Armor School Points of Contact

The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch, Headquarters, Department of the Army, PB 17-14-1

Editor in Chief Features LISA ALLEY 10 The Armored Brigade Combat Team 2014-2024: Improving Abrams Lethality Commandant by MAJ Robert Brown BG LEE QUINTAS 12 Integrating Live, Virtual, Constructive Enablers: U.S. Army in Europe’s Ability to Create a Blended Training Environment ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published quarterly by the U.S. by Bradley Joy, Edward Rykard and LTC Andrew L. Green Army Armor School, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite 23 Cavalry Branch: a Redesignation for the 21st Century W142, 1 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905. by CPT Nathan A. Jennings Disclaimers: The information contained in ARMOR repre- 28 Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader’s Course sents the professional opinions of the authors and does not by Nicole Randall necessarily reflect the official Army, U.S. Army Training and 35 ‘Confessions of Mediocrity’ Doctrine Command or U.S. Army Armor School position, nor does it change or supersede any information presented in oth- by 1LT Paul A. Brannan er official Army publications. 37 Knowledge Management at the Brigade by MAJ Thomas E. Laybourn Manuscripts and their accompanying figures become government property and public domain upon receipt in ARMOR ed- 40 Observations from the Opposing Force itorial offices. (The ideas within the manuscript remain the au- by CPT Andrew J. Rossow and CPT Amos C. Fox thor’s intellectual property and may be reused by the author, 45 How We Got Here and Where We Are Going: a Doctrinal Approach but the work itself — the particular expression of the ideas — to the Health of the Force passes to public domain upon receipt of the manuscript.) AR- MOR staff will make necessary grammar, syntax and style by CPT Keith Eisenberger, CPT J.P. Steadman and CPT Nick Knepp corrections on the text to meet publication standards and will redesign illustrations and charts for clarity and to standards as necessary. ARMOR staff may coordinate changes with authors in the interest of ensuring that content remains accurate and professionally developmental. As a non-copyrighted government publication, no copyright is granted if a work is published in ARMOR, and in general, no copyrighted works should be submitted for consideration to publish. On occasion, however, ARMOR may wish to publish copyrighted material, and in that instance, individual authors’ copyrights will be protected by special arrangement. As the primary purpose of ARMOR content is the professional development of Armor Branch soldiers, ARMOR prints only materials for which the Armor School has proponency: armored, direct-fire ground combat systems not serving primarily as infantry carriers; weapons used exclusively in these sys- Departments tems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; miscellaneous items of equipment which armored and armored cavalry or- 1 Contacts ganizations use exclusively; training for all 19-series officers 2 Letters and CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concern- 3 Commandant’s Hatch ing the training, logistics, history and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at a brigade/regiment level and below, 5 Gunner’s Seat to include Threat units at those levels. 7 From the Boresight Line Distribution: Approved for public release. Distribution is un- 8 From the Screen Line limited. Official distribution is made as one copy for each ar- 18 Saddles and Sabers mored brigade headquarters; armored cavalry regiment head- 53 Battle Analysis quarters; armor battalion headquarters; armored cavalry squadron headquarters; reconnaissance squadron headquar- 59 Reviews ters; or armored cavalry troop, armor company and motorized 60 Shoulder-sleeve insignia: 8th Cavalry Regiment brigade headquarters of the U.S. Army. In addition, Army li- braries, Army and DoD schools, HQDA and Army Command staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations and training of the personnel for such organizations may request two copies by sending a request to the editor in chief. Reprints: ARMOR is published by the authority of the Chief of By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Staff, U.S. Army, and is in the public domain except where copyright is indicated. ARMOR requests that reprinted material car- Official: RAYMOND T. ODIERNO ry credit given to ARMOR and the author. Direct inquiries to Ed- General, United States Army itor in Chief, ARMOR, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite Chief of Staff W142, 1 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905. GERALD B. O’KEEFE Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army January-February 2014, Vol. CXXIII, No. 1 1404201 Armor School Points of Contact

ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: Articles can be submitted as email attachments to usarmy.benning.tradoc.mbx.armor-mag- ARMOR Editorial Offices [email protected]. For all submissions, please include a complete mailing address and daytime phone number. Editor in Chief Lisa Alley (706) 545-9503 SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per Email: [email protected] DSN 835 issue, we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and accepted for publication by, other Army professional bul- Deputy Editor letins. Please submit your article to only one Army profession- Vacant (706) 545-8701 al bulletin at a time. Email: DSN 835

GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We will accept conventional Editorial Assistant photo prints or electronic graphic and photo files in no less Jenny Forte (706) 545-2698 than 300 dpi TIF or JPG format. (Please do not send photos Email: [email protected] DSN 835 embedded in PowerPoint and Word.) If you use PowerPoint for illustrations, please try to avoid the use of excessive col- Covers and Art Support or and shading. If you have any questions concerning elec- Jody Harmon (706) 545-5754 tronic art or photo submissions, contact Erin Wold. Email: [email protected] DSN 835 UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution de- livery problems or changes of unit address, email usarmy.ben- [email protected]; phone DSN U.S. Army Armor School 835-2698 or commercial (706) 545-2698. Requests to be added to the official distribution list should be in the form of a letter or email to the Editor in Chief. Commandant (ATZK-DF) BG Lee Quintas (706) 545-2029 EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: U.S. Army Armor Email: [email protected] DSN 835 School, ATTN: ARMOR, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg.4), Suite W142, 1 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905. Deputy Commandant (ATZK-DF) COL John C Hermeling (706) 545-2029 REPRINTS: ARMOR is published by authority of the Chief Email: [email protected] DSN: 835 of Staff, U.S. Army. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where Armor School Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) copyright is indicated. Request all organizations not affiliated CSM Michael Clemens (706) 545-3815 with the Department of the Army contact ARMOR for repro- Email: [email protected] DSN 835 duction/reprinting permission. Inquiries may be directed to Editor in Chief, ATTN: ARMOR, McGinnis-Wickam Hall 194th Armored Brigade (ATZK-BAZ) (Bldg. 4), Suite W142, 1 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA COL Scott D. King (706) 626-5969 31905. Email: [email protected] DSN 620 ARMOR MAGAZINE ON-LINE: Visit the ARMOR maga- 316th Cavalry Brigade (ATZK-SBZ) zine Website at www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/. COL David S. Davidson (706) 626-8670 Email: [email protected] DSN 620 ARMOR HOTLINE — (706) 626-TANK (8265)/DSN 620: The Armor Hotline is a 24-hour service to provide assistance Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) with questions concerning doctrine, training, organizations and George DeSario (706) 545-1352 equipment of the armor force. Email: [email protected] DSN 835 LETTERS

Dear ARMOR, better support it. That cultivation of to focus wholly and solely on the doc- senior NCOs will pay dividends when trine and tactics of cavalry operations. In the article “Reconnaissance Train- they return to an operational unit. The result is an instructor who is an ex- ing: a Time for Innovation” (ARMOR pert in his craft and laser-beam-fo- October-December 2013 edition), CPT Also, Fox’s article does not address the cused on training future cavalry lead- Amos C. Fox asserts that the Cavalry increased number of non-armor/infan- ers. Instructors will, on average, con- Leaders’ Course (CLC) should be inte- try officers who attend the course, duct eight to 10 teaches annually, cre- grated into the Maneuver Captains’ which will be severely degraded if CLC ating unmatched expertise in the doc- Career Course (MCCC) for the purpos- is folded into MCCC. A typical resident trine and course outcomes. To comes of expanding maneuver officers’ CLC class will contain a small number bine CLC’s curriculum into a profes- knowledge of cavalry operations at the of aviation officers from the Aviation sional military education (PME) course troop and squadron level. While I Career Course, as well as field artillery, like MCCC – which is required to train agree wholeheartedly with the pur- engineer and other non-maneuver students across a broad spectrum of pose of his article, I must disagree with branches – and this percentage is even subjects – will degrade this expertise. the proposition, as it will likely erode greater on mobile training teams. While the numbers will show an in- the effectiveness of the CLC curricu- These students come from various crease in “trained” officers, the reality lum. points in their careers, from pre-com- is those officers’ understanding of cav- mand junior captains and lieutenants Fox points out the relatively low num- alry doctrine will be greatly reduced to field-grade officers in squadron and ber of noncommissioned officers who from current CLC standards. brigade staff positions. This mixture of attend CLC in the resident course. rank and branch, coupled with the While we appreciate the value placed While from a pure numbers standpoint NCOs previously mentioned, creates a on CLC in Fox’s article, we must also this is correct, the intangible benefit learning environment unique from point out that the course’s autonomy of having NCOs in the class is over- MCCC and its branch equivalents. The is what creates that value: the ability looked. NCO students provide ground- result is a course where students learn to focus solely on providing world- ed experience and context for the of- not just from the instructor but also class cavalry operational and doctrinal ficers, whose experience in cavalry op- from the experience of seasoned NCOs instruction. Instead, the Armor Branch erations is varied. The result is an of- and the knowledge of other officers. should consider the percentage of its ficer graduate who has had an “aper- officers who will serve in cavalry orga- ture widening” classroom experience If reconnaissance and security training nizations vs. armor units and adjust its through the combination of knowl- is important, we should seek to avoid training focus accordingly, as ad- edge and experience provided by the the one-size-fits-all military-education dressed in the article “Ideas on Caval- NCOs, and an NCO graduate who has system. Integration of courses like CLC ry” (ARMOR October-December 2013). had the opportunity to learn alongside with MCCC, and the Army Reconnais- To integrate with the MCCC would not commissioned officers and increase sance Course (ARC) with Armor Basic result in innovation but would rather his exposure to military operations Officer Leadership Course (ABOLC) (as lead to stagnation. above the platoon and troop level. In- has been mentioned in some circles) deed, every class I have taught has re- will, without question, decrease the BRIAN J. HARRIS sulted in an NCO revealing to me that effectiveness of the course and its out- CPT (P), AV he has a much better appreciation for put. As a functional course, CLC is able CLC Manager what his commanders do and how to

2 January-February 2014 COMMANDANT’S HATCH

BG Lee Quintas Commandant U.S. Army Armor School

Developing and Integrating Capabilities at the Armor School The Armor School is off to a fantastic compete to join our formations, to our 2014! The momentum gained in 2013 battle-hardened veterans, the Armor certainly sets the stage for a produc- School provides the foundation of ini- community. Also, each edition will tive, prosperous and inspired new tial and functional training as well as center around a theme that captures year. As we orient on the strategic leader development. As the Army con- Armor and Cavalry subjects while re- goals of the Army of 2020, leaders tinues to adapt to an ever-changing maining focused on promoting dia- across the Maneuver Center of Excel- fiscal and security environment, the logue. lence (MCoE) recognize an enduring el- Armor School, as part of the MCoE, ement: that our future success within plays a key role in developing, evaluat- This publication is Cavalry-based with unified land operations rests on our ing and integrating capabilities in sup- a theme of “developing, evaluating Soldiers’ and leaders’ expertise to con- port of the operating force. Through and integrating capabilities.” Follow- duct combined-arms maneuver and this transition, we continue to provide ing are the focus and theme for our wide-area security in a complex envi- well-trained Soldiers and leaders to upcoming editions of 2014: ronment and against a dynamic and populate our Armor and Cavalry for- • March-April (Armor focus, sophisticated hybrid threat. mations. As we evolve the force to im- “transitioning to an Army of prove its capabilities, I ask for your Accordingly, the Armor School contin- preparation / decisive-action continued support to provide your ues to improve our ability to integrate training environment” theme); best and brightest to the home of Ar- all our efforts toward delivering first- mor – to properly invest in our future, • May-June (Cavalry focus, “6x36 class training and leader development. especially as we navigate this challeng- scout formation” theme); We optimize the execution of our ing period. courses through a broadly collabora- • July-August (Armor focus, “mobile tive effort that includes the Infantry protective firepower” theme); I’d like to highlight my guidance for School and MCoE, other centers of ex- ARMOR’s further development (and • September-October (Cavalry cellence and across the force. The rel- hopefully improvement). As you read focus, “regional force alignment evance, rigor and thoroughness of this edition, you will notice several and reconnaissance and security each of our courses ensures Soldiers changes to the publication. My inten- echelons above brigade” theme); and leaders have the requisite skills tion, as we continue to make adjust- and development to understand and • November-December (Armor ments to the magazine, is to enhance master their critical competencies as focus, “Army 2025” theme). reader experience while providing a members of the combined-arms team. forum that shares information and As the Army continues to transform, it The Armor School acknowledges its best practices, proposes new ideas is important that our professional pub- unique role in our collective responsi- and presents alternative and adaptive lications like ARMOR propose differ- bility to educate, train and inspire approaches. ARMOR will spark frank, ent viewpoints, exchange ideas and America’s Armor and Cavalry Soldiers open and energetic discussion on is- share lessons-learned and best prac- and leaders for a lifetime of service to sues that matter to our profession – tices. We want you to enter the discus- the nation. From the new Soldiers and not only within the context of the sion on our most controversial topics! lieutenants who volunteer and magazine, but also among all of our The magazine will also feature a

January-February 2014 3 number of recurring columns. As that were very popular in ARMOR in number of ways you can submit your always, Thunderbolt 7 and I will use the 1990s. Given the unique situations thoughts, comments and concerns. We Commandant’s Hatch and Gunner’s in the past decade, and our emphasis will continue to publish letters to the Seat to share current ideas and on adaptive leadership, tactical vi- editor, as we did in this edition, when initiatives relevant to the combined- gnettes provide an exceptional tool to we receive feedback or alternative arms team. We will also feature “From exercise and practice our tactical acu- views on a previously published arti- the Screen Line” to highlight emerging men. Along with your proposed solu- cle. There are various on-line sites Cavalry topics, as well as “From the tions, I also encourage you to submit dedicated to facilitating correspon- Boresight Line” to capture the latest your own challenging and thought-pro- dence. Each of the articles published from the Bradley and tank master- voking scenarios to the community. on eARMOR (http://www.benning. gunner schools. The “Saddles and With each tactical vignette, we will army.mil/armor/eARMOR/) provide Sabers” column will provide a publish the author’s solution in addi- space for you to capture your thoughts historical perspective of Armor and tion to “A Way: The Reader’s Best So- and respond to other opinions. Log Cavalry, while “Battle Analysis” will lution” in follow-on editions. onto the eARMOR Facebook page provide a detailed and thorough look (https://www.facebook.com/pages/ ARMOR will provide a vibrant, rele- into a conflict to highlight and ARMOR-magazine/122557661278366) vant and interactive medium for the reinforce enduring lessons for the to see updates, read recent articles Armor and Cavalry community. As with force. and share. And of course, you can all ideas, there will be dissenting email me directly as well. Starting in the next edition, we will views. I encourage them! If you dis- present a tactical vignette titled agree with a viewpoint, present your I look forward to hearing from you! “What’s Your Next Move?” Many read- case to the rest of us. There are a Forge the Thunderbolt! ers will remember tactical vignettes

4 January-February 2014 GUNNER’S SEAT

CSM Michael Clemens Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor School

