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Transfers of Major Weapons: Deals with Deliveries Or Orders Made for 2010 to 2019

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Transfers of Major Weapons: Deals with Deliveries Or Orders Made for 2010 to 2019 Transfers of major weapons: Deals with deliveries or orders made for 2010 to 2019 Note: The ‘No. delivered’ and the ‘Year(s) of deliveries’ columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. The ‘Comments’ column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/sources-and-methods>. Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database Information generated: 17 August 2020 Year(s) Supplier/ No. Weapon Weapon Year of No. recipient (R) ordered designation description of order delivery delivered Comments Russia R: Syria (10) T-90S Tank (2015) 2015 (10) Probably second-hand; possibly aid (25) T-62 Tank (2016) 2017 (25) Second-hand; probably aid; T-62M version (10) BMP-1 IFV 2017 2017 (10) Second-hand; probably aid; BRM-1K version China (1000) Kh-31A1/AS-17 Anti-ship missile/ARM (1997) 2001-2016 (1000) Kh-31A and Kh-31P or Kh-31AMK and Kh-31PMK version; for Su-30, J-8M and/or JH-7 combat aircraft; including production of Kh-31P in China as KR-1, YJ-9 or YJ-91 (1500) 9M119 Svir/AT-11 Anti-tank missile (1998) 2001-2015 (1500) For Type-98 and Type-99 tanks; possibly produced or copied in China as GP7 from 2015 or technology used in development of GP7 30 AK-176 76mm Naval gun (2004) 2008-2018 (30) Chinese-produced H/PJ-26 version for 30 Type-054A (Jiangkai-2) frigates produced in China 30 Mineral/Band Stand Sea search radar (2004) 2005-2018 (30) For 30 Type-054A (Jiangkai-2) frigates produced in China; probably produced (possibly without license) in China (8) AK-176 76mm Naval gun (2005) 2007-2019 (6) Chinese-produced H/PJ-26 version for 8 Type-071 (Yuzhao) AALS produced in China AK-176 76mm Naval gun (2010) 2013-2019 (59) Chinese-produced H/PJ-26 version for 60 Type-056 (Jiangdao) frigates produced in China India (25000) 9M113 Konkurs/AT-5 Anti-tank missile (1988) 1992-2016 (25000) For BMP-2 IFV; ordered from Soviet Union and produced under Russian licence after break-up of Soviet Union; incl 9M113M version from 2003 9 Garpun/Plank Shave Air search radar (1998) 2000-2016 9 For 3 Kolkata (Project-15A) destroyers and 3 Brahmaputra (Project-16A) and 3 Shivalik (Project-17) frigates produced in India; for use with SS-N-25 missiles; Indian designation Aparna (400) PJ-10 BrahMos Anti-ship MI/SSM (1998) 2006-2019 (185) Officially joint venture for development but mainly using Russian technology from Yakhont (SS-N-26) anti-ship missile; incl for NGMMCB coast defence systems (426) PJ-10 BrahMos SSM 1998 2006-2019 (310) Officially joint venture for development but mainly using Russian technology from Yakhont (SS-N-26) anti-ship missile 140 Su-30MK FGA aircraft (2001) 2005-2019 (132) $3-5.4 b deal; Su-30 MKI version; produced in India; delivery planned by 2020 6 RBU-6000 ASW MRL (2003) 2014-2016 6 For 3 Kolkata (Project-15A) destroyers produced in India 8 RBU-6000 ASW MRL (2003) 2014-2017 6 For 4 Kamorta (Project-28) frigates produced in India 300 T-90S Tank 2006 2009-2018 (300) (63) MiG-29SMT/Fulcrum-F FGA aircraft 