Metaphysical Systems and Decision Procedures

This dissertation haB been microfilmed exactly as received 6 6 - 1 5 , 1 5 8 YANDELL, Keith Edward, 1938- METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND DECISION PROCEDURES. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1966 Philosophy University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND DECISION PROCEDURES DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Keith Edward Yandell, 3.A., A.M The Ohio State University 1966 Approved by Adviser Department of Philosophy ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS From Dr. Hector Neri Castenada, who taught the introduction to philosophy course which captured my interest for the discipline to Drs. Marvin Fox, Virgil Hinshaw, and Richard Severens who compose my reading committee, I have been fortunate in my teachers. To Professors Castenada, Edmund L. Gettier, Raymond Hoekstra, George Naknikhian, Robert C. Sleigh, and Alvin Plantinga I owe whatever allegiance to clarity and precision in philosophy I have attained. I learned as much from them over coffee as in lectures--a testi mony to their graciousness to students and their dedication to philosophy. To Professors Wallace Anderson, Stephen Barker, Marvin Fox, Charles Kielkopf, Everett J. Nelson, Andrew Oldenquist, Richard Severens and Morris Weitz I owe whatever advances have been made in my philosophic methodology and outlook since my days at Wayne State University. I must add a word of thanks to two men under whom I have not studied: Professor Virgil Hinshaw who has served on the reading committee for my disserta tion (and who more than once prodded me toward the position of having one to be read) and Professor Robert G. Turnbull who has provided encouragement, some very practical advice and assistance, and some delightful conversations. Two more comments must be made, and are difficult to make. They are difficult for two reasons: I am not talented at such tasks, and those about whom they are made would as soon they were not. Professor Richard Severens, my adviser in this endeavor, provided a con stantly high standard of philosophic work in his lectures and conversations. Clarity, cogent argumentation, and constantly relating one's work to "the tradition" are demands which he, since he exemplifies them, can make on others. Professor Marvin Fox, the remaining member of my reading committee, has constantly manifested, in his own distinct way, equally high standards of philo sophic work. His courses and our conversations have been reminders that philosophy need not be divorced lii• j ■ from those "human concerns" which constitute the core of thoughtful living. His wise advice at crucial junctures has saved me from foolish mistakes. X owe him much. My teachers have, in many cases, become friends as well; my training has been more joy than drudgery. Since it is not so everywhere, I have good reason to be grateful. VITA July 16, 19 3 8 B o m - Davenport, Iowa 1956 Graduated, Cooley High School, Detroit, Michigan 1960 B.A. (History, Philosophy-honors), Wayne State University M*A. (Philosophy), Wayne State University 1961 -1963 Instructor in Philosophy, Kings College, Briarcliff Manor, New York 1963 *1965 Teaching Assistant, The Ohio State University 1965- ■1966 Instructor in Philosophy, The Ohio State University 1966- Assistant Professor in Philosophy, The University of Wisconsin v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION......................................... 1 Chapter I. WHY TALK ABOUT "CATEGORIES"?............. 6 II. SOME CRITERIA FOR WHAT CONSTITUTES A CATEGORY............................. 12 III. SOME EXAMPLES OF CATEGORIAL CLASHES . 51 IV. HALL'S CRITERION FOR CATEGORIAL COMMIT MENT....................................... 71 V. PRAGMATIC PROCEDURES AND PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS ..................................... 104 VI. PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS AND COMMON SENSE. 143 VII. ON SOME PURPORTED BIFURCATIONS.............. 162 VIII. LANGUAGE STRATA AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROB LEMS.......................................... 176 IX. THE FALSIFIABILITY CRITERION................ 189 X. PARADIGM CASES AND POLAR CONCEPTS .... 209 XI. MONISM, DUALISM, AND THE TWO WORLDS ARGUMENT..................................... 242 XII. THE STRUCTURE OF COMMON SPEECH, THOUGHT, AND EXPERIENCE. ............ 254 vi CONTENTS - Cont'd. Chapter Page XIII. SELF-STULTIFICATION ARGUMENTS............. 274 EPILOGUE ............... ......................... .. 295 BIBLIOGRAPHY................. ..................... 