Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons: Sorted by Recipient. Deals with Deliveries Or Orders Made for Year Range 1986 to 2014
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Future Technology and International Cooperation a UK Perspective
MAY Future Technology and International Cooperation A UK perspective In 2011, NATO’s Integrated Air Defence (NATINAD) and the supporting NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS) marked 50 years of safeguarding NATO’s skies. In order to successfully reach future milestones NATO must continue (and in many cases improve) its air defence interoperability across the strategic, operational and tactical domains. In order for this to become reality a combination of exploiting synergies and acknowledging that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts1 is required at all levels. Recent improvements and a greater focus on future capability within the UK’s Joint Ground Based Air Defence (Jt GBAD) will enable the Formation to deploy its units and sub-units in order to operate the latest air defence weapon systems, within a multinational environment, against a near-peer adversary or asymmetric threat, and win. Major Charles W.I. May RA – 14 (Cole’s Kop) Battery Royal Artillery* the strategic direction of the British Armed ‘If I didn‘t have air supremacy, I wouldn‘t be here.’ Forces, and subsequently the operational level (SACEUR, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, June 1944) construct. As the new direction is towards Joint Force 2025 (JF2025) it is pragmatic for this paper to focus on the next 10 years. The his article will highlight the UK military’s purpose is to identify and highlight the Tstrategic situation, perception and under- pertinent capability enhancements and future standing of the air threat before explaining the vision of the UK’s Ground Based Air Defence new military structure to which the Formation Formation and its developing role within the is adapting. -
Askari Bank Limited List of Shareholders (W/Out Cnic) As of December 31, 2017
ASKARI BANK LIMITED LIST OF SHAREHOLDERS (W/OUT CNIC) AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2017 S. NO. FOLIO NO. NAME OF SHAREHOLDERS ADDRESSES OF THE SHAREHOLDERS NO. OF SHARES 1 9 MR. MOHAMMAD SAEED KHAN 65, SCHOOL ROAD, F-7/4, ISLAMABAD. 336 2 10 MR. SHAHID HAFIZ AZMI 17/1 6TH GIZRI LANE, DEFENCE HOUSING AUTHORITY, PHASE-4, KARACHI. 3280 3 15 MR. SALEEM MIAN 344/7, ROSHAN MANSION, THATHAI COMPOUND, M.A. JINNAH ROAD, KARACHI. 439 4 21 MS. HINA SHEHZAD C/O MUHAMMAD ASIF THE BUREWALA TEXTILE MILLS LTD 1ST FLOOR, DAWOOD CENTRE, M.T. KHAN ROAD, P.O. 10426, KARACHI. 470 5 42 MR. M. RAFIQUE B.R.1/27, 1ST FLOOR, JAFFRY CHOWK, KHARADHAR, KARACHI. 9382 6 49 MR. JAN MOHAMMED H.NO. M.B.6-1728/733, RASHIDABAD, BILDIA TOWN, MAHAJIR CAMP, KARACHI. 557 7 55 MR. RAFIQ UR REHMAN PSIB PRIVATE LIMITED, 17-B, PAK CHAMBERS, WEST WHARF ROAD, KARACHI. 305 8 57 MR. MUHAMMAD SHUAIB AKHUNZADA 262, SHAMI ROAD, PESHAWAR CANTT. 1919 9 64 MR. TAUHEED JAN ROOM NO.435, BLOCK-A, PAK SECRETARIAT, ISLAMABAD. 8530 10 66 MS. NAUREEN FAROOQ KHAN 90, MARGALA ROAD, F-8/2, ISLAMABAD. 5945 11 67 MR. ERSHAD AHMED JAN C/O BANK OF AMERICA, BLUE AREA, ISLAMABAD. 2878 12 68 MR. WASEEM AHMED HOUSE NO.485, STREET NO.17, CHAKLALA SCHEME-III, RAWALPINDI. 5945 13 71 MS. SHAMEEM QUAVI SIDDIQUI 112/1, 13TH STREET, PHASE-VI, DEFENCE HOUSING AUTHORITY, KARACHI-75500. 2695 14 74 MS. YAZDANI BEGUM HOUSE NO.A-75, BLOCK-13, GULSHAN-E-IQBAL, KARACHI. -
Security & Defence European
