DOCSLIB.ORG

Front Cover, TOC, Markings, Terms, Safety

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Front Cover, TOC, Markings, Terms, Safety This guide provides information to facilitate international unexploded ordnance (UXO) awareness and identification. This guide is not intended for use by Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technicians. Rather, it is designed for other personnel who, of necessity, are trying to identify ordnance in the absence of trained EOD military professionals. Prepared By: Naval Explosive Ordnance Volume 1 of 2 Disposal Technology Division 18 August 2004 Indian Head, Maryland DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. - 1 - TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Projectile ............................................................................................34 Miscellaneous Information ...................................................................3 Grenade .............................................................................................36 Disclaimer/Warning .............................................................................3 Fuze ...................................................................................................38 Contact Information .............................................................................3 Rocket ...............................................................................................39 Guided Missile ...................................................................................40 Language Identification Chart Landmine ...........................................................................................42 .............................................................................................................4 Naval Mine .........................................................................................45 Depth Charge, Sound Signal & Marker .............................................47 Soviet Ordnance Terms Scatterable ........................................................................................48 Transliteration of Russian Alphabet .....................................................7 Ammunition Filler Codes .....................................................................8 Ordnance Information Pages General Ordnance Markings ...............................................................9 Projectile Suffixes ..............................................................................10 Volume 1 Soviet Projectile Weight Classifications .............................................10 Bombs ........................................................................................ 1 – 25 Caliber of using weapons identified by third- Dispensers, Clusters & Launchers ............................................. 1 – 20 component numbers of the model code. ........................................11 Projectiles ................................................................................. 1 – 131 Model Markings for Mines .................................................................11 Volume 2 Typical Mine Markings .......................................................................12 Fuze/Firing Devices ....................................................................1 – 93 Typical Bomb Markings .....................................................................12 Grenades .................................................................................... 1 – 12 Foreign Projectile Terms Rockets .......................................................................................1 – 39 Russian ..............................................................................................13 Guided Missiles .......................................................................... 1 – 25 Arabic ................................................................................................16 Landmines .................................................................................. 1 – 40 Chinese .............................................................................................22 Pyrotechnics ..................................................................................1 – 5 Markings Improvised Explosive Devices .......................................................1 – 2 Alphanumeric markings .....................................................................25 Misc Explosive Devices .................................................................1 – 5 Graphic Symbols ...............................................................................29 Depth Charge or Other Underwater ..............................................1 – 1 Map of Afghanistan ............................................................................30 Scatterable ................................................................................. 