Deliberative Democracy Deliberative Arthur Lupia the Prospects & Limits of the Prospects Dædalus Cristina Lafont Cristina Lafont Alice Siu James S

Home , Claus Offe, Deliberative democracy, Democracy in Motion, Jane Mansbridge

Summer 2017

Ian Shapiro Simon Beste · · Nicole Curato

Selen A. Ercan · William Bazeyo ·

Mark E. Warren

Simon Niemeyer ·

· · Hélène Landemore · Roy William Mayega Roy Nathan Tumuhamye

· ·

Anne Norton Anne Norton · Baogang He André Bächtiger John S. Dryzek John S. with Claus Offe · Julius Ssentongo Bernard Manin Lyn Atuyambe Lyn Cass R. Sunstein Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Journal of the American Academy · Carolyn M. Hendriks Carolyn Deliberative Democracy Deliberative Arthur Lupia The Prospects & Limits of The Prospects Dædalus Cristina Lafont Cristina Lafont Alice Siu James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge, guest editors Mansbridge, Fishkin & Jane James S.

Dædalus Summer 2017 The Prospects & Limits of Deliberative Democracy

explores the frontiers of the frontiers explores Dædalus knowledge and issues of public importance. and diversity, and diversity, Representing the intellectual community in its breadth Representing

edited by Ned Blackhawk, K. Tsianina Lomawaima, Lomawaima, K. Tsianina edited by Ned Blackhawk, Deloria, Philip J. Bryan McKinley Jones Brayboy, Douglas Medin, and Mark Trahant Loren Ghiglione, Eric Stollenwerk, Tanja A. Börzel & Sonja Grimm, & A. Börzel Eric Stollenwerk, Tanja NancyAbdeta Lindborg & & Mesfin Beyene, JosephSeyoum Hewitt, John Stedman, Richard Gowan & Stephen Doucet, and Jean-Marie Guéhenno Lyse edited by Karl Eikenberryedited by Karl Krasner & Stephen Kalyvas, Stathis N. M. Fazal, Tanisha Fukuyama, Francis Call & Susanna Campbell, Steven Heydemann, Chuck Clare Lockhart, Risse & Thomas Sumit Ganguly, Stedman, Stewart Patrick, Martha Crenshaw, Paul H. Wise Paul H. Wise Stedman, Stewart Martha Patrick, Crenshaw, Vanda Lischer, Kenyon Sarah & Michele Barry, Felbab-Brown, Hendrik Spruyt, Will Reno, Biddle, Stephen & MiguelAila M. Matanock García-Sánchez, and Barry Posen edited by Karl Eikenberryedited Stephen Krasner & Bruce Fearon, Stephen John Jones & D. with James

Native Americans & Academia Ending Civil Wars: Constraints & Possibilities & Possibilities Constraints Wars: Ending Civil Civil Wars & Global Disorder: Threats & Opportunities Disorder: Threats & Global Civil Wars on the horizon: on the @americanacad U.S. $15; www.amacad.org; $15; www.amacad.org; U.S. Introduction

James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge

Democracy is under siege. Approval ratings for democratic institutions in most countries around the world are at near-record lows. The number of recognized democratic countries in the world is no longer expanding after the so-called Third Wave of democratic transitions.1 Indeed, there is something of a “democratic recession.”2 Further, some apparently democratic countries with competitive elections are undermining elements of liberal democracy: the rights and liberties that ensure freedom of thought and expression, protection of the rule of law, and all the pro- tections for the substructure of civil society that may be as important for making democracy work as the JAMES S. FISHKIN, a Fellow of the electoral process itself.3 The model of party compe- American Academy since 2014, is tition-based democracy–the principal model of de- Director of the Center for Delib- mocracy in the modern era–seems under threat. erative Democracy, the Janet M. That model also has competition. What might be Peck Chair in International Com- munication, Professor of Commu- called “meritocratic authoritarianism,” a model in nication, and Professor of Political which regimes with flawed democratic processes nev- Science (by courtesy) at Stanford ertheless provide good governance, is attracting at- University. tention and some support. Singapore is the only suc- JANE MANSBRIDGE, a Fellow of cessful extant example, although some suggest China the American Academy since 1994, as another nation moving in this direction. Singapore is the Charles F. Adams Professor is not a Western-style party- and competition-based of Political Leadership and Dem- democracy, but it is well-known for its competent civil ocratic Values at the Harvard Ken- servants schooled in making decisions on a cost-ben- nedy School. efit basis to solve public problems, with the goals set (*See endnotes for complete contributor by elite consultation with input from elections rath- biographies.) er than by party competition.

6 Public discontent makes further difficul- Over the last two decades, another ap- James S. ties for the competitive model. Democra- proach to democracy has become increas- Fishkin & Jane cies around the world struggle with the ap- ingly prominent. Based on greater deliber- Mansbridge parent gulf between political elites who are ation among the public and its represen- widely distrusted and mobilized citizens tatives, deliberative democracy has the who fuel populism with the energy of an- potential, at least in theory, to respond gry voices. Disillusioned citizens turning to today’s current challenges. If the many against elites have produced unexpected versions of a more deliberative democracy election results, including the Brexit deci- live up to their aspirations, they could help sion and the 2016 U.S. presidential election. revive democratic legitimacy, provide for The competitive elections and referenda more authentic public will formation, proof most current democracies depend on vide a middle ground between widely mis- mobilizing millions of voters within a con- trusted elites and the angry voices of pop- text of advertising, social media, and efforts ulism, and help fulfill some of our common to manipulate as well as inform public opin- normative expectations about democracy. ion. Competing teams want to win and, in Can this potential be realized? In what most cases, are interested in informing vot- ways and to what extent? Deliberative de- ers only when it is to their advantage. The mocracy has created a rich literature in both rationale for competitive democracy, most theory and practice. This issue of Dædalus influentially developed by the late econo- assesses both its prospects and limits. We mist Joseph Schumpeter, held that the same include advocates as well as critics. As de- techniques of advertising used in the com- liberative democrats, our aim is to stimu- mercial sphere to get people to buy prod- late public deliberation about deliberative ucts can be expected in the political sphere. democracy, weighing arguments for and On this view, we should not expect a “gen- against its application in different contexts uine” public will, but rather “a manufac- and for different purposes. tured will” that is just a by-product of po- How can deliberative democracy, if it litical competition.4 were to work as envisaged by its supporters, Yet the ideal of democracy as the rule of respond to the challenges just sketched? “the people” is deeply undermined when First, if the more-deliberative institutions the will of the people is in large part manu- that many advocate can be applied to real factured. The legitimacy of democracy de- decisions in actual ongoing democracies, pends on some real link between the public arguably they could have a positive effect on will and the public policies and office-hold- legitimacy and lead to better governance. ers who are selected. Although some have They could make a better connection be- criticized this “folk theory of democracy” tween the public’s real concerns and how as empirically naive, its very status as a folk they are governed. Second, these institu- theory reflects how widespread this nor- tions could help fill the gap between dis- mative expectation is.5 To the extent that trusted elites and angry populists. Elites leaders manufacture the public will, the are distrusted in part because they seem normative causal arrow goes in the wrong and often are unresponsive to the public’s direction. If current democracies cannot concerns, hopes, and values. Perhaps, the produce meaningful processes of public suspicion arises, the elites are really out will formation, the legitimacy claims of for themselves. On the other hand, pop- meritocratic autocracies or even more ulism stirs up angry, mostly nondelibera- fully autocratic systems become compar- tive voices that can be mobilized in plebes- atively stronger.6 citary campaigns, whether for Brexit or for

146 (3) Summer 2017 7 Introduction elected office. In their contributions to this These are some of the challenges facing issue, both Claus Offe and Hélène Lande- those who might try to make deliberative more explore the crisis of legitimacy in democracy practical. representative government, including the The earliest work on deliberative democ- clash between status quo–oriented elites racy began by investigating legislatures.7 In and populism. Deliberative democratic this issue, Cass Sunstein, in contrast, looks methods open up the prospect of prescrip- at deliberation among policy-makers with- tions that are both representative of the in the executive branch. Bernard Manin entire population and based on sober, evi- looks outside government toward debates dence-based analysis of the merits of com- and public forums that can improve the de- peting arguments. Popular deliberative in- liberative quality of campaigns and discus- stitutions are grounded in the public’s val- sions among the public at large. ues and concerns, so the voice they magnify Much of the energy in deliberative de- is not the voice of the elites. But that voice mocracy efforts has focused on statisti- is usually also, after deliberation, more ev- cal microcosms or mini-publics, in which idence-based and reflective of the merits of citizens, usually recruited by random sam- the major policy arguments. Hence these pling, deliberate in organized settings. In institutions fill an important gap. some settings, relatively small groups of fif- How might popular deliberative democ- teen or so deliberate online with an elect- racy, if it were to work as envisaged by its ed representative.8 In other settings, the supporters, fulfill normative expectations groups can be given access to balanced of democracy, thought to be unrealistic information and briefing materials that by critics of the “folk theory”? The issue make the best case for and against various turns on the empirical possibility that the options. They can also be given access to public can actually deliberate. Can the peo- competing experts who answer their ques- ple weigh the trade-offs? Can they assess tions from different points of view. Then, competing arguments? Can they connect at the end of the deliberations in these or- their deliberations with their voting pref- ganized settings, there is some way of har- erences or other expressions of preference vesting their considered judgments. Sever- about what should be done? Is the problem al of the essays discuss Deliberative Polling, that the people are not competent, or that which brings together a random sample of they are not in the right institutional con- citizens for a weekend of deliberation and text to be effectively motivated to partici- gathers data, as in an opinion poll, from pate? These are empirical questions, and the random samples both upon recruit- the controversies about them are part of ment and then again at the end of the de- our dialogue. liberations. The method also permits qualitative data by recording the discussions, This issue includes varying definitions, both in moderated small groups and in ple- approaches, and contexts. The root notion nary sessions where questions generated in is that deliberation requires “weighing” the small groups are directed at experts rep- competing arguments for policies or candi- resenting different points of view. Other dates in a context of mutually civil and di- mini-publics, such as “citizens’ juries” verse discussion in which people can decide and “consensus conferences,” are usually on the merits of arguments with good in- smaller (a couple of dozen instead of two or formation. Is such a thing possible in an era three hundred people) and arrive at some- of fake news, social media, and public dis- thing like an agreed-upon statement or ver- cussions largely among the like-minded? dict as a recommendation to the public or

8 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences to authorized policy-makers. Some ran- necting the people to policy-making. Nicole James S. domly selected mini-publics even make Curato, John Dryzek, Selen Ercan, Carolyn Fishkin 9 & Jane binding decisions. Hendriks, and Simon Niemeyer offer a sys- Mansbridge The basic rationale for the mini-public tematic overview of what they regard as the approach is that if the random sample that key findings of the deliberative democra- is gathered to deliberate is representative cy research around the globe. Their find- of the population, and if it deliberates un- ings are optimistic and differ from some of der good conditions, then its considered the critical perspectives presented later in judgments after deliberation should rep- the issue. resent what the larger population would The second group of essays might be la- think if somehow those citizens could en- beled “new thinking.” Bernard Manin pro- gage in similarly good conditions for con- poses that the core of deliberation is cap- sidering the issue. A great deal depends on tured by what he calls the “adversarial the mini-public actually being representa- principle,” according to which public dis- tive and on the account of good conditions cussions should be organized to allow a to which it is exposed. “confrontation of opposing positions.” Im- Whenever an application of delibera- plementing this idea is more complex than tive democracy depends on a randomly se- first appears and has a history going back to lected mini-public, that application raises Ancient Athenian institutions. Manin of- the issue of degree of empowerment. Can fers various suggestions, including some for or should such mini-publics supplant de- modern televised debates. Hélène Lande- mocracy by competitive elections? No con- more asks whether deliberative democracy tributor to this issue makes that argument. can be saved from the current crisis of rep- But in several cases, duly appointed admin- resentative democracy around the world. istrators have committed in advance to im- Her positive answer depends on an ambi- plementing the recommendations of such a tious sketch of an “open democracy,” in mini-public and, in some cases, those rec- which institutions would be inclusive and ommendations are binding. How much can power accessible to ordinary citizens, in- randomly selected groups be relied upon for cluding through representation in delibera- authoritative public decisions and in what tive bodies of randomly chosen citizens, cit- ways? Cristina Lafont argues against re- izens’ initiatives, and crowd-sourced law- lying solely on such groups for decisions, making and policy processes. but opens the door to discussions of a pos- The next two groups of essays alternate- sible albeit limited role for them. She use- ly present and respond to some of the main fully poses the problem from the perspec- criticisms of deliberative democracy. Ar- tive of the vast majority of citizens who will thur Lupia and Anne Norton argue in their not be in a mini-public: how do the deliber- elegant phrasing that “inequality is always ations connect with them if they have not in the room.” If the outcome of delibera- deliberated? tion is inevitably distorted by the more advantaged participants dominating the dis- The essays are organized roughly in five cussions, the results are not likely to repre- groups. To introduce the topic of deliber- sent the true views of the rest of the group. ative democracy, Claus Offe sketches the Rather, any such results would reproduce conflict between distrusted elites and the the inequalities and power relations among populism of Brexit and other plebiscitary the participants. Inequality among partic- processes, arguing that deliberation via ran- ipants is one of the major challenges to the dom sampling could help fill the void, con- larger idea of implementing deliberative

