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PRECISION GUIDED MISSILES in 4Are Section Presented Data the Re for Analysis There Are 36Types Selected 1 REVISTA Militară. STUDII DE Securitate și Apărare PRECISION GUIDED MISSILES: ANALYSIS Veaceslav PERJU1 The general data are presented related to the certain types of the precision guided missiles (PGMs) produced in China, India, Israel, Russia, Turkey and USA. The analysis of PGMs was made concerning the guidance technologies, range of activity, destination, platform launch, speed and precision of target hitting. Keywords: precision, guidance, missile, range, destination, platform, launch, target, hitting. INTODUCTION In section 4 are presented the data re- Precision guided missiles (PGMs) rep- garding the destination of the PGMs. The resents one of the key modern military PGMs were classified in the following technology in many countries due to ability groups: anti-air, anti-ground targets, anti- to destroy the targets with great accuracy, ships, anti-submarines and anti-tanks. It to avoid a collateral damage, to minimize was determined the percentage of the civilian and military casualties. PGMs of different groups. The PGMs can solve tactical, operation- In section 5 there were determined the al-tactical, operational and strategic objec- main kinds of the PGMs launching plat- tives. Forces with high precision weapons forms: air launched – from aircrafts and and delivery systems for them become the helicopters; ship-launched; submarine- main factor of deterring large-scale con- launched and land - launched. It was deter- flicts and local wars. mined the percentage of the different kinds In section 1 of the article are presented of the used launching platforms. the general data of some types of the PGMs In section 6 was determined of the tar- produced in China, India, Israel, Russia, gets accessing time based on the speed of Turkey and USA. the PGMs and their range of activity. In section 2 there were determined the In section 7 is described the PGM’ pre- guidance technologies (GT) used in PGMs - cision of the target hitting (PTH). As metric TV, Radio, Wire, Radar, Laser, Satellite, of PTH was used Circular Error Probability Inertial, Digital Scene Matching Area Cor- (CEP). It was determined the diapason of relation (DSMAC) and Thermal/Infrared the CEP for PGMs of different operational technologies. It was established the fre- range and guidance technologies. GEOPOLITICĂ quency of using the GT in PGMs and of the ȘI 1. THE GENERAL DATA OF THE number of GT used in one PGM. PRECISION GUIDED MISSILES In section 3 are described the categories of the PGMs depending of their range of For analysis there are selected 36 types activity: of short, medium and long range. of the precision guided missiles, produced It was determined the percentage of the in China, India, Israel, Russia, Turkey and \ SECURITATE PGMs of different categories. USA (Table 1). The general data of the 6 1 Veaceslav PERJU, doctor habilitate, Armed Forces Military Academy, Republic of Moldova. REVISTA Militară. NR. 1 (21) / 2019 described PGMs are presented in the Table nologies, range of activity, weight-diam- A1 (Annex 1). eter-length parameters, destination, plat- The analysis shows that the PGMs are form launch, speed and precision of the characterized by different guidance tech- target hitting. Table 1. PGMs by countries and types Nr. Country Types/references 1. China CHETA HY-1/HY-2/HY-4/C-611 Silkworm [11,35,36]; CHETA KD-63 [11, 37]; CHETA YJ-8/YJ-81/C-801, YJ-82/C-802 and YJ-83/C-803 [10, 11, 38]; HN-1/2/3 [13, 39]; 2. India 3K-55/3M-55/Kh-61 Yakhont/PJ-10 Brahmos A/S [9, 11, 40] 3. India and Novator 3M-54 Club/Kalibr[11, 41] China 4. Israel LAHAT [17, 19, 42, 43] 5. Russia Kh-31P/A/MP/MA [11, 15, 44]; Kornet-EM [12, 45]; Palma/Sosna [12, 46, 47]; Raduga3M-80, 3M-82 and Kh-41 Moskit[11, 48, 49]; Raduga Kh-22M Burya[11, 50, 51]; Raduga Kh-55/55M/SM Kent [11, 16, 52]; Raduga Kh-59/59M/D Ovod[11, 53]; Ugroza[19, 54]; 9K111 Fagot [26, 27]; 9K114 Shturm[28, 29]; 9K115 Metis M1 [30-32]; 9K720 Iskander[33, 34]; 9M113M Konkurs[14, 55] 6. Turkey Cirit [19, 56] 7. USA AGM-65B/H/J/KMaverick[5, 19, 20]; AGM-65D/F/G Maverick [57]; AGM-84Harpoon [11, 58, 59]; AGM-86C CALCM [20, 60, 61]; AGM-88 HARM [7, 19, 62]; AGM-114 Hellfire[2, 19, 63]; AGM-123 Skipper II [3, 19, 64]; AGM-142 series [4, 11, 65]; AGM-158 JASSM [3, 20, 66, 67]; APKWS [1, 8, 19, 68, 69]; BGM-71 TOW [22, 23]; BGM-109 Tomahawk [20, 70, 71]; FGM-148 Javelin [24, 25]; MGM-140 ATACMS [18, 72]; SLAM/SLAM-ER [6, 20, 21, 73] 2. THE GUIDANCE TECHNOLOGIES used the Radar and Inertial technologies – USED IN PGMs every of them in 12 PGMs (17,4%). Follows the Thermal/Infrared technol- GEOPOLITICĂ In the Table 2 are described the guid- ogies – in 10 PGMs (14,5%), Laser and Sat- ȘI ance technologies used in PGMs, such as TV, Radio, Wire, Radar, Laser, Satellite, ellite technologies – in 9 PGMs (13,1%) of Inertial, Digital Scene Matching Area Cor- each, TV technologies – in 7 PGMs (10%), relation (DSMAC) and Thermal/Infrared DSMAC technologies – in 5 PGMs (7,3%), technologies. Wire technologies – in 4 PGMs (5,8%) and The analysis of the data shows, that in Radio technologies – in 1 PGM (1,4%). the guidance systems most frequently are \ SECURITATE 7 REVISTA Militară. STUDII DE Securitate și Apărare Table 2. PGMs guidance technologies Guidance PGMs PGM’ nr in Table A1 PGM’ kind technology Nr % 1. Radar 3,5,6,13,15, 12 17,4 AGM-84, AGM-88 HARM, AGM- 114 Hellfire, CHETA HY-1/HY-2/ 19,23,25,26, HY-4/C-611 Silkworm, CHETA YJ-8/ YJ-81/C-801, YJ-82/C-802 and YJ- 27,28,31 83/C-803, Kh-31P/A/MP/MA, Nova- tor 3M-54 Club/Kalibr, Raduga 3M- 80, 3M-82 and Kh-41 Moskit, Raduga Kh-22M Burya, Raduga Kh-55/55M/ SM Kent, Raduga Kh-59/59M/D Ovod, 3K-55/3M-55/Kh-61 Yakhont/ PJ-10 Brahmos A/S 2. Inertial 4,9,12,15,18,22,23,25, 12 17,4 AGM-86C CALCM, AGM-158 JASSM, BGM-109 Tomahawk, CHE- 27,29,31,35 TA YJ-8/YJ-81/C-801, YJ-82/C-802 and YJ-83/C-803, HN-1/2/3, M-39 ATACMS, Novator 3M-54 Club/ Kalibr, Raduga 3M-80, 3M-82 and Kh-41 Moskit, Raduga Kh-55/55M/ SM Kent, SLAM and SLAM-ER, 3K-55/3M-55/Kh-61 Yakhont/PJ-10 Brahmos A/S, 9K720 Iskander 3. Thermal/ 2,8,9,10,13, 10 14,5 AGM-65D/F/G Maverick, AGM-142 Infrared series, AGM-158 JASSM, APKWS, 17,20,24, CHETA HY-1/HY-2/HY-4/C-611 Silk- worm, FGM-148 Javelin, Kornet-EM, 28,29 Palma/ Sosna, Raduga Kh-59/59M/D Ovod, SLAM and SLAM-ER 4. Laser 2,6,7,10,16,20,21,24,30 9 13,1 AGM-65D/F/G Maverick, AGM- 114 Hellfire, AGM-123 Skipper II, APKWS, Cirit, Kornet-EM, LAHAT, Palma/ Sosna, Ugroza 5. Satellite 4,9,12,18,22,23,29,31,35 9 13,1 AGM-86C CALCM, AGM-158 JASSM, BGM-109 Tomahawk, HN- 1/2/3, M-39 ATACMS, Novator 3M- 54 Club/Kalibr, SLAM and SLAM- ER, 3K-55/3M-55/Kh-61 Yakhont/ PJ-10 Brahmos A/S, 9K720 Iskander GEOPOLITICĂ 6. TV 1,8,11,13,14,20,24 7 10 AGM-65B/H/J/KMaverick, AGM-142 ȘI series, BGM-71 TOW, CHETA HY-1/ HY-2/HY-4/C-611 Silkworm, CHETA KD-63, Kornet-EM, Palma/Sosna 7. DSMAC 12,18,27,29,35 5 7,3 BGM-109 Tomahawk, HN-1/2/3, Raduga Kh-55/55M/SM Kent, SLAM and SLAM-ER, 9K720 Iskander 8. Wire 11,32,34,36 4 5,8 BGM-71 TOW, 9K111 Fagot, 9K115 \ SECURITATE Metis M1, 9M113M Konkurs 9. Radio 34 1 1,4 9K115 Metis M1 8 Total PGMs 69 100 REVISTA Militară. NR. 1 (21) / 2019 Number of Guidance Technologies only one GT, in 10 PGMs (27,8%) are using (GT) used in one PGM vary from 1 until 2 GT, in 10 PGMs (27,8%) are using 3 GT, 4 (Table 3). In 15 PGMs (41,7%) is using and only in 1 PGM (2,7%) are using 4 GT. Table 3. Number of guidance technologies used in PGM Nr of used Total PGM’ nr in guidance PGMs PGM’ kind Table A1 technologies Nr % 1 1, 3, 5, 7, 14, 15 41,7 AGM-65B/H/J/KMaverick, AGM-84, AGM-88 16, 17, 19, HARM, AGM-123 Skipper II, CHETA KD-63, 21, 26, 30, Cirit, FGM-148 Javelin, Kh-31P/A/MP/MA, LA- 32, 33, 34, HAT, Raduga Kh-22M Burya, Ugroza, 9K111 Fag- 36 ot, 9K114 Shturm, 9K115 Metis M1, 9M113M Konkurs 2 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 10 27,8 AGM-65D/F/G Maverick, AGM-86C CALCM, 11, 15, 22, AGM-114 Hellfire,AGM-142 series, APKWS, 25, 28 BGM-71 TOW, CHETA YJ-8/YJ-81/C-801, YJ- 82/C-802 and YJ-83/C-803, M-39 ATACMS, Ra- duga 3M-80, 3M-82 and Kh-41 Moskit, Raduga Kh-59/59M/D Ovod 3 9, 12, 13, 18, 10 27,8 AGM-158 JASSM, BGM-109 Tomahawk, CHETA 20, 23, 24, HY-1/HY-2/HY-4/C-611 Silkworm, HN-1/2/3, 27, 31, 35 Kornet-EM, Novator 3M-54 Club/Kalibr, Palma/ Sosna, Raduga Kh-55/55M/SM Kent, 3K- 55/3M-55/Kh-61 Yakhont/PJ-10 Brahmos A/S, 9K720 Iskander 4 29 1 2,7 SLAM and SLAM-ER 36 100 3.
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