Project for Alternative Livelihoods in , Berlin August 2005 Eastern (PAL)

PAL Internal Document No. 5 Abridged Version Conflict Processing and the Opium Poppy Economy in Afghanistan Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher

The Opium Economy in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is by far the 2004 OPE Total value of Opium Poppy Economy (OPE) world’s largest producer of Distribution of in 2004: $2.8 billion or 40% of GDP (2003) P A L opium and in 2004 the country Profit IS A PROJECT Farmers’ produced an estimated 4200 share FUNDEDED BY THE $ 0.6 billion Threat: tons. Profits from the drug (21%) The Opium Poppy Economy domi- EUROPEAN UNION, Drug dealers’ & PARTNERED BY THE economy generated about 40% protectors’ share nates emerging state institutions $ 2.2 billion MINISTRY OF RURAL of the country’s GDP, and (79%) RECONSTRUCTION were equivalent to five times AND DEVELOPMENT the annual budget of the AND MANAGED BY 1 billion USD Afghan state. Clearly, the Corrupting the GTZ IS state Afghan drug economy is cause

Amount X This document is an for great concern. Fostering anti-state abridged version of the forces PAL Internal Document According to the Minister of No. 5 Rural Reconstruction and could dominate political institu- interview with the author, "Conflict Processing and Development “the Opium Poppy tions like the parliament and sack 16.02.2005). the Opium Economy in Economy generates 2.8 billion Afghanistan" reformers and pro-western forces The two objectives of combat- by Jan Koehler, Dollars revenue within in the government. Gradual ing the drug economy and pro- May 2005. Afghanistan. 600 million dollars approaches to opium poppy eradi- moting state-building need to The field work was stay with the farmers; 2.2 billion cation that worked in Thailand or implemented in coopera- be carefully balanced. Wider dollars are generated from farm Pakistan, where robust state insti- tion with Coordination for gate to border. Roughly one billion state-building in Afghanistan is Afghan Relief (CoAR). tutions are in place, will not work Dollars of this profit already in Afghanistan; only a shock ther- endangered by the drug econ- finances corrupt government like apy will save the state-building omy and by badly designed and Contents security forces, governors, minis- endeavour”. (Paraphrased from poorly executed measures ters. In a short time drug barons against it. The Opium Economy in 1 Afghanistan The Research 1 The Research Why Farmers Get into 2 the Drug Economy Field research was carried out in two provinces: Why Farmers Stay in 3 Laghman and Nangarhar but the findings the Drug Economy probably apply to other poppy producing Why Farmers Should 4 regions of Afghanistan. Nangarhar is a tradi- Get out of the Drug Economy tional poppy growing province and Laghman is Conflicts in Rural 5 a relative newcomer. Afghanistan 359 household interviews and 121 ‘key infor- Conflict, State Building 14 and the Fight against mant’ interviews were conducted with repre- the Drug Economy sentatives of different social groups who are Conclusions 18 directly or indirectly involved in the drug Conflict Processing and the Opium Poppy Economy in Afghanistan

economy or who had knowl- makers and experts in Kabul social issues (about cultural edge about the drug business. and the provincial centres. norms and social, ethnic or Those interviewed included gender discrimination). The impact of the drug econ- teachers, traditional village omy on conflicts and on the representatives, spiritual lead- existing conflict processing ers, doctors, civil servants and mechanisms was also exam- representatives of law enforce- ined. Apart from conflict ment bodies. 25 conflict case caused by the drug economy, studies were also analysed; there are also conflicts over these case studies provide natural resources, over the Local currencies and information about the social, process of state-building, measurements used: political and economic causes conflicts related to the distri- of conflict. Only a few of In this remote village in Alingar bution of resources by inter- 1 ha 5 jrib these cases were directly district of national donors and the rules 1 $ 60 Pakistani Rupees the petrol station is a leftover related to the drug economy. and procedures advocated by from the time when a major Lastly, 45 in-depth interviews 1 seer 1.250 kg them, as well as conflicts over opium poppy bazaar was at- were conducted with policy tracting inter-regional traders with a demand for fuel Why Farmers Get into the Drug Economy

The wider project of Afghanistan is an agrarian country which suffers from the ratio was even higher, state-building in country. 78% of the popu- a scarcity of irrigated land. 44% or 1.2 billion USD, Afghanistan is lation live in rural settle- according to UNODC esti- The crop also has a number endangered not only ments. The overwhelming mates. These revenues are of significant benefits for the by the drug economy, majority of Afghan farmers therefore a crucial lifeline whole economy: It guaran- but also by badly are, for the most part, pre- for many farmers. However, tees a cash injection into designed and poorly occupied with food security it would be wrong to various levels of the national executed measures and with ensuring survival. assume that the revenues economy, it has a stabilising against it. There are strong incentives from the drug economy are effect on the currency by for farmers to engage in the a panacea for rural poverty improving the balance of cultivation of opium poppy. in Afghanistan. The growth payments, and it is labour The crop has a number of in the opium poppy econ- intensive which means that striking advantages over omy after 2001 has without the work force is kept in the other crops. Opium poppy doubt helped many farmers regions, thus preventing is very marketable and the to recover and to repay their potentially disruptive migra- crop is durable and well debts which accumulated tion to urban centres or suited for storage, which during the preceding years neighbouring countries. gives the farmer a much of drought. Nevertheless, needed reserve currency in It has been estimated that widespread poverty among kind. The modest water 21% of the income gener- the rural population still Valley in Laghman; this year requirement of the crop also ated by the opium poppy affects nearly all farmers, wheat is the dominant crop economy (roughly 0.6 bil- cultivated makes it well suited for a including those involved in lion USD) stayed with the the cultivation of the opium farmers in 2004. For 2003