146 (3) Summer 2017 9 Introduction democracy–a challenge that must be pur- some parliamentary contexts, particularly sued with great seriousness. those characterized by “coalition settings, Responding to critics of deliberation, second chambers, secrecy, low party disci- Alice Siu reflects on the role of inequality pline, low issue polarization, and the strong using data from Deliberative Polls, both presence of moderate parties.” Their insti- online and face-to-face, finding far less dis- tutional prescription for parliament con- tortion than critics expect. She also offers trasts sharply with Shapiro’s. Regarding surprising findings on who takes the most public deliberation, they draw on Europolis, talking time, who has the greatest influence a European-wide Deliberative Poll with a on the outcomes, and who offers more “jus- sample of ordinary citizens, and provide ev- tified” arguments, supplying reasons for idence that the citizens were able to reason their positions. But this is an ongoing em- in ways comparable to those of the parlia- pirical question. No one has yet systematic- mentarians. ally studied the role of inequality under dif- In her essay, Cristina Lafont makes a ferent deliberative designs. More research case against giving any decisional status with controlled experiments could clarify to mini-publics. Although she grants that this issue further. deliberating mini-publics may make rea- Ian Shapiro robustly defends the model sonable decisions when the participants of competitive democracy as the alterna- have considered the options in good con- tive to deliberative democracy. He believes ditions, to grant them power over decisions that through party competition we can fos- on this basis would be to give “blind defer- ter an “argumentative ideal” that has ele- ence” to a “special version of elite concep- ments of deliberation, but does not suffer tions of democracy.” On the representative- from either the lack of realism of the delib- ness argument for granting them power, the erative model or the potential veto power public might think that the participants in of intense minorities that emerges when a mini-public “share our interests, val- consensus is the decision rule or goal. He ues, and policy objectives,” so their views champions an argumentative version of the will “coincide with what we would have Westminster two-party competition mod- thought if we had participated.” Yet most el in which each side must make its case. He larger mini-publics (including those that also criticizes the room for deliberation of- collect post-deliberative opinions in con- fered in multiparty proportional represen- fidential questionnaires) are not designed tation systems, in an argument that con- to produce consensus. In this respect, they trasts with the position offered by André differ from the model of deliberation most Bächtiger and Simon Beste in their contri- criticized by Shapiro. Hence there is almost bution to this issue. always, at least in the larger mini-publics, a Bächtiger and Beste contest the “standard majority view and a minority view revealed argument that politicians do not want to de- in the final confidential questionnaires or liberate and citizens are not able to.” They vote. Lafont argues that an individual voter draw on extensive empirical work with the who has not participated cannot be sure “Discourse Quality Index,” which exam- whether she would have been in the ma- ines the reasoning offered by deliberators jority or in the minority after deliberation. in legislatures, especially on the question of Why should she be bound by the majority whether they offer justifications for their as- view post-deliberation if she might have sertions. They find that, despite the current come out with the minority view? cynicism about representative democracy, No essay in this issue stands as an explic- room for genuine deliberation appears in it response to Lafont, as we fortuitously

10 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences had for the first two critics. So we will try high-quality deliberation. In this case, how- James S. to respond here by asking: if the citizens in ever, high-level policy-makers, rather than Fishkin & Jane the broader public believe in democracy, the people themselves or their elected rep- Mansbridge then why might they not take as serious- resentatives, are doing the deliberating. ly the recommendations of deliberating James Fishkin, Roy William Mayega, Lyn majorities as they do the decisions of non- Atuyambe, Nathan Tumuhamye, Julius deliberating majorities? In a deliberating Ssentongo, Alice Siu, and William Bazeyo mini-public, the final reported views are examine the first Deliberative Polls in Af- what the people in microcosm concluded rica. Those skeptical of the capacity of ran- on the basis of in-depth deliberation. If a domly selected bodies to make intelligent decision is taken on the basis of the major- decisions have assumed that if such proce- ity after deliberation, there will certainly dures are viable at all, they must apply only be dissenters, as with any majority decision. or primarily in developed countries with Much depends on what we mean by the highly educated populations. Can these public taking the results seriously. Lafont methods be applied to populations with argues forcefully against any trust-based low literacy and very low educational lev- argument that might suggest “blind def- els? Can the people in such communities erence” to the majority in a randomly se- reason usefully about the trade-offs of ma- lected mini-public. Perhaps, however, duly jor policy choices affecting their commu- elected officials might delegate some re- nities? Can they do so in ways useful for sponsibility to such a group. How much policy? The difficult issues of disaster re- decisional status should the recommenda- lief and population pressure in rural Ugan- tions of a mini-public have? Should these da pose a test case for the question: who mini-publics be an official part of a decision can deliberate? In these first African De- process or only part of the dialogue in the liberative Polls, random sampling and de- public sphere? Are there contexts in which liberation allowed the people who must live they could bear the full weight of an institu- with development policies to be consulted, tional decision? The question of role poses with reasonable results, even in such diffi- a central challenge for deliberations based cult conditions. on mini-publics. In the final essay of the issue, Baogang He The final section focuses on applications. and Mark Warren look outside the purview The essays shed light on the questions: who of competitive democratic systems to ask deliberates, and in what context? As Cass whether the practice of deliberative democ- Sunstein notes, the term deliberative democracy may be feasible within authoritarian racy was coined in a study of how delibera- regimes, such as China. They ask: why have tion took place in the Senate, in ways that, some Chinese authorities embraced and to some degree, matched how the Consti- supported the form of a randomly selected tution’s framers thought the Senate ought mini-public for “grass roots experimen- to act.10 Deliberation is a crucial part of tation” for local government decisions? government in the executive and judicial Can deliberating mini-publics be properly branches. Sunstein distills his experience conducted for budget and other local deci- in government to offer a compelling picture sions in a society that lacks the civil liber- of deliberation taking place within the pol- ties and individual rights familiar in com- icy teams grappling with interagency issues petitive democracies? What are the effects and the production of good policy in the ex- and prospects of what they call “delibera- ecutive branch of the U.S. government. His tive authoritarianism?” Will such experi- account seems to satisfy all the criteria for mentation lead to further institutional de-

146 (3) Summer 2017 11 Introduction velopment in line with democratic values reform mass politics and public debate to or will it simply serve to legitimate current avoid not only fake news, but also the in- power relations and institutions, preclud- creasing pressures of narrow-casting in the ing long-term reform? commercial media, self-sorting into information bubbles on social media, and geo- This issue examines a wide range of de- graphic sorting by ideology as people move liberative democratic practices and appli- to more politically homogeneous commu- cations. It includes competitive democra- nities. It should leave the reader asking: cies, authoritarian regimes, and developed What challenges and critiques are most and developing countries. It opens up de- telling for deliberative democracy? How bates on how to improve deliberation in serious are the ways in which deliberation legislatures and other governmental bod- can go awry? Whatever conclusions our ies, and on what institutional roles and de- readers reach on these questions, this is- cision power randomly selected citizens sue depicts a vibrant area of democratic ex- might have after they have been able to dis- perimentation at a time when many have cuss issues in some depth under good con- lost confidence in the processes of electoral ditions. It asks how we might effectively representative democracy.

endnotes * Contributor Biographies: JAMES S. FISHKIN, a Fellow of the American Academy since 2014, is Director of the Center for Deliberative Democracy, the Janet M. Peck Chair in International Com- munication, Professor of Communication, and Professor of Political Science (by courtesy) at Stan- ford University. He is the author of When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consulta- tion (2009), Deliberation Day (with Bruce Ackerman, 2004), and The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy (1995). JANE MANSBRIDGE, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1994, is the Charles F. Adams Professor of Political Leadership and Democratic Values at the Harvard Kennedy School. She is the author of Why We Lost the ERA (1986) and Beyond Adversary Democracy (1983), and coeditor of Political Negotiation (with Cathie Jo Martin, 2015) and Deliberative Systems (with John Parkin- son, 2012). 1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Oklahoma City: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 2 Larry Diamond, “Facing Up to Democratic Recession,” Journal of Democracy 26 (1) (January 2015): 141–155. 3 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 4 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1942), 263. 5 Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2015). 6 For the legitimacy of the distortions from economic inequality, see Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014). 7 The work began with Joseph Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), followed by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

12 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Press, 1996); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton, James S. N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); Jürg Steiner, André Bächtiger, Markus Spörndli, and Fishkin Marco R. Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action: Analyzing Parliamentary Discourse (Cambridge: & Jane Cambridge University Press, 2004); and further work inspired by this Swiss team and others. Mansbridge 8 See, for example, Michael A. Neblo, Kevin M. Esterling, Ryan P. Kennedy, David M. J. Lazer, and Anand E. Sokhey, “Who Wants to Deliberate–And Why?” American Political Science Review 104 (3) (August 2010): 1–18. 9 On citizens’ juries, see the work of Ned Crosby and Peter Dienel. On binding decisions and other features of a variety of randomly selected mini-publics, see Yves Sintomer, Petite histoire de l’expérimentation démocratique: Tirage au sort et politique d’Athènes à nos jours (Paris: La Découverte, 2011). 10 Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason.

146 (3) Summer 2017 13 Referendum vs. Institutionalized Deliberation: What Democratic Theorists Can Learn from the 2016 Brexit Decision

Claus Offe

Abstract: This essay proceeds in three steps. First, it will briefly outline the often invoked “crisis” of representative democracy and its major symptoms. Second, it will discuss a popular yet, as I shall argue, wor- ryingly misguided response to that crisis: namely, the switch to plebiscitarian methods of “direct” democracy, as advocated, for example, by rightist populist forces in many European Union member states. The United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum of June 2016 illuminates the weaknesses of this approach. Third, it will suggest a rough design for enriching representative electoral democracy with nonelectoral (but “aleatory,” or randomized) and nonmajoritarian (but deliberative and consultative) bodies and their pecu- liar methods of political will formation (as opposed to the expression of a popular will already formed).

One core question of political theory is how best to make collectively binding decisions: who should make those decisions, and by what rules and procedures? The modalities of decision-making are not just something to be determined at the founding, or “constitutional” moment, of a political community once and for all times by some pouvoir constituant (constituent power). The question of whether our rules and procedures are still “good enough” or whether they are in need of amendments and adjustments is an ongoing challenge in the background of any political pro- CLAUS OFFE, a Foreign Honorary cess, and certainly one that qualifies as democratic. Member of the American Academy Yet how should we decide how to decide? The dif- since 1995, is Professor Emeritus ficulty of any conceivable answer to this question of Political Sociology at the Hertie derives from its tricky recursive logic. The answer, School of Governance in Germa- in order to be recognized as valid and binding, must ny. He is author of Europe Entrapped (2015), Varieties of Transition: The itself be decided upon–but how and by whom? If East European and East German Ex- we were able to deduce the “right” mode of deci- perience (1997), and Modernity and sion-making from a robust theory of a divine order, the State: East, West (1996). as in an ideal-typical theocratic regime, the problem

14 would go away. Conversely, if we had a sci- are quintessential political systems “on the Claus entific theory about whose decision-mak- move,” driven by the legitimacy of rule and Offe ing competencies and methods would yield its effectiveness. optimal policy results and rational problem In the course of the last forty years of the- solutions (as was the claim of “scientific” oretical self-reflection and empirical ob- state socialism), the problem of deciding servation of the stability, modes of oper- how to decide would also evaporate and ation, and trajectories of change of liberal the one best way of running a country and representative democracies, many propo- its economy would reveal itself beyond any sitions have been advanced that converge doubt. Given the modern obsolescence of on the diagnosis of a “crisis,” or the creep- either of these certainties, we need to face ing deformation, of liberal representative the fact that neither constitutional meth- democracy. This multifaceted crisis exists ods of arriving at decisions nor the resulting in the absence of explicitly nondemocratic decisions themselves (that is, policies) are (totalitarian, theocratic, or otherwise au- capable of having unquestionable validity. thoritarian) countermodels and theoreti- At best, political procedures can be consis- cal doctrines of how political rule should be tent with widely shared normative premises conducted. To oversimplify: The vast ma- of fairness, and policy outcomes can be re- jority of contemporary mankind believes in grettable–or not. and endorses (some version of the above) democratic principles and promises.1 At the Any account of what we mean by liberal same time, large minorities and sometimes representative democracy will, rather un- majorities of inhabitants of existing liberal controversially, include the following fea- democracies are dissatisfied with, and feel tures: Liberal democracy is a political sys- left out by or alienated from, the democratic tem applying (at least, so far) only to nation- routines and practices they experience. We states and their subnational territorial com- may thus say that abstract liberal democ- ponents. The right to rule derives, directly racy is celebrating its near-global victory, or indirectly, from periodic and contested while concrete and existing democracies elections through which the composition of are widely looked at with discontent and legislative assemblies and governments is frustration over failures of both the legiti- determined. It is premised upon the dichot- macy and effectiveness of democratic rule. omy between rulers and ruled, or (elected) More specific, liberal democracies of the elites and (voting) nonelites. Citizens, re- Organisation for Economic Co-operation gardless of other resources they control, en- and Development have experienced symp- joy equal political rights and freedoms (vot- toms of stress and malfunctioning over the ing, communication, association) as a mat- last generation that have activated a glob- ter of constitutional guarantee. Rule of law al discourse of political theorists and prac- and division of powers constrain the use of titioners to suggest innovative remedies. state power and its monopolistic exercise, What are the deficiencies or illnesses to thus making its use at least minimally ac- which these remedies are targeted? To gen- countable. As an empirical generalization, eralize, symptoms of this dissatisfaction in- we can add that democracies are constant- clude the following. ly challenged and self-scrutinizing politi- 1) Apathy and other forms of nonpar- cal systems that face on-going controver- ticipation and political alienation are on sial demands for their own revision, devel- the rise and are undermining the increas- opment, and improvement. Democracies ingly nominal equality of political rights. are continuously being renegotiated. They The least advantaged strata of populations

146 (3) Summer 2017 15 What (by education, economic, and class status, minorities, and everything “foreign,” in- Democratic and also by age, gender, and minority sta- cluding, in the eu context, Brussels as the Theorists Can Learn tus) show the strongest features of (self-) location of its executive branch. The kind from the exclusion. As many people in these cate- of social protection populists offer derives 2016 Brexit Decision gories do not vote or participate through not from constituted state power to achieve membership in parties and other formal collective goals through policies, but from organizations, a vicious cycle is set in mo- territorial borders of nation-states. Popu- tion by which elites of such organizations list movements and parties are, in many find little strategic incentive to respond to cases, not instrumentally focused on poli- the interests and values of the marginalized cy, but expressively focused on the politics groups. At the upper end of the socioeco- of protest, obstruction, and the assertion nomic hierarchy, investors, financial insti- of some kind of identity against a distrust- tutions, employers, and a host of organized ed “establishment” and political class, as interests enjoy de facto privileges of shap- well as minorities and foreign or suprana- ing political agendas and constraining the tional powers. They also focus on “strong” resources that elected governments have leaders whose space of action must not be available for the conduct of policies. unduly constrained by liberal constitution- 2) Political parties and elites have suffered al and other inhibitions, thus giving rise to from a rapid loss of trust concerning both the oxymoronic phenomenon of illiber- their willingness and ability to respond to al democracy and more-or-less soft forms nonelites and to promote desired kinds of of electoral authoritarianism. Its preferred social and economic change. The “monito- form of legitimation (of both leaders and ry” tactics of commercial and social media, policies) is by reference to plebiscitarian with their “gotcha” incentives, further dis- acclamation and referenda, which allegedly credit elites. As major socioeconomic prob- are best suited to reveal the true, authentic, lems (such as low growth, precariousness unified, and uncorrupted will of the people of employment, widening inequality, so- –a will that, in reality, is often but a mere cial exclusion, and international conflicts) artifact of media and party campaigns con- have come to be seen as beyond the reach of fronting the “establishment,” foreign forces, any conceivable government, the perceived and minorities. political purchasing power of the ballot de- 4) The space left to maneuver for govern- clines. In many cases, the parameters set by ing elites, and hence the extent to which the political economy of capitalist democ- they can relate at all responsively to pop- racies have enforced a convergence of major ular interests and demands, is increasing- political parties that makes them virtually ly limited by the international political indistinguishable in terms of programs and economy (globalization) with its neolib- ideology. The result tends to be restricting eral imperatives of competitiveness, aus- competition to the appeal of leading per- terity, debt consolidation, and tax compe- sonalities. tition, giving rise to a condition now often 3) If political mobilization and contes- described as “postdemocracy.” Parameters tation occur at all, they do so, to a rapidly that determine peoples’ life chances and liv- growing extent, in rightist populist ways: by ing conditions–whether in their roles as appeals not to shared interests or some ver- workers, consumers, savers, or citizens re- sion of the common good, but to primordi- ceiving state-provided services and trans- al and ethnonational identities and “moral fers–are set by technocratic supranational majorities,” and in confrontational oppo- elites at places and levels that have largely sition to established elites, outside groups, escaped the reach of national policy-making