1 – 14 Safety and General Information Bomb .................................................................................................31 Dispenser ..........................................................................................33 - 2 - INTRODUCTION MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION This guide provides ordnance identification information for over 800 ordnance items. The Afghanistan Ordnance Identification Guide provides information to facilitate international unexploded ordnance (UXO) awareness and identification. This guide is not intended for use by Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technicians. Rather, it is designed for other personnel who, of necessity, are trying to identify ordnance in the absence of trained EOD military professionals. • Each weapon category is sorted by diameter (mm). • Due to space restrictions, a maximum of seven (7) "ordnance used with" entries will be shown. On certain ordnance this list will be incomplete. • If available, the N.E.W. (Net Explosive Weight) is listed underneath the "ordnance used with" section. DISCLAIMER/WARNING Demining/unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance operations are extremely hazardous and subject personnel involved to significant risk of serious injury or death. By its very nature, UXO is unpredictable and each incident presents unique problems that cannot be addressed in a general guide. While this product provides the best available information for identification of ordnance, the developers accept no legal responsibility for damage or injury to personnel or property resulting from its use. The safe and effective use of the information in this guide assumes a certain level of technical competence in its target audience. At a minimum, users must be trained in general ordnance explosive safety and demolition procedures. Use this information at your own risk! CONTACT INFORMATION EOD Technical Support Center: 1-877-EOD-INFO (363-4636) COMM: 301-744-4069/4070/4071/4072/4076 or DSN 354-XXXX Internet web page: https://naveodtechdiv.navsea.navy.mil SIPRNET: http://tsc.jeodnet.smil.mil Please send comments and suggestions to: [email protected] - 3 - LANGUAGE IDENTIFICATION CHART - 4 - LANGUAGE IDENTIFICATION CHART - 5 - LANGUAGE IDENTIFICATION CHART - 6 - SOVIET ORDNANCE TERMS Transliteration of Russian Alphabet - 7 - SOVIET ORDNANCE TERMS Ammunition Filler Codes - 8 - SOVIET ORDNANCE TERMS General Ordnance Markings - 9 - SOVIET ORDNANCE TERMS Projectile Suffixes Soviet Projectile Weight Classifications - 10 - SOVIET ORDNANCE TERMS Caliber of using weapons identified by third- Model Markings for Mines component numbers of the model code. - 11 - SOVIET ORDNANCE TERMS Typical Mine Markings Typical Bomb Markings - 12 - FOREIGN ORDNANCE TERMS Russian - 13 - FOREIGN ORDNANCE TERMS Russian - continued - 14 - FOREIGN ORDNANCE TERMS Russian - continued - 15 - FOREIGN ORDNANCE TERMS Arabic - 16 - FOREIGN ORDNANCE TERMS Arabic - continued - 17 - FOREIGN ORDNANCE TERMS Arabic - continued - 18 - FOREIGN ORDNANCE TERMS Arabic - continued - 19 - FOREIGN ORDNANCE TERMS Arabic - continued - 20 - FOREIGN ORDNANCE TERMS Arabic - continued - 21 - FOREIGN ORDNANCE TERMS Chinese - 22 - FOREIGN ORDNANCE TERMS Chinese - continued - 23 - FOREIGN ORDNANCE TERMS Chinese - continued - 24 - MARKINGS Below is a list of common alphanumeric markings that may be found on Alphanumeric ordnance. Country Markings CAA CHINA Alphanumeric SINGAPORE Country CIS Markings CSA CHINA 9M USSR CSS CHINA AA USSR CSSC CHINA AK NETHERLANDS DM GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC POST WWII) AMA DENMARK DM GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC POST WWII) DYNAMITE AMC FRANCE GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC POST WWII) APX FRANCE NOBEL ARF ITALY EAB FRANCE ARGES AUSTRIA ECIA SPAIN ARS FRANCE ECN FRANCE AS FRANCE ECP FRANCE AS USSR EF SINGAPORE ASS FRANCE EHD BELGIUM AT USSR EM CHINA ATM NORTH KOREA ET CHINA AZDM GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC POST WWII) ET USSR AZZ GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC POST WWII) EURO NETHERLANDS BAE UNITED KINGDOM EVR CZECHOSLOVAKIA BCK GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC POST WWII) F CHILE BCK GERMANY (PRE WWII) F SWEDEN BK USSR F USSR BL FRANCE FAB USSR BMP BELGIUM FB CHILE BPD ITALY FB ITALY BR SPAIN FERRANTI UNITED KINGDOM BR USSR FFR SWEDEN BRP SPAIN FFV SWEDEN BT FRANCE FL NETHERLANDS C CANADA FMK ARGENTINA - 25 - MARKINGS Alphanumeric Alphanumeric Country Country Markings Markings FN BELGIUM M SWEDEN FROG USSR M SWEDEN FrSv CZECHOSLOVAKIA M YUGOSLAVIA FUI FRANCE M.Md1 FRANCE GIAT FRANCE MA BELGIUM gts CZECHOSLOVAKIA MA NETHERLANDS H FRANCE MAUSER GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC POST WWII) HBS UNITED KINGDOM MCR BELGIUM HGC IRAQ MDH VIETNAM HGE IRAQ MK FRANCE HE IRAQ MK ISRAEL HP AUSTRIA MK ITALY IMB UNITED KINGDOM MK PAKISTAN IMI ISRAEL MK SWEDEN JNS NETHERLANDS MK UNITED KINGDOM KAAKAA EGYPT MKE TURKEY KB YUGOSLAVIA MKS ISRAEL KV/YU YUGOSLAVIA MKS UNITED KINGDOM KY/KU YUGOSLAVIA
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Hezbollah's Missiles and Rockets
    JULY 2017 CSIS BRIEFS CSIS Hezbollah’s Missiles and Rockets An Overview By Shaan Shaikh and Ian Williams JULY 2018 THE ISSUE Hezbollah is the world’s most heavily armed non-state actor, with a large and diverse stockpile of unguided artillery rockets, as well as ballistic, antiair, antitank, and antiship missiles. Hezbollah views its rocket and missile arsenal as its primary deterrent against Israeli military action, while also useful for quick retaliatory strikes and longer military engagements. Hezbollah’s unguided rocket arsenal has increased significantly since the 2006 Lebanon War, and the party’s increased role in the Syrian conflict raises concerns about its acquisition of more sophisticated standoff and precision-guided missiles, whether from Syria, Iran, or Russia. This brief provides a summary of the acquisition history, capabilities, and use of these forces. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & middle east INTERNATIONAL STUDIES program CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 1 ezbollah is a Lebanese political party public source information and does not cover certain topics and militant group with close ties to such as rocket strategies, evolution, or storage locations. Iran and Syria’s Assad regime. It is the This brief instead focuses on the acquisition history, world’s most heavily armed non-state capabilities, and use of these forces. actor—aptly described as “a militia trained like an army and equipped LAND ATTACK MISSILES AND ROCKETS like a state.”1 This is especially true Hwith regard to its missile and rocket forces, which Hezbollah 107 AND 122 MM KATYUSHA ROCKETS has arrayed against Israel in vast quantities. The party’s arsenal is comprised primarily of small, man- portable, unguided artillery rockets.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Compliance with UNSCR 2231
    Iran’s Compliance with UNSCR 2231 Alleged Violations Must Be Addressed Valerie Lincy IRAN WATCH REPORT Behnam Ben Taleblu August 2017 1 Executive Summary UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231 implements the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran and imposes missile- and arms-related restrictions. Little-noticed biannual reporting by the UN Secretary General alleges that Iran is repeatedly violating these non-nuclear provisions. Thus far, the United States has responded to such violations with sanctions and designations of Iranian and foreign entities supporting Tehran’s ballistic missile development. However, the UN and its member states have not responded. More must be done to investigate allegations of noncompliance and to punish violations of the resolution. The Challenge of Responding to Alleged Violations of UNSCR 2231 On July 27, Iran tested its Simorgh satellite launch vehicle from a newly inaugurated space center.1 In response, the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom addressed a letter to the UN Security Council calling the test “a threatening and provocative step” and “inconsistent” with UNSCR 2231, which codifies the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal.2 The countries expressed alarm over Iran’s satellite launch vehicle test because it could help extend the range of Tehran’s nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. The Simorgh test is only the latest example of Tehran’s defiance of ballistic missile restrictions set forth in Annex B of UNSCR 2231. According to a June 20 report by the UN Secretary General,3 Iran may have violated the prescribed limitations on arms imports and exports and ballistic missile testing, as well as entity-specific prohibitions on multiple occasions.
    [Show full text]
  • Two Years After the Murder of Natalia Estemirova: the Investigation Continues Along a False Path
    TWO YEARS AFTER THE MURDER OF NATALIA ESTEMIROVA: THE INVESTIGATION CONTINUES ALONG A FALSE PATH Article 4: No one shall be held in slavery or servi- Article 1: All human beings are born free and tude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms. Article 5: No one shall be subjected to torture equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 6: Everyone has the right to recognition every- another in a spirit of brotherhood. Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this where as a person before the law. Article 7: All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimina- Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other tion to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination. Article 8: Everyone has the right to an effective rem- on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person edy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. by law. Article 9: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, liber ty and security of person.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective 2016
    The Russian Armed Forces are developing from a force primarily designed for handling internal – 2016 Perspective Ten-Year in a Capability Military Russian disorder and conflicts in the area of the former Soviet Union towards a structure configured for large-scale operations also beyond that area. The Armed Forces can defend Russia from foreign aggression in 2016 better than they could in 2013. They are also a stronger instrument of coercion than before. This report analyses Russian military capability in a ten-year perspective. It is the eighth edition. A change in this report compared with the previous edition is that a basic assumption has been altered. In 2013, we assessed fighting power under the assumption that Russia was responding to an emerging threat with little or no time to prepare operations. In view of recent events, we now estimate available assets for military operations in situations when Russia initiates the use of armed force. The fighting power of the Russian Armed Forces is studied. Fighting power means the available military assets for three overall missions: operational-strategic joint inter-service combat operations (JISCOs), stand-off warfare and strategic deterrence. The potential order of battle is estimated for these three missions, i.e. what military forces Russia is able to generate and deploy in 2016. The fighting power of Russia’s Armed Forces has continued to increase – primarily west of the Urals. Russian military strategic theorists are devoting much thought not only to military force, but also to all kinds of other – non-military – means. The trend in security policy continues to be based on anti- Americanism, patriotism and authoritarianism at home.