Page 2 Project for Alternative Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan (PAL)

poppy. There is a wide gap Annual credits in 2004 in income and power Annual credit acquired in 2004 by households The diagram shows the high categorised by land owned between the farmers on the number of seasonal credits 100,0 Columns one hand and the landlords (salaam) taken in 2004, no %

indicating even access to yes %

d e involved in large scale r

credit for farmers irrespec- i 75,0

u q

opium poppy cultivation, tive of their landholdings. c

a

t

This reflects a situation in i

the traffickers and traders, d e

which access to credit was r 50,0

c

the professionals running widely available because of :

e c

the undisturbed involve- n

refining labs and the politi- e d ment of most farmers in i

c 25,0 n cal patrons who provide opium cultivation in 2004. I security services in return The expectation is that this situation will change signifi- for shares, bribes or infor- 0,0 cantly in 2005, with re- none <0,1 jrib 0,1-0,5 jrib 0,5-1 jrib >1 jrib mal taxes on the other hand. source poor farmers having Land owned per household member less access to annual credits than resource rich farmers.

Why Farmers Stay in the Drug Economy The inherent logic of the salaam-system encourages credit-takers to plant the cash Cash incomes are undoubt- the credit agreement. culture credits promotes the crop with the highest expected edly a great incentive to Salaam is also used as a cultivation of opium poppy. return on investment. Credit- cultivate opium poppy. credit scheme for leasing givers, in turn, are maximizing Opium poppy is a crop well their profits by lending credits However, there are other land. Farmers with little suited to a country which to those farmers who will plant factors which also seriously land can lease land in return has a large rural workforce crops with the highest expected restrict farmers’ alternatives. for an amount of the future and a dramatic scarcity of profits. As a consequence, this harvest or the money system of agriculture credits The most important factor irrigated land. Land short- equivalent. While this is an promotes the cultivation of is what could be called the age is primarily a natural established credit system for opium poppy. salaam-trap. Many farmers given, however, there are a range of agricultural prod- are obliged to take seasonal social and political factors ucts, the inherent logic of credits in order to bring which exacerbate existing the salaam-system encour- their families through the land shortages: ages credit-takers to plant winter or to plant crops for the cash crop with the high- Traditional rules of inheri- the coming year. An estab- est expected return on tance foresee that every son lished traditional credit sys- investment. Credit-givers, in should receive an equal plot tem exists, which is referred turn, are maximizing their of land. This fosters from to as salaam. It is a payment profits by lending credits to generation to genera- received in advance for a those farmers who will plant tion increasing land- crop yet to be planted and crops with the highest fragmentation. As a result, harvested. The credit sum is expected profits. As a conse- competition for arable land usually about half the mar- Poppy field in of quence, this system of agri- within and between kin ket value of the expected Nangarhar; reportedly, after initial groups and communities is clashes with farmers, most fields were future harvest at the time of tough. eradicated before harvest

Page 3 Conflict Processing and the Opium Poppy Economy in Afghanistan

Pressure on land is also Property insecurity increases exacerbated by the fact that for significant segments of land tenure security is low. local communities, as does Property rights for land are land concentration in the weakly institutionalized, hands of new elites. and local power holders Hence, where the opium Above: separating the wheat from misuse the power of guns or the chaff ( poppy economy has estab- 2003) the power of office in order lished itself as the main eco- Below: Formerly irrigated land, to accumulate land. Com- desertification in Quarghai district nomic activity, it dominates munities and farmers who Land scarcity in upper such vital aspects of the are not well connected and Laghman. Irrigated ter- rural economy as access to races feeding a village lack the critical support of credit, access to arable land of 5400 inhabitants the local power holders and access to wage labour. become very vulnerable.

Why Farmers Should Get out of the Drug Economy

If the plight continues to be Opium poppy is a high risk crop failure – due to market, a market depending so despite high prices, I may crop despite the short term drought, insufficient irriga- on powerful patrons. The probably first mortgage my benefits it offers the individ- tion, pest infestation or a very real prospect of large land and if it doesn’t meet ual farmer. In the long run, lack of affordable labour scale eradication and law my requirements, I may sell dependency on opium during harvest. Unlike other enforcement threatens to it. Ultimately I will leave poppy increases risks for the crops, there is a higher hurt the farmers who are the country because it was individual farmers, and for unpredictability of farm gate dependent on opium opium which met our life the rural economy as a prices as these prices are poppy. purposes whole. Opium poppy is, as subject to the speculative with other crops, subject to manipulation of an illegal

“Foreigners put pressure on despite high prices, I may the state and the state got probably first mortgage my compelled to have us destroy land and if it doesn’t meet my poppy crops and was shouting requirements, I may sell it. that we will provide you an Ultimately I will leave the alternate livelihood. It neither country because it was opium provided us an alternate live- which met our life purposes.” lihood nor helped, but left us Security exercise along the Nan- (Farmer from Shinwar dis- idle and without a career. If garhar channel; the heavily armed trict in Nangarhar) personnel was made up of the plight continues to be so Afghans and US security forces in and without uniform

Page 4 Project for Alternative Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan (PAL)

