare distinction of the conveyance to him of the personal thanks and approval of His Majesty the Emperor.' 364 Germany's naval representative in Brazil had withdrawn from the regular meetings with the other foreign heads of naval forces, who were struggling to co-ordinate efforts to keep the harbour open and protect lives and property in the face of a deteriorating situation.365 German merchant shipping, however, was achieving remarkable success in getting through the restrictions imposed by the insurgents, landing cargoes while British vessels remained anchored offshore.366 The foreign secretary, Lord Rosebery, was informed that one
British shipping company had resorted to transferring its steam launches 'to the German flag and to German ownership' in order to receive the greater protection that German registration afforded in the troubled waters of Rio harbour."
Americans, including William Rockefeller368 of Standard Oil, and Isidor Straus, a businessman, congressman, and friend of Gresham, were among those clamouring for their government to become more assertive in keeping Brazil open to American businesses.369 As the blockade continued, the reciprocal tariff provisions in the McKinley
364 Wyndham to Rosebery, 10 December 1893, (nos. 241 & 242), F.O. 420/152, 29-30. 365 As early as 21 Dec 1894, Germany was conspicuous in its absence from a meeting which included 'Les Commandants Superieurs des forces navales de l'ltalie, des Etas-Unis, de l'Angleterre, de la France, et du Portugal, and by 20 January 1895, Wyndham was telegraphing Rosebery, that 'the German Commander is acting quite independently, holding aloof from the conferences held by his colleagues. The other Naval commanders are acting completely in accord.' F.O.420/152, 75 & 79. 366 Messrs James Matthew & Co., 16 December 1893, enclosed in Sir J. Leng, M.P. to Rosebery, 9 January 1894, F.O. 420/152, 34. 367 Messrs. E. Johnston, Son and Co. to Rosebery, 11 January 1894, F.O. 420/152, 37. 368 Brother and business partner of John D. Rockefeller. 359 American involvement in the Brazilian naval revolt is covered in some detail in: Walter LaFeber, 'United States Depression Diplomacy and the Brazilian Revolution', 107-118. The same subject is discussed in: Grenvilleand Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, 117-118. 159 act were being replaced by new legislation that promised to do even more to facilitate
Brazil's trade with the United States. There was concern in Washington that a rebel victory achieved with European support might lead to Brazilian trade being directed away from the United States.370 The Brazilian minister in Washington fed American fears of monarchical sympathisers being linked to pro-insurgent British plots.371 This created a disinformation campaign encouraging the United States to use its naval forces to break the rebel blockade.372 Thompson relayed his own suspicions to Gresham in a telegram describing the 'attitude of English residents who are known to be in sympathy with the cause of the insurgents, although they have not overtly so declared.'373
The rebels sought recognition as belligerents, a move that would give their blockade legitimacy under international law, something Thompson and the secretary of state opposed. This would have brought to mind recollections of the belligerent status accorded the Confederacy by Great Britain in the American Civil War, and the assistance the South garnered from Britain as a result of such recognition. The question of recognizing the insurgents was intertwined with the use of force by foreign countries. So
LaFeber, 'United States Depression Diplomacy and the Brazilian Revolution', 112. 371 LaFeber states that Gresham, 'received word from Thompson that the Brazilian government had two affidavits showing that Great Britain was helping the rebels, and that this pro-da Gama policy was being followed in the hope that the insurgent leader would reinstall the monarchy, once he overthrew the Peixoto regime. Gresham especially feared the withdrawal of the British fleet protection, for he believed it would be a prelude to recognizing da Gama's belligerency.' LaFeber, 'United States Depression Diplomacy and the Brazilian Revolution', 112. 372 Topik uses quotations from the biography of Brazil's minister in Washington, Salvador Mendoca, to describe the situation there. ' Da Gama's first manifesto allowed Mendoca to deliver his most telling argument to Gresham. Referring to the Cleveland administration's early refusal to recognize the republic that overthrew Hawaii's Queen Liliuokalani, the Brazilian minister asked rhetorically, "Do you not think that two attempts to restore monarchies are too many for one Democratic administration?" He suggested that the way to defeat the British plot was for the United States to break the blockade. The British would have no choice but to follow, since they would not "want to watch with arms crossed as only North American ships freely unload in Rio.'" See: Topik. Trade and Gunboats, 141-142. See also: Carlos Sussekind Mendoca, Salvador de Mencdoca: Democrata do Imperio e da Republica, (Rio: Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1960), 208. 373 Thompson to Gresham, 3 February 1894, U.S. Department of State, The Executive Documents of the House of Representatives for the Second Session of the Fifty-third Congress. 1893-'94 Vol. 1 (1893-1894), 121. 160 long as the insurgents remained unrecognized, an outside power would likely only engage the rebellious party, because engaging the forces of the Brazilian government would imply a declaration of war. Even recognition of belligerent status, however, would involve taking sides in an internal domestic dispute. On the other hand, if the insurgents were given belligerent status, force could be applied against, or on behalf of, either the government or the insurgents in the process of endeavouring to land goods from a neutral state. Wyndham and the Foreign Office did not believe that the time was right to use force or to recognize the insurgents. Wyndham favoured a continued policy of studied neutrality, and an avoidance of armed confrontation in the harbour district where civilian lives and property were at risk. Wyndham believed, however, that the time could arrive when he would need to request the 'authority to use force,' and he stated he would then see this decision linked to the 'question of recognizing the insurgents ... as belligerents.'
Wyndham was betraying a possible personal bias in favour of the naval rebels, but there was also a humanitarian and practical implication to the carefully worded options he was proposing. The insurgents had 'complete control of the traffic in the bay of Rio de
Janeiro.'374 Any naval operations would need to take this into account in assessing the best tactics to employ in landing British goods.
At the same time, the Germans were pondering similar options. In late January,
Wyndham again met with Luxburg, who believed that the United States was planning to use force against Admiral da Gama and the rebels. Luxburg had sent a telegram to Berlin suggesting that the German naval commander might be authorized to use force as well.
Wyndham to Rosebery 28 January 1894, F.O.420/152, 112. 161
Wyndham believed Luxburg 'asked for authority to recognize the insurgents as belligerents immediately on their obtaining any notable success.'375
Wyndham feared the deteriorating situation. British coal shipments were being blocked, but still he was reluctant to recommend the use of force. To do so involved taking sides and endangering civilians, though it incidentally assisted the insurgent cause as well. Wyndham realized that the need to maintain impartiality was not a dilemma shared by American Minister Thompson, who was 'biased in favour of Peixoto, which makes me fear that he is anxious to have recourse to force against the insurgents.'376
Thompson continued to relay information supplied by the Brazilian government to
Washington, asserting that the British were secretly helping the rebels.377
By late January, Wyndham was anticipating a move by the United States, which had despatched additional ships to the troubled area. Three of their new warships, the
Detroit, the San Francisco and the New York, made up the most powerful naval presence in Brazilian waters.378 The new American naval commander, Admiral Andrew Benham, directed that his country's merchant ships were not to be interfered with. On 29 January, the Detroit was escorting an American merchant vessel into harbour when the insurgents fired a blank shell in warning, seeking to prevent her from unloading. The Detroit
3/i Wyndham to Rosebery 28 January 1894, F.O.420/152, 112. 376 Wyndham to Rosebery 28 January 1894, F.O.420/152, 112. 377 'Gresham . . . received word from Thompson that the Brazilian government had two affidavits showing that Great Britain was helping the rebels, and that the pro-da Gama policy was being followed in the hope that the insurgent leader would reinstall the monarchy, once he overthrew the Peixoto regime. The Brazilian Minister in Washington confirmed this information.' See: LaFeber, 'United States Depression Diplomacy and the Brazilian Revolution', 112. Based on Gresham to Bayard, 18 December 1893, RG 59, Instructions, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington. Nothing in British archival sources was discovered to substantiate this claim. 378 The various characteristics of these three ships are described by John D. Alden. U.S.S. Detroit was designated a protected cruiser, 2,008 tons commissioned in 1893; the San Francisco, also a protected cruiser, displaced 4,083 tons, commissioned in 1890, while New York, an armoured cruiser, 8,200 tons, was completed in 1893. See: Alden, The American Steel Navy, 65 and 374. See also: LaFeber, 'United States Depression Diplomacy and the Brazilian Revolution', 114. 162 responded with a live shell, piercing the side of the insurgent ship, and the Americans warned that more damaging fire would come if they were threatened again. This brought a remarkably speedy end to the Brazilian naval revolt. It established that the insurgents could not enforce the blockade, though this was not immediately appreciated.379
Wyndham did not recognize the fact that the naval revolt was about to collapse, and in this he was not alone. On land, particularly in the south, the government was in retreat and Wyndham was of the opinion that freeing up access to Rio harbour would be an ongoing task. Wyndham continued to express the opinion that the insurgents might be recognized under certain conditions. 38° Lord Rosebery, however, disagreed. The government would 'prefer to protect commerce by the use of force rather than recognize the insurgents as belligerents.' Rosebery offered this directive in the light of recent intelligence concerning the successful American naval action.
Within hours of sending this telegram, Rosebery met with Count Metternich from the German Embassy and with the Italian ambassador. They saw things differently. Both emphasised that it was time to recognize the insurgents. Metternich made the most forceful case, arguing that recognition would prevent further conflict in Rio harbour, acknowledging that it might additionally lead to the 'break-up of the present state into several Republics.' Metternich believed non-recognition represented a policy that 'might be welcome to the United States, but it would not be favourable to European commercial
LaFeber, 'United States Depression Diplomacy and the Brazilian Revolution',114-115. 380 Wyndham's telegram informing Rosebery that Benham had made 'a demonstration of force against the insurgent fleet', also included his observation that 'the recognition of the insurgents as belligerents would be preferable to the employment of force.' See; Wyndham to Rosebery 31 January 1894, FO420/152, 115. 381 Rosebery to Wyndham 2 February. 1894, F.O. 420/152, 118. 163 interests.'" Rosebery replied to Metternich and the Italian Ambassador, explaining that he had already given Wyndham directions in the matter, and that Britain did not think the time was right for recognition, particularly as the rebels seemed to be in the process of surrendering. Rosebery did not disguise the fact that his views took into account the fact that the United States had 'openly espoused the cause of the Brazilian Government.'383
Rosebery consulted Sir Julian Pauncefote to get a better perspective on the views of the American government. The foreign secretary was still receiving intelligence that suggested the insurgents' victories on land might justify recognising them.384 Pauncefote discussed the situation with Gresham, and replied that the United States had rejected three such requests from the insurgents already, based on international precedents and practical considerations. The United States had successfully broken the insurgents' blockade; to
IOC accord them belligerent status would only lead to the blockade being reinstated.
Armed with the views of the American secretary of state, Rosebery met with Ambassador
Bayard to assure him that, as foreign secretary, he 'thought it most desirable that Great
Britain and the United States should act in cordial concurrence.' He observed that
Rosebery sent a confidential precis of his meeting with Metternich to the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir E. Malet, 2 February. 1894, F.O.420/152, p. 118. It is difficult to speak decisively about the role played by the Germans in the naval revolt. Nancy Mitchell on p. Ill of her study, The Danger of Dreams: German and American Imperialism in Latin America, (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1999) states that the naval revolt raised hopes in Berlin that 'the federal government in Rio de Janeiro would be unable to hold the country together and the southern states would break away and turn to Germany for protection.' She asserts that the 'Wilhelmstrasse, however, was cautious ... it would not support the rebels unless England did so first.' The observations from Wyndham seem to substantiate this, though Wyndham does report he believes that Krupp was selling ammunition to the Government. See: Wyndham to Rosebery, 25 December 1893, F.O. 420/152, 56. Shortly before Benham intervened, Wyndham stated that he had been informed on good authority that the German naval commander was threatening to use force against the insurgents. See: Wyndham to Rosebery, 28 January 1894. F.O. 420/152, 111. Most reports from Wyndham suggest that the Germans had a close working relationship with the insurgents. 383 Rosebery to Malet, 2 February 1894, F.O. 420/152, 118. Metternich met with Rosebery again on 5 February pressing the case of the insurgents to be recognized as belligerents. The suggestion was again rejected. See: Rosebery to Malet, 5 February. 1894, F.O. 420/152, 141. 384 Rosebery to Pauncefote 3 February 1894, F.O. 420/152, 126. 385 Pauncefote to Rosebery, 5 February 1894, F.O. 420/152, 141. 164
Britain, the United States and other powers had co-ordinated their approach to the naval rebellion, while 'Germany alone' held itself 'aloof for reasons which Rosebery did not profess to know or understand.386
The American press tended to endorse their government's action in Brazil, with the New York Times praising Admiral Benham as the man who 'restored our prestige in the eyes of foreign nations.'387 The events in Rio harbour provided an early example of how an invigorated United States Navy could support American foreign policy in an area where business interests were strong and could be enhanced. In the end, Britain welcomed American action, which had brought resolution to a situation that was becoming increasingly intolerable to all concerned. While individual Englishmen on the spot may have favoured one side or the other in the rebellion, the Foreign Office insisted on a policy of non-intervention. The United States, on the other hand, was able to achieve dramatic results after massing naval resources in Rio and acting to impose its will in a complex dispute.
Nevertheless, the perception that Britain was involved in opposing American policy in Brazil lingered on. Britain had worked actively to harmonize her Brazilian policies with those of the United States, though this fact does not seem to have been widely recognized. British efforts to frustrate German designs apparently remained little appreciated by Americans disposed to view any British action in the region with suspicion. In March and April 1894, in the wake of the Brazilian naval revolt, and as the
Nicaraguan situation moved into its critical phase, British activities in the hemisphere remained as controversial as ever to Americans. Secretary of State Gresham and John
386 Rosebery to Pauncefote, 7 February 1894, FO420/152, 142-143. 387 New York Times, 15 March 1894. 165
Morgan, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, discussed the latter's view that 'the time is ripe in Congress for vigorous action in respect of the obligations of Great
TOO Britain and a firm denial of her pretensions.'
In this early test of American diplomatic and naval strength, Britain demonstrated a willingness to defer to American leadership and power in a matter of considerable significance. In the months that followed, however, American policy-makers were given further grounds to suspect British designs, as ownership of the remote South Atlantic island of Trinidad began to draw international attention.
The Annexation of Trinidad
Sovereignty over the remote and uninhabited island of Trinidad became the focus of an
Anglo-Brazilian dispute not long after the naval revolt was quelled. The island is located
1,800 km. northeast of Rio de Janeiro and comprises about 18 square kilometres. In 1893 the Foreign Office searched their records and found reference to its being claimed for
Britain in 1700 by Dr. Edmond Halley, a future astronomer royal, and to the fact that an attempt to establish a British settlement there in 1782 had failed, as had some subsequent attempts by the Brazilians.389
This search was sparked by an apparently frivolous inquiry from a resident of
New York City describing himself as Baron Harden Hickey, who wrote to the Foreign
Office in September 1893, informing the British government that he intended to assume possession of the remote island. Lord Rosebery did not think it advisable to reply to this,
388 Morgan to Gresham, 29 March 1894, quoted in: LaFeber, 'United States Depression Diplomacy and the Brazilian Revolution', 117. For press comment see page 110. 389 Memorandum, 30 Septemberl893, F.O. 420/158, Confidential Print 6794, Title to the Island of Trinidad (South Atlantic) 1894-1895, The National Archives, Kew, 3-4. 166 or to a second letter received in January of the following year from the same New York baron, who stated the island was henceforth to be known as the Principality of Trinidad, and that he would take the title of prince.390
A more serious communication concerning Trinidad arrived at the Foreign Office in November 1894. The Chairman of the Telegraph Construction and Maintenance
Company, retired Admiral George Henry Richards, notified the foreign secretary, now
Lord Kimberley, that the Brazilian government was in the process of taking action that could result in Brazil purchasing the British cables running along the Brazilian coast.
Richards expressed his concern that if this occurred, 'the continuity of British telegraph communication between this country, the River Plate, and the west coast of South
America will be broken, greatly to the detriment of the English Telegraph Companies.'
Richards noted that there was an Anglo-American dimension to the situation, because if his companies' connection to Brazil were interrupted, 'telegraph traffic to and from
England would, in such a case, have to pass over the Brazilian Government lines or over those of an American Company, and through the land lines of the United States.'
Richards had a simple solution. In order to 'maintain telegraphic communication by
British cables,' a new line should be laid 'from St. Vincent (Cape Verde Islands) to the
Island of Ascension, and thence to Buenos Ayres.' Richards explained that a 'great length of cable' was required to get from Ascension to the Argentine coast. 'If a mid- station could be established on the Island of Trinidad, in the South Atlantic, and the cable be divided into two sections, the scheme might then be carried out and the unbroken communication by British cables be restored.'
390 Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 18 December 1894, F.O. 420/158, 3. See also, Bertie, Memorandum, 5 August 1895, F.O. 420/158, 41-42. 167
Many of the monopolistic concessions extended by the Brazilian government to entice the British-owned telegraph companies into that country expired in the early 1890s.
The concessions were only partly renewed. The Brazilian government enacted legislation that would allow it to purchase at cost the lines connecting Brazilian cities. Brazil did not renew the British company's right to land their materials free of customs, and it imposed a per word tax on all telegrams passing through the country, including messages destined for the lucrative and growing Argentine market. Argentina, for its part, expressed interest in subsidizing a cable that would give it a direct link to the outside world, avoiding the expensive Brazilian stranglehold on its communications. Thus there were a number of factors favouring the establishment of a new line across the South Atlantic via Trinidad, landing in Argentina and bypassing Brazil. All this occurred at a time when Britain was facing challenges to its dominance of the international telegraphic business from Germany, the United States and France. This situation was made more acute by the increasing realization of the strategic importance of cables.
There was a precarious balance of interests between the Brazilian government and the foreign companies working to supply the country's telegraphic services. Submarine cables connected the Brazilian system with Europe, while another submerged line connected the main coastal towns, continuing to Uruguay and Argentina. There were periodic quarrels between the companies and the government over revenue sharing,
391 The complex business arrangements involved in establishing cable connections with South America are covered in Dwayne R. Winseck and Robert M. Pike, Communication and Empire: Media, Markets, and Globalization, 1860-1930, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 65-85. Sir John Pender states the commercial and strategic reasons for the Trinidad annexation in: Pender to Salisbury, 17 August 1895, F.O. 420/158, 72-73. 392 Attempts to establish a direct telegraph connection between Europe and Argentina began in the 1880s, and are described in: Jorma Ahvenainen, The European Cable Companies in South America before the First World War, ([Helsinki]: Academia Scientiarium Fennica, 2004), 211-218. 393 P.M. Kennedy, 'Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870-1914', The English Historical Review, Vol.86, No. 341 (October 1971), 728-752. 168 mutual accusations of poor maintenance, and calls by both sides to integrate the system either by private acquisition or nationalization.394 It is likely the coastal service would have already been nationalized after its twenty-year concession expired in 1892, were it not for the depressed economic situation.395 This contingency, moreover, made the laying of a new cable to South America via Trinidad island all the more desirable.
In his letter requesting annexation of Trinidad, Richards stated that his information showed that the island was British. If there were any doubt, the government
'looking to the great interests involved, might be pleased to resume formal possession of the island.' Richards also requested that the Brazilians not be informed of his company's plans for Trinidad Island.396
When asked to comment, the Colonial Office was mainly concerned that the proper form should be used in asserting British sovereignty.397 The Admiralty favoured the project because it involved running the proposed new cable via Ascension Island, facilitating communications with ships using the naval facilities there. Foreign Office staff advised it would be 'a wise precaution' to refer the question to the British legation in
Rio de Janeiro before taking further action.399 Lord Kimberley replied decisively: 'No.
Immediate steps should be taken to take possession of the island. Request Admiralty to
The most profitable service was the undersea cable from Cape Verde to the Northeast tip of Brazil operated by the Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Company. The coastal service was provided by a separate entity known as the Western and Brazilian Telegraph Company. The former was more closely controlled by Sir John Pender's corporate structures, though he had an interest in both, and the companies eventually merged. Ahvenainen, The European Cable Companies, 231-324 & 398-401. 395 Winseck and Pike, Communication and Empire, 76. 396 Richards to Kimberley, 28 November 1894, F.O. 420/158, 1. 397 Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 28 December 1894, F.O. 420/158, 4. 398 Admiralty to Foreign Office,, 31 December, F.O. 420/158, 5. 399 Francis Villiers, Minute, 1 January 1895, F.O. 420/158, 5. 169 take such steps without delay.' The Admiralty immediately requested the senior naval officer on the south-east coast of America, to annex Trinidad 'without delay.'401
Commander Foley encountered strong currents and headwinds during the six day voyage of H.M.S. Barracouta from Montevideo to Trinidad Island, arriving on 17 January
1895. He found no indication of possession by another power, and proceeded to proclaim ownership as provided in station orders. The White Ensign was raised and a copy of his proclamation placed in a glass bottle and deposited at the base of the flagstaff. On a rock- face visible from the sea, the crew painted the word 'RECORD' in eight-foot letters.
Foley carried out a similar ceremony on Martin Vas Rocks nearby.402 In the year that followed, the orderly annexation of Trinidad Island proved about the only straightforward aspect of what developed into an international incident involving a range of diplomatic, strategic, commercial and financial complications.
One of the first to know of the raising of the White Ensign on Trinidad was the influential Sir John Pender, the pioneer of submarine cable technology and the main actor behind the scenes, and later at centre stage, pressing for annexation. Pender served as a
Liberal member of parliament from 1865-1866 and 1872-1885, and was a sitting member
4UU Kimberley, Minute, 3 January 1895, F.O. 420/158, 5. 401 Edward Grey to Admiralty, 4 January 1895. Grey's letter to the Admiralty concluded with a cautionary paragraph, stating that 'The officer charged with this duty will no doubt, before issuing the Proclamation, satisfy himself that no foreign Power has existing rights over the island, which would preclude the assertion of British sovereignty.' The Admiralty replied confidentially on 7 January 1895, by sharing a draft of the telegram they proposed sending to the Senior Naval Officer, South-east Coast of America, ordering him to annex the islands providing 'you have no knowledge of previous occupation or of existing rights over them.' The Foreign Office replied the same day approving the telegram but requesting this phrase be omitted because 'Lord Kimberley thinks that this passage might lead the Senior Naval Officer to believe that Her Majesty's Government are unaware of the previous occupation of the islands by Brazil, and therefore to delay carrying out his instructions until he had further communicated with the Admiralty.' F.O. 420/158, 6-7. 402 Foley to Admiralty, 4 February 1895. His proclamation dated 24 January 1895 reads in part: 'Now therefore, I, John Foley Esquire, Commander HMS Baracouta do hereby proclaim and declare to all men that from and after the date of these presents, the full sovereignty of the island of Trinidad and the adjacent rocks of Martin Vas . . . together with their dependencies, in Her Majesty Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, for ever.' ADM. 1/7245 Brazil, 1895, The Narional Archives, Kew. 170
from 1892-96 when the Trinidad Island affair unfolded. He became an adherent to the
Liberal Unionist element of his party, ensuring his continuing influence with the
Salisbury government.403 Pender held a controlling or minority interest in most British
cable operations, including the strategic lines to India, Australia, and the Far East.404
Even before the Foreign Office received notice from the Admiralty that the island had
been annexed, Pender was writing to the Colonial Office, secure in the knowledge that
Trinidad was 'under the British flag,' and requesting that his company be 'granted
exclusive privileges' to land their cables there.405 As knowledge of the annexation slowly
spread, first within British official circles and subsequently to government officials in
Brazil, the Foreign Office found itself deluged with a range of views differing
substantially from those advanced by Admiral Richards, Sir John Pender and the
companies they controlled.
