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Deals with Deliveries Or Orders Made for 1950 to 2017

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Deals with Deliveries Or Orders Made for 1950 to 2017 Transfers of major weapons: Deals with deliveries or orders made for 1950 to 2017 Note: The ÔNo. deliveredÕ and the ÔYear(s) of deliveriesÕ columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. The ÔCommentsÕ column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/sources-and-methods>. Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database Information generated: 08 May 2018 Year(s) Recipient/ No. Weapon Weapon Year of No. supplier (S) ordered designation description of order delivery delivered Comments Poland S: Soviet Union (100) Yak-23 Fighter aircraft (1950) 1950-1951 (100) Second-hand (but not more than 1-2 years old); probably aid Czechoslovakia (600) OT-62A TOPAS APC (1964) 1966-1968 (600) Incl production of components in Poland; incl WPT- Topas ARV version Russia (77) T-72 Tank (1978) 1992-1995 (77) Ordered from Soviet Union and produced under Russian licence after break-up of Soviet Union (10) V-46 Diesel engine (1988) 1992-1996 (10) For WZT-3 ARV produced in Poland 10 M28B Bryza-1R MP aircraft (1992) 1992-2001 (10) 12 An-28TD Bryza-1TD Light transport ac 2001 2001-2004 (12) Soviet Union (277) MiG-15 Fighter aircraft (1950) 1951-1954 (277) Incl assembly/production in Poland as LIM-1 (1000) T-34-85 Tank (1950) 1951-1954 (1000) 500 MiG-15bis Fighter aircraft (1952) 1953-1955 (500) Incl assembly/production in Poland as LIM-2 (337) MiG-17 Fighter aircraft 1952 1956-1960 (337) Polish designation Lim-5M (100) Mi-1 Light helicopter (1953) 1956-1960 (100) Polish designation SM-1 (70) MiG-15UTI Trainer aircraft (1953) 1953-1955 (70) Incl assembly/production in Poland as LIM-3 or SBLIM-1 (1500) T-54 Tank (1953) 1954-1964 (1500) 12 Project-254/T-43 Minesweeper (1955) 1957-1962 12 Polish designation Zubr 239 MiG-17PF Fighter aircraft (1957) 1959-1961 (239) Polish designation Lim-5P and Lim-6bis/R 133 An-2 Light transport ac 1960 1962-1979 133 (1500) T-55 Tank (1963) 1964-1978 (1500) 317 Mi-2 Light helicopter 1964 1965-1984 (317) Incl Mi-2RM naval and Mi-2URN/US/URP armed versions (100) BTS ARV (1969) 1971-1978 (100) Polish designation WZT-1 (10000) Strela-2/SA-7 Portable SAM (1969) 1972-1990 (10000) Incl for use on helicopters and SA-N-5 naval version; Polish designation Strzala-2M (533) 2S1 122mm Self-propelled gun (1970) 1971-1991 (533) Most produced in Poland (682) T-72 Tank (1976) 1979-1991 (682) Most assembled/produced in Poland; T-72B and T- 72G version; more produced under Russian licence after break-up of Soviet Union (700) MT-LB APC (1980) 1980-1990 (700) (10) V-46 Diesel engine (1988) 1989-1991 (10) For WZT-3 ARV produced in Poland Czechoslovakia (1000) Tatra-928 Diesel engine 1959 1964-1973 (1000) For OT-64A/C (SKOT(SKOT-2) APC produced in Poland (111) DANA 152mm Self-propelled gun (1982) 1982-1984 (111) Polish designation M-77 (30) RM-70 122mm Self-propelled MRL (1985) 1986 (30) Czech Republic (48) M601 Turboprop 1991 1993-1996 (48) For 48 PZL-130 trainer aircraft produced in Poland; M601D version; ordered from Czechoslovakia and