Focusing on Tactical Expertise, Role of NCO, Developing Future Scout and Armor Crewman This month, ARMOR looks at how we public of Vietnam; his citation best ex- are developing, evaluating and inte- emplifies this role: grating capabilities. From my position, Repeatedly abandoning positions of greater emphasis on NCOs identifying what does this mean to the Armor and teaching individual tasks, deter- noncommissioned officer? Certainly, relative safety, he directed artillery and air support by day and marked the mining their collective tasks, and hav- the NCO has the responsibility of training the CSM and other key NCOs re- ing the small units of the Army – unit’s location by night, despite the heavy, concentrated enemy fire. His viewing, refining and certifying those crews, teams and squads – to fight to- tasks. This chain of events will be the dauntless will instilled in the men of gether cohesively by using their train- key in retaining 12 years of hard-won the 23rd Battalion a deep desire to re- ing and equipment effectively. We all experience and its integration with sist. Assault after assault was repulsed know that tough, realistic training more traditional Armor and Cavalry breeds a confident team focused on as the battalion responded to the ex- tasks and missions. accomplishing the mission. But is there traordinary leadership and personal a larger role for the NCO? Are there re- example exhibited by SFC Littrell as he Some of the best Armor NCOs are sponsibilities that go beyond training? continuously moved to those points serving inside the generating force, As our units down to the squad level most seriously threatened by the ene- and that continues to be a goal we will gain access to more enablers and my, redistributed ammunition, maintain. The upholding of standards greater capabilities, the “everyday” strengthened faltering defenses, cared in the schoolhouse is a sacred respon- job of the NCO grows. The NCO’s ex- for the wounded and shouted encour- sibility that will not be forfeited. Lead- pertise in training and employing ca- agement to the Vietnamese in their ership development is the Armor pabilities available to the squad and own language. When the beleaguered School’s main effort, and NCOs play a platoon, and in advising the command- battalion was finally ordered to with- pivotal role in teaching, coaching, er at the company and battalion, is of draw, numerous ambushes were en- mentoring and training the future of paramount importance to our Armor countered. SFC Littrell repeatedly pre- our Armor and Cavalry force at every and Cavalry force. This role has ex- vented widespread disorder by direct- level. In an era of diminishing resourc- panded exponentially during opera- ing air strikes to within 50 meters of es, we can no longer have an “operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. With this their position. Through his indomitable tional vs. institutional” mindset but in mind, I believe we should focus on courage and complete disregard for his must find ways they complement each three critical areas: tactical expertise safety, he averted excessive loss of life other. To serve in this capacity, an NCO in the operational unit, the role of the and injury to the members of the bat- must be qualified as a squad leader, NCO in the generating force, and the talion. tank commander or platoon sergeant; development of the future scout and 99 percent of the NCOs in the generat- Without a doubt, our collective ability armor crewman. ing force have recent, relevant deploy- to be that expert, both personally and ment and combat-related experiences In most of our Armor and Cavalry in the development of our Soldiers, they bring to the classroom to ensure force, the NCO is responsible for build- has expanded with new systems and we are integrating real-world capabili- ing the team at the operational level technological resources previously un- ties and scenarios into instruction. and for being the tactical expert at available now being exploited at the employing his squad or platoon. SFC squad level. However, this increased Instructors at Fort Benning have made Gary Littrell was awarded the Medal capacity is easily met with greater po- great strides incorporating rotary- of Honor for his actions while serving tential, ability and aptitude of today’s wing assets, high-frequency communi- as an adviser to the Army of the Re- NCOs. Nonetheless, it will require a cations, Air Force Joint Terminal Attack

January-February 2014 5 Controllers (JTAC) and unmanned aer- As we seek to define, develop and indigenous forces” is evaluated to ial vehicle platforms into day-to-day evaluate future capabilities, the NCO maintain the premier reconnaissance lesson plans. On a more fundamental remains at the forefront. NCOs have capability the Army has always en- level, added rigor in one-station unit led their elements or participated as joyed. These projects, along with NCOs training (OSUT) and the NCO Academy evaluators and observers during Army serving in developmental roles where (NCOA); increased physical-fitness and Expeditionary Warfare Experiments they test and evaluate future vehicle land-navigation requirements; weap- (AEWEs), where they have pioneered and weapon systems, ensure we are on- and platform-specific training; and the 6x36 scout platoon and precision focused on the integration of capabili- the return of a culminating field-train- fires at the squad level, and have ties from across the spectrum to de- ing exercise (FTX) conducted in the worked to formalize the requirement velop the best mounted warrior. field with leaders and Soldiers from all for a company intelligence-support In summary, the Armor NCO’s skills, courses (Armor Basic Leadership team (CoIST). Also, NCOs are working training and professional experiences Course (ABOLC), Officer Candidate hard on the development of the “scout makes him an invaluable tool to our School (OCS), NCOA and OSUT) train- of the future,” identifying the skillsets branch and a critical part of our devel- ing ensures we are developing the ca- needed for reconnaissance leaders in opment strategy. His ability to train his pabilities the force requires. Leaders 2020 and beyond. Legacy tasks like formations, coach and mentor, and and Soldiers being evaluated in their “provide early warning” are being use experience to evaluate future ca- respective positions also aids develop- maintained, while “integrate joint capabilities will be essential in the Armor ment of these capabilities. pabilities” are added and “integrate force’s future.

6 January-February 2014 FROM THE BORESIGHT LINE How Master Gunner Training Improves Unit Readiness

The company-level master gunner method for conducting a borescope his element. To maximize the tank’s serves an important function in main- exercise? How is a condemned gun- capabilities, the crew must be well taining unit readiness. The foundation tube identified? The master gunner versed in the employment and func- for the master gunner’s success is set has the answers to all these questions tional operation of the fire-control at the Master Gunner School, located and more. The master gunner has the system. For example, as a general rule, at Fort Benning, GA, part of the Ma- knowledge to interpret and enter data when should the laser rangefinder be neuver Center of Excellence. Most on a Weapon Record Data Form, DA placed in first or last return? What commanders are aware the master 2408-4. happens when the tank is in emergen- gunner can be a vital asset to unit gun- cy mode as opposed to normal mode? nery training but may be less aware of The master gunner understands the The master gunner knows. the training the master gunner has re- hydraulic system and can rapidly iden- The master gunner has the answers to ceived that prepares him to bridge the tify problems. The turret must be ex- all these questions and more because gap between crew-level knowledge of ercised (spun around three times to he has been trained to the highest turret systems and the full capabilities the left and right), but why? The mas- standard at the Master Gunner School. of a maintenance team. ter gunner knows this rapidly forces the hydraulic fluid through the hydrau- When used properly, the master gun- Master-gunner maintenance training lic reservoir, where a series of baffles ner is more than just a glorified land begins with a basic understanding of removes air from the system. and ammo noncommissioned officer; how electricity works. Master gunners he is a subject-matter expert. Incorpo- are taught the basics of electron the- Armament accuracy checks (AACs) are rating the master gunner into unit ory and the paths electricity takes as conducted once a month at crew level. maintenance training will improve unit it travels through the turret. A master The average tank commander knows readiness and assist a unit in being the gunner is taught to read schematics, how to conduct AACs. The master gun- most lethal on the battlefield. and this helps lay the foundation for ner understands that AACs ensure the SFC Edward Rosendale follow-on troubleshooting training. A fire-control system is fully operation- 316th Cavalry Brigade master gunner is by no means an elec- al. The master gunner is trained pre- U.S. Army Armor School trician, but in this case, a little knowl- cisely on how to do each step and is a edge goes a long way. valuable asset in training crews to properly conduct AACs. A master gun- The next step in training is learning the ner can identify possible reasons for functions and capabilities of the M256 AAC failures and can even construct an guntube, breech ring and recoil sys- AAC solution board with just some ply- Acronym Quick-Scan tem. This teaches the master gunner wood and paint. several important maintenance functions. When and how is the recoil ex- When it comes time to conduct gun- AAC – armament accuracy check ercise conducted? What is the proper nery, the master gunner is in

January-February 2014 7 FROM THE SCREEN LINE The Lost Art of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield by MAJ Joseph Byerly and first sergeant and executive officer as- during mission analysis that assists CPT Brian Harris sist the commander in planning, these planners in depicting the effects of individuals do not comprise the com- terrain in a single source document. It Proper planning for combat operations mander’s staff at the company level, allows all participants to be “on the at all levels of command is vital. While no more so than the battalion execu- same page” with regard to their un- adaptability within the execution tive officer and command sergeant derstanding of the terrain – as op- phase can overcome various challeng- major function as the battalion staff. posed to their independent assess- es, proper planning can reduce or ment of the map and topography eliminate some of these roadblocks Product develop- sources. However, the MCOO is not in- before the mission commences. As tended as a briefing tool, nor should it Cavalry Leader’s Course (CLC) instruc- ment: wasted time detract from planning through time tors, the authors have noticed several or value added? spent on its development. trends regarding lack of mission anal- “I think I ran out of planning time be- ysis, specifically intelligence prepara- A well-done MCOO will not guarantee cause I was trying to get my MCOO tion of the battlefield (IPB), as leaders mission success, nor does a poorly perfect.” –multiple CLC students plan operations. This article will ad- done MCOO mean the plan is doomed dress the most commonly identified is- The U.S. military is on the cutting edge to fail. At company level, leaders typi- sues with the hopes of educating cur- of technology and looks for ways to cally operate in a time-constrained en- rent and future company-level leaders enhance its capabilities through use of vironment. Leaders must focus their as they prepare their units for the the latest in visual systems and simu- efforts on what gets them the most re- complex battlefields of the future. lation. While these are effective in en- turn on their investment. The likeli- abling leaders to visualize and describe hood of a well-developed MCOO being Lack of IPB elements of a plan to subordinates, shown in a brief, or having a dramatic IPB is the cornerstone on which our leaders must evaluate the cost against effect on the execution of mission friendly course of action (CoA) is built. the reward when developing briefing tasks by subordinates, is low. Instead, Failure to properly conduct IPB can re- products. Leaders cannot focus on leaders must use their time wisely. sult in mission failure or increased ca- products for display at the expense of Evaluation of available maps, satellite sualties. Field Manual (FM) 2-01.3, In- a properly developed plan. imagery and other topography re- telligence Preparation of the Battle- sources, coupled with understanding At company/troop level, leaders who of friendly and enemy capabilities, will field, contains the fundamentals re- spend time creating products to dis- enable the leader to plan effectively garding proper mission analysis for play their analysis generally find that without wasted time on slides and un- commanders and their staffs. While a analysis to be devoid of real substance necessary map overlays. valuable resource for battalion-and- and relegated to “covering the bases,” above level staffs, company command- as opposed to adding value to the Key terrain ers must also execute mission analysis planning process. The result is, of as outlined within the manual. course, time wasted on briefing prod- “If everything is important, than nothing is.” –Pat Lencioni It is important to note that the ab- ucts with little practical application for sence of a staff at the company level execution. The most common product Key terrain, as defined by Joint Publi- does not relieve the commander’s re- to drain a student’s time in CLC is de- cation 2-01.3, is any locality or area sponsibility to plan and resource his velopment of the modified combined whose seizure, retention or control af- unit the same way a higher headquar- obstacle overlay (MCOO). fords a marked advantage to either ters staff does. Company-sized ele- FM 2-01.3 states, “[T]he MCOO pro- combatant. Not every mountaintop, ments do not require a staff, as the vides the basis for identifying air and tall structure or government building, unit’s size is within the commander’s ground avenues of approach and mo- however, is key terrain. Leaders at all span of control; that is, one person can bility corridors. It integrates into one levels must take time to study the map effectively manage the unit without overlay all obstacles to movement. … to determine what is and isn’t key ter- the addition of a staff. The result is the The MCOO depicts the terrain accord- rain based on their mission, the ene- commander’s requirement to function ing to mobility classification.” In other my’s capabilities and the characteris- as his own staff. While the company words, the MCOO is a product created tics of the terrain itself.

8 January-February 2014 Key terrain varies by echelon. Terrain for commanders to properly plan for maintain the initiative in contact. that may not give a marked advantage enemy reactions to friendly actions. MAJ Joe Byerly is a student at the Na- to a battalion might be key for a com- Too often junior officers expect the val War College, Newport, RI. He pre- pany. Also, because company com- enemy to operate in a singular man- viously served as an instructor at CLC, manders should plan the enemy’s dis- ner, with limited reaction expected. At 3-16 Cavalry Regiment, Fort Benning, position two levels down, there might the same time, however, these same GA; plans officer, 2nd Armored Brigade be terrain that gives a squad-sized el- officers will expand on their own Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, ement a marked advantage that wasn’t “adaptability” and claim they will be Fort Stewart, GA; commander, Head- identified by the battalion staff. While able to react quickly to changes on the quarters and Headquarters Company, commanders should let subordinate battlefield in a fluid manner. Will the 1-64 Armored Regiment; commander, leaders know what higher headquar- enemy commander not also attempt C Troop, 3-7 Cavalry Regiment; squad- ters considers key terrain, they should to adapt to friendly actions? By dis- ron plans officer, 3-7 Cavalry; and pla- also develop their own within the counting the enemy’s ability to con- toon leader, A Troop, 2-1 Cavalry Regi- scope of their operation. duct multiple CoAs and having more ment, Fort Lewis, WA. MAJ Byerly’s than one option, the commander can military education includes Armor Of- Failure to evaluate create a false sense of security con- ficer Basic Course, Scout Leaders’ the threat cerning his own plan’s effectiveness. Course, Maneuver Captains’ Career Course and CLC. MAJ Byerly holds a “Know [your] enemy and know your- By considering multiple CoAs, the bachelor’s of science degree from self; in a hundred battles you will nev- commander can further prepare for North Georgia College and State Uni- er be in peril.” –Sun Tzu enemy reactions, as well as the differ- ing possibilities of initial disposition. versity in criminal justice. He is the re- Leaders must understand the threat Analysis of only one enemy array pre- cipient of Fiscal Year 2011 General and evaluate its capabilities, intent vents preparation, limits reconnais- Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award, and possible actions. The rote memo- sance focus and places the burden of Bronze Star (one oak-leaf cluster) and rization of threat weapons system reaction on the subordinate leaders. Meritorious Service Medal (one oak- ranges does not constitute a complete Contrarily, by assessing multiple CoAs, leaf cluster). evaluation of the enemy. Without the friendly commander can employ CPT Brian Harris is course manager/in- analysis of where the enemy plans to his organic and supporting elements in structor for CLC, 3-16 Cavalry, Fort position his weapons systems or to fo- a manner that allows greater flexibility Benning. He previously served as com- cus his combat power, such knowledge once contact is made. It enables the mander, A Troop, 1-17 Cavalry, 82nd is nearly useless. Leaders must assess commander to quickly shift combat Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC; as- the enemy in total to effectively devel- power and seize the initiative upon sistant S-3 plans officer and tactical op his tactical plan. making contact vs. focusing on one en- operations officer/pilot-in-command, emy template and reacting to unex- FM 2-01.3 states that enemy analysis B Troop, 1-17 Cavalry; and mortar-pla- pected contact. In essence, assessing toon leader, HHC, 2-72 Armored Regi- must be conducted two echelons multiple enemy CoAs enhances a com- ment, 2nd Infantry Division, Camp down. This means the commander mander’s ability to adapt; he has al- Casey, South Korea. CPT Harris’ mili- cannot simply reissue his higher head- ready considered the “what ifs” and tary education includes Pathfinder quarters’ analysis as his own. He must can rapidly shift forces in response to School, Airborne Course, CLC, Aviation further refine the enemy situational enemy actions. template to the squad/section level. Captains’ Career Course, Joint Firepow- This level of detail allows for a greater Conclusion er Course, Army Aviation Tactical Op- allocation of company organic and The importance of mission analysis erations Officer Course, Aviation War- supporting assets, providing over- cannot be overstated. Without proper rant Officer Basic Course, Initial Entry match to the company. Simple analy- assessment of the terrain and weath- Rotary Wing Course/OH-58D FSXXI ses of enemy platoon locations at the er, a leader cannot maximize his organ- Course and Armor Officer Basic Course. company level do not provide focus for ic and supporting assets capabilities. He holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in the commander to employ combat Without analysis of the enemy, both history from University of Central Flor- power. capabilities and intent, a leader cannot ida and is a recipient of the Bronze Star position his forces quickly and risks Medal, Purple Heart and four Air Med- Developing 1 CoA granting his opponent the initiative. als. “History repeatedly demonstrates that Failure to consider multiple enemy the threat/adversary often surprises CoAs is to embrace ambiguity at a dan- Acronym Quick-Scan those who predict only one [CoA].” – gerous level and risks mission failure FM 2-01.3 and catastrophic loss to friendly forc- CLC – Cavalry Leader’s Course Commanders must develop enemy es. The enemy can and will attempt to CoA – course of action CoAs based on a combination of his outmaneuver friendly forces. Leaders FM – field manual must anticipate these actions and le- IPB – intelligence preparation of the understanding of the enemy’s capabil- battlefield ities and intent, coupled with his own verage friendly capabilities quickly. MCOO – modified combined obstacle tactical experience and knowledge. Proper enemy analysis shortens the re- overlay Multiple CoAs are essential action time and enables leaders to

