Deliberative Democracy Deliberative Arthur Lupia the Prospects & Limits of the Prospects Dædalus Cristina Lafont Cristina Lafont Alice Siu James S
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
on the horizon: Dædalus Civil Wars & Global Disorder: Threats & Opportunities edited by Karl Eikenberry & Stephen Krasner with James D. Fearon, Bruce Jones & Stephen John Stedman, Stewart Patrick, Martha Crenshaw, Paul H. Wise & Michele Barry, Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Hendrik Spruyt, Stephen Biddle, Will Reno, Aila M. Matanock & Miguel García-Sánchez, and Barry Posen Ending Civil Wars: Constraints & Possibilities Democracy Summer 2017 The Prospects & Limits of Deliberative Dædalus edited by Karl Eikenberry & Stephen Krasner Francis Fukuyama, Tanisha M. Fazal, Stathis N. Kalyvas, Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Steven Heydemann, Chuck Call & Susanna Campbell, Summer 2017 Sumit Ganguly, Clare Lockhart, Thomas Risse & Eric Stollenwerk, Tanja A. Börzel & Sonja Grimm, Seyoum Mesfin & Abdeta Beyene, Nancy Lindborg & Joseph Hewitt, Richard Gowan & Stephen John Stedman, The Prospects & Limits of Lyse Doucet, and Jean-Marie Guéhenno Deliberative Democracy Native Americans & Academia edited by Ned Blackhawk, K. Tsianina Lomawaima, James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge, guest editors Bryan McKinley Jones Brayboy, Philip J. Deloria, Loren Ghiglione, Douglas Medin, and Mark Trahant with Claus Offe · Nicole Curato John S. Dryzek · Selen A. Ercan Carolyn M. Hendriks · Simon Niemeyer Bernard Manin · Hélène Landemore Representing the intellectual community in its breadth Arthur Lupia · Anne Norton · Ian Shapiro and diversity, Dædalus explores the frontiers of Cristina Lafont · André Bächtiger · Simon Beste knowledge and issues of public importance. Alice Siu · Cass R. Sunstein · Roy William Mayega Lyn Atuyambe · Nathan Tumuhamye Julius Ssentongo · William Bazeyo Baogang He · Mark E. Warren U.S. $15; www.amacad.org; @americanacad Introduction James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge Democracy is under siege. Approval ratings for democratic institutions in most countries around the world are at near-record lows. The number of rec- ognized democratic countries in the world is no lon- ger expanding after the so-called Third Wave of dem- ocratic transitions.1 Indeed, there is something of a “democratic recession.”2 Further, some apparently democratic countries with competitive elections are undermining elements of liberal democracy: the rights and liberties that ensure freedom of thought and ex- pression, protection of the rule of law, and all the pro- tections for the substructure of civil society that may be as important for making democracy work as the JAMES S. FISHKIN, a Fellow of the electoral process itself.3 The model of party compe- American Academy since 2014, is tition-based democracy–the principal model of de- Director of the Center for Delib- mocracy in the modern era–seems under threat. erative Democracy, the Janet M. That model also has competition. What might be Peck Chair in International Com- munication, Professor of Commu- called “meritocratic authoritarianism,” a model in nication, and Professor of Political which regimes with flawed democratic processes nev- Science (by courtesy) at Stanford ertheless provide good governance, is attracting at- University. tention and some support. Singapore is the only suc- JANE MANSBRIDGE, a Fellow of cessful extant example, although some suggest China the American Academy since 1994, as another nation moving in this direction. Singapore is the Charles F. Adams Professor is not a Western-style party- and competition-based of Political Leadership and Dem- democracy, but it is well-known for its competent civil ocratic Values at the Harvard Ken- servants schooled in making decisions on a cost-ben- nedy School. efit basis to solve public problems, with the goals set (*See endnotes for complete contributor by elite consultation with input from elections rath- biographies.) er than by party competition. © 2017 by James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge doi:10.1162/DAED_ x_00442 6 Public discontent makes further difficul- Over the last two decades, another ap- James S. ties for the competitive model. Democra- proach to democracy has become increas- Fishkin & Jane cies around the world struggle with the ap- ingly prominent. Based on greater deliber- Mansbridge parent gulf between political elites who are ation among the public and its represen- widely distrusted and mobilized citizens tatives, deliberative democracy has the who fuel populism with the energy of an- potential, at least in theory, to respond gry voices. Disillusioned citizens turning to today’s current challenges. If the many against elites have produced unexpected versions of a more deliberative democracy election results, including the Brexit deci- live up