Sellars in Context: an Analysis of Wilfrid Sellars's Early Works Peter Jackson Olen University of South Florida, [email protected]
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The Social Sciences—How Scientific Are They?
31 The Social Sciences—How Scientifi c Are They? Manas Sarma or Madame Curie. That is, he social sciences are a very important and amazing in their own way. fi eld of study. A division of science, social sciences Tembrace a wide variety of topics from anthropology A better example of a social to sociology. The social sciences cover a wide range of science than law may be topics that are crucial for understanding human experience/ economics. economics behavior in groups or as individuals. is, in a word, fi nances. Economics is the study By defi nition, social science is the branch of science that deals of how money changes, the rate at which it changes, and with the human facets of the natural world (the other two how it potentially could change and the rate at which it branches of science are natural science and formal science). would. Even though economics does not deal with science Some social sciences are law, economics, and psychology, to directly, it is defi nitely equally scientifi c. About 50-60% of name a few. The social sciences have existed since the time colleges require calculus to study business or economics. of the ancient Greeks, and have evolved ever since. Over Calculus is also required in some science fi elds, like physics time, social sciences have grown and gained a big following. or chemistry. Since economics and science both require Some colleges, like Yale University, have chosen to focus calculus, economics is still a science. more on the social sciences than other subjects. The social sciences are more based on qualitative data and not as Perhaps the most scientifi c of the social sciences is black-and-white as the other sciences, so even though they psychology. -
BRONZE AGE FORMAL SCIENCE? with Additional Remarks on the Historiography of Distant Mathematics
ROSKILDE UNIVERSITETSCENTER ROSKILDE UNIVERSITY Faggruppen for filosofi og Section for philosophy videnskabsteori and science studies BRONZE AGE FORMAL SCIENCE? With additional remarks on the historiography of distant mathematics JENS HØYRUP FILOSOFI OG VIDENSKABSTEORI PÅ ROSKILDE UNIVERSITETSCENTER 3. Række: Preprints og reprints 2003 Nr. 5 In memoriam Robert Merton 1910–2003 Revised contribution to Foundations of the Formal Sciences IV The History of the Concept of the Formal Sciences Bonn, February 14-17, 2003 I. Past understandings of mathematics .......................... 1 Aristotle and others ............................................ 2 Scribal cultures I: Middle Kingdom Egypt ........................... 4 Scribal cultures II: Old Babylonian epoch ............................ 6 Riddle collections – and a hypothesis ............................... 15 II. Understandings of past mathematics ......................... 16 Second (didactical) thoughts ...................................... 18 Bibliography .............................................. 20 The paper was prepared during a stay at the Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte,Berlin. I use the opportunity to express my sincere gratitude for the hospitality I received. Referee: Aksel Haaning My talk falls in two unequally long parts, each turning around a particular permutation of the same three key words:* – The first, longer and main part treats of past understandings of mathematics. – The second, shorter part takes up understandings of past mathematics. In both parts, -
Outline of Science
Outline of science The following outline is provided as a topical overview of • Empirical method – science: • Experimental method – The steps involved in order Science – systematic effort of acquiring knowledge— to produce a reliable and logical conclusion include: through observation and experimentation coupled with logic and reasoning to find out what can be proved or 1. Asking a question about a natural phenomenon not proved—and the knowledge thus acquired. The word 2. Making observations of the phenomenon “science” comes from the Latin word “scientia” mean- 3. Forming a hypothesis – proposed explanation ing knowledge. A practitioner of science is called a for a phenomenon. For a hypothesis to be a "scientist". Modern science respects objective logical rea- scientific hypothesis, the scientific method re- soning, and follows a set of core procedures or rules in or- quires that one can test it. Scientists generally der to determine the nature and underlying natural laws of base scientific hypotheses on previous obser- the universe and everything in it. Some scientists do not vations that cannot satisfactorily be explained know of the rules themselves, but follow them through with the available scientific theories. research policies. These procedures are known as the 4. Predicting a logical consequence of the hy- scientific method. pothesis 5. Testing the hypothesis through an experiment – methodical procedure carried out with the 1 Essence of science goal of verifying, falsifying, or establishing the validity of a hypothesis. The 3 types of -
The State of Inclusive Science Communication: a Landscape Study
