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Arthur Balfour and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1894-1923

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Arthur Balfour and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1894-1923 View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of East Anglia digital repository A Matter of Imperial Defence: Arthur Balfour and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1894-1923 Takeshi Sugawara A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of East Anglia School of History November 2014 © “This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that use of any information derived there from must be in accordance with current UK Copyright Law. In addition, any quotation or extract must include full attribution.” 1 Abstract This thesis investigates Arthur Balfour’s policy towards Japan and the Anglo-Japanese alliance from 1894 to 1923. Although Balfour was involved in the Anglo-Japanese alliance from its signing to termination, no comprehensive analysis of his role in the alliance has been carried out. Utilising unpublished materials and academic books, this thesis reveals that Balfour’s policy on the Anglo-Japanese alliance revolved around two vital principles, namely imperial defence and Anglo-American cooperation. From the viewpoint of imperial defence, Balfour emphasised the defence of India and Australasia more than that of China. He opposed the signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 because it was not useful in the defence of India. The Russo-Japanese War raised the concern of Indian security. Changing his lukewarm attitude, Balfour took the initiative in extending the alliance into India to employ Japanese troops for the defence of India. Moreover, as an advocate of Anglo-American cooperation, Balfour made every effort to maintain good Anglo-American-Japanese relations. However, imperial defence and Anglo-American cooperation began to clash within the alliance during the Great War. Although the Siberian intervention was useful Japanese military assistance in the defence of India, America, who was not interested in India, hesitated to support it due to her suspicion against Japan. After the war, the alliance was still instrumental in defending India and Australasia, but its existence damaged the relations with America. Balfour tried to achieve both imperial defence and Anglo-American cooperation by developing the alliance into an Anglo-American-Japanese trilateral agreement with a military clause to revive a bilateral defensive alliance. But America and Japan did not support Balfour’s plan at the Washington Conference, and he had to accept the Four-Power Treaty without any military commitment. 2 Contents Acknowledgements 4 Introduction 6 1. Emergence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1894-1905 79 2. Testing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1905-1918 196 3. Managing the Termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 280 1918-1923 Conclusion 356 Select Bibliography 370 3 Acknowledgements In the course of this research, I have incurred numerous debts of gratitude to many people. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Thomas Otte, who showed me the proper course of my research and gave me constant encouragement and support. His comments on drafts of my PhD thesis were meticulous and enabled me to correct many errors which I could not detect by myself. Professor John Charmley supervised my MA dissertation and his lesson about how to read handwriting sources was valuable to me. I also owe a particular debt to Dr Antony Best, who gave thoughtful advice in many academic conferences and a party at his house. Professor Ian Nish kindly discussed Balfour at the Washington Conference with me. I am grateful to Dr. Geoffrey Hicks, Dr. Larry Butler, Dr. Steven Cherry, Dr. Laurence Cole and Dr. Seung-young Kim for their many kindnesses. The responsibility for any deficiencies rests with me alone. I have been blessed with many Japanese, British and international friends since I began studying diplomatic history in Britain. Their friendship is invaluable. In particular, I would like to thank Richard Gerrard. If I had not seen him, my life in Britain would become totally different. 4 Finally, I owe a special debt of gratitude to my family. I want to thank my parents, Hiroshi and Fumie, my sister Chiharu and my brother Yosuke. Without their inexhaustible support, I could not have completed the research and finished writing the thesis. This PhD thesis is dedicated to my family as a token of affection and gratitude. Takeshi Sugawara Norwich and London November 2014 5 Introduction I. At the end of the nineteenth century Britain was paying a great deal of attention to the defence of her Empire. While she still possessed enough economic, military and naval might to safeguard her global interests, her growing rivalry with European powers such as Russia, France and Germany had spread from Europe into Africa and Asia. The rise of newcomers such as America and Japan complicated political