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December 2001 MARCIA BARON CURRICULUM VITAE January 2020 Department of Philosophy Sycamore Hall 026 Indiana University 1033 E. 3rd St. Bloomington, IN 47405 Education: University of North Carolina Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1982 M.A. (Philosophy) 1978 Oberlin College B.A. with high honors (Majors: Philosophy and Spanish) 1976 Professional Positions: Honorary Professor, University of St. Andrews 2014-2017 Professor, University of St. Andrews 2012-2014 Rudy Professor, Indiana University, Bloomington 2004- Professor, Indiana University, Bloomington 2001- Visiting Scholar, Dartmouth College Summers 2005 and 2007 Visiting Professor, University of Auckland (New Zealand) Summer 1999 Professor, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 1996-2001 Visiting Research Fellow, University of Melbourne (Australia) Summer 1995 Associate Professor, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 1989-96 Visiting Associate Professor, University of Chicago Spring 1990 Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Spring 1987 Visiting Assistant Professor, Stanford University Spring 1985 Assistant Professor, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 1983-89 Visiting Assistant Professor, UIUC 1982-83 Assistant Professor, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1982-83 Instructor, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1981-82 Instructor, Illinois State University Spring 1980 Areas of Specialization: Ethics, Philosophy of Criminal Law Area of Competence: History of Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophical Issues in Feminism Academic Awards and Honors: Short-term faculty exchange award from IU with University of Bayreuth for June-July, 2019 Erasmus Program Guest Professorship, University of Pavia, Italy, March 2013 Awarded a year-long NEH fellowship for 2010 Awarded one semester of release time from College Arts and Humanities Institute (CAHI), Indiana University, for Fall 2009 Joseph Rodman Visiting Professorship, University of Western Ontario, October 2005 President, Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, 2002-2003 Vice-President, 2001-2002. Fellowships at the Center for Advanced Study, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Spring 2000 and Fall 1988. My Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology was selected by Choice magazine for its list of Outstanding Academic Books for 1996, and was selected for Author Meets Critics sessions at the 1998 Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association and the 1997 APA Eastern Division Meetings (at the latter, as a session of the North American Kant Society). Fellowship awarded by the UIUC College of Liberal Arts and Sciences for Study in a Second Discipline, 1997-98. Subject of study: Criminal Law. University Scholar, UIUC, 1989-92. Fellowship in the UIUC Program for the Study of Cultural Values and Ethics, Fall 1990. University of Melbourne fellowship, Summer 1995. American Council of Learned Societies Research Grant, 1984-85. National Endowment for the Humanities Grants for participation in the 1990 Summer Institute on Hume and the Enlightenment and the 1983 Summer Institute on Kantian Ethical Thought. Humanities Released Time, University of Illinois Research Board, Spring 1986, Fall 1989, Spring 1994, and Fall 1999. Ranked "Excellent" by students at UIUC, Spring 1990, Fall 1991, and Fall 1993. Phi Beta Kappa, 1975. Foreign Languages: Good in Spanish and German; minimal knowledge of French. Publications: Books: Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate. Co-authored with Michael Slote and Philip Pettit. Blackwell, 1997. Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology. Cornell University Press, 1995. Paperback, 1999. Guest-edited issue of Inquiry (2015). Topic: Moral and Legal Accountability. Contributors: Antony Duff, Kenneth Simons, Angela Smith, Gary Watson, Susan Wolf. Articles: 1. "Negligence, Mens Rea, and What We Want the Element of Mens Rea to Provide," Criminal Law and Philosophy (2019 online; not yet assigned to an issue). DOI: 10.1007/s11572-019-09509-5. 2. "Negligence and the Mens Rea Requirement," Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik /Annual Review of Law and Ethics, Themenschwerpunkt: Strafrecht und Rechtsphilosophie, Gedächtnisschrift für Joachim Hruschka, Vol. 27 (2019): 325-344. 3. “Sexual Consent, Reasonable Mistakes, and the Case of Anna Stubblefield,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 15:2 (Spring 2018): 429-449. 4. “Patriotism and Impartiality,” co-authored with Taylor Rogers, in Handbook of Patriotism, ed. Mitja Sardoč (Springer, 2018). 5. “Shame and Shamelessness,” Philosophia 46 (2018): 721-731. (DOI 10.1007/s11406-017-9933-x) 6. “Rethinking 'One Thought Too Many',” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. 7 (Nov. 2017): 31-50. 7. "Hate Crime Legislation Reconsidered," Metaphilosophy 47 (October, 2016): 505-523. 8. "Justification, Excuse, and the Exculpatory Power of Ignorance," in Rik Peels, ed., Perspectives on Ignorance from Moral and Social Philosophy (Routledge, 2016), pp. 53-76. 