9 January-February 2014 The Armored Brigade Combat Team 2014-2024: Improving Abrams Lethality

by MAJ Robert Brown armored gunshields – greatly en- advancements to defeat threat targets hanced platform survivability, espe- equipped with AERA and APS. The primary mission of the M1A2 Sys- cially in the complex urban terrain tem Enhancement Package (SEP) v2 prevalent in Iraq. The advanced multi-purpose (AMP) Abrams main battle tank (MBT) is to round is a line-of-sight munition with provide mobile, protected firepower However, in response to requirements three modes of operation: point deto- for combined-arms maneuver and for 2014-2024, the Abrams’ lethality nate, delay and airburst. This essential wide-area security. The Abrams must must continue to be improved. This capability required in urban environ- be capable of engaging the enemy in improvement in lethality for the ments allows the tank crew to defeat any weather, day or night, on the Abrams M1A2 SEPv3 will derive from AT guided-missile teams at ranges of multi-dimensional, non-linear battle- the combination of developmental up- 50 to 2,000 meters with a precision le- field using firepower, maneuver and grades and the addition of mature thal airburst. The point-detonate and shock effect. technologies that include the Ammu- delay modes allow for obstacle reduc- An increasing array of threat tactics nition DataLink (ADL), improved tion (OR), bunker defeat and a wall- and weapons – including advanced ex- 120mm ammunition, Improved For- breach capability for dismounted in- plosive reactive armor (AERA), Active ward-Looking Infrared (IFLIR) and the fantry. The AMP round also reduces Protection Systems (APS) and impro- low-profile (LP) Common Remotely the logistics burden by replacing four vised explosive devices – necessitate Operated Weapon System (CROWS). existing rounds (M830 high-explosive continual improvement to the Abrams (HE) AT, M803A1 multipurpose HEAT, platform so it can meet this mission. Improved 120mm M1028 canister and M908 HE-OR). ammunition For current and recent operations, the ADL Abrams underwent many upgrades The M829E4 (soon to be type-classi- and configuration changes in response fied as the M829A4) is the fifth-gener- These enhanced munitions rely on the to evolving threats. Upgrades like the ation kinetic-energy anti-tank (AT) ADL to provide communications with Tank Urban Survivability Kit (TUSK) – round. This new round provides heavy- the platform’s fire-control system. The which includes advanced reactive ar- armor defeat capability at extended ADL consists of a modified breech- mor, upgraded belly armor and crew ranges. It uses a depleted-uranium block, upgraded Improved Fire-Control penetrator and anti-armor design Electronics Unit and upgraded Abrams

10 January-February 2014 closed-hatch force maintains overmatch and battle- FOV. Also, LP field dominance for the near future. CROWS will be The M1A2 SEPv3 will provide future equipped with armored formations an unmatched an upgraded day combination of lethality, mobility and camera that uses survivability. picture-in-picture technology MAJ Rob Brown is the assistant U.S. to combine dif- Army Training and Doctrine Command ferent FOVs, and (TRADOC) capability manager for the it offers a 340 Abrams in the Capabilities Develop- ment and Integration Directorate, Ma- tank software. percent larger scene in the wide FOV. neuver Center of Excellence, Fort Ben- IFLIR The Army’s strategy for modernizing ning, GA. He has also served as assis- the Abrams fleet revolves around in- tant product manager for the Patriot; The ability to identify targets prior to crementally upgrading aspects of the Javelin; Tube-launched, Optically- engagement remains one of the big- platform through a combination of tracked, Wire-guided Improved Target gest obstacles to improving Abrams le- technological insertion and product Acquisition System; and Non-Line-of- thality. The new IFLIR solves this prob- improvements based on evolving Sight Launch System – all at Program lem using long- and mid-wave infrared threats and available technologies. Executive Office-Missiles and Space, technology in both the gunner’s prima- The advances in Abrams lethality stem Redstone Arsenal, AL. MAJ Brown is a ry sight and the commander’s inde- from a synergistic combination of graduate of the Scout Platoon Leaders’ pendent thermal viewer. The IFLIR will technological efforts. The IFLIR will en- Course, Armor Officer Advanced provide four fields of view (FOV) dis- able early and accurate target detec- Course and acquisition basic and inter- played on high-definition displays, tion and identification. Once identi- mediate courses, and is Level II-certi- greatly improving target acquisition, fied, the crew can then engage those fied in program management. He holds identification and engagement times targets with either of the two new en- a bachelor’s of science degree from the – compared to the current second- hanced rounds via the ADL with a high University of Tennessee in political sci- generation FLIR – under all conditions, probability of hit / kill. ence. including fog / obscurants. Recent and continued upgrades to the LP CROWS Abrams MBT will ensure the armored Acronym Quick-Scan The Abrams’ lethality is further improved through ADL – Ammunition DataLink a product im- AERA – advanced explosive reactive armor provement to LP AMP – advanced multi-purpose CROWS. This ef- APS – Active Protection Systems fort improves the AT – anti-tank CROWS – Common Remotely Oper- tank command- ated Weapon System er’s situational FOV – fields of view awareness with- HE – high explosive out compromis- HEAT – high-explosive anti-tank IFLIR – Improved Forward-Looking ing capability. LP Infrared CROWS signifi- LP – low profile cantly lowers the MBT – main battle tank OR – obstacle reduction profile of the SEP – System Enhancement Package weapon station, TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training and returning both Doctrine Command open- and

11 January-February 2014 Integrating Live, Virtual, Constructive Enablers: U.S. Army in Europe’s Ability to Create a Blended Training Environment

by Bradley Joy, Edward ability to exercise squadron-level Each squadron rotated through the Rykard and LTC Andrew L. collective-training objectives that training environment over the course Green otherwise would not have been of four days (Figure 2). Day 1 began possible. Second, the LFX provided a with troop-leading procedures. Each When U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) consistent and reproducible training day’s activities built on the previous conducted a unique squadron-level environment to exercise mission day, culminating on Day 4 with the live live-fire exercise (LFX) in support of 2nd command. The LFX integrated and gunnery phase. Day 2 (“sim” day) al- Cavalry Regiment (CR) in November leveraged virtual, constructive and lowed squadron leadership from the 2012, the LFX’s blended training envi- gaming capabilities of the Joint squadron tactical CP down to Stryker ronment combined live, virtual, con- Multinational Simulation Center vehicle commanders, drivers and gun- structive and gaming (LVC-G) training (JMSC) with the live capabilities of ners to rehearse the LFX using Virtual enablers to provide multi-echelon JMTC’s Grafenwoehr Range Operations Battlespace 2 (VBS2). The “dry” day training from the individual Soldier to to achieve this initial step toward an was a full squadron rehearsal with all the squadron commander and staff. integrated architecture that the squadron Soldiers executing their This blending of simulation with live integrated training environment will tasks in the full exercise environment training produced a one-of-a-kind bring. but without live ammunition. The final training event that has implications for day for each squadron was the com- future training. So what was unique about the USA- plete LFX with live ammunition, end- REUR LFX? Simply put, the LFX demon- The LFX’s training environment was a ing with troop- and squadron-level af- strated the capability to leverage cur- temporary low-cost solution before ter-action reviews (AARs). rent LVC-G capabilities into a synchro- USAREUR’s scheduled fielding of the nized exercise environment to support live, virtual, constructive-integrating The DATE scenario that JMRC devel- the integration of multiple echelons architecture (LVC-IA). Planners from 7th oped based on U.S. Army Training and above the individual Soldier through Army’s Joint Multinational Training Doctrine Command’s Intelligence Sup- the battalion command-post (CP) lev- Command (JMTC) in Grafenwoehr, port Activity (G-2 Threats)’s final-draft el, which becomes extremely impor- Germany – which is USAREUR’s train- document, “Full-Spectrum Training En- tant as we transition to a home-sta- ing command – designed the environ- vironment” (dated February 2011), tion-deployment master training plan ment. JMTC planners also developed a was expanded by 2CR planners to in- with less funding. scenario that replicated operational clude the Grafenwoehr Training Area (GTA) and to place the squadron’s variables from the Caucasus Region in Exercise background coordination with JMTC’s subordinate commanders and staff into the com- Once the JMTC command- element, the Joint Multinational Read- er agreed to support 2CR’s Conduct command and control (ART 5.0) iness Center (JMRC), and 2CR planners. LFX by using JMTC’s LVC-G Execute the operations process The scenario was a continuation of enablers to employ a con- what 2CR experienced the month be- Conduct security operations (ART 6.7.3) tinuation of the DATE sce- fore during its decisive-action training Conduct a screen nario that JMRC had devel- environment (DATE) rotation at JMRC, oped, planning and execu- Conduct a guard the Army’s only overseas combat ma- th nd tion of this exercise inte- Conduct battle handover (4 and 2 squadrons) neuver training center. grated not only JMTC ca- Conduct defensive operations (ART 7.2) The 2CR LFX blended training pabilities but also those Employ lethal fires in support of the brigade from the 2CR. The 2CR environment addressed home-station Synch close air support (battalion) training concepts to help provide a provided the training ob- more engaging and challenging jectives (Figure 1) and de- Employ fires (ART 3.0) training environment over traditional veloped an aggressive ex- Provide fire support live-fire “gunnery” exercises. First, the ecution timeline coming Apply lessons learned from collective training creation of an expanded training on the heels of its DATE ro- during DATE rotation environment in time and space tation to take advantage of allowed multi-echelon training and the lessons-learned. Figure 1. 2nd Cavalry Regiment training objectives.

12 January-February 2014 Community road closure

31 (We) 1 (Th) 2 (Fr) 3 (Sa) 4 (Su) 5 (Mo) 6 (Tu) 7 (We) 8 (Th) 9 (Fr)

4 Squadron TLP Sim Dry Live OCD OCL

1st Squadron TLP Sim Dry Live OCD OCL eekend ay anday ay W ay Report 2nd Squadron TLP OCD OCL/Sim Dry Live of Command of USAREUR Change USAREUR All Saints D Regiment After-actionRegiment 3rd Squadron TLP OCD OCL/Sim Dry Live D Veteran’s

Figure 2. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment’s exercise execution timeline.

ENEMY MISSION: 113 Mech BTG conducts movement to contact IOT seize key road/ rail junctions in eastern Yevlakh Province IOT control local hydrocarbon resources and prevent BEARS reinforcement between Gorgas and Baku Axis. SAPA forces provide recon support and local area defenses in populated areas along 113 BTG AAs to support ACF movement to contact. 113 Mech BTG T: Conduct movement to contact P: Defeat 2CR forces in Yevlakh Province and seize key LOCs (FREIHUNG) between Gorgas and Baku 11 Recon Battalion COLTS T: Conduct area reconnaissance P: Provide early warning and situational DOLPHINS awareness for 113 BTG movement to contact Endstate: 2CR forces defeated in Yevlakh Province / GATR expelled from key population areas / ACF control key road / rail junctions in eastern Yevlakh Decisive Operations: 113 BTG conducts GIANTS movement to contact w/2 X Mech Inf Battalion along northern AA. Main body attacks to seize FREIHUNG LOV IVO OBJ COLTS and DOLPHINS or IVO OBJ EAGLES. Shaping Operation 1: 1 X Mech Inf Battalion JETS (Recon) flank screen along southern AA Shaping Operation 2: SAPA conducts local SAPA SJ area defense in population centers along AA1 and T: DEFEND T: Attack to expel AA2 IOT FIX 2CR in eastern Yevlakh P: IOT FIX 2 CR forces in eastern Yevlakh P: IOT deny 2CR / GATR access to Reserve: 1 X light tank battalion (T-63) acts as prevent 2CR penetration into central human terrain through use of suicide exploitation force along AA1 after penetration is Yevlakh Province attacks, complex IED events, harassing achieved SAF engagements and intimidation of Scheme of Fires: 113 Artillery Battalion sup- population. pressed IVO Nurnberg; organic 2S9 provide support to troops in contact.

Figure 3. Enemy’s most likely CoA. plex Caspian Sea environment. (EXCON) cell worked to establish the range operations and simulation con- operating environment as well as com- trol. The 2CR and JMTC partnered to con- mand and control (C2) of the live rang- trol the LFX. COL Keith Barclay, 2CR es. There were four main control ele- The 2CR current-operations cell con- commander, was the senior trainer. ments within the higher control: 2CR sisted of 2CR Soldiers that replicated The rest of the exercise control current operations, scenario control, all the activities of elements that were

13 January-February 2014 higher, adjacent, lower, supporting Constructive Constructive and supported to Virtual UAS enemy unit platforms the squadron con- platform ducting the LFX. This included two live field-artillery SIGACTs batteries from created by TA 2CR’s fires squadron as well as constructive units in simulation. The 2CR and JMSC personnel made up the scenario- control cell, whose primary task was to maintain over- watch of all forces replicated – enemy and friendly Constructive forces – to ensure friendly unit the squadron’s Live TA platforms training objectives were being met. Figure 4. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment live-fire blended CTP. (CTP taken from a squadron tactical battle command The simulation- (TBC) client) control cell focused on the con- in Figure 4. and Below (FBCB2) and frequency- structive and virtual enablers, along modulation radio communications. with mission-command systems Gaming VBS2 through Simulation-C4I Inter- (MCSs), that provided the “wrap- Creating the right training environ- change Module for Plans, Logistics and around” common tactical picture (CTP) ment for 2CR began with Day 2 simu- Exercises (SIMPLE) provided Stryker viewed by 2CR’s CP. lation rehearsal and Army Games for platform position reports to FBCB2. Training enablers. Over the course of Creating a blended the LFX simulation days, 571 2CR Sol- Tactical Gaming Branch, led by Ed diers from 12 troops used JMSC’s (spe- Rykard, supported the simulation days training environ- cifically, the Model and Simulation Di- using two VBS2 license managers, nine ment vision’s Tactical Gaming Branch) prima- VBS2 dedicated servers, 22 VBS2 ad- The integration of LVC enablers into ry Army Games for Training enabler, ministrator machines, 184 VBS2 client the LFX served three main purposes: VBS2. workstations, 49 FBCB2 “white boxes” • First, it ensured the replicated and one SIMPLE system, all intercon- The simulation days’ purpose was to nected running one scenario. training environment met the conduct crew-coordination drills for commander’s training objectives. vehicle commanders, drivers and gun- “Making it real”: • Second, the wrap-around simula- ners as well as C2 tasks by the squad- tion provided commanders and ron TAC. Soldiers were able to refine developing live-fire staffs with an expanded operating their necessary skillsets in a virtual en- portion environment that ensured higher, vironment that replicated GTA (geo- To add the live-fire portion of the adjacent, supporting and support- specific VBS2 terrain). Soldiers re- blended training exercise, JMTC’s live- ed roles are addressed within the ceived training on VBS2 and then con- fire training and range-operations exercise. ducted a mini-exercise before engag- staff worked with 2CR planners to cre- ing in their assigned mission. ate enough live-fire range space on • Third, enhanced simulation GTA for an entire Stryker squadron to wraparound improves commander Soldiers were outfitted with their virtual Stryker variant and allowed to ma- train simultaneously. The 2CR com- and staff understanding and neuver on GTA-specific terrain (Ranges mander did not want to use the tradi- visualization and facilitates 112, 117, 118, 132 and 312). They en- tional west side of GTA’s ranges (the development of a more accurate gaged a mix of live, virtual enemies as Range 301 Multi-purpose Range Com- CTP by using MCSs and processes. well as pop-up targets. C2 of maneu- plex and Range 201) but envisioned The blended LVC training environment vering elements was achieved using linking six ranges together on GTA’s created by 2CR and JMTC is depicted Force XXI Battle Command Brigade east side to enable four to five Stryker

14 January-February 2014 troops to simultaneously engage tar- weapons, as well as developing the Figure 5, which depicts the linkage gets. While this design provided a system for targetry control and syn- among LVC domains simulating the more doctrinally realistic squadron chronization, took the Maneuver squadron’s MCSs (FBCB2, TBC). frontage of nine kilometers, it added Branch team two months from con- JCATS provided the high-fidelity ex- complexity to C2 of the ranges and ception to final proofed plan with panded training environment for the linkage of the range targetry to digital combined range-surface danger-zone feeds to create a believable scenario. friendly forces wraparound as well as packets. The final target package was the enemy units depicted in the ene- After scheduling and de-conflicting then given to JMSC to link the VBS2 my course-of-action (CoA) diagram on range space, the live-fire development gaming rehearsal to the actual terrain Page 13. This enabled the squadron’s team worked hand-in-hand with JMSC and enemy that 2CR Soldiers would commanders and staffs during the op- scenario planners to determine the see during the live-fire portion. erations process to visualize the oper- replicated-to-real enemy transition ational environment and to better see point, and the timing and control of Virtual and con- themselves through the regiment’s the multi-range target set. Each structive unit and platform message feeds to range’s targetry was hand-selected to To meet 2CR’s training objectives, TBC clients and FBCB2. Also, JCATS was match the envisioned enemy situation- JMSC provided a near-real-time CTP to able to easily depict enemy formations al template, or ensitemp, and to en- the squadron CPs. Virtual (Multiple in time and space and was the source sure multi-range safety. The 2CR’s Unified Simulation Environment, or of two intelligence feeds to the squad- commander also wanted each troop to MUSE) and constructive (Joint Conflict ron’s CPs. be able to fire its organic mortars as and Tactical Situation, or JCATS) tools First, JCATS through SIMPLE and the well as enable firing the squadron’s were used along with 2CR live FBCB2 regiment’s mission-command servers tube-launched, optically tracked, wire- (terrestrial-based) systems to create provided a replicated top-down ensi- guided anti-tank missile systems and the CTP on the training audience’s temp. Second, MUSE (virtual enabler) Mobile Gun Systems. MCS. JMSC simulation and exercise provided full-motion video feeds from Selecting and proofing firing positions planners leveraged LVC tools to create a replicated Shadow unmanned aerial for each squadron’s complement of the exercise technical construct in system (UAS) displaying the movement

Track park 2C exercise and technical control Track park 2C exercise squadron command post

Remote JCATS MUSE CSS MUSE VRSG Vbrick UAS/FMV video v11.0.2 v18.0.0.4 v18.0.0.4 laptop

JCATS DIS Win Netlink WES Spark Web Spark Web Spark Web v11.0.2 v8.1.0.2 chat client UAS Control chat server chat client

DIS PDUs Regimental Port 3000 command post

SIMPLE GCCS-A C2PC GW CPOF Db DIS LAN DIS PDUs v4.0.2p5.3 TMS v3.2.1j v6.1.1p4 Repo TBC client AFATOS vBC10.0.3V vBC11 MultiCast Groups 223.8.51.20 - SQRD SA BCS BCS vBC0903 FBCB2 223.8.51.21 - RGT SA vBC0905 v6.5.2.2 FBCB2 JVMF v6.5.2.2 TMS EZ-PASS AIC POS: RPT (K05.01) NRTS NRTS CTC: RPT (K04.11) Topics Pass-to-pass PASS PASS POS-RPT:/MCS/CORR-BLUE:US/ARMY/ JVMF POS-RPT:/MCS/CORR-GREEN:US/ARMY/ POS: RPT (K05.01) POS-RPT:/MCS/CORR-RED:US/ARMY/ EZ-PASS CTC:RPT (K04.11) POS-RPT:/MCS/CORR:US/ARMY/ POS-RPT:/MCS/GCCS/ORGANIC-LINK: US/ARMY Live troop vehicles JVMF FBCB2 POS: RPT (K05.01) v6.5.2.2 Training audience MCS CTC: RPT (K04.11) AIC FBCB2 v6.5.2.2

JMSC simulation system SIPR/tactical

JMSC MCS Simulation LAN

Figure 5. Diagram depicts elements of the LVC simulation to MCS architecture used to create 2CR’s CTP.