a 7.90 D European & Security ES & Defence 4/2016 International Security and Defence Journal Protected Logistic Vehicles ISSN 1617-7983 • www.euro-sd.com • Naval Propulsion South Africa‘s Defence Exports Navies and shipbuilders are shifting to hybrid The South African defence industry has a remarkable breadth of capa- and integrated electric concepts. bilities and an even more remarkable depth in certain technologies. August 2016 Jamie Shea: NATO‘s Warsaw Summit Politics · Armed Forces · Procurement · Technology The backbone of every strong troop. Mercedes-Benz Defence Vehicles. When your mission is clear. When there’s no road for miles around. And when you need to give all you’ve got, your equipment needs to be the best. At times like these, we’re right by your side. Mercedes-Benz Defence Vehicles: armoured, highly capable off-road and logistics vehicles with payloads ranging from 0.5 to 110 t. Mobilising safety and efficiency: www.mercedes-benz.com/defence-vehicles Editorial EU Put to the Test What had long been regarded as inconceiv- The second main argument of the Brexit able became a reality on the morning of 23 campaigners was less about a “democratic June 2016. The British voted to leave the sense of citizenship” than of material self- European Union. The majority that voted for interest. Despite all the exception rulings "Brexit", at just over 52 percent, was slim, granted, the United Kingdom is among and a great deal smaller than the 67 percent the net contribution payers in the EU. This who voted to stay in the then EEC in 1975, money, it was suggested, could be put to but ignoring the majority vote is impossible. -
Missiles OUTLOOK
SPECIFICATIONS Missiles OUTLOOK/ GENERAL DATA AIRFRAME GUIDANCE OUTLOOK/ POWERPLANT SPECIFICATIONS MAX. MAX. SPAN, BODY LAUNCH MAX. RANGE STATUS/OUTLOOK/REMARKS DESIGNATION/NAME LENGTH WINGS OR DIAMETER WEIGHT CONTRACTOR TYPE NO. MAKE & MODEL (FT.) FINS (FT.) (FT.) (LB.) (NAUT. MI.) AIR-TO-AIR CHUNG-SHAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (CSIST), Taoyuan, Taiwan Skysword 1 (Tien Chien 1) 9.8 2.1 0.42 196.4 — IR 1 X solid propellant 9.7 In service with Taiwan air force since 1993. Skysword 2 (Tien Chien 2) 11.8 2 0.62 396.8 — Active radar 1 X solid propellant 32.4 In service with Taiwan air force since 1996. DENEL (PTY.) LTD., Pretoria, South Africa OPERATORS SATELLITE A-Darter 9.8 1.6 0.54 195.8 Denel IIR 1 X solid propellant — Fifth-generation technology demonstrator. Likely co-development with Brazil. COMMERCIAL R-Darter 11.9 2.1 0.53 264 Denel Radar 1 X solid propellant — Development completed 2000. For South African Air Force Cheetah and Gripen aircraft. U-Darter 9.6 1.67 0.42 210 Denel Two-color, IR 1 X solid propellant — First revealed in 1988; similar to Magic. Entered production in 1994. In use on South African Air Force Cheetah and Impala aircraft. DIEHL BGT DEFENSE, Uberlingen, Germany COMMERCIAL AIM-9L/I-1 Sidewinder 9.4 2.1 0.4 189 Diehl BGT Defense IR 1 X solid propellant — Upgraded and refurbished. IRIS-T 9.7 — 0.4 196 Diehl BGT Defense IIR 1 X solid propellant — In production. SATELLITE OPERATORS SATELLITE MBDA MISSILE SYSTEMS (BAE Systems, EADS, Finmeccanica), London, UK; Vélizy, France; Rome, Italy Aspide 12.1 3.4 0.67 479 Alenia Semiactive radar, homing 1 X solid propellant 43 In service. -
Sir Frank Cooper on Air Force Policy in the 1950S & 1960S
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors concerned and are not necessarily those held by the Royal Air Force Historical Society Copyright © Royal Air Force Historical Society, 1993 All rights reserved. 1 Copyright © 1993 by Royal Air Force Historical Society First published in the UK in 1993 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. Printed by Hastings Printing Company Limited Royal Air Force Historical Society 2 THE PROCEEDINGS OFTHE ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY Issue No 11 President: Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Michael Beetham GCB CBE DFC AFC Committee Chairman: Air Marshal Sir Frederick B Sowrey KCB CBE AFC General Secretary: Group Captain J C Ainsworth CEng MRAeS Membership Secretary: Commander P O Montgomery VRD RNR Treasurer: D Goch Esq FCCA Programme Air Vice-Marshal G P Black CB OBE AFC Sub-Committee: Air Vice-Marshal F D G Clark CBE BA Air Commodore J G Greenhill FBIM T C G James CMG MA *Group Captain I Madelin Air Commodore H A Probert MBE MA Group Captain A R Thompson MBE MPhil BA FBIM MIPM Members: A S Bennell Esq MA BLitt *Dr M A Fopp MA PhD FMA FBIM A E Richardson *Group Captain N E Taylor BSc D H Wood Comp RAeS * Ex-officio The General Secretary Regrettably our General Secretary of five years standing, Mr B R Jutsum, has found it necessary to resign from the post and the committee. -