Those who had to accept poppy thus leads to Community representatives in of Nangarhar, credits to bring their house- increased dependency and discussing the consequences hold through the winter on the increased risk of sudden of the cultivation ban on the the speculative assumption poverty for the weakest seg- community of a successful opium har- ments of rural society. vest will be especially hard hit by eradication efforts. Losing your land But eradication also hurts Land sold or bought over the past 5 years per household Land is not a commodity like any other the small credit-givers many in the Eastern . 100,0% Columns no of whom run small busi- There is no open market for land and yes families and households are extremely nesses, and who are often reluctant to sell their land. Often it is 75,0% also in debt. The system of the last asset sold. Having to sell family

land is considered shameful. Private 50,0% the salaam-credits acts as a land is therefore often ‘acquired’ and risk multiplier: Credit is ‘lost’ rather than being bought and sold. given and the return on Before all property rights on land are 25,0% completely lost, the land is often mort- credit is calculated without a gaged and if the debt cannot be repaid, 0,0% force majeure clause to the the land is taken over in full by the Bati Kot Shinwar Rodat Qarghai Alingar mortgage lender. Nangarhar Laghman contract. In other words, all risks – ranging from bad The following diagrams illustrate the Land mortgaged out by household general reluctance to trade in land. In harvest to eradication meas- 100,0% Columns our sample, the frequency of selling or no % ures – are shouldered by the buying land over the past five years was yes % weaker party, the farmer- higher in districts with an entrenched 75,0% and dominant opium poppy economy credit-taker. Such credit (higher in Nangarhar, lower in the arrangements easily result in Laghman districts that are relatively new 50,0% debt accumulation, forced to opium poppy cultivation). The same trend can be observed in the mortgaging 25,0% work-migration, and the of land. This regional difference may stripping of household assets indicate that dependency on a high- profit but high-risk drug economy does, 0,0% (from livestock and house- Bati Kot Shinwar Rodat Qarghai Alingar indeed, increase property insecurity Nangarhar Laghman hold items to land). Opium with regard to arable land.

Conflicts in Rural Afghanistan

Conflict itself is not neces- an integral part of develop- primary concern for alterna- sarily a problem for a soci- ment. Such a means of deal- tive development initiatives ety. Socially embedded con- ing with conflict facilitates but the question of whether flicts which are dealt with adaptation to changing en- conflict leads to violence. (“processed”) according to vironments in a non-violent accepted and practised rules way. Thus, it is not conflict Top: Soviet tank left in a cornfield; Left: Over the past 25 years over 6 and in a non-violent way are per se that should be the million Afghans sought refuge in neighbouring countries, Pakistan in particular. Migration still is an exit option in reaction to conflict and economic hardship

Page 5 Conflict Processing and the Opium Poppy Economy in Afghanistan

Land-tenure Pauperisation: Breakdown of stripping of assets, insecurity local conflict migration, - debt accumulation regulation - legal insecurity resistance Land - pressure on land concentration Professionalisation with groups that have & criminalisation of resources to aquire and the opium poppy power to secure land economy tenure

Elite competition (new drug-lords versus established Dependence on Mujaheddin leaders) drug economy - mono-cash crop option for poor farmers - access to annual credit - access to land & labour Vicious circle of dependency

We have investigated conflicts and conflict processing capacities in rural Afghanistan. Of special interest was Number of conflicts of concern the impact of the drug economy on conflicts and on for the respective community in 2004 existing conflict processing mechanisms. Apart from the drug economy, we were also interested in the relevance More of four other areas of conflict. These were: Conflicts 9% 0 conflicts over natural resources, conflicts related to the process of 3 conflicts 24% state-building, conflicts related to the distribution of 9% resources by international donors but also to new rules and procedures advocated by international donors, and

2 conflicts finally issues of social conflict (conflicts about cultural

18% norms and social, ethnic or gender discrimination). In order to shed some light on these issues, we firstly conducted 25 conflict case studies. The following table 1 conflict (see next page) displays the conflicts we identified in 40% each district and allocates them within one of the five conflict fields. The red font colour indicates that a con- flict involved a significant though not necessarily lethal level of violence. The numbers in brackets depict cross- relations the case has to other areas of conflict. The Boys and young men listen- ing to the radio via a NGO- numbering in the bottom rows shows the incidence of sponsored world receiver. primary conflicts and cross-related secondary conflicts The teenager to the left hides his Kalashnikov; the within a particular area. village was in feud with a neighbouring community We cross checked the findings of these 25 case studies and most men were armed with evidence from the household and the position

Page 6 Project for Alternative Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan (PAL)

Conflict areas (note: the explanation of the table starts on the previous page)

Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Area 4 Area 5 Natural re- Opium-Poppy State-building NGO activity Social conflict sources economy

District I: ∗[2, 5] Bati Kot ∗[2, 3] ∗[3, 5] ∗[2, 3, 5] ∗[2, 5] District II: ∗[2, 3, 5] ∗[3, 5] ∗[2, 3, 5] Shinwar ∗[2, 5] ∗[2, 3, 5] District III: ∗[2, 3] ∗[1, 3, 5] ∗[1] Rodat ∗[2, 3, 5] ∗[5] District ∗[5] ∗[2] ∗[1, 2, 3] VIII: ∗[1, 2, 3] ∗[3, 4] V: ∗[2, 3, 5] ∗ [0] ∗[1, 2, 3] Qargahi ∗[2, 4] ∗[3] total pri- 13 3 1 4 4 mary con- flicts total cross- 5 16 16 2 14 relations

interviews. Eleven of the conflicts conflict over land must rely The main findings are which were primarily con- on the protection of power- reported below. cerned with tenure issues ful patrons if they want to also showed an indirect link “win”. Consequently, stir- By far the most relevant area with the opium poppy ring up conflicts and resolv- of conflict is competition economy. Conflicts over ing them by exercising over agricultural land and, land also showed a high power appears to be a com- related to this, over access to propensity for violence. mon strategy for local power irrigation water. Of the 25 Eleven of the thirteen land holders to build up their case studies analysed in this conflicts involved a high networks of patronage. We survey, thirteen directly degree of violence. In most also found that a number of related to land tenure con- cases, influential power conflicts were first stirred up flicts and an additional four holders were at least indi- by district level state officials case studies involved dis- The heroes of the past earned their rectly involved in conflicts and then resolved by the prestige in violent struggle against putes over land as a secon- over arable land. We found same officials for an foreign intrusion (and internal fighting dary aspect of conflict. between different factions). The vio- that farmers involved in a (informal) fee. lent heroism of the past haunts state and society today