15 January-February 2014 ranges over the GTA MUSE JCATS SIMPLE range net with the ensitemp’s arrival • Replicated UAS • Ground replication • Translates simulation and developed bands • Provided full-motion video • Ground movement and message protocols into of targets in harmony in 3D environment engagement USMTF message formats with the execution for mission-command matrix. The effect for • Link to common ground • Rotary wing systems station • Missile replication the training unit was Line-21 META data • Link to BFT/CPOF a seamless transition from digitally tracked CFF OTH:GOLD enemy to visually ob- POS:RPT servable targets for the live fire. Figure 6. Simulations models used. The higher-control cell made spot re- BCS TBC/CPOF FBCB2 ports and significant- activity entries into FBCB2 and TBC cli- • Server stack that central- • Supports mission-com- • Supports mission-com- ents to further devel- izes software capabilities mand WfF mand WfF op the CTP the squad- • Publish and subscribe • Provides situational • Provides near-real-time ron CPs viewed. Sol- services awareness and collab- mission-command infor- diers were in place to MS Exchange server orative tools to support mation on the move decision-making provide the normal MS SharePoint Displays platform loca- • Displays as common option data interaction between the squadron CP and eration/tactical picture Distributes mission orders and graphics its higher headquarters, 2CR. AFATDS *GCCS-A The EXCON cell provided the proper • Supports Army’s fires WfF • Provides common opera- amount of detail at • Army’s link with Air Force tional picture at combat- the right time to for A2C2 ant command and JTF meet the command- level er’s training objec- • Provides ground, surface tives. The total EX- and air track data CON cell consisted of 53 Soldiers, Depart- ment of the Army ci- *Provided by JMSC vilians and contrac- tors. With about 700 Figure 7. Mission-command systems. Soldiers participating in each phase of the of JCATS enemy systems through EXCON cell. This group used an execu- LFX, there was roughly a 13:1 ratio of named areas of interest and into the tion matrix that CPT James Gibbs, 2CR training personnel to support person- engagement areas. Each squadron S-2 S-3 Plans, developed to ensure this oc- nel. This demonstrated through effec- had to go through the proper planning curred. The execution matrix allowed tive exercise design that a streamlined, process to schedule and use the Shad- the EXCON cell to not only control cost-effective expanded training envi- ow UAS. Control of the Shadow was movement of enemy forces but also to ronment can be achieved. achieved through chat services to Sol- make adjustments within the JCATS During 4-2 CR’s AAR, the 4-2 CR execu- diers from the UAS platoon controlling simulation and live-target presenta- tive officer commented that “the the flight plan and payload of the vir- tion sequence based on training audi- squadron staff did a better job when tual Shadow UAS. ence actions / reactions. they were able to interface with their The GTA live-fire training team staff – higher headquarters and [were] placed Control in addition to the normal control team in the environment built for the LFX To ensure the squadron’s training ob- of target operator, range officer in beyond live units occupying ranges.” jectives were met, control of enemy charge and range safety officer – op- movement and synchronization with erated each of the six range towers. Implications for fu- range-based live targets fell to a group The GTA range safety chief, CPT Chris ture training comprised of Soldiers from 2CR, JMTC Arnold, in coordination with the other As the Army begins fielding LVC-IA and range operations and JMSC staff in the EXCON team leads, synchronized the USAREUR prepares for the transition,

16 January-February 2014 small changes now in training para- innovative ways to train USAREUR past work assignments include digms and use of current training en- units in the future. simulation analyst liaison officer, 1st ablers can impact LFXs and home-sta- Armored Division G-3 TREX, LTC Andrew Green is chief of range option training. LVC-IA is not a replace- Wiesbaden, Germany; and deputy site erations at GTA, JMTC, Grafenwoehr. ment for live training, and this solution lead, Vilseck Battle Command Training His past duty assignments include is not, either. It is not only a way to en- Center, Vilseck, Germany. His military commander, 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry hance live training, it is also a way to schooling includes Intermediate Level Regiment, Vilseck, Germany (Operation help commanders and their staffs Education, Command and General Enduring Freedom 2010-12); executive achieve a higher level of proficiency Staff College. Joy holds a bachelor’s of officer to the chief of staff, Allied Land and become better prepared after science degree from the University of Component Command, Heidelberg, completing live training. Alabama in business administration. Germany; joint planner, Commander’s He is a member of the JMSC team that The LFX developed by JMTC and 2CR Interagency Engagement Group, Head- won the 2010 Army Modeling and capitalized on available resources and quarters, U.S. European Command; Simulation Award for Army-wide team st designed an environment to meet the and battalion executive officer, 1 Bat- intelligence training. needs of the squadron training audi- talion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cav- ence. Because of budgetary restric- alry Division, Fort Hood, TX (Operation Edward Rykard, a retired Air Force tions and personnel constraints, train- Iraqi Freedom 2, 2003-2005). His mili- crew chief (C-141, C-5 and C-17), is ing centers cannot allocate a large tary schooling includes U.S. Army Com- chief of tactical gaming at JMSC, amount of resources to build training mand and General Staff College, Com- Grafenwoehr, and has led tactical exercises. However, if training centers bined Arms and Services Staff School, gaming since its inception in 2009. He use technology and simulations, this Airborne School, Armor Officer Ad- holds a bachelor’s of science degree makes it more efficient and effective vanced Course, Ranger School and Ar- from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Uni- to allocate training resources to lever- mor Officer Basic Course. LTC Green versity in professional aeronautics. He age LVC capabilities into a synchro- holds a bachelor’s of art degree from is also a member of the JMSC team that won the 2010 Army Modeling and nized exercise environment that can Seattle University in political science. Simulation Award for Army-wide team support integration of multiple eche- Bradley Joy serves as federation intelligence training. lons – individual Soldiers or squadron manager at JMSC, Grafenwoehr. His CPs and higher. JMTC’s unique structure lends itself to building a cohesive team and having a Acronym Quick-Scan shared understanding to quickly design, plan and execute exercises of this AAR – after-action review JMTC – Joint Multinational Training type. All LVC-G enablers to support the C2 – command and control Command LFX reside in and are controlled direct- CoA – course of action LFX – live-fire exercise ly by JMTC. CP – command post LVC – live, virtual and constructive CR – cavalry regiment LVC-G – live, virtual, constructive CTP – common tactical picture and gaming Conclusion DATE – decisive-action training envi- LVC-IA – live, virtual, constructive- Soldiers and leaders from 2CR trained ronment integrating architecture in the LFX exercise construct by using Ensitemp – enemy situational tem- MCS – mission-command system LVC-G training enablers. The 2CR’s plate MUSE – Multiple Unified Simulation EXCON – exercise control Environment subordinate squadrons moved from a FBCB2 – Force XXI Battle Command SIMPLE – Simulation-C4/Interchange challenging DATE rotation at JMRC and Brigade and Below Module for Plans, Logistics and Exer- transitioned straight into the LFX gun- GTA – Grafenwoehr Training Area cises JCATS – Joint Conflict and Tactical TAC – brigade tactical command post nery conducting defensive operations Situation TBC – tactical battle command in an expanded training environment. JMRC – Joint Multinational Readiness UAS – unmanned aerial system The JMTC team learned a great deal Center USAREUR – U.S. Army Europe and will use these lessons for further JMSC – Joint Multinational Simulation VBS2 – Virtual Battlespace 2 Center development of more efficient and

17 January-February 2014 SADDLES AND SABERS Cross-Domain Concepts of the Malaya Campaign

by retired U.S. Marine for Malaya (now Malaysia) are instruc- rubber plantations and tin mines Corps LTC Robert W. tive as to the potential of this ap- linked together. A road and rail net- Lamont proach. work was forged down the west side History may well find January 2012 as Terrain a a watershed moment in the evolution of American strategic thought. The De- factor partment of Defense planning guid- As with all military ance for that year signaled both a shift campaigns conducted to the Pacific as a theater of focus and ashore, terrain was a the realignment of budgetary resourc- pivotal factor around es needed to implement this new vi- which opposing strate- sion.1,2 Supporting this top-level guid- gies were formulated. ance was the release, also in January During the 1920s, the 2012, of the Joint Operational Access British viewed the jun- Concept (JOAC) to address the chal- gle-covered mountains lenges of emerging anti-access and ar- that ran the length of ea-denial capabilities along the Asian Malaya as a barrier rimlands. that would force any attacker to land direct- Following up, the Army and Marine ly on the island of Sin- Corps issued a joint concept paper in gapore.4 However, the March 2012 dealing with gaining and economic development maintaining access within the con- of the Malay Peninsu- structs of this new planning guidance. la’s natural resources Figure 1. The British believed the terrain of neighbor- The fundamental theme for this new served to open routes ing Malaysia would force the Japanese to land on the approach was the idea that cross-do- through this barrier as island of Singapore. (Map from CIA World Factbook) main synergy would provide increased capability beyond the mere additive of combat power provided from the introduction of more units into the force mix.3 Domains are those dimensions of conflict, often thought of as the purview of selected services, in which opposing forces contest each other to assert their will and operational construct on their enemy to secure a desired endstate. These domains include land, maritime, air, space and cyberspace. This new approach uses advantages in one domain to offset shortfalls in another to complicate the opponent’s ability to focus combat capability. The purpose of this article is to review a historical example of how such interaction can support joint campaign objectives. While not including the do- Figure 2. The British presumed that the mountains of Malaysia (current coun- mains of space and cyberspace, the try indicated in cream color) would be a barrier to the Japanese. (Map from Japanese opening moves of the Battle CIA World Factbook)

18 January-February 2014 of the country that could support Patani was known as “the ledge” and commander had a force that could large-scale military movement.5 Thus, became the objective of a spoiler op- move rapidly on roads or infiltrate out the progressive development of the eration call Matador.9 This thrust to to the flank along a jungle-covered country’s transportation system began gain defensive terrain reveals the stra- route. The presence of engineer units to undermine a key assumption on the tegic intent of the Malayan command, well forward helped retain mobility defense of Britain’s naval base in the which was to delay down the length of when obstacles were encountered.13 Far East. the peninsula until reinforcements The presence of well-trained all-arms could recover the battle. teams gave the Japanese commander Running the length of Malaya is a high tactical options his British opponent mountain range that compartmental- The long littoral flank of the Malaya was unable to counter. izes the country into two parts. One of Peninsula further complicated Com- the reasons most of the cultural settle- monwealth deployment. The threat of Japanese strategy sought to accom- ment occurred on the west side of this a landing to the rear of troops delay- plish three objectives in conquering range was that the height of these ing in the north forced the British to Singapore: first, isolate the naval base mountains – 7,000 feet in some places defend the length of the country. At from air reinforcement via India by – shielded the region from the mon- the start of the war, the 3rd Indian seizing the Kra Isthmus;14 second, land soon rains coming in from the South Corps was assigned the north, east and at Singora and Patani in Thailand to se- China Sea.6 The drainage requirements center approaches. The 8th Australian cure the approaches to the maneuver for this large volume of water could Division held Johore in the south. Sin- corridor on the west side of the penin- significantly affect any military cam- gapore was defended by a fortress sula; and last, advance down the paign. Lateral movement out of a garrison. Lastly, the 12th Indian Brigade length of the country, using littoral beachhead, and hence up or down the was positioned at Port Dickson as a returning movements when required to coast, required crossing many gaps at serve.10 The influence of seaborne secure Singapore. The British antici- each point where the water reaches landings prevented the British from pated all these events, hence the Jap- the sea. The Japanese had identified massing their force at the expected anese did not achieve strategic sur- no less than 250 bridges that would point of contact in the north. This in- prise. However, the speed at which the have to be captured intact, or rebuilt, herent maritime mobility is an exam- Japanese were able to operate result- if they were to sustain a drive to Sin- ple of cross-domain influence that ed in tactical shock and provided them gapore.7 This requirement would influ- complicated the landward dispositions the initiative throughout the Malaya ence the organization and tactics of of the defense. Campaign.15 GEN Tomoyuki Yamashita’s 25th Army, which was assigned to capture the Japanese tactics Malaya Campaign British naval base at Singapore. Under the command of COL Toshiro Kota Bharu is located at the northeast Hayashi, a special Japanese staff sec- corner of Malaya at the end of a tenu- The last terrain feature that would af- tion, later named the Taiwan Army Re- ous rail line that snakes its way across fect the campaign, especially in the search Section, was established to the center of the peninsula. Defending opening stages of the amphibious study the requirements of tropical the beaches here was 8th Indian Bri- landings, was manmade. The Malaya- warfare. Analyzing geography, climate, gade. Japan’s Takumi detachment, Thai border was to provide an unde- unit structure and the diverse popula- 6,000 men of the 56th Infantry Regi- fended zone north of Malaya from tions in the region, this section devel- ment, arrived off the coast at night which the Japanese could strike down oped what training was necessary to Dec. 8, 1941, and attempted a landing the west coast.8 If they were able to prepare for the conflict and to validate through six-foot surf. The strong cur- get ashore at Singora and Patani, the campaign plans. Joint maneuvers were rent pulled the boats away from the road network would support a con- held, with elements of 5th Division and planned landing area and scattered verging move on the Muda River. The 5th Air Force group from Manchuria, to the assault wave into the teeth of the British also came to this conclusion test deployment and communications defenders. This was the only point at and attempted to develop an opening arrangements.11 In another field exer- which the initial landings would en- strategy to counter Japanese plans cise, a reinforced infantry battalion counter resistance on the ground.16 without violating Thailand’s borders landed on Hainan Island. It moved As daylight broke over the beaches, prior to hostilities. around the circumference of the is- Hudson aircraft were able to strike the land, covering 600 miles – or about the The British command viewed the neu- transports, scoring a hit on one and distance from Thailand to Singapore – tral status of Thailand as a parallel to damaging several landing craft. The to simulate an advance on the British Belgium in Western Europe and as losses off the coast made the naval es- naval base. The battalion destroyed such drew a similar response. To retain cort commander want to withdraw, and repaired bridges, practiced at- the east flank of the Jitra position, but Takumi refused. As the day wore tacks and conducted other tests.12 once Japanese landings were detected on, Japanese airpower recovered con- at Patani, it was envisioned that Com- The organization that emerged from trol of the sky, and troops ashore were monwealth of Nations forces would these tests was a Japanese combined- able to expand the beachhead by infil- move into Thailand and secure defen- arms force built around the infantry. trating through gaps in the line. The sible terrain. The area where the road Backed with artillery, tanks and an en- appearance of these small bands of in- rises off the coastal plain south of gineer element, the infantry filtrators behind forward beach de-