Constantine Phipps, a cousin of the Marquess of Normanby, had recently been
appointed the British minister to Brazil, succeeding Hugh Wyndham. He was taken aback
when informed of the Trinidad annexation plan, as he disagreed with the key assumption
leading to this hasty action. He was aware that the main British submarine cable landed
The Concise Dictionary of National Biography Part 1. 404 Pender's main holding company was the 'massive Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Company. This new technology powerhouse was presided over by the most prominent cable baron-John Pender-and woven into the fabric of business and diplomatic circles through a vast network of relationships. The firm was also vertically integrated with the most important telegraph company in Britain (the Magnetic) and well connected to the largest global communication projects then being contemplated.' Winseck and Pike, Communication and Empire, 24. 405 Pender's letter to Lord Ripon at the Colonial Office is dated 22 January 1895. His source of information is not indicated, but in it he states that 'The island of Trinidad, in the South Atlantic Ocean, being under the British flag, it may probably be desirable, in order to shorten the cable lengths, to land a projected submarine cable on the island.' Pender goes on to assert his view that 'any Company landing cables on the island should be granted exclusive privileges for so doing.' See Pender to Ripon, 22 January 1895, F.O. 420/158, 8. Commander Foley informed the Admiralty of the annexation by a confidential telegram from Monte Video sent, received and forwarded to the Foreign Office on 4 February 1895, more than a week after the date of Pender's letter requesting exclusive privileges on the island. Foley to Admiralty, 4 February 1895, F.O. 420/158, 8-9. 171 in Brazil and that service to the rest of the continent branched out from there. He also realized that British traffic passing through Brazil to Argentina was particularly lucrative.
There was another telegraph service on the Pacific side of the Andes, with which the
Pender's lines were connected, and this could in turn be connected to cables from the
United States. Brazilian nationalization of the British-financed lines might compromise security and strengthen the competitive position of the American companies. But Phipps did not believe nationalization was a serious possibility because it would not be a profitable undertaking for Brazil.406 On hearing of the annexation of Trinidad after the fact, Phipps telegraphed the Foreign Office questioning the rationale, and asserting that the 'Brazilian Government have no intention of purchasing the coast cable belonging to the Western and Brazillian Telegraph Company, as suggested in your Lordship's despatch.'407 And in a longer written communication, Phipps noted that the purchase of the telegraph company was unlikely, given 'the present state of Brazillian finance.'408
The Foreign Office refused Pender's request for exclusive landing rights on
Trinidad, stating it could not support ' a monopoly of this kind,'409 and inquired of the
Post Office what terms should be extended to Pender's company, and their reply indicated some of the darker implications of the international business of cable communications.
The Post Office urged that there should be a condition requiring that the cable 'must be laid within a specified period.' Otherwise, it was possible that the laying of the cable might be 'indefinitely deferred.' The Post Office was suspicious that delay might in fact be part of Pender's strategy. Once landing rights on Trinidad were conceded, the cable
406 Phipps to Kimberley, 27 February 1895, F.O. 420/185, 8. 407 Phipps to Kimberley, 27 February 1895, F.O. 420/185, 8. 408 Phipps to Kimberley, 13 February 1895, F.O. 420/185, 9. 409 Foreign Office to Sir G. Richards, 22 March 1895, F.O. 420/158, 10. 172 companies could use this fact to 'make better terms with the Brazilian Government, or to persuade that Government not to carry out the purchase of the Western and Brazilian
Company's cables.' The Post Office understood that the legislation to nationalize the
British cables in Brazil had been passed, 'and it only remains to settle the terms of purchase.' If the companies could hold out the threat of an alternative cable being laid, the Brazilian government 'might be induced to pay a higher sum on being assured that the proposed alternative cable would not at present be laid, or might be persuaded not to give effect to the law authorizing the purchase of the Western and Brazilian Company's cables.410
In July, while a general election campaign was being waged in Britain, news reports from London reached Brazil that Trinidad Island had been annexed. Ever vigilant in any matter touching on President James Monroe's doctrine, the American Minister
Thomas Thompson telegraphed Washington with the news that 'a British force has occupied the island of Trinidad off the coast.'411
In London, the Brazilian minister called at the Foreign Office to assert that
Trinidad Island was Brazilian, not British territory. Francis Bertie, the permanent under secretary, dismissed these objections stating, 'there could be no question of Brazilian sovereignty.' Bertie believed Brazil's objections were 'merely an attempt to establish a telegraphic monopoly.' In response to assertions that Brazil would ask Britain to
410 General Post Office to Foreign Office, 25 March 1895, F.O. 420/158, 11-12. 411 Thompson to Olney, 19 July 1895, quoted in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895 Part I, 63. In fact the British minister convinced Brazilian authorities not to send a war vessel to the disputed island. 173 withdraw, Bertie pointed out that because Britain had taken possession in 1700 and colonized the island briefly in 1781, it was 'not probable that we should withdraw.' 412
In Brazil, British Minister Phipps was asked by Brazilian Foreign Minster De
Carvalho if reports of Trinidad's annexation were true. Phipps confirmed this, stating that no record of Brazilian ownership seemed to exist for the remote island. The foreign minister replied that 'historical records, easily accessible, proved that Brazil inherited the island with other Portuguese possessions, and that periodical visits were made to it by
Brazilian warship.' He added that public opinion in his country demanded that 'Brazilian rights must be defended.' Phipps managed to convince him that plans to send a Brazilian warship to Trinidad to refute the British claim was 'inadvisable pending an issue being arrived at.'413
Lord Salisbury, who by now was leading the new Liberal Unionist government, combining the offices of prime minister and foreign secretary, supported the stand taken by Phipps. Salisbury believed Brazil could 'have no title to the island superior to that of
Great Britain.' He asserted that 'Her Majesty's Government cannot consent to waive their rights to the island, which is required as a telegraph cable station, and you should, in friendly terms, warn the Brazilian Government that they trust the latter will not send a
412 Bertie, Memorandum, 20 July 1895, F.O. 420/158, 19. After preparing his precis of his meeting with Brazilian Minister Correa, Bertie went on to draft a second memorandum, presumably with his new political masters in mind, of the background of the growing controversy, which concludes with the observation: 'There is no trace in the Foreign Office of any claim having been made to the island by a foreign Power; the Americans do not claim it as a guano island.' Memorandum by Mr. Bertie, 20 July 1895, F.O. 420/158, 19-20. 4,3 Phipps to Salisbury, 20 July 1895, F.O. 420/158, 20. 174 ship to assert a right of sovereignty, as they could only regard it as a deliberately unfriendly act on the part of Brazil.' 414
In the days that followed there were demands in the Brazilian Congress for the government to explain itself in relation to the Trinidad Island occupation. The speaker of the country's legislature stated his belief that 'Brazilian rights would be recognized by
Great Britain, but, if not, Brazil would not fail to fulfil the duty incumbent on her.' Some
3,000 Brazilians turned out for a public meeting to protest the British annexation of
Trinidad Island. Anti-British sentiment necessitated that crews of five British warships then in the harbour at Rio de Janeiro be kept on board.415
Phipps met with De Carvalho again on 23 July. The foreign minister's tone was moderate, likely due to his ability to quote a number of historical precedents that supported his country's claim to Trinidad, much impressing the British minister with the strength of the Brazilian case.416 These arguments had not arrived at the Foreign Office
Salisbury to Phipps, 21 July 1895. Phipps replied to Salisbury that he did not invoke the warning, explaining 'I reserved the final expression in case necessity for its use should arise.' He went on to observe that 'The intended departure of a cruiser yesterday has been, it is said, countermanded. There is considerable excitement here.' Phipps to Salisbury, 22 July 1895, F.O. 420/158, 20. 415 Phips to Salisbury, 23 July 1895, F.O. 420/158, 20A. 416 In a despatch to Salisbury which arrived at the Foreign Office three weeks later, Phipps provided an extended account of his meeting with de Carvalho. 'I said that I was speaking now quite without instructions. If Her Majesty's Government were convinced by his arguments as to the validity of the Brazilian title to the island, would he see any objection to granting to us say a perpetual lease at a nominal rent with full control. His Excellency said that he was also speaking without authority, but that, personally, he could see none ... I added that I would continue to speak frankly. It was to Great Britain, as a commercial nation, of great importance to maintain without fear of disturbance her telegraphic communications. Every security in this respect was, I was convinced, offered by the present Government in Brazil, but, candidly speaking, I could not but feel that under the recent regime such security had been hardly beyond doubt. His Excellency said he could not cavil at what I had said. The question was merely one of amor propre which in his country was most sensitive. All, he felt, that he could be desired was a recognition of Brazilian rights, and in view of the friendship prevailing between our Governments he fostered the hope that this would be accorded, as Brazil could not resign them. He added a few words in which he accounted for the susceptibility evidenced by the existence of a feeling that under the Empire such events as those at Amapa [where there had been a longstanding border dispute with the French in French Guiana] and Trinidad would not have occurred. A solution of this matter would be afforded by amicable discussion as in the case of the Amapa incident, and if that failed arbitration would be the sole issue.' See: Phipps to Salisbury, 23 July 1895, F.O. 420/158, 53-54. 175 before Salisbury met with the Brazilian minister in London. De Souza Correa described the agitated state of public opinion in Brazil as a result of the British annexation, and called for British withdrawal. Salisbury replied that, since Britain had claimed the island two hundred years ago, 'our title was indisputable.' 417 Telegraphic communications ensured that the affair developed quickly. Phipps' telegram arrived in London explaining that the Brazilian government had provided him with copies of British Admiralty orders from 1782 calling for the evacuation of Trinidad, along with directions for it to be handed over to Portugal as part of the viceroyalty of Brazil.418 A search of Foreign Office records was undertaken immediately, apparently confirming the facts as stated by the
Brazilian government.419
In Brazil, the press unanimously denounced the British action. The Brazilian
Congress rang with speeches expressing outrage in the matter. Public meetings in Rio continued to fuel public indignation over British disregard for Brazil's ownership of the
South Atlantic island. Police posted a guard at the British Consulate in Rio de Janeiro. In
Sao Paulo attempts were made to break down the door of the consulate, while in the nearby town of Santos, the Cafe de Londres was cautiously renamed the Cafe de
Trinidad. Phipps reported it was 'beyond doubt that the event has exercised an influence on commerce and finance, exchange on London falling 8 per cent, in the course of to day.' Even one of the country's most 'moderate and well-conducted' newspapers was demanding that 'retaliation must be exercised upon the British Companies in Brazil,
417 Salisbury to Phipps, 24 July 1895, F.O. 420/158, 20. 418 Phipps to Salisbury, 24 July 1895, FO 420/158, 20-21. 419 In a Memorandum prepared by a senior Foreign Office clerk, it was confirmed that in 1782, the Portuguese Minister in London had protested the fact that Trinity Island, a possession of the Portuguese Crown as a dependency of Brazil, had been occupied by troops from a British warship. George III apparently agreed that British action in taking the island and using it as a base for operations along the coast of Latin America was contrary to British treaty commitments, and ordered that the island be evacuated. Oakes, Memorandum , 25 July 1895, FO 420/158, 22-23. 176
which exhaust all the wealth of the country, whilst even repudiation of debt is distinctly
hinted at.'420 The United States minister telegraphed the State Department that the
'British claim to the island of Trinidad' was being 'disputed earnestly by Brazilian
minister of foreign affairs. The people express indignation.'
It was, however, the historical information provided by Brazil, challenging the
British claim, which shook the Foreign Office out of its previous, and highly confident,
position. By the end of July Salisbury was telegraphing Phipps that this information
necessitated a new and more flexible approach: a compromise might be arrived at 'as an
act of friendship, and in preference to leaving the matter in a state of suspense, which is
most unsatisfactory.' Salisbury proposed that Britain might 'take a lease of the island
from the Brazilian government for use as a telegraphic station.'422 Pender expressed his
view that should the claim to Trinidad be given up, he would favour a lease. Failing that,
his companies would rely on the British government, 'to obtain for them better treatment
than hitherto from Brazil.'
As if to provide comic relief in the midst of these serious negotiations, the Foreign
Office received yet another note, this time in the best diplomatic lingua franca, from the
Phipps to Salisbury, 25 July 1895, F.O. 420/158, 61-62. It is interesting to compare the anti-British sentiment the Trinidad affair inspired, with the generally pro-American sentiment that seemed to exist in Brazil around this time. In July 1894, the American minister reported that 'a general demonstration of friendliness and good will to our Government was made by the people of Rio de Janeiro. In honor of the anniversary of our Declaration of Independence all public departments were closed, flags displayed, and some buildings very beautifully decorated. The vessels of the national squadron were also decorated, and the fortresses in the harbor ... fired a national salute.' Thompson to Gresham, 12 July 1894, United States Department of State, Papers, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 3, 1894, 85. And later in the year, Thompson reported that the cornerstone had been laid for 'the pedestal of a monument proposed to be erected to the memory of Monroe ... the great American statesman and the doctrine that bears his name.' See: Thompson to Gresham, 12 July 1895, United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President, Transmitted to Congress December 2, 1895: Part I, 48. 421 Thompson to Olney, 28 July 1895, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895, 63. 422 Salisbury to Phipps, 30 July 1895, F.O. 420/158, 34-35. 423 Bertie, Memorandum, 2 August 1895, F.O. 420/158, 36. 177
West 36 Street, New York, office of the 'Grand Chancelier' and 'Secretaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangeres de la Principaute de Trinidad, le Comte de la Boissiere.' The count forwarded to Lord Salisbury a copy of his note to United States Secretary of State
Walter Gresham,424 in which he confirmed that Baron Harden Hickey had taken possession of Trinidad Island and had assumed the title of 'Son Altesse Serenissime le
Prince James ler.' The note continued:
A la suite de cette prise de possession, le Gouvernement Bresilien, invoquant un droit d'ancienne occupation Portugaise (prescrit depuis longtemps), a signifie au Gouvernement Anglais d'avoir a lui abandonner l'ile...Je viens aujourd'hui prier votre Excellence de vouloir bien demander au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis de 1'Amerique du Nord de reconnaitre la Principaute de Trinidad...Ce faisant, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis de 1'Amerique du Nord accordera une fois de plus son puissant concours a la cause du droit et de la justice meconnue par l'Angleterre et le Bresil, mettra fin a une situation qui menace de troubler la paix, retablira la concorde entre deux grands Etats prets a en venir aux mains, et se montera de plus, en agissant ainsi, le fidele interprete de la celebre doctrine de Monroe.425
No suggestion exists that this or any of the letters from the aspiring princely claimant or his chancellor were ever answered by the Foreign Office.
In Washington, the hot summer was enlivened with press reports concerning the tempest brewing over the South Atlantic island, with the Washington Record claiming to have interviewed a State Department official concerning the outcome of the dispute.
'Why,' the State Department official replied, 'It's very simple to me. Brazil will doubtless refer the matter to the attention of the United States. The Monroe doctrine states expressly that we cannot regard that... other than in the light of an unfriendly act to us and dangerous to our peace.' 'And if Great Britain refuses to withdraw?' The State Department official shrugged his shoulders and replied:
The communication was incorrectly addressed to Walter Gresham, Richard Olney having succeeded Gresham as secretary of state on 8 June 1895. Tansill, Bayard, 700. See, in particular, footnote 172. 425 Boissiere to Gresham, 27 July 1895, enclosed in: Boisierre to Salisbury, 27 July 1895, FO 420/158, 45- 46. 178
'Either the British lion or the American eagle will have to stick its tail between its legs and slink ignominiously away.'426
The second assistant secretary of state, Alvey Adee,427 wrote to his new superior,
Richard Olney, enclosing the news cuttings, observing that the State Department official referred to was 'a myth of the reporter's creation.'428 Nevertheless, Adee had to admit that the 'newspaper men are wild about the Trinidad business. I suppose a dozen of them have been in today to ask what the United States are going to do about the British seizure.' The question of 'whether we will permit Great Britain to purchase the island from Brazil in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine' had become mixed with reports 'that
Baron Harden-Hickey's Chancellor is coming to Washington to demand recognition [of] the mid-ocean Principality.' American press coverage contributed an aura of triviality to the Trinidad affair. The island was undeniably miniscule and remote. With the insertion of the eccentric Baron Harden-Hickey into the unfolding drama in the guise of the erstwhile prince of Trinidad, public attention was diverted from the more serious diplomatic and commercial aspects of affair.
The American pretender to the Trinidad throne continued to seek the attention of the State Department. Adee received a request from Harden-Hickey's 'Chancellor,' the
Comte de la Boissiere, decrying the fact that 'the legitimate rights of my August
Sovereign' were disregarded when 'a British warvessel . . . took possession of the Island
426 Washington News, 30 July 1895. 427'The State Department escaped the worst abuses of the era of spoilsmen. Much of its work was done by a single person, the legendary AlveyAdee, a bureaucrat par excellence who served nearly forty years as second assistant secretary. The State Department's institutional memory and a master of diplomatic practice, Adee drafted most of its instructions and dispatches.' See: Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 279. 428 Adee to Olney, 31 July 1895, Olney Papers, Library of Congress, Reel 11. 429 Adee to Olney, 2 August 1895, Olney Papers. 179 in the name of Great Britain.' Boissiere wished the United States to 'recognize the
Principality of Trinidad as an independent state,' and asserted that in doing so the United
States would 'lend its powerful aid to the cause of right and justice . . . disregarded by
Great Britain and Brazil.' This would 'put an end to a situation which threatens to disturb the peace,' showing that the United States was, 'a faithful interpreter of the celebrated Monroe doctrine,'430 Adee confided to Olney that he could not see 'how the recognition of the sovereignty of the nondescript Baron (with a European title) as against the claims of Brazil . . . will help the Monroe Doctrine, or how we can be supposed to confirm his title.'431
Under pressure from a New York Times correspondent, Adee met with Boissiere in early August. Adee relayed his impressions to Olney, explaining that 'Baron Hardin
[sic] -Hickey, it seems is the son of an Irish Baron, but I cannot find his title in
Whittakers official list.' Adee understood he had come to the United States and
'embarked in large Californian enterprises, married a daughter of Mr. Flagler,432 and apparently as a condition to that marriage, became naturalized here. His mother was a
Californian.' Adee completed his description of his meeting with the Chancellor to James
I, Prince of Trinidad by explaining that, 'It has not been easy for me to recite this conversation with appearance of seriousness, and I certainly do not expect you to receive it in any very serious light.'433
The same month a more serious meeting was convened in London between Lord
Salisbury and De Souza Correa, the Brazilian minister. They concluded, somewhat
430 Boissiere to Adee, undated, but apparently received 30 July 1895, enclosed in: Adee to Olney, 30 July 1895, Olney Papers. 431 Adee to Olney, 2 August 1895, Olney Papers. 432 Flagler was a partner of Rockefeller in founding the Standard Oil Co. 433 Adee to Olney, 8 August 1895, Olney Papers,. 180 prematurely, that the differences between their two countries were not now matters 'of substance, but simply of form.' Brazil was willing to grant a lease of Trinidad Island for telegraphic purposes, and Salisbury conceded Britain was not inclined to contest their title, but before doing this he wanted 'absolute certainty of the lease.' To do this,
Salisbury wanted Correa and Pender to get together to sort out an acceptable arrangement, after which Britain would 'be ready to recognize the title of Brazil.'434
Pender was less than enthusiastic. He pointed out to Salisbury that attempts to resolve the range of difficulties with Brazil had so far proved unsuccessful. He was developing a new plan to run a cable from the West African colony of Sierra Leone to
South America, though he still wanted to see 'a thoroughly satisfactory and mutually advantageous working arrangement between the Brazilian Government and the Cable companies.' Without this, Pender was concerned that there could be difficulties 'best provided against by Great Britain retaining the Island of Trinidad and the right to land a telegraph cable there.'435
The cable magnate was, however, fighting a rearguard action. The Foreign Office now realized that the British claim to Trinidad was much weaker than originally thought, and the commercial and diplomatic problems its annexation was causing were proving disproportionate to the value the island represented. In the months that followed, revelations casting light on Pender's business dealings worked to further dampen the ardour of the Foreign Office in championing his cause in the Trinidad Island affair.