16 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences and its democratic accountability, while criminal enemies of the state, or ethno- Claus nation-states suffer from a decline of their linguistic minorities. Although Switzer- Offe “governing capacity,” facing conditions in land has the oldest and most famous tradi- which they by themselves are unable to pro- tion of direct democratic legislation in Eu- vide for their citizens’ socioeconomic, civil, rope (usually preceded in that country by and military security and the integrity of extensive and reasonably balanced pub- their physical environment. lic debates on issues), these practices have spread in more limited forms to other coun- The battle cry of rightist populism is: tries in Europe, with hot spots in the right- “Let us, the people decide” and take con- ist populist regimes that have emerged in trol out of the hands of untrustworthy na- many of the post-Communist polities. In tional elites and illegitimate supranational Hungary, a national referendum on a man- forces. The arsenal of plebiscitarian meth- datory eu migrant quota was held (and lost ods (which, to be sure, are sometimes also by the government due to insufficient turn- advocated by some nonpopulist forces) out) in October of 2016. Yet probably the includes referenda on policy issues, citi- most consequential referendum held in Eu- zen initiatives to hold such referenda, and rope to date appeared in precisely the Euro- agenda initiatives to force legislatures to ad- pean country where parliamentary repre- dress certain policy issues. The use of sur- sentative democracy was born: the United vey research for identifying popular pref- Kingdom. erences and then elevating them to the sta- The Brexit referendum of June 23, 2016, tus of policy priorities on leaders’ platforms asked citizens to vote on whether the United can sometimes be seen as cases of social sci- Kingdom should leave the European Union ence–assisted populism. Thirty-six of the or remain a member state. Note that this forty-seven member states of the Council referendum was called for, but not initi- of Europe have by now adopted one or all ated by, a rightist populist political party. of these direct-democratic devices as part To the contrary, it was politically designed of their constitutional repertoire. In 2012, by David Cameron, a Conservative yet pro- the eu itself introduced the European Cit- European prime minister, who intended to izen Initiative as a device of supranational curb the growing political influence of the direct democracy. In recent years, these in- populist United Kingdom Independence struments of direct democracy have been Party (ukip), thus turning, he hoped, the applied to policies as varied as whether to means of populists against their ends. To permit or ban the construction of minarets, the surprise of most observers, that plan restrictions on migration, the public use of failed when a narrow majority of voters ac- a minority language, the acquisition of ag- tually voted Leave. Was it a wise decision to ricultural land by foreigners, same sex mar- let the question of Britain’s eu membership riage, the (retroactive) imposition of inher- be decided by referendum? In addressing itance taxes, and the introduction of a basic this question, I shall refrain from discussing income. For example, in the context of the the substantive political question of wheth- recent failed military coup in Turkey, Presi- er Brexit is a “good” move, confining myself dent Erdoğan has gestured at holding a ref- to the issue of whether the method used in erendum on reintroducing the death pen- making the decision was an adequate one. alty. The target groups of these referendum Here is a rough summary of the events. In campaigns may be Muslims, migrants, sex- the 2014 general elections to the European ual minorities, wealthy heirs, foreign real Parliament, ukip, the British anti-eu po- estate speculators, European institutions, litical party, won a relative majority of 27.5

146 (3) Summer 2017 17 What percent of the vote, with most of its votes was 51.9 percent Leave versus 48.1 percent Democratic taken from those defecting from the Con- Remain, with the citizenry sharply divid- Theorists Can Learn servative Party. Recognition of this grow- ed along class, age, and regional lines, but from the ing threat prompted incumbent Conserva- not equally sharply along party lines. Giv- 2016 Brexit Decision tive Prime Minister Cameron to commit en a turnout of 71.8 percent of all eligible himself in January 2013 to holding a refer- voters, roughly 37.3 percent of the elector- endum on the Brexit issue by the year 2017 ate will have caused (if it actually comes to if he were reelected in the national elec- that) Britain’s exit from the eu by a mar- tions of May 2015. His decision was a con- gin of just four percentage points.2 cession to the rightist populist demand to When making their decision on referen- let “the people” express its will directly, dum day, citizens were largely left with their rather than being represented by distrusted own individual means of will formation elites suspected of being corrupted by their (their beliefs and preferences) and with- own or other special or “foreign” interests. out much clear guidance from the political Populists are to be classified as “rightist” parties as to which of the alternatives, to- when framing the people in terms of nativ- gether with their entirely unknown impli- ist ethnic belonging versus some strange, cations, to choose. The two major parties foreign, and (as such) threatening enemy. were either openly divided (Conservatives) Cameron’s promise to hold a referendum or deeply ambivalent (Labour) about what was intended to serve the dual purpose of to recommend to their voters. Yet the only 1) increasing British bargaining power in party that was clear and committed on the ongoing negotiations with eu partners issue (ukip) had no chance of achieving the (who were seen as averse to further ukip parliamentary representation through ma- gains and the prospect of Brexit and hence joritarian British electoral law to follow its ready to grant concessions to the British option through. The division of pros and government on the key issues of Euro- cons was almost orthogonal to the major mobility and “ever closer” integration) and party cleavage. Similarly divided were the 2) immunizing the Conservative electoral media, with some of the tabloid press en- base against further defections of voters, as gaging in a vehement denunciation of the Eurosceptic Conservative voters were now eu, often with little regard for the truth of offered the option of expressing their Leave their claims.3 Moreover, both camps relied preference without having to switch to sup- heavily on fear as a negative economic mo- porting ukip. tivation: the Leavers feared losing control Both of these purposes were, to an ex- over the fates of “our” country to “Brus- tent, achieved, the second more fully than sels” (or of having to compete with foreign the first. The turn to plebiscitarian meth- migrant labor for jobs),4 and the Remain ods (which are foreign to the United King- camp feared the adverse economic conse- dom’s constitutional traditions) came at quences (jobs, trade, investment, exchange the price of undermining the authority rates) of Brexit. Appeals to the advantag- of Parliament, the members of which op- es, political attractions, prior commit- posed Brexit by a large majority. Having ments, hopes, and promises of remaining won the 2015 elections and being bound were rarely advanced, implying that there by his referendum promise, Cameron ini- were few. Left in a state of disorientation tiated the eu Referendum Act, which was and anxiety, and being informed by the passed by the House of Commons in De- media and polling organizations that the cember 2015. When the referendum was contest would be a tight one (suggesting eventually held on June 23, 2016, the result that every vote or abstention could make

18 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences a big difference), voters were left to rely on In this implicit debate of identity versus Claus their gut feelings, rather than an informed interest, the elderly and the less-educated Offe judgment, on the merits of the two alter- considered eu membership both a cultur- natives.5 The dichotomy of a referendum al and economic threat and hence gravitat- further induced the voters to ignore the nu- ed toward the Leave option, while the best- merous intermediate solutions that might educated, younger (below age forty-five) have been worked out through bargaining voters welcomed diversity within Britain following the formal declaration of Brexit. because they could “compete with ease in One of the damages the reliance on the ple- an internationalised labour market.”8 biscitarian method can do stems from its How has the Brexit referendum per- one-sided fixation on voting at the expense formed in realizing the democratic prin- of the two other modes of democratic po- ciple of equality of political rights to make litical communication: arguing and bar- one’s voice heard? Good democrats know gaining.6 Plebiscitarian procedures thus that those affected by the law must have a impoverish the tool box of democratic pol- voice in making the law. Yet voting rights itics by eliminating the space for postvot- in the Brexit case became effective only by ing reasoning and compromise-finding in passing three filters: First, in the United the institutional framework of representa- Kingdom, you must be a citizen, not just a tive democracy. They privilege the fast, im- resident, to be eligible for voter registration pulsive snapshot reaction generated by pas- in national elections/referenda. Millions of sions and visceral instincts over the more mainland eu citizens residing in the Unit- time-consuming balancing of interests and ed Kingdom were thus not allowed to regis- the typically lengthier process of persuasion ter and vote. That would be immaterial had through argument. As a consequence, con- the referendum been on a “purely British” sistency is not required: voters can simulta- issue. But here the category of people most neously opt for lower taxes and greater ex- directly affected by Brexit are exactly those penditures, or for cheaper gas and stricter migrant workers from member states re- environmental standards. siding in the United Kingdom. After Brex- Not only were the two major parties split it, these migrant workers are likely to be de- in their preferences between Remain and prived of some or all of their socioeconomic Leave, but voters were also “cross-pres- rights as eu citizens.9 sured” at the individual level. Many voters Second, you must register in order to be were motivated by the issues of immigra- admitted to the voting booth. “Many peo- tion and “sovereignty,” with the support for ple chose not to register to vote because the Leave alternative fueled by an identity- they feared the debt collection agencies based opposition to having to adopt “for- that are allowed access to the electoral reg- eign-made” eu laws (“let’s take back con- ister.”10 As many as seven million eligible trol of our country”). Yet, at the same time, adults were not registered to vote in the many of the same voters “regarded the eco- United Kingdom in 2016, perhaps in part nomic impact of leaving the eu negatively. due to that deterrence effect. . . . No less than 40 [percent] reckoned that Third, you must vote. Thirteen million re- Britain would be worse off economically if gistered voters did not turn out. They were it left the eu. . . . The two central issues of the disproportionally young, renters, mem- campaign were seemingly pulling voters in bers of ethnic minorities, and recent mov- opposite directions.”7 Fears for the econo- ers. Older people voted in greater propor- my, based on socioeconomic interest, pro- tion. They generally voted for Leave, while vided a reason for voting in favor of Remain. among those aged eighteen to twenty-four,

146 (3) Summer 2017 19 What 73 percent voted (if they voted) for Remain. sions of the largely unanticipated referen- Democratic But the youngest age groups also had the dum outcome (for Britain and for the geo- Theorists Can Learn largest share of abstainers. Again, a paradox political role of the eu and its prospects for from the shows up in that those affected by the out- further disintegration), over four million 2016 Brexit Decision come for the longest time span (the young) voters signed a petition in the days after the had the lowest impact on that outcome, and referendum that called for holding a second those least affected the greatest impact. referendum, thus indicating a widespread So much for the democratic egalitarian- sense of regret, as well as alarm, over the ism of voting in referenda. In regular elec- outcome. Yet such a repetition would seem- tions, contending political parties provide ingly have required another Referendum some guidance to voters and tend to make Act as its legal basis. It would have opened an effort to mobilize in demographically the horrifying perspective of an endless balanced ways. Now another problem of chain of further referenda on the outcomes referenda is that there is no way to make of prior referenda: vote until the outcome sure that the answer voters give is actually seems right! If the first is seen by voters as their answer to the specific question they ill-considered and in need of self-correc- are asked: in this case the question of eu tion, why should the second fare better?13 membership or not. Chances are that the How can the decision to let the relative answer the Leavers gave was the answer to majority of those participating in the ref- an entirely different question, such as: “Do erendum decide on a complex, highly con- you want to seize the opportunity to send sequential yet, at the same time, most un- a hostile message and cause trouble to the predictable national issue be justified as the hated political establishment–be it the na- “right” procedural decision–rather than as tional or the one in Brussels?”11 If this is the the (eventually failed) opportunistic calcu- question being actually answered (and an- lus of a leading politician to maintain his swering “yes” is less inhibited because of power over his party and the country? In a widespread belief that the Remain camp other words: what is this outcome’s pro- would win anyway), there is no reason for cedural source of validity and normative voters to stick to their answer for even a sin- bindingness? The procedural design of the gle day after the vote. When surveyed im- Referendum Act was ill-considered. It failed mediately after the referendum, “7 [per- to make use of the several safety valves cent] of those who voted Leave feel like they that can be applied in referenda in order to did not make the right choice,” while no strengthen the normative bindingness, or less than 29 percent considered their vote legitimacy, of the outcome: that is, its pros- instrumentally futile as the two goals of the pects of being durably and universally rec- Leave campaign could not, in fact, both be ognized as reasonable and hence valid, rath- accomplished in the upcoming Brexit nego- er than as a regrettable collective misstep. tiations with the eu: namely, the interest- For one thing, a quorum, or minimally re- related goal to stay in the single market and quired turnout of voters, could have been enjoy its economic advantages and the iden- stipulated, such as a 75 percent require- tity-related goal to limit freedom of move- ment. The stipulation of such a threshold, ment of eu citizens and to “take back con- however, might have provided the oppor- trol.”12 Concerns of interest and those of tunity for the Remain side to sabotage the identity seem to have pulled voters in dif- referendum by launching an abstain cam- ferent directions. paign. Another possibility might be a super- Given the vast and highly uncertain majority requirement, such as a 60 percent short-term as well as long-term repercus- threshold for the winner.14 Adopting such a