alignments among the great powers. British statesmen had to consider how Britain should protect her interests across the world in this complex and uncertain situation. As one of their solutions, British global diplomacy fastened on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was signed in 1902 and continued until 1923. British policymakers, both those who supported it and those who did not, discussed its management for more than twenty years. Arthur Balfour played an important role in British policy on the Anglo-Japanese alliance. In 1921 he boasted that ‘for 20 years I had been an advocate of close relations 6 between Great Britain and Japan’.1 There is room for examining whether he was really a proponent of cordial Anglo-Japanese relations. However, it is clear that he was involved in British foreign policy towards Japan for about twenty years. He dealt with the signing of the alliance as a senior member of the Cabinet, and undertook its revision and renewal in 1905 as Prime Minister. He tackled the problem of Japanese naval and military assistance to Britain as Foreign Secretary during the Great War, and coped with the end of the alliance as head of the British delegation to the 1921-1922 Washington Conference. Only Balfour was involved in each of these significant turning points in the alliance as the pivot of British government. Therefore, he provides a unique prism through which to investigate how senior British politicians regarded the Anglo-Japanese alliance in its entirety. Arthur Balfour (1848-1930), 1st Earl of Balfour from 1922, was born into a wealthy landowning family at Whittingehame House in Scotland. His father, James Balfour, died when he was seven years old and thereafter the 3rd Marquis of Salisbury, his maternal uncle and a prominent Conservative statesman, assumed his care. He was educated at Eton College and then at Cambridge University, where he studied philosophy and moral science.2 Supported by Salisbury, he became a Conservative Member of Parliament in 1 Balfour to Lloyd George, 19 Dec. 1921, CAB 30/6/W.D.C.87. 2 Balfour wrote many books on philosophy in his life. For example, A.J. Balfour, The Foundations 7 1874. Soon after entering the House of Commons Balfour embarked upon a world tour, visiting Canada, America, New Zealand and Australia.3 Japan was not included in his travels, although he landed at Singapore and Ceylon on the way from Australia to Britain. This indicated that Balfour was not yet interested in Japan. Balfour’s involvement in British foreign policy began in 1878. Salisbury, who became Foreign Secretary at that year, appointed him Parliamentary Private Secretary. Balfour made his debut in European diplomacy at the Congress of Berlin, which aimed to resolve the Eastern Question caused by the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.4 Accompanying Salisbury, Balfour had an opportunity to socialise with European statesmen, including the German Chancellor Prince Bismarck. As Balfour confessed later, this position brought him into ‘close contact with public affairs, and with those by whom public affairs were then directed’.5 When Salisbury formed his first Cabinet in 1885, Balfour was supposed to of Belief: Being Notes Introductory to the Study of Theology (London, 4th edn.1895); A.J. Balfour, Decadence: Henry Sidgwick Memorial Lecture (Cambridge, 1908); A.J. Balfour, Theism and Thought: A Study in Familiar Beliefs, Being the Second Course of Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of Glasgow, 1922-23 (London, 1923). 3 M. Egremont, Balfour: A Life of Arthur James Balfour (London, 1980), p. 43. 4 For details of the Eastern Question, see R.W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics (London, 1962); R. Millman, Britain and the Eastern Question, 1875-1878 (Oxford, 1979); M. Ković, Disraeli and the Eastern Question (Oxford, 2011). For different views, see J. Charmley, Splendid Isolation?: Britain, the Balance of Power and the Origins of the First World War (London, 1999); B. Grosvenor, ‘Britain’s “most isolationist Foreign Secretary”: The Fifteenth Earl and the Eastern Crisis, 1876-1878’ in G. Hicks, (ed.) Conservatism and British Foreign Policy, 1820-1920: The Derbys and their World (Farnham, 2011), pp. 129-168. 5 A.J. Balfour, Chapters of Autobiography (London, 1930), p. 103. 8 contribute to foreign policymaking. The Prime Minister also headed the Foreign Office and considered making Balfour Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Indeed, Balfour was in favour of taking this post, informing Salisbury that ‘I would do anything that most conduced to the smooth working of your arrangements’.6 However, in the end, Salisbury gave Conservative Member of Parliament Robert Bourke the under-secretaryship and Balfour served as President of the Local Government Board, with no seat in the Cabinet. Balfour finally joined the Cabinet during Salisbury’s second administration from 1886-1892 and was consecutively appointed Secretary for Scotland, Chief Secretary for Ireland and First Lord of the Treasury.
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