delivered from Czech Republic after 1992 break- up of Czechoslovakia 10 MiG-29 Fighter aircraft 1995 1995-1996 10 Second-hand; exchanged for 11 W-3 helicopters; incl 1 MiG-29UB version 1 Z-142/Z-242L Trainer aircraft (2012) 2013 1 Z-242L version 2 Z-143L Light aircraft (2012) 2013 (2) For training; Z-143Lis version Lithuania 1 Mi-8MT/Mi-17 Transport helicopter (2001) 2002 1 Second-hand; Mi-8MTV-1 version; partly financed by Polish oil company Russia 3 MR-123/Bass Tilt Fire control radar (1988) 1992-1994 (3) For 3 Sassnitz (Orkan) FAC from in FRG (originally ordered from GDR before German unification); probably ordered from Soviet Union and delivered from Russia after break-up of Soviet Union 3 AK-176 76mm Naval gun (1989) 1992-1995 3 For 3 Sassnitz (Orkan) FAC from in FRG (originally ordered from GDR before German unification); probably ordered from Soviet Union and delivered from Russia after break-up of Soviet Union 3 AK-630 30mm Naval gun (1989) 1992-1995 3 For 3 Sassnitz (Orkan) FAC from in FRG (originally ordered from GDR before German unification); probably ordered from Soviet Union and delivered from Russia after break-up of Soviet Union 9 M-520 Diesel engine (1989) 1992-1995 9 For 3 Sassnitz (Orkan) FAC from in FRG (originally ordered from GDR before German unification); probably ordered from Soviet Union and delivered from Russia after break-up of Soviet Union 4 An-28TD Bryza-1TD Light transport ac (1993) 1994-1996 (4) Incl 2 M-28M version also used for MP 7 Mi-8MT/Mi-17 Transport helicopter (2006) 2008 7 Second-hand (modernized in Poland after delivery) 5 Mi-8MT/Mi-17 Transport helicopter 2010 2010-2011 5 Armed Mi-17-1V version; for use in Afghanistan Soviet Union (300) Il-10 Sturmovik Ground attack ac (1949) 1950-1953 (300) Most B-33 version from Czechoslovakian production line 3 Yak-17 Fighter aircraft (1949) 1950 3 11 Yak-17UTI Trainer aircraft (1949) 1950 11 (18) An-2 Light transport ac (1950) 1951-1956 18 100 M-1943 160mm Mortar (1950) 1950-1951 (100) Possibly Second-hand (280) M-30 122mm Towed gun (1950) 1950-1960 (280) May incl assembly/production in Poland (400) BTR-152 APC (1951) 1952-1955 (400) (400) BTR-40 APC (1951) 1952-1955 (400) (12) Yak-12 Light aircraft (1951) 1951 (12) Polish designation Jak-12 4 B-34 L/56 100mm Naval gun (1952) 1955 (4) For modernization of 1 Wicher destroyer (100) MiG-17 Fighter aircraft (1952) 1954-1955 (100) (50) Mi-4A Helicopter (1953) 1954-1955 (50) (5) M-XV Type Submarine (1953) 1954-1955 (5) Second-hand (but only 1-3 years old); Polish designation Kaszub (40) Yak-11 Trainer aircraft (1953) 1954-1955 (40) (12) Il-14 Transport aircraft (1954) 1955-1956 (12) (12) MiG-17PF Fighter aircraft (1954) 1955 (12) 4 Project-122/Kronstadt Patrol craft (1954) 1955 4 Polish designation Czujny (80) Il-28 Bomber aircraft (1955) 1955-1957 (80) Incl some Il-28U trainer version 20 Project-183/P-6 FAC (1955) 1956-1958 (20) (300) PT-76 Light tank (1955) 1957-1958 (300) (1500) K-5/AA-1 SRAAM (1956) 1957-1961 (1500) For MiG-19PM and MiG-17 combat aircraft 24 MiG-19 Fighter aircraft (1956) 1957-1958 24 4 Project-122/Kronstadt Patrol craft (1956) 1957 4 Polish designation Czujny (20) SM-4-1B 130mm Towed gun (1956) 1957-1958 (20) (100) SON-9/Fire