19 January-February 2014 fenses led to a premature Indian with- Hesitation in reacting to the Japanese while mortar fire held the Punjabi drawal and ensured the Takumi de- landing and the slow pace of the move companies in place. The British com- tachment made it ashore.17 Cross-do- resulted in a loss of time that could not mander elected to withdraw to Jitra, main success in the air provided a sta- be regained.20 The Japanese were able destroying key bridges along the bilizing influence to secure local land- to put an infantry regiment, reinforced route.22 Japanese tanks rapidly transi- ing operations. with tanks and artillery, ashore at Pa- tioned to pursuit and prevented the tani, and they lost no time in setting Commonwealth forces from establish- In an effort to recover the situation at out for the ledge. In the encounter ing a solid defensive line. Kota Bharu, the overall commander in battle that followed, Japanese tanks This strategy ended the British pres- Malaya, LTG A.E. Percival, sent up re- overran the advance guard of the Kro- 18 ence in Thailand. serves by rail. This seemed inconsis- hcol unit and forced them over to the tent with the British strategic design. defense on ground much less suited While operations were going poorly on Dividing his limited combat power of for a stand than the ledge.21 The tenets the ground for the British, events at rd the 3 Indian Corps on either side of on which Matador had been planned sea and in the air proved worse. Of the the central mountains diluted his abil- were coming unhinged. 110 aircraft available to the Common- ity to hold on to the main avenue of wealth when war broke out, only 50 In the west, the 11th Indian Division, approach out of Thailand, but Percival were still functional by nightfall.23 which had been waiting to execute must have been influenced by the re- Force Z, consisting of the HMS Prince Matador, crossed the Thai border ports coming out of Kota Bharu that of Wales and HMS Repulse, put to sea about mid-afternoon. They were able put the size of the enemy landing there under the command of ADM Sir Tom 19 to move 10 miles toward Singora and, as a division. This illustrates that Phillips in an attempt to contest the together with two Punjabi companies, when contact is first established, over- landings at Singora and Patani. Locat- established a defensive position by estimation of enemy strength is com- ed by the Japanese, these ships were dusk. An armored reconnaissance demon. By landing on multiple dispersed sunk by torpedo plane attack. With tachment from the Japanese 5th Divi- beaches, coupled with the interdiction their passing went any chance to coun- sion found these positions, and the se- of reconnaissance aircraft, the Japa- ter Japanese moves afloat.24 Thus, in quence of events that followed would nese were able to magnify the confu- the early stages of the battle, the Jap- become a familiar scene during the sion and uncertainty during initial con- anese gained control of the air and sea Malaya Campaign. The lead tanks were tact. around Malaya. This was coupled with stopped on the road by accurate fire a strong foothold on the north end of Across the mountains, the Krohcol unit from Indian anti-tank gun crews. The the peninsula that provided a point of was waiting for orders to execute Mat- Japanese then dismounted and worked departure for the move to Singapore. ador and move up to defend the ledge. their way around the enemy’s flanks, The Commonwealth move back into Malaya stopped at the Jitra and Kroh line. These positions had two fundamental weaknesses. First, they were not mutually supporting and each could be encircled and reduced at will. No plans had been made to defend these areas in-depth, and time spent on executing Matador had resulted in a lack of prepared fighting positions being dug. Second, a failure by the British to accurately reconnoiter the track from Kroh to Grik left this approach open to the Japanese 42nd In- fantry Regiment. This placed the enemy in position from which to cut off the northern Malaya Peninsula and secure Port Weld in the process. The Jap- anese planned to use the Strait of Ma- lacca for amphibious moves and had brought assault boats across the peninsula for this purpose.25 The use of shore-to-shore movement was one cross-domain technique the Japanese 25th Army would use to avoid the obstacles formed by the drainage gaps that could potentially impede their ad- Figure 3. Japanese troops mop up in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. vance. This littoral threat from the

20 January-February 2014 western seaward flank would further the initiative throughout the Malaya combined-arms team allows the SBCT complicate British defensive planning Campaign against a defender of equal to operate over a wide range of terrain ashore. size. The littoral threat forced the Brit- types as needed. ish to partition their forces across the Jitra had a long and difficult frontage The Armor community has always length of the peninsula, creating op- to defend. The 15th Indian Brigade held been a strong advocate of the synergy portunities for Japanese army units to a four-mile front along the road with found in combined-arms operations. It mass on each defensive position in its right flank unsecured. Defending is a natural progression to extend this succession on the land. Japanese air- from the sea to 15th Indian Brigade’s approach to the wider array of combat power was able to gain functional, but left flank at a distance of 12 miles was power found in the joint task force. not absolute, control during the land- 6th Indian Brigade. This left 28th Indian The path ahead will demand refining ings. Brigade in reserve under the direct both the manner in which landpower control of the division commander, Success on land compelled a strong can exploit opportunities rendered by MG D.M. Murray-Lyon.26 naval response to counter landings on cross-domain operations and how the multiple sites. Airpower in turn was capabilities of ground forces can en- The Japanese advanced from Singora able to negate forces afloat and open able the success of joint forces operat- with two regiments led by a reconnais- more maneuver options to forces ing in other domains. sance battalion supported with tanks. ashore as the waters around the Ma- The strength of this vanguard was able laya Peninsula became avenues of ap- As the modern joint force explores the to smash the covering force near Asun proach. Finally, the speed with which complexity and interactions inherent and probe the length of the Jitra line. the land force could operate retained in adding space and cyberspace do- The weakness of the British east flank the strategic advantages gained prior mains to its operational horizon, this soon became clear, but the piecemeal to landing that forced the enemy to introduction increases need for multi- commitment of the Commonwealth face an expanding array of tactical service cross-talk and communication. reserve managed to stabilize the situ- threats they were unable to counter Operational experimentation is crucial ation. With his reserve used and the on the ground. to better understand and develop the Japanese preparing to launch a set- manner in which these new combina- piece assault, Murray-Lyon decided he Similarly, the U.S. Army’s mounted mations will allow the joint commander had had enough and ordered a with- neuver elements provide the key forc- to exploit non-traditional defeat drawal that would not stop until they es of landpower within the context of mechanisms. Issues of command rela- reached Singapore.27 a cross-domain campaign. The matu- tionships, priority of effort and opera- rity of the Army Preposition Afloat tional interference and spillage compel The Japanese organization and equip- force structure provides a strategical- our attention as we seek to optimize ment yielded a force that could react ly mobile hard-hitting brigade capable the contribution of each member of quickly. By having tanks well forward of being tailored to various levels of the joint task force within and beyond with the reconnaissance elements, combat intensity. Its unique structure their respective domains. In this way, they could attack directly from the enables exploitation of speed and tem- we can build on the historical lessons line-of-march without losing time to po within any joint theater of opera- from the opening round of the last Pa- reform. The strength with which these tion and thus provides the best vehicle cific conflict to temper future outcome units could hit pushed aside all but to retain any strategic advantage resolution in the region in a manner well-prepared defenses.28 Their infan- gained through initial battlefield shap- consistent with our national interests. try achieved this speed as well. Along ing, extended operational reach and the roads, Japanese infantry used any exploiting opportunities across do- Retired U.S. Marine Corps LTC Robert means at hand to retain their mobility. mains. W. Lamont served as an exercise action Bicycles were issued to each division officer for III Marine Expeditionary for this purpose, but trucks, motorcy- The Stryker Brigade Combat Team Force in Okinawa, Japan, planning Tan- cles and local transport were also (SBCT) in particular, when properly re- dem Thrust in Australia and Cobra drawn into service.29 Off the roads, the inforced, holds strong promise to pro- Gold in Thailand. Other assignments Japanese retained the ability to ma- vide the landpower component in included operations analyst in the neuver by having their soldiers travel many of the more austere Asian re- Studies and Analysis Division, Marine light – only small arms and lightweight gions. The high rate of speed of the Corps Combat Development Command, mortars were carried; heavier supplies Stryker wheeled combat system, cou- completing analyses for anti-armor were moved by truck.30 This force pled with its reduced logistical de- force structure, combat identification structure matched the tactical doc- mands, answers the challenge of the and the Advanced Amphibious Assault trine the Taiwan Army Research Sec- current JOAC to project and sustain Vehicle. He also served as a tank com- tion had outlined. military force. The full array of tactical pany commander and assistant opera- capabilities resident in the SBCT orga- tions officer with 3rd Tank Battalion, Conclusion nization provide the joint force com- Twenty-nine Palms, CA. His service In summary, the influence of applying mander with the means to present his afloat includes executive officer, Ma- combat power across the domains of opponent with a wide range of mount- rine Detachment, USS Constellation, land, littoral and air allowed a Japa- ed and dismounted threats. This bal- and combat cargo officer, USS Cleve- nese force to seize and hold ance of a protected, mobile, land. His military schooling includes

21 January-February 2014 the Basic School, Quantico, VA; Armor 4 Falk, Stanley L., Seventy Days to Singa- 18 Ibid. Officer Basic Course, Fort Knox, KY; pore, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 19 Willmott. and Armor Officer Advanced Course, 1975. 20 Falk. 5 Ibid. 21 Kirby. Fort Knox, KY. He holds a bachelor’s of 6 22 science degree in management and Willmott, H.P., Empires in the Balance, Falk. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 23 Ibid. technology from the U.S. Naval Acad- 1982. 24 Ibid. emy and a master’s of science in oper- 7 Ibid. 25 Willmott. ations research from Naval Postgradu- 8 McIntyre, W. David, The Rise and Fall of 26 Ibid. ate School. He is a silver level member the Singapore Naval Base 1919-1942, 27 Ibid. of the Order of St. George. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979. 28 Ibid. 9 Kirby, S. Woodburn, Singapore: The 29 Ibid. Notes Chain of Disaster, New York: Macmillan 30 Falk. 1 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Co., 1971. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st 10 Ibid. Century Defense, Washington, DC, Janu- 11 Morley, J.W., The Fateful Choice, New ary 2012. York: Columbia University Press, 1980. 2 Department of Defense, Defense Bud- 12 Falk. Acronym Quick-Scan get Priorities and Choices, Washington, 13 Ibid. 14 DC, January 2012. Willmott. JOAC – Joint Operational Access 3 15 Department of Defense, Joint Opera- Ibid. Concept tional Access Concept (JOAC), Washing- 16 Falk. SBCT – Stryker brigade combat team ton, DC, Jan. 17, 2012. 17 Kirby.

22 January-February 2014 Cavalry Branch: a Redesignation for the 21st Century by CPT Nathan A. Jennings institutionally attentive to the robust the striking imbalance of quantities mechanized superiority advocated by between tank companies and recon- Armor Branch has become a concep- authors BG David Haight, BG Paul naissance troops, America’s mounted tual anachronism. After a decade of in- Laughlin and CPT Kyle Bergner in their arm is a predominantly cavalry com- fantry-centric wars in Southwest Asia, ARMOR article, “Armored Forces: Mo- munity already. Given this structural and a significant reduction in the M1 bility, Protection and Precision Fire- rationale, the renaming of an archai- Abrams fleet due to modular restruc- power Essential for Future,” but also cally defined Armor Branch can thus turing, the massive tank corps of the more accurately reflect the majority be evaluated along three lines of jus- Cold War no longer exists. In the place functions of its fleeter reconnaissance tification: the physical form of the of sheer mechanized density, a new squadrons.2 Not yielding to the false force, the predominant functions of and more dynamic incarnation of choice between professional biases to- the force and the storied cavalry tra- America’s mounted arm has assumed ward either heavy or light postures, dition that predates mechanization. primacy, centered on the array of re- the entire armored corps would ben- connaissance squadrons that now en- efit from a renewed appreciation of joy majority status in the armored Force’s physical form the mutual importance between community. The first consideration, which reflects America’s troopers and tankers. upon the physical form of the mount- Given the depth and totality of this This rebalancing would amount to ed component across the various mod- transformation, Armor Branch should nothing less than a reinterpretation of ularity levels of brigade combat teams embrace the heretofore unthinkable: the mounted arm’s cultural center, (BCT), appreciates the vast gulf be- it should redesignate as Cavalry representing a dynamic broadening of tween quantities of tank companies Branch. Such a change would not only emphasis across the branch. It would and cavalry troops now in active ser- recognize the diversity of the current draw upon the most useful aspects of vice. It narrates in stark numbers the forms and functions of the force but the organizational contest for the disparities between personnel and also promote a more relevant and ver- heart and soul of the armored commu- equipment associated with the M1 satile mounted arm. nity. By combining the rich heritage of Abrams platforms, and the same asso- The ascendance of a Cavalry Branch, the late division cavalry squadrons, ciated with the proliferation of hum- harkening back to the very origins of legacy armor battalions and armored vees, M1117 Stryker recce vehicles, the U.S. Army, would move far beyond cavalry regiments (ACRs) with the M1128 Stryker Mobile Gun Systems the symbolic. In terms of perception, more varied mounted branch of today, (MGSs) and M3 Bradley Cavalry Fight- the rebranding would cast aside Cold rebranding would unite the disparate ing Vehicles (CFVs). While the first rep- War connotations of mechanized mass wings of the entire community under resents a distinct minority in the com- that accompany traditional “Armor” a more accurate universal identity. munity, the latter assemblage indicate and instead invoke the 21st Century a far more versatile and multi-purpose While the remaining tank companies 3 adaptability that the historical notion in combined-arms battalions (CABs) capability across the cavalry majority. of “Cavalry” offers. As suggested by will always remain crucial to the vital- Beginning with the 20 infantry BCTs CPT Ken Segelhorst in his 2012 essay ity of the army’s mounted arm, the (IBCTs) in the Army, there is a like in ARMOR, titled “Keeping the Sabers larger proportion of cavalry troops quantity of cavalry squadrons contain- Sharp,” the revitalized application of across the array of infantry, battlefield ing 40 motorized cavalry troops now the historic cavalry spirit would invoke surveillance, Stryker and armored bri- operating in support of both airborne favorable connotations of the Western gades would finally achieve recogni- and rifle battalions. Lacking the formi- Frontier while revealing the branch’s tion for their status as the branch’s dable firepower, protection and mobil- commitment to increased expedition- fighting majority. ity of mechanized platforms, these 1 ary capacity. Furthermore, the change troopers nevertheless carry the an- would align the branch’s image with Cavalry Branch: cient esprit de corps unique to caval- the reality of a current force structure ry’s dynamism into the heart of the in- that is primarily oriented toward the already a reality The argument for redesignation as fantry arena, with an increased mea- doctrinal domains of reconnaissance Cavalry Branch is grounded not just in sure of expeditionary capacity.4 In an and security (R&S) operations. the theoretical but also the practical. ocean of blue, their guidons stream In more substantive implications, a re- As the composition of the branch is re- red and white, and it must be remem- naming would signify the armor and evaluated, the assessment rapidly bered they are as vital to the future of cavalry community’s commitment to moves beyond realignment of organi- the mounted branch as the mecha- mounted dominance across all dimen- zational culture and finds deeper vali- nized legions of III Corps. As a pure sions of ground combat. In this con- dation in the reality of the current component of 19Cs and 19Ds, the sin- text, the branch would remain force structure. In all but name, due to gularly R&S focus of the light squad-