20 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences supermajority rule would avoid deciding a whereas the voting public can only blame Claus matter of this magnitude by a slim and pos- itself (that is, nobody in particular, since the Offe sibly even accidental and unstable majority. vote is secret and nobody can be held ac- A third safety measure could have been the countable) in case the results of a referen- use of federal constraints. Given that the dum turn out to be widely seen as mistaken. United Kingdom is a multinational polit- A further provision that was, in fact, de- ical entity, one or more of its constituent ployed in the Brexit referendum was the pro- nations–Northern Ireland, Wales, and in cedural stipulation that the government is particular Scotland (where the Remain vote not strictly bound to implement the result, achieved a substantial majority)–could but can treat it as merely advisory. As sover- have been procedurally protected from de- eignty resides in Parliament, it is, arguably, feat by a (narrow) overall national major- that representative body that must eventu- ity by granting Scotland autonomy rights ally decide whether or not to endorse and concerning the issue of eu membership. implement, through its law-making, the In fact, the referendum result has strength- referendum decision. In theory, the only ened Scotland’s claim for national autono- thing that even the most sovereign body my, thus putting into political jeopardy the cannot do is abdicate its own law-making very unity of the United Kingdom. Finally, a powers and transfer them to another body, test vote (as sometimes taken in party groups such as the multitude of citizens voting in a of legislative bodies) could have been pro- referendum. It seems to follow that a prime vided, the result of which would have in- minister cannot self-bindingly promise formed voters about dispositions of their voters that he or she will follow their ex- fellow citizens and encourage them to re- pressed preferences as if they constituted vise or assert their own dispositions accord- an act of legislation. Absent a parliamen- ingly in the second (and only valid) round. tary or at least executive ratification of the Applying some or all of these provisions (presumed) popular will as expressed in a could have been justified by the fact that referendum, such a referendum cannot be the Brexit referendum was a one-shot and binding. For example, the invocation of Ar- highly consequential decision, which will ticle 50 of the Treaty on the European Union create consequences that are certain to be (teu)–the article that prescribes the first felt in the long term. In contrast, the “nor- step of the procedures of actually exiting mal” democratic procedure of holding con- the Union–must be an act of Parliament tested elections is defined by its periodic- or at least, if “royal prerogative” were to ap- ity, meaning that governing authority is ply (which is bitterly contested), a decision granted pro tempore and that losers of an of the prime minister, who in turn might election will have another chance in four be seen as in need of winning the legiti- or five years’ time, with both competing macy of her or his decision through an en- parties and members of the general public dorsement through regular elections (rath- given a learning opportunity to revise plat- er than a nonelectoral accession to office, forms and preferences during the interval. as in the case of Prime Minister Theresa An election constitutes both a government May). These manifold ambiguities and and an opposition of losers, while a refer- disputes illustrate the extent to which the endum constitutes a fait accompli that can “will of the people” is a largely elusive sub- no longer be challenged.15 If after an ordi- stance contingent on the procedures by nary legislative election, policies are consid- which it is being assessed. Holding a ref- ered to have gone wrong, there is someone erendum has not been, in the instance of to blame (and punish) in the next election, Brexit, a way to settle a question, but an in-

146 (3) Summer 2017 21 What advertent move to open a constitutional weeks, while the most prominent Leave pro- Democratic Pandora’s box. The attempt to fight pop- tagonist, Boris Johnson, moved up to the Theorists Can Learn ulism by adopting its own plebiscitarian position of Britain’s Foreign Secretary. The from the weapon has not only misfired, but has had new prime minister’s signature tautology– 2016 Brexit Decision a destructive impact upon the principle of “Brexit means Brexit,” being void of any in- representative government. formation about what Brexit means–rati- To be sure, a parliamentary validation of fies the unconditional surrender of repre- the referendum decision might well be the sentative to plebiscitarian will formation. It result of principled argument and prop- also gives carte blanche to rulers to define the er deliberation, weighing the merits of meaning ex post. As constitutional scholars the “advice” the voting public has offered Richard Gordon and Rowena Moffatt have against alternative policies. Yet the sover- stated with unfathomable yet inconclu- eignty of Parliament, in the sense of hav- sive juridical wisdom: “In practice, the . . . ing the last and decisive word, has largely referendum outcome will bind the govern- been rendered nominal by the referendum ment. In theory it is advisory but in reality and the legislature’s prior decision to hold its result will be decisive for what happens that referendum. By adopting the eu Refer- next.”17 At the time of the submission of endum Act, thereby (seemingly) passing its this essay in December 2016, the answer to legislative responsibilities to the “people,” this question is by no means settled by the the Parliament has virtually destroyed its referendum, but remains a pending case be- recognition as a body to be credited with fore the highest court of the country. the capacity to form policy on the basis of informed, considered, and balanced argu- Given all these premises, dilemmas, and ment. It has eschewed its responsibility to consequences, the Brexit referendum must do so, thereby confirming, in a way, the car- be considered a clear and unambiguous les- icature populists paint of members of the son on what democracies ought not to do. “political class.” If Parliament abdicates its Holding referenda with a 50 percent ma- law-making authority on as weighty an is- jority on important substantive policy issue as eu membership, what should pre- sues with substantial yet unknown long- vent it from doing so on other issues in the term results is a misguided remedy to the future?16 ills of liberal democracy. Referenda encour- Having unleashed the plebiscitarian forc- age the accountability-free expression of es voicing fear of foreign control and for- poorly considered mass preferences and eign migrants, neither the political par- de-emphasize requirements of consisten- ties nor the members of Parliament could cy, compromise-building, and the reflec- henceforth afford to advocate any solution on consequences. By inviting citizens tions to future uk-eu relations that could to leap into the dark, they create irrevoca- be denounced as defying the referendum’s ble facts and preclude learning. They often “advice.” Politicians cannot be expected betray minimal standards of rational policy to commit electoral suicide by refusing to formation, traces of which are institution- follow the “will of the people,” the expres- alized in even the most corrupted practices sion of which they themselves had allowed of parliamentary debate, party competition, for, even if only as part of a power game. and mass media reporting. They anonymize These problems (and not an electoral or par- the locus of accountability. If these critical liamentary defeat) made the committed Re- generalizations are only partly right, the mainer David Cameron disappear from the urgent question is: can we think of better scene of uk national politics in a matter of and smarter–more reliably “regret-avoid-

22 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences ing”–modes of making highly salient deci- can preference formation be improved so Claus sions? Otherwise, we may regret decisions as to make the citizen preferences that will Offe that fail to take sufficient account of the fu- later be translated into policies by govern- ture, other people, and the facts.18 How can ing elites more regret-proof? we minimize these forms of rational regret The first of these two major reorienta- while maintaining the basic tenets of liberal tions of democratic innovation involves democratic theory: namely, equality of civil complementing the universe of the adult and political rights, freedom of opinion, and permanent legal residents of the territory the division of state powers? The remain- of a state (or municipal entity or province), der of this essay will consist of a short and who are the ultimate source of popular sov- schematic account of what should be done ereignty, with a small body (“mini-public” instead on the basis of deliberative demo- or “deliberative panel”) of persons that is cratic theory. (as accurately as possible) statistically representative of the whole. Constituting ac- Apart from large literatures on new social tive citizenship by lot is an ancient idea, movements, civil society, and social capi- dating back to the times of Athenian de- tal, a major conceptual and theoretical in- mocracy (and found, to some degree, in novation in democratic theory over the last Renaissance Italian city republics), that fell generation has been the idea of deliberative into discredit in the course of the French democracy. Compared with conventional and American revolutions with the crypto- approaches in democratic political theory, aristocratic notion that the people can be deliberative theory performs a dual shift represented only through elected bodies of emphasis. In one shift that has become and leaders.20 Lotteries as a procedure of re- increasingly popular among theorists, and cruiting people for public roles are typically even to some degree in practice, delibera- regarded as risky because they rely on high- tion is brought to the public through a par- ly optimistic assumptions concerning both tial move from territorial representation to the readiness and the competence of those aleatory,19 or randomized, representation– chosen by lot to perform the needed public an analog to jury selection through sorti- roles. Yet both the readiness and compe- tion in the common law countries. This use tence objections can be dealt with through of randomly selected citizens also serves to appropriate institutional precautions. partially dissolve the conventional dichot- The readiness of randomly selected can- omy of ruling elites representing voting yet didates to assume the tasks assigned to them ruled nonelites. Few suggest replacing cur- by lot can be enhanced through a compen- rent political institutions with such bodies; sation that follows a rule of thumb such as they are intended to complement existing “no loss, no gain,” with a cap of, say, 150 per- institutions to help correct their known de- cent of the median income, depending on ficiencies. the complexity of the issue under consid- The second shift moves from an ideal eration. To enhance that readiness, the du- of maximizing the citizens’ expression of ration of the time in “office” might also be political preferences (in participatory de- limited to a maximum of six months, for ex- mocracy, as many people as possible should ample. Nevertheless, civic duty to partici- have a chance to voice their preferences on pate in deliberative mini-publics will proba- as many issues as possible and as directly as bly remain hard to enforce, and participants possible) to maximizing the citizens’ capac- who see themselves as being coerced will ity to form preferences and judgments on likely not properly perform. Techniques of public affairs they will not later regret. How stratified sampling may offer a solution in

146 (3) Summer 2017 23 What case the characteristics of the sample devi- els would perform a purely consultative Democratic ate far (by gender, age, socioeconomic, ed- function,21 helping citizens form prefer- Theorists Can Learn ucational, and minority status) from those ences that they would then express in elec- from the of the constituency as a whole. The logisti- tions and possibly referenda. And citi- 2016 Brexit Decision cal problems of organizing face-to-face de- zens must be provided access to those rec- liberation sessions on national legislation ommendations through the reporting of in geographically large countries might be print media, brochures, and (public) elec- alleviated by first selecting (possibly, again, tronic media. The role of deliberative bod- by lot) two municipal units from which the ies should be strictly advisory, addressing samples are to be drawn. Although in com- both elites and voters. That role should posing that sample a measure of self-selec- also be limited to the specific issue of pub- tion cannot be avoided, the statistical repre- lic policy about which a deliberative panel sentativeness of members of the mini-pub- is commissioned to elaborate a recommen- lics thus selected should be much superior dation. The lay policy-makers who jointly to that of the composition of ordinary legis- author such a recommendation may con- lative bodies. The relatively small size of de- clude with a consensual recommendation liberative panels (probably fewer than one or with majority and minority positions. In hundred candidates) must be big enough the latter case, a second order consensus on to allow for representativeness on all rele- what stood in the way of a consensual rec- vant variables, yet small enough to allow ommendation should be provided. The two for serious and inclusive face-to-face argu- panels may also disagree in their consensu- ing under the supervision of a trained facil- al recommendations. If the recommenda- itator. The virtue of lottery representation tion is both consensual within panels and would consist not only in providing a polit- identical between the two locations, this is ical role to ordinary citizens, but in deny- likely to translate into the highest degree ing such a role to political parties and orga- of persuasiveness and impact on elector- nized interests. Unlike the parties and inter- al outcomes. This impact is due to the en- est groups, randomly selected citizens are lightened vicarious judgment that “people unlikely to have the interest or the capac- like us” have formed on the issue at hand. ity to entrench themselves in their public The more consensual the recommendation role of deliberators. within and between panels, the stronger its Even thornier than the issue of readi- influence ought to be and probably will be ness to participate is the issue of compe- on the decisions that voters and elected rep- tence. Members of issue-specific deliber- resentatives will make. ative panels need to acquire a measure of The premise from which theorists of de- understanding and expertise, as do mem- liberative democracy by sortition start is bers of legislative bodies, in order to ar- the assumption that citizens do not simply rive at minimally reasoned conclusions. have political preferences and attitudes, in- Such expertise can be provided by an ade- cluding preferences and aversions to par- quate number and diversity of recognized ticular policies. Rather, they continuously experts made available to members of a form these preferences in a process of on- mini-public as providers of information. going confirmation, revision, and learn- Concerns about deficiencies in the knowl- ing. Most of the time and on most issues, edge and experience of members of delib- most peoples’ preferences are incomplete, erative mini-publics are further reduced by inconsistent, insufficiently informed, con- the fact that no political decision-making tingent, fluid, and subject to relations of power is vested in them. Deliberative pan- trust, as when we adopt the point of view

24 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences of others because we happen to feel con- to some “most different” design) selected Claus fident about the adequacy of their judg- subterritorial entities (counties or cities). A Offe ment. The capacity of forming thoroughly statute would regulate the size of the panel, considered judgment can today no longer the sampling method, the mode of oper- be vested in individual representatives (as ation (including a budget for expert assis- Burke claimed), but must emerge from the tance and compensation payments), the discursive confrontation of diverse mem- role of facilitators and moderators, and bers of an organized body. The key demo- the scheduling of meetings. Their work of cratic act of voting is about the expression (at most) six months would result in poli- of preferences, whereas the activity taking cy recommendations (consensual or other- place in randomized deliberative panels wise) in the form of an executive summary, (as well as, mostly implicitly, in many oth- together with the reasoning from which er theaters, such as peer groups, schools, re- the recommendations derive. The identity ligious communities, media, the arts, con- of members would ideally be kept anony- sumption, and not least the political pro- mous through the time of deliberations so cess itself ) is that of the formation and as to shield the deliberators from outside in- (de)consolidation of those preferences fluence. Neither governments nor citizens through learning. The presence of deliber- would be pressured to follow those poli- ative panels–and the public perception of cy recommendations. Governments (and, the conclusions they arrive at–allows ordi- perhaps, political parties) might, however, nary citizens to get an idea about what hap- be formally required to publish an official pens when “people like us” spend time and statement specifying the reasons why they energy on refining their preferences, find- did not follow the advice, in cases in which ing out for themselves and others what they they decide not to do so. hold to be the right position on particular It is impossible to know whether the out- policy issues. The role of the citizen delib- come of the Brexit decision would have erators will be strictly limited to that of an been different if it had been processed advisory agency assisting citizens (includ- through an institutional arrangement of ing elected and appointed officials) in the will formation such as the one just out- process of their will formation. lined. Whatever the answer, British voters For such reflexive preference learning to and elites would at least have been more take place at the level of mass constituen- certain that they made the right decision cies, deliberative panels need to be institu- than they can possibly be after the experi- tionalized: that is, made part of the rules ence of the Brexit referendum. regulating the process of legislation. To illustrate, one conceivable institutional design would be the following. A deliberative panel would come into being at the initiative of at least 20 percent of the members of the state or federal legislature. These members would also define the policy issue on which the panel is commissioned to deliberate. The panel would deliberate one year prior to a decision to be taken by the legislature or executive branch on the policy. Such panels would always come in pairs, with both being active in two (according

146 (3) Summer 2017 25 What endnotes Democratic 1 Theorists This generalization does not apply to the Chinese case of industrial capitalism presided over Can Learn by a “Communist” party. But that model is neither intended for export nor appealing to elites from the or masses of Western societies. 2016 Brexit 2 Decision The day after the referendum, Philip Stephens, chief political commentator of the Financial Times, commented in undisguised horror: “Who would have thought pragmatic, moderate, incrementalist Britain would tear down the political temple? This week’s referendum result was a revolt against the status quo with consequences, national and international, as profound as anything seen in postwar Europe.” Philip Stephens, “How a Cautious Nation Came to Tear Down the Political Temple,” Financial Times, June 24, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/ b90a7278-3a02-11e6-9a05-82a9b15a8ee7. 3 The ironic label “post-truth” has been attached by several commentators to populist move- ment practices. This label is not only deserved by the generous use populist campaigns have made of outright lies, but also, as in the Trump campaign, by their anti-intellectual aversion to expertise and educated intelligence. 4 Princeton economist Ashoka Mody has put it well: “Cameron misjudged . . . by making an economic case for remaining in the European Union rather than attempting a serious political argument for Europe–one based on shared values.” Ashoka Mody, “Don’t Panic: Britain’s Economy Can Survive Just Fine Outside the European Union,” Independent, July 4, 2016, http:// www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/dont-panic-britains-economy -can-survive-just-fine-outside-the-european-union-a7118736.html. 5 There is more than a grain of truth in Edmund Burke’s famous claim: “Your representative owes you . . . his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.” In the case of Brexit, it was the plain cowardice of representatives facing a populist challenger that caused this sacrifice. Edmund Burke, “Speech to the Electors of Bristol,” November 3, 1774. 6 Jon Elster, “Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies,” Journal of Constitutional Law 2 (2) (March 2000): 345–421. 7 John Curtice, “Brexit: Behind the Referendum,” Political Insight 7 (2) (2016), http://pli.sagepub .com/content/7/2/4.full.pdf+html. 8 Ibid. Wolfgang Streeck has argued that “the losers under neoliberal internationalism [globalization] place their hopes on their nation states.” Wolfgang Streeck, “Where Are We Now? Responses to the Referendum,” London Review of Books 38 (4) (July 14, 2016), http://www.lrb .co.uk/v38/n14/on-brexit/where-are-we-now#streeck. This causal explanation of the outcome commands a great deal of empirical plausibility. But equally great is the temptation to exclaim, with the words of the great Austrian poet Ernst Jandl, “What an error!” 9 A reciprocal loss of socioeconomic status rights applies to British citizens who were economically active in eu member states and, after Brexit, are now relegated to the status of third country nationals. 10 Benjamin D. Hennig and Danny Dorling, “In Focus: The eu Referendum,” Political Insight 7 (2) (2016), http://pli.sagepub.com/content/7/2/20.full. 11 This was widely seen by commentators to have happened in a Dutch referendum held on the highly technical as well as politically rather marginal issue of a Dutch Approval Act on a Eu- ropean Union–Ukraine Association Agreement, which was held in The Netherlands on April 6, 2016. The outcome was a turnout of 32.8 percent, with 61 percent voting against the Act. In an interview after the referendum, the members of the rightist nationalist Citizens’ Commit- tee eu that had successfully campaigned for holding it admitted not caring about Ukraine, but rather were just against the eu political system. See Wilmer Heck, “Oekraïne kan ons niets schelen,” ncr, March 31, 2016, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/03/31/oekraine-kan -ons-niets-schelen-1606419-a969298.