298 vii INTRODUCTION In the sustained argument which constitutes this work various threads of doctrine and perspective are woven into what hopefully results in a recognizable pattern. Two questions govern the discussion: 1) What makes a philosophical system philosophical?; 2) How can one decide between competing philosophical systems? Since systems are (in the main) composed of assertions, a mark must be sought which will distinguish properly pHilosophical assertions from other kinds. This mark is found in the peculiar modality of philosophical asser tions, a modality which is categorial in nature. Philosophical systems will then be constituted by just such modal assertions. This way of putting the matter oversimplifies my position somewhat, as the modality of philosophical assertions depends upon their system atic context and is "system relative." 1 2 The value of category-talk Is not a matter of universal agreement, and our first chapter discusses the very different views as to its value held by Ryle and Hall (who offer a thesis much like my own) on the one hand, and by Warnock and Cross, for example, on the other. Not much can be said about this issue until we become clear about what a "category" is, and my second chapter deals with several criteria for what constitutes a category. Unfortunately, all of them fail to be adequate. Nonetheless, the ways in which these criteria fail are instructive, furnishing clues as to how a more prosperous criterion can be framed. Part of the insight gained from the failure of these criteria is that categorial clash occurs in sen tential contexts rather than in single words or terms; my third chapter provides examples of categorial clashes taken from modem and contemporary philosophy. It provides, by the way, an illustration of the rele vance of so-called "historical" issues to contemporary disputes• My fourth chapter, which in effect completes 3 the first section of this work, offers an earmark for recognizing sentences bearing categorial commitment. My indebtedness to the work of Everett W. Hall is too apparent to require emphasis. Since the first four chapters contain a view of what philosophy is, it is appropriate to consider other, competing views on this matter. No pretense is made to exhaustiveness in this regard, but a fair sampling, I think, is provided. Thus my fifth chapter attacks the view (held by Carnap) that traditional philosophical questions are meaningless unless translatable into issues in the logic of science, and the view (held by Quine) that philosophical issues are simply more general than, but no different in kind from, scientific ones. Each of these views appeals to pragmatic decision procedures which also receive criticism. In my sixth chapter I turn to 6. E. Moore as representative of the view that common sense is the proper touchstone for philosophical theses, and sub ject it to criticism. Chapter Seven deals with the 4 view of Broad that philosophy may properly be divided into critical and speculative branches, and Strawson's assertion that philosophy is (at least, metaphysics is) either descriptive or revisionary. An approach to decision procedure is implicit in each of these views, and in each case both view and suggested decision procedure are critically discussed. As a final chapter in what may be regarded as the second section of this work. Chapter Eight considers the proposal of Waisroann that the metaphor of language strata is helpful in sorting out different kinds of assertions and different levels of problems. A consequence of his suggestion is that certain problems (e.g., the issue of "free will") are merely confusions. I critise this conclusion and the view from which it arises. Thus Chapters Five through Eight deal with competing con ceptions of the philosophical enterprise, with competing views of proper philosophical decision procedure implicit in these coiqpeting perspectives. Turning from reflections about what philosophy is to specific proposals about how to decide philosoph ical problems, the next four chapters deal with the 5 falsifiability criterion, the paradigm case argument and the polar concepts argument, the two-worlds argument, and an appeal to the structure of common speech, thought, and experience. The issues are the same as in the earlier chapters though the eiqphasis is different. In these chapters, the mode of decision procedure is in the foreground, with systematic implications about what philosophy is in the background. Thus, only the stage setting is reversed. My view is that none of the proposed criteria for philosophic decision procedure is sufficiently neutral of categorial bias of its own to succeed as a neutral judge of inter-systematic clashes. At this point of the argument, I am wide open to the charge of scepticism. To rebut the charge, I offer a mode of decision procedure of my own. With what success, let the reader judge. CHAPTER I WHY TALK ABOUT "CATEGORIES"? The importance of the notion of a "category" is a disputed matter. Writing in the 19 38-9 volume of the Aristotelian Society

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