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Alvin I. Goldman -- Curriculum Vitae (September 2014)

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Alvin I. Goldman -- Curriculum Vitae (September 2014) Current Address(es) Department of Philosophy Rutgers University 106 Somerset Street New Brunswick, NJ 08901 Center for Cognitive Science Rutgers University 152 Frelinghuysen Road Piscataway, NJ [email protected] Education Columbia University, B.A., 1960, Summa cum laude Princeton University, M.A., 1962, Ph.D., 1965 Positions Held Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, Board of Governors Professor, 2002- Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Science University of Arizona, 1983-2002 Professor, 1983-1994, Regents’ Professor, 1994-2002 Department of Philosophy and Program in Cognitive Science University of Illinois at Chicago, Professor of Philosophy, 1980-83 University of Michigan, Assistant Professor, 1963-69; Associate Professor, 1969-73; Professor, 1973-80 Princeton University, Visiting Professor, Spring 2004 Yale University, Visiting Professor, Fall 1991 University of Pittsburgh, Visiting Associate Professor, Summer, 1972 Corpus Christi College, Oxford University, Temporary Member of Senior Common Room, 1967, 1988 Fellowships, Grants, Awards, and Honors Romanell Prize Lecturer on Philosophical Naturalism, American Philosophical Association (2010) Volume 79 of Grazer Philosophische Studien (2009) devoted to the philosophy of Alvin Goldman; reprinted as Reliable Knowledge and Social Epistemology, eds., G. Schurz and M. Werning, Rodopi (2009). Listed in Who’s Who in America. (2006) Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (elected 2004). Resident, Bellagio Study and Conference Center, Bellagio, Italy, July 2003. Volume 29 of Philosophical Topics (2001) devoted to The Philosophy of Alvin Goldman. Co-winner (with William Talbott), Berger Prize in philosophy of law, American Philosophical Association, 2000-01. Romanell-Phi Beta Kappa Professorship, 2000-2001 (to deliver three public lectures at one’s home university, in this case, University of Arizona). NEH Fellowship for University Teachers (2000-2001), $24,000 ("Mind Understanding Mind"). Research Professorship, U of Arizona Social and Behavioral Sciences Research Institute, 2000. 1 NEH Grant of $116,000 to direct a Summer Seminar for College and University Teachers, "Philosophical Foundations of Social Epistemology", 2000. Fellow, Udall Center for Public Policy Studies (U of Arizona), 1996. Co-Investigator, Group Project on Rationality, National Endowment for the Humanities, $120,000 grant, 1993-96 Participating faculty member, NSF Project entitled "Cognitive Science: Language and Cognition,” 1993-95. Visiting Fellow, University of Pittsburgh Center for Philosophy of Science, Fall 1994. William Evans Visiting Fellowship, University of Otago, New Zealand, 1993. ACLS Travel Grant, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, 1989. Research Professorship, U of Arizona Social and Behavioral Sciences Faculty, 1985. National Science Foundation Scholars Award, 1983. Fellow, National Humanities Center, 1981-82. Fellow, John Simon Guggenheim Foundation, 1975-76. Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 1975-76. George Santayana Fellow, Harvard University, 1970-71. Sinclair Award for Counseling, University of Michigan, 1967. Danforth Fellow, 1960-63. Woodrow Wilson Fellow, 1960-61. Phi Beta Kappa (1960). Listed in Marquis' Who's Who in the West, 25th edition, 1996 Listed in Who’s Who in America. 2005. Included in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Ted Honderich, ed. (1995). Biography in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edition, R. Audi, ed. (2000). Biography in Dictionary of Twentieth Century Philosophers, Routledge, forthcoming Biography in MacMillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition, forthcoming Extramural Activities and Positions President, American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 1991-92 National Board of Officers, American Philosophical Association, 1990-93 President, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 1987-88 Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Executive Committee, 1978-80 National Humanities Center, Final Selection Panel, 1986, 2002. National Endowment for the Humanities, Selection Panel, Washington, D.C., 1991. Committee on Lectures and Prizes, American Philosophical Association, 1976-78 Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession, APA, 1986, 1994-1997 Selection committee for the annual APA Romanell lecture on philosophical naturalism, 1997-2000 (member and sometime chair). Selection committee for the Romanell-Phi Beta Kappa Professorship. 2003-2006. r Editorial Activities Editor in Chief. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology. Edinburgh University Press. 