26 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 12 See James Crouch, “Voters React to Post-Referendum World,” Opinium, July 1, 2016, http:// Claus opinium.co.uk/voters-react-to-post-referendum-world/. The thought that voting for Brexit Offe means “taking back control” is plainly delusionary, at least in the short and medium term. Article 50, which is still binding for the United Kingdom, stipulates that “the Union shall ne- gotiate and conclude an agreement with [the uk].” In the interest of the Union to prevent the Brexit decision from becoming a template that other member states might follow, the eu is likely to opt for the harshest possible terms in negotiating Britain’s exit arrangement, thus “taking control” over the economic fates of the United Kingdom to an unprecedented extent. The Lisbon Treaty, Article 50 of the Treaty of European Union, December 13, 2007. 13 There is, however, a strong argument for having a second referendum at a later point. As the proponents of Brexit had no plan (and could not have one) concerning the many and very different versions of what is going to happen next in re-embedding Britain into the international political economy, the eventual outcome of negotiations with the eu must also be subject to a (dis)approval by voters. As Simon Wren-Lewis has cogently argued: “I cannot see the logic in saying people should have a direct say in whether to leave the eu, but no direct say on what to leave for.” Simon Wren-Lewis, “Why We Must Have a Second Brexit Referendum,” Social Europe, August 29, 2016, https://www.socialeurope.eu/2016/08/must-second-brexit-referendum/. The emphasis is mine. 14 As one commentator has noted: “It is highly unusual [in mature democracies] that, particularly on issues of great constitutional significance, a simple majority of those who happened to vote on a particular day should be regarded as binding.” Brendan Donnelly, “After Brexit: The Light at the End of the Tunnel is Several Oncoming Trains,” Social Europe, July 18, 2016, https://www.socialeurope.eu/2016/07/light-end-tunnel-several-oncoming-trains/. 15 “The 48 [percent] of voters . . . who wanted to remain in the European Union now suddenly find themselves substantially unrepresented in the British Parliament.” Ibid. 16 This question touches on the thorny issue, not to be dealt with in the present essay, of what kind of policy issues are “safe” to be processed by plebiscitarian methods. Referenda on con- stitutions can arguably enhance the self-binding effect and thus the constitution’s validity and longevity. The adoption of legal rules, the consequences of which are easily understood, predictable, and largely uncontroversial (such as local referenda on opening hours of stores), would also seem unproblematic. The same can surely not be said of the plebiscitarian adoption, now common in several eu countries, of rules that discriminate against moral, ethnic, migratory, sexual, religious, or criminal minorities (as in the current initiative of the Turk- ish president to hold a referendum on the reintroduction of the death penalty). 17 Richard Gordon and Rowena Moffatt, Brexit: The Immediate Legal Consequences (London: The Constitution Society, 2016), 7. 18 Future-regardingness, other-regardingness, and fact-regardingness can serve, taken together, as a standard of political rationality. See Claus Offe, “Crisis and Innovation of Liberal De- mocracy: Can Deliberation Be Institutionalised?” in Citizens in Europe: Essays on Democracy, Con- stitutionalism and European Integration, ed. Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss (Colchester, United Kingdom: ecpr Press, 2016), 73–98. 19 See Hubertus Buchstein, “Elective and Aleatory Parliamentarism,” in Parliamentarism and Dem- ocratic Theory, ed. Kari Palonen and José María Rosales (Opladen, Germany: Budrich, 2015), 255–278; and David van Reybrouck, Against Elections: The Case for Democracy (London: The Bod- ley Head, 2016). Some also use the word “sortition” and others “the lot” to describe this feature of representation through random selection. 20 Rousseau was still convinced that a democracy must be built on a mix of territorial and aleatory representation. See chapter three of book four of Jean Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social. 21 See Patrizia Nanz and Claus Leggewie, Die Konsultative: Mehr Demokratie durch Bürgerbeteiligung (Berlin: Wagenbach, 2016). See also Baogang He and Mark E. Warren, “Authoritarian De- liberation in China,” Dædalus 146 (3) (2017) for the spectrum between advisory/consultative deliberative panels and empowered ones.

146 (3) Summer 2017 27 Twelve Key Findings in Deliberative Democracy Research

Nicole Curato, John S. Dryzek, Selen A. Ercan, Carolyn M. Hendriks & Simon Niemeyer

Abstract: This essay reflects on the development of the field of deliberative democracy by discussing twelve key findings that capture a number of resolved issues in normative theory, conceptual clarification, and associated empirical results. We argue that these findings deserve to be more widely recognized and viewed as a foundation for future practice and research. We draw on our own research and that of others in the field.

Deliberative democracy is a normative project grounded in political theory. And political theorists make a living in large part by disagreeing with and criticizing each other. In fact, it is possible to evaluate the success of a political theory by the number NICOLE CURATO is Australian Re- of critics it attracts, and the vitality of its intramural search Council Discovery Early Ca- disputes. By this measure, deliberative democracy is reer Research Fellow at the Uni- versity of Canberra. very successful indeed. Yet if the normative project is to progress and be applied effectively in practice, JOHN S. DRYZEK is Australian Re- it needs to lay some issues to rest. search Council Laureate Fellow Deliberative democracy is not just the area of con- and Centenary Professor at the University of Canberra. tention that its standing as a normative political theory would suggest. It is also home to a large volume of SELEN A. ERCAN is Senior Re- empirical social science research that, at its best, pro- search Fellow at the University of ceeds in dialogue with the normative theory. Indeed, Canberra. the field is exemplary in this combination of politi- CAROLYN M. HENDRIKS is Asso- cal theory and empirical research. Deliberative ideas ciate Professor at the Australian have also attracted the attention of citizens, activists, National University. reform organizations, and decision-makers around SIMON NIEMEYER is Australian the world. The practical uptake of deliberative ideas Research Council Future Fellow at in political innovation provides a rich source of les- the University of Canberra. sons from experience that can be added to theoriz- (*See endnotes for complete contributor ing and social science. This combination has prov- biographies.) en extremely fruitful. Rather than proving or falsi-

28 fying key hypotheses, deliberative practice Deliberation is essential to democracy. Social Nicole Curato, has sharpened the focus of the normative choice theory appears to demonstrate that John S. Dryzek, Selen A. Ercan, project, showing how it can be applied in democratic politics must be plagued by ar- Carolyn M. many different contexts. bitrariness and instability in collective de- Hendriks & We believe that conceptual analysis, logic, cision. Notably, for political scientist Wil- Simon Niemeyer empirical study, normative theorizing, and liam Riker, clever politicians can manipu- the refinement of deliberative practice have late agendas and the order in which votes set at least some controversies to rest, and are taken to ensure their preferred option we provide the following set of twelve key wins.8 But if their opponents are also clever, findings that can be used as the basis for fur- they can do the same. And in that case, there ther developments. can be no stable will of the people that can possibly be revealed by voting (in, say, a leg- Deliberative democracy is realistic. Skeptics islature). So, how can meaning and stability have questioned the practical viability of de- be restored to democracy? There are essen- liberative democracy: its ideals have been tially two mechanisms, once dictatorship is criticized as utopian and its forums have ruled out. The first is what rational choice been dismissed as mere experiments, with theorist Kenneth Shepsle calls “structure no hope of being institutionalized effec- induced equilibrium,” under which formal tively.1 rules and informal understandings restrict But skeptics have been proved wrong by strategizing, including the ability to manip- the many and diverse deliberative innova- ulate agendas and the order in which votes tions that have been implemented in a va- are taken.9 The second is deliberation. riety of political systems.2 Both state and Political theorist David Miller and, lat- nonstate institutions demand more deliber- er, John Dryzek and political philosopher ative forms of citizen engagement. Policy- Christian List have demonstrated formal- makers and politicians convene citizens’ fo- ly that deliberation can, among other re- rums to elicit informed views on particular sponses: 1) induce agreement to restrict the issues.3 Studies find that deliberating citi- ability of actors to introduce new options zens can and do influence policies, though that destabilize the decision process and impacts vary and can be indirect.4 Delib- 2) structure the preferences of participants erative forums are also being implement- such that they become “single-peaked” ed in parliamentary and electoral contexts.5 along one dimension, thus reducing the Outside the state, citizen forums are funded prevalence of manipulable cycles across and implemented variously by civil society alternatives (in which option A beats B in a organizations, think tanks, corporations, majority vote, B beats C, and C beats A).10 and international organizations to advance Empirical research confirms this effect.11 a particular cause, foster public debate, or This result explains why all democratic promote democratic reform.6 settings, in practice, feature some combina- The recent turn toward deliberative sys- tion of communication, which can be more tems demonstrates that deliberative demo- or less deliberative, and formal and infor- cratic ideals can be pursued on a large scale mal rules. The more deliberative the com- in ways that link particular forums and munication, the better democracy works. more informal practices, such as commu- Democracy must be deliberative. nication in old and new media.7 Delibera- Deliberation is more than discussion. Delib- tive democracy is not utopian; it is already erative democracy is talk-centric. But talk implemented within, outside, and across alone can be pathological, producing wild- governmental institutions worldwide. ly mixed results from an ideal deliberative

146 (3) Summer 2017 29 Twelve Key perspective.12 Resolution here requires dis- tique has been raised by political theorist Findings in tinguishing carefully between deliberation Chantal Mouffe, who criticizes delibera- Deliberative Democracy and discussion. tive democrats for missing the crucial role Research Empirical observation reveals that de- that passion plays in politics and for em- liberation is more complex than original- phasizing the rationalism of liberal dem- ly theorized, involving both dispositional ocratic political thought.20 and procedural components. The purely Deliberative democrats have responded procedural rationalist model of delibera- by foregrounding the varied articulations of tion is normatively problematic because it reason-giving and consensus requirements is empirically questionable.13 Distinguish- of deliberation. Most have acknowledged ing between deliberation and discussion in- political philosopher Iris Young’s concep- troduces an emotional dimension in which tion of “communicative democracy” and dispositional factors, such as open-minded- have conditionally embraced greeting, rhet- ness, are important.14 oric, humor, testimonies, storytelling, and The overall content of this disposition other sorts of communication.21 Even the has more recently been referred to as the originally somewhat rationalistic criteria “deliberative stance,” which political the- of the widely used Discourse Quality Index orists David Owen and Graham Smith have have evolved to include storytelling as one defined as “a relation to others as equals en- indicator, recognizing the importance of gaged in mutual exchange of reasons orient- personal narratives in political claim-mak- ed as if to reaching a shared practical judge- ing.22 Recent developments in deliberative ment.”15 Achieving a deliberative stance in theory have begun to recognize the plurali- citizen deliberation involves careful facili- ty of speech cultures. The turn to delibera- tation and attention to “emotional interac- tive systems has emphasized multiple sites tion.”16 Its achievement in group settings of communication, each of which can host can be a pleasurable experience and consis- various forms of speech that can enrich the tent with ideals of human cognition.17 Scal- inclusive character of a deliberative system. ing these effects up to the wider deliberative The increasing attention paid to delibera- system requires careful attention to institu- tive cultures is also part of this trajectory, tional settings.18 in which systems of meanings and norms Deliberative democracy involves multiple sorts in diverse cultural contexts are unpacked of communication. Some democrats have to understand the different ways political charged deliberative democracy with be- agents take part in deliberative politics.23 ing overly rationalistic. For political scien- Deliberation is for all. The charge of elitism tist Lynn Sanders, deliberation works un- was one of the earliest criticisms of delib- democratically for it excludes “those who erative democratic theory: that only privi- are less likely to present their arguments in leged, educated citizens have access to the ways that we recognize as characteristical- language and procedures of deliberation. ly deliberative.”19 Sanders refers to wom- However, empirical research has estab- en, racial minorities, and the poor, whose lished the inclusive, rather than elitist, char- speech cultures depart from “rationalist” acter of deliberative democracy. forms of discourse that privilege dispas- Findings in deliberative experiments sionate argumentation, logical coherence, suggest that deliberation can temper rath- and evidence-based claims as practiced in er than reinforce elite power. Political sci- the most exclusive kinds of scholarly de- entists James Druckman and Kjersten Nel- bates, parliamentary procedures, and judi- son have shown how citizen conversations cial argumentation. A similar kind of cri- can vitiate the influence of elite framing.24

