THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN Critique of a Myth by GERHARD RITTER Foreword by B. H. LIDDELL HART OSWALD WOLFF (PUBLISHERS) LIMITED London, W.i 1958 Translated by ANDREW and EVA WILSON The original German edition was published in 1956 by Verlag R. Oldenbourg, Munich © by Verlag R. Oldenbourg, Munich, Germany MADE AND PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY THE GARDEN CITY PRESS LIMITED LETCH WORTH, HERTFORDSHIRE CONTENTS FOREWORD by B. H. Liddell Hart .. .. .. .. 3 INTRODUCTION .. .. .. ....................................................................................................... 11 PART ONE: Exposition .. .. .. .. .. .. 15 I. The development of Schlieffen's operational ideas .. 17 1 The shift of emphasis from East to West .. .. .. 17 2 Preliminary stages of the operational plan of 1905.. .. 37 3 The military testament of 1905 .. .. .. .. 48 4 Operational memoranda after retirement .. .. .. 69 II. The political implications of the SchliefFen Plan .. .. 78 5 The breach of neutrality .. .. .. .. .. 78 6 Schlieffen, Holstein and the Morocco crisis of 1905-6 .. 96 PART TWO : Texts . ..................................................................................... 129 I. Schlieffen's great memorandum of December 1905 .. 131 A. Editor's Introduction .. .. .. .. 1 3 1 B. Text of the memorandum .. .. .. .. 1 3 4 Appendix: Extracts from the prehrninary drafts of the December memorandum of 1905 .. .. .. 148 7 Draft I .. ................................................................................... 148 8The beginning of Draft IV .. .. .. 1 5 3 9 From Draft II .................................................................................... 15 3 10From Draft III .................................................................................. 155 11From Draft IV ................................................................................... 156 12From Draft IV ................................................................................................................. i$£ 13From Draft VI .................................................................................. 157 14From Fragment VII .. .. .. .. .. 158 p. From Draft VI ................................................................................. 159 II. Schlieffen's additional memorandum of February 1906 .. 161 1 2 CONTENTS III. General observations on the SchliefFen Plan by H. von Moltke ...................................................................................... 165 15Schlieffen's memorandum of December 28th, 1912 .. 168 Appendix to the memorandum of 1912 .. .. 177 16Notes by Major von Hahnke on Graf Schlieffen's memo- randum of December 28th, 1912 .. .. .. 179 VI. Schlieffen's operational plan for "Red" (France) of 1911..................183 INDEX ...........................................................................................................................................193 FOREWORD by B. H. Liddell Hart FOR two generations the Schlieffen Plan has been a magic phrase, embodying one of the chief mysteries and "might have beens" of modern times. The mystery is cleared up and the great "If" analysed in Gerhard Ritter's book—a striking contribution to twentieth-century history. In the years following World War I German soldiers spoke of Graf Schlieffen with wistful awe as their supreme strategist, and ascribed the failure of the 1914 invasion of France to the way in which his masterly plan, worked out when Chief of the Great General Staff from 1891 to 1905, had been whittled down and mishandled by his successor, the second Moltke. The repulse of that opening offensive was followed by years of trench-deadlock, and eventually by Germany's collapse in 1918. By the time she and her allies collapsed, her surviving European opponents were themselves near to exhaustion, Russia had turned Communist and gone out of the war, while the United States had become the world's leading Power. So the consequences were immense and far-reaching. It was very natural, in retrospect, that German soldiers and war historians should have placed so much weight on the second Moltke's departure from the Schlieffen Plan as the prime cause of their military calamities. That view also gained general acceptance in military and historical circles abroad, as it was so obvious that the operational plan pursued by the German Supreme Command of 1914 had gone wrong, and that the repulse of the German armies in the Battle of the Marne had been a turning-point in the war. Moreover the evidence that became known, from German staff disclosures, tended to confirm the conclusion that Schlieffen's plan had been much more promising and that his successor had violated Schlieffen's principal prescriptions. The course of the campaign was exhaustively examined during the postwar years, and there was voluminous discussion of the fateful changes which took place in the German plan. But the examination and discussion were conducted on an inadequate basis of knowledge about 5 6 FOREWORD the SchliefFen Plan itself. Detailed information about its content was too sparse to be satisfying. Only broad outlines and fragmentary passages were published. That state of insufficiency has continued until the publication of Gerhard Ritter's book. He unearthed Schlieffen's papers during a visit to the United States in 1953. After lying for many years in the German archives at Potsdam, where they had been deposited by Schlieffen's son-in-law, they had been carried away to the American archives in Washington after World War II, along with a mass of other military documents. It was fortunate that the papers should have come into the hands of Gerhard Ritter—an historian of high quality, whose discernment is matched by his trustworthiness, and a gifted writer. He presents the full text of Schlieffen's military testament, and the relevant parts of other memoranda which shed light on the evolution of the Plan. They are preceded by Professor Ritter's masterly exposition of their content and significance, while his accom panying notes add to the illuminating effect. The whole forms a book of outstanding historical importance. But it is also extraordinarily interesting to read for a book of its kind. At first glance it may look too scholarly in form to be of wide appeal. But that impression soon changes as one gets deeper in the book. It might well be described as an "historical detective story"—and is fascinating when read in that way. Going on from clue to clue, it becomes evident that the secret of the SchliefFen Plan, and the basis of SchliefFen's formula for quick victory amounted to little more than a gambler's belief in the virtuosity of sheer audacity. Its magic is a myth. As a strategic concept it proved a "snare and delusion" for the executants, with fatal consequences that were on balance inherently probable from the outset. The basic problem which the Plan had to meet was that of two-front war, in which Germany and her Austrian ally faced Russia on the East and France on the West—a combination whose forces were numerically superior although separated from one another. SchliefFen sought to solve the problem in a different way from that contemplated by his predecessors, the elder Moltke and Waldersee. His way, in his view, would be quicker in execution and more complete in effect. The elder Moltke, despite the triumphant result of the offensive against France which he had directed in 1870, doubted whether it could be repeated against the reorganised and strengthened French Army. His plan was to stay on the defensive against France, nullify Russia's FOREWORD 7 threat by a sharp stroke at her advanced forces, and then turn westward to counter-attack the French advance. It was essentially a defensive- offensive strategy. His aim was to cripple both opponents, and bring about a favourable peace, rather than to pursue the dream of total victory. Moltke's immediate successor, Waldersee, showed more bias in favour of offensive action and aggressive policy. But he did not change Moltke's decision to stay on the defensive in the West, and when he urged the case for a preventive war against Russia his offensive impulse was curbed by Bismarck. But Schlieffen, in his very first memorandum after taking office in 1891, questioned the assumption that the French fortifications were such a great obstacle as "to rule out an offensive" in the West, emphasis- ing that "they could be by-passed through Belgium." It was an early indication of a tendency to view strategic problems in a purely military way, disregarding political factors and the complications likely to arise from a violation of neutral countries. In the next year his mind began to turn against the existing plan of taking the offensive in the East, along with the Austrian Army, since 011 his calculation it would be very difficult to gain a decisive victory there, or prevent the Russian Army retiring out of reach. For him it did not suffice to lame the opponents— they must be destroyed. His conception of war was dominated by the theoretical absolutes of Clausewitzian doctrine. So when he came to the conclusion that such absolute victory was unattainable in the East, he came back to the idea of seeking it in the West. Initially, he considered the problems of a direct thrust into France, but soon concluded that success was impossible in that way. While hoping that the French might take the offensive, giving him the chance to trap them and deliver a counter-thrust into France, he felt that such self-exposure on their part was too uncertain a hope to provide the quick