The Brazilian government had long harboured deep suspicions of Pender. During the summer of 1895, diplomatic discussions came to focus on the fact that the cable
434 Salisbury to Phipps, 16 August 1895, F.0.420/158, 71. 435 Pender to Salisbury, 17 August 1895, F.O. 420/158, 72-73. 181 agreement Brazil entered into the previous year with one of Pender's companies precluded Brazil from allowing any other cables to be run through Brazilian territory to
Uruguay or Argentina, except those currently in existence. The Brazilians realized that the proposed Trinidad cable was intended to bypass them and deprive their country of this traffic and resultant tax revenues. To facilitate such a development would not be in
Brazil's national interest. Nor did arbitration seem a suitable solution from the Brazilian perspective, as it would likely prolong the matter and inflame public opinion. The
Brazilians suggested that Britain might compensate for the loss of Trinidad by a favourable drawing of the disputed Brazil-British Guiana frontier. Phipps was aware that this would involve the Colonial Office, recently placed under the direction of Joseph
Chamberlain, and that it could be 'a difficult institution to deal with and very sturdy in the defence of the interests confided to its care.'43
In late August, the Foreign Office's permanent under-secretary, Sir Thomas
Sanderson, met with Brazil's diplomatic minister in London, De Souza Correa, to discoverwhat might be happening with Pender and any private arrangements over the island that could help resolve the dispute. Correa described how Pender had spoken of the cable to the River Plate as being far from a fait accompli. He was now looking for this to be subsidized by the Argentine government, and Correa was satisfied that this subsidy was something the Argentineans 'were not in a position to give.' Correa proposed that Britain recognise the Brazilian title to Trinidad and trust his government to
436 During these negotiations Phipps suggested that if the Brazilians could not agree to the use of Trinidad Island as a cable station, Pender might run the line to Rio Platte via Ascension and St. Helena. The Brazil press was at this time reporting that Pender had completed his line to Ascension, that it was unprofitable, and that the continuation of that line to South America was intended to recoup revenues. See: Phipps to Salisbury, 16 August 1895, F.O. 420/158, 82-84. See also, extract from the Gazeta de Noticas, 22 August 1895, enclosure in: Phipps to Salisbury, 26 August 1895, F.O. 420/158, 82-84. 182
'do what was right' in the matter of telegraphic communications. Sanderson concluded the talks, believing they had reached a deadlock. If Britain agreed to what Brazil was asking, 'Pender would be left without any lever for his negotiations.' Sanderson wondered if it might be best to let Pender know 'that the Brazilian counter-claim to
Trinidad is not a very easy one to refute, and that they should lose no time in coming to terms.'437
Phipps had never seen much hope of success in direct negotiations between the
Brazilians and Pender, whose flamboyant business reputation had not endeared him to
Brazilian officials. Phipps doubted Carvalho would 'consent to an arrangement being come to with Sir John Pender. The whole question had arisen in consequence of an intrigue set on foot by that gentleman, of which he had the threads in his hands.' Phipps boldly asserted that 'Sir John had not been frank either with the late Government of Her
Majesty, or with that of Brazil.' The most recent contact with Pender seemed to suggest that he no longer required Trinidad Island because 'the anticipated subsidy to be granted by the Argentine Government [to lay a direct line from Trinidad to that country] was no longer available, and without such subsidy the proposed cable would not be possible.'438
The Foreign Office referred the Trinidad Island question to the Law Officers of the Crown to get their assessment as to the validity of the British case for annexing the island. Their report gave qualified support for British action in annexing the island, noting
437 Sir T. Sanderson, Memorandum, 22 August 1895, FO 420/158, 73-74. 438 Pender's business dealings were complex, and Phipps explained how, 'Aware that Congress had authorized the outlay of 2,000,000 /. to buy the Western Telegraph cables, Sir J. Pender had offered last February to produce that sum himself subject to an engagement to hand over the lines to the Brazilian Government whenever it had that sum available to pay him. That offer had been refused, and Sir John now felt that he was in a position to oust the Western Telegraph Company, diminishing its receipts as well as those of Brazil, and to insure a monopoly of the River Plate traffic' See: Phipps to Salisbury, 15 September 1895, F.O. 420/158, 90-91. 183 that it remained uninhabited, that 'there never has been any occupation of any sort of the island by Brazil,' and that there was nothing to show 'that any title that Portugal had, passed to Brazil.' It was suggested that the former point be stressed in communications with Brazil over the matter.439
When this opinion was somehow leaked to 'a favoured few' by a Rio newspaper, a run on Brazilian currency followed.440 More anti-British protests ensued, along with demands that the government legislate against British businesses operating in Brazil.
There was talk of Brazil breaking off diplomatic relations with Great Britain, while scurrilous press reports circulated concerning Pender's shady business dealings.441
Phipps reported that it was rumoured that Rothschild interests, given their substantial investments in Brazil, were working on Brazil's behalf to 'secure a favourable decision.'442
Salisbury endeavoured to strike a conciliatory tone in relaying the law officers' opinion to the Brazilians. His despatch, while upholding the possibility of British title being sound, included an option for Brazil to exercise sovereignty over the disputed South
Atlantic outcrop. The foreign secretary emphasized that the reason for British annexation had been to 'facilitate the telegraphic communication of the world,' and if there were some other way to achieve this Britain was 'willing to allow formal rights, which in other
439 Law Officers of the Crown to Salisbury, 24 October 1895, F.O. 420/158, 92A. 440 Phipps to Salisbury, 19 October 1895, F.O. 420/158, 92. 441 An Extract from the Journal de Commercio, of October 13, 1895, stated that with respect to the Trinidad question, ' ... we must bear in mind that Sir John Pender was the Deus ex machina of this unjustifiable act of the British Government, and that whilst, through the intermedium of Admiral Richard, the Director of his "Brazilian Submarine Company," and Lord Sackville Cecil, the brother of Lord Salisbury, &c, he was proposing to the Brazilian Government to come to an arrangement with it respecting the "Western and Brazilian," that does not belong to him, he obtained from Lord Rosebery the occupation of the Island of Trinidad.' Enclosed in: Phipps to Salisbury, 19 October 1895, F.O. 420/158, 94. 442 Salisbury to Phipps, and Phipps to Salisbury, 21 October 1895, F.O. 420/158, 90-91. 184 respects were of little or no practical value, to fall into abeyance.' Salisbury commented on the problems posed by the Brazil's contractual arrangements involving Pender which precluded 'the erection of a telegraphic station on the island.' He did not think these need be 'insuperable', even hinting that nationalization of the cable company might resolve this. As for ownership of Trinidad Island, Salisbury offered that 'in deference to the wishes of an ally' with which Britain had 'many ties of commerce and of friendship' he was willing 'to submit the question of title to arbitration, if the two Governments can agree upon a satisfactory Arbiter.'443
These lengthy observations were sent to Phipps by surface rather than cable, to guide him in his dealings with Carvalho. The Brazilian government took offence at the length of time it took for the despatch to arrive and then, at the fact that a formal diplomatic note had not been prepared conveying Britain's position. This was eventually rectified, though in the interim the idea of arbitration had become a matter of general discussion in the Brazilian press and government circles.444 The American minister
Salisbury recited the background issues as these related to the island, noting that the impetus for annexation sprang from the possible compulsory takeover by the Brazilian government of the cables connecting the other states of South America, though the reason for British intervention was to facilitate international telegraphic communications. He commented that the 'Brazilian Government profess to be prevented from granting any lease [to Trinidad Island] upon these terms by an agreement concluded with the Western Telegraph Company in 1893. As they have by a recent Act of the Chambers and the Senate taken power to purchase compulsorily the rights of this very Company, the obstacle to the erection of a telegraphic station on the island does not seem to be insuperable.' As for ownership of Trinidad, Salisbury noted that since the eighteenth century when it was occupied alternatively by Great Britain and Brazil, that the island, 'has not been occupied by Portugal or Brazil, or any other Power, and it has remained for a century quite uninhabited. In 1825 the independence of Brazil was recognized under Treaty by Portugal; but the Island of Trinidad is not mentioned in that Treaty.' See: Salisbury to Phipps, 16 November 1895, F.O. 420/158, 95-97. 444 In early November, Carvalho was complaining to Phipps about the long delay in receiving a response from the British Foreign Office. See: Phipps to Salisbury, 6 November 1895, F.O. 420/158, 100; Salisbury's despatch of 16 November laying out in detail the British position including willingness to refer the Trinidad question to arbitration, does not yet appear to have been received in early December, when Phipps was reporting that with a single exception, 'the newspapers have entered on a violent campaign against arbitration, and the leader of the Jacobin party has delivered a speech advising its rejection, but admitting mediation.' See: Phipps to Salisbury, 2 December 1895, F.O. 420/158, 101. The dispute with 185 reported to Washington that the Brazilian president was considering arbitration, while
Carvalho had a 'legal opinion against it, but considerations of policy may induce an
,445 acceptance.
When Phipps finally delivered the properly formatted views of Her Majesty's
Government to Foreign Minister Carvalho on 18 December, public opinion in Brazil had seemingly turned against arbitration as being 'incompatible with national dignity.'446
Phipps could only report that the 'Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs. . .while respecting the opinion expressed by your Lordship .. . maintained his own.'447
The issue was still unresolved in late December 1895, as the whole process of
Anglo-American diplomatic relations moved towards a breaking point over the British
Guiana-Venezuela boundary question, a dispute that involved supposedly rich trade routes and placer gold deposits, and was therefore able to capture the imagination of the
American public in a way that Trinidad Island never could. Olney chose Guiana's
Orinoco basin, which incidentally bordered on northern Brazil, as the ground over which he would defend the Monroe Doctrine, fully aware that the principles being defended included Trinidad Island. The mishandled annexation of Trinidad was one more item on the list of territorial and other transgressions, including suspected support for naval insurgents in Rio harbour, the Corinto landing, sporadic border incidents with Venezuela and the various Canadian disputes that, rightly or wrongly, gave credence to those elements in the United States harbouring suspicions as to British territorial 'pretensions.'
Carvalho regarding the correct form by which the British government's views should be conveyed to the Brazilian government seems have been dealt with between 12 and 15 December. See: Phipps to Salisbury, 12 December 1895, F.0.420/158, 101, and Salisbury to Phipps, 15 December 1895, F.O. 420/158, 102. 445 Thompson to Olney, 30 November 1895, Foreign Relations of the United States, Part I, 1895,69. 446 Phipps to Salisbury, 28 Novemberl895, 1895 F.O. 420/158, 106. 447 Phipps to Salisbury,, 18 December 1895, 1895 FO 420/158, 106. 186
In due course, Britain was able to accept the good offices of the government of
Portugal, and a face saving solution to the Trinidad Island fiasco was implemented.
Portugal confirmed that Trinidad Island had been transferred to Brazil in 1825, and that
Britain should therefore recognize Brazilian sovereignty. The Admiralty issued the necessary orders for the 'removal of the flagstaff and of the record of occupation.'448
H.M.S. Barracouta, the same ship whose crew had proudly raised the White Ensign only eighteen months previously, was sent to haul down the colours. In an added touch of irony, the signal confirming de-annexation was sent telegraphically from Montevideo along the same Brazilian cable that had sparked the dispute over the island's ownership in the first place. Pender never built a cable station on Trinidad Island.449
Conclusion
The Anglo-American experience in relation to Brazil included occasionally bitter, three- sided animosity generated by local instability and the expansion of trade and commercial enterprises seeking to capture an important market. Diplomacy as well as naval and military factors played their part in the dispute resolution process, though some of the discord generated in the Brazilian context was carried forward to the Venezuelan crisis, as were some important lessons learned.
In the harbour of Rio de Janeiro, the United States discovered that its fleet was sufficiently large and modern to have a profound influence on hemispheric affairs, directing the outcome of a bloody revolution with the firing of a single shell from a
448 Foreign Office to Admiralty, 7 August 1896, ADM1/7245. 449 Officer Commanding HMS Barracouta to Admiralty, 1 September 1896, ADM. 1/7245. Ascension Island was connected in 1899, but not Trinidad. See: Hugh Barty-King, Girdle Round the Earth: The story of Cable and Wireless and its Predecessors to Mark the Group's Jubilee 1929-1979, (London: Heinemann, 1979), 126-127. 187 shipboard gun. Rightly or wrongly, the Brazilian naval revolt fed American suspicions of
British meddling in the political fortunes of an important Latin American country that possessed a market both countries sought to exploit. The botched annexation of Trinidad
Island gave added credence to those American voices warning that the tentacles of British imperialism were being extended to the Western Hemisphere. The Brazilian naval revolt demonstrated that the United States had the capability to oppose successfully actions that did not accord with American foreign policy.
The British experience in this South Atlantic triangular exchange was very different. British concern for the outcome of the Brazilian naval revolt focussed on opening the harbour to trade. The fact the United States Navy accomplished this was welcomed by the Foreign Office and led to an offer to extend arrangements for mutual co-operation. American action had alleviated a situation in which the Royal Navy was reluctant to act, and American forces supported the interests of both countries, incidentally confounding the schemes of Germany. The affair over Trinidad Island was less salutary, illustrating the dangers into which commercial machinations could catapult the diplomatic process. This episode did nothing to strengthen British influence in Brazil, though perhaps the absence of an early outcry from the United States over the matter was deceiving, as Venezuela was to be the context in which this offence against the Monroe
Doctrine was ultimately addressed. British policy-makers did well if they concluded from the Trinidad affair that annexations in the Western Hemisphere, even on a
Lilliputian scale, could be fraught with problems. V. Venezuela and the Boundaries of Discord 1895-1896
The series of Anglo-American Western Hemispheric disputes that began in the mid-
1880s, culminated in the crisis that developed over the Venezuela-British Guiana boundary. Questions concerning this boundary had simmered over many years, rising to prominence during the summer of 1895 and reaching crisis proportions in the weeks around Christmas that year. The mechanism for settlement was agreed to in 1896, marking a new balance in the Anlo-American relationship. The dispute over the
Venezuelan boundary was about much more than control of the jungles of the Orinoco basin. In fact, the various hemispheric quarrels involving Britain and the United States during the preceding ten years, tended to be reflected in it. The confrontation sparked by the dispute bore directly on the need to clarify, in a public way, the respective roles that
Britain and the United States would assume in hemispheric affairs in the years to follow.
The American press and public did not appreciate the extent to which Britain had, for many purposes, indicated its willingness to concede hemispheric leadership to the
United States under certain conditions. American suspicion of British hemispheric intentions seemed justified when, in 1895, the new colonial secretary in Salisbury's
Unionist government, Joseph Chamberlain, initiated actions in Venezuela that suggested a new aggressiveness in British policy. The appointment of Richard Olney as Grover
Cleveland's secretary of state a few weeks earlier meant that Chamberlain found himself
188 189 dealing with an American leader fully capable of opposing any fresh hints of British acquisitiveness. Olney and Chamberlain both saw themselves representing the political forces of expansionism in their respective countries. The diplomatic events surrounding the Venezuelan boundary crisis provided a public forum in which these expansive forces would clash, leading to a re-definition of the Anglo-American relationship.
The dispute included much discussion of the Monroe Doctrine. Olney insisted on
British acceptance of its application to the Venezuelan dispute as a sign of American hegemony in the hemisphere. The crisis escalated as a result of the less than diplomatic manner in which Olney communicated this over the summer of 1895. There was real reluctance, particularly on the part of Chamberlain, to acknowledge explicitly that the
United States should play a more prominent role in hemispheric affairs than Britain, a fact leading to further escalation of the crisis as the year drew to a close.
Both Britain and the United States pulled back from further confrontation.
Reasons for this included the collapse of financial markets on Wall Street in the face of threatened hostilities and the subsequent willingness of Britain to allow the United States to insert itself in the Anglo-Venezuelan dispute. In doing this, Britain accepted an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine that Britain had, to this point, avoided.
Chamberlain's part in this process was of great significance. His actions were inspired both by apprehension over the American threats of war, and by extensive British commitments elsewhere. His assertive approach to the border controversy had done much to escalate the dispute, and his willingness to back down in the face of an aggressive
American stand set the tone for subsequent British policy. Nevertheless, in resolving the dispute most British diplomatic objectives were met. British acceptance of arbitration 190 proved cathartic, and was balanced by the United States committing itself to use its influence in the hemisphere to support, rather than hinder Britain in its dealings with
Venezuela and, by implication, other Latin American states. The Venezuela settlement pertained primarily to the Caribbean and Latin America, though its resolution held implications for Canadian-American relations as well. Following the crisis, Britain continued its policy of seeking to facilitate North American solutions to the range of regional problems arising between the United States and Canada. Facing challenges elsewhere in the world, Britain was increasingly able to view the Western Hemisphere as a region with which it could deal at arm's length, with some assurance that its interests there were safeguarded.
The Hemispheric Context
There had been attempts in the years preceding the Venezuelan crisis to establish a form of arbitration to resolve the widest possible range of Anglo-American disputes.450 A formal system of this type would have given greater stability to the improvised diplomatic processes that had come to characterize Anglo-American relations. In June 1894, a joint resolution of the United States Senate and House of Representatives requested that the president negotiate what was usually referred to as a General Treaty of Arbitration with
Great Britain. The same year, 354 members of the British House of Commons signed a memorial endorsing the idea, and the Canadian House of Commons passed a resolution supporting the 'peaceful settlement by arbitration of any disputes . . . which cannot be
450 The development of the arbitration movement in its broader international context is discussed by Richard Langhorne, 'Arbitration: the first phase, 1870-1914' in Michael Dockrill and Brian McKercher (eds.) Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 43-55. 191 adjusted by diplomatic agency.' The American Senate Committee considering the matter had difficulty determining what matters should and should not be arbitrated. In an endeavour to assist, the British ambassador and expert in international law, Sir Julian
Pauncefote, prepared a draft treaty text, which he shared with Secretary of State Gresham, who in turn supplied a counter-draft. The negotiations were interrupted with Gresham's death later in 1895. At the height of the Venezuelan boundary crisis, President Cleveland put forward a much more one-sided arbitral process that was rejected by Britain.
Questions related to developing a mutually acceptable method of arbitration were central to resolving this matter. A much truncated proposal was eventually voted on and defeated by the Senate in 1897.451
Churning in the background throughout the Venezuelan crisis was the ongoing, dispute over Bering Sea seals. The Paris tribunal announced its award in 1893, largely supporting British contentions concerning the freedom of the seas, but directing that specific conservation measures be implemented, and compensation paid to Canadian sealers illegally detained in Alaskan waters. Gresham pushed Britain to join in enacting enabling legislation to provide for enforcement in the upcoming 1894 sealing season. On
451 The 1895 treaty drafts are forwarded in: Pauncefote to Kimberley 15 February 1895, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 236-238. The arbitration movement is discussed in: Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement, 26-28. Defeat in 1897 was blamed at the time on the Senate's determination to protect its prerogatives in the field of international relations. The Canadian Resolution referred to British support for the arbitration movement and stated that 'this House believing it to be in the interests of Canada that the present friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States should be cultivated and maintained, views with the highest satisfaction the disposition shown by both countries to promote the peaceful settlement by arbitration of any disputes or differences between them which cannot be adjusted by diplomatic agency. The prominent Liberal and future Speaker of the House of Commons, David Edgar, was in favour of the treaty and the arbitration movement in general, stating that 'our destiny is absolutely bound up with the destiny of the hemisphere.' Sir Julian Pauncefote passed along Edgar's remarks to the Foreign Office, observing as well, that President Cleveland was 'most desirous' to see the proposed treaty approved, though he was reluctant to take action unless he could be assured it 'would be favourably entertained' by the British government. See Canada, Parliament, Debate of the House of Commons, Vol. XXXVII, Ottawa, 1894, 3102-3114 and Pauncefote to Kimberley, 11 June 1894, F.O. 420/149, 173-174. 192 the Anglo-Canadian side, there was annoyance at American delays in paying compensation for the detained ships. Pauncefote sought to include a Canadian in the negotiation of these North American matters, to which Gresham responded that he would
'treat with the Imperial Government only.'452 While the Foreign Office accepted this, it referred most questions to Canada by way of the Colonial Office. The absence of formal
Canadian participation contributed to the resulting delays. In the spring, Britain finally passed the enforcement legislation. Canada was included in talks in Washington over the matter of compensation, and Gresham's offer of $425,000 was accepted. Opposition in the American Senate, however, voted down the appropriation, and the matter remained contentious. Gresham and many legislators in the United States argued that the Paris tribunal award was insufficient. In 1895, a bill passed the House of Representatives threatening to authorize extermination of the seals by 'mercy killing' should a joint commission not succeed in erecting more effective measures to restrict pelagic sealing.
On assuming office, Olney complained about the lax enforcement of sealing regulations by the Royal Navy, and reiterated his predecessor's request for the establishment of a commission, including Japanese and Russian representatives, to develop better conservation measures.453 Britain declined to participate on such a body, only offering to appoint an agent to work with an American to study the matter.454 Then, in January 1896, as the Venezuelan dispute was still rattling Anglo-American relations, a new version of the 'mercy killing' legislation was introduced in the House of Representatives. It passed easily, and moved to the Senate for consideration in February. Olney interceded in the
452 Gresham to Bayard, 6 January 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States 1894, App I„ 140. 453 For details on the action of British naval officers, see: Olney to Roosevelt, 18 June 1895, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895, Pt. 1, 647-649. Olney to Gough, 24 June 1895, Foreign Relations of the United States,, 849-653 expands on an earlier note from Gresham pressing for a new system of regulations encompassing Russian, Japanese, and American seals. 454 Gough to Olney, 19 August 1895, Foreign Relations of the United States, Part I, 665-666. 193 matter and convinced the Senate to drop the bill in view of the difficulties already posed by the Venezuelan situation
In 1895, Olney and Cleveland decided to champion the cause of Venezuela, at a time when the fur seals dispute remained only partially resolved and the experience in
Brazil was casting an air of suspicion over the Anglo-American relationship. The Corinto landing in April seemed to suggest that Britain was prepared to deploy its forces in the hemisphere at will, regardless of American sensitivities. It would be understandable if an incoming secretary of state, like Richard Olney, concluded that the Anglo-American relationship needed to be re-worked both in substance and appearance.
Confrontation Along the Boundary
The border between Spanish territory and Dutch Demarara, which later became British
Guiana, was never legally defined. In 1840 Britain authorized Robert Schomburgk to survey a boundary to define the frontier between the two states. Venezuela never accepted this line which, with the passage of time, Britain tended to regard as the minimal extent of British territory. This was particularly the case after the mid-1880s when attempts to arrive at a mutually agreeable method for arbitrating the matter failed.
Venezuela refused to accept the Schomburgk boundary, and asserted its title to roughly two-thirds of the area behind it. Venezuela kept the United States informed of its claims and sought American support, asserting that British claims violated the Monroe Doctrine.