The State of Inclusive Science Communication: A Landscape Study Katherine Canfield and Sunshine Menezes Metcalf Institute, University of Rhode Island Graphics by Christine Liu This report was developed for the University of Rhode Island’s Metcalf Institute with generous support from The Kavli Foundation. Cite as: Canfield, K. & Menezes, S. 2020. The State of Inclusive Science Communication: A Landscape Study. Metcalf Institute, University of Rhode Island. Kingston, RI. 77 pp. Executive Summary Inclusive science communication (ISC) is a new and broad term that encompasses all efforts to engage specific audiences in conversations or activities about science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and medicine (STEMM) topics, including, but not limited to, public engagement, informal science learning, journalism, and formal science education. Unlike other approaches toward science communication, however, ISC research and practice is grounded in inclusion, equity, and intersectionality, making these concerns central to the goals, design, implementation, evaluation, and refinement of science communication efforts. Together, the diverse suite of insights and practices that inform ISC comprise an emerging movement. While there is a growing recognition of the value and urgency of inclusive approaches, there is little documented knowledge about the potential catalysts and barriers for this work. Without documentation, synthesis, and critical reflection, the movement cannot proceed as quickly as is warranted. The University of Rhode Island’s Metcalf -
How Science Works
PB 1 How science works The Scientific Method is traditionally presented in the first chapter of science text- books as a simple recipe for performing scientific investigations. Though many use- ful points are embodied in this method, it can easily be misinterpreted as linear and “cookbook”: pull a problem off the shelf, throw in an observation, mix in a few ques- tions, sprinkle on a hypothesis, put the whole mixture into a 350° experiment—and voila, 50 minutes later you’ll be pulling a conclusion out of the oven! That might work if science were like Hamburger Helper®, but science is complex and cannot be re- duced to a single, prepackaged recipe. The linear, stepwise representation of the process of science is simplified, but it does get at least one thing right. It captures the core logic of science: testing ideas with evidence. However, this version of the scientific method is so simplified and rigid that it fails to accurately portray how real science works. It more accurately describes how science is summarized after the fact—in textbooks and journal articles—than how sci- ence is actually done. The simplified, linear scientific method implies that scientific studies follow an unvarying, linear recipe. But in reality, in their work, scientists engage in many different activities in many different sequences. Scientific investigations often involve repeating the same steps many times to account for new information and ideas. The simplified, linear scientific method implies that science is done by individual scientists working through these steps in isolation. But in reality, science depends on interactions within the scientific community. -
The Manifest Image and the Scientific Image(1)
(1) The Manifest Image and the Scientific Image Bas C. van Fraassen Princeton University (published: pp. 29-52 in D. Aerts (ed.). Einstein Meets Magritte: The White Book -- An Interdisciplinary Reflection. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999.) PART ONE. WORLDVIEWS IN COLLISION (?) .................................... 2 1. The Clash ........................................................... 2 2. The three main differences between the Images ....................... 3 PART TWO. THE PLAGUE OF IRREMEDIABLE VAGUENESS .......................... 4 3. Deconstructing the Manifest Image ................................... 4 4. Deconstructing the Scientific Image ................................. 5 5. Philosophical choices in response ................................... 7 PART THREE. AN INCOHERENT FICTION ....................................... 8 6. The Images as philosophical miscreants .............................. 8 6.1 What is this thing called the Manifest Image? ................... 8 6.2 And what of that thing called the Scientific Image? ............. 9 6.3 The dialectic that engenders the dichotomy ...................... 9 7. The very idea of images .......................................... 10 PART FOUR. REAL LIFE WITH SCIENCE ..................................... 11 8. A new beginning .................................................... 12 9. The continuity of common sense and science in method ............... 13 10. Perspectival discourse and relativity ............................ 13 11. Value- and function-laden discourse ............................. -
Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY NEW BRUNSWICK AN INTERVIEW WITH PETER D. KLEIN FOR THE RUTGERS ORAL HISTORY ARCHIVES INTERVIEW CONDUCTED BY SANDRA STEWART HOLYOAK and PAUL CLEMENS NEW BRUNSWICK, NEW JERSEY JUNE 6, 2011 TRANSCRIPT BY KATHRYN T. RIZZI Sandra Stewart Holyoak: This begins our third session with Professor Peter Klein on June 6, 2011, in New Brunswick, New Jersey, with Professor Paul Clemens and Sandra Stewart Holyoak. Again, gentlemen, thank you. Last time, we talked about your time in graduate school. Peter D. Klein: Right. Well, we talked a little bit about grad school, because I told you about Rulon [S.] Wells, [III], and I told you about my dissertation committee, but I didn't tell you very much about the dissertation. Whether that matters or not, who knows? We talked a little bit about Kingman Brewster and the wonderful time we had in trying to get [Richard J.] Bernstein tenure, losing, which helped me to acquire a healthy skepticism about academic administrations, let's put it that way, and how faculty members can have such high principles, but exercise such low practice. [laughter] I'm not saying all faculty members, or most, but a bunch that I came in contact with at that place. Now, of course, it turned out that they were right. He shouldn't have gotten tenure. [laughter] As a teacher, he deserved it, no question about that, but the problem, of course--a problem, not the--a problem with giving tenure to a person who is primarily a teacher is that that person may not keep up in the field. -
Just What Is the Relation Between the Manifest and the Scientific Images? Comments on Brandom
Just What is the Relation between the Manifest and the Scientific Images? Comments on Brandom I. Introduction The last half of the (long) first chapter of Brandom’s From Empiricism to Expressivism constitutes an extended argument against one half of Wilfrid Sellars’s version of scientific realism. I say ‘half’ of Sellarsian scientific realism because Brandom agrees with Sellars’s anti-instrumentalism. The half Brandom takes issue with is Sellars’s claim that the “scientific image” [SI] —an idealized, complete scientific framework for the description and explanation of all natural events and objects—possesses such ontological priority over the “manifest image” [MI]—itself an idealization of the ‘commonsense’ framework of persons and things in terms of which we currently experience ourselves and the world—that it will come to replace the MI in all matters of explanation and description. Brandom’s argument against this Sellarsian idea is rather roundabout. First, he traces Sellars’s distinction between the MI and the SI back to the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena. Then he argues against several attempts to understand identity claims across disparate frameworks. Neither, claims Brandom, will permit us to identify objects across the MI/SI divide. But if we cannot identify the objects of concern across the frameworks, then a shift from the MI to the SI is not a form of replacement of one framework by a better, but simply a change of subject that poses no threat to the MI. The overall argument of the chapter is that, though what Sellars made of the Kantian notion of a category is a very Good Idea, Sellars’s assimilation of scientific realism to a kind of transcendental realism in Kant’s sense, is a Bad Idea with a muddled basis and unworkable consequences. -
December 2001
MARCIA BARON CURRICULUM VITAE January 2020 Department of Philosophy Sycamore Hall 026 Indiana University 1033 E. 3rd St. Bloomington, IN 47405 Education: University of North Carolina Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1982 M.A. (Philosophy) 1978 Oberlin College B.A. with high honors (Majors: Philosophy and Spanish) 1976 Professional Positions: Honorary Professor, University of St. Andrews 2014-2017 Professor, University of St. Andrews 2012-2014 Rudy Professor, Indiana University, Bloomington 2004- Professor, Indiana University, Bloomington 2001- Visiting Scholar, Dartmouth College Summers 2005 and 2007 Visiting Professor, University of Auckland (New Zealand) Summer 1999 Professor, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 1996-2001 Visiting Research Fellow, University of Melbourne (Australia) Summer 1995 Associate Professor, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 1989-96 Visiting Associate Professor, University of Chicago Spring 1990 Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Spring 1987 Visiting Assistant Professor, Stanford University Spring 1985 Assistant Professor, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 1983-89 Visiting Assistant Professor, UIUC 1982-83 Assistant Professor, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1982-83 Instructor, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1981-82 Instructor, Illinois State University Spring 1980 Areas of Specialization: Ethics, Philosophy of Criminal Law Area of Competence: History of Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophical Issues in Feminism Academic Awards and Honors: Short-term faculty exchange award from IU with University of Bayreuth for June-July, 2019 Erasmus Program Guest Professorship, University of Pavia, Italy, March 2013 Awarded a year-long NEH fellowship for 2010 Awarded one semester of release time from College Arts and Humanities Institute (CAHI), Indiana University, for Fall 2009 Joseph Rodman Visiting Professorship, University of Western Ontario, October 2005 President, Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, 2002-2003 Vice-President, 2001-2002. -
XX Век II. METAETHICS of the 20Th CENTUR