23 January-February 2014 rons figures prominently in the argu- timate deterrence in land warfare. maneuver. When required, and due to ment for a new Cavalry Branch. the unique mobility of the armored Armed with the venerable M1 Abrams corps, these squadrons likewise con- A second, and less known, form of on one hand, and a mix of M3 CFVs duct the historical cavalry missions of light mounted maneuver is found in and humvees on the other, the ABCT security, escort and, if need be, at- the cavalry squadrons of the battle- represents the current mounted com- tack.10 field surveillance brigades (BfSBs). De- munity’s maximum fusion of firepow- signed as a division- or corps-level R&S er, protection and mobility. Within the The ultimate effect of this nearly asset in a more economized 21st Cen- organizational lineages of these heavy branch-wide focus on reconnaissance, tury context, the Army’s three existing battalions and squadrons, the fighting and the diversity of associated scout BfSBs each contain a cavalry squadron spirit of the ACR, division cavalry and vehicles used to conduct it, is that the with two motorized cavalry troops. tank battalions live on, albeit in a re- majority of 19A lieutenants will serve Like the squadrons of the infantry duced manifestation. In this category as scout-platoon leaders for their ini- BCTs, these organizations operate on alone, the mechanized dimension – tial assignment. Unlike the Armor humvee platforms while conducting the tank companies – outnumber re- Branch of decades past, incoming gen- light reconnaissance with unstabilized connaissance troops by a ratio of ap- erations of armor officers will primar- weapons systems. Also like the squad- proximately 4:3. Given future pros- ily plan and execute R&S, while only a rons of the IBCTs, the BfSB cavalry pects of reducing brigades while add- subsection of their peers will lead tank march under traditional red-and-white ing another CAB to each remaining platoons. To be clear: most armor of- guidons.5 ABCT, this ratio is expected to increase ficers will spend their formative years to 6:3.8 as cavalrymen and will never com- The cavalry squadrons of the Stryker mand tank formations. The existence BCTs (SBCTs) offer the third organiza- Despite the numerical superiority of of the Army Reconnaissance Course tional form where cavalry dominates the Abrams platform in the mecha- (ARC) – which is unique in instructing Armor Branch’s presence. Consisting nized brigades, the total assessment of cavalry planning and tactics at the pla- of 24 cavalry troops across eight cav- the mounted arm’s composition defin- toon level – underscores the Army’s alry squadrons and eight brigades, itively reverses the trend. Taking in ac- recognition of this reality. with more MGS platoons supporting count the aggregate quantities of 24 infantry battalions, the cavalry 19-series company-level elements This disparity in armor and cavalry component once again achieves ma- across the entire spectrum of combat leadership also extends into the ranks jority status. While offering more fire- brigades, the disparity between armor of armor captains. Based on the dis- power, protection and mobility than and cavalry is staggering: 60 tank com- proportionate availability of tank and the humvees of the IBCTs and BfSBs, panies to 115 cavalry troops. This dis- cavalry commands for the immediate the Stryker platform provides an inter- proportion results in a mounted arm future, 66 percent of armor captains mediate level of armored capability for that is weighted just 34 percent armor will command cavalry troops, while the force. Also, these cavalry squad- to 66 percent cavalry.9 Given this acute only 34 percent will lead tank compa- rons support their brigades by seam- comparison, it is clear that Armor nies. Also, though CABs currently out- lessly integrating advanced collection Branch has already transformed into number cavalry squadrons 2-to-1 in technologies into their maneuver. In Cavalry Branch. While the M1 Abrams ABCTs, command in the headquarters the Stryker infantry battalions, MGS remains conditionally pre-eminent in companies and troops of those battal- platoons bring an increase in direct the heavy arena, the plethora of scout ions will result in parity since armor firepower that only the cannons of the platforms across the combat and sur- captains will compete with infantry 6 armored corps can provide. veillance brigades drives the contrast and engineer captains for the former, but the latter is exclusively command- The fourth and most dynamic compo- home: the predominant form of our ed by 19-series. This likelihood of cav- nents of the mounted arm are found current force is cavalry, and the gold alry service, in both line troops and in the armored BCTs (ABCTs). While guidons of the tank companies are the headquarters troops, is again recog- the BfSBs and infantry and Stryker bri- minority. nized at Fort Benning, GA. Like ARC, gades field an imposing majority of the Cavalry Leader’s Course is provid- cavalry troops and squadrons, the tank Predominant function ed to instruct R&S-centered troop- A second justification for the ascen- companies of the CABs arrive to upset leading procedures to company-level dance of a Cavalry Branch, that of the equation in the mechanized bri- cavalrymen, while no comparable function, stems directly from the com- gades alone. Distributed across 15 course exists exclusively for tankers. heavy brigades and six divisions, the position of the mounted component. Army maintains 30 CABs and 15 caval- As cavalry troops have assumed nu- The trend in disproportionate cavalry ry squadrons for a total of 60 tank merical majority in the force, the mis- assignments, and therefore focus on companies and 45 mechanized cavalry sion of R&S has correspondingly risen R&S operations as opposed to com- troops.7 Though lacking expeditionary to the fore. In each of the IBCTs, BfSBs, bined-arms assault, continues into the rapidity, these heavy legions remain SBCTs and ABCTs, cavalry squadrons ranks of the armor field-grade offi- unequaled in the application of preci- are assigned doctrinal missions of con- cers. Similar to the opportunities avail- sion destruction against ground ducting zone, area and route recon- able to junior officers, the sheer nu- threats while serving as America’s ul- naissance to shape their brigade’s merical superiority of cavalry

24 January-February 2014 squadrons over CABs defines the true the nation’s founding. Long before the These cherished traditions, harkening nature of Armor Branch as cavalry. dominance of the main battle tank, back to the founding of the United While all 45 squadrons are ostensibly American cavalrymen and dragoons States, invite the mounted arm of the allocated for assignment to 19-series provided increased mobility to the U.S. Army to once again embrace a Cavalry majors and lieutenant colonels, only Army’s campaigns. Throughout the Branch. They connect the cavalrymen 28 CABs are available for the same.11 Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and dragoons of the 18th and 19th cen- the Mexican-American War, the Civil turies who conducted reconnaissance, Taking the disparity in key-develop- War, the Spanish-American War and security, escort and attacks on the ment opportunities even further, the the multiplicity of Indian Wars, gener- Great Plains with the cavalry squad- operations officer, executive officer ations of horse soldiers prosecuted rons of the modern force who perform and battalion-command billets in the American wartime objectives with the almost identical tactical tasks in a CABs are shared with 11-series offi- esprit de corps global arena. When combined with the cers, thereby reducing further the cavalry’s distinctive . tank corps’ recent heritage in division quantity of O-5 armor officers that will In light of this proud history, reactiva- cavalry and ACRs, and the ascendancy ever command tanks. Like their lieu- st tion of a Cavalry Branch in the 21 Cen- of cavalry squadrons across the Army’s tenants and captains, field-grade offi- tury signifies not a step away from the IBCTs, BfSBs, SBCTs and ABCTs over the cers of the mounted arm are far more heart of the armored community but past decade, a compelling justification likely to seize red-and-white colors rather a return to the deepest and for a reinvented Cavalry Branch shines than to grasp the same for a CAB. The most enduring culture in American forth. resulting career path, from commis- mounted warfare. This history and tra- sioning to battalion-level command, dition is seen daily across the various Moving the branch reveals likely advancement based in BCTs as troopers hoist the same red- cavalry-centric units focused function- forward and-white guidons carried by their ally on R&S operations. A revamped branch for the mounted predecessors in previous centuries. It community would unite the disparate is reflected in the Stetsons worn wings of the mounted arm with a new Storied cavalry proudly by cavalrymen and cavalry- focus on versatility and relevance tradition women as they mark their unique sta- while maintaining a reduced version of The final justification for designation tus within the larger Army community. the tank force. Yet these changes are as a Cavalry Branch rests less on quan- It is fulfilled annually in the rigors of not enough. To elevate the armored tifiable metrics and more on history spur rides and emphasized by earning force under the current system to a and tradition. While the culture of the golden spurs in combat. And finally, it higher level of effectiveness, further Armor Branch essentially dates back to is found in award ceremonies, where change is required. As a closing salvo, mechanization for World War II, the the honors of the Order of St. George the following paragraphs suggest sev- traditions of the U.S. Cavalry and its are bestowed on those who achieve eral points of improvement that would dragoon predecessors originated with high levels of branch leadership. enhance the competency of any future

Figure 1. Cavalry tradition is commemorated as troopers from 1st Cavalry Division’s Horse Cavalry Detachment charge across Noel Field during the activation ceremony of the division’s 4th Brigade Combat Team at Fort Bliss, Texas, Oct. 20, 2005. (Photo by SPC Paula Taylor)

25 January-February 2014 Armor Branch or Cavalry Branch. without. Short of addressing this mis- operating environment. In pursuit of placement, Armor Branch should lob- this objective, the redesignation of Ar- First, the Army must address the by strenuously for a commensurate mor Branch to Cavalry Branch would much-criticized deficiencies in the cav- share of rifle battalion commands for offer both a symbolic and substantive alry squadrons of the ABCTs. With a Ranger-qualified armor officers. move toward achieving that objective. dearth of both firepower and protection, and an anemic allocation of crew- Fourth, cavalry-squadron command This argument holds true even when men and scouts in humvees and CFVs, teams should continue to embrace the accounting for the expected BCT re- the squadron is suited only for moder- role of “chief of reconnaissance” for configuration over the next four years. ately contested R&S operations. It can- their respective BCTs. The mounted While the disproportionate reduction not fight for information, nor execute community cannot allow itself to be- across the Army between IBCTs and its mission in the face of robust ar- come narrowly focused on single-di- ABCTs will result in a net increase in mored resistance. To remedy this flaw, mensional methods of ground recon- CABs and decrease in cavalry squad- the Army should restructure cavalry naissance. Instead, it must seek to in- rons, ultimately bringing parity at 36 troops with a 2/2 slant of tank and CFV tegrate and administer the entire pan- apiece, the differential at the company platoons. With retention of their oply of brigade-level intelligence-col- level will remain weighted in favor of tracked mortars, these troops would lection efforts and thereby emerge as a cavalry emphasis. Even when ac- offer the brigade a measure of the the habitual leader of any R&S task counting for the addition of a third fighting capacity once fielded by the force. In addition to this effort, Armor CAB to each of the remaining 12 ACRs.12 Branch should seek to permanently ABCTs, cavalry troops will still outnum- augment each cavalry squadron with ber tank companies 91 to 72 Army- The cavalry squadrons of the IBCTs of- an organic military-intelligence pla- wide. Considering the previous reduc- fer a second organizational structure toon to enhance collection capacity in- tion of the tank corps, this more bal- that requires scrutiny. Given the Ar- ternal to the squadron.14 anced percentage differential of 56 to my’s intent to add a third rifle battal- 44 should be celebrated by the mount- ion to the light brigades, these cavalry Fifth, and finally, a slight change in ed arm as an increase to the branch’s squadrons should replace their 11-se- perception must be applied not just to effectiveness and versatility.15 ries dismounted reconnaissance troop the branch writ large but also to the with a third 19-series motorized cav- tank platoons and companies that al- Given the immediacy of the challenges alry troop. This increase in motorized low the fullest measure of dominance facing the armor and cavalry force, the mobility, in addition to the retention in ground warfare. As the branch way ahead must be decisive yet bal- of a robust dismounted infantry pla- moves increasingly toward a motor- anced. Finding effective moderation toon as a squadron-level asset, would ized posture due to economy-of-cost between the tank-centric corps of the allow each squadron to symmetrically measures imposed from national lead- past and an increasingly expeditionary align their shaping functions with the ers, the tank corps should be raised to force of the future will emerge crucial three maneuver battalions while still elite status within the mounted com- to sustaining American primacy in using their specialized platoon for munity. As a critical minority in the mounted warfare. Furthermore, justi- deep insertion. If need be, any of the force, often operating without the fication for a reinvention of the cavalry troops could also be dismount- mentorship of 19-series O-5s and E-9s mounted arm as a cavalry-centric com- ed to increase long-range insertion ca- in CABs, only Armor Branch’s best and munity is already inherent in the form, pacity for the BCT. The BfSBs should brightest should be allowed to crew functions and traditions of the R&S likewise adopt this restructuring to al- the main battle tank. In this manner, squadrons that now define most of the low increased ground mobility for R&S let lieutenants and captains at the ma- 19-series formations across the con- efforts at division and corps eche- neuver courses compete for these stellation of IBCTs, BfSBs, SBCTs and lons.13 elite assignments. Let tanker boots be ABCTs. For the mounted arm of the worn as a mark of selectivity, and fi- 21st Century, it is time to recognize and Third, the Army should address the in- nally, consider allowing tankers to own embrace this reality; for the tankers creasing issue of infantry lieutenant the singular right to wear the black be- and troopers of the modern armored colonels and command sergeants ma- ret as they did in ages past. corps, it is time to accept the ascen- jor leading reconnaissance squadrons dance of an official Cavalry Branch. populated primarily by 19-series Sol- The discussion over the institutional diers. While the competency of 11-se- center of the Armor Branch will not CPT Nathan Jennings is an instructor at ries field-grade officers and senior end with this article. It is offered as a the U.S. Military Academy’s History De- noncommissioned officers to lead cav- modest proposal to contribute to the partment, West Point, NY. His previous alry organizations is not in doubt – and ongoing discussion over the future of duty assignments include troop com- indeed, this author served under a the armored corps. Yet the implemen- mander for Headquarters and Head- magnificent infantry squadron com- tation of these improvements, in addi- quarters Troop and C Troop, 4-9 Caval- mander and command sergeant major tion to a shift in cultural and organiza- ry, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Caval- who enthusiastically embraced the tional emphasis toward cavalry versa- ry Division, Fort Hood, TX, and Kirkuk, cavalry culture – the fact remains that tility, is necessary to align the Ameri- Iraq (deployed 2009); platoon leader, B for every infantryman who accepts a can mounted arm with the demands of Company, 1-34 Armored Regiment, 1st cavalry command, a cavalryman goes the post-Iraq and Afghanistan Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley,

26 January-February 2014 KS, and Baghdad, Iraq (deployed 2006- 5 Field Manual 3-55.1, Battlefield Surveil- Battle Proven and Future Primed,” AR- 2007); and 19D Cavalry Scout, 2-2 Ar- lance Brigade (BfSB), June 2010. MOR, June-August 2010. 13 mored Cavalry Regiment (Light), Fort 6 Field Manual 3-20.96; Field Manual Field Manual 3-20.96. 14 Polk, LA. His military schooling includes 3-20.16, Mobile Gun System Platoon, Flood, Bryan K. LTC, Hayes, James A. Air Assault, Airborne, Maneuver Offi- February 2013. MAJ, and Cook, Forrest MAJ, “IBCT’s Re- connaissance Squadron,” ARMOR, March- cer Basic Course, Maneuver Officer Ad- 7 Field Manual 3-90.5, The Combined April 2011. Arms Battalion vanced Course and CLC. CPT Jennings , April 2008; Field Manual 15 http://www.army.mil/article/106373/ holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in his- 3-20.96. Brigade_combat_teams_cut_at_10_ tory from Northwestern State Univer- 8 http://www.army.mil/article/106373/ posts_will_help_other_BCTs_grow/. sity of Louisiana and a master’s of arts Brigade_combat_teams_cut_at_10_ degree in history from the University of posts_will_help_other_BCTs_grow/. Texas at Austin. 9 Field Manual 3-90.6; U.S. Army organization, http://www.army.mil/info/organiza- Acronym Quick-Scan Notes tion/. 1 Segelhorst, Ken CPT, “Keeping the Sabers 10 Field Manual 3-20.96; Training Circular Sharp: Maintaining Relevance in the Mod- ABCT – armored brigade combat 3-20.96, Reconnaissance and Cavalry team ern Era,” ARMOR, November-December Squadron Collective Task Publication, ACR – armored cavalry regiment 2012. May 2012. ARC – Army Reconnaissance Course 2 BCT – brigade combat team Haight, David BG, Laughlin, Paul BG and 11 Field Manual 3-90.6; U.S. Army organi- Bergner, Kyle CPT, “Armored Forces: Mo- BfSB – battlefield surveillance bri- zation, http://www.army.mil/info/organi- gade bility, Protection and Precision Firepower zation/. CAB – combined-arms battalion Essential for Future,” ARMOR, November- 12 Broadwater, Jeff LTC, “Reorganizing the CFV – Cavalry Fighting Vehicle December 2012. Recon Squadron to Enhance Heavy Bri- IBCT – infantry brigade combat team 3 Field Manual 3-90.6, Brigade Combat gade Combat Team Capabilities,” ARMOR, MGS – Mobile Gun System R&S – reconnaissance and security Team, September 2010. September-October 2007; Pinheiro, Cole SBCT – Stryker brigade combat team 4 Field Manual 3-20.96, Reconnaissance CPT, “The Armored Cavalry Regiment: and Cavalry Squadron, March 2010.