The United States tended to advise moderation and offered its services as a mediator. By 194 the 1890s, Britain's refusal to consider arbitration on the Guianan side of the Schomburgk provisional boundary constituted an insuperable obstacle to resolving the dispute.455
Since the 1870s, gold was being exploited within the disputed area, and the expanding British claims in ensuing years raised the stakes for all parties. In 1887,
Venezuela broke off diplomatic relations with Great Britain, and the German Foreign
Office was given responsibility for communicating with Caracas. Border incidents began to erupt within the disputed region, and it was one of these which, in 1895, provided the spark for the international incident which followed.456
For about a year, Venezuelan soldiers had manned a post only a few miles away from a British Guiana police station in the Uruan district along the Cuyuni River, which was disputed territory inside the Schomburgk line. This was an area where the British proposed building a road to facilitate gold extraction. Venezuela protested the road- building plan,457 and the colonial police protested the building of the Venezuelan military post. The colony's governor ordered that, should the Venezuelans abandon their post, the colonial police were to occupy it.458 On the morning of 2 January 1895, the Venezuelans
In several of his published works, Charles S. Campbell offers assessments of the crisis from a largely American perspective. One of the best of these is, The Transformation of American Relations 1865- 1870See, pages 194-221. Chapters VII and VIII in Walter Frederick Lafaber's 'The Latin American Policy of the Second Cleveland Administration' still has much to recommend it. A mid-Atlantic assessment is provided by John A.S. Grenville and George Berkley Young in chapters 5 and 6 of: Politics, Strategy and American Diplomacy. John A.S. Grenville examines the crisis from a largely British perspective in chapter III of his famous study, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy the Close of the Nineteenth Century, ( London: Athlone Press 1964). For an examination of the crisis from the Venezuelan perspective see: Simon Alberto Consalvi, Grover Cleveland y la Controversia Venezuela-Gran Bretana: La Historia Secreta, (Caracas[?]: Historias de Papel, 1992). An assessment of the crisis from the viewpoint of public opinion in the United States, Canada and the British Isles is provided in Marshall Bertram, The Birth of Anglo-American Friendship. Coverage, particularly of the military plans prepared in connection with the crisis, appears in Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, Berkley, 1967, 319-333. 456 Kimberley to Pauncefote, 20 March 1895, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 241. 457 Venezuelan Vice-Consul to Governor Lee, 10 December 1894, F.O. 420/160, Confidential Print 6745, Boundary Between British Guiana, Venezuela, and Brazil, Part XI, 1895, The National Archives, Kew, 2. 458 The Governor ordered that 'as soon and as often as the ground now occupied by the Venezuelans is vacated by them, possession must be at once retaken by the Colonial police, who will keep a patrol or 195 departed, and a small force of police under the command of Inspector Barnes and Sub-
Inspector Baker landed at the apparently-abandoned Venezuelan site. They hauled down the Venezuelan flag, raised that of the colony, and posted a guard. Soon, a boat containing a Venezuelan officer and twenty soldiers appeared. The British Guiana police lowered the Union Jack, but were nonetheless arrested, detained and questioned. The nearby colonial police station was pillaged and ransacked. After being held on the
Cuyuni for ten days, the police contingent were moved to Upata near the coast, a trip taking eight days. At Upata it was announced that the president of Venezuela had ordered the detainees' release, though a further two days of travel was required before the two colonial police officers, five constables, one sergeant and a servant could reach the
Venezuelan port of Los Tablas. From there, they were able to proceed to Trinidad where they arrived more than a month after their ordeal began. It soon became clear that the colonial police had not been physically abused. Nevertheless, it was alleged that a
Grenadian who lived near the police outpost, had been flogged and beaten by the
Venezuelans.459 By the end of January, the Foreign Office was referring to the border incident as 'the reported outrage by Venezuelans on British territory.'460
Even before full reports arrived from Barnes and Baker, diplomatic channels were dealing with this potentially highly volatile situation. On 25 January, the United States
Ambassador in London, Thomas Bayard, raised the boundary dispute in a conversation
sentries thereon by day and night, and any attempt on the part of the Venezuelans to reoccupy it must be met by formal protest from the Senior Officer of the police. Until force is attempted or threatened on the part of the Venezuelans, the Colonial police must remain in possession; should force be either so attempted or threatened, they must retire under protest.' See; Governor Lee to Marquis or Ripon, 20 September 1894, F.O. 420/145, Confidential Print 6745, Boundary Between British Guiana, Venezuela, and Brazil, Part X, 1894,11. 459 Barnes to Governor Sir F. Broome, 7 February 1895, F.O.420/160, 22-25. See also: Declaration by Inspector Barnes, 31 January 1895, F.O.420/160., 34. 460 Kimberley to Malet, 30 January 1895, F.O.420/160, 8. 196 with Kimberley. Bayard was proving to be a strong proponent of respectful and supportive Anglo-American relations, and he suggested Kimberley use the good offices of the United States to bring about a settlement. Kimberley asked the Colonial Office to prepare a report and maps so that he could more accurately discuss the matter.461 He also sent a telegram to Berlin asking the German charge d'affairs in Caracas to 'request an immediate explanation of the circumstances' of the latest border incident.462
The Foreign Office kept Bayard informed of developments concerning the difficult Venezuelan boundary question. On one visit, Kimberley showed the ambassador the documents the Colonial Office had prepared describing the British position, including a map showing the disputed area where 'the Venezuelans had recently made an aggression [and] ill-treated some of the colonial police stationed there.' Bayard underscored that his government was 'anxious to do anything in their power to facilitate a settlement of the difficulty.' Kimberley reiterated that his government were 'ready to go to arbitration as to a certain portion of the territory, [but] could not consent to any departure from the Schomburgk line.'4 3
Among the factors encouraging Olney to intervene more vigorously, was the work on behalf of the Venezuelans conducted by William L. Scruggs, the former United States diplomatic representative in Caracas. While holding that position, Scruggs had bribed the president of Venezuela to obtain a settlement for an American company, an action that proved too much even for the worldly Secretary of State John W. Foster, who
Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 26 Januaryl895, F.O.420/160, 6. Kimberley to Malet, 27 January 1895, F.O.420/160, 6. Kimberley to Pauncefote, 23 February 1895, FO420/160, 17. 197 dismissed him in 1892.464 Scruggs agreed to enter the employment of Venezuela as their advocate in Washington and, over the next several years, Scruggs successfully used his skills as a journalist and as a well-connected lobbyist to create a sense of heightened indignation among Americans over the Venezuelan boundary situation, which he characterized as European encroachment in the Western Hemisphere.465 The rising wave of American sympathy for the Latin American country encouraged Venezuela to step up its confrontational tactics along the disputed boundary, contributing to local disturbances.
With Scruggs firmly entrenched behind the scenes, both houses of congress unanimously endorsed a resolution in February, 1895, calling on Britain and Venezuela to seek arbitration of the boundary dispute. The British landing and brief occupation of the
Nicaraguan port of Corinto followed, feeding anti-British sympathies among American legislators and public alike.
Confrontation Between the Capitals
Olney assumed power in early June, and two weeks later Rosebery's Liberal government resigned, leading to Lord Salisbury's resumption of the offices of prime minister and foreign secretary.467 Salisbury is often characterized as a reserved and detached foreign secretary,468 while, in contrast, Olney is depicted as an impatient and naive diplomatic
Foster dismissed Scruggs in November, 1892. The story of his dismissal is related in Grenville and Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, 132-133. 465 Perhaps Scruggs' best known and most successful act of advocacy on behalf of Venezuela was his publication of the pamphlet: William L. Scruggs, British Aggression in Venezuela, the Monroe Doctrine on Trial, (Atlanta, 1894), which played an important role in galvanizing American opinion on this question. 466 Grenville and Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, 142-145. 467 Richard Olney was sworn in on 10 June, and Lord Rosebery's Government fell a fortnight later. The impact of these events is discussed in: Eggert, Richard Olney Evolution of a Statesman, 170. See also: Tansill, Bayard, 702. 468 Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, 5-11. 198 debutant. Yet, style apart, Salisbury and Olney were contending with popular acceptance in both countries of the spirit of imperial expansion, along with the complementary navalist theories of the day, while the general arbitration process that had been advanced in 1894, was going nowhere.
President Cleveland's second administration had difficulty balancing the new wave of imperialist sentiment with traditional American foreign policies. The public relations fiasco of the Corinto landing added to the unpopularity of the administration's foreign policy record, which included its handling of the unsettled state of affairs in the island kingdom of Hawaii. Shortly after assuming office, Cleveland and Gresham had to deal with a pro-annexationist coup in Honolulu, which installed a provisional government with assistance from the American Navy. By eschewing appeals to annex the strategic island group and by attempting to restore the Hawaiian Queen, much was done to tar the administration with charges of indecision and to discredit its capacity to advance
American interests. Gresham tended to cling to what was increasingly viewed as an outdated, moralistic view of America's role in world affairs. The Hawaiian annexation issue endowed the question of American activism in international affairs with a relevance it had not previously enjoyed.470 The death of Secretary of State Gresham, moreover, coincided with the public outcry over events in Nicaragua. Consequently, an early
Eggert states that 'Olney's actions in the summer of 1895 indicated nothing more complex than a desire to get matters settled promptly, a general unwillingness to trust others, and a naive assumption that straight talk and a show of determination of themselves would turn the trick.' Eggert, Richard Olney Evolution of a Statesman ,197. 470 The place of Hawaii in the development of American expansion and Anglo-American relations has been analysed by several historians. Charles S. Campbell includes a chapter 'Commitments in Hawaii and Samoa' in The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 67-83, in which he places the annexation of Samoa and Hawaii within the broader international diplomatic context. John A.S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young's chapter 'An Administration in search of a policy: Hawaii and Latin America, 1893- 1895' in Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, attempt to explain the Cleveland Administration's reluctance to approve annexation of Hawaii as part of a wider tendency towards indecision, which alters with the appointment of Olney and the incitement of public opinion over the Venezuela boundary question. 102-124. 199
objective of Olney's was to demonstrate a more assertive stance with respect to Anglo-
American relations generally and the Venezuelan boundary question in particular. Olney would certainly not be sending the Foreign Office a secret message in the style of
Gresham, assuring that the United States had no hostile intentions. Olney's fresh
approach was fully supported by Cleveland.471
The new and robust direction given to American foreign policy by Olney and
Cleveland was mirrored in the new emphasis on international and imperial relations championed by Joseph Chamberlain, who accepted the cabinet post of colonial secretary in Salisbury's government. His role in cabinet was significant, and he was said to exercise 'the power of a co-premier and sometimes more.'472 Not long after assuming office, Chamberlain declaimed to the House of Commons his programme for bringing prosperity to Britain and its colonies in an increasingly competitive world. Britain's capital resources were required to 'develop those estates which belong to the British
Crown ... for the benefit of their population and for the benefit of the greater population which is outside.'473
Throughout his period as colonial secretary, the gold bearing districts of the
Empire held a special allure for Chamberlain. Shortly after assuming office in the autumn of 1895, he took the decision to use military force, including four companies of the West India Regiment, to subjugate the Asante (Ashanti) people in West Africa whom,
Even before Gresham's death, Cleveland had asked Olney to report on the disputed boundary. His appointment as secretary of state on 8 June 1895 marked a shift towards a more assertive foreign policy in the closing months of the Cleveland administration. For an assessment of Olney's stand on Hawaii and his diplomatic style, see: Grenville & Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, 161-162. 472 James L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, Vol. Ill, (London: Macmillan, 1934), 7. This assessment has been endorsed by many writers including R.C.K. Ensor, England 1870-1914, (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1936, 224. 473Great Britain. Parliament, Hansard (House of Commons), 4th Series, XXXVI, 22 August 1895, 642. 200 he believed, inhabited 'one of the richest gold fields in the world.' His action opened the area to mineral development, and he was credited with achieving this without the spilling of blood or the expenditure of British tax revenues. The episode did much to enhance his reputation and to encourage him to venture into those aspects of international relations he could influence as colonial secretary.475
Salisbury's energies were absorbed with the so-called Eastern Question and
Turkish atrocities in Armenia. Colonial issues were left to Chamberlain, whose not infrequent incursions into the realm of foreign policy were tolerated and occasionally incorporated into action by the astute and more experienced Salisbury. Chamberlain was apprehensive for the future and sought to devise schemes that would ensure a place of prominence for Britain in the increasingly competitive international arena.47
Chamberlain included British Guiana in his plans for enriching the Empire and the
Mother Country. In early September, he wrote privately to Salisbury concerning that colony's gold bearing district, referring to the 'very rich territory close to and probably over the Schomburgk boundary', noting that he was 'trying to get it developed.'
Chamberlain believed that if the area 'answers the description given me by the gold officer of the Colony-it may turn out to be another Transvaal or West Australia.'477
Marsh, Joseph Chamberlain, 427. 475 Chamberlain used colonial revenues to pay for the Ashanti expedition which succeeded in subjugating the Ashanti by January 1896. See: Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, 22. See also: A.F. Madden, 'Changing Attitudes and Widening Responsibilities, 1895-1914' CHBE Vol III, 391. The role of the West India Regiment in the garrisoning and military operations carried out in West Africa and elsewhere is recorded in: Brian Dyne, The Empty Sleeve, The Story of the West India Regiments of the British Army, (Antigua: Hansib, 1997), 229-231. 476 For analysis of the relations between Salisbury and Chamberlain in the formation of British foreign policy, see: part II of Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, which is entitled 'Salisbury and Chamberlain: The Struggle for Control of Policy, 1898-1899, 127-318. Chamberlain is seen to be less than consistent in his approach to such issues as the German alliance and dealings with Russia and China. 477 Chamberlain to Salisbury, 4 September 1895, Salisbury Papers, Hatfield House. This is also quoted in: Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, 63. On 7 September Chamberlain addressed a despatch to the governor, stating the necessity of using every effort to 'foster and to develope [sic] the gold-mining 201
Olney devoted much of his first three weeks as secretary of state to composing a lengthy despatch on the Venezuela question, intended to keep British interests as far as possible from the disputed Guiana/Venezuelan gold fields and the commercial artery of the Orinoco River, which was thought to be the key to the markets and riches of the interior.478 Olney's document struck both a more aggressive as well as a more legalistic tone than earlier communications exchanged with Britain on the subject. It was also very long: Cleveland described the despatch dated 20 July 1895, as his 'twenty-inch gun.' The diplomatic salvo included a loquacious defence of the Monroe Doctrine and a less than unbiased precis of the particulars of the boundary dispute. Included were sections peppered with strong language, parts of which were construed as an ultimatum.
This remarkable diplomatic note needs to be understood in the light of the particular personal and political forces that shaped it. Under Gresham, acceptance of the
British presence in the hemisphere was assumed, and various interventions were applied to minimize the discord created when Anglo-American interests conflicted. This approach drew hostile comment from the press, with calls for more dramatic assertions of
American policy.479 On assuming office, Olney did just that, even as there were
industry, which has already made some advance, though it has not yet attracted any large amount of capital.' Chamberlain urged that the governor proceed with building a controversial road to the goldfields for both economic and commercial reasons. Chamberlain requested to be informed, 'whether any capitalists are to be found in the Colony who would be prepared to purchase for a capital sum a concession of a fair portion of the gold field in the North Western District.' Chamberlain believed that with in this way it could not only be readily determined 'whether gold can be profitably worked on a large scale in that region, but the purchase money would be devoted to meeting the cost of constructing the road I have referred to. The Secretary noted that he was making enquiries in London in the hope of 'inducing capitalists here to consider the enterprise.' Chamberlain to Governor, 7 September 1895, CO. 111/481. 478 The Olney papers contain several drafts of the despatch including revisions made by Cleveland. Olney Papers, Library of Congress, Reel 10. 479 Cecil Spring Rice to Francis Villiers, 12 April 1895, quoted in: Gwyn, The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, 175. The letter goes on to note that: 'The papers here are working away at Venezuela. The South Americans are in with all the low press men and every sort of lie is propagated about British aggression . . . The jealousy of England is so acute that nothing we can do will do the slightest good.' 202 indications of increased British activism in hemispheric affairs. In essence Olney's less than diplomatically worded despatch aimed at establishing that the Anglo-American power sharing model that had worked with limited success for the past several years was inadequate. Several pages were devoted to a discussion of the Monroe Doctrine as a principle of international law authorizing the United States to insert itself in the
Venezuelan dispute. British compliance would constitute public recognition of the
United States as the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere in a manner that paid scant attention to the requirements of British prestige.
The document assumed a hectoring tone, including phrases claiming that the
Monroe Doctrine rested 'upon facts and principles that are both intelligible and incontrovertible. That . . . any permanent political union between an European and an
American State [is] unnatural and inexpedient.'480 It referred to instances of 'alleged
481
British aggression upon Venezuelan territory,' and stated that it was necessary to protest Britain's actions, because failure to do so would be 'injurious to the interests of the people of the United States.' This was a matter with which 'the honour and welfare of this country are closely identified.' Lightly veiled language was used to threaten the possible declaration of war, noting that the executive was acting at this time because the
'measures necessary or proper for the vindication' of these various issues would if necessary 'be determined by another branch of the Government.'482 Finally, Britain was called on to 'submit the Venezuelan boundary question in its entirety' to arbitration. If
Britain were not prepared to do so, the president wished to be informed of this in time to
480 Olney to Bayard (communicated to Salisbury by Bayard 7 August 1895), 20 July 1895, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 256. mlbid., 253. 4S2Ibid., 260. 203
'lay the whole subject before Congress in his next Annual Message.'483 Bayard read this despatch in early August to Salisbury, whose government held one of the strongest majorities Britain had seen in many years.
Salisbury's reaction to this 'elaborate and exhaustive statement' was to view it as being concerned with two interrelated issues. The matter of the British Guiana boundary
'was not of a very extensive character' in itself, but Olney's note had tied the boundary matter to 'the invocation of doctrines so far-reaching in their scope,' that they needed to be referred to the Law Officers of the Crown for a legal opinion. Salisbury observed that the need to engage in this kind of process was unlikely to bring the controversy to a 'very early conclusion,' but he thought this kind of careful study was preferable to the
'acceptance of some principle of international law to which in reality we were not prepared to assent.
The matters Olney and Cleveland raised also concerned large portions of a British colony, and Chamberlain's views had to be given consideration as well. The 'twenty- inch gun' arrived at a time when Chamberlain was pressing for a vigorous response to what he described as the 'recent aggression and outrage at Uruan.' The colonial secretary was willing to agree to the possibility of arbitration, but he reasserted that the
Schomburgk line was the minimum that Britain could accept. Chamberlain regarded the situation on the border as 'almost intolerable,' believing that the time had come when a
'determined stand should be taken in the matter with a view to its final settlement.'
Should 'any fresh trespass on the rights of the Colony' occur, he added, it would be necessary to proceed to 'expel the aggressors' without further diplomatic formalities.
4mIbid., 261. 484 Salisbury to Gough, 7 August 1895, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 261. 204
Chamberlain stated his determination to 'satisfy himself that the Colony can put a sufficient force on the border to deal effectually with the situation.'485
Chamberlain, like Salisbury, had a range of international issues demanding his attention, not the least of which was the South African situation, where a potential crisis seemed to be unfolding in the Transvaal, involving some of the world's richest gold fields. There, the South African Republic had chosen to stand up to Britain's expansive policies and the powerful international mining interests operating there. The Afrikaner dominated republic was increasingly looking to Germany to protect it against any such encroachments, much as Venezuela looked to the United States. In the six months that followed, the crises involving Venezuela and the Transvaal became intertwined, forcing
Chamberlain to take a number of key decisions in the period around the end of 1895. At the heart of these decisions was the need to prioritize Britain's imperial interests, including the deployment of the available diplomatic, naval and military assets required to realize the many schemes Chamberlain envisaged for developing and expanding the various colonial estates for which he was responsible.
In Washington, there were reports that the new British government was assuming a harder line in relation to the Venezuelan boundary dispute. Pauncefote, on a visit to
Ottawa in October, made reference to the situation in a speech given wide coverage in the
United States. The ambassador acknowledged that there might be territory along the boundary that could be subject to arbitration. However, there was also territory 'which has been occupied for generations, about which there can be no successful dispute, and which, of course, would not be submitted to arbitration, as the case does not admit of it
485 Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 30 August 1895, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 261-262. 205 our title being perfectly clear.' Pauncefote observed privately to Lord Salisbury that, on returning to Washington, he had 'found the Press raging and lying outrageously about
Venezuela, but I think it is beginning to quiet down.'487
During August and September, as the Crown's law officers and the Colonial
Office prepared their position papers concerning the legal and historical claims Britain possessed in relation to the lands lying between the Orinoco and Esquibo Rivers, a claim of a very different sort was being asserted by the mainly expatriate mining community in
Johannesburg known as 'uitlanders.' This mainly English speaking community believed its rights were being disregarded, and that the Afrikaner dominated local government was failing to enact the various legal reforms necessary to conduct modern mining operations.488 The uitlanders looked to the empire builder Cecil Rhodes, the immensely wealthy mining magnate and Premier of Cape Colony for leadership in their quarrels with the rural Dutch settlers who controlled the Transvaal government.489 Many uitlanders believed the removal of this government represented the desired solution to their predicament, a factor creating the conditions that led to the catastrophe that came to be known as the Jameson Raid.4 °
Washington Post, 6 October 1895, quoted in: Tansill, Bayard, 711. 487 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 25 October 1895, Salisbury Papers, Hatfield House 3M/A39. 488Unlike the isolated, intermittent placer deposits of Guiana, the gold discovered on the Witwatersrand in 1886 ran deep and rich, and would eventually outstrip every other goldfield operating in the world. In 1898 the Transvaal produced 27 percent of the international supply of gold. Yet, in 1895, the Transvaal, known formally as the South African Republic, lay just outside British control. For more information see: Christopher Saunders and Ian R. Smith, 'Southern Africa, 1795-1910', Andrew Porter (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. Ill, 609. 489 Two masterful studies of the connection between capital markets, Transvaal government mining policy and unrest among the various segments of the mining community in Johannesburg are: Richard Mendelsohn, 'Blainey and the Jameson Raid: The Debate Renewed', Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 6 No. 2 (April 1980); and S.D. Chapman, 'Rhodes and the City of London: Another View of Imperialism', The Historical Journal, Vol. 28, No. 3 (September 1985). 490 The Jameson Raid and the events leading up to and following it comprise one of the most extensively discussed episodes in the historiography concerning this period. It is not the intention of this study to do other than to build on this work and to show the connection between the main events of the Jameson Raid to 206
The situation in South Africa, and to a lesser extent Venezuela, was on the minds of those responsible for Anglo-German relations. Retiring after more than ten years as
British ambassador to Berlin, Sir Frederick Malet had guided Anglo-German relations during the period of transition from the masterful leadership of Bismarck to the sometimes impetuous direction of Kaiser Wilhelm II. In mid-October, the Kaiser hosted
Malet at his shooting lodge. Parting interviews were conducted, and during these Malet flagged the issue of German support for the Transvaal as the one dark spot in the otherwise satisfactory relations between their two countries. The ambassador's remarks much angered Wilhelm, who interpreted them as an ultimatum and threat of war. Once
Malet was gone, the Kaiser asserted to a remaining British diplomat that 'we are not
Venezuela.'491 Difficulties with Germany, the Transvaal and demands from Cleveland and Olney over the Venezuela boundary were moving towards a coincidental climax in
December.492
On 14 October 1895, in accordance with Chamberlain's firmly expressed views,
Salisbury addressed a peremptory note to the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs, which Venezuela in turn relayed to Washington, where it likely evoked recollections of similarly worded directives issued to Nicaragua earlier in the year that culminated in the
Corinto landing. Salisbury's note referred to the 'outrages committed on British subjects
the development of the Venezuela Boundary Crisis. In so doing, it will be shown how, through Joseph Chamberlain, the two crises came to be linked, and in so doing forced British policy-makers to accept the necessity of examining more carefully the priorities established with respect to imperial and foreign policy. A classic study of the Jameson Raid is found in: Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, Chapter I. Other important studies include Jean van der Poel, The Jameson Raid, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951). Also see: Jeffrey Butler, The Liberal Party and the Jameson Raid, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). The best general narrative account of the raid is Elizabeth Longford, Jameson's Raid, London (1960) 1982. 491 Gosselin to Salisbury, 4 November 1895, Salisbury Papers. This is also quoted in: Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy y, 105. 492 Lamar Cecil, Wilhelm II, Prince and Emperor, 1859-1900,[\o\. I], (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 284-285, 207 and property in January last by officers and men in the service of the Venezuelan government.' Salisbury rejected Venezuela's contention that there had been no 'ill- treatment' of the British subject, J.H. Francis. The note required that Venezuela
'formally and in writing express their regret for the insult offered to the British flag for the seizure of the two officers and six constables of the British Guiana police, stationed on the right bank of the River . . . and for their subsequent removal and detention.'