Page 7 Conflict Processing and the Opium Poppy Economy in Afghanistan

The opium poppy economy fied as the main area of con- of daily business. This again itself was not identified as flict. We recorded disputes points to the fact that, at being among the most rele- between traders about con- least for the time being, the vant areas of conflict. Until tractual arrangements, and opium poppy economy is February 2005, when our conflicts over the distribu- socially embedded and fieldwork was conducted, tion of profits generated by widely seen as a normal eco- conflict within the opium the opium poppy and her- nomic activity. poppy economy appears not oin trade. Interestingly, we We found frequent disputes to have been the major con- did not record a high level between creditors and farm- cern for rural communities. of escalation or violence, ers unable to return credits This reflects the strong and there was no dispute taken in opium under the social embedding of the over the basic rules of the salaam credit scheme; as the opium poppy economy in trade, these were disagree- Two main residues of honour in following case study illus- existing and reliable rules of ments over specific aspects Pashtun community life: the integrity trates: of the compound and of female fam- market and trade relations. ily members men have to defend We identified only a few In the planting period of 2000, They were repelled by about 30 cases in which the opium the household of Abdul M. was people loyal to Abdul M. Fight- poppy economy was identi- short of cash after losing part of ing erupted between the two its earlier harvest to the groups which resulted in some The opium poppy economy has an drought. Abdul M. borrowed minor injuries. Farmer A. indirect impact on existing conflicts, 23 seers of opium from the referred the case to the Taliban because it influences, just like other richer farmer A. The price district government but it fixed for this amount of opium refused to get involved and economic activities, the capacities of was 8,699 Pakistani Rupees ordered a jirga on the issue. By actors in a conflict. In other words: per seer, i.e. roughly 200,000 that time Abdul M. had The opium poppy economy does not Rupees altogether. This value is returned the initial value of the directly cause conflicts, but existing usually based on the estimated opium borrowed (the 80,000 conflicts are affected by the resources it Market place outside maximum value of opium at Rupees), but farmer A. insisted Jalalabad the time the credit is due to be on receiving the full salaam generates. repaid. Abdul M. took the credit originally agreed. The opium and sold it for the price jirga – here a rather informal of the day, namely 80,000 “court of arbitration” specialis- Rupees. He invested in opium ing in business and trade issues poppy cultivation in order to and not one of the more for- return the salaam credit the malised inter-communal jirgas following year. Unfortunately – proposed a compromise based for him (and many like him) on paying half of the claimed in 2001 the Taliban ban on interest. Neither party, how- opium poppy cultivation took ever, reached agreement and effect and he lost his harvest the conflict is still ongoing. For again. Thus, Abdul M. was Abdul M. there is the threat unable and unwilling to pay the he or some close kinsmen the agreed amount of 200,000 may be taken hostage by farmer Top: shopkeepers are often a key source Rupees back to farmer A. A. in order to recover his claim. of cash to borrow in salaam agreements. Farmer A. mobilised 10 rela- Top-right: Street market selling products considered haram (sinful) in tives and went to the village of Afghanistan, like alcohol. Abdul M. to push his claims. Right: A product considered haram in the West—raw opium.

Page 8 Project for Alternative Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan (PAL)

Did conflicts change with the opium poppy economy over the past 5 years?

100,00 Another interesting finding is that the over- Columns answer not known % whelming majority of respondents felt that the conflicts worsened % no change % general level of conflict was not affected by the 75,00 conflicts eased %

opium poppy economy (42%) or, indeed, e

decreased because of the opium poppy econ- g n

a 50,00

omy (43%). In Alingar, in Laghman province, h C a staggering 90% of respondents even felt that the opium poppy economy had had a positive 25,00 and easing impact on conflicts in the commu- nity. This is particularly relevant as Alingar has 0,00 only recently started to cultivate opium poppy. Bati Kot Shinwar Rodat Qarghai Alingar Nangarhar Laghman

Consequently, we did not one’s favour in flict, 80% of the respon- win. We read this as a strong find that the opium poppy Afghanistan), or they are dents considered money to indicator of corruption in offi- economy thus far has been a used to acquire land, which be most decisive, with 60% cial and informal institutions; it major factor in conflict esca- in turn increases the pres- considering patronage to be is also an equally strong indica- lation at the community sure on this scarce resource. decisive. Kinship ties were tor of the weakness of rule by level. However, we did find The profits which can be seen as decisive by 40%. law. that most conflicts do have made from opium cultiva- Thus, money and patronage an indirect link to the tion also increase opium poppy economy. the value of irri- Assets most significantly influencing the outcome of a conflict (multiple responses possible) The opium poppy economy gated land, which has an indirect impact on in turn exacer- existing conflicts, because it bates conflicts Patronage influences, just like other over land. economic activities, the Evidence from the Kin-ties capacities of actors in a con- interviews con- flict. In other words: The firms that opium opium poppy economy does Physical force poppy economy not directly cause conflicts, profits are an im- but existing conflicts are portant means of Money affected by the resources it winning conflicts: generates. Profits from the When asked opium poppy economy are about the most Answer not known used to bribe and to buy relevant resources weapons (quite promising 0,0 25,0 50,0 75,0 influencing the ways of solving conflicts in outcome of a con- Incidence in % of total sample

Page 9 Conflict Processing and the Opium Poppy Economy in Afghanistan

We also note a very high propensity for all conflicts to Number of violent conflicts of concern become violent. There is a surprisingly high level of violence for the community in 2004 as part of conflict processing in all areas of conflict. Such a constant degree of violence seems to indicate that violent behaviour in conflicts is to some degree socially accepted. More We asked our respondents to tell us how many conflicts of 3,0%