9. “The Distinction between Objective and Subjective Standards in Criminal Law,” in Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl and Harald A.Wiltsche (eds.): Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium (De Gruyter, 2016). 10. "A Kantian Take on the Supererogatory," Journal of Applied Philosophy 33:4 (November 2016): 347-362. First published online June 2015. 11. “The Supererogatory and Kant’s Wide Duties,” in Reason, Value, and Respect: Kantian Themes from the Philosophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr, edited by Robert Johnson and Mark Timmons (OUP, 2015), pp. 215-231. 12. “The Mens Rea and Moral Status of Manipulation,” Manipulation: Theory and Practice, edited by Christian Coons and Michael Weber (OUP, 2014), pp. 98-120. 13. “Culpability, Excuse and the ‘Ill Will’ Condition,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. 88 (2014), pp. 91-109. 14. “The Ticking Bomb Hypothetical,” in Mark Timmons, ed., Disputed Moral Issues, 3rd edition (OUP, 2014) and 4th edition (OUP, 2017). 15. “Moral Worth and Moral Rightness; Maxims and Actions,” in Reading Onora O’Neill, edited by David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson, and Daniel Weinstock (Routledge, 2013). 16. “Rape, Seduction, Shame, and Culpability in Tess of the d’Urbervilles,” in Subversion and Sympathy: Gender, Law, and the British Novel, edited by Alison L. LaCroix and Martha C. Nussbaum (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 126-149. 17. “Friendship, Duties Regarding Specific Conditions of Persons, and the Virtues of Social Intercourse,” in Kant’s Tugendlehre: A Comprehensive Commentary, edited by Oliver Sensen, Andreas Trampota, and Jens Timmerman (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2013), pp. 365-382. 18. “The Standard of the Reasonable Person in the Criminal Law,” in Structures of Criminal Law, edited by R A Duff, L Farmer, S E Marshall, M Renzo, and V Tadros (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 11-35. 19. “Gender Issues in the Criminal Law,” The Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Criminal Law, edited by John Deigh and David Dolinko (OUP, 2011), pp. 335-402. 20. “Self-Defense: The Imminence Requirement,” Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Law, edited by Leslie Green and Brian Leiter (OUP, 2011): 228-266. 21. “Virtue Ethics in Relation to Kantian Ethics: An Opinionated Overview and Commentary,” in Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics, edited by Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth (Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 8-37. 22. “Provocation and Justification,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 43 (2009): 117-142. 23. “Reframing the Issues: Differing Views of Justification and the Feminist Critique of Provocation,” in Criminal Law Conversations, edited by Kimberly Ferzan, Stephen Garvey, and Paul H. Robinson (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 329-331. 24. “In Defense of the Proxy Thesis,” in Criminal Law Conversations, pp. 417-418. 25. “Kantian Moral Maturity and the Cultivation of Character,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education, edited by Harvey Siegel (Oxford, 2009), pp. 227-244. 26. “Beneficence and Other Duties of Love in the Metaphysics of Morals,” co-authored with Melissa Seymour Fahmy, in Blackwell Guide to Kant's Ethics, edited by Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (Blackwell, 2009), pp. 211-228. 27. “Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics, and the ‘One Thought Too Many’ Objection,” in Kant's Virtue Ethics, edited by Monika Betzler (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2008), pp. 69-101. 28. “Excuses, Excuses,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (January, 2007): 21-39. 29. "Moral Paragons and the Metaphysics of Morals," in A Companion to Kant, edited by Graham Bird (Blackwell, 2006), pp. 335-349. 30. “Overdetermined Actions and Imperfect Duties," in Moralische Motivation: Kant und die Alternativen, edited by Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kühn, and Dieter Schönecker (Felix Meiner Verlag, 2006), pp. 23-37. 31. "Acting from Duty (GMS I, 397-401)," in Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. New Interpretations, edited by Christoph Horn and Dieter Schönecker (Walter de Gruyter Verlag, 2006), pp. 72-92. 32. "(Putative) Justification," Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 13 (2005): pp. 377-394. 33. "Is Justification (Somehow) Prior to Excuse? A Reply to Douglas Husak," Law and Philosophy 24: 6 (2005): 595-609. 34. “Justifications and Excuses,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 2 (Spring 2005): 387-413. 35. "Killing in the Heat of Passion,” in Setting the Moral Compass: Essays by Women Philosophers, edited by Cheshire Calhoun (Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 353-378. 36. “Manipulativeness” (Presidential Address), Proceedings and Addresses of the
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