Salisbury also demanded the payment of 'the sum of 1,500/. for distribution as compensation,' and that Venezuela 'apologize for the spoliation of property belonging to the Government of British Guiana and for the arrest and ill-treatment of Francis.' If
Venezuela did not comply within three months, Britain would 'adopt other means for obtaining satisfaction and for exacting full compensation for the outrages complained of.'493
The Foreign Office also had to consider the submission Chamberlain's office had prepared to guide Salisbury in responding to Olney's lengthy treatise on the wider matter of the right of the United States to intervene in the Venezuelan border dispute and
Britain's claims in the disputed region. Chamberlain believed that it was 'essential that the reply should emphatically repudiate this attempt to apply the Monroe doctrine to the question of the Venezuelan boundary.'
Chamberlain asserted that Salisbury needed to 'place in strong relief the fact that
Great Britain is an American Power with a territorial area greater than the United States themselves, and with a title acquired prior to the independence of the United States.'
Chamberlain attached 'the first importance' to the need to assert that Britain was indeed
493 Salisbury to Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs, 14 October 1895, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 276-277. 208 an American power. This was essential if for no other reason than 'from the point of view of the Canadian Dominion.'494
The report from the law officers was delivered in mid-October. It began by stating that the Monroe Doctrine 'propounded in this despatch is absolutely incompatible with international law.' It went on to maintain that 'the claim of the United States to prescribe that the dispute should be settled by arbitration, is wholly unjustified by international precedent.'495 With Chamberlain's views and the law officers' opinion in hand, Salisbury and the staff of the Foreign Office began drafting their reply to the firmly stated views of Secretary Olney and President Cleveland.
Chamberlain was developing a reputation in official circles for his bellicosity and jingoism. In late November, Lady Frances Balfour confided to her diary that she never heard Lord Salisbury 'talk of any colleague as he does of him.' Salisbury said that
'Chamberlain wants to go to war with every Power in the World, and has no thought but
Imperialism.'496 During the five or six weeks before Christmas 1895, Chamberlain not only allowed himself to be drawn more deeply into Rhodes' plotting on the Rand, but he stepped up his aggressive standoff with Venezuela, providing the administrator of British
Guiana with a detailed directive for defending the frontier. Chamberlain thought that a
'serious and organized attack on the part of Venezuela' was unlikely, though, should this happen, he did not doubt that 'actual war' between the Venezuela and Britain would
494 Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 11 September 1895, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 270. 495 Law Officers (Richard E. Webster & R.B. Finlay) to Salisbury, 12 Oct. 1895, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 275-276. 496 Journal of Lady Frances Balfour, 26 November 1895, Ne Obliviscaris. Quoted in: Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians, 339. Lady Frances Balfour was a daughter of the Duke of Argyll and was married to Arthur Balfour's youngest brother Eustace, and through the Balfour family was related to Lord Salisbury. See also: Kenneth Young, Arthur James Balfour: The Happy Life of the Politician Prime Minister Statesman and Philosopher 1848-1930, (London: Bell and Sons, 1963), 83. 209 follow. The result of such conflict 'would be determined by the action of the British fleet at the ports of Venezuela' rather than by operations by land on the British Guiana frontier.
To prevent this chain of events, the colonial secretary wished to avoid the 'incursions of small parties of filibusters, such as occurred in the case of the attack on the post at
Uruan.' He therefore authorized augmenting the police by building of new police stations near the border, adding two sub-inspectors and thirty-five men to the force, and equipping the police with a third maxim gun. With these reinforcements, Chamberlain believed there should be the necessary resources to 'drive the intruders out.'497
The American Embassy wanted to know when Salisbury's reply to Olney's correspondence on the Venezuela border should be expected. The president requested that he have this in hand in time for the opening of Congress, scheduled for 2 December.
Cleveland intended to make reference to Britain's position on the Venezuelan question in his opening message. Hard pressed by other international issues, Salisbury did not complete his work on this complex issue until 26 November. Olney's salvo had comprised fourteen printed pages. Salisbury chose to write a three-page despatch on the subject of the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine, and to compile a separate six-page despatch concerning the border question. The length of these two documents precluded their being telegraphed, so they were sent by steamship the day following their completion, with copies delivered to the American Embassy in London.
After three days, the Foreign Office inquired of the embassy's first secretary,
James Roosevelt, if the substance of the two despatches had been cabled to Washington.
Roosevelt replied in the negative, maintaining that 'it was difficult if not impossible to
497 Chamberlain to Administrator BG, 3 December 1895, FO 420/168, Part XII Respecting the Boundary British Guiana and Venezuela, January to June 1896, 22-23. 210 send a correct summary by cable,' and that, because 'the despatches were to be held as strictly confidential' until read by Pauncefote to Olney, 'any cable summary sent by us could not be used by the president in his message.' Foreign Office staff was surprised.
There had been some confusion, thinking the legislative session opened a week later than was in fact the case, but they had also thought the embassy would 'send a summary by cable,' enabling the president to prepare his message. When informed otherwise, Francis
Bertie from the Foreign Office replied, 'I must see his Lordship about this, but I fear it is too late.'498
Salisbury developed a reputation for the calculated use of procrastination as a diplomatic tactic. It is doubtful, however, that there was an overt attempt by Salisbury to slight Olney or Cleveland by delaying these sensitive communications. It was the
Americans who attached the greatest significance to the date of arrival, and it was logical to assume that whatever expedited delivery the embassy thought warranted would be used. On the other hand, Ambassador Bayard, as an advocate of improved Anglo-
American relations, may have chosen to resort to an officious interpretation of diplomatic protocol in an attempt to delay the substance of Salisbury's despatches arriving in time to form part of the President's message opening Congress.499 When Cleveland composed his opening message, he could only summarize the discussions to date and explain that the secretary of state had asked for a definite answer as to whether Britain would agree to submit the Venezuelan controversy in its entirety to impartial arbitration.
Rosevelt to Bayard, 30 November 1895, quoted in: Tansill, Bayardl\5 499 Two days after the opening of Congress, Bayard wrote to Cleveland trying to minimize the impact of Salisbury's despatches, describing them as being 'in good temper and moderate in tone.' He tried to shift the emphasis away from Salisbury's refutation of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, suggesting that, 'Our difficulty lies in the wholly unreliable character of the Venezuelan Rulers.' Bayard to Cleveland, 4 December 1895, quoted in: Tansill, Bayard, 716. 211
Salisbury had done much to lay the foundations of Anglo-American accord during his previous tenure in office when dealing with an early stage of the confrontation with
Nicaragua over the Mosquito Reserve, but his ability to manoeuvre was now constrained by Chamberlain's aggressive defence of all things colonial. Salisbury responded to
Olney's brash and confrontational tone with his own more erudite style of verbal aggression. He rejected Olney's assertion that Britain must accept the Monroe Doctrine and American intervention on Venezuela's behalf and refused to participate in an act of public abasement as requested.
Salisbury's despatches finally arrived and Pauncefote was able to meet with Olney on 7 December to go over the anxiously awaited documents. Reporting back to
Salisbury, Pauncefote observed that, 'Mr. Olney seemed very anxious when I read Your
Lordship's despatches to him.' While carefully worded, they could hardly be seen as exercises in de-escalation. His first despatch was based on the Law Officers' legal opinion, and it savagely critiqued 'the political maxims which are well known in
American discussion under the name of the Monroe doctrine.' He argued that the conditions under which President Monroe 'penned his celebrated message' were historical, and concerned a period when 'portions of South America had recently declared their independence, and that independence had not been recognized by the Governments of Spain and Portugal.' Times had changed, and the 'dangers which were apprehended by President Monroe have no relation to the state of things in which we live at the present day.' No longer were European states 'treating any part of the American Continent as a fit object for European colonization.' At the same time, Olney's argument suggesting that
'union between Great Britain and Canada; between Great Britain and Jamaica; between 212
Great Britain and British Honduras or British Guiana are unnatural and inexpedient' was one Salisbury could not accept. 'President Monroe disclaims any such inference . . . but in this, as in other respects, Mr. Olney disclaims any such inference from his doctrine.'
And as for the assertion that the 'unnatural and inexpedient' character of such political connections was so obvious that it 'will hardly be denied,' Salisbury retorted that,
Her Majesty's Government are prepared emphatically to deny it on behalf of both the British and American people who are subject to her Crown. They maintain that the union between Great Britain and her territories in the Western Hemisphere is both natural and expedient.
Salisbury also commented on the idea of using arbitration to resolve international disputes, noting that this 'had proved itself valuable in many cases; but it is not free from difficulty.' Olney's contention that Britain should agree to arbitrate the dispute in its entirety was something with which the American secretary of state need not concern himself. Salisbury explained that the 'only parties who are competent to decide that. . . are the two parties whose rival contentions are in issue.' Olney's view that the United
States had a right to intervene was something that 'cannot be reasonably justified, and has no foundation in the law of nations.' Salisbury continued, maintaining that the United
States had no right to 'affirm as a universal proposition' that it had a role in the affairs of certain states merely 'because they are situated in the Western Hemisphere.' Even if there was something 'salutary' in the words of President Monroe, Salisbury argued, it was
'impossible to admit' that this had been 'inscribed by any adequate authority in the code of international law.' 50°
Salisbury to Pauncefote, 26 November 1895, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 277-280. 213
The second note from Salisbury concerned the specifics of the boundary controversy, with respect to which Olney had taken an 'erroneous view of many material facts' founded on "ex parle statements emanating from Venezuela.' Salisbury did not think the matter concerned the United States, but as Anglo-Venezuelan diplomatic relations were suspended, Salisbury believed his note could provide an opportunity for
'setting right misconceptions.' Salisbury then reviewed the various historical aspects of the claim from a British perspective. The British government, Salisbury concluded, wished to maintain friendly relations with Venezuela and 'certainly have no design to seize territory that properly belongs to her, or forcibly to extend sovereignty over any portion of her population.' Britain was, furthermore, willing to 'submit to arbitration the conflicting claims,' including 'large tracts of territory which from the auriferous nature are known to be of almost untold value.' There were, however, limits beyond which
Salisbury was not willing to proceed. The foreign secretary was not prepared to permit arbitration based on,
the extravagant pretensions of Spanish officials in the last century, and involving the transfer of large numbers of British subjects, who have for many years enjoyed the settled rule of a British Colony, to a nation of different race and language, whose political system is subject to frequent disturbance, and whose institutions as yet too often afford very inadequate protection to life and property.... Her Majesty's Government are convinced that in similar circumstances the Government of the United States would be equally firm in declining to entertain proposals of such a nature.501
Salisbury to Pauncefote, 26 November 1895, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 286. 214
In time Salisbury's prediction would ring true, as later attempts to apply the general principles eventually agreed to with respect to Venezuela were declined by the United
States as the basis for arbitrating the Alaska boundary.502
The Christmas Crises
President Cleveland and Secretary of State Olney were in no mood to back down, and what followed was a special presidential message to Congress. Drafted initially by Olney with sections contributed by Secretary of War Daniel Lamont, Pauncefote's biographer notes that the president took this draft and 'sat at his desk until dawn writing his message, obviously in something like a white heat. On Tuesday morning there was a Cabinet
Meeting at which the Message was read. On the same day, December 17, it was sent to
Congress.'503
The message was framed with sufficient loopholes to enable both sides to extract themselves with dignity. Nevertheless, Cleveland's message employed no shortage of aggressive language that, for a period of days, created a crisis mentality on both sides of the Atlantic, and forced all parties to consider, if only briefly, the implications of engaging in open hostilities. Most of the message consisted of a reply to Salisbury's
A memorandum concerning, inter alia, the Alaska boundary was prepared in Ottawa by R.W. Scott. This was forwarded by Lord Minto to the Colonial Office in the wake of the apparent collapse of the 1898- 1899 Joint High Commission chaired by Lord Hershell. This stated: 'The British members of the Commission were willing, and offered to refer the question to arbitration on terms precisely the similar to those adopted, if not insisted upon by the United States, with respect to the Venezuela boundary-line. The United States Commissioners would not agree to this unless special provision was made that no matter where the Arbitrators should find the boundary to be, the settlements along the coast of the Lynn Canal which have been made by the United States should remain part of the territory of that country.' Enclosure in: Minto to Chamberlain, 10 April 1899, Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, (gen. eds.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs 1899, Part I, From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World War, Series C, North America, 1837-1914 Series C, North America, 1837-1914, Vol. 11, Expansion and Rapprochement, 1899-1905, (University Publications of America, 1987), 40-42. 503 Mowat, The Life of Lord Paucefote, 184. See also Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 208-209. 215 assertion that the Monroe Doctrine was not a part of accepted international law and therefore, did not apply to current circumstances. Cleveland's response was categorical, stating that the doctrine 'is strong and sound because its enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a nation.' Cleveland expressed his conviction that the Monroe
Doctrine made the notion of the balance of power inapplicable in the Americas, noting that 'the balance of power is justly a cause for jealous anxiety among the Governments of the old world,' while the 'observance of the Monroe doctrine [is] of vital concern to our people and their Government.'504
When it came to the boundary issue, Cleveland used fewer and stronger words, asserting that the time had come for the 'United States to take measures to determine . . . the true divisional line between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana.'
Cleveland asked for funding for a 'Commission . . .who shall make the necessary investigation, and report upon the matter with the least possible delay.' The next step would be for 'the United States to resist by every means in its power' British attempts to appropriate lands or to exercise jurisdiction 'over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela.'
The message also contained an ominous threat of consequences to come.
Cleveland observed that, in making these recommendations, he was 'fully alive to the responsibility incurred, and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow.' He believed it a 'grievous thing to contemplate the two great English-speaking peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly competitors in the onward march of civilization.'
504 Message from the President of the United States relative to the Venezuelan Boundary Controversy.. .December 17, 1895, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 290. 216
Nevertheless it would be a 'calamity' for the United States to submit to 'wrong and injustice, and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honour.'
In the United States, the initial public response to the president's message was overwhelmingly supportive. In reporting its contents to its readers, the New York Tribune headline proudly proclaimed, 'President Stands Firm.'506 The New York Sun stated the next day that the 'war spirit' in the houses of Congress 'was livelier than ever,' and that this was encouraged by the 'receipt of a bushel of telegrams from all quarters of the
United States.'507 Olney received large numbers of supportive letters, including one from the publisher of the weekly Rossland, British Columbia Prospector, who, in endorsing
Olney's action, decried the existence of 'the fortress at Esquimalt' and reminded Olney that among his many supporters there were 'several thousand of us - American citizens - on the north side of the international boundary.'508
On Christmas Eve, Pauncefote wrote to Lord Salisbury to report that amongst
Americans there was 'a condition of mind which can only be described as hysterical', and that one senator had even, 'proposed the immediate purchase of a million stand of arms; coast defences, iron-clads.' Even though American legislators, the press and the public at first embraced the president's confrontational policies, Pauncefote went on to explain that this support had dropped off when share prices in New York tumbled in response to the war scare, requiring the president to prepare another Congressional message to deal with the 'threatened depletion of the gold reserve in the Treasury.' Pauncefote sensed a
505 'Message from the President.. . Relative to the Venezuela Boundary Controversy', 17 December 1895, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Volume 10, 291-292. 506 New York Tribune, 18 December, 1895 507 New York Sun, 19 December 1895. 508 W.D. Pratt to Olney, 24 December, Olney Papers, Reel 15. See also: Marshall Bertram, The Birth of Anglo-American Friendship: The Prime Facet of the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute, a Study of hte Interreaction of Diplomacy and Public Opinion, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1992). 217 reversal of public opinion 'in opposition to the warlike attitude of the President.' This was particularly so given the fact that 'most eminent jurists of the country condemn him, as do also the Bishops and clergy, and he naturally meets with no sympathy from the financial world.'509
Another observer of the situation was Mr. Bax-Ironside, the second secretary at the British Embassy in Washington, who had canvassed his sources to try to explain the bellicose response of the American president and cabinet. Ironside believed that the president was using the Venezuela issue to 'make himself and his party popular' and to dispel the reputation for 'inertness and supineness' created by the Nicaragua episode.
Ironside thought Richard Olney 'a man of considerable ability' who had succeeded the more pacific Walter Gresham. The main factor bearing on the change of policy was, however, political. The president with his 'perspicacity' was able to see the Venezuela matter as one that 'could be boomed, especially as a good deal of jealousy towards
England exists in this country.' Bax-Ironside believed the 'popular enthusiasm exceeded even Mr. Olney's expectations,' though, on the negative side, he and Cleveland were
'annoyed at Lord Salisbury dividing the subject,' and in so doing 'separating the discussion of the Monroe Doctrine from that of the Boundary Question.'510 Pauncefote was able to see a glimmer of hope in the crisis. He anticipated 'a great reaction of feeling and opinion will soon manifest itself in the country.' Pauncefote predicted that the
'President's Message may turn out a 'boomerang.'5n
509 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 24 December 1895, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Volume 10, 292, and New York Sun. 23 December 1895. 510 Confidential Memorandum of Bax-Ironside, enclosed in Pauncefote to Salsbury, 20 December 1895, Salisbury Papers, 3M/A39. 511 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 24 December 1896, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10,292. 218
Chamberlain was at Highbury, his home near Birmingham, preparing for the
Christmas Holidays when news of Cleveland's belligerent message to Congress reached him. Sir Robert Meade, the permanent under secretary of state at the Colonial Office, wrote to Chamberlain the same day, urging that, in light of the deteriorating international situation, South African affairs should be given time to cool down. Chamberlain was aware of the possibility of a rising of uitlanders being staged in Johannesburg with some kind of outside support from Rhodes, and that Germany was supportive of the Afrikans government. Meade pointed out that the web of support for the uitlanders had been put in place before 'you had seen President Cleveland's Message. Perhaps as we shall have to face German opposition you may wish the uitlander movement to be postponed for a year or so.'512 Chamberlain acknowledged that the American situation was difficult, but that he was reluctant to see it derail the expected uitlander insurrection.
It must be noted that the American affair cannot become serious for some time. First they have to get the assent of the Senate - then appoint a Commission - then make inquiry - and then? Suppose they decide that the line to the Essequibo is Venezuelan. Will they tell us to evacuate, and declare war if we do not? As long as the Venezuelans do not attack us we shall not attack them. Altogether it must be months before there is a real crisis. Now as to the Transvaal. Might it not come off just at the critical time if it is postponed now? The longer it is delayed the more chance there is of foreign intervention. It seems to me that either it should come at once or be postponed for a year or two at least. Can we ensure this?513
Chamberlain's parliamentary secretary, Lord Selborne, who was also Lord
Salisbury's son-in-law, wrote to Highbury asking Chamberlain's opinion of 'Cleveland's
512 Meade to Chamberlain, 18 December 1895, quoted in: Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, vol. 3, 71. 513 Chamberlain to Meade, 18 December 1895, quoted in: Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, vol. 3, 72. 219 attitude' and 'the mad thirst for war which seems to have smitten American politicians.'
Selborne proposed that, if Cleveland's actions were 'merely electioneering,' then they were 'the wickedest in history', but if the motive was something more than an
'electioneering dodge, then it is sheer downright madness.'514
Chamberlain replied that he viewed the situation created by the President's
Message 'with grave concern.' He did not think the events in Washington were due
'entirely to electioneering motives.' Chamberlain thought, regretfully, that 'probably a majority of Americans would look forward without horror to a war with this country.
This is so different from the feeling prevailing here.' Only three months previously,
Chamberlain had asserted that the Foreign Office must 'emphatically repudiate this attempt to apply the Monroe doctrine to the question of the Venezuelan boundary.'515
Now he began to wonder if it might be desirable to recognize this doctrine, which he asserted, Americans believed in 'as some people believe in the Bible - without knowing much of its contents, but accepting it as of Divine inspiration.' Chamberlain suggested to
Selborne that if there were to be any further diplomatic correspondence with the United
States, it should 'express our sympathy with the main idea of President Monroe.'
Chamberlain did not think it would be in British or American interests 'that European
Powers should come into America.' Still, the colonial secretary remained convinced that
Britain must oppose 'the unnatural and altogether unprecedented extension of this doctrine.'516
514 Selborne to Chamberlain, 18 December 1895, quoted in: D. George Boyce (ed.), The Crisis of British Power, The Imperial and Naval Papers of the Second Earl of Selborne, 1895-1910, , (London: Historians' Press, 1990), 25. 515 Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 11 September 1895, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 270. 516 Chamberlain to Selborne, 20 December 1895, quoted in: Boyce, The Imperial and Naval Papers of the Second Earl of Selborne, 26-28. 220
Selborne shared with Chamberlain his fear that the Venezuelans might take advantage of the crisis to cross the Schomburgk line with the intention of 'dragging the
U.S. into war with us.'517 Chamberlain believed he had dealt with this already, by acting to strengthen the colony's police, though developments in the unfolding crisis soon caused him to alter this assessment. There were signs that his firm stand was beginning to crumble.
On Christmas Eve, Chamberlain wrote to Salisbury, using as his starting point the fact that influential elements in both Britain and the United States were horrified over the massacres of Armenians occurring in Turkey. He argued that an appeal for joint action in defence of the Armenians might well mitigate ill-feeling and confirm the familial ties that
CIO should be uniting these two Anglo-Saxon peoples. Salisbury thought the proposal ridiculous, writing to Arthur Balfour that he read it 'with perfect dismay. Randolph
[Churchill]519 at his wildest could not have made a madder suggestion.' Salisbury suspected that Chamberlain's American wife was behind the scheme.520 Balfour, however, did not completely dismiss the proposal. He and Chamberlain sat side by side on the government's front bench in the House of Commons. While the two shared very different temperaments and a degree of rivalry, their mutual respect is reflected in the fact that Balfour was able to see merit in the idea and replied to his uncle that he thought it 'in
517 Selborne to Chamberlain, 18 December 1895, quoted in: Boyce, The Imperial and Naval Papers of the Second Earl of Selborne , 25-26. In a postscript Selborne observes, 'I think it quite likely now that the Venezuelans may cross the Schomburgk line in comparatively large numbers with the deliberate object of provoking a conflict and so dragging the U.S. into war with us. Ought not preliminary steps be taken in conjunction with the W.O. so that, if this does happen, the troops in the West Indies may be concentrated in B Guiana with as little delay as possible to support the Constabulary and kick the Venezuelans back again?' 518 The letter of 24 December 1895 is summarized in: Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain,\o\. 3, 68- 69. 519 Randolph Churchill (1849-1894) was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader in House of Commons when Salisbury formed the government in 1886. He resigned later in the year in a dispute concerning funding for the army and navy. 520 Chamberlain to Salisbury, 27 December 1895, quoted in: Young, Arthur James Balfour, 168. 221 some ways unfortunate that we cannot turn American sentiment on the Armenian question (if it exists) to some account.' He thought that as the United States was not perceived to have an interest in the matter, and that the country's involvement would not be 'regarded with the insane suspicion which stupefies Europe where England is concerned.'521
Chamberlain directed a further letter to Selborne on Christmas Eve as well. The colonial secretary had not completely abandoned his previous truculence. 'The Americans are not a people to run away from,' he asserted, adding that he did not 'know any people from whom we can afford to take a kicking.'522 Then, after Christmas, news arrived at
Highbury that the Venezuelans had reinforced their position on the disputed Uruan with twenty-five more men. The colony's administrator inquired by telegraph if he should
'send the reinforcement and Maxim up the river.'523 A now more moderate Chamberlain directed his office to telegraph his reply on 29 December, stating that,
it was unnecessary to take the fresh action suggested, and that the police on the frontier should act as before, not employing force in cases of aggression, but should retire under protest; that a conflict was undesirable in present circumstances, which had changed since the date of the despatch of the 3r December; that our policy is at present to avoid all appearance of aggression, and that if the other side attacks us, they put themselves in the wrong.