2 conflicts relevance occurred in their community in 2004, and how 13,1% many of those in fact included the use of violence. Roughly half of all respondents identified one or more violent con- 0 conflicts flicts. In general, two-thirds of respondents mentioned that 46,5% conflicts became violent. 1 conflict

37,4% The fact that conflicts are often “resolved” by means of raw power, bribes and patronage not only points to the fact that the rule of law does not have much weight in rural areas. It also implies that conflicts are not “processed” in an orderly way and thereby resolved, but instead they become what we call “power-locked”, i.e. they may break out anew as soon

as power relations change institutions at the local level purpose of finding an and the party which is dissat- are unable to make and accepted resolution to a isfied with the status quo sees implement binding deci- specific conflict. Jirgas deal a new opportunity for chang- sions. Theoretically, it with a range of conflicts, ing the unsatisfactory situa- would be possible for infor- but they figure prominently tion. mal, traditional societal in land tenure disputes. The institutions to step in, sub- procedure of a jirga foresees The state’s capacity for deal- stituting the state function that parties to a conflict ing with conflicts is very low. by providing non-violent formally suspend their right Nevertheless we found that conflict processing. Unfor- to seek a decision by power the overwhelming majority tunately, however, the avail- and transfer the case to the of all conflicts were brought able informal and tradi- jirgamar (the representatives by one or both parties to the tional self-governing institu- of the jirga). If the jirga attention of the official state tions, the most prominent makes a bad judgement, it is institutions which should be being the jirga and the expected to take full respon- responsible for dealing with shura, are equally unsuited sibility and the enmity them. However, we also to this task. They cannot between the parties switches found that none of these substitute for the state’s to the jirga. A judgement of conflicts were resolved by weakness in providing con- the jirga is signed by finger- State-in-the-making (top down): The state institutions in a binding deputy of warlord-turned-police flict regulation. print by the parties to the chief in Jalalabad; army recruits in way that outlived changes in conflict and by representa- jeeps sponsored by the Russian the power-relations between Jirgas are gatherings of rep- government; Soviet era prison tives of the jirga. It is often the parties involved. resentatives of the conflict- under renovation backed up by a public oath ing parties and mediators. Therefore, one of the most of compliance. They are called for the sole Page 10 worrying findings is that state Project for Alternative Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan (PAL)

Degree of involve- Involvement of district administration in local conflict processing ment in and impact of state administra- Impact tion on conflicts of state involvement during 2004 accord- not asked frequently ing to the respon- not know n dents: other pending compromise not know n

sometimes

escalation none

never rarely

freezing of conflict

Involvement of provincial administration in local conflict processing

Impact

of state involvement no answ er

sometimes

rarely other not know n not know n

escalation

freezing of conflict

none

never

Involvement of the central state administration in local conflict processing

Impact

of state involvement other

not know n other not know n

never none

Page 11 Conflict Processing and the Opium Poppy Economy in Afghanistan

Evidence from the case development. Communities ‘very representative’ or studies suggests, however, elect a council (a shura) ‘representative’ of the com- that parties tend to with- which represents the village munity by 85% of respon- draw from the agreement if community as a whole dent households. This they feel that power rela- rather then just a part of it. ‘approval rating’ in terms of tions have shifted in their This council then prioritizes the councils’ representa- favour. Jirgas may therefore the village’s needs and tional quality was only

Convention of the influential non- be effective at finding deci- implements various devel- slightly lower for landless governmental community council sions, but they cannot opment measures jointly respondents (80%). On the organisation, run by the brother of implement them against the with the international other hand, the head of the the then governor of Nangarhar changing tides of mostly organisations. It is clear that shura did not figure promi- informal power. such a structure resembles in nently across the board in both form and function terms of respect. On aver- The second institution institutions of communal age, only 10% of house- which is often involved in self-governance. holds named this function conflicts about land tenure as being held by one of the is the shura. Shura is an By far the most ambitious most highly respected peo- Seen through the eyes of the average Arabic term meaning attempt at engineering com- ple in the village. In terms farmer, the most burning issues are ‘consultation’. The term munity development shuras of power, the head of the security and development. The shura is nowadays over- as a substitute for rural self- problems here would not change with shura was considered power- stretched and refers to a governance institutions are the replacement of opium poppy by ful by only 20% of respon- whole range of organisa- the so called Community another cash-crop. From the dent households, but there perspective of rural households, the tional forms of public and Development Councils, is strong variation between punitive system of credit, a lack of private interests. Most which are implemented all districts. In Shinwar 41% of access to arable irrigated land, power- often, however, it is used to over the country as the households indicated that locked and unrepresentative formal describe a village council backbone of the National the head of the shura was and informal governance, property that consists of male land- Solidarity Programme insecurity, legal ambiguity, a high one of the most powerful owners and assumes certain (NSP). Community level of violence and lack of binding functionaries in the village, competencies of self- Development Councils are decisions in conflict processing are which may reflect the strong government in rural com- intended to be representa- problems that exist with or without the engagement of the shura opium munities. tive organisations elected by initiative of the Nangarhar a female and a male repre- Such local traditional shuras governor’s brother in that sentative of each family must be set apart from the district. In Alingar, how- within a community. Each so-called ‘development ever, only 1.6% of house- Community Development shuras’. Development holds felt this to be the case, Council is responsible for shuras are promoted in rural and the khan (large land- identifying and participating Afghanistan in the context owner) and village elders in the implementation of of internationally sponsored were clearly considered development projects. community mobilizing more powerful. Head of a Community Council, elected programmes. These pro- The results from interviews While nearly 75% of the according to the NSP programme of grammes assume that village paint an ambivalent picture the Afghan government respondent households con- communities have to of traditional and new com- sidered their local shura to become mobilized as a pre- munity councils. The shura be independent from Page 12 condition for successful was seen as being either Project for Alternative Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan (PAL) powerful people, only 21% trusted the shura to resolve a conflict against the inter- ests of the stronger party. Perceived threat to the local community (open question, multiple answers, coded after the interview) In sum, the data shows great ambivalence with regard to local councils, in terms of Other whom they represent, how independent they are, what defines their legitimacy, and Western influence how effective they may be in fairly process- ing conflicts. This finding urges caution in Economic insecurity having expectations of traditional and newly founded institutions for local self- Insecurity: renegate forces governance which are too high. Insecurity: coalitions forces However, it is also clear from our findings that it is not the opium poppy economy Insecurity: central government that has caused this crisis of local self- governance. Instead it is the corruption of Insecurity: local governance state institutions and the weakness of infor- 0,0 25,0 50,0 75,0 mal and new (NSP) institutions which Incidence in % makes conflict processing very vulnerable to manipulation by power. Seen through the eyes of the average farmer, the most burn- ing issues are security and development. The problems here would not change with the replacement of opium poppy by Perceived hopes for the local community (open question, multiple answers, coded after the interview) another cash-crop. From the perspective of rural households, the punitive system of credit, a lack of access to arable irrigated Other land, power-locked and unrepresentative formal and informal governance, property Better economy insecurity, legal ambiguity, a high level of violence and lack of binding decisions in conflict processing are problems that exist Infrastructure development (NSP) with or without the opium poppy.