30 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Simon Niemeyer has shown how deliber- participants that are less partisan, using Nicole Curato, ative mini-publics, such as citizens’ juries independent facilitators, or ensuring de- John S. Dryzek, Selen A. Ercan, (composed of a relatively small number of liberations are public. Carolyn M. lay citizens), can see through “symbolic pol- Empowering or generative forms of Hendriks & itics” and elite manipulation of public dis- power are central to the communicative Simon Niemeyer course through spin doctoring.25 Real- force of deliberative governance.31 Author- world deliberative processes provide con- itative power is also necessary for delib- siderable evidence on deliberation’s poten- erative democracy, which requires lead- tial to build capacities of traditionally mar- ers who are receptive to the concerns of ginalized groups. Economist Vijayendra affected publics and have the legitimate Rao and sociologist Paromita Sanyal’s work authority to consider and act on the pub- on gram sabhas in South India is a landmark lic’s preferences and concerns.32 Actors in study, demonstrating village-level deliber- and around deliberative processes can also ations’ capacity to mobilize civic agency strategize to advance agendas and address among the poor, counteracting resource inequalities.33 scarcity and social stratification.26 Brazil’s Deliberative democrats recognize that National Public Policy Conferences–one coercive power pervades social relations, of the biggest nationally successful exercis- but understand that certain kinds of power es in public deliberation–illustrate how or- are needed to maintain order in a deliber- dinary citizens influence public policy once ative process, to address inequalities, and they acquire the opportunity to take part in to implement decisions.34 consequential deliberation.27 Productive deliberation is plural, not consen- These examples illustrate deliberative de- sual. A seeming commitment to the pursuit mocracy’s record in curtailing, rather than of consensus–that is, agreement on both perpetuating, elite domination by creating a course of action and the reasons for it– space for ordinary political actors to create, once provided a target for critics of delib- contest, and reflect upon ideas, options, and erative democracy, who stressed its other- discourses. worldly character and silencing of dissident Deliberative democracy has a nuanced view voices.35 However, contrary to these argu- of power. Early critics of deliberative de- ments, deliberative democrats have rare- mocracy worried about its political na- ly endorsed consensus as an aspiration for iveté, particularly its neglect of power and real-world decision-making (as opposed to strategy.28 However, deliberative democ- one theoretical reference point). racy is not naive about power, but rather Decision-making in deliberative de- has a nuanced approach to it. mocracy can involve voting, negotiation, In the deliberative ideal, coercive forms or workable agreements that entail agree- of power, defined as the threat of sanction ment on a course of action, but not on the or use of force against another’s interests, reasons for it. All of these benefit from de- are absent because they distort communi- liberation, which can involve clarification cation.29 But deliberative practice reveals of the sources of disagreement, and under- that coercive power is ubiquitous: it per- standing the reasons of others. Rather than vades the very process of argumentation consensus, deliberation should recognize and communication, affects the remit and pluralism and strive for metaconsensus, organization of deliberative procedures, which involves mutual recognition of the and shapes the broader policy context.30 legitimacy of the different values, prefer- Procedural designs can, however, limit ences, judgments, and discourses held by coercive power by, for example, selecting other participants.36

146 (3) Summer 2017 31 Twelve Key At first sight, this acceptance of plural- practice par excellence, but rather are used Findings in ism and metaconsensus might seem to as a tool to democratize other facets of po- Deliberative Democracy contradict the findings of political scientist litical life and deepen the quality of political Research Jürg Steiner and colleagues that the more participation. consensual a system of government, the Second, the political projects of partici- better the quality of deliberation that oc- patory and deliberative democracy are in- curs in its legislature. Consensual democ- timately linked. Pateman’s aspirations for a racies–notably the Nordic countries, The “participatory society,” in which various as- Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland– pects of our social and political lives are de- are also arguably the world’s most success- mocratized, are not distinct from delibera- ful states on a variety of indicators, sug- tive democrats’ vision of a society in which gesting a strong correlation between delib- all citizens affected by a decision have ca- eration and public policy success, though pacities and opportunities to deliberate in correlation here does not necessarily imply the public sphere.39 This has been articulat- causality. However, the concept of consen- ed by “macro” deliberative theorists, whose sual liberal democratic states (as opposed focus is to improve the quality of political to adversarial) does not imply consensus in participation in the public sphere, whether the strong sense we identified. Consensu- online or offline, mediated or face-to-face, al states are still pluralistic, but their plu- such that citizens can affect political pro- ralism is channeled into workable agree- cesses on issues they care about. ments, not adversarial point-scoring. Deliberative transformation takes time. De- Participation and deliberation go together. A liberation by definition requires amena- sharp distinction between participation bility to preference transformation, but and deliberation is drawn by political theo- such transformation may not be a good rist Carole Pateman, who argues that delib- measure of the quality of deliberation.40 erative democrats have shown “little inter- While large changes in preferences can est in the last thirty years of participatory occur early in deliberative processes, this promotion” and instead focus on mini-pub- change can reflect anticipation of absorb- lics or “new deliberative bodies.”37 ing information and group deliberation as This distinction misfires. First, while it much as the effect of deliberation proper.41 is true that a large number of deliberative The goal of deliberation is for citizens scholars research mini-publics, these stud- to determine reflectively not only prefer- ies are motivated by the desire to better un- ences, but also the reasons that support derstand how lessons learned from small- them.42 As we have already noted, at the scale deliberative forums can be scaled up group level, this involves the formation of to mass democracies and enhance the qual- a kind of metaconsensus featuring mutu- ity of political participation. So, for exam- al recognition of the manner in which be- ple, John Dryzek and ecological economist liefs and values map onto preferences.43 Alex Lo have shown how particular rhetor- This process takes time and deliberation ical moves can increase the quality of rea- does not necessarily follow a smooth path. soning in a mini-public, which has direct Initial changes to preferences can even be implications for how climate change should partially reversed. The initial opening up be communicated in the public sphere (fur- of minds (as part of taking a deliberative ther examples will be provided in our dis- stance) and uptake of information rep- cussions of time, group polarization, and resents a dramatic threshold in the transi- divided societies).38 Mini-publics, in other tion toward deliberation proper, producing words, are not valorized as democratic changes that represent catharsis as much as

32 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences deliberation. It is subsequent reflection that Their experiment involved citizens delib- Nicole Curato, produces deliberative preferences, only af- erating immigration in Finland, and after John S. Dryzek, 44 Selen A. Ercan, ter the stance is achieved. Consequently, deliberation, a group that was moderate- Carolyn M. reported results from very short delibera- ly to extremely hostile to immigrants shift- Hendriks & tive processes may only reflect the path to- ed toward a generally more tolerant opin- Simon Niemeyer ward, rather than the result of, deliberation. ion. After unstructured discussion, a simi- True deliberative transformation takes lon- lar group was, on average, more extreme. ger than that. Deliberation does, then, provide solutions Deliberation is the solution to group polariza- to group polarization, most obviously when tion. Cass Sunstein has claimed that a “law it moves beyond unstructured discussion. of group polarization” causes “deliberative Deliberative democracy applies to deeply di- trouble.”45 For if a group is made up of peo- vided societies. Deeply divided societies char- ple whose opinions range from moderate acterized by mutually exclusive religious, to extreme on an issue, after deliberation, national, racial, or ethnic identity claims the group’s average position will be closer challenge any kind of democratic politics, to the extreme. Thus, deliberation leads to including deliberative politics, which some unhealthy political polarization. There are skeptics believe belongs only in more order- three reasons why deliberative democracy ly and less fraught settings. Popular politi- does not succumb to this. cal solutions for deeply divided societies in- First, polarization depends crucially on stead involve power-sharing negotiated by group homogeneity, in which initial opin- elites from different blocs, leaving no space ions vary from moderate to extreme in a for public deliberation (indeed, communi- single direction, such as the degree of de- cation of any sort) across the divide.49 nial of climate science or the degree of sup- There is, however, growing empirical ev- port for public education. For anyone de- idence showing that deliberative practic- signing a deliberative forum, the solution es can flourish in deeply divided societies is simple: make sure there are participants to good effect, be it in association with, or from different sides on an issue. James at some distance from, power-sharing ar- Fishkin says this is exactly how his delib- rangements. Evidence comes from formats erative opinion polls resist polarization: a ranging from mixed-identity discussion random selection of participants ensures groups located in civil society to more struc- a variety of initial views.46 tured citizen forums with participants from Second, what Sunstein describes as polar- different sides.50 Mini-public experiments ization could, in many cases, be described as on deeply divided societies, for example, clarity. This is especially important for op- generate crucial lessons on how conversa- pressed groups struggling to find a voice.47 tions in the public sphere can be organized Talk with like-minded others can give peo- in such a way that they aid in forging mu- ple, individually and collectively, the confi- tual respect and understanding across dis- dence subsequently to enter the larger pub- cursive enclaves. As political scientist Rob- lic sphere; enclave deliberation can have ert Luskin and colleagues have noted, once positive effects in the deliberative system. assembled, conflicting groups in divided so- Third, political scientist Kimmo Grön- cieties can “have enough in common to per- lund and colleagues have demonstrated mit meaningful and constructive deliber- that polarization only applies under un- ation.”51 Such deliberation can promote structured conversation;48 polarization is recognition, mutual understanding, social not found when groups are run on standard learning about the other side, and even sol- deliberative principles with a facilitator. idarity across deep differences.52

146 (3) Summer 2017 33 Twelve Key Deliberative processes have been applied communicative dynamics of deliberative Findings in in divided societies such as South Africa, systems.57 Deliberative Democracy Turkey, Bosnia, Belgium, and Northern Deliberative democracy scholars deploy Research Ireland. Given the depth of the disagree- multiple research methods to shed light on ment among conflicting groups, delibera- diverse aspects of public deliberation in tive practices do not seek or yield consen- practice. Those who insist on using conven- sus (understood as universal agreement tional social science methods must recog- both on a course of action and the reasons nize that their results should be interpreted for it), but they play a crucial role in terms in light of this broader array of methods and of “working agreements” across the parties the breadth of understanding so enabled. to a conflict. Under the right conditions, deliberation in divided societies can help to We have surveyed what we believe to be bridge the deep conflicts across religious, a number of key resolved issues in the the- national, racial, and ethnic lines. ory, study, and practice of deliberative de- Deliberative research productively deploys di- mocracy. In a number of cases, we have re- verse methods. Standard social science meth- plied to critics skeptical of the desirability, ods, such as surveys and psychological ex- possibility, and applicability of delibera- periments, are often used to study deliberative democracy. Our intent is not, however, tion. However, they do not do full justice to to silence critics. Rather, we hope that their the ability of deliberators to develop their efforts can be more tightly focused on the own understanding of contexts, which can real vulnerabilities of the project, rather extend to the kinds of social science instru- than its imagined or discarded features. ments that are appropriate and to questions However, we suspect that, in practice, our that should be asked. Standard methods summary of key findings will be more use- have a hard time capturing these dynamic ful to those seeking to advance or study the aspects of deliberative opinion formation, project, rather than those trying to refute it. and they tell us nothing about the broader For these scholars and practitioners, identi- political or social context in which public fying the resolved issues will leave them free deliberation occurs.53 to concentrate on unresolved issues. Innovative quantitative methods have been developed to remedy these short- comings:54 they can involve analyzing the content of deliberations to assess deliberative practice against normative standards, to measure the quality of deliberation, and to evaluate the intersubjective consistency of deliberators across preferences and values.55 Qualitative and interpretive methods have also generated empirical insights into public deliberation, particularly through in-depth case studies. Methods such as in-depth interviews and observation have been used to examine the views and behavior of political actors in and around deliberative forums.56 Frame and narrative analysis have been used to map discourses and analyze the

34 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences endnotes Nicole Curato, * John S. Dryzek, Contributor Biographies: NICOLE CURATO is Australian Research Council Discovery Early Selen A. Ercan, Career Research Fellow at the Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis at the University Carolyn M. of Canberra, Australia. She has published articles in such journals as Policy Sciences, Policy Studies, Hendriks & and European Political Science Review. Simon Niemeyer JOHN S. DRYZEK is Australian Research Council Laureate Fellow and Centenary Professor in the Centre for Deliberative Democracy and Global Governance at the Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis at the University of Canberra, Australia. His recent books include Democratiz- ing Global Climate Governance (with Hayley Stevenson, 2014), Climate-Challenged Society (with Rich- ard B. Norgaard and David Schlosberg, 2013), and The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (third edition, 2013). SELEN A. ERCAN is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Deliberative Democracy and Global Governance at the Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis at the University of Canberra, Australia. She has published articles in such journals as International Political Science Review, Policy and Politics, Australian Journal of Political Science, and Critical Policy Studies. CAROLYN M. HENDRIKS is Associate Professor at the Crawford School of Public Policy at the Australian National University. She is the author of The Politics of Public Deliberation: Citizen En- gagement and Interest Advocacy (2011) and has published in such journals as Politics & Society, Po- litical Studies, and European Journal of Political Research. SIMON NIEMEYER is Australian Research Council Future Fellow at the Institute for Gover- nance and Policy Analysis at the University of Canberra, Australia. He has published articles in such journals as American Political Science Review, Politics & Society, Ethical Perspectives, and Australian Journal of Politics and History. 1 John Mueller, Capitalism, Democracy, and Ralph’s Pretty Good Grocery (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Daniel A. Bell, “Democratic Deliberation: The Problem of Im- plementation,” in Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement, ed. Stephen Macedo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 71–87. 2 Stephen A. Coleman, Anna Przybylska, and Yves Sintomer, eds., Deliberation and Democracy: Innovative Processes and Institutions (New York: Peter Lang, 2015). 3 Tina Nabatchi, John Gastil, G. Michael Weiksner, and Matt Leighninger, eds., Democracy in Motion: Evaluating the Practice and Impact of Deliberative Civic Engagement (Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 2012). 4 Gregory Barrett, Miriam Wyman, and Vera Schatten, “Assessing Policy Impacts of Delibera- tive Civic Engagement,” in ibid., 181–203. 5 Carolyn M. Hendriks, “Coupling Citizens and Elites in Deliberative Systems: The Role of In- stitutional Design,” European Journal of Political Research 55 (1) (2016): 43–60. 6 See Nabatchi et al., Democracy in Motion. 7 John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge, eds., Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 8 William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1982). 9 Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Institutional Agreements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models,” American Journal of Political Science 23 (1) (1979): 27–59. 10 David Miller, “Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice,” Political Studies 40 (1) (1992): 54– 67; and John S. Dryzek and Christian List, “Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation,” British Journal of Political Science 33 (1) (2003): 1–23. 11 Christian List, Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin, and Iain McLean, “Deliberation, Single-Peak- edness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy,” Journal of Politics 75 (1) (2013): 80–95.