27 January-February 2014 Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader’s Course by Nicole Randall continue to develop their individual attempted, before coming to the skills and MOS-related skills. course because land navigation has the For some Soldiers, it’s “shoot, move highest attrition rate of any of RSLC’s and communicate,” but for Soldiers “RSLC trains young Soldiers and lead- other standards. skilled in the art of reconnaissance and ers about what reconnaissance is, how surveillance, it’s “communicate, collect it fits into the commander’s planning “We do that because, as a reconnais- and report.” Sometimes this task oc- and actions on the ground, and how it sance Soldier, you need to know where curs without heavy fire support only will usually lead to successful mission you’re going,” Baumgartner said. “You several dozen feet from the enemy and accomplishment,” explained COL Rob- can’t rely on Global Positioning System possibly thousands of miles from ert Choppa, Infantry School comman- because it can be broken. You need to friendly forces. dant. know how to look at a map and understand terrain and how to get there.” The question is: Where do you send Consolidating all the reconnaissance Soldiers and leaders to teach them the courses into one brigade gives service Advanced land kind of control, intuition and skill it members who attend RSLC a one-stop takes to deal with this kind of situa- shop for all their R&S needs. navigation, extraction? The answer is to the Maneuver tion methods Center of Excellence’s 29-day-long Re- “It is the only course in the Army The five-point land-navigation course connaissance and Surveillance Leader’s where [a student] can learn about the RSLC teaches has been compared to Course (RSLC). specific reconnaissance tasks a small some of Special Operations’ courses element is going to be required to do,” and is considered advanced land navi- said LTC James Hayes, commander of gation. Phase I of RSLC is mostly com- Department of rd th 3 Squadron, 16 Cavalry Regiment. prised of Skill Level I and II tasks, where Reconnaissance “It’s also the only place you can learn students not only learn more skills, This specialized course, a long-standing special insertion and extraction tech- they also master the basics of wood- sister course to Ranger School, was re- niques, it’s the only place where you’re land reconnaissance, small-unit tactics, cently integrated into the Armor going to learn to plan for an air inser- patrolling and communications sys- School to form the new Department of tion, and it’s also the only course that’s tems. The course’s cadre builds on Reconnaissance. RSLC serves as just a teaching certain special skills.” skills students (hopefully) bring to the piece of the reconnaissance and secu- course and trains them to enhance rity (R&S) training this newly formed Gaining expertise those skills. consolidation offers; in conjunction with the Army Reconnaissance Course in basics “In the first phase, we build them up, and Cavalry Leader’s Course, RSLC pro- To climb the reconnaissance ranks, you and if you didn’t have the skills when vides a particular level of learning for must first be an expert in the basics, you got here, you’re going to have all military occupational specialties according to 1SG Brian Baumgartner. them by the time you hit Phase II so (MOSs) associated with reconnais- “No matter your MOS, these are the you can hit the ground running,” sance. basics; usually the best people in the Baumgartner said. “When your boots world are the best at the basics,” said hit the ground in Phase II, you should “We’ve reorganized here at the Ma- Baumgartner, the course’s first ser- know what you have to do.” neuver Center and we’ve brought the geant and a former course writer and [R&S] classes together,” said BG Leop- senior instructor. “We teach the basics Phase I teaches students the skills they oldo Quintas, Armor School comman- very well. We teach a lot of special- need during their situational and final dant. “What we’re endeavoring to do mission tactics, too, but we teach the field-training exercises. These basic is establish a continuity of training basics of doing a reconnaissance patrol skills are how to build observation from inception, when a Soldier enters very well.” posts and hide sites, as well as special the Army, all through the enlisted tactics and extraction methods. Other ranks and officer ranks to make sure RSLC starts the same way most courses skills trained and tested include the we develop experts in reconnaissance do: with an Army Physical Fitness Test student’s airborne abilities with not and security.” (APFT). The course requires a student only static-line jumps from a UH-60 to patrol on foot for miles and carry a Blackhawk helicopter but also practice As Soldiers travel through the ranks in 75-pound rucksack for most of that dis- techniques mostly reserved for Special the U.S. Army, they are educated in tance. This requires endurance and Operations units – like the high-alti- their professional development in the strength, which are tested during the tude, high-open (HAHO) or high-alti- Noncommissioned Officer Academy. Army’s APFT. RSLC also requires a writ- tude, low-open (HALO) military free- However, throughout their career, de- ten land-navigation test, which is avail- fall (MFF) insertion methods. A HALO pending on their MOS, they need to able on-line and should be taken, or or HAHO jump, usually executed at

28 January-February 2014 Figure 2. RSLC cadre and students jump from 10,000 feet during their HALO MFF. (Pho- to by Ashley Cross, MCoE PAO photographer) Figure 1. RSLC students fast-rope to the ground during SPIES/FRIES training. (Pho- best for success,” Baumgartner said. (MBMMR)], which has satellite capa- to by Ashley Cross, MCoE PAO photogra- “One of the most important skills the bilities, but we don’t apply it in the pher) students learn in Phase I is communi- course. We like them to know about it around 25,000 feet with oxygen masks, cations. RSLC is one of the only military because in theater, everybody’s using is accomplished on Fort Benning, GA, courses left to teach certain types of satellites. So we teach that here so at around 10,000 feet. communications methods.” they know how to use it when they get to theater. The [AN/PRC-150(C) Multi- “RSLC conducts [MFF] operations to SSG Chris Loken, an RSLC instructor, band Radio, also known as the Falcon stay current because there are units elaborated: “We teach three systems. II] is high-frequency (HF) communica- out there that do jump MFF that are We teach the [AN/PRC-148 Multiband tions, and it covers the HF band that’s reconnaissance units, and sometimes Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR)]. That’s the lowest band of frequencies we use. these units come through our course,” a squad-level radio you use to talk Because it uses such a low band, it Baumgartner said. “In the past, RSLC within your team. We also teach the doesn’t use satellites. It actually uses has been asked if a Special Forces or [AN/PRC-117F Multiband Manpack Ra- the ionosphere to get that signal from Special Operations unit came to the dio or Multiband Multi-mission Radio Point A to Point B.” course, if it would be possible to jump HALO.” In addition to airborne jumps, the students also learn extraction methods and other insertion methods like the Special Purpose Insertion / Extraction System (SPIES) and the Fast Rope Inser- tion / Extraction System (FRIES). It’s important these reconnaissance Soldiers are given experience using these methods, not only because RSLC is one of the few courses that includes these methods in its program of instruction (PoI), but it’s also important students are able to see what exactly is done during the execution of these methods so they may include them in any plans they make in the next part of the course or in the future. Communications “It’s about showing students different Figure 3. RSLC students learn communications techniques using the Tuff Book. (Photo options so they can plan their mission by Ashley Cross, MCoE PAO photographer)

29 January-February 2014 Learning all these communications recovered. Therefore RSLC teaches a weapons, so you may be wondering methods allows a Soldier to use them class on evasion and recovery. why these Soldiers wouldn’t just en- and plan those capabilities into their gage any enemy they encounter. That “At one point or another, if you’re de- mission. is not part of the mission for most re- ployed, there’s always a chance you’re connaissance Soldiers; they may not “You have to talk,” Loken said. “If you going to need to know how to evade have the proper resources, so evasion can’t talk, you can’t report, and if you and how to be recovered, so I think it’s becomes their best option. can’t report, that maneuver command- very important everybody knows this,” er you’re supporting goes in blind.” said SSG Charles Hannan, an RSLC in- “If you’re a regular infantry squad, structor. “What’s important in this more than likely, you have a lot of fire- Another aspect of communications course is getting the guys to start power and you’re not far away from RSLC teaches is the transfer of images, thinking about coming up with a really friendly lines,” Hannan said. “But long- video and other media to the com- good evasion plan.” range surveillance Soldiers may only be mander. Radio communication was [carrying] [an M203 grenade launcher] once the only way to relay information, Part of RSLC is creating an evasion plan as the largest caliber of weapon they and the Soldier would have to describe of action. This includes recognizing have, and they don’t have the firepow- what he saw. While that form of com- markings, calling aircraft and recogniz- er to stay engaged in a fight.” munication is still widely used, it’s no ing the environment they are in and longer the only capability at a Soldier’s where they can attain vital resources Learning confi- disposal. like water, edible plants and appropriate shelter. dence “Now we can send commanders pic- Students learn confidence during RSLC. tures, videos and graphic representa- “Along with evasion and recovery, we Soldiers learn graduate-level recon- tions of the ground, of what the go pretty in-depth on the basics of sur- naissance skills and techniques, but [named area of interest (NAI)] looks vival, which is a huge part of being able they also learn control and confidence, like,” Baumgartner said. “If it’s an as- to evade,” Hannan said. “Because even which are vital when they are in com- sault commander coming through, he if you have a good plan to be recov- promising situations. can understand what the NAI looks like ered, if something goes wrong, you so he’s better prepared for that task.” don’t necessarily know when you’re “There’s something about a Soldier going to get recovered. It could be any- with a compass and a map, stepping where from 24 hours to 72 hours. You out into the darkness to find points, Evasion, recovery, that builds resiliency and confidence,” survival may have all your food and supplies, or you may not. So along with evasion Baumgartner said. “He’s out there As the course continues, students and recovery, we teach the survival alone, unafraid, and he’s accomplish- move into more complex and higher portion as well.” ing a mission. In a small unit, you need skill-level tasks. One of the most im- to rely on your leadership. Graduating portant tasks a reconnaissance Soldier These basics include things like how to from this course should instill confi- can maintain is the ability to survive. make a fire, how to purify or procure dence in the Soldier. If you can lead six When his unit is dropped hundreds of water or food, and how to create a to eight guys here, you can lead a pla- miles inside enemy lines to observe an shelter. This part of the course teaches toon, a section or a company on the NAI and it is compromised, Soldiers some of the basic survival, evasion and battlefield confidently.” need to know how to evade the enemy recovery techniques the Survival, Eva- and survive until they can be sion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) Phase II in RSLC takes the basic skills Course teaches but students have learned in Phase I and gives them a situation in which to ap- on a more basic ply those skills. Many of the most im- level. The point of portant parts of Phase II are in the stu- the evasion and re- dents learning how to plan and for covery class in what to plan. RSLC is really to give the students “You don’t just do a five-paragraph op- the basics and erations order (OPORD),” Baumgartner start them thinking said. “That’s what most units do – they about how they rely on a concept of operations, which will incorporate is a one-slide confirmation of the op- those basics into eration. What we do here is teach the their plan. students to use the military decision- making process (MDMP) with troop- “You need to sur- leading procedures (TLPs). We plan this vive long enough way because there are just so many to be recovered,” contingencies a reconnaissance Soldier Figure 4. An RSLC student briefs his plan during the confirma- Hannan iterated. needs to think about.” tion-brief portion of the planning process to RSLC instructor Rick Gainey. (Photo by Patrick Albright, MCoE PAO photographer) All Soldiers carry Planning starts with learning TLPs and

30 January-February 2014 how to use MDMP within three to four days of classroom instruction. After classroom instruction, students report to planning bays, where they are assigned an experienced walker / instructor, who takes them through each step of the process. Students learn what right looks like from an experienced reconnaissance and surveillance noncommissioned officer (NCO), according to Baumgartner. “It’s a good time for the Soldiers, NCOs and officers who come through here to get developed by a senior NCO,” he said. “After [students] complete that, they go to the situational training exercise (STX).” STX phase The STX is the halfway point for students and starts with several days of planning and preparation. Then stu- Figure 5. An RSLC student exits the aircraft during the STX. (Photo by Ashley Cross, dents are inserted via airborne jump MCoE PAO photographer) from a UH-60. This is also an opportunity for MFF-qualified students and cadre to jump HALO from 10,000 feet. After landing on Arkman Drop Zone, students start their 48-hour patrol with their assigned walker. Unlike the final field-training exercise (FTX) at the course’s end, the STX is student-led and cadre-assisted. “An RSLC instructor will be walking with them, critiquing them and reset- ting them if they need to,” Baumgart- ner said. “Their job is to make sure [students] are successful.” Students will go through the whole operation, getting eyes on the NAI and reporting, and then they’ll be extracted. Once they are pulled out, they are brought back to the RSLC isolation facility and refitted, and the FTX starts, according to Baumgartner. Figure 6. An RSLC student pulls security at Selby CACTF during the urban portion of RSLC’s FTX. (Photo by Patrick Albright, MCoE PAO photographer) FTX phase “[The students] come back, and it’s and creativity of how to construct an confirmation brief, which is a time to start the graded portion of the observation post to how students per- reassurance to the commander that course,” explained SFC Christopher form in a leadership position. the team understood his intent. Next Fresquez, an instructor / writer at is the backbrief. Before starting the RSLC. “So we give them the OPORD, “[The instructor] sits in on their briefs mission, the reconnaissance Soldier which they are expected to execute on – their confirmation briefs, their completes a backbrief with a brigade their own.” OPORD and their backbrief – to make commander, squadron commander or sure [students] understand the infor- division commander – any echelon During the final FTX planning process, mation and applied it in the right way,” that has any interest in that mission, the instructor can answer questions, Fresquez said. according to Fresquez. but his purpose is primarily to grade students on a range of tangibles and After producing their OPORD, the team Planning is a crucial point when it intangibles: from the technical aspects steps into what is called the comes to students building their team.

31 January-February 2014 They remain with this team for the rest Urban reconnaissance engages stu- Combined Arms Collective Training Fa- of their FTX; leadership positions ro- dents to find and infiltrate a building cility (CACTF). The CACTF is a group of tate, but this is the team, rain or shine, where they can set up an observation buildings used specifically for this kind aboveground or underground (literal- post. Students set up a command area, of training. ly). a location that helps maintain light dis- “When you’re moving into an urban cipline. This is important because the “As the FTX goes on, students learn to environment, there are more things to Tuff Book, a small laptop-type device rely on each other as a team,” be cognizant of,” Zuniga said. “We’ve that reconnaissance Soldiers may use Baumgartner said. “Successful teams got streetlights, dogs, traffic; we have to communicate with their higher com- use the word teamwork. Individuals more things to worry about than just mand, throws light. A location like this don’t pass this course; it’s not about an making noises in the woods. Now helps students avoid discovery. individual, it’s about a team effort to we’re occupying a building, so we be successful for the mission. Teams Another part of the team sets up a sur- teach them which building to occupy, who fail to work together or let issues veillance area and watches the “city.” if that building has been occupied be- get in the way are the ones who suffer. This area on Fort Benning is the Selby fore, if anybody is going to compro- This course is designed for teams, not mise them and individuals.” how long they’re going to be there Teamwork, planning and preparation for.” are done throughout several days to give students time to learn and retain Throughout the en- this vital part of their instruction. “It’s tire mission, from very important because one of the insertion to patrol things students get the most out of in to occupying the this course is the planning process be- building and con- cause it’s nonstandard, compared to ducting surveil- what they’re used to doing,” Fresquez lance, students said. have an experienced RSLC instruc- Urban-reconnais- tor with them. sance phase “We want to teach After completing the planning process, the students who students are inserted via FRIES and pa- come here to use trol several miles to their NAI. The ur- those techniques ban-reconnaissance portion of RSLC is and teach them something students usually have never Figure 7. Students use camouflage to hide the Tuff Book during what we’ve been experienced. It is also the first chance their woodland FTX. (Photo by Patrick Albright, MCoE PAO pho- through,” Zuniga for them to see how well their evasion tographer) said. plan will work. “If you don’t have a plan for every contingency for what you’re going to do in a million different situations, you’re going to fail because being that forward of friendly troops all by yourself, you have to know what you’re going to do,” Fresquez said. “So planning is very important.” The students’ plans encompass their mission, which is to observe the patterns of life of the people in and around the area the students are ob- serving. Said SSG Jesus Zuniga, an RSLC instructor, “The way we’re fighting in real life right now, we’re moving out from the woodland environment into urban reconnaissance, and we’re moving into buildings. So we teach the students multiple techniques and procedures for how to move from the wood- Figure 8. Students relay intelligence back to the compound using the Tuff Book during land environment into a village.” their woodland FTX. (Photo by Patrick Albright, MCoE PAO photographer)

32 January-February 2014 After students collect the appropriate information and send it back, they learn the enemy is moving into the woodland environment around the city, so they are extracted. Woodland phase The woodland portion of the FTX is a culmination of what the students learned throughout Phase 1 and during the STX. SSG James Henderson, an RSLC instructor, explained: “What it does is challenge teams to use what they’ve learned, to come together as a team and implement those tasks and skills into successful mission completion. Included in that are various insertion techniques, whether it be by vehicle, airborne operation or FRIES insertion.” During the woodland FTX, students are inserted and then patrol throughout Figure 9. Students learn to construct their observation posts using shovels and cre- the day and night finding their NAI. ativity. (Photo by Ashley Cross, MCoE PAO photographer) When they find their NAIs, they set up their observation posts based on their the naked eye,” Henderson said. “That training up to this point. way, you can pull the most details and the most information from that NAI.” “They also move into the small-unit tactics of what we’ve taught them as While used often by surveillance far as crossing danger areas, reacting teams, video surveillance, pictures and to contact and reacting to indirect imagery can’t provide the context us- fire,” Henderson said. “After students ing all five senses like a Soldier can. construct their observation posts, they There are many ways to analyze an gather and collect intelligence on the area, and a commander needs to know NAI they are tasked to perform their every aspect of an area his unit may be mission on.” moving through, not just the visual aspect. The observation post is set up only “When [Soldiers are] sending message yards from the NAI and is concealed traffic, they can’t be vague,” Hender- using the forest itself or in a subterra- son said. “They need to be as detailed nean den dug by Soldiers when they as possible and not allow anything to first arrive at the site. Using the sur- get lost in translation. [They need to] rounding environment and shovels make sure it’s feasible and easy to they carry in their packs, students con- read.” struct their observation post during the FTX to conduct surveillance on the Soldiers need to understand that when NAI chosen. Surrounded by dirt, cov- the information they gather goes to a ered with logs, their own waterproof higher command, it’s getting dissemi- equipment and then another layer of nated to multiple units and experts, dirt and plant life, students make this and they will start data-mining to fill in site look like another patch of forest so any gaps in intelligence, according to they can remain undiscovered. Henderson. Getting Soldiers as close as possible to “It all comes together in that final re- Figure 10. RSLC students are extracted via SPIES on the final day of their FTX. the NAI is useful because even with all port, and that final report goes to the (Photo by Patrick Albright, MCoE PAO the technical advancements available, commander, and he’s going to deter- photographer) nothing beats a trained Soldier’s vi- mine the next course of action,” Hen- sion. derson added. meters away, another site is set up called the hide site. “It’s important, getting that vantage However, before the information gets point to where you can cover as much to the commander, it’s disseminated “The information they collect from the of the NAI as possible with optics and throughout the team. Several hundred observation post goes back to the hide