Security improves

Head of a village (malek) Education with other senior figure; the village lost most of its land 10,0 20,0 30,0 40,0 to newcomers in the neighbourhood that enjoy Incidence in % the protection of local post- Taliban militias (now police)

Page 13 Conflict Processing and the Opium Poppy Economy in Afghanistan

Conflict, State-Building and the Fight against the Drug Economy Combating the drug econ- How could opium cultiva- understanding that being a omy in Afghanistan is of tion be reduced so quickly? warlord or jihadi com- crucial importance for both We found that it was mander is less secure and Afghanistan and the inter- mainly through the infor- less lucrative than a position national community. The mal mechanics of coercion, in the state bureaucracy. question of which strategies persuasion and cooptation, President Karzai backed this should be applied has been combined with the promise demand by declaring a jihad much debated, because it is of compensation funded by (persistent struggle) against clear that the choice of strat- the international donors. the opium poppy economy egy and the way it is imple- The main transmission belt two days after his inaugura- mented will have a consider- linked President Hamid tion in autumn 2004, able impact on the ongoing Karzai and General Daud thereby linking an involve- state-building project. (Deputy Minister of the ment in the opium poppy Top: Head of police, Bati Kot Interior for Counter Below: Village head in Alingar The research for this report economy with notions of Narcotics) to the governors was conducted in districts of religious sin and collective and police chiefs at province two provinces where the shame. and district levels. In Loyalty to the cultivation of opium poppy December 2004, the provin- At the same time, the pro- President has to be has come to a near total halt cial leadership was sum- vincial power holders who bought, and foreign within one year. This shows moned to Kabul and told had supported the election that it is not impossible to sponsors are to pay for that they would lose their campaign of President dramatically curb opium it. It is clear that such positions within the state Karzai and secured him cultivation in a matter of administration if they did votes in the eastern prov- a political system is months. It is, however, by not achieve a reduction in inces urged their fragile at best no means clear that this opium poppy cultivation in “constituencies” to follow achievement is sustainable. their provinces and districts. We looked at how this dra- the President they had, after No other demand was made matic reduction in opium all, elected. However, pro- with regard to law enforce- cultivation has been vincial power holders ment activities, such as in- achieved and what conse- stressed time and again in terdiction, arrests and perse- quences it has had. We interviews that loyalty was cution of traders and their found that the success came not a one-way street. In- security providers. Obvi- at a price: It negatively stead, they viewed it as a ously, the threat of losing affected the livelihood of reciprocal relationship of office was a significant many farmers, and it dependency that can be incentive for provincial strengthened a political sys- revoked by both parties at power holders, most of tem at the provincial level any time. Compliance with whom are former that may not be supportive the ban on cultivation was Top: Alternative crops in Achin mujaheddin commanders of state-building. explicitly seen as conditional (roses next to opium poppy) and their associates. There Below: cash for work project on rapid compensation and appears to be a growing rural development. Page 14 Project for Alternative Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan (PAL)

Our community has a problem. attack and confiscate the harvest The problem is that everyone and put us in jail. This is a prob- knows we had a deal last year with lem for our community and we ask the provincial government about you for your help in this. the percentage of opium poppy (Petition to Haji Nazrulla fields we would keep. So everybody Baryalai, head of the Top: alternative crops in Qarghai knew we have harvested opium. Below: security operation along Organisation of Councils of This harvest is with the farmers the Nangarhar canal; later some Nangarhar Communities, read and landowners at their communities were targeted by to the author during an interview house searches for opium homesteads. This harvest we have on 21 February 2005) to sell to pay back our debts and to satisfy our daily needs. But today, when we take our harvest to the bazaar we are called drug-dealers Top: Emblem of the Organisation of and punished. When we keep the Councils of Nangarhar Communities opium at home security forces Below: Village intelligentsia in the local pharmacy However, meeting these President has to be bought, expect this to change. We expectations is beyond the and foreign sponsors are to expect that farmers may quit financial and organisational pay for it. It is clear that their loyalty to the central Eradication without providing capacity of the Afghan gov- such a political system is and provincial government. alternative livelihoods may actually work as a price- ernment. Keeping the fragile at best. The majority It therefore may be too early support programme which promises that led the pro- of farmers seemed to toler- to hail the success of the benefits traders, protectors vincial power holders to ate this ‘eradication con- provincial law enforcement and big-time landlords who cooperate in combating the tract’ this year. However, bodies in bringing down have the freedom to choose drug economy thus depends since it is unlikely that the opium poppy cultivation in when to produce and sell their on foreign financing and on resulting hardships for the eastern Afghanistan. products. foreign organizations. In farmers will be mitigated by other words, loyalty to the quick compensation, we