146 (3) Summer 2017 35 Twelve Key 12 Tali Mendelberg, “The Deliberative Citizen: Theory and Evidence,” in Political Decision Making, Findings in Deliberation and Participation: Research in Micropolitics, vol. 6, ed. Michael X. Delli Carpini, Leonie Deliberative Huddy, and Robert Y. Shapiro (Greenwich, Conn.: jai Press, 2002), 151–193. Democracy Research 13 Iris Marion Young, “Justice, Inclusion, and Deliberative Democracy,” in Deliberative Politics, ed. Macedo, 151–158. 14 George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoughue, and Sudeep Bhatia, “Modelling the Interplay Be- tween Affect and Deliberation,” Decision 2 (2) (2015): 55–81; and Jason Barabas, “How De- liberation Affects Policy Opinions,” American Political Science Review 98 (4) (2004): 687–701. 15 David Owen and Graham Smith, “Survey Article: Deliberation, Democracy, and the Systemic Turn,” Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (2) (2015): 228. 16 Jane Mansbridge, Janette Hartz-Karp, Matthew Amengual, and John Gastil, “Norms of De- liberation: An Inductive Study,” Journal of Public Deliberation 2 (1) (2006). 17 Hugo Mercier and Hélène E. Landemore, “Reasoning is for Arguing: Understanding the Suc- cesses and Failures of Deliberation,” Political Psychology 33 (2) (2012): 243–258. 18 Simon J. Niemeyer, “Scaling Up Deliberation to Mass Publics: Harnessing Mini-Publics in a Deliberative System,” in Deliberative Mini-Publics: Practices, Promises, Pitfalls, ed. Kimmo Grön- lund, André Bächtiger, and Maija Setälä (Colchester, United Kingdom: ecpr Press, 2014). 19 Lynn M. Sanders, “Against Deliberation,” Political Theory 25 (3) (1997): 349. 20 Chantal Mouffe, “Politics and Passions: The Stakes of Democracy,” Ethical Perspectives 7 (2/3) (2000): 146–150. 21 Iris Marion Young, “Difference as a Resource for Democratic Communication,” in Delibera- tive Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, ed. James F. Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: The mit Press, 1997), 383–406. 22 Jürg Steiner, André Bächtiger, Markus Spörndli, and Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action: Analyzing Parliamentary Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 23 Jensen Sass and John S. Dryzek, “Deliberative Cultures,” Political Theory 42 (1) (2014): 3–25. 24 James N. Druckman and Kjersten R. Nelson, “Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens’ Con- versations Limit Elite Influence,” American Journal of Political Science 47 (4) (2003): 729–745. 25 Simon J. Niemeyer, “The Emancipatory Effect of Deliberation: Empirical Lessons from Mini-Publics,” Politics & Society 39 (1) (2011): 103–140. 26 Vijayendra Rao and Paromita Sanyal, “Dignity Through Discourse: Poverty and the Culture of Deliberation in Indian Village Democracies,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 629 (1) (2010): 146–172. 27 Thamy Pogrebinschi and David Samuels, “The Impact of Participatory Democracy: Evidence from Brazil’s National Public Policy Conferences,” Comparative Politics 46 (2014): 313–332. 28 Ian Shapiro, “Enough of Deliberation: Politics is About Interests and Power,” in Deliberative Politics, ed. Macedo, 28–38. 29 Jane Mansbridge, James Bohman, Simone Chambers, et al., “The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy,” Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (1) (2010): 64–100. 30 Carolyn M. Hendriks, “Deliberative Governance in the Context of Power,” Policy and Society 28 (3) (2009): 173–184. 31 Ibid. 32 Jonathan W. Kuyper, “Deliberative Democracy and the Neglected Dimension of Leadership,” Journal of Public Deliberation 8 (1) (2012). 33 Jennifer Dodge, “Environmental Justice and Deliberative Democracy: How Social Change Organizations Respond to Power in the Deliberative System,” Policy and Society 28 (3) (2009): 225–239.

36 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 34 See Mansbridge et al., “The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative De- Nicole Curato, mocracy.” John S. Dryzek, 35 Selen A. Ercan, Iris Marion Young, “Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy,” in Carolyn M. Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, Hendriks & N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 120–135; and Aletta J. Norval, Aversive Democracy: Inher- Simon itance and Originality in the Democratic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Niemeyer 36 John S. Dryzek and Simon J. Niemeyer, “Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals,” American Journal of Political Science 50 (3) (2006): 634–649. 37 Carole Pateman, “Participatory Democracy Revisited,” Perspectives on Politics 10 (1) (2012): 8. 38 John S. Dryzek and Alex Y. Lo, “Reason and Rhetoric in Climate Communication,” Environ- mental Politics 24 (1) (2015): 1–16. 39 Pateman, “Participatory Democracy Revisited,” 10. 40 Lucio Baccaro, André Bächtiger, and Marion Deville, “Small Differences that Matter: The Impact of Discussion Modalities on Deliberative Outcomes,” British Journal of Political Science 46 (3) (2016). 41 Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer, “When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy,” Political Studies 51 (4) (2003): 627–649. 42 Bernard Manin, “On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation,” Political Theory 15 (3) (1987): 338–368. 43 See also Simon Niemeyer and John S. Dryzek, “The Ends of Deliberation: Metaconsensus and Intersubjective Rationality as Deliberative Ideals,” Swiss Political Science Review 13 (4) (2007): 497–526. 44 Simon J. Niemeyer, “When Does Deliberation Really Begin?” working paper series (Canberra, Australia: Centre for Deliberative Democracy and Global Governance, 2016). 45 Cass R. Sunstein, “Deliberative Trouble: Why Groups Go to Extremes,” Yale Law Journal 110 (1) (2000): 71–119. 46 James Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (Oxford: Ox- ford University Press, 2009), 131–132. 47 Christopher F. Karpowitz, Raphael Chad, and Allen S. Hammond, “Deliberative Democra- cy and Inequality: Two Cheers for Enclave Deliberation among the Disempowered,” Politics & Society 37 (4) (2009): 576–615. 48 Kimmo Grönlund, Herne Kaisa, and Maija Setälä, “Does Enclave Deliberation Polarize Opin- ions?” Political Behavior 37 (4) (2015): 995–1020. 49 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977). 50 Ian O’Flynn, “Divided Societies and Deliberative Democracy,” British Journal of Political Science 37 (4) (2007): 731–751. 51 Robert C. Luskin, Ian O’Flynn, James S. Fishkin, and David Russell, “Deliberating across Deep Divides,” Political Studies 62 (1) (2014): 117. 52 Bora Kanra, Islam, Democracy, and Dialogue in Turkey: Deliberating in Divided Societies (Aldershot, United Kingdom: Ashgate, 2009); and George Vasilev, Solidarity across Divides: Promoting the Moral Point of View (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015). 53 John S. Dryzek, “Handle with Care: The Deadly Hermeneutics of Deliberative Instrumenta- tion,” Acta Politica 40 (2) (2005): 197–211; and Selen A. Ercan, Carolyn M. Hendriks, and John Boswell, “Studying Public Deliberation After the Systemic Turn: The Crucial Role for Inter- pretive Research,” Politics & Policy 45 (2) (2017): 195–218. 54 Laura W. Black, Stephanie Burkhalter, John Gastil, and Jennifer Stromer-Galley, “Methods for Analyzing and Measuring Group Deliberation,” in The Sourcebook of Political Communication

146 (3) Summer 2017 37 Twelve Key Research: Methods, Measures, and Analytical Techniques, ed. R. Lance Holbert (New York: Rout- Findings in ledge, 2009), 323–345. Deliberative 55 Democracy See, for example, Katharina Holzinger, “Kommunikationsmodi und Handlungstypen in den Research Internationalen Beziehungen. Anmerkungen zu einigen irrefuhrenden Dichotomien,” Zeitschrift Für Internationale Beziehungen 8 (2) (2001): 243–286; Steiner et al., Deliberative Politics in Action; and Niemeyer, “The Emancipatory Effect of Deliberation.” 56 Carolyn M. Hendriks, “Praxis Stories: Experiencing Interpretive Policy Research,” Critical Policy Analysis 1 (3) (2007): 278–300. 57 John Boswell, Carolyn M. Hendriks, and Selen A. Ercan, “Message Received? Examining Transmission in Deliberative Systems,” Critical Policy Studies 10 (3) (2016): 263–283; and Ercan et al., “Studying Public Deliberation After the Systemic Turn.”

38 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Collusion in Restraint of Democracy: Against Political Deliberation

Ian Shapiro

Abstract: Recent calls to inject substantial doses of deliberation into democratic politics rest on a misdiag- nosis of its infirmities. Far from improving political outcomes, deliberation undermines competition over proposed political programs–the lifeblood of healthy democratic politics. Moreover, institutions that are intended to encourage deliberation are all too easily hijacked by people with intense preferences and abun- dant resources, who can deploy their leverage in deliberative settings to bargain for the outcomes they prefer. Arguments in support of deliberation are, at best, diversions from more serious threats to democracy, notably money’s toxic role in politics. A better focus would be on restoring meaningful competition between representatives of two strong political parties over the policies that, if elected, they will implement. I sketch the main outlines of this kind of political competition, differentiating it from less healthy forms of multiparty and intraparty competition that undermine the accountability of governments.

Advocates of political deliberation usually defend it as a collaborative activity motivated by the possibility of agreement. Even when agreement proves elusive, deliberation helps people come to grips with one another’s views, draw on their different expe- riences and expertise, and better understand the contours of their enduring disagreements. People’s views will be better informed, and the decisions they make will be of higher quality than if they had not deliberated. When study after study reveals most people to be appallingly ill-informed about much public policy, deliberation’s appeal seems obvious. Two IAN SHAPIRO, a Fellow of the Amer- minds are better than one, three better than two, and ican Academy since 2000, is the so on. Democracy will be improved if its decision- Sterling Professor of Political Sci- making can incorporate, and build on, the benefits ence and Henry R. Luce Director of of deliberation. Or so it is frequently claimed.1 the MacMillan Center at Yale Uni- versity. His recent books include Deliberation should not be confused with argu- Politics against Domination (2016) and ment. When people argue, there is an expectation The Real World of Democratic Theory that one of them will, or at least should, win. Even (2011). when we speak of one person making an argument,

77 Against we see this as something that stands until quire power by prevailing in a “competi- Political it is contradicted, or challenged and beat- tive struggle for the people’s vote,” gives Deliberation en by a better argument. Like the delibera- institutional expression to the argumen- tionists, proponents of argument believe it tative ideal.4 This was perhaps best exem- will enhance understanding and improve plified in the Westminster system as it ex- the quality of decisions. This was the es- isted from 1911, when the Parliament Act sence of John Stuart Mill’s defense of the stripped the House of Lords of its real pow- robust clash of opinions in On Liberty: it ers, until the late 1990s, when the Lords would lead people to hold better-informed was reformed to enhance its legitimacy as and more accurate views. Mill even went a second chamber and the Commons be- so far as to worry–needlessly, it turned gan ceding authority to European and oth- out–that as advancing science expand- er courts, the Bank of England, and indeed the realm of settled knowledge, people pendent agencies. The twentieth century’s would be deprived of argument’s benefits. middle eight decades were the heyday of No longer forced to sharpen their wits by Parliament’s supremacy within the British defending their views in the marketplace political system and of the Commons’ su- of ideas, they would become mediocre premacy within Parliament. Epitomized dullards; less able to think for themselves at Prime Minister’s Questions, the some- and more easily manipulated by others.2 times overwrought weekly gladiatorial My claim here is that the argumenta- clashes over the famous wooden despatch tive and deliberative ideals should be more boxes, it thrives on the ongoing contest be- clearly distinguished than they usually are. tween opposing policies and ideologies. They support different and incompatible Schumpeterian democracy depends on institutional arrangements. I also maintain alternation between two strong parties in that the argumentative ideal is superior be- government. The party that wins the elec- cause, when appropriately institutionalized, tion exercises a temporary power monop- it helps hold governments accountable for oly, but the loyal opposition–a govern- their actions. By contrast, the deliberative ment-in-waiting whose leaders hope to ideal cannot easily be institutionalized–and take power at the next election–continu- perhaps cannot be institutionalized at all– ally challenges its policies. This system de- because people who prefer to bargain can pends on combining first-past-the-post sin- easily abuse rules designed to promote de- gle member plurality (smp) electoral sys- liberation. But deliberation’s difficulties tems with parliamentary democracy. The run deeper. Its defenders fail to appreciate smp electoral system produces two large that, in politics, deliberation and the search parties, so long as the political makeup of for agreement are–to borrow an antitrust the constituencies more or less reflects the analogy–unhealthy forms of collusion in political makeup of the national popula- restraint of democracy. They should worry tion.5 Parliamentary systems ensure that less about voter ignorance, which, as Antho- the parties will be strong because the lead- ny Downs noted long ago, might well reflect er of the majority party is also the chief ex- sensible budgeting of scarce time, and wor- ecutive. Government and opposition clash ry more when office-seekers fail to engage in across the aisle continually, and compete robust public debates over the policies that, during elections by offering voters the dif- if elected, they will enact.3 ferent programs they plan to implement. The deliberative model, by contrast, Joseph Schumpeter’s competitive model calls for institutions that create incentives of democracy, in which governments ac- to seek agreement rather than victory–or

78 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences at least agreement as a condition for vic- which gives temporary control of the gov- Ian tory. Rules that require concurrent major- ernment’s power monopoly to the majority Shapiro ities in bicameral chambers force represen- party and relies on alternation over time as tatives to find common ground when they its main mechanism of accountability, the can, and compromise when they cannot. U.S. model divides up the control of pow- Executive vetoes and supermajority pro- er on an ongoing basis. Madison’s slogan visions to override them create similar in- was that “ambition must be made to coun- centives. Proponents of deliberation often teract ambition.”8 The checks and balances find proportional representation pr( ) con- force the players in the different branch- genial for comparable reasons. Instead of es to accommodate themselves to one an- two catchall parties that must submerge other; hence its affinities with the delib- their disagreements in order to win elec- erative ideal. tions, pr leads to party proliferation, bring- ing a more diverse array of voices to the po- Up to a point. A major limitation of insti- litical table. In addition to the left-of-center tutions that encourage deliberation is that and right-of-center parties characteristic of they can produce bargaining instead. Ju- smp systems, in pr systems, liberals, reli- ries, for example, are traditionally subject gious groups, Greens, separatists, and na- to unanimity requirements that put pres- tionalists, among others, can all elect rep- sure on their members to talk out their dif- resentatives to the legislature to be part of ferences until they reach agreement. When the conversation. Because one party sel- this works well, it produces thorough ex- dom wins an absolute majority, coalition ploration of all the arguments and evidence government, which forces parties to seek provided by the contending parties: a post- and perhaps even manufacture common er child for the benefits of deliberation. But ground, is the norm. a jury can also be held hostage by a recal- The U.S. system is a hybrid. The smp citrant crank who has nothing better to do electoral system produces two large par- when everyone else wants to go home. His ties, but the independently elected pres- superior bargaining power and stubborn- ident weakens them, and the system of ness might enable him to extract agreement checks and balances forces consensus-seek- from the others, but this will not be delib- ing and compromise to the extent possible. erative consensus on the merits of the case. The American founders intended the Sen- What holds for juries also holds for other ate, in particular, to be a constraining body institutions that we might hope will induce made up of what Jefferson would later re- deliberation. When they produce bargain- fer to as an “aristocracy of virtue and tal- ing instead, those with the most leverage ent.” It has been heralded as such by com- will prevail. So it is that small parties often mentators dating back at least to Alexis de exert disproportionate influence over coa- Tocqueville.6 The idea that the Senate is the lition governments, U.S. Senators can use world’s greatest deliberative body, which holds and filibuster rules to thwart the will first gained currency with Daniel Web- of the majority, and various other super ster’s three-hour soliloquy in defense of majority and concurrent majority rules can the Union in 1850, has been repeated to the be deployed to similar effect. point of banality, no matter how scant its In short, deliberation requires people to connection with reality.7 I will have more to act in good faith, but it is not possible to de- say about the kind of competition the U.S. sign institutions to induce good faith. “If system fosters shortly. As a prelude to this, men were angels,” Madison wrote, “no notice that, unlike the Westminster model, government would be necessary.”9 In-

