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Kirstin A. Schäfer. Werner von Blomberg: Hitlers erster Feldmarschall: Eine Biographie. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006. 291 pp. Illustrations. EUR 32.90, cloth, ISBN 978-3-506-71391-9. Reviewed by Katrin Paehler Published on H-German (June, 2009) Commissioned by Susan R. Boettcher Kirstin Schäfer has written a fascinating biog‐ sailles Treaty--embraced a new military philoso‐ raphy of General Werner von Blomberg that is, at phy, defined more by Carl von Clausewitz than by once, an embarrassment of riches and slightly un‐ Alfred von Schlieffen. Blomberg and others of his satisfactory. In three substantial sections, the au‐ cohort envisioned the coming war as a "war of thor diligently follows her subject's life from his liberation," conducted by a people's army earliest experiences to the pinnacles of his career equipped with the most modern weaponry and as Adolf Hitler's minister of defense (as of 1935, led by a strong, psychologically influential leader. minister of war) and commander-in-chief of the It is easy to see why Blomberg was comparatively German army to his eventual dismissal from this open to National Socialism. position, "banishment," and death in March 1946. Blomberg achieved the frst pinnacle of his Strengths of the book are found in the rich‐ career as the head of the Troop Ofce and de facto ness of the sources exploited and the author's leader of the secret Great General Staff. In this ca‐ ability to evaluate and contextualize them. Her pacity, one of Blomberg's main concerns was the first section focuses on Blomberg's strategic think‐ modernization of the German military, the restric‐ ing and writing in historical context and in rela‐ tions of the Versailles Treaty notwithstanding. In tionship to that of his contemporaries, rivals, and the 1920s, modernization of the German military like-minded colleagues. Schäfer ably recreates the meant cooperation with the Soviet Union and, in‐ networks of military thought and planning and terestingly enough, Blomberg, like other men of the personnel politics that defined the Weimar Re‐ the "young generation," admired the Red Army public. In the officers' corps, Blomberg belonged for its unity and its role in educating the Soviet to the "young generation" of military thinkers and soldiers and "the socially completely integrated planners, who--after the nation's defeat and under military, carried by the pride, enthusiasm, and the impact of the restrictions imposed by the Ver‐ willingness to sacrifice of an entire society" (p. H-Net Reviews 71). Blomberg's travels in the Soviet Union in 1928 Geneva in 1931, the penultimate step before his made him into a Russophile for the rest of his life. appointment as Hitler's minister of defense. It was His tenure as the head of the Troop Office and during his time in Geneva, which Blomberg ap‐ leader of the secret Great General Staff came to an parently loathed, that his frst wife died, in May end in 1929, when he collided with minister of de‐ 1932. They had been married for twenty-eight fense Wilhelm Groener and the head of his office, years and were the parents of fve children; by all General Kurt von Schleicher, over the role of the accounts, Blomberg was depressed and his career military in the Weimar Republic. Groener saw the appeared to be on its last legs. military as an instrument of the political leader‐ Blomberg's appointment to Hitler's cabinet, ship that was to be restricted to realistic tasks; he unexpected as it was, lifted his spirits and was, by also believed that any attack would come from Schäfer's account, a compromise between Hitler the east (Poland). Blomberg disagreed and refused and Paul von Hindenburg and not the result of to back down. Eventually, Blomberg was "exiled" prior contact between Blomberg and Hitler. to East Prussia, where he was appointed comman‐ Among the main goals of this appointment was der of Military District I. the prevention of an "army revolt" against Hitler. Schäfer sees Blomberg's time in East Prussia In the following years, Blomberg delivered: ini‐ as the "incubation phase of his affinity to National tially the desired domestic stability and eventual‐ Socialism," and she is undoubtedly correct in her ly the army as a whole, all the while energetically assessment (p. 84). In East Prussia, Blomberg supporting Hitler's military plans, especially rear‐ found an ideal location to realize his own vision mament. Schäfer strongly objects to the tradition‐ of "defense," which involved elements germane to al view that Reichenau, Blomberg's appointment East Prussia, such as the compilation of lists of po‐ as the head of the office of the Ministry of De‐ tential soldiers, warehousing of materiel, and reg‐ fense, was the real force in the ministry; rather, istration of groups thought capable of military de‐ she regards them as a team, as much as the mili‐ fense activity. In short, what made Blomberg a lia‐ tary hierarchies allowed. bility in Berlin, namely, his willingness to act It is well known, although rarely delineated against the Versailles Treaty and his penchant to in such detail, how Blomberg delivered the Ger‐ plan for a levée en masse, made him an asset in man military to Hitler, by integrating it into the "far away" East Prussia. It was also in East Prussia new state, through its politicization or indoctrina‐ that Blomberg came into closer personal contact tion, via the creation of images that came to de‐ with men who were sympathetic to Hitler and Na‐ fine the new times, and by using it to support ac‐ tional Socialism, such as Walter von Reichenau. tively the measures against Ernst Röhm. Schäfer His comparative isolation also allowed Blomberg argues that Blomberg came to regard Hitler as the to consider politics in depth. These were also the charismatic leader for whom he and the nation years, however, during which the Nazi Party be‐ had waited, even though Blomberg rejected some gan its rise on the national political scene. Schäfer of the Nazi Party's policies and regarded with con‐ aptly delineates how Blomberg could engage, if tempt the "brown capitanos." Yet Blomberg be‐ largely theoretically, with politics and remain, in lieved in Hitler--and apparently cherished his re‐ his own mind, an apolitical soldier and how he lationship with the Führer. One imagines Ian Ker‐ could warm to the message, if not to all of its pro‐ shaw smiling at this confirmation of his research. ponents. [1] Blomberg's East Prussian sojourn ended with Despite his nervousness about Hitler's foreign his assignment to the Disarmament Conference in policy, Blomberg was supportive of it, even 2 H-Net Reviews though he was seen abroad as a "war-unwilling never made good on his purported promise to call war minister" (p. 160). Hitler fostered this image, Blomberg back to service. Blomberg spent his last as it served him well, especially in Blomberg's years in personal and professional isolation, even travels abroad. Schäfer portrays the relationship when interned after the war. He died in allied de‐ between Hitler and Blomberg as largely void of tention in March 1946. Making reference to conflict. In that context, Schäfer downplays the Robert Musil, Schäfer regards Blomberg as a "gen‐ relevance of the November 1937 meeting of Ger‐ eral without characteristics," describing him as many's highest military leaders, for which "vague, hard to pin down, and contradictory," in a Friedrich Hoßbach produced the minutes. The way that was "typical for his time" (p. 218). Yet, for traditional interpretation maintains that this a "man without characteristics," he certainly held meeting, and Blomberg's hesitance towards war, strong opinions and considerable influence. led to his eventual dismissal from his position as Schäfer's study is detail-soaked and based on minister. Rather, Schäfer argues, Blomberg was much archival research. Unfortunately, the not really opposed to Hitler when it came to a pos‐ sources simply do not address the vexing question sible war, even though differences on timing and of why Blomberg decided to marry a much technical feasibilities existed. Schäfer also sug‐ younger woman he had known for only a short gests that Blomberg did not share Hitler's ideolog‐ time, or whether he was aware of her police ical obsessions, in particular when it came to record. In 1932, Gruhn was accused of having racial war in the East, but opines that Blomberg posed for photos that were considered porno‐ chose to ignore that part of the equation. Largely, graphic; her partner (the photographer) was also Blomberg saw himself as Hitler's "responsible ad‐ accused. It appears that the incident was settled visor" (p. 172). Schäfer maintains that, in early with a minor fne. A police fle from 1934 indi‐ 1938, Blomberg was at the pinnacle of his career-- cates that Gruhn, who was accused of theft but not a minister serving on borrowed time. never prosecuted for it, was at one point regis‐ As a war minister Blomberg also enjoyed a tered as a prostitute. But Blomberg did marry her lively social life. He eventually met and married and, based on circumstantial evidence, Schäfer the much younger Margarethe Gruhn, much to suggests that he was well aware of his bride's the consternation of his colleagues, associates, past, but did not expect to suffer such stark pro‐ and adult children. As is now well known, Gruhn fessional consequences. This assessment certainly had a police record and the outrage over this opens an interesting perspective on Blomberg's scandalous marriage was fanned by Hermann own view of his position and relationship with Göring and others. Eventually, Hitler dismissed Hitler.