India's Prospects in the Area of Ballistic Missile Defense
РАБОЧИЕ МАТЕРИАЛЫ WORKING PAPERS МОСКОВСКИЙ ЦЕНТР КАРНЕГИ CARNEGIE MOSCOW CENTER Petr toPychkanov IndIa’s ProsPects In the area of BallIstIc MIssIle defense: a regIonal securIty PersPectIve 32012 WORKING PAPERS № 3 • 2012 PETR TOPYCHKANOV INDIA’S PROSPECTS IN THE AREA OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: A REGIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE МОСКОВСКИЙ ЦЕНТР КАРНЕГИ CARNEGIE MOSCOW CENTER The Working Papers series was founded in 1999. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Carnegie Endowment or the Carnegie Moscow Center. Carnegie Moscow Center Russia, 125009 Moscow, Tverskaya ul., 16/2. Tel: +7 (495) 935-8904 Fax: +7 (495) 935-8906 E-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.carnegie.ru Electronic versions of all Carnegie Moscow Center publications may be found at: http://www.carnegie.ru The Carnegie Moscow Center is an independent public policy research institution that promotes intellectual collaboration among Russian and international scholars and policy experts and provides analysis on a wide range of political, economic, and social issues. The main vehicles for its work are its publications and seminars. Working Papers provide readers with access to the main current research on Russian and Eurasian domestic and foreign policy. The series includes intermediate results of research and articles for immediate release. You may send your comments to the email address above. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace or the Carnegie Moscow Center. The publication is distributed freeofcharge. -
Army Guide Monthly • Выпуск
Army G uide monthly # 12 (15) Декабрь 2005 Польский WZM-5 демонстрирует опытный образец бронетранспортера Irbis Финляндия готовится принять на вооружение AMOS Более 100 машин DURO будет поставлено Великобритании Разработки XM307 получают дополнительное финансирование Канадская Армия заказывает RG-31 с противоминной защитой Rheinmetall не будет поставлять вооружение для чешского бронетранспортера Украина подарила Ираку бронемашины и оружие 29 комплексов Тор-М1 для Ирака GIAT и KMW изучают возможность создания совместного танка Изготовлен опытный образец гусеничной машины SEP Aselsan продемонстрировала две новые танковые системы В Израиле продемонстрирована автономная неуправляемая машина Spotter FIAT представил внедорожник Oltre, базирующийся на армейском LMV ADI расширяет семейство машин Bushmaster 4x4 Поддержание спокойствия: Машины внутренней безопасности Снижение заметности как один из способов повышения защищенности бронетехники Франция экспортировала в 2004 году ВиВТ на сумму 7,1 млрд. евро Германская пехота получает БМП Puma Военное Применение Гибридных Электроприводов Чили закупит в Германии 100 танков Леопард-2 Дания заказала 45 гусеничных БМП CV-90, заказ может увеличиться до 1170 машин. www.army-guide.com Army Guide Monthly • #12 (15) • Декабрь 2005 ВПК ZSMU-1,27 Kobuz, разработанным фирмой Obrum, с Польский WZM-5 демонстрирует пулеметом WKM-B калибра 1,27 мм фирмы ZM опытный образец бронетранспортера Tarnow. Irbis также оснащен модульной системой Irbis внутренней связи Fonet, фирмы WB Electronics и цифровой системой связи и управления. Irbis имеет заднюю рампу с гидравлическим управлением оригинальной конструкци. Бронетранспортер может иметь защиту нескольких уровней. Он полностью плавающий и может перевозиться военно-транспортным самолетом C-130. Возможны три варианта корпуса, отличающиеся высотой: вариант низкого корпуса, соеднего - для некоторых исполнений машины, таких как командирская, и высокий вариант. -
ISSUE 5 AADH05 OFC+Spine.Indd 1 the Mortar Company