    [Show full text]
  • CNC Coding Using Siemens 810D Control System For
    CNC Coding Using Siemens 810d Control System For Manufacturing Konkurs-M Missile (Bush) Syed Shoeb Pasha, Mohammed Abdul Rahil Juned, Mohammed Furqan Uddin, Mohammad Owais Ghazi Rayyan Ahmed and Dr. Syed Azam Pasha Quadr (Hod/Vice Principal) Lords Institute Of Engineering And Technology Jntu Hyderabad 500008 ABSTRACT A CNC machine could be programmed to We have taken up bush component for process a piece in a shorter amount of time and manufacturing at Bharat dynamic limited. with higher accuracy. This automated process is According to process plan tools were selected possible using commands that guide the machine and mounted as per given drawing and design along X, Y, and Z coordinates. The machine CNC program is coded accordingly. Using operator would load the desired program along Siemens 810D control system the program is with the tools needed to create a piece. The goal executed and bush is manufactured in EMCO of this lab is to learn the CNC metal cutting Turn 700 and Turn 365 machines. It consists of approach. four stages 1. Process plan, 2. Selection of tools, the tools are selected according to the operation Keywords- CNC, Design, Drawing, Milling, to be performed and precision level that has to Program, Machine tools. be given, 3. CNC program, CNC program has been generated according to the sequence of 1. Introduction operations, Clearance and precision, 4. The 9M113 Konkurs missile is Executed. increasingly common place in current and recent conflict zones and represents a capable long- CNC machines are widely used to range system for its age. In recent months manufacture different parts in different types of Konkurs systems have been employed by Houthi materials.
    [Show full text]
  • Honored, Not Contained the Future of Iraq’S Popular Mobilization Forces
    MICHAEL KNIGHTS HAMDI MALIK AYMENN JAWAD AL-TAMIMI HONORED, NOT CONTAINED THE FUTURE OF IRAQ’S POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES HONORED, NOT CONTAINED THE FUTURE OF IRAQ’S POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES MICHAEL KNIGHTS, HAMDI MALIK, AND AYMENN JAWAD AL-TAMIMI THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY www.washingtoninstitute.org Policy Focus 163 First publication: March 2020 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2020 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1111 19th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington DC 20036 www.washingtoninstitute.org Cover photo: Reuters ii Contents LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS........................................................................................................... v PREFACE: KEY FINDINGS.......................................................................................................... vii PART I: THE LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND NOMINAL STRUCTURE OF THE HASHD............................................................................................................................................. xxi 1. Legal Basis of the Hashd ..................................................................................................... 1 2. Organizational Structure of the Hashd ........................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Missile War in Yemen (CSIS)
    JUNE 2020 The Missile War in Yemen AUTHORS Ian Williams Shaan Shaikh A Report of the CSIS Missile Defense Project JUNE 2020 The Missile War in Yemen AUTHORS Ian Williams Shaan Shaikh A Report of the CSIS Missile Defense Project About CSIS The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world’s greatest challenges. Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 2015, succeeding former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA). Founded in 1962, CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, who has served as president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS’s purpose is to define the future of national security. We are guided by a distinct set of values—nonpartisanship, independent thought, innovative thinking, cross-disciplinary scholarship, integrity and professionalism, and talent development. CSIS’s values work in concert toward the goal of making real-world impact. CSIS scholars bring their policy expertise, judgment, and robust networks to their research, analysis, and recommendations. We organize conferences, publish, lecture, and make media appearances that aim to increase the knowledge, awareness, and salience of policy issues with relevant stakeholders and the interested public. CSIS has impact when our research helps to inform the decisionmaking of key policymakers and the thinking of key influencers. We work toward a vision of a safer and more prosperous world. CSIS is ranked the number one think tank in the United States by the University of Pennsylvania’s “Global Go To Think Tank Index.” CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
    [Show full text]
  • Iranian Proxy Development in Yemen and the Future of the Houthi Movement
    Could the Houthis Be the Next Hizballah? Iranian Proxy Development in Yemen and the Future of the Houthi Movement Trevor Johnston, Matthew Lane, Abigail Casey, Heather J. Williams, Ashley L. Rhoades, James Sladden, Nathan Vest, Jordan R. Reimer, Ryan Haberman C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2551 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0251-6 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2020 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover photo: Reuters/Naif Rahma; Flag: dikobraziy/GettyImages. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report documents the results of a project analyzing the prospects that Iran will further invest in the Houthis and develop them as an enduring proxy group in Yemen.