to their aspirations, they could help sion and the 2016 U.S. presidential election. revive democratic legitimacy, provide for The competitive elections and referenda more authentic public will formation, pro- of most current democracies depend on vide a middle ground between widely mis- mobilizing millions of voters within a con- trusted elites and the angry voices of pop- text of advertising, social media, and efforts ulism, and help fulfill some of our common to manipulate as well as inform public opin- normative expectations about democracy. ion. Competing teams want to win and, in Can this potential be realized? In what most cases, are interested in informing vot- ways and to what extent? Deliberative de- ers only when it is to their advantage. The mocracy has created a rich literature in both rationale for competitive democracy, most theory and practice. This issue of Dædalus influentially developed by the late econo- assesses both its prospects and limits. We mist Joseph Schumpeter, held that the same include advocates as well as critics. As de- techniques of advertising used in the com- liberative democrats, our aim is to stimu- mercial sphere to get people to buy prod- late public deliberation about deliberative ucts can be expected in the political sphere. democracy, weighing arguments for and On this view, we should not expect a “gen- against its application in different contexts uine” public will, but rather “a manufac- and for different purposes. tured will” that is just a by-product of po- How can deliberative democracy, if it litical competition.4 were to work as envisaged by its supporters, Yet the ideal of democracy as the rule of respond to the challenges just sketched? “the people” is deeply undermined when First, if the more-deliberative institutions the will of the people is in large part manu- that many advocate can be applied to real factured. The legitimacy of democracy de- decisions in actual ongoing democracies, pends on some real link between the public arguably they could have a positive effect on will and the public policies and office-hold- legitimacy and lead to better governance. ers who are selected. Although some have They could make a better connection be- criticized this “folk theory of democracy” tween the public’s real concerns and how as empirically naive, its very status as a folk they are governed. Second, these institu- theory reflects how widespread this nor- tions could help fill the gap between dis- mative expectation is.5 To the extent that trusted elites and angry populists. Elites leaders manufacture the public will, the are distrusted in part because they seem normative causal arrow goes in the wrong and often are unresponsive to the public’s direction. If current democracies cannot concerns, hopes, and values. Perhaps, the produce meaningful processes of public suspicion arises, the elites are really out will formation, the legitimacy claims of for themselves. On the other hand, pop- meritocratic autocracies or even more ulism stirs up angry, mostly nondelibera- fully autocratic systems become compar- tive voices that can be mobilized in plebes- atively stronger.6 citary campaigns, whether for Brexit or for 146 (3) Summer 2017 7 Introduction elected office. In their contributions to this These are some of the challenges facing issue, both Claus Offe and Hélène Lande- those who might try to make deliberative more explore the crisis of legitimacy in democracy practical. representative government, including the The earliest work on deliberative democ- clash between status quo–oriented elites racy began by investigating legislatures.7 In and populism. Deliberative democratic this issue, Cass Sunstein, in contrast, looks methods open up the prospect of prescrip- at deliberation among policy-makers with- tions that are both representative of the in the executive branch. Bernard Manin entire population and based on sober, evi- looks outside government toward debates dence-based analysis of the merits of com- and public forums that can improve the de- peting arguments. Popular deliberative in- liberative quality of campaigns and discus- stitutions are grounded in the public’s val- sions among the public at large. ues and concerns, so the voice they magnify Much of the energy in deliberative de- is not the voice of the elites. But that voice mocracy efforts has focused on statisti- is usually also, after deliberation, more ev- cal microcosms or mini-publics, in which idence-based and reflective of the merits of citizens, usually recruited by random sam- the major policy arguments. Hence these pling, deliberate in organized settings. In institutions fill an important gap. some settings, relatively small groups of fif- How might popular deliberative democ- teen or so deliberate online with an elect- racy, if it were to work as envisaged by its ed representative.8 In other settings, the supporters, fulfill normative