Can Fire control radar (1956) 1956-1965 (100) For use with S-60 57mm and KS-19 100mm AA guns (5) Top Bow Fire control radar (1956) 1957-1958 (5) For use with SM-4-1 130mm guns (200) BTR-50 APC (1957) 1959-1962 (200) 13 Il-14 Transport aircraft (1957) 1958-1959 13 Il-14P version from GDR production line 11 MiG-19PM Fighter aircraft 1957 1958 11 2 Skory Destroyer (1957) 1957-1958 2 Second-hand; Polish designation Grom 129 ZSU-57-2 SPAAG (1957) 1957-1961 (129) (20) 8K11/Scud-A TEL Mobile SSM launcher (1960) 1961-1962 (20) Incl for missiles with nuclear warheads (under Soviet control) (50) BM-14 140mm Self-propelled MRL (1960) 1961-1962 (50) (50) BM-24 240mm Self-propelled MRL (1960) 1961-1965 50 (5) Il-18 Transport aircraft (1960) 1961-1966 5 Il-18B version (1750) K-13A/AA-2 SRAAM (1960) 1961-1967 (1750) For MiG-21 combat aircraft (140) MiG-21F-13 Fighter aircraft (1960) 1961-1964 (140) MiG-21F-13 version; incl MiG-21U trainer version (80) R-11/Scud-A SSM (1960) 1961-1962 (80) Incl for use with Soviet nuclear warheads (under Soviet control) (800) BRDM-1 Reconnaissance AV 1961 1961-1964 (800) 4 Project-613/Whiskey Submarine (1961) 1962-1965 (4) Second-hand; Polish designation Orzel Class (500) 3M6 Shmel/AT-1 Anti-tank missile (1962) 1962-1963 (500) For 9P27 (BRDM-1) tank destroyer (100) BRDM-1 Tank destroyer (1962) 1962-1965 (100) 9P27 and 9P110 versions (15) Luna/FROG Mobile SSM launcher (1962) 1963-1964 (15) Incl for missiles with nuclear warheads (under Soviet control) 40 S-75 Dvina/SA-2 SAM system (1962) 1963-1966 (40) (1000) V-750/SA-2 SAM (1962) 1963-1966 (1000) (500) 3M11/AT-2a Anti-tank missile (1963) 1964-1965 (500) (31) ASU-85 Self-propelled gun (1963) 1965 (31) (150) KS-1/AS-1 Anti-ship missile (1963) 1963-1965 (150) S-2 (SS-C-2b Samlet) coast defence version (100) P-15/SS-N-2A Anti-ship missile (1963) 1963-1965 (100) For Project-205 (Osa) FAC 13 Project-205/Osa FAC (1963) 1963-1965 (13) Osa-1 version (9) SS-C-2 CDS Coast defence system 1963 1963-1965 (9) 6 Su-7B FGA aircraft (1963) 1964 6 Su-7BM version (250) K-13A/AA-2 SRAAM (1964) 1964-1972 (250) For Su-7B combat aircraft (190) MiG-21PF Fighter aircraft (1964) 1964-1969 (190) MiG-21PF and MiG-21PFM versions; incl MiG- 21US trainer version (80) R-17 Elbrus/Scud-B SSM (1964) 1964-1965 (80) Incl for use with Soviet nuclear warheads (under Soviet control) (2) An-12 Transport aircraft (1965) 1966 (2) 6 An-24 Transport aircraft (1965) 1966-1970 6 (58) Mi-8T Transport helicopter (1965) 1967-1983 58 12 Su-7B FGA aircraft (1965) 1966 12 Su-7BK version (16) 9P117/Scud-B TEL Mobile SSM launcher (1967) 1967-1968 (16) Incl for missiles with nuclear warheads (under Soviet control) 4 Su-7B FGA aircraft (1967) 1968-1969 4 Su-7BK version; incl 2 Su-7U trainer version (87) ZSU-23-4 Shilka SPAAG (1967) 1968-1971 (87) (228) BM-21 Grad 122mm Self-propelled MRL (1968) 1968-1972 (228) (510) BRDM-2 Reconnaissance AV (1968) 1969-1976 (510) Incl some with AT-3 anti-tank missiles (150) K-13A/AA-2 SRAAM (1968) 1968-1970 (150) For MiG-21RF reconnaissance aircraft (225) MiG-21MF Fighter aircraft (1968) 1968-1981 (225) MiG-21M, MiG-21MF and MiG-21MF-75, MiG- 21UM trainer and MiG-21R
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