    [Show full text]
  • Snapping Back Against Iran
    POLICY BRIEF SNAPPING BACK AGAINST IRAN The case of the Al Bari 2 and the UN arms embargo Jay Bahadur DECEMBER 2020 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author is highly grateful to the non-profit research organization C4ADS for its assistance with data ingestion and analysis in relation to mobile-phone records. Richard Gowan at the International Crisis Group provided invaluable technical and contextual understanding of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the ‘snapback’ debate at the UN Security Council. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Jay Bahadur is an independent researcher and investigator based in Nairobi. From 2015 to 2019, he served as the armed groups expert, and subsequently the coordinator, of the UN W Security Council Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, and its successor, the Panel of Experts on Somalia. His areas of focus included the Islamist militant groups Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State, maritime arms-smuggling networks, piracy, and the oil and gas sector. Bahadur is the author of the 2011 book The Pirates of Somalia. © 2020 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Global Initiative. Cover: A US naval helicopter hovers above a dhow in the Arabian Sea. The dhow was seized in November 2019 while reportedly transporting arms to the Houthi rebel movement in Yemen. © US Navy Please direct inquiries to: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Avenue de France 23
    [Show full text]
  • General Assembly Distr.: General 15 July 2013 English Original: Chinese/English/Russian/ Spanish
    United Nations A/68/138 General Assembly Distr.: General 15 July 2013 English Original: Chinese/English/Russian/ Spanish Sixty-eighth session Agenda item 99 (e) of the preliminary list* General and complete disarmament: transparency in armaments United Nations Register of Conventional Arms Report of the Secretary-General Summary The present report, which is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 66/39, contains information received from Member States on the export and import of conventional arms covered by the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, including “nil” reports, as well as additional background information on military holdings, procurement through national production and international transfers of small arms and light weapons for the calendar year 2012. As of the date of submission of the present report, the Secretary-General has received reports from 45 Governments. * A/68/50. 13-39359 (E) 290713 210813 *1339359* A/68/138 Contents Page I. Introduction ................................................................... 3 II. Information received from Governments............................................ 3 A. Index of information submitted by Governments................................. 3 B. Reports received from Governments on conventional arms transfers................. 6 III. Information received from Governments on military holdings and procurement through national production ............................................................. 43 IV. Information received from Governments on international transfers
    [Show full text]
  • Cnc Coding Using Siemens 810D Control System for Manufacturing Konkurs-M Missile Syed Shoeb Pasha, Mohammed Abdul Rahil Juned, Mohammed Furqan Uddin, Mohammad Owais
    © 2020 JETIR November 2020, Volume 7, Issue 11 www.jetir.org (ISSN-2349-5162) CNC CODING USING SIEMENS 810D CONTROL SYSTEM FOR MANUFACTURING KONKURS-M MISSILE SYED SHOEB PASHA, MOHAMMED ABDUL RAHIL JUNED, MOHAMMED FURQAN UDDIN, MOHAMMAD OWAIS DR. SYED AZAM PASHA QUADRI, PROFESSOR & HOD, DEPARTMENT OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, LORDS INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY. Abstract We have taken up bush component manufacturing. According to process plan tools were selected and mounted. As per given drawing and design CNC program is coded accordingly. Using Siemens control system the program is executed and bush is manufactured in EMCO Turn 700 and Turn 365 machines. FIRST STAGE- Process plan SECOND STAGE- Selection of tools The tools are selected according to the operations to be performed and precision level that as to be given. THIRD STAGE- CNC, Program. CNC program has been generated according to the sequence of operations, clearance and precision. FOURTH STAGE- Executed. 1. INTRODUCTION The 9M113 Fagot (‘Bassoon’; NATO reporting name: AT-4 Spigot) and 9M113 Konkurs (‘Contest’; NATO: AT-5 Spandrel) were partially codeveloped as semi-automatic command to line-of-sight (SACLOS) replacements for the 9M14 Malyutka (Little One; NATO: AT-3 Sagger). The earlier 9M14 featured manual command to line-of-sight (MCLOS) guidance, requiring an operator to manually guide the missile onto target. This method required a high degree of skill to operate, and necessitated controlling the missile’s flight through a magnifying periscope from a fixed position. Development began in 1962 at KBP Tula, under the oversight of chief designer Arkadiy G. Shipunov, formerly of the Central Scientific Research Institute for Precision Machine Engineering (TsNIITochMash).
    [Show full text]
  • Military Spending and Arms Sales in the Gulf
    burke chair in strategy Military Spending and Arms Sales in the Gulf How the Arab Gulf States Now Dominate the Changes in the Military Balance By Anthony H. Cordesman with the assistance of Michael Peacock April 28, 2015 Request for comments: This report is a draft that will be turned into an electronic book. Comments and suggested changes would be greatly appreciated. Please send any comments to Anthony H. Cordsman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, at [email protected]. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman, Peacock: Gulf National Security Balance 24.4.15 Rev 15:00 2 Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................................................................4 II. MILITARY EXPENDITURES ...........................................................................................................................................................................6 THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES (IISS) ESTIMATES ............................................................................................................................... 6 THE STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI) ESTIMATES .................................................................................................................. 6 MILITARY SPENDING AS A PERCENT OF GDP AND COMPARATIVE GDP ..................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]