Chamberlain asked that this information be relayed to the Foreign Office, so that they might 'contradict any reports from the American side that aggressive steps are being
S94- taken by the Colony ... to disturb the status quo.' There were further urgent messages
521 Balfour to Salisbury, 29 December 1895, quoted in: Young, Arthur James Balfour, 168-169. 522 Chamberlain to Selborne, 24 December 1895, quoted in: Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, 67. 523 Colonial Office (E. Wingfiled) to Foreign Office, 18 January 1896, Foreign Office, 420/168, 21-22. 524 Information about the revised instructions telegraphed to Guiana was not sent to the Foreign Office until mid-January, likely on account of news of the Jameson Raid arriving a short time after the telegram to British Guiana was sent. The telegram itself was not included in the Confidential Print, and the quotation is 222 arriving at Highbury for Joseph Chamberlain during these critical days, which ultimately required his presence in London before the year was out, and necessitated a number of decisions that would have profound consequences for his future career and for international affairs on both sides of the Atlantic.
The conciliatory 'boomerang' that Pauncefote thought he perceived working its way through 'thought and feeling' in the United States, was working with considerable effect through the political world of London as well. Chamberlain's readiness to avoid conflict along the disputed border and to make peace with the United States stood in stark contrast to his stance earlier in the year, and significantly, it took place before news reached him from South Africa of the launch of the doomed Jameson Raid. Chamberlain had been a major force influencing Salisbury to stand up to Venezuela and the United
States in defence of the interests of British Guiana. His about-face undermined his chief at a critical time in the Venezuela crisis. Within hours of sending the telegram changing policing policy for the Uruan, news of a potentially more serious crisis implicating the colonial secretary reached Highbury.
Chamberlain was dressing for the annual servants' ball at Highbury, when he received word that Dr. Leander Jameson had launched his filibustering expedition from
Bechuanaland in support of what proved to be a non-existent uitlander rising in
Johannesburg. Chamberlain rushed to catch a midnight train to London, arriving at his home there in the early hours of 30 December. Chamberlain acted decisively to control the damage caused by the raid, though troubles with the United States and Venezuela were never far from his mind.
a summary forwarded to the Foreign Office. See: Colonial Office (E. Wingfiled) to Foreign Office, 18 January 1896, F.O. 420/168, 21-22. 223
Chamberlain sent orders for Jameson to retire, and disclaimed any British endorsement of the raiders' actions. Jameson ignored all orders to desist. His raid failed on encountering Boer resistance outside Johannesburg, where his surrender took place on
2 January. A serious concern for Chamberlain and the Foreign Office was the likelihood of German involvement in the deteriorating South African situation. A German warship was cruising off the coast of Mozambique, and there seemed a real likelihood of German troops landing. Chamberlain acted swiftly to strengthen the British naval presence in
South African waters, asking that 'two of the largest ships of war' stationed at the Gold
Coast be sent there due to the 'serious complications' that had arisen.525 A few days later, the Foreign Office requested that the warship at Zanzibar be sent to Mozambique waters as well.526
Significantly, no serious naval preparations were ever made in connection with the
Venezuelan dispute. Chamberlain had informed the governor of British Guiana that the navy would handle matters should hostilities erupt there, and it was well known that the navy represented the only serious threat to the United States in the event of conflict in
North America. The necessity to maintain balance with France and Russia in European waters meant that very few ships were available to reinforce the Royal Navy in the
Americas. Three of the ships that could be spared were sent to South Africa and not the
Western Hemisphere, indicating the relative priority accorded the two crises that were unfolding simultaneously.527 Kaiser Wilhelm added fuel to the diplomatic firestorm in
525 R. Meade [Colonial Office] to H. Rawson [Admiralty], 30 December 1895. Admiralty 1/7302. See also: Colonial Office to Admiralty, 31 December 1895, ADM. 1/7302 Correspondence, Foreign Office, January to February, 1896, The National Archives, Kew. 526 Foreign Office to Admiralty, 7 January 1896, ADM. 1/7302. 527 Marder states that 'The only out of the ordinary American naval action reported to Whitehall was the postponement of the departure of the U.S. North Atlantic fleet from the British West Indies. The squadron 224
South Africa when he addressed a telegram to the republic's president, Paul Kruger, expressing his 'sincere congratulations' that his people had dispelled the armed bands that had 'invaded your country as disturbers of the peace' and that this had been done 'without appealing to the help of friendly powers.' The so-called Kruger telegram was sent on 3
January, and did much to sour Anglo-German relations. Nevertheless, the main decisions to accord the South African crisis higher priority than Venezuela had already been taken.
In response to growing international security concerns, the Admiralty formed a 'flying squadron' in early January that was to be available to respond to crisis situations at short notice, though South Africa was apparently the main intended destination. The squadron
MO never deployed and was finally disbanded in October 1896.
The New Year Resolution
On 9 January, the second secretary at the American Embassy wrote to Ambassador
Bayard, passing on something he had been told by a contact at the Foreign Office, 'in strictest confidence.'' It seemed that Lord Salisbury had 'very considerably modified his views in regard to the Venezuelan question.' The foreign secretary did not 'wish to stir up trouble between England and the United States,' and was prepared to 'trim' his views
was to have sailed from Hampton Roads on December 21. Officially, it was stated that the reason for the delay was that two of the ships were not ready. There was no unusual naval activity in England in connection with the crisis, and there were no preparations to send reinforcements to the weak North America or Pacific squadrons. The main consideration must have been the fact that war was never likely. However, the failure to take even precautionary measures must be attributed to the general European situation and the utter inability of the Admiralty to spare ships from other stations.' Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, 255. See also: George B. Young, 'Intervention Under the Monroe Doctrine: The Olney Corollary', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 2, (Jun. 1942), 259. 'A careful study of manuscript archives of the Navy Department for 1895 revealed no instance of orders to naval vessels to prepare for possible hostilities with England. The South Atlantic Squadron wintered in Montevideo.' 528 Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, 256-257. See also: Confidential signal to Commander Training Squadron, 3 January, 1896, Admiralty 1/7302. 225 to meet the requests of the United States Government in the matter.'529 A major factor in the rapid British policy shift was undoubtedly related to the - albeit remote - possibility of war with the United States, which Cleveland's December message to Congress threatened. Joseph Chamberlain took the threat as real, and worked actively to reverse the policies he had done so much to shape. In response to Cleveland's threat, and before news of Jameson's disastrous raid reached him, he had started to re-think Salisbury's dismissal of the Monroe Doctrine, and had directed his officials in British Guiana to take a less confrontational stand. He then encouraged prominent and sympathetic national figures to open informal discussions aimed at achieving face saving solutions for both sides.
When the British cabinet met on 11 January, support for opposing the United
States had evaporated, and a decision to seek an amiable settlement was taken. The contest in South Africa was threatening British interests more vital than those of the
Guiana hinterland. Salisbury, however, generally resisted employing bluff as a tool of diplomacy, and he is reported to have informed his cabinet at this meeting that 'if we were to yield unconditionally to American threats another Prime Minister would have to be found.'530 Nevertheless, yield to some extent he did. In reporting the decision to the
Queen, Salisbury stated that the 'general impression was that a widespread wish for an honourable arrangement existed, and that every effort should be made to attain it.'
The impetuous Chamberlain and the philosophical Balfour were both uneasy with the prospect of their country navigating the increasingly precarious diplomatic seas of the
529 David D. Wells to Bayard, 9 January, 1896, quoted in: Tansill, Bayard, 738. 530 Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, vol. 3, 161. 531 Salisbury to the Queen, 11 January 1896, quoted in: Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, 68. 226
1890s without diplomatic friend or ally within hailing distance. One of Balfour's biographers has remarked on 'how close their lines of thought were, yet how different in detail and in method of application.' Following the 11 January cabinet meeting, both men worked to swing British opinion behind the idea that the United States, far from being a nagging potential enemy, was more like an errant relative that needed to be reincorporated within the family fold. This involved publicizing a view of world affairs that differed from that of their chief's earlier strong stand against the Americans. Four days after the decisive cabinet meeting, Balfour spoke to supporters in Manchester, stating that 'the idea of war with the United States carries with it some of the unnatural horror of a civil war The time will come, the time must come, when someone, some statesman of authority, more fortunate even than President Monroe, will lay down the doctrine that between English-speaking people war is impossible.'532 Less than two weeks later, Joseph Chamberlain was heard proclaiming in a similar vein to his followers, that 'while I should look with horror upon anything in the nature of a fratricidal strife, I should look forward with pleasure to the possibility of the Stars and Stripes and the Union
Jack floating together in defence of a common cause sanctioned by humanity and by justice.'533
Both sides made use of the press and informal diplomacy to break the diplomatic ice-jam created by Cleveland's pre-Christmas message. Helping to open these talks were
Joseph Chamberlain, Sir William Harcourt,534 and Lord Playfair,535 all of whom were
532 Salisbury to the Queen, 11 January 1896, quoted in: Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, 172. 533The Times, 27 January 1896, quoted in : Charles S. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement, 183. 534 Sir William Harcourt served as Gladstone's Chancellor of the Exchequer, and subsequently as Liberal leader in the House of Commons. 535 Lord Playfair was a prominent chemist and had served as a Liberal Member of Parliament, Pastmaster- General and Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons before being raised to the peerage. 227 married to Americans and found the prospect of Anglo-American hostilities abhorrent.536
The involvement of these amateur diplomats was not always agreeable to careerists.
Pauncefote observed that a correspondence involving Bayard, Chamberlain, and Playfair had 'much annoyed' Olney. Nevertheless, by late January Pauncefote was reporting that, 'public feeling in regard to the Venezuelan question is again subsiding, and it is evident that the Administration is anxious to arrive at a friendly settlement.'538
On January 2, before the war clouds generated by the Venezuelan crisis had time to clear, Lord Minto opened the Canadian parliamentary session. His only reference to the situation was a single line, indicating that measures would be introduced to 'provide for the better arming of our militia and the strengthening of Canadian defences.'
Debate in the House of Commons was at first surprisingly subdued and involved discussion of a bipartisan resolution concerning the 'British Connection and Imperial
Defence.' This referred to the 'threatening aspect of foreign affairs', and it affirmed
Canada's 'unaltered loyalty and devotion to the British Throne.'
The resolution stated that, 'should occasion unhappily arise,' Canada was prepared to make 'substantial sacrifices' to maintain the 'honour of Her Majesty's
Empire.' It went on to reiterate the 'oft-expressed desire of the people of Canada to maintain the most friendly relations with their kinsmen of the United States.'540 Most members were supportive. Wilfrid Laurier, speaking from the opposition benches,
536 The development of these discussions is described in detail in: Tansill, Bayard, 740-753. See also Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, 69-71. See also: Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, vol. 3, 161-163. 537 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 27 March 1896, Salisbury Papers. 538 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 23 January 1896, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, , Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 296. 539 Canada. Parliament, Debates of the House of Commons, 1896, 1-3. 540 The debate took place through January and early February, with the Resolution being approved 5 February 1896. Canada, Parliament, Debates of the House of Commons Vol. XLI, Ottawa, 1896, 32-33. 228 concurred that arming the militia was a necessity, but he also asserted that 'we are at peace with our neighbours.' Laurier acknowledged that 'there were a few days ago a little ripple between Great Britain and the United States', but that, fortunately, 'the best people in the United States to-day would regard a war between England and the United States as fratricidal.'541
In the meantime, the government had sent the quartermaster general, Colonel
Percy Lake, to Britain to purchase modern rifles for the militia. Parliament was later asked to vote a $3 million appropriation to enable the country to pay for these armaments and to take action to address the deplorable state of Canadian defences, indicating the seriousness with which the government viewed the international situation and the tensions created by the Venezuelan crisis. This tangible response marked a significant move towards Canada assuming responsibility for its own defence.542
As the storm clouds cleared, the reaction in Canada was one of relief combined with an element of imperial swagger. Sir Charles Tupper, who was soon to assume the office of prime minister, wrote to Sydney Buxton, until recently Chamberlain's under secretary for the colonies. Tupper boasted of 'the hearty and united spirit among
Canadians of all parties and class to stand by the mother country in a crisis which seemed to threaten the destruction of many happy homes.' Tupper believed the 'unanimous
Canada, Parliament, Debates of the House of Commons Vol. XLI, Ottawa, 1896, 16 January 1896, 165. 542 The fact that parliament was asked to do this after some contracts had been signed generated debate, though the funds were approved, though after parliament had technically expired, on 21 April 1896. Norman Penlington, Canada and Imperialism 1896-1899, 33. Many have seen the Venezuelan crisis as a turning point in Canada's realization of the need to develop the country's defences. Stephen Harris states: 'Still, the most dramatic influence on Canadian attitudes to and perceptions of national security was the sudden deterioration in Anglo-American relations over the question of the Venezuelan boundary in 1895- 96. Though the dispute originated in South America, it was obvious that Canada would be the main battleground should it come to war. Confronted by the worst case it had ignored for so long, the Canadian government could not remain inactive.' Stephen J. Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 59. 229 sentiment of the principles of public men here' would have a 'very valuable effect upon our neighbours to the south, who only agree so far as I am able to judge in their desire to obtain possession of Canada.'543
Resolving the crisis required concessions and active co-operation from both sides.
President Cleveland in his special message had provided for the creation of a United
States commission to inquire into the 'true division line' between Venezuela and British
Guiana, and it was soon discovered that in order for this body to do its work, documentary evidence from both sides was required. Ambassador Bayard avoided any hint of belligerency in requesting assistance. His note to Salisbury asked to 'beg leave to make application to your Lordship that, if entirely consistent with your sense of international propriety, the Commission may be furnished with such documentary proofs
... or other evidence.'544 Salisbury replied that 'any information that is at the command of Her Majesty's Government upon any subject of inquiry that is occupying the attention of the Government of the United States will be readily placed at the disposal of the
President.'545
Still outstanding was the ultimatum Britain had delivered to the Venezuelan government over the border incident in the Uruan district. Venezuela was given three months to respond, and this was due to expire in mid-January. A week before the threatened deadline, word arrived from the British minister in Mexico City that
Venezuela would be asking the Mexican minister in London to act for Venezuela. It
543 Tupper to Buxton, 22 February 1896, Chamberlain responded in kind in a letter written by H.T. Wilson acting as his secretary. 'We have been delighted here at the expressions of the patriotic spirit of the Dominion during the recent difficulty. I really think we might be grateful to the German Emperor & President Cleveland for their action, which has undoubtedly gone far to heighten the bonds that unite the Empire.' Wilson to Tupper, 10 March 1896, Tupper Papers, Reel C3206, Library and Archives Canada 544 Bayard to Salisbury, 3 February 1896, FO 420/168, 45. 545 Salisbury to Bayard, 7 February 1896, FO 420/168, 46. 230 seemed the American government had officially advised Venezuela 'to accept the terms of the British Ultimatum . . . which was just in its terms, and which did not affect the question of the Guiana boundary.'546 Matters became confused when Salisbury received a similar request that the Brazilian diplomatic mission should undertake the duty of representing Venezuela.547 Pauncefote assured Salisbury that 'much pressure is being brought on Venezuela by the United States' Government to come to a settlement with
Great Britain.'548 Bayard worked to clarify where and with whom the negotiations should take place, and suggested that Pauncefote discuss the matter with the Venezuelan minister in Washington. In accepting this arrangement, Salisbury thanked Bayard for the 'friendly feeling which has led the Government of the United States to make the suggestion.'549
When Pauncefote finally met with Minister Rojas in Washington in early February, the result was less than satisfactory. While Rojas agreed to pay the £1,500 reparations, he refused to make the apology Britain had demanded. His rationale was that a decision had not been reached as to whether the district where the incident occurred was Venezuelan or
British territory.
The inconclusive negotiations with Venezuela over the ultimatum dragged on through April, finally resulting in a form of apology.550 The Uruan incident, nevertheless, marked a significant shift in Anglo-American relations. The secretary of state had become involved on Great Britain's behalf, urging the Venezuelan government to accede to Britain's demands, and assisting in establishing conditions for achieving settlement.
546 Dering to Salisbury, 7 February 1896, FO 420/168, 47. 547 Salllisbury to Dering, 8 February 1896. FO 420/168, 48. See also: Salisbury to Pauncefote 17 February 1896, FO 420/168, 52. 548 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 13 February 1896. FO 420/168, 49. 549 Salisbury to Bayard, 19 February 1896. FO 420/168, 52. 550 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 2 April 1896, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 306. 231
Later in the year, a British surveyor was arrested by the Venezuelans in the same Uruan district. Salisbury directed Pauncefote to seek Olney's intervention, and the secretary of state responded by notifying the Venezuelan minister that there could be 'no occasion . . . for continuing the imprisonment.' He also advised the Venezuelan representative that it was 'most unwise' for that country to be 'adding to existing grievances.'55! The following day Pauncefote confirmed that the State Department had received confirmation that Venezuela had released the surveyor.
With respect to the wider boundary settlement, the informal diplomacy of January and February showed limited progress. Olney became directly involved in March, discussing and exchanging proposals with Salisbury through Pauncefote.553 The United
States had backed down from its confrontational stance, and Britain pulled back from its position that the United States had no right inserting itself in a matter involving Britain and Venezuela. Arbitration was accepted by both sides, though Venezuela was largely excluded from the discussions pertaining to the details of these arrangements.554
Britain and the United States wrangled over the principles that should be used by the arbiters in deciding the boundary line. Britain was adamant that obscure historical considerations should not determine the disposition of territory long settled by British subjects. A formula was eventually developed for expressing this without reference to the much maligned Schomburgk Line. Areas in the disputed zone were to be excluded if settled by nationals of either side for some agreed period of time. Bargaining on the specifics of this kind of compromise began in earnest in April, when Salisbury suggested
551 Olney to Andrade, 25 June 1896, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 316. 552 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 26 June 1896, FO 420/168, 189. 553 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 1 March 1896. FO 420/168, 49. 554 Tansill, Bayard, 748. 232 that nine years residence should establish good title.555 To this Olney took 'decisive objection',556 though he eventually suggested that sixty years occupation might be acceptable.
Chamberlain endeavoured to break the stalemated negotiations. On the pretext of a late summer visit to see his wife's family, he called on Olney, and floated the idea of
ceo thirty years settlement giving title.' Olney was suspicious of Chamberlain, possibly on account of the earlier chaos created by informal diplomacy. He waited until October, by which time Pauncefote had returned from consultations with Salisbury in England, and was able to make an offer on behalf of the British government that forty-five years settlement be construed to give title. Olney responded with an offer of fifty years, which was accepted.559 The basic terms of the treaty were agreed to after the November
American elections, which Olney's Democrats lost.560 There were expressions of outrage in Venezuela when it became known that residency was to be accepted as a factor in determining title to disputed territory and that Venezuela was not to be represented on the
555 Salisbury to Pauncefote, 22 May 1896, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 311. 556 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 15 June 1896, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 313. 557 Olney to Pauncefote, 15 July 1896, United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President, Transmitted to Congress December 7, 1896, and the Annual Report of the Secretary of State, 253-254. 558 Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, 71-72. 559 During the summer of 1896, as British and American diplomats were beginning to discover the principles that promised to resolve the Venezuelan dispute, a discovery of a very different kind was being made in Canada's Yukon. On 17 August, George Carmack, Skookum Jim and Tagish Charlie discovered the immensely rich placer gold deposits on Bonanza Creek, sparking the Klondike gold rush. Until this time, the dispute over the boundary between Canada and Alaska's 'panhandle' had generated relatively little hostility within the broader Anglo-American relationship. The Klondike gold discoveries changed this, increasing the economic factors at stake in the Alaska boundary question. Thus the Alaska boundary dispute was suddenly accorded a new significance, requiring resolution in the next stage of Anglo- Canadian-American dealings. See: Norman Penlington, The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal, (Torono: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1972). 560 Tansill, Bayard, 114-115 233 arbitral committee. The latter difficulty was resolved, when Venezuela was allowed to name one of the arbiters, though the individual could not be a Venezuelan. An American, therefore, represented the Latin American state.
The Arbitral Committee met at Paris in 1899, composed of two members appointed by Great Britain, one for the United States and one for Venezuela. Frederick de
Martens, a Russian international jurist was selected by these four to be the fifth arbiter and president of the tribunal.562 The arbitration proceedings largely upheld the British claim, following the Schomburgk Line except at the mouth of the Orinoco, where Port
Barima was awarded to Venezuela and in the mountainous south. The disputed Cuyuni
River served to define the boundary for a distance of about 100 km.563
Conclusion
The objectives Olney and Cleveland brought to the Venezuelan dispute were met when
Britain accepted that the matter was one that properly concerned the United States. This followed the interpretation Olney and Cleveland had placed on the Monroe Doctrine.
Salisbury minced his words about this, stating in the House of Lords that 'bringing in of the Monroe Doctrine was, controversially, quite unnecessary for the United States.
Considering the position of Venezuela in the Caribbean Sea, it was no more unnatural
Olney's tendency to bypass Venezuela in negotiating the terms of arbitration and the Venezuelan response are analysed in Grenville and Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, 176-178. 562 Martens had published an assessment of the Russian and British positions in Central Asia in 1879, a fact that contributed to allegations that he was biased in favour of British interests. His book has subsequently been translated into Spanish by the Venezuelan Government as Rusia e lnglaterra en Asia Central, (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la Republica, 1981). 563 There were subsequent allegations de Martens used less than judicial criteria in seeking a compromise award. As a result, Venezuela today rejects the results of the Arbitral process and the Venezuela-Guyana boundary remains in dispute. William Cullen Dennis, 'The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration of 1899', The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Oct., 1950) pp. 720-727. The current Venezuelan position is presented in Oscar J. Marquez, 'Una Repuesta en Defensa de la Guayana Esequiba', La Pluma Liveral, (Caracas, 2007). 234 that the United States should take an interest in it than that we should feel an interest in
Belgium and Holland.'564 Salisbury nevertheless signalled British acceptance of the main thrust of a fundamental tenet of American foreign policy, accepting that the United States had the leading role to play in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. This had largely been conceded before, but never in so public a forum.