2005-2012; Cambridge University Press 2012- Member of Editorial Boards: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Nous; Philosophy and Phenomenological Research; Oxford Essays in Epistemology; Principia; Ethics and Information Technology; Philosophers’ Imprint (e-journal); Essays in Philosophy (e-journal); Mind and Society; Raritan: A Quarterly Review; Review of Philosophy and Psychology; Abstracta (online journal, with Portuguese/Brazilian editorship). Referee (partial list): Philosophical Studies; American Philosophical Quarterly; Synthese; Philosophical Review; Nous; Mind; Philosophical Quarterly; Philosophy of Science; British Journal for the Philosophy of Science; Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior; Ethics; Behavioral and Brain Sciences; Child Development; Trends in Cognitive Sciences; Law and Philosophy; MIT Press; Oxford University Press, Westview Press; National Endowment for the Humanities; National Science Foundation; 2 Social Science Research Council of Canada. Advisory Editor, Philosophical Gourmet Report; Studies in Cognitive Systems (Kluwer Publishers); Member, Board of Directors, Institute for Law and Philosophy (Rutgers University). Intramural Administration and Committee Work (A) Department (only major assignments are listed) Chairman, Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, 1977-79. Director of Graduate Studies, University of Michigan Placement Officer, University of Michigan Graduate Admissions Chairman, University of Michigan Promotion Committee, University of Illinois at Chicago Director of Graduate Studies, University of Arizona Department Executive Committee, University of Arizona (many years) Recruitment Committee, Chair, University of Arizona (many years) Promotion and Tenure Committee (or Committee on Professional Status), Chair, University of Arizona, 1990-91, 1993-94 (B) College and University Senate Assembly, University of Michigan Humanities Board, University of Illinois at Chicago Faculty Senate, University of Illinois at Chicago Social and Behavioral Science Research Institute governing board, University of Arizona (many years) Social and Behavioral Sciences Promotion and Tenure Committee University of Arizona, 1988-89, Chair, 1989-90 Executive Committee, Cognitive Science Program, University of Arizona Steering Committee, Institutional Analysis Program, University of Arizona Budget Priorities Committee, Social and Behavioral Sciences, 1992, University of Arizona Conference Organization and Directorships Director, 2000 Summer Seminar on the Philosophical Foundations of Social Epistemology, NEH. Co-Director, 1986 Summer Institute on the Theory of Knowledge, funded by NEH. Local Arrangements Chairman, Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Tucson, 1989. Co-Organizer, Conference on Human Inference, University of Chicago, October, 1980; funded by the Sloan Foundation. Teaching Experience Theory of Knowledge, Knowledge and Cognition, Social Epistemology, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophical Naturalism, Philosophy and Psychology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Social Science, Theory of Human Action, Contemporary Philosophy, Issues and Methods in Analytic Philosophy, , Philosophy of Language, American Philosophy, Introduction to Philosophy, Introduction to Logic, Great Books. 3 Publications I. Chronological Organization of All Publications Books: 1. A Theory of Human Action, Prentice-Hall (1970), 230 pp.; reprinted in paperback by Princeton University Press (1977). 2. Values and Morals, edited, with Jaegwon Kim, D. Reidel (1978), 331 pp. 3. Epistemology and Cognition, Harvard University Press (1986), 437 pp. Paperback edition (1988). 4. Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences (collected papers), MIT Press (1992), 336 pp. 5. Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, edited, MIT Press (1993), 860 pp. Hardcover and paperback. 6. Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Science, Westview Press (1993), 182 pp. Hardcover and paperback. Italian translation (1996). Korean translation (1998). 7. Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1999). 407 pp. Hardcover and paperback. 8. Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public (collected papers). New York: Oxford University Press (2002). 224 pp. Paperback edition (2004). 9. Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading, New York: Oxford University Press (2006), 364 pp. Paperback edition (2008). 10. G. Schurz and M. Werning, eds. Reliable Knowledge and Social Epistemology: Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Goldman and Replies by Goldman. Amsterdam: Rodopi (2009). 11. Social Epistemology: Essential Readings, edited, with Dennis Whitcomb. New York: Oxford University Press (2011). 12. Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays (collected papers). New York: Oxford University Press (2012). 13. Joint Ventures: Mindreading, Mirroring, and Embodied Cognition: (collected papers). Oxford University Press (2014).
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