Our job as a law enforcement provide alternative livelihoods, agency is to make sure eradication alternative crops and development is done and farmers are not culti- to the farmers, both short term and vating opium poppy. We want to long term. put some 4-5 traffickers in jail (Dep. Minister of the Interior, from each poppy producing prov- General Daud, 15.02.2005, ince to make an example. […] The interview notes) other side is the poverty of the farmers. We, the Afghan state, will Left: Rickshaw taxis in Jalalabad depicting do our part, there will be no more favourite Pakistani or Indian movie motifs Village youth at an idle poppy cultivation. But it is the Top: The head of border guards, nephew of the then governor and son of a leading filling station responsibility of the big donors to mujaheddin commander, at his guesthouse

Page 15 Conflict Processing and the Opium Poppy Economy in Afghanistan

There are also other aspects cation without providing power holders over the rural to worry about. The sur- alternative livelihoods may population. Bad local gov- prising fact that opium actually work as a price- ernance may become worse. poppy cultivation was re- support programme which If so, the rural population duced following an order benefits traders, protectors will hold the Afghan state from Kabul should not be and big-time landlords who less accountable for this interpreted as a sign of have the freedom to choose situation than the foreign growing state capacities. when to produce and sell forces. Law enforcement in The state remains weak. It is their products. the context of the opium more that regional power poppy economy is driven by The moral problem of rely- holders and their enforce- policy priorities formulated ing on “gunmen to catch ment structures proved that elsewhere and implemented Top: Educated villager, son of pharmacist in gunmen” aside, there are also they are able to “switch off” via the central Afghan state. Alingar district some very practical risks Below: Soviet army graffiti in the cultivation, even when this This foreign drive behind Pamir; the communist period is remem- with this strategy. The cen- bered for excessive violence as well as for means depriving a large eradication clearly has not education and infrastructure programmes tral state, together with the number of households of escaped the eye of the rural coalition forces, clearly their livelihoods. The trou- population and appears to wanted to “get things “When the Russians came to the ble with this is that all of be discussed vividly at the villages to build roads and to plant done”, and they achieved our respondents are con- village level. The following trees we received them like gods. surprising results. However, vinced that it is precisely quote from a tailor in When they came with tanks and they did so by entrenching these regional power holders Shinwar district represent a weapons look what happened to local power holders. Thus, them. The Americans and British who profited from the line of argument which was came with tanks and weapons the temporary success in opium poppy economy, encountered time and again straight away. If things continue eradication did not both directly and indirectly in interviews: like they are now do you think strengthen the rule of law, by selling political patronage people like you will still be able to but instead strengthened walk around here freely next and security. No one doubts arbitrary rule by force and year?” (Interview with a head of that these power holders can shura and former commander in patronage, executed by local Nangarhar) kick-start the opium poppy economy again if their demands are not met. “There has been drought for about eight years. With my tailor- ing work, I cultivated some poppy fields; but this year as the A counter-narcotics pro- government forbade poppy cultivation, I didn’t cultivate the gramme that targets primar- land because wheat cannot meet the costs [of leasing the land]. ily the weakest part of the I don’t own land. I am indebted, too. Thus, I wonder how to chain - the farmers - and pay off the debt. The state hasn’t helped us at all. We were very that is implemented by optimistic for the [presidential] election assuming that a good power holders who them- government would be set up and it would heal our wounds; selves may be part of the but they kill us because they grab our livelihood and kill us opium poppy economy, through hunger. They satisfy their foreign lords and forced us Water well in a Rodat could easily backfire. Eradi- village to stop poppy cultivation.” (A tailor from Shinwar)

Page 16 Project for Alternative Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan (PAL)

A worst case scenario in places where opium poppy benefits former mujaheddins Afghanistan’s immediate plays a significant role in the who enjoy, at least for the future that is put forward economy, it is clear that the time being, the patronage of quite prominently by many bulk of informal taxes stem the centre and of the coali- experts and responsible offi- from the opium poppy tion. It may not necessarily cials proposes a weak economy. be a mode of governance Afghan state being captured that can be transformed Seen from the local perspec- by a powerful and well- easily into a rule of law, tive, the opium poppy econ- Large household compound in Rodat, organised drug-mafia. From exercised by an impartial omy is thus far not a prime Nangarhar; households in the re- the evidence of this research state administration. In search sample range from 1 to 203 area of conflict. An increas- members with an average of 15 we conclude that other words, it cannot be ing criminalisation of the members or 2.4 nuclear families Afghanistan is still far from denied that the President, residing in one household opium poppy economy becoming an integrated backed by coalition forces, could change this, as it narco-state. State institu- exercised an unexpected would lead to the exclusion tions at provincial and dis- measure of central control. of farmers and small traders trict levels are not domi- However, this does not nec- from the profits available. nated by drug-barons, but essary mean a step towards Quite probably, it would mostly by former strengthening state capaci- also trigger a process of inte- The measure of top- mujaheddin commanders. ties. The measure of top- gration and monopolisation, down control and the Their autonomy from the down control and the stabil- which would lead to the stability that has been central state varies consid- ity that has been achieved emergence of a few large achieved by co-opting erably. Some former by co-opting local power scale drug barons that con- local power holders mujaheddin commanders act holders undermines the undermines the trol the business. Yet so far with little constraint, emergence of a state that emergence of a state this has not happened. Cur- whereas others, like those in Afghans can recognise as that Afghans can rently the threat comes from the eastern provinces where legitimate. The eradication recognise as legitimate another direction. this research was conducted, measures of 2005 fostered a very much depend on the While we would certainly mode of governance based backing of the central state not claim that the opium on cooptation and patron- and of US-led coalition poppy economy has taken age. Our snapshots from the forces. over the state at the provin- field in rural Afghanistan cial or district level, we lead us to doubt whether Until now there have been would argue that the opium this strategy will in the long no instances of narco-barons poppy economy is financing run be effective for achiev- capturing the state. On the a certain type of local gov- ing the immediate objective contrary, state office is ernance that is problematic of combating the opium becoming an attractive for central state building. poppy economy and for the resource in the hands the This type of governance is wider goal of building reli- former mujaheddin in order Haji Din Mohammad, then governor built on networks of patron- able state institutions. of Nangarhar (released of his duties to tax the local economy. In age and rules by coercion. It in June 2005)