2008 2012-2019 (26) $850-965 m deal; Indian MiG-29 rebuilt to MiG-29UPG (MiG-29SMT) (300) YaMZ-238 Diesel engine (2009) 2011-2013 (300) For 300 Casspir-6 APC (MPV) from South Africa (216) PJ-10 BrahMos-A ASM (2012) Officially joint venture for development but mainly using Russian technology from Yakhont (SS-N-26) anti-ship missile; for Su-30 combat aircraft; deliver planned from 2020 25000 9M119 Svir/AT-11 Anti-tank missile 2013 2014-2019 (7500) INR30 b ($474 m) deal; for T-90 and possibly T-72 tanks; incl 15000 produced in India; planned from 2006 but delayed several years due to problems with production in India; Indian designation Invar 236 T-90S Tank (2013) INR60 b deal; produced in India 149 BMP-2 IFV (2017) INR9.2 b ($141 m) deal; selected 2015 but not yet ordered by end-2019 (200) Ka-226T Sergei Light helicopter (2017) 'RSH' (ex-'LUH') programme; incl 140 produced in India; selected but contract not yet signed by end-2019 4 Talwar Frigate 2018 Incl 2 produced in India; delivery planned 2023-2026 4331 9M113 Konkurs/AT-5 Anti-tank missile 2019 INR8.3 b deal; Konkurs-M version; produced in India 5175 Igla-S/SA-24 Portable SAM (2019) $1.5 b (INR108 b) or INR270 b 'VSHORAD' programme; incl assembly and production in India; selected 2018 but possibly not yet ordered by end-2019 464 T-90S Tank 2019 INR200b ($2.8 b) deal (incl up to 80% produced in India); delivery planned by 2024 Iran 9M111 Fagot/AT-4 Anti-tank missile (1991) 1993-2019 (5400) For BMP-2 and Boraq IFV . .9M14M/AT-3 Anti-tank missile (1995) 1996-2019 (4950) Iranian designation RAAD; incl I-RAAD version 9M113 Konkurs/AT-5 Anti-tank missile (1998) 1999-2019 (3250) Iranian designation probably Towsan-1 Kazakhstan 3 Project-22180 Patrol craft 2009 2010-2014 (3) Kazakh designation Sardar North Korea (3000) 9M111 Fagot/AT-4 Anti-tank missile (1987) 1992-2010 (3000) Continuation of original order from Soviet Union; status uncertain (probably production of unauthorized copy in North Korea from early-2000s) Turkey (2) S-400/SA-21 SAM system 2017 2019 (2) Version incl Turkish components Viet Nam (8) Project-1241/Tarantul FAC (2004) 2008-2016 8 Project-12418 (Tarantul-5) version; incl 6 produced in Viet Nam . .Kh-35 Uran/SS-N-25 Anti-ship missile (2011) 2019 (10) Incl for Pohang frigate; possibly produced in Viet Nam as KCT-15 4 FC-54 Patrol craft (2012) 2012-2014 4 Vietnamese designation TT400TP Afghanistan 10 Mi-8MT/Mi-17 Transport helicopter 2010 2010 10 Mi-17V-5 version; financed by UAE (6) Mi-8MT/Mi-17 Transport helicopter (2010) 2011 6 Probably second-hand; Mi-17V1 version; bought via and financed by USA; incl for training of Afghan crews and US instructors in USA 21 Mi-8MT/Mi-17 Transport helicopter 2011 2011-2012 21 $375m deal (bought via and financed by USA); Mi-17V-5 version 12 Mi-8MT/Mi-17 Transport helicopter 2013 2013 12 $197 m deal (bought via and financed by USA); Mi-17V-5 version 30 Mi-8MT/Mi-17 Transport helicopter 2013 2014 30 $572 m deal (bought via and financed by USA); Mi-17V-5 version Algeria (400) Berezhok IFV turret 2005 2006-2010 (400) For modernization of 400 BMP-1 IFV to BMP-1M (4000) Kornet/AT-14 Anti-tank missile 2005 2006-2010 (4000) For BMP-1 IFV modernized to BMP-1M (300) 48N6/SA-10 SAM 2006 2008-2011 (300) For S-300PMU-2 (SA-20B) SAM system (40) 53-65 AS torpedo 2006 2010 (40) For Project-636 (Kilo) submarines (900) 57E6 SAM (2006) 2012-2016 (900) For Pantsyr-S1 air-defence systems (38) 96K9 Pantsyr-S1 Mobile AD system (2006) 2012-2016 (38) (500) 9M131 Metis-M/AT-13 Anti-tank missile (2006) 2009-2013 (500) (5) Kasta-2E2 Air search radar (2006) 2012-2016 (5) For use with Pantsyr AD systems 2 Project-636E/Kilo Submarine 2006 2010 2 $400 m deal (3) S-300PMU2/SA-20B SAM system (2006) 2008-2011 (3) (40) TEST-71 AS/ASW torpedo (2006) 2010 40 For Project-636 (Kilo) submarines 16 Yak-130 Trainer/combat ac 2006 2011 (16) $200-250 m deal 2 Garpun/Plank Shave Air search radar (2007) 2011-2012 2 For modernization of 2 Project-1234 (Nanuchka or Hamidou) corvettes (4) Pozitiv-ME1.2 Air/sea search radar (2007) 2011-2012 4 For modernization of 2 Project-1159 (Koni or Rais) frigates and 2 Project-1234 (Nanuchka or Hamidou) corvettes (20) TEST-71 AS/ASW torpedo (2007) 2011-2013 (20) For modernized Project-1159 (Koni or Mourad Rais) frigates (30) Kh-35 Uran/SS-N-25 Anti-ship missile (2009) 2011-2013 (30) For modernized Project-1234 (Nanuchka or Hamidou) corvettes 16 Su-30MK FGA aircraft 2010 2011-2012 (16) $0.8-1 b deal; Su-30MKA version (120) T-90S Tank 2011 2012-2014 (120) $470 m deal; T-90SA and T-90SKA versions (1000) 9M120 Ataka/AT-9 Anti-tank missile 2013 2016-2018 (1000) For Mi-28 combat helicopters; designation uncertain (possibly not 9M120 but 9M114) (100) 9M317/SA-17 Grizzly SAM (2013) 2017 (100) (4) 9P78 Iskander SSM TEL (2013) 2017 (4) Recipient uncertain (could be other recipient in Middle East or North Africa) (1) Buk-M2/SA-17 SAM system (2013) 2017 (1) (25) Iskander SSM (2013) 2017 (25) Recipient uncertain 6 Mi-26 Transport helicopter 2013 2015 6 Part of $2.7 b deal; Mi-26T2 version 42 Mi-28N Combat helicopter 2013 2016-2018 (42) Part of $2.7 b deal; Mi-28NE version (40) 53-65 AS torpedo (2014) 2018 (40) For Project-636 (Kilo) submarines 360 Berezhok IFV turret (2014) 2015-2017 (360) For modernization of 360 BMP-1 IFV to BMP-1M (4000) Kornet/AT-14 Anti-tank missile (2014) 2015-2017 (4000) 2 Project-636E/Kilo Submarine 2014 2018 2 (203) T-90S Tank (2014) 2015-2016 (203) T-90SA and T-90SKA versions (40) TEST-71 AS/ASW torpedo (2014) 2018 (40) For Project-636 (Kilo) submarines 8 Mi-26 Transport helicopter 2015 2017 8 Mi-26T2 version 14 Su-30MK FGA aircraft 2015 2016-2018 (14) Su-30MKA version (11) Tigr APV 2015 2016-2017 (11) (4) TOS-1 Self-propelled MRL (2015) 2016 (4) (300) BMPT Terminator Tank/AFSV (2016) BMPT-72 version Angola (8) Mi-8MT/Mi-17 Transport helicopter 2013 2015-2016 8 Part of $1 b deal; Mi-171Sh armed version 12 Su-30K FGA aircraft 2013 2017-2019 12 Second-hand (originally delivered to India but returned to Russian producer) but modernized in Belarus to Su-30SM before delivery; financed with Russian loan 12 Mi-24P/Mi-35P Combat helicopter (2015) 2016 12 Second-hand; modernized before delivery Argentina 2 Mi-8MT/Mi-17 Transport helicopter 2010 2011 2 EUR20 m deal; Mi-17V-5 or Mi-171E version; for SAR and use in Antarctica Armenia (144) 5V55U/SA-10 SAM (2007) 2009-2010 (144) Second-hand (2) S-300PS/SA-10B SAM system (2007)
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