Максимов Л.В. Сектор этики ИФ РАН (апрель 2016) Метаэтика. Избранная библиография. Часть II. – XX век II. METAETHICS OF THE 20th CENTURY (SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY) 1. Bruce A. Ackerman Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven: YAle University Press, 1980) 2. Robert Ackermann "Consistency and Ethics" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69, 1969. 3. E. M. Adams "A Critique of the Emotive Theory of Ethical Terms" in Journal of Philosophy 46, 1949. EMA complains that Ayer and Stevenson do not adequately analyse approbation, failing properly to distinguish it from mere liking. If we do analyse it we find it involves a cognitive element in the form of a judgement of rightness. So it is incoherent to analyse judgements of rightness in terms of approval. "Word-Magic and Logical Analysis in the Field of Ethics" in Journal of Philosophy 47, 1950. "The Nature of Ethical Inquiry" in Journal of Philosophy 48, 1951. "Cartesianism in Ethics" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16, 1956. "Mr Hare on the Role of Principles in Deciding" in Mind 65, 1956. "The Nature of 'Ought'" in Philosophical Studies 7, 1956. "'Ought' Again" in Philosophical Studies 8, 1957. "Hall's Analysis of "Ought"" in Journal of Philosophy 55, 1958. "The Theoretical and the Practical" in Review of Metaphysics 13, 1960. Ethical Naturalism and the Modern World-View (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). "Classical Moral Philosophy and Metaethics" in Ethics 74, 1964. "A Defense of Value Realism" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 4, 1966. "Gewirth on Reason and Morality" in Review of Metaphysics 33, 1980. "The Subjective Normative Structure of Agency" in Regis, Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism "Rationality and Morality" in Review of Metaphysics 46, 1993. -
R Stephen J. Wykstra Office Address: Philosophy Department, Calvin
r Stephen J. Wykstra Office Address: Philosophy Department, Calvin College, Grand Rapids, MI 49546 Home Address: 1149 Legion Park Dr., Holland, MI 49423 Telephone: Office (616) 526-6410 Home (616) 392-7258 Education: B.A. Physics, Philosophy, Hope College, 1972 Ph.D. History and Philosophy of Science University of Pittsburgh, 1978 Dissertation: The Interdependence of History of Science and Philosophy of Science: Toward a Meta-theory of Scientific Rationality Ph. D Committee/References: Larry Laudan, Wilfrid Sellars, Adolf Grunbaum, J.E. McGuire Recent References: Del Ratzsch, David Hoekema, Michael Beatty, Trent Dougherty, Alvin Plantinga Teaching Experience: 1972-1974: Teaching Fellow, University of Pittsburgh 1978-1984: University of Tulsa 1985- : Calvin College Courses Taught: Problems of Philosophy, Symbolic Logic, Modern Philosophy, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Religion, History of Science, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Topics in Modern Philosophy; Critical Reasoning; Faith and Reason; Modal Logic and Its Applications; Evidentialism and Reformed Epistemology Languages: Reading knowledge of French and German Professional Activities: 1. National Science Foundation Fellow (1979): Workshop on Ethical Issues in Engineering 2. Visiting Research Fellow (1979): Center for Philosophy of Science, Pittsburgh 3. National Endowment for Humanities Fellow (1982): Summer Seminar on Philosophy of Religion (William Rowe) 4. Oxford University (1982): SCR Fellow (Oriel College) 5. National Endowment for Humanities (1983): Summer Research Fellowship 6. Paid Consultant, Center for Science Studies (1984-85) Virginia Polytechnic Institute 7. National Endowment for Humanities (1987): Summer Institute in Philosophy of Religion 8. American Philosophical Association (1988): Planning Committee (Central Division) 9. American Philosophical Association (1989-92) Professional Rights Committee 10. Referee for Philosophy of Science, Nous, Faith and Philosophy, National Science Foundation, Philosophical Studies. -
Van Fraassen: Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism
Aaron Leung Philosophy 290-5 Week 11 Handout Van Fraassen: Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism 1. Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism What is scientific realism? According to van Fraassen, “Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. This is the correct statement of scientific realism.” His formulation has two important features: (1) It is pragmatic (and sufficiently circumscribed so that it applies to the actual history of science). Science only aims to provide a literally true story of the world; we shouldn’t claim that science actually does provide a true story because, for the most part, it hasn’t. (2) It is epistemic. Acceptance of a theory is identified with belief in its truth. This epistemic feature is itself fairly circumscribed; it says nothing about reasons for believing, and it allows for degrees of acceptance and tentative acceptance, corresponding to degrees of belief and tentative belief. “Anti-realism is a position according to which the aim of science can well be served without giving such a literally true story, and acceptance of a theory may properly involve something less (or other) than belief that it is true.” (N.b. We are not discussing metaphysical realism. Van Fraassen and everyone else in this debate agree that there is a real world out there which theories may or may not refer to, and which makes theories true or false, and which is independent of what anyone believes.) What does “literally true” mean? That the language in a literally true account should be literally construed, and that the account should be true when it is so construed.