Page 17 Conflict Processing and the Opium Poppy Economy in Afghanistan

Taxing and protecting the Controlling via patronage over informal economy, independent enforcement including the drug economy Local capacities autonomies

Informal Local armed Mutually reenforcing relationship (security for taxes) economy groups

Sustainable local alternatives to national statehood Conflict processing by rule of law has to be re-established, Coopted by the central power rather than absorbed by state institutions especially at the district level, The local autonomies threat where it is currently absent. In the long run, the provision of security and of the rule of law are the most important sources Right: Guards in front of the of legitimacy for an emerging Governors palace in state and thus are the most Jalalabad Far-right: Deputy head of important resources that fuel police in Mitarlam, Laghman successful state-building province

Conclusion

From the perspective of the would be the provision of Hence, conflict processing rural population, the objec- institutions that could deal by rule of law has to be tives of combating the drug- with conflicts in a reliable re-established, especially at economy and building reli- and predictable way. As this the district level, where it is able state institutions would research shows, conflicts in currently absent. In the long be served by providing fair post-war rural Afghanistan run, the provision of secu- credit opportunities for are common. They tend to rity and of the rule of law farmers, by restructuring be power-locked, open to are the most important farmers’ debts, by a state- manipulation and they very sources of legitimacy for an sponsored financial pro- often turn violent. We emerging state and thus are

Top: New fitness centre in Jalalabad gramme and by increasing found that existing tradi- the most important run by the governing elite; land tenure security through tional institutions such as resources that fuel successful Below: Kite-competition at the Abdul Haq park in Jalalabad, pastime for the the registration of private, jirgas and shuras are no ade- state-building. common people common and public land. quate substitute for dealing Lastly, of crucial importance with conflict by rule of law. Page 18

PAL Internal Document No. 5 Abridged Version

Project for Alternative Livelihoods in About the Authors Eastern Afghanistan (PAL) New Duramsal, Rigisha Mohad Khan House 6, Street 2 Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher are founding members of the Berlin based Jalalabad/ Afghanistan research and consultancy company ARC (Analysis, Research Consulting, Team Leader: Leo Brandenberg www.arc-berlin.com). Phone: +93 (0) 70 607829 E-mail: [email protected] ARC conducts research with a focus on conflict and conflict prevention in the suc-

GTZ Development-oriented Drug Control cessor states of the Soviet Union and its neighbouring countries. ARC is committed Programme (DDC) to bridging the gap between social science and the information needs of practitio- Dag-Hammarskjöld Weg 1-5 ners in the field. ARC has provided its services to national and international devel- 65726 Eschborn/ Germany opment organisations in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Russia and Afghanistan. Head of Project: Christoph Berg [email protected] This report was commissioned by the Programme for Alternative Livelihoods (PAL), a European Union financed programme implemented by the Deutsche Gesellschaft IS für Technische Zusammenarbeit GTZ in Kunar, Laghman and Nangarhar provinces in Eastern Afghanistan. The research was conducted on behalf of and in coopera- tion with GTZ’s Development-oriented Drug Control Programme (DDC) in order to Disclaimer: provide an understanding of the interdependency of conflict and the Opium Poppy This publication has been produced Economy in the Eastern Provinces of Afghanistan. with the assistance of the European Union and the gtz IS. The content of All photos were taken by Jan Koehler. this publication is the sole responsibility of the consultant and can in no way be taken to reflect www.gtz.de/drogen the views of the European Union or www.arc-berlin.com

Synopsis

Afghanistan faces two principle chal- mon peace, the rule of (state rather straints, political constraints and socio- lenges for success in sustained peaceful than customary or Islamic) law and a cultural constraints. We then ask how development: state-building and rapid legitimate state capable of providing these constraints impact on the conflict social transformation. Success in estab- essential services and public goods to its processing capacities of households lishing accepted and functional state citizens, both economy and society will within communities, between commu- institutions will only be possible if the remain power-locked and stagnant at nities and between communities and Afghan state and society engage with best. the emerging state on the district and one another in a constructive way. The provincial levels. In this report we investigate the nexus state has yet to penetrate society with between the Opium Poppy Economy its institutions and it has yet to con- (OPE) and conflict dynamics in vince society of the legitimacy of its Afghanistan from three main perspec- rules. After years – or decades for many tives: (1) the impact of the OPE on rural communities - of coping without conflict processing at the community functional state-institutions, this proc- level; (2) counter-narcotics measures; ess implies painful social change that and (3) state-formation and anti-state directly affects the family, household dynamics. We concentrate on how and community levels. At the same OPE-related dynamics affect the scope time, sustainable and peaceful social of choice of actors at the bottom of the and economic development after years value adding chain. We look at the of insecurity, violence and civil war Girls returning home from school issue of dependency and insecurity depends more than anything else on from three angles: economic con- successful state-building. Without com-