Salisbury's statement in the House of Lords, however, said nothing of Canada, and it is likely no specific change of policy was intended. In 1896 the most pressing
Anglo-Canadian dispute was still the Bering Sea fur seals. The Foreign Office reflected
Canadian opinion in refusing to be influenced by American threats to destroy the seals by mercy killings. Before leaving office, Olney sought to have the Foreign Office implement measures that would strengthen the regulations for searching sealing vessels, examining sealskins, and precluding the use of firearms. Britain responded that inspections taking place in Canada would require Canadian legislation, and that Canada would be consulted in relation to the other issues raised.565 The United States and Canada remained at odds, though the issues concerned were less than critical, and relations remained at a manageable level throughout the Venezuelan affair. Ironically, British endeavours to encourage the United States and Canada to develop mutually acceptable solutions to their hemispheric based disputes bore only meagre results. Olney attempted to avoid direct dealings with Canadian politicians, preferring to negotiate with Canada remotely, through the machinery of the British Foreign Office.
564 Hansard, Fourth Series, XXXVII, 52 (11 February 1896), 84-85 565 Olney to Pauncefote, 15 December 1896. See also: Pauncefote to Olney, 16 January 1897, United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President, Transmitted to Congress December 6, 1897, 258-261. 235
Chamberlain's objectives in the Venezuelan crisis shifted as events unfolded. In its early phase, he insisted that Venezuela be handled firmly, and that border incursions be met forcefully. When the United States took up the Venezuelan cause, quoting the
Monroe Doctrine in the process, Chamberlain pressed for a rejection of this American intrusion, maintaining that it was not a matter that concerned the United States and that
Britain had every right to operate as a Western Hemispheric power. Cleveland's bold defiance and threat of hostilities shook Chamberlain's conviction. Believing that
Cleveland meant business, Chamberlain ordered the British Guiana government to show greater flexibility along the disputed border and sought means of accommodating the
United States in the dispute. The fact that the Venezuelan crisis occurred at the same time as the Jameson Raid made Chamberlain realize the necessity of ascribing a priority order to the various imperial dreams he espoused and to appreciate that British interests in the Western Hemisphere had to be linked to an Anglo-Saxon destiny that included the
United States.
Salisbury allowed the British position to be heavily influenced by Chamberlain. It is possible he would not have taken so strong a stand in the first place, had not his colonial secretary pressed him to do so. Having assumed this stance, Salisbury was reluctant to abandon his ground and only did so in the face of a cabinet decision.
Throughout the dispute, the one matter on which Salisbury was unprepared to budge concerned the rights of 'British colonists who have settled in territory which they had every ground for believing to be British.' Salisbury was adamant that he would not watch their 'fortunes possibly ruined' as the result of the decision of an arbiter, 'who, in 236 the last resort, must, of necessity, be a foreigner.'" In this he prevailed, and the decision of the tribunal largely confirmed British title to the territory claimed by the colony.
The Venezuelan crisis focussed public attention in Canada on the complex nature of the Anglo-Canadian-American relationship, leading to a public declaration in the
Dominion House of Commons, stating that loyalty to Britain and friendly relations with the United States were the cornerstones on which Canada's interests rested. The crisis also shook Canada out of its complacent disregard for military preparedness.
There was likely never any real danger that war would result from the Venezuelan boundary dispute, but in facing the prospect of hostilities, compromises were made that altered both sides of the Anglo-American relationship. By working through the boundary dispute, Salisbury conceded that Britain must respect the paramount role assumed by the
United States in Western Hemispheric affair. This was a concession of greater importance for Americans to perceive than for Britain to grant. For some time Britain had been prepared to defer to the United States on a wide range of matters of hemispheric concern, provided British interests and prestige were not compromised. The United
States now found itself embarked on a course that incidentally involved it, not so much in opposing Britain in hemispheric affairs, as supporting Britain and other outside powers in their claims arising from disputes with the occasionally chaotic republics of the region.567
Salisbury to Pauncefote, 22 May 1896, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series C, Vol. 10, 310-311. 567 George Young defined what he believed constituted the 'Olney Corollary' to the Monroe Doctrine as follows: 'If grounds exist sufficient to persuade the United States that the political or territorial integrity of an American state is threatened by a non-American power, the United States regards the Monroe Doctrine as automatically implicated, and claims the right to intervene between the two disputing states. Termination of the dispute through a settlement reached by the free consent of both states will be considered as satisfying the Doctrine. If, however, no such settlement is reached, the United States may suggest, and impose impartially, such a composition of the dispute as seems in its sole judgment reasonable and just.' Young continues, arguing that 'The implications of so broad a right of intervention as this . . . were not lost on the British. Evidence accumulates that they were aware of the magnitude of their 237
Referring to the Venezuelan dispute, Salisbury observed that American intervention introduced 'a solid and substantial Government which, in effect, offers a guarantee for . .. any settlement that may be arrived at.'568 Far from opposing Britain in its quarrels with
Venezuela, the United States now found itself insisting that Venezuela comply with an earlier British ultimatum. Following the arbitral award, Venezuela was required to accept a boundary that constituted a dramatic withdrawal from the original claim that generated this international incident and its paradoxical conclusion.
concessions to Olney, and that their diplomacy was thereafter directed toward persuading the United States to accept responsibility for the behavior of the Latin American states. The fruit of this policy, in part at least, was the Roosevelt Corollary.' See; Young, 'Intervention Under the Monroe Doctrine', 279-280. 568 Great Britain, Parliament, Hansard (House of Lords), 4th Series, XXXVII, (11 February 1896) 84-85. CONCLUSION
The Venezuelan boundary crisis stands at the conclusion of the better part of a decade during which relations between Great Britain and the United States deteriorated in the face of a series of discordant incidents, each of which was invested in varying degrees with diplomatic, commercial and strategic significance. Threats to engage in hostilities were inferred though never acted on, and diplomacy succeeded in resolving most matters.
After Venezuela, the nature of the relationship was largely transformed, with Great
Britain according explicit recognition to the dominant role the United States was capable of playing in hemispheric affairs, and the United States indicating its willingness to accept that some commonality of interest existed in British and American participation in hemispheric affairs. The foundations were laid for increased Anglo-American co operation in future years, an important element in fashioning the history of the twentieth century.
The series of disputes analysed here constituted a process by which Britain and the United States came to appreciate the value of working together, rather than in opposition. Treaties concluded earlier in the nineteenth century had been loosely based on the principles of toleration and co-operation. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850) was framed to give Britain and the United States a joint role in the development of any future isthmian canal, while in the Treaty of Washington (1871) the United States, perhaps somewhat grudgingly, acknowledged the right of Canada to develop as a British state in
238 239
North America. It was, however, British commercial and naval predominance at mid- century that gave real meaning to the clauses of these diplomatic instruments, while the growth of American capacity in these same fields later in the century proved their undoing.
In the 1880s, as American industry and naval resources developed, the United
States also began to expand its interpretation of the rhetorical cornerstone of American hemispheric policy, the Monroe Doctrine. At the same time, Canada was seeking to assert its right to compete as a distinct political and economic entity in North America, while imbibing the tenets of late nineteenth century imperialism which were gaining support in
Britain and elsewhere. This produced a dangerous political chemistry, leading to a number of local, interconnected and potentially explosive events. The main players found themselves involved in a diplomatic process, which worked to inform each of the expectations and requirements of the other. The volatility factor was, however, increased with the insertion of more assertive players in the mix, in the persons of Richard Olney and Joseph Chamberlain. The result was the confrontation over the Venezuelan boundary, the accompanying threats of confrontation, and the eventual cathartic settlement in which most of the diplomatic objectives of both sides were achieved.
The confrontations involving Britain and the United States during this period were mainly based in local hemispheric disputes, something that was very much a concern to
American policymakers. Increasingly, they were viewing this region as one they should dominate economically, politically and from a security perspective, functions Britain had performed for much of the nineteenth century. Britain and the United States transmitted some mixed messages to one another in their handling of these local disputes, something commented on by the young British diplomat, Cecil Spring Rice, who for many of these 240 years was on the staff of the British Embassy in Washington. Writing in 1891, while assigned to the Bering Sea sealing controversy, he stated his conviction that 'all these
Western diplomatic affairs [were] most difficult.' Yet he never questioned that Britain must accommodate the United States.
It is a question of supply. We get an enormous proportion of our food supply from the U.S So in case of a European naval war in which we are engaged, the U.S. navy is bound to protect our commerce and food supply, which is an important consideration. Besides this, our trade with them is six hundred million out of a total of sixteen hundred, and our interests are bound up inextricably.569
Britain's accommodation of the United States became subsumed in the minutiae of the various hemispheric disputes. In a similar way, these incidents provided a forum in which American policy-makers debated how and when to assert their intolerance with
British pretensions. An early occasion presented itself in 1888, when American Secretary of State Thomas Bayard described his predicament in a memorandum compiled in relation to complaints that Britain was using the Mosquito Reservation to dominate affairs on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast. He was willing to wait until 'this canal across Lake
Nicaragua was commenced' and 'Americans got down there in force,' factors that would
'affect the state of affairs very much,' clearly in favour of the United States.570 A year later, in the course of an exchange of views over British activity along this same coast,
Lord Salisbury stated that it would give the British government 'the greatest possible satisfaction' if arrangements could be made to relieve Britain of further responsibility for
Spring Rice to Ronald Munor Ferguson, 7 June 1891, In: Stephen Gwynn (Ed.) The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, Vol. I, 112-113. Throughout much of the period of this study, Cecil Spring Rice was employed at the British Embassy in Washington. He arrived there on what was supposed to be a temporary assignment in 1887, and moved back and forth between Washington and the Foreign Office. He was in Japan between 1892-1894, returning to Washington in 1894, whence he left for Germany in 1895. 570 Memorandum of Bayard after a conversation with Nicaraguan Minister H. Guzman, 10 February 1888, In: Charles Callan Tansill, Bayard, 669. 241 the Mosquito Indians. This signalled British willingness to withdraw, along with a determination to see leadership transferred in a way that respected British prestige, commercial interests, and existing treaty obligations. Subsequent events showed that these seemingly reasonable expectations were easier to stipulate than fulfil.
The situation concerning Canada was even more complex, involving as it did a maturing state firmly based in the geopolitics of North America, diplomatically dependent on Britain, and competing for the resources and markets of a shared continent. In one of his letters, Spring Rice explained how Americans tended to view the 'wrongs inflicted by
Canada' as being 'done by Gt. Britain, so Gt. Britain is responsible.'
We make an arrangement. If it is unfavourable to the U.S., this is again an unfriendly act; if it is acceptable, the newspapers point out to Canada that Great Britain has abandoned her colony, and that the only resource is annexation - One is naturally anxious to come to a friendly arrangement with the U.S.A., but we are more anxious not to sacrifice our colony.571
Of the many Anglo-American disputes, the most serious implicating Canada concerned the fur seals of the Bering Sea. This involved Britain more directly than the other similar dispute of this period concerning the North Atlantic fishery. The Bering Sea was an international zone, where the United States sought to impose its domestic legislation to control the harvesting of seals. The principle of the freedom of the seas was caught up in the dispute, a principle Britain as the world's leading maritime power had to defend. The need for agreed conservation measures to preserve the seal herds was clear, though the livelihoods of many Canadians seemed to hinge, in the short-term at any rate, on keeping these measures to a bare minimum. Frustrated by the futility of fur seal diplomacy, Spring Rice summed up the British dilemma, explaining that 'we argue a
571 Spring Rice to Ferguson, 7 June 1891, in: Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, Vol.1, 112-113. 242 cause we do not understand and defend an interest which is not ours. I have never seen it so strongly shown as in these negotiations.'572
The option existed of having Canadian politicians visit Washington in various capacities, and engage in direct negotiations, sometimes with, and occasionally without,
British diplomatic oversight. It was Thomas Bayard who proposed this as a solution that might usher in a new era in Canadian-American relations. In 1887 he hoped to resolve the whole range of continental disputes, suggesting to Sir Charles Tupper that 'this wordy triangular duel' end, and that 'more direct and responsible methods should be resorted to.'
The resulting Joint High Commission of 1887-1888, on which Tupper sat as the Canadian representative, achieved results that fell far short of Bayard's, and many others', expectations. Canada and the United States in these years were forcefully contesting access to offshore resources, though the Joint High Commission was only able to consider the North Atlantic fishery. Clearly local interests and political sensibilities were heavily implicated. Not surprisingly it was the British representative on the commission, Joseph
Chamberlain, and not Sir Charles Tupper or Thomas Bayard, who worked to broker the various solutions. In the main, even these proved too much for the American Senate, which rejected the Chamberlain-Bayard Treaty. Fortunately, all parties had made provision for this. By modus vivendi, a framework was created that preserved the peace for American and Canadian fishing fleets for several years to come. The hard bargaining by Canadian politicians was not soon forgotten.
For the most part American secretaries of state preferred dealing through formal
British diplomatic channels where Canada was concerned. The exception was in relation
572 Spring Rice to Ferguson, 7 June 1891, in: Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, Vol.1, 112-113. 243 to commercial and tariff negotiations, a field over which Britain exercised minimal supervision. In one of his insightful letters, Spring Rice made reference to the difficulty of involving Canada in the diplomatic process, noting that the dominion's position could be 'trying.' Spring Rice relates this to Canada's reliance on Britain for defence. 'This makes them very violent and outspoken in their attitude', and he maintained that Canada needed 'to pay more of the costs of defence.'573
The upshot was that for most of this period, and for some years following, Britain,
Canada and the United States would be entwined in a complex three-sided diplomatic process that involved matters being routed from Washington to the Foreign Office, from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office, thence to the governor general in Ottawa, who would consult with the Canadian cabinet for their views, with a response then being routed back to Washington via London, reversing the chain. The answer was often not what the Americans wished to hear, highlighting the competitive nature of the Canadian-
American relationship, and the fact that two similarly structured jurisdictions, equipped with similar economic engines, straddled the North American continent and appeared pitted against each other. This generated rather more soul-searching in Canada than the
United States. In Canada, public discussion examined various economic policy options ranging from the protectionist National Policy, through various forms of reciprocity, including the extreme solution of commercial union, often portrayed as the prelude to annexation. In the United States, there was reluctance to entertain options that did not include some degree of Canadian economic and political submission. As a result Canada sought shelter under the traditional cover of British diplomacy, at a time when British
573 Spring Rice to Ferguson, 7 June 1891, in: Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, Vol.1, 112-113. 244 foreign policy itself was seeking honourable accommodation with the United States. In
1891, Spring Rice commented on this situation, around the time Canada's Conservative government was preparing to engage in an upcoming round of half-hearted, pre-election tariff negotiations with James Blaine, the secretary of state in Benjamin Harrison's
Republican administration. 'The U.S. will make large offers, coupled with a condition that Canada differentiates against England,' Spring Rice continued, predicting that, in turn, Canada would 'make large offers on condition that they are also extended to
England.' Rice believed that in both cases 'the actors look to the gallery. The U.S. expects to bring into relief the choice laid before Canada - to be an appendage of the U.S. and commercially prosperous, or an appendage of Great Britain and poor - the choice, that is, between the dollar and the shilling.'574
Unlike the economic sticks with which the United States threatened Canada,
Secretary of State James Blaine offered the Caribbean and Latin American countries of the hemisphere more attractive carrots, in the form of reciprocal trade agreements. Spring
Rice saw this as an attempt to 'put the colonies in the dilemma of choosing between . . . the Empire and commercial ruin', and he feared their annexation by the United States as a likely outcome.575 Nevertheless, succeeding American governments were unable to continue these arrangements in the face of opposition from vested domestic interests determined to work behind a tightly sealed tariff wall.
The United States increasingly found itself able to augment its economic policies with an enhanced naval capacity. The Monroe Doctrine, enunciated in the early
' Spring Rice to Ferguson, 6 November 1891, in: Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, Vol. I, 116. 245 nineteenth century, asserted the intention of the United States to exercise a degree of control over the affairs of the Western Hemisphere, and the creation of a modern fleet gave the country the ability to accomplish this lofty objective. This reality became increasingly clear to American and British policy-makers in the contexts of the Chilean crisis of 1892, and the Brazilian naval revolt of 1894. American naval power combined with American military resources and the indefensible nature of the Canadian-American border, gave the United States a much-enhanced stature in calculations of Western
Hemispheric defence and security matters. In 1892, Spring Rice discussed this new reality, insisting that 'we can't possibly afford to quarrel, and that if we did, not only would it be an immense disaster, but we couldn't beat them.'576
Britain had indicated to the United States and Nicaragua its willingness to withdraw from the position it occupied as a traditional, distant, informal and unacknowledged suzerain along the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua. This strategic withdrawal might have worked to strengthen Anglo-American relations, but this was not to be the case. Affecting the transfer of power proved difficult, given the chaotic revolutionary conditions in Nicaragua and the range of British and American interests there. The revolution in Nicaragua impinged dramatically on events, though British withdrawal from the Mosquito Coast was never in doubt. Assertive actions by a British naval commander aimed at preserving the status quo were overturned. A similar fate awaited attempts by British and American diplomatic and naval personnel bent on protecting the livelihoods and political institutions of their nationals. The tortuous state of local conditions precluded Britain withdrawing in an orderly manner with due regard
576 Spring Rice to Ferguson, 25 April 1892, in: Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, Vol I, 119. 246 paid to British interests and prestige. Britain endeavoured to avoid participation in local developments, but the long history of British involvement in Mosquito affairs made this difficult, and British actions were never free from American suspicion. Nicaraguan affronts to a British consular official constituted an unacceptable challenge to British prestige. The Royal Navy was required to intervene to extract symbolic reparations at
Corinto on Nicaragua's Pacific coast, an act that worked to bring about a serious deterioration in Anglo-American relations.
On the other side of the equation, British naval personnel were impressed by the professionalism and efficiency of American officers and crew acting to protect lives and property along the Mosquito Coast. At the local level, British and American responsibilities sometimes overlapped, so that to some extent, the naval commanders effectively relieved one another. British respect for the American naval presence in the hemisphere was further enhanced when American warships moved to bring an end to a bloody revolution in Brazil by firing a single shot into the side of an insurgent cruiser.
Events in Brazil, however, added to American doubts about the true nature of British intentions in the Western Hemisphere. The Brazilian government encouraged a view that
Britain favoured those working to divide, conquer and restore the monarchy in that young republic. British actions to annex the Brazilian island of Trinidad for cable laying purposes in 1895 seemed to add substance to allegations of British aggression on
President Monroe's side of the Atlantic Ocean.
Americans, on the other hand, were distinctly unimpressed with the part the Royal
Navy was playing in the joint policing role the two countries' maritime forces were called on to perform in protecting the seals of the Bering Sea. Attempts in 1894 to develop a more effective framework for enforcement became caught up in the glacial pace of the 247 triangular diplomacy involving Washington, London and Ottawa. Spring Rice observed how 'departmental correspondence between the F.O., the Col. Office and Canada only resulted in the perpetual discovery of new difficulties.' The end result of this was 'delay on delay.'577
The Venezuelan boundary crisis followed. It had been brewing for many years.
Venezuelan ministers in Washington had long lobbied American secretaries of state to champion their cause. The Venezuelan border with British Guiana had never been delineated, and it was asserted that the Monroe Doctrine gave the United States grounds to intervene and oppose British encroachments in the gold bearing placer mining fields located in the disputed region. American secretaries of state were reluctant to become too deeply embroiled, espousing arbitration and direct talks between Britain and Venezuela.
This changed in 1895. The Venezuelan government made use of a publicist to raise public awareness of its case, and the appearance of British intervention in hemispheric affairs, particularly at Corinto, did little to lessen the charges levelled against Britain.
Spring Rice described how 'the South Americans are in with all the low press men and every sort of lie is propagated about British aggression.'578
The public relations campaign coincided with changed leadership in both London and Washington, so that those responsible for managing the looming crisis were, for the most part, new to the game. Richard Olney and Joseph Chamberlain assumed office in
June and July 1895 respectively, and each was anxious to place a new and more forthright face on his country's international relations. Their predecessors had managed to use
577 Spring Rice to Ferguson, 19 March 1894, in: Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, Vol. I, 154. 578 Spring Rice to Villiers, 12 April 1895, in: Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, Vol. I, 175. 248 earlier incidents to gain a deeper appreciation of the factors working to ruffle and smooth relations. There had been a general reluctance to indulge in threats of hostile action, leading to a general belief that open confrontation was unlikely. Olney, Chamberlain and
Cleveland, however, showed they were prepared to move more closely to the brink in this regard than had their predecessors.
In the end, the Venezuelan crisis was a diplomatic dispute in which the only salvos exchanged were verbal. Nevertheless, it provided a forum in which a number of problems that had long plagued the relationship were publicly confronted. Britain had been prepared to defer to the United States in matters of regional concern for some time, particularly in relation to the Caribbean and Latin America. Following a threat of force,
Britain publicly accepted that the United States had the right to participate in resolving the Venezuelan dispute. This involved British acceptance of the tenets of the Monroe
Doctrine, and acknowledgement of American paramountcy in hemispheric affairs.
Less publicly, the Venezuelan crisis became the context in which the United
States quietly began assuming a larger share in policing the actions of the region's states on behalf of the international community. Kimberley had expressed his frustration at
American hypocrisy in this regard in the midst of the public relations fiasco that followed the Corinto landing. In a private letter to Pauncefote, the foreign secretary had commented on the 'intolerable' behaviour of the Nicaraguans, and expressed his wish that
'the U. States would make itself responsible for the decent behaviour of these little States to other States' and in so doing 'relieve much trouble.' Kimberley saw the connection with the Monroe Doctrine but believed that this policy related primarily to 'the 249 acquisition of territory which is quite another matter.'579 The Venezuela crisis led to a significant broadening of this narrow interpretation. Britain obtained American support in extracting reparations from Venezuela for acts against the British Guiana police, and the
United States insisted on Venezuelan compliance in the unpopular arbitration process.
The Venezuelan crisis occurred at a time when Canada was consumed with internal domestic strife flowing from the dispute over the Manitoba schools question and the failing leadership of Prime Minister Mackenzie Bowell. The threat of war forced the government to take emergency action to provide for its own defence. While the resulting military preparations were modest, they marked an important step. Canada's intentions in the field of external relations were being linked to the development of its military capability. The crisis also engaged the Canadian House of Commons in a public discussion on the nature of the Anglo-Canadian-American relationship, leading to an expression of Canada's 'unalterable loyalty and devotion to the British Throne', as well as the desire of Canadians 'to maintain the most friendly relations with their kinsmen of the United States,'580 the precise balance upon which Canadian external policy evolved over the next half century and more.
Overall, these years of discord produced a degree of harmony, forcing all sides to confront the dynamics of the ever-shifting balance of economic, naval, military and diplomatic factors operating within the hemisphere. Canada remained within the British imperial fold, a function in part of the actions of American governments seeking to dominate the wider region. However, the British imperial fold, at least in its Western
Hemispheric guise, was being moved ever closer into the orbit of the United States.
579 Kimberley to Pauncefote, 3 May 1895, Kimberley Papers, Eng. C. 4408, The Bodelian Library, Oxford. 580 Parliamentary Resolution, British Connection and Imperial Defence, 5 February 1896, Canada, Parliament, Debates, House of Commons, Vol. XLI, 1896, 1186-1187. 250
British power and prestige in the hemisphere survived the crisis, though continuing in relative decline. The mid-Victorian diplomatic settlements were practically undone, and in their place the United States achieved the pre-eminence in hemispheric affairs it sought, along with implied new responsibilities to be exercised on behalf of the international community. This situation was acceptable to Great Britain, facing challenges elsewhere in the world where such co-operative arrangements were even more difficult to consummate. Spring Rice summed up the situation, observing that 'there is no point on which the interests of the U.S. and G.B. are diametrically opposed ... there is no reason whatever why we shouldn't enjoy a sort of peace.'581
Spring Rice to Villiers, 12 April 1895, in: Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, 175. BIBLIOGRAPHY:
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United States Department of State, The Executive Documents of the House of Representatives for the Second Session of the Fifty-third Congress. 1893-'94 Vol. 1.
United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 3, 1894.
United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President, Transmitted to Congress December 2, 1895: Part I. 255
United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President, Transmitted to Congress December 2, 1895: Part II. (Ill 105)
United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President, Transmitted to Congress December 7, 1896, and the Annual Report of the Secretary of State.
United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President, Transmitted to Congress December 6, 1897.
United States Department of State, Extracts from the Seventh Annual Message of James Monroe, December 2, 1823.
United States Department of State, The Executive Documents of the House of Representatives for the Second Session of the Fifty-third Congress. 1893- '94 Vol. 1 (1893-1894)
United States House of Representatives, 'Resolution 8909', Congressional Record, 53rd congress, 3r Session, 2361.
IV. Books
Adams, Iestyn, Brothers Across the Ocean British Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' 1900-1905, (London: Tauris Academic, 2005).
Ahvenainen, Jorma, The European Cable Companies in South America before the First World War, ([Helsinki]: Academia Scientiarium Fennica, 2004).
Alden, John D, The American Steel Navy, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989).
Allen, H.C., The Anglo-American Relationship since 1783, (London: Adam & Chares Black, 1959).
Allen, H.C., Great Britain and the United States, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955).
Barratt, Glynn, Russian Shadows on the British Northwest Coast of North America, 1810- 1890, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983).
Baity-King, Hugh ,Girdle Round the Earth: The story of Cable and Wireless and its Predecessors to Mark the Group's Jubilee 1929-1979,(London: Heinemann, 1979).
Bell, C. Napier, Tangweera: Life and Adventures Among 'Gentle' Savages, (London: Edward Arnold, 1899). 256
Belloff, Max, Imperial Sunset Volume I: Britain's Liberal Empire 1897-1921, (New York: Alfred A. Knopff, 1969).
Benians, E.A., Butler, Sir James, and Carrington, C.E., (eds.) Cambridge History of the British Empire Vol. III. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959).
Berger, Carl, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1867- 1914, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970).
Bertram, Marshall, The Birth of Anglo-American Friendship: The Prime Facet of the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute, a Study ofte Interreaction of Diplomacy and Public Opinion, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1992).
Bourne, Kenneth, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America 1815-1908, (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967).
Bourne, Kenneth, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).
Boutilier, James A. (ed.), The RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968, (Vasncouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982).
Boyce, D. George (ed.), The Crisis of British Power, The Imperial and Naval Papers of the Second Earl of Selborne, 1895-1910, (London: The Historians' Press, 1990).
Brendon, Piers, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire 1781-1997, (London: Jonathan Cape, 2007).
Brown, Robert Craig, Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974).
Brown, Robert Craig, Canada's National Policy 1883-1900, A Study of Canadian- American Relations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).
Brown, Thomas N., Irish-American Nationalism 1870-1890, (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966).
Buchan, John, Lord Minto: A Memoir, (London: Thomas Nelson, 1924).
Buckner, Phillip (ed.) Canada and the British Empire, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
Burke, Bernard, Dictionary of the Peerage and Baronetage, (London, 1889).
Butler, Jeffrey, The Liberal Party and the Jameson Raid, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). 257
Campbell, Charles A., Great Britain and the United States 1895-1903, (London: Longmans, 1960).
Calhoun, Charles W, Gilded Age Cato, (University Press of Kentucky, 1988).
Campbell, Charles S, Jr., Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957).
Campbell, Charles S, From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783-1900, (New York, 1974).
Campbell, Charles S, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 1865-1870, New York: Harper Colophon, 1976).
[Canada] Report of the Commissioner of the North-West Mounted Police Force, 1888, (Ottawa: 1889).
Canada, Parliament, Debate of the House of Commons, Vol. XXXVII, Ottawa, 1894.
Canada, Parliament, Debates of the House of Commons Vol. XLI, Ottawa, 1896.
Careless, J.M.S, The Union of the Canadas, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967).
Cecil, Lamar, Wilhelm II, Prince and Emperor, 1859-1900, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989-1996) 2 vols.
Clegern, Wayne M., British Honduras: Colonial Dead End 1859-1900, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967).
Collin, Richard H, Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean, the Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine and he Latin American Context, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990).
Consalvi, Simon Alberto, Grover Cleveland y la Controversia Venezuela-Gran Bretana: La Historia Secreta, (Caracas[?]: Historias de Papel, 1992).
Creighton, Donald, Canada's First Century 1867-1967, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970).
Divine, Michael J, 'John W. Foster', American National Biography, Ed: John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
Dennis, William Cullen, 'The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration of 1899', The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 44, No. 4,(October 1950).
Devine, Michael J, John W. Foster: Politics and Diplomacy in the Imperial Era, 1873- 1917, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981). 258
Michael Dockrill, Michael and McKercher, Brian (eds.), Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Dozier, Craig L, Nicaragua's Mosquito Shore, The Years of British and American Presence, (University of Alabama Press, 1985).
Dyne, Brian, The Empty Sleeve, The Story of the West India Regiments of the British Army, (Antigua: Hansib, 1997).
Eggert, Gerald G, Richard Olney Evolution of a Statesman, (Pennsylvania University Press, 1974).
Ensor, R.C.K., England 1870-1914, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936).
Esthus, Raymond A., Theodore Roosevelt and International Rivalries, (Waltham: Ginn- Blaisdell, 1970).
Fausto, Boris, A Concise History of Brazil, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
Foster, John W, Diplomatic Memoirs, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), 2 vols.
Fraser, Peter, Joseph Chamberlain Radicalism and Empire, 1868-1914, (London: Cassell, 1966).
Friedbeg, Aaron L., The Weary Titan Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
Froude, J.A, Short Studies on Great Subjects, Vol. II (London: Longmans, 1906 ed.).
Garvin, James L. (with Amery, Julian), The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, (London: Macmillan, 1933-1969) 6 vols.
Gay, John Thomas, American Fur Seal Diplomacy: The Alaskan Fur Seal Controversy, (New York: Peter Lang, 1987).
Gelber, Lionel M., The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics, 1898-1906, (London: Oxford University Press, 1938).
Goldstein, Erik, and B.J.C. McKercher, Power and Stability British Foreign Policy, 1865- 1965, (London: Frank Cass, 2003).
Gordon, Donald C, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1870-1914, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965). 259
Glazebrook, G.P. de T., A History of Canadian External Relations, (London: Oxford University Press, 1950).
Granatstein, J.L, Canada's Army, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).
Granatstein, J.L., How Britain's Weakness Forced Canada into the Arms of the United States, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).
Granatstein, J.L., and Hillmer, Norman, For Better or for Worse Canada and the United States to the 1990s, (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1991).
Great Britain, The Navy List, HMSO, 1885-1896.
Great Britain, Parliament, Hansard (House of Commons), 4th Series, XXXVI.
Great Britain, Parliament, Hansard (House of Lords), 4th Series, XXXVII
Grenville, John A.S, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy the Close of the Nineteenth Century, (London: Athlone Press, 1964).
Grenville, John A.S. and George Berkely Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
Gough, Barry M., 'The Influence of History on Mahan', in John B. Hattendorf (ed.) The Influence of History on Mahan, (Newport, R.I.: The Naval War College Press, 1991).
Gough, Barry M., The Royal Navy and the Northwest Coast of North America 1810-1914: A Study of British Maritime Ascendancy, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1971).
Gough, Barry M., Gunboat Frontier: British Maritime Authority and Northwest Coast Indians, 1846-90, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984).
Gudat, Edgardo Mondolfi, El Aguila y el Leon: El Presidente Benjamin Harrison y la Mediacion de los Estdos Unidos en la Controversia de Limites entre Venezuela y Gran Bretana, (Caracas: Estudios, Monografias y ensayos, 2000).
Gwynn, Stephen (ed.), The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice A Record , (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1929), 2 vols.
Hagan, Kenneth, This People's Navy, (New York: The Free Press, 1991).
Hamilton, Gail, Biography of James G. Blaine, Henry Hill, (Norwich: Henry Hill, 1895). 260
Harris, Stephen J, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988).
Hattendorf, John B., (ed.) The Influence of History on Mahan, (Newport, R.I.: The Naval War College Press, 1991).
Herrick, Jr, Walter R, The American Naval Revolution, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966).
Herring, George C, From Colony to Superpower, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
Hillmer, Norman and Granatstein, J.L., Empire to Umpire, (Toronto: Irwin, 1994).
Hood, Miriam, Gunboat Diplomacy 1895-1905, Great Power Pressure in Venezuela, (New York: A.S. Barnes, 1977).
Houston, Cecil J. and Smyth, William J., The Sash Canada Wore: A Historical Geography of the Orange Order in Canada, (Toronto, 1980).
Humphreys, R.A, The Diplomatic History of British Honduras 1638-1901, (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).
Innis, H.A, The Cod Fisheries, The History of an International Economy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954).
Karnes, Thomas L, The Failure of Union Central America, 1824-1960, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961)
Kennedy, P.M, 'Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870-1914', The English Historical Review, Vol.86, No. 341 (October 1971),
Kennedy, Paul M., The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, (New York: Random House, 1987).
Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, (London: 1976, Penguin ed. 2004).
Knight, Franklin W., The Caribbean: The Genesis of a fragmented Nationalism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
Kubicek, Robert V., The Administration of Imperialism: Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office, (Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 1969).
Kubicek, Robert V., Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice: The Case of South African Gold Mining Finance 1886-1914, (Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979). 261
LaFeber, Walter, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations Volume II, The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
Laughlin, J. Laurence and H. Parker Willis, Reciprocity, (New York: Baker and Taylor, 1903).
Levine, Robert M., The History of Brazil, (Westport Conn.: Greenwood, 1999).
Longford, Elizabeth, Jameson's Raid, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1960, Panther, 1982).
Lowe, C.J., Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy, 1878-1902 (New York: Macmillan, 1967).
Lower, Arthur R., Colony to Nation: A History of Canada, Toronto: Longmans, 1946).
Luebke, Frederick C, Germans in the New World: Essays in the History of Immigration, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999).
Mansergh, Nicholas, The Irish Question 1840-1921A Commentary on Anglo-Irish Relations and on Social and Political Forces in Ireland in the Age of Reform and Revolution, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1975).
Marder, Arthur J, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Power in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905 (London: Frank Cass, 1964).
Marks, Frederick W. Ill, Velvet on Iron: The Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979).
Marquez, Oscar J, 'Una Repuesta en Defensa de la Guayana Esequiba', La Pluma Liveral, (Caracas, 2007).
Marr, William L, and Donald G. Paterson, Canada: An Economic History, (Toronto: Gage, 1980).
Marsh, Peter T, Joseph Chamberlain, Entrepreneur in Politics, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994). de Martens, Frederick, Rusia e Inglaterra en Asia Central, (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la Republica, 1981).
Maycock, Sir Willoughby, With Mr. Chamberlain in the United States and Canada, 1887-88, (Toronto: Bell & Cockburn, 1914). 262
McCullough, David, The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal 1870-1914, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977).
McKercher, B.J.C., Esme Howard: A Diplomatic Biography, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
McKercher, B.J.C., and Lawrence, Aronsen, The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 1902-1956, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996).
Mendoca, Carlos Sussekind, Salvador de Mencdoca: Democrata do Imperio e da Republica, (Rio: Instututo Nacional do Livro, 1960).
Miller, Carman, The Canadian Career of the fourth Earl ofMinto: The Education of a Viceroy, (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980).
Miller, Carman, Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899-1902, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993).
Milner, Marc, Canada's Navy: The First Century, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).
Mitchell, Nancy, The Danger of Dreams: German and American Imperialism in Latin America, (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1999).
Morison, Samuel Eliot, The Oxford History of the American People, (New York: Oxford University Press 1965).
Morton, Desmond, A Military History of Canada, (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1990).
Morton, Desmond, Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia 1868- 1904, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970).
Mowat, R.B. The Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and the United States, (London: Edward Arnold, 1925).
Mowat, R.B, The Life of Lord Paucefote First Ambassador to the United States, (Boston, 1929).
Nash, Peter T, Joseph Chmberlain Entrepreneur in Politics,, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
Naylor, Robert A., Penny Ante Imperialism, (Rutherford: Associated University Press, 1989).
Newton, Thomas Wodehouse Legh, 2d baron, Lord Lansdowne: A Biography, (London: Macmillan, 1929). 263
Parker, Matther, Panama Fever: The Epic Story of the Building of the Panama Canal, (New York: Anchor Books, 2007).
Pendle, George, A History of Latin America, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971). Penlington, Norman, The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1965).
Penlington, Norman, Canada and Imperialism 1896-1899, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965).
Perkins, Bradford, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Vol. I, The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
Perkins, Bradford, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895- 1914, (New York: Atheneum, 1968).
Piatt, D.C.M, Latin America and British Trade 1806-1914, (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1972).
Piatt, D.C.M., The Cinderella Service: British Consuls Since 1825, (London: Longman, 1971).
Porter, Andrew (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. Ill, The Nineteenth Century, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),
Porter, Bernard, Britain, Europe and the World 1850-1986, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1987).
Poppino, Rollie E., Brazil: The Land and People, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2nc* ed., 1973).
Powell, John (ed.), Liberal by Principle, (London: Historians' Press, 1996).
Preston, Richard A., The Defence of the Undefended Border Planning for War in North America 1867-1939, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977).
Preston, Richard A., Canada and 'Imperial Defense' A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defense Organization, 1867-1919 (Durhamn NC: Duke University Press, 1967).
Reynolds, David, Britannia Overruled: British Policy & World Power in the 20' Century, (London: Longman, 1991).
Robinson, Ronald and John Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1961), 264
Rodriguez, Mario, A Palmerstonian Diplomat in Central America, Frederick Chatfield, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1964).
Rosen, Roman Romanovich, (Baron), Forty Years of Diplomacy, (London: Unwin, 1922) 2 vols.
Russell, Peter (ed.) Nationalism in Canada, (Toronto: McGrqw-Hill Ryerson, 1966).
Sarty, Roger, The Maritime Defence of Canada, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996).
Scheina, Robert, Latin America's Wars : The Age of the Caudillo, 1791-1899, (Washington: Brassey's, 2003).
Schurman, D.M, The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval and Strategic Thought, 1867-1914, (London: Cassell, 1965).
Schull, Joseph, Laurier the First Canadian, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965).
Scruggs, William L, British Aggression in Venezuela, the Monroe Doctrine on Trial, (Atlanta, 1894).
Searle, G.R, The Quest for National Efficiency, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971).
Seeley, J.R., The Expansion of England, (London: Macmillan, 1883, 1902 ed.).
Smith, Goldwin, Canada and the Canadian Question, (Toronto: Hunter Rose, 1891).
Stacey, C.P., Canada and the British Army, (London: Longmans Green & Co., 1936).
Stanley, George F. G, The Birth of Western Canada, (Toronto, 1975).
Steiner, Zara S, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1891-1914, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969),
Stewart, Gordon T., The American Response to Canada, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1992).
Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, In Defence of Naval Supremacy, (London, Unwin Hyman,1989).
Tansill, Charles C, America and the Fight for Irish Freedom, 1866-1922, (New York: Devin Adair, 1957).
Tansill, Charles C, The Foreign Policy of Thomas F. Bayard, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1940). 265
Tansill, Charles C, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943).
Tennyson, Brian Douglas (ed.), Canadian-Caribbean Relations Aspects of a Relationship, (Sydney, N.S.: Centre for International Studies, 1990).
Thompson, John Herd, and Randall, Stephen J., Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994).
Topik, Steven C, Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the Age of Empire, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).
Turk, Richard W., The Ambiguous Relationship: Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987).
Tyler, Alice Felt, The Foreign Policy of James G. Blaine, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1927). van der Poel, Jean, The Jameson Raid, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951). von Oertzen, Eleonore and Lioba Rossbach, and Volker Wunderich (eds.) The Nicaraguan Mosquitia in Historical Documents 1844-1927, (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1990).
Waite, Peter, B., Canada 1874-1896: Arduous Destiny, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971).
Ward, Alan J., Ireland and Anglo-American Relations 1899-192, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969).
Warner, D.F., The Idea of Continental Union: Agitation for the Annexation of Canada to the United States, (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1960).
Watt, D. Cameron, Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century .(London: Longmans, 1965).
Watt, D. Cameron, Succeeding John Bull America in Britain's Place 1900-1975, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
Williams, Gerald O., The Bering Sea Fur Seal Dispute, (Eugene Or.: Alaska Marine, 1984).
Williams, Mary Wilhelmine, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy 1815-1915, (Washington: American Historical Association, 1916).
Winks, Robin W, Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1960). Winks, Robin W, Canadian-West Indian Union: A forty-year Minuet, (London: Athlone Press 1968).
Wilson, Keith M., British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy: From Crimean War to First World War, (London: Croom Helm, 1987).
Winseck, Dwayne R, and Robert M. Pike, Communication and Empire: Media, Markets, and Globalization, 1860-1930, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).
Woodward, Ralph Lee Jr., Central America: A Nation Divided, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
Wright, Leigh, Julian Pauncefote and British Imperial Policyl855-1889, (Lanham: University Press of America, 2002).
Young, Kenneth, Arthur James Balfour: The Happy Life of the Politician Prime Minister Statesman and Philosopher 1848-1930, (London: Bell and Sons, 1963).
Zaslow, Morris, The Opening of the Canadian North 1870-1914, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971).
V. Journal Articles
Boyle, T., 'The Venezuela Crisis and the Liberal Opposition, 1895-96', The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Sept. 1978).
Blake, Nelson M., 'Background of Cleveland's Venezuelan Policy', American Historical Review, XLVII (1941-2).
Campbell, Charles S., 'The Dismissal of Lord Sackville, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 4 (March 1958).
Chapman, S.D, 'Rhodes and the City of London: Another View of Imperialism', The Historical Journal, Vol. 28, No. 3 (September 1985).
Drus, Ethel, 'A Report on the Papers of Joseph Chamberlain Relating to the Jaqmeson Raid and the Inquiry', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research Volume XXV (1952).
Dennis, William Cullen, 'The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration of 1899', The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 44, No. 4 (October 1950). 267
Gooch, John, 'Great Britain and the Defence of Canada, 12896-1914', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 3 No.3 (May 1975).
Gluek, Alvin C., 'The Invisible Revision of the Rush-Bagot Agreement, 1898-1914', The Canadian Historical Review, Vol. LX, No. 4 (December 1979).
Grenville, John A.S, 'Great Britain and the Isthmian Canal, 1898-1901', American Historical Review, Vol. 61, No. 1 (1955).
Hiller, J.K., 'The Newfoundland Fisheries Issue in Anglo-French Treaties, 1713-1904', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 24, No. 1 (January 1996).
Kennedy, P.M., 'Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870-1914, The English Historical Review, Vol. 86, No. 341 (Oct., 1971).
Headrick, Daniel R., and Griset, Passcal, 'Telegraph Cables: Business and Politics, 1838- 1939', The Business History Review, Vol. 75, No. 3 (Autumn, 2001).
LaFeber, Walter, 'The Background of Cleveland's Venezuelan Policy: A Reinterpretation', The American Historical Review, Vol. 66, No. 4 (July 1961).
LaFeber, Walter, 'United States Depression Diplomacy and the Brazilian Revolution, 1893-1894', The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 40, No.l (February 1960).
Mackinder, Halford, 'The Geographical Pivot of History', Geographical Journal, XXIII, no. 4, (April 1904).
Martel, Gordon, 'The Meaning of Power: Rethinking the Decline and Fall of Great Britain' The International History Review, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (November 1991).
McKercher, B.J.C., '"Our most Dangerous Enemy": Great Britain Pre-eminent in the 1930s', The International History Review, Vol. XIII No. 4 (November 1991).
Mendelsohn, Richard, 'Blainey and the Jameson Raid: The Debate Renewed', Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 6 No. 2 (April 1980).
Neary, Peter, 'Grey, Bryce, and the Settlement of Canadian-American Differences, 1905- 1911', The Canadian Historical Review, Vol, XLIX, No. 4 (December 1968).
Neilson, Keith, '"Greatly Exaggerated": The Myth of the Decline of Great Britain before 1914', The International History Review, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (November 1991).
Sarty, Roger, 'Canadian Maritime Defence, 1892-1914', Canadian Historical Review, Vol. LXXI, No. 4 (November 1990).
Smith, Joseph, 'Britain and the Brazilian Naval Revolt of 1893-4', Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 1970). 268
Volwiler, A.T, 'Harrison, Blaine, and American Foreign Policy, 1889- 1893', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 79, No. 4, (November 1938).
Wells, Samuel F., 'British Strategic Withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere, 1904- 1906', Canadian Historical Review, Vol. XLIX, , No. 4 (December 1968).
Young, George B., 'Intervention Under the Monroe Doctrine: The Olney Corollary', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 2, (Jun. 1942).
VI. Unpublished Theses
Boutilier, Roger Alan, 'Canadian-West Indian Political Union Overtures, 1911-20', Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Queen's University, 1973.
Forbes, Wayne Leslie, 'Some Canadian Editorial Opinion Concerning the Spanish- American War: The Spanish-American War as a Case Study in Canadian Editorial Opinion of the United States of America', Unpublished M.A Thesis, Queen's University, 1970.
LaFeber, Walter, 'The Latin American Policy of the Second Cleveland Administration', Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1959.
Shanahan, David, 'The Irish Question in Canada: Ireland, the Irish and Canadian Politics 1880-1922', Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1989.