146 (3) Summer 2017 79 Against deed, when power is at stake and repre- er the changes in people’s views produced Political sentatives must answer to constituents, by Deliberative Polls and other consulta- Deliberation the impulse to bargain will likely overpow- tive mechanisms tried thus far are really im- er even genuine desires to reason collabo- provements on their pre-deliberative views ratively. In 2009, a number of centrist Re- or simply changes.13 These issues need not publican Senators showed an interest in detain us here, however, since my present working with the Obama White House for point is that–whatever its merits–institu- “cap-and-trade” legislation on toxic emis- tionalizing deliberation turns out to be an sions control. They soon bolted, however, elusive endeavor. If it is purely consultative, when confronted with Tea Party–orches- it is not clear why anyone will or should pay trated threats of primary challenges in their attention to it. Yet if rules are created to in- constituencies, should they choose to per- stitutionalize deliberation and give it real sist.10 Since power is endemically at stake decision-making teeth, they can all too easi- in politics, it seems unlikely that there will ly undermine political competition and em- be much genuine deliberation or that politi- power people with leverage to appropriate cians will resist the impulse to exploit rules them for their own purposes. that might maximize their leverage instead. An exception that proves the rule is the Schumpeter’s competitive model of de- British House of Lords. It functioned most mocracy trades on analogies between the effectively as a deliberative body after it lost political marketplace of ideas and the econ- most of its real powers in 1911. Peers who omy. Political parties are the analogues of participated were mainly public-spirited in- firms; voters mirror consumers. Schum- dividuals who specialized in particular ar- peter treats the policies that parties pro- eas and were often nonpartisan or cross- pose to enact if they become governments benchers. But the Lords has become more as the political analogues of the goods and partisan and assertive since the 1999 re- services that firms sell, and the votes that forms restored a measure of its legitimacy politicians seek as analogues of the reve- as a somewhat democratic institution, albeit nues that firms try to earn. Democratic ac- one at a considerable distance from the bal- countability is the political equivalent of lot box.11 What the Lords has gained in legit- consumer sovereignty: the party that does imacy has come at the price of diminished best at satisfying voters wins their support. effectiveness as a deliberative institution.12 Schumpeter’s illuminating analogy is The various deliberative institutions that nonetheless strained in several ways, two have been tried out or proposed in recent of which matter here. One is that political years are exclusively consultative. Deliber- parties are vying to control a monopoly, a ative Polls and citizens’ juries have no au- fact that constrains competitive possibili- thority to decide anything. They might af- ties. As I argue below, the best option is com- fect how people vote, but it is the voting petition between two large, centrally con- that will be decisive. Objects of theoreti- trolled parties. The Schumpeterian analogy cal conjecture like ideal speech situations also falters because there is no unproblem- are even more radically divorced from pol- atic equivalent of a firm’s shareholders for itics, since they depend on armchair spec- political parties. Some will single out par- ulation about what people would decide in ty members or activists as the appropriate settings that are devoid of power relation- political shareholders, but parties that em- ships. Questions can and have been raised power them run into trouble. Membership about whether such speculations add up in political parties is typically free or very to anything we should believe, or wheth- cheap, rendering them susceptible to hos-

80 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences tile and anomalous takeovers, like that per- the sword fell, with each side blaming the Ian petrated by Donald Trump in the 2016 Re- other for intransigence. Perhaps it was a Shapiro publican primaries, or that which occurred cynical way for both parties to achieve cuts in the British Labour Party in the summer without being savaged by their electoral of 2016. Party leader Jeremy Corbyn lost bases. Whether due to blundering or col- a confidence vote in the Parliamentary La- lusive cynicism, the result was that every- bour Party by 172 to 40 in June, triggering one had an alibi and no one was undeni- a leadership challenge, but an easily aug- ably responsible for the outcome. Coali- mented membership nonetheless reelected tion governments live perpetually on such him as leader with 61.8 percent of the vote ambiguous terrain, undermining account- three months later.14 As this example under- ability for what governments actually do. scores, grass roots activists tend to be un- Competition enhances political account- representative of a party’s supporters in ability, but some kinds of competition are the electorate. This imbalance can be espe- better than others. As we have seen, com- cially pronounced in two-party systems, petition between representatives of two which, as I argue below, are nonetheless best parties, one of which will become the from the standpoint of robust public debate. government, enhances accountability be- Representation should be geared to max- cause they run on the platform they will be imizing the chances that public debate will judged on as governments. Moreover, the center on the policies that parties, if elect- need to sustain broad bases of voter sup- ed, will implement as governments.15 This port gives them strong incentives to advo- is why smp beats pr, and why strong, cen- cate policies that will be good for the coun- tralized parties are better than weak, decen- try as a whole, or at least for large swaths of tralized ones. Supporting a party in a mul- the population. Smaller parties represent tiparty system can help voters feel better more narrowly drawn interests: business, represented because their representatives’ organized labor, and ethnic and religious views are likely closer to their ideals than groups. This loads the dice in favor of clien- would be the case in a two-party system. telism, because politicians know that they But this is an illusion. What really matters will be held accountable for how effectively is the policies that governments will im- they advocate or bargain for their group’s plement. That cannot be known until af- interests in a governing coalition. It is better the coalition is formed, post-election. ter for parties to compete over what is best Coalition governments decrease account- for the country as a whole than to bargain ability, since different coalition members over the rents they can extract for their cli- can blame one another for unpopular pol- ents. This contrast can be overdrawn, to be icies.16 Americans got a taste of this when sure, because large catchall parties consist unusual conditions produced a cross-party of different interests among whom implicit coalition to enact the Budget Sequestra- bargains must be struck to keep them in the tion Act in August 2011, putting in place party. But that bargaining is constrained by $1.1 trillion of automatic spending cuts over the need to propound and defend platforms eight years split evenly between defense that can win support from other groups as and domestic programs, unless Congress well, otherwise they cannot hope to be- passed an alternative by January 2013. The come the government. Sword-of-Damocles proposal was widely said to be sufficiently draconian that the The sequester episode underscores the fact representatives would be forced to find a that the weakness of U.S. political parties is compromise. In the event, they did not and only partly due to republican institution-

146 (3) Summer 2017 81 Against al arrangements. Another source of party is to say nothing of the fact that in politics, Political weakness is decentralized competition, an preferences are always expressed subject to Deliberation artifact of the wrongheaded idea that local budget constraints. The intense antiregu- selection of candidates somehow makes the lation preferences of the multibillionaires process more democratic. In reality, because Charles and David Koch are massively am- of their comparatively high rates of partic- plified because their budget constraints dif- ipation, activists, whose beliefs and pref- fer vastly from those of the typical voter.20 In erences tend to be both more extreme and short, there are good reasons for the rules of more intensely held than the median voter democratic decision-making to reflect how in their constituencies, dominate primaries many people want something, rather than and caucuses. This enables them to force how intensely they want it. representatives to pursue agendas that the median voter in their district abjures, or to People have theorized about democracy serve the median voter only with the kind for millennia, yet it is only in the past few of subterfuge that might have been at work decades that the idea has gained currency behind the Budget Sequester Act. The same that democracy depends on, or at any rate is true of referenda, which sound demo- can be substantially enhanced by, deliber- cratic–“hooray for direct democracy!” ation. I have sought to show here that this –but which also enfranchise intense single- is a dubious proposition. It is hard, if not issue voters who turn out at disproportion- impossible, to create institutions that will ately high rates. Thus it was with the Brexit foster deliberation in politics, and institu- referendum in June of 2016, when a major- tions designed to do so are all-too-easily ity of those who voted produced the result hijacked for other purposes. But deliber- to leave, even though polling indicated that ation is in any case the wrong goal. Com- the median British voter favored the uk’s petition is the lifeblood of democratic pol- remaining in the European Union, as did itics, and not just because it is the mech- substantial majorities of both major parties anism by which governments that lose in the House of Commons.17 elections give up power. Institutions that Some will say that making the system re- foster competition also structure politics sponsive to voters with intense preferenc- around argument, which Mill was right es is a good thing. There is, indeed, a strand to identify as vital to the advancement of of democratic theory dating back to James knowledge and good public policy. Buchannan and Gordon Tullock’s Calculus But not any competition. The contesta- of Consent in 1962 whose proponents defend tion over governing ideas that Mill prized is vote trading and vote buying on the utilitari- best served when two large parties are con- an ground that it improves the overall social strained to compete over potential govern- utility.18 But democracy’s purpose is to man- ing programs. It is compromised by multi- age power relations, not to maximize social party competition that encourages clien- utility. The contrary view would suggest that telism, as we have seen. And it is damaged it was right for the U.S. government to aban- even more by competition within parties, don Reconstruction when Southern whites which empowers people with local agen- opposed it with greater intensity than most das and intense preferences who partici- voters favored it, and that it was right for pate disproportionately in primaries and the intense preferences of neoconserva- caucuses. This can render parties vulnera- tives who wanted the United States to in- ble to the ideological capture of candidates vade Iraq in 2003 to override those of more- by well-funded groups, as has happened numerous but less-fervent skeptics.19 This with the Tea Party in Southern and Mid-

82 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences western Republican primaries since 2009. democratic politics by relegating it to a Ian But a more general problem is associated purely consultative role; but in that case, it Shapiro with local control of selection processes, is hard to see what the hype surrounding de- in which candidates find themselves com- liberation amounts to. Regardless, the most pelled to compete by promising to secure pressing political challenges in the United local goods. Once elected, they face pow- States do not result from lack of delibera- erful incentives to engage in pork barrel tion. Rather, they stem from the increas- politics with other similarly situated poli- ing subversion of democracy by powerful ticians, protecting public funding for sine- private interests since the Supreme Court’s cures and bridges to nowhere in their dis- disastrous equation of money with speech tricts. This problem is worse in districts– in Buckley v. Valeo four decades ago, and the the vast majority in the United States–that subsequent playing out of that logic in Cit- have been gerrymandered to be safe seats, izens United and subsequent decisions.21 As so that the primary is the only meaningful politicians have become increasingly depen- election. It is better for party leaders to seek dent on countless millions of dollars to gain candidates who can both win in their dis- and retain political office, those with the re- tricts and support a program that can win sources they need undermine the process by nationally. The leaders, in turn, are held manufacturing–and then manning–huge accountable by the backbenchers who re- barriers to entry, by contributing to both po- move them when they fail to deliver win- litical parties in ways that stifle competition, ning platforms. In sum, two large, centrally by capturing regulators and whole regulato- controlled parties are most likely to foster ry agencies, by giving multimillionaires and the programmatic competition that is best billionaires the preposterous advantage of for democratic politics. By contrast, multi- running self-funded campaigns, and by do- party competition encourages wholesale ing other end-runs around democratic pol- clientelism, and intraparty competition en- itics. Unless and until that challenge can be courages retail clientelism. addressed, debating what deliberation can Deliberation can be rendered harmless add to politics is little more than a waste of and perhaps, occasionally, beneficial for time.

endnotes 1 For example, see Jane J. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Universi- ty of Chicago Press, 1983); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009); James S. Fish- kin, The Voice of the People (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); James S. Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Hélène Landemore, Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012); Jürgen Habermas, Communica- tion and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975); and Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984). There are, of course, major differences among these and other theorists of deliberative democracy that do not concern me here. 2 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. David Bromwich (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003 [1859]), 86–120. 3 See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 244– 246, 266–271.

146 (3) Summer 2017 83 Against 4 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1942), Political 269. Deliberation 5 Where there is substantial regional variation, by contrast, as in India, smp systems can produce party proliferation. 6 Tocqueville described the Senate as peopled by America’s “ablest citizens”; men moved by “lofty thoughts and generous instincts.” By contrast, the House of Representatives consist- ed of “village lawyers, tradesmen, or even men of the lowest class” who were of “vulgar de- meanor,” animated by “vices” and “petty passions.” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in Amer- ica, ed. J. P. Mayer (New York: Anchor Books, 1969 [1835, 1840]), 200–201. 7 Terence Samuel, The Upper House: A Journey behind Closed Doors (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 68. 8 James Madison, “Federalist No. 51,” in The Federalist Papers, ed. Ian Shapiro (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009 [1787–1788]), 264. 9 Ibid. 10 Jane Mayer, Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires behind the Rise of the Radical Right (New York: Doubleday, 2016), 198–225. 11 The House of Lords Act of 1999 reduced the membership from 1,330 to 699 and got rid of all but ninety-two of the hereditary peers, who were allowed to remain on an interim basis, and an additional ten who were made life peers. On the recent evolution, see Meg Russell, The Contemporary House of Lords: Westminster Bicameralism Revived (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 13–35, 258–284. 12 For elaboration, see Ian Shapiro, Politics against Domination (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni- versity Press, 2016), 73–78. 13 See Ian Shapiro, The Real World of Democratic Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), 266–271. 14 James Lyons and Sanya Burgess, “Corbyn Reelected as Labour Leader with Increased Mandate,” The Times, September 24, 2016, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/corbyn-re-elected -as-labour-leader-with-increased-mandate-c7jqjgjm7. 15 The argument in this and the next two paragraphs will be developed more fully in Frances Rosenbluth and Ian Shapiro, Democratic Competition: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, forthcoming 2018). 16 Kathleen Bawn and Frances Rosenbluth, “Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral Accountabil- ity and the Size of the Public Sector,” American Journal of Political Science 50 (2) (2006): 251–265. 17 Charlie Cooper, “eu Referendum: Final Polls Show Remain with Edge over Brexit,” The Inde- pendent, June 23, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-poll -brexit-remain-vote-leave-live-latest-who-will-win-results-populus-a7097261.html; and Anushka Asthana, “Parliamentary Fightback against Brexit on Cards,” The Guardian, June 26, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/26/fightback-against-brexit-on-cards-remain -eu-referendum-heseltine. 18 James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962). Robert Dahl flirted with the notion that attending to intensity might be desirable from the standpoint of political stability, though he was skeptical that it could be measured. Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 90–123. 19 For discussion of the dangers inherent in catering to intense preferences, see Shapiro, Politics against Domination, 46–61. 20 See Mayer, Dark Money, 120–158, 226–270, 354–387. 21 See Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1, 59 (1976); Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 558 U.S. 310 (2010); and SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 84 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences