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SECRET NOFORN // 20300114 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SOUTHERN COMMAND JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360 JTF GTMO- CG 14 January2005 MEMORANDUMFOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172 Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9AF - 000987DP (S) JTF GTMO DetaineeAssessment 1. (FOUO) PersonalInformation: JDIMS/NDRCReferenceName: HajiGhalib Aliases andCurrent/ True Name: None Place of Birth: Ghanikheyl, Afghanistan (AF) Date of Birth: 1963 Citizenship: Afghanistan InternmentSerialNumber( ISN) US9AF-000987DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detaineeis in good healthexceptfor chronic lower backpain. He has no knowndrug allergies. Detaineehas a history ofmajor depressivedisorderwith suicidalideation. Hehas a nonspecificanxietydisorder. He takes nopsychiatricmedications. Detaineehas no travel requirements. 3. (SI/NF) JTF GTMO Assessment: a . (S ) Recommendation: JTF GTMOrecommendsdetainee be Transferredto the ControlofAnother Country for ContinuedDetention(TRCD) . b . (S ) Summary: Detainee is not assessed as being a member ofAl Qaida or the Taliban . Detainee is the former Security Commander for Shinwar District inthe Nangahar Province, AF, and was arrested at his compound on 26 February 2003 following the discovery by US Special Forces of a suspected ImprovisedExplosive Device (IED) production facility. The detainee was arrested with three letters that associated him with senior Taliban officials, to CLASSIFIED BY : MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C ) DECLASSIFY ON : SECRET// NOFORN // 20300114 SECRET NOFORN // 20300114 JTF GTMO -CG SUBJECT : Recommendation to be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD ) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: -000987DP (S include Mullah Omar, the Taliban Supreme Leader. The detainee denies any knowledge of the letter. According to interpreter support at the Bagram Control Point, there are questions of the authenticity of a letter written on the letterhead from Mullah Omar. Detainee is cooperative during interrogations, but his veracity may be questioned. Detainee has been deceptive when questioned about his association with Mulawi Kabir, the former Taliban Governor of Jalalabad, AF, and the Taliban as well as his knowledge of who was using the IED cache that was found at the time of his arrest. Detainee is assessed as not being a member of the Taliban , but is assessed to be able to answer questions as to the origin and identity of the individual s) who possessed the IED cache. The detainee's experience of being a combat commander for 15 years would indicate the detainee may be a medium risk due his ability to organize and lead men that may possibly participate or directly support terrorist acts against US and coalition forces in Afghanistan . 4. ( /NF) DetaineeBackgroundSummary: Unlessotherwisenoted the following paragraphsare based solely on the detainee'sstatements. a . Prior History: Detainee fought against the Soviets during the Soviet Jihad under Haji Khadir. (Analyst Note: Haji Khadir was the former Afghan Vice President that was assassinated on 6 July 2002 in Kabul, AF .) The detainee served under Khadir as a commander for nearly 15 years. Following the Soviet Jihad, the detainee served as the Deputy of Refugee Affairs in Jalalabad, AF. During the time period when the Taliban controlled Afghanistan, the detainee was sent by Khadir to fight the Taliban . The detainee was captured by the Taliban and was held for nearly two months until village elders spoke in his behalffor his release. Following the detainee's release the Taliban exiled him from Afghanistan. The detainee fled from Afghanistan with his wives and children to Pakistan living with a Yusef Haji for five to six years before returning to Afghanistan. Detainee returned to Afghanistan to fight against the Taliban fighting under Khadir and Khadir's son Haji Zair during the fighting in Tora Bora inNovember of 2001. ( Analyst Note : Haji Zair is the current Border Chiefof the Nangarhar Province, AF .) b . Training and Activities: Followingthe fall of the Taliban, Haji Khadir appointed the detainee as the Security Commander for Shinwar Districtin the Nangahar Province, AF, in June of 2002. Detainee was in charge of36 soldiers and was primarily concerned with drug interdiction and eradication operations as Commander of Security. The detainee was involved in a raid in early January 2003 that seized 75,000 liters ofchemicals used for the processing ofpoppies from a house in Ghani Kheyl Nangahar Province, AF. The detainee answereddirectly to Gul Kareem , the Chief of Security of Jalalabad, AF. 2 SECRET 20300114 SECRET 20300114 JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: Recommendation to be Transferred to the Control ofAnother Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9AF-000987DP (S) Capture Information: Detaineewas captured on 26 February 2003 by US Special Forces (USSF) following the discovery of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) production facility ina compound located adjacent to the detainee's security compound and his suspected relationshipwith Mulawi Kabir, the former Taliban Governor ofJalalabad, AF . Detaineewas captured with US9AF- 000986 (AF-986), a cousin and subordinate commander. Detaineewas captured with numerous pieces ofincriminating letters inhis pocket litter that associates him with Taliban officials. The detainee claims to have no knowledgeofthe letters that he was captured with and that they were plantedto frame him. Detainee was held at the BagramControl Point till his transfer to JTF GTMO. d . (S ) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 17 July 2003 e . ( SI NF) Reasonsfor Transferto JTF GTMO: To provideinformationon the following Local and tribal political issues Duties as Head of Security 5. ( SI Detainee Threat: a. (S ) Assessment: It has been determined that the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may possibly to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (SINF) Reasonsfor ContinuedDetention: Detainee was captured with three letters implicating him with ties to the Taliban: first letter, written by the administrator of Ghunikiel AF, Haji Jabar, identifiedthe detainee as a producer ofIEDs. Inthe letter, Jabar claims that he warned the detainee about the production of IEDs and he did not heed the warning. ( Analyst Note: The wording ofthis document refers to the detainee as the “ Previous Security Commander and may have been written following the arrest ofthe detainee.) second letter was written on the personal letterhead ofMullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban Supreme Leader. The letter informs Mulawi Kabir, the former Taliban Governor ofJalalabad, AF, ofthe detainee's wishes to meet with Kabir and Mulawi Ahmed Jan, a suspect Anti- Coalition leader with ties to Taliban. ( Analyst Note: Interpreters at the Bagram Control Point notedthat could not confirm that the signature on the letter is really the signature ofMullah Omar. The interpreters 3 SECRET 20300114 SECRET NOFORN 20300114 JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: Recommendation to be Transferred to the Control ofAnother Country for Continued Detention ( TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9AF-000987DP S) also noted that letterhead from Mullah Omar always contained a “ control number. This particular letter did not contain any type of “ control number. third letter is addressed to the Nangarhar Intelligence Department and all Taliban members” identifyingthe detainee and urges all recipients ofthe letter to offer as much help to him as possible. Detainee was administereda polygraphon 5 May2003 and was found to be deceptive when questioned about his association with MulawiKabir and the Taliban and his knowledgeofwho was usingthe IED cache captured during his arrest. Followingthe arrest ofthe detainee approximately 80 tribal elders gathered to condemnthe detainee for his activities tied to the storing and productionofIEDs. • Duringinitial interrogations detainee denied having any knowledgeof the IED cache captured during his arrest. In subsequent interrogations, the detainee finally admitted to knowingabout the cache for at leasttwo - to -three months before his capture. Detainee has been cooperative during interrogations, but due to his deception when questioned about his knowledge about the IEDs found at the time of his arrest, his veracity is questionable. Detainee's Conduct This detainee has a past history ofpassive/aggressive behavior. The detainee has assaulted the guard staff in the past on several occasions and exhibits extreme emotion. 6. (SINF) DetaineeIntelligenceValue Assessment: a . Assessment: JTF GTMO has determined that this detainee is ofMEDIUM intelligence value . Detainee was the former Security Commander for Shinwar District inthe Nangahar Province, AF, and was involved in drug interdiction and eradication operations. Detainee is assessed to be able to provide information on the narcotics trade in the Nangahar Province to include information on drug production facilities, individuals involved in the narcotics trade and poppy farming. Detainee was arrested following a raid on an IED production facility and should be able to answer questions about the manufacturing of IEDs, detailed construction of the IEDs recovered, individuals involved in the construction of the IEDs, targets that the IEDs were to be used against, individuals involved in a plot to use the IEDs, and any AF- involvement inthe production or use of the recovered IEDs. 4 // 20300114 SECRET // 20300114 JTF GTMO - CG SUBJECT : Recommendation to be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention ( TRCD ) for Guantanamo Detainee , ISN: US9AF - 000987DP ( S ) b . Areas of PotentialExploitation: Narcotics trade in the Nangahar Province Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) captured with the detainee AF-986 involvement in the production or use ofthe captured IEDs Mulawi Kabir, the former Taliban Governor of Jalalabad, AF 7. (S ) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantstatus was reassessedon24 February2004, andhe remainsanenemy combatant. JAY W. HOOD Brigadier General, US Army Commanding 5 SECRET// NOFORN 20300114.
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