ARTILLERY AND AIR DEFENCE ARTILLERY ISSUE 5 HANDBOOK HANDBOOK – ISSUE 5 PUBLISHED MARCH 2018 THE CONCISE GLOBAL INDUSTRY GUIDE ARTILLERY AND AIR DEFENCE AADH05_OFC+spine.indd 1 3/16/2018 10:18:59 AM The Mortar Company. CONFRAG® CONTROLS – THE NEW HIGH EXPLOSIVE STANDARD HDS has developed CONFRAG® technology to increase the lethal performance of the stan- dard High Explosive granade for 60 mm CDO, 60 mm, 81 mm and 120 mm dramatically. The HE lethality is increased by controlling fragmentation mass and quantity, fragment velocity and fragment distribution, all controlled by CONFRAG® technology. hds.hirtenberger.com AADH05_IFC_Hirtenberger.indd 2 3/16/2018 9:58:03 AM CONTENTS Editor 3 Introduction Tony Skinner. [email protected] Grant Turnbull, Editor of Land Warfare International magazine, welcomes readers to Reference Editors Issue 5 of Shephard Media’s Artillery and Air Defence Handbook. Ben Brook. [email protected] 4 Self-propelled howitzers Karima Thibou. [email protected] A guide to self-propelled artillery systems that are under development, in production or being substantially modernised. Commercial Manager Peter Rawlins [email protected] 29 Towed howitzers Details of towed artillery systems that are under development, in production or Production and Circulation Manager David Hurst. being substantially modernised. [email protected] 42 Self-propelled mortars Production Elaine Effard, Georgina Kerridge Specifications for self-propelled mortar systems that are under development, in Georgina Smith, Adam Wakeling. production or being substantially modernised. Chairman Nick Prest 53 Towed mortars Descriptions of towed heavy mortar systems that are under development, in CEO Darren Lake production or being substantially modernised. -
Hezbollah's Missiles and Rockets
JULY 2017 CSIS BRIEFS CSIS Hezbollah’s Missiles and Rockets An Overview By Shaan Shaikh and Ian Williams JULY 2018 THE ISSUE Hezbollah is the world’s most heavily armed non-state actor, with a large and diverse stockpile of unguided artillery rockets, as well as ballistic, antiair, antitank, and antiship missiles. Hezbollah views its rocket and missile arsenal as its primary deterrent against Israeli military action, while also useful for quick retaliatory strikes and longer military engagements. Hezbollah’s unguided rocket arsenal has increased significantly since the 2006 Lebanon War, and the party’s increased role in the Syrian conflict raises concerns about its acquisition of more sophisticated standoff and precision-guided missiles, whether from Syria, Iran, or Russia. This brief provides a summary of the acquisition history, capabilities, and use of these forces. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & middle east INTERNATIONAL STUDIES program CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 1 ezbollah is a Lebanese political party public source information and does not cover certain topics and militant group with close ties to such as rocket strategies, evolution, or storage locations. Iran and Syria’s Assad regime. It is the This brief instead focuses on the acquisition history, world’s most heavily armed non-state capabilities, and use of these forces. actor—aptly described as “a militia trained like an army and equipped LAND ATTACK MISSILES AND ROCKETS like a state.”1 This is especially true Hwith regard to its missile and rocket forces, which Hezbollah 107 AND 122 MM KATYUSHA ROCKETS has arrayed against Israel in vast quantities. The party’s arsenal is comprised primarily of small, man- portable, unguided artillery rockets. -
General Assembly Distr.: General 31 July 2001 English Original: Arabic/English/French/ Russian/Spanish
United Nations A/56/257 General Assembly Distr.: General 31 July 2001 English Original: Arabic/English/French/ Russian/Spanish Fifty-sixth session Item 85 (s) of the provisional agenda* General and complete disarmament: transparency in armaments United Nations Register of Conventional Arms Report of the Secretary-General** Contents Paragraphs Page I. Introduction .......................................................... 1–10 2 II. Information received from Governments................................... 11–12 4 A. Composite table of replies of Governments ...................................... 5 B. Replies received from Governments ............................................ 8 III. Index of background information provided by Governments for the calendar year 2000 ...... 60 IV. Information received from Governments on military holdings and procurement through national production .............................................................. 63 Annex Views received from Governments in accordance with paragraph 5 (a) of General Assembly resolution 55/33 U .............................................................. 103 * A/56/150. ** Finalization of the present report was dependent on the receipt of a substantial number of submissions by Governments. 01-49573 (E) 200901 *0149573* A/56/257 I. Introduction 1. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 46/36 L of 9 December 1991, on transparency in armaments, the Secretary-General, on 1 January 1992, established the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. In that resolution, the -
Avoiding Another War Between Israel and Hezbollah
COUNTING THE COST Avoiding Another War between Israel and Hezbollah By Nicholas Blanford and Assaf Orion “He who wishes to fight must first count the cost.” Sun Tzu, The Art of War ABOUT THE SCOWCROFT MIDDLE EAST SECURITY INITIATIVE The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative honors the legacy of Brent Scowcroft and his tireless efforts to build a new security architecture for the region. Our work in this area addresses the full range of security threats and challenges including the danger of interstate warfare, the role of terrorist groups and other nonstate actors, and the underlying security threats facing countries in the region. Through all of the Council’s Middle East programming, we work with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region. You can read more about our programs at www.atlanticcouncil.org/ programs/middle-east-programs/. May 2020 ISBN-13: 978-1-61977-099-7 This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. This report is made possible by general support to the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. COUNTING THE COST Avoiding Another War between Israel and Hezbollah CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................2 -
Iran's Compliance with UNSCR 2231
Iran’s Compliance with UNSCR 2231 Alleged Violations Must Be Addressed Valerie Lincy IRAN WATCH REPORT Behnam Ben Taleblu August 2017 1 Executive Summary UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231 implements the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran and imposes missile- and arms-related restrictions. Little-noticed biannual reporting by the UN Secretary General alleges that Iran is repeatedly violating these non-nuclear provisions. Thus far, the United States has responded to such violations with sanctions and designations of Iranian and foreign entities supporting Tehran’s ballistic missile development. However, the UN and its member states have not responded. More must be done to investigate allegations of noncompliance and to punish violations of the resolution. The Challenge of Responding to Alleged Violations of UNSCR 2231 On July 27, Iran tested its Simorgh satellite launch vehicle from a newly inaugurated space center.1 In response, the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom addressed a letter to the UN Security Council calling the test “a threatening and provocative step” and “inconsistent” with UNSCR 2231, which codifies the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal.2 The countries expressed alarm over Iran’s satellite launch vehicle test because it could help extend the range of Tehran’s nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. The Simorgh test is only the latest example of Tehran’s defiance of ballistic missile restrictions set forth in Annex B of UNSCR 2231. According to a June 20 report by the UN Secretary General,3 Iran may have violated the prescribed limitations on arms imports and exports and ballistic missile testing, as well as entity-specific prohibitions on multiple occasions.