33 January-February 2014 site,” Henderson said. “The team lead- future operations, according to SFC “The guys who are selected to come er is located there; he’s the ground- Nelson Ashbrook, an RSLC instructor. here by their battalion or squadron force commander for that team. It’s his “[Debriefing] is our chance to gather commander have a special task in the responsibility to make sure all that intelligence and every piece of infor- Army,” Baumgartner said. “That task is data that’s being collected on that NAI mation they have and put it to paper to [answer information requirements] is being sent to higher.” and disseminate it,” Ashbrook said. for that commander. Being a reconnaissance guy is self-sacrificing be- The technical and intangible skills Throughout the FTX’s woodland por- cause you don’t have the glory mission gained in RSLC are priceless to a recon- tion, leadership positions change. The of assaulting the NAI and becoming the naissance Soldier’s skill level. However, team receives fragmentary orders hero of the battle.” (FRAGOs), which are changes in the even with the chance to do some original order. They receive new NAIs unique tactical insertion or extraction While many may not receive the na- and pick up their sites to move to their techniques and receiving the technical- tion’s highest military recognitions for next NAI. communications training, nothing is distinguishing themselves in firefights, more important than learning the acts their contribution to America’s success “With the changing global situation we of collection and reporting. on the battlefield is no less crucial. may end up finding ourselves in, there RSLC takes on the challenge of training “You’re there to gather information for are areas where they need to learn these highly skilled and specialized Sol- the lives of the guys who are coming how to navigate cross-country over diers. varying terrain such as swamps, creeks, after you,” Baumgartner said. “Your rivers, multiple roads, trails and wood- brothers in arms rely on what you tell Their importance may best be summed land environments,” Henderson said. a commander because he’s going to up by this quote from the Ranger shape his plan off what you give him. Handbook: “Tell the truth about what After receiving several FRAGOs and If you give him a very detailed plan, it you see and what you do. There is an getting compromised, a situation could change the operation, it could Army depending on us for that correct where they have been discovered by change what he does.” information.” the enemy and have to evacuate quickly and use their evasion skills, students The basics of collecting and reporting Nicole Randall is a reporter for Fort are extracted via SPIES. Learning this include many facets, but RSLC makes Benning Television in the Maneuver extraction system and applying it dur- sure students come away not only Center of Excellence Public Affairs Of- ing their FTX is important for the stu- knowing the basics, but able to con- fice, where she previously served as the dents so they can incorporate the duct them. news director. Ms. Randall holds a method into their plans in the future. bachelor’s of science degree in commu- “We teach the basics of it and then we While they have already learned FRIES nications-journalism and a bachelor’s also include tactics, techniques and and other possible methods of extrac- of science degree in English from procedures of how to do it better at tion, course cadre find it’s important Plattsburg State University. different levels,” Baumgartner said. to give students options. Another byproduct of the course’s PoI “What works for you one way to get in is discipline. “Discipline is the most im- Acronym Quick-Scan won’t necessarily work for you to get portant asset to a reconnaissance Sol- out,” Henderson said. “Extraction is dier because you have to be disciplined APFT – Army Physical Fitness Test plain and simple, but it’s complex at enough to be alert, to man security, to CACTF – Combined Arms Collective the same time. During the SPIES por- Training Facility be on security at any time,” Baumgart- tion, students have to look around on FRAGO – fragmentary order ner said. “Discipline is what keeps Sol- their map at the terrain and pick the FRIES – Fast Rope Insertion / Ex- diers alive. If I choose to go to sleep traction System best spots they can maneuver to and while I’m [pulling security] on an NAI, FTX – field-training exercise feasibly get an aircraft in to pull them HAHO – high altitude, high opening my whole team could be killed.” out.” HALO – high altitude, low opening HF – high frequency This kind of discipline is evident in MDMP – military decision-making Debriefing, discipline maintaining control if an enemy Soldier process When students are brought back to the walks right over the top of your obser- MFF – military freefall compound, they are debriefed as they MOS – military occupational specialty vation post and keeping yourself alert NAI – named area of interest would be after an actual mission. Not when you’ve been awake for days. This NCO – noncommissioned officer only are they collecting intelligence to is the kind of life-saving discipline RSLC OPORD – operational order answer the commander’s information impresses upon Soldiers. PoI – program of instruction requirements, they’re also collecting R&S – reconnaissance and security RSLC trains Soldiers who not only have RSLC – Reconnaissance and Surveil- information the moment they hit the lance Leader’s Course ground – even if it’s not what they’re a higher responsibility to their own SPIES – Special Purpose Insertion / looking for – that could be helpful in unit but who affect the fate of units Extraction System who come after them. STX – situational training exercise TLP – troop-leading procedures

34 January-February 2014 ‘Confessions of Mediocrity’ by 1LT Paul A. Brannan understand, then these new Soldiers are no shortage of fools on earth, so gave me open and honest feedback what’s the worst that can happen? I (Editor’s note: Although Army profes- about what they thought was good or made, and somehow survived, more sional bulletins do not usually publish bad about my presentation. than my fair share of mistakes. I was personal essays, this compelling appeal lucky, though, to have parents, great for professional development and men- When they left, Whitehead gave me his teachers and key mentors who all im- torship is worth ARMOR readers’ no- critique. He told me my presentation parted one vital fact to me: people tice.) was not perfect, but I had “tightened make mistakes. Mistakes are the fod- my shot group” and incorporated the Bottom line up front: I expect my fu- der for real learning. Someone who feedback the original grading officer ture to be filled with failure. never fails is either perfect (which cer- had given me. He also gave me some tainly doesn’t describe me) or is never pointers from what he had learned I have never been particularly book willing to push himself. Most mistakes when he went through a different smart. At school, I was always more of aren’t that big a deal, really. Because Army school. As a result, at my next doer than a thinker. As a result, I went failure isn’t the big deal; it’s the giving MCCC OPORD, I was able to incorpo- to Maneuver Captain’s Career Course in to failure that is. Over the years, my rate the feedback from Whitehead and (MCCC) at Fort Benning, GA, with ev- quixotic impulsiveness and lack of his recruits. ery expectation of all that “brain stuff” smarts ensured I had plenty of experi- being a challenge. What’s interesting about all this is that ence in failure; my tenacity (read: A key part of MCCC is putting together at the same time I was practicing my bloody-mindedness) drove me to keep operation orders (OPORDs) and brief- skills at giving a presentation to an au- trying until I overcame the challenge. dience, the new recruits were getting ing them to an instructor. One of my ometimes I see hesitancy within the chance to experience receiving a OPORDs did not go particularly well, the Army to step outside our mission briefing. While I was develop- and the senior officer grading it tore comfort zone, to embrace the my presentation and analysis to ing my skills at which parts of the or- S challenges and failures that come with der I needed to emphasize most, they shreds. Truth be told, he probably striving to “be all we can be.” While I were developing their skills at identify- wasn’t as harsh as he should have was in Officer Candidate School (OCS), ing which part of the mission they been. After such a terrible mess, I our commander was a strong believer needed to understand most. As I had headed home and drowned my sor- in running as the key fitness skill and the opportunity to practice explaining rows in single malt whiskey. we ran a lot; coincidentally, he was a how the enemy would attack using So- fast runner. One of my old battalion he next morning I dragged my viet doctrine, they had the opportuni- commanders was a firm believer in re- worthless carcass over to Harmo- ty to begin thinking about how their sistance training (which, coincidentally, ny Church to meet with (and enemy may deploy and behave in com- T he was awesome at) and focused less maybe get some help from) a drill ser- bat. on running. When, as a junior enlisted geant, SFC Dave Whitehead, with Soldier, I was being taught the Warrior whom I had deployed during my career eyond the information con- Tasks and Drills, it seemed every in- as an enlisted medic. A little more than tained in the presentation, I sin- structor insisted that the most impor- a week later, he arranged for me to cerely hope the new recruits B tant skills were the ones at which, co- also learned a couple of other key present my OPORD again, this time to points. First, that officers are human; incidentally, he was most capable. him and a roomful of basic trainees. I officers can make mistakes, and they started out by explaining to the new On the flip side, I remember at Armor need to develop their skillset just as recruits that I was also in school at Fort Basic Officer Leadership Course much as an enlisted Soldier does. Sec- Benning, that officers were also ex- (ABOLC) talking to a fellow student ond, although the recruits are new to pected to keep improving their skills. I who was on the verge of a panic attack the Army and “low on the food chain,” told them I would appreciate their help because he had failed a test. He was there is nothing stopping them – like because I needed to work on building very worried that he might fail the re- there is nothing stopping me – from in- OPORDs so I could do it right when test and get recycled. He was a smart creasing their Army skills, embracing there were lives (possibly theirs or young man, with a first-rate education education opportunities and one day those of their buddies) on the line. So and good brain, and failing a test was being Army leaders standing in front of I presented the OPORD again, and this a new experience for him. Somehow in Soldiers laying out their own mission time it was not a senior officer critiqu- all that good education he’d never got- plans. ing me but a roomful of future tankers. ten knocked down, so he’d never had When I finished, I had them backbrief As I say, I’m no thinker; I was always to get himself back up. All his previous me on parts of the plan so I could see that kid who got into (read: led others experience of success had denied him how effective I had been in imparting into) trouble. I figured that fools may the chance to build up the necessary the mission details. I had them ask rush in where angels fear to tread, but resilience for standing firm against a questions on points they didn’t the angels are all in heaven, and there minor setback.

35 January-February 2014 Good leaders fail sometimes. They get were a platoon of line medics, I can Hopefully, I will never stop rushing in over it; they get on with trying again. only hope there weren’t similarly re- where angels fear to tread, never stop Real leaders see their failures as poten- laxed standards for his medical train- finding myself in situations where my tial learning points for themselves and ing. Downrange, when you are fatigued plans go down in glorious flames. If others. For example, I had the honor of and stressed, and a real individual ever timidity or ego tempers my ac- being at one of the first briefings MG needs his medic’s attention, the old tions, if failure becomes something to Sean MacFarland gave his subordinate Grim Reaper is rarely willing to “check avoid, then I need to be concerned. commanders when he took command the block.” Because that is when I will have truly of 1st Armored Division in May 2013. failed. Rather than regale us with a list of his s U.S. presidents Theodore Roo- great achievements, he told us about sevelt and Richard Nixon noted, 1LT Paul Brannan is a student in how, as a young lieutenant, he had al- Athere is no effort without error MCCC’s Class 07-13. He previously most been fired as a platoon leader. As and shortcoming. The schoolhouse served as a rear-detachment com- a company-grade officer, I appreciated needs to be the place where we are mander in 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry, knowing that my division was led by a pushed to our limits and then a little 1-1 Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas; man who had the humility to embrace farther, where we develop our skillset executive officer, Company C, 4-17 In- his own challenges and the resolution and make mistakes. If students aren’t fantry, 1-1 Armored Division; Mobile to keep pushing himself until he being challenged by what they are Gun System (MGS) platoon leader, reached his current rank, and it was taught in Army schools, the bar is prob- Company B, 4-17 Infantry, 1-1 Armored the ideal introduction to who my new ably set too low. Beyond the school- Division; senior line medic, Company B, commanding general was as a person. house, if we wish to consider ourselves 4th Battalion, 64th Armor, 4th Brigade, as professionals, we need to put our 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; his hesitance to embrace chal- egos aside and seek out what we can- and platoon medic, Company D, 4th Bat- lenge – to truly test ourselves – not do, rather than congratulate our- talion, 64th Armor. In addition to MCCC, bleeds over into how Army T selves on what we can. In training we 1LT Brannan’s military schooling in- schools are conducted. When I attend- need to take risks that we won’t be cludes ABOLC, Fort Knox, KY; and OCS, ed Warrior Leaders Course (WLC), I perfect; we need to take risks that Fort Benning. His civilian education in- found much of the curriculum to be we’ll fail at some things. Only when we cludes a bachelor’s of science degree about “checking the block” and every- do will we truly learn something new; in psychology from the Open Universi- one getting a “go.” Out of my WLC only when we do will we grow as lead- ty, a distance-learning pioneer in the class, every student passed – even the ers of men. United Kingdom, his home country. ones who got into trouble, failed the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) or My ability to produce OPORDs is still otherwise didn’t perform to standard. behind that of many of my peers. I know it’ll take me time to reach their Likewise, shortly before I left my line Acronym Quick-Scan unit to attend OCS, my platoon re- level of expertise. However, as long as ceived three new Soldiers straight from I am willing to embrace my shortcom- advanced individual training (AIT) – all ings and continually practice the skill- ABOLC – Armor Basic Officer Lead- set involved, I will get better; indeed, ers Course of them failed the first APFT I gave him. AIT – advanced individual training One had spent most of AIT on profile by committing myself to improving, I’ll APFT – Army Physical Fitness Test and hadn’t had to do any physical eventually overtake those of my fellow MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s Career training, and another told me he’d students who have far more natural Course talent but who discard what they were OCS – Officer Candidate School been allowed to graduate on the basis OPORD – operations order that the unit he went to (i.e., us) would taught once they graduate MCCC. WLC – Warrior Leaders Course improve his physical ability. Since we

36 January-February 2014 Knowledge Management at the Brigade by MAJ Thomas E. Laybourn often employed as an afterthought or automation) or 57-series (simulations Knowledge management (KM) exists as with a very limited conscious scope. operations) major. Regrettably, this billet goes unfilled because of the a process for facilitating more effective During recent direct-action rotations at limited number of officers in these mission command. Realistically, our the National Training Center (NTC), functional areas. It is unrealistic to units can increase their effectiveness units have had their KM officers expect, with the demands for these by applying a systematic view of KM at (KMOs) focus almost exclusively on functional areas at higher echelons, the brigade level. By educating the cor- portal management. Though this is a that we will have greater fielding of rect personnel; reviewing the process critical element of KM, it really only ad- these positions in the future. Only one by which information is shared; adjust- dresses the tools aspect of sharing in- out of the four recent Army combat ing how our infrastructure or units are formation – and ultimately knowledge training center (CTC) rotations was organized; and adapting which tools – with subordinate battalions, compa- filled with the appropriate 57-series we use to actively see ourselves and nies and platoons. By not addressing officer. This is why most often the KMO off which we fight, our brigades can all aspects of the KM methodology, bri- is designated as an additional duty. continue to build efficiencies and make gades have lost much efficiency during This is acceptable, and in some cases our commanders’ ability to execute their missions. Therefore the purpose may even be more useful, at brigade mission command effective. of this article is to identify shortcom- level. Recognizing that KM exists as a process ing trends as they relate to the four fo- for facilitating more effective mission cus areas of the KM methodology: peo- Officers identified for the additional command has been a slow revelation ple, process, tools and organization. duty of KMO generally focus on their for many of our formations. Most bri- primary position. This is most vivid gades acknowledge this need, and People when the additional duty is placed on some even post banners in their tacti- Acknowledging that everyone executes the S-6 or one of the S-6’s personnel. cal operations centers (TOCs) that KM to some degree, it is surprising that This provides adequate attention on read, “Who else needs to know?” Un- the KMO’s role often relegates to an the BCT’s portal but does not address fortunately, most units have not iden- additional duty. It is most useful to em- other aspects of BCT KM vigorously – tified a systematic method for getting ploy a dedicated staff agent to actively or, in some cases, at all. Ironically, KM knowledge to those other units “who look for knowledge-sharing gaps rather is being applied by most members of need to know,” whatever it is that than trust to intuition from throughout the staff at all times, but the lack of needs to be conveyed. the staff as a whole. Making the appli- centralized review of all warfighting cation of KM should be the KMO’s ded- functions (WfFs) as applied to a mis- The KM process, per Field Manual icated mission. The KMO’s capacity to sion leaves operations disjointed when 6-01.1, focuses on identifying knowl- effectively identify gaps and offer solu- they transition from the planning edge-sharing gaps in four areas: proce- tions often increases if he or she has phase to execution. dures, personnel, tools and organiza- attended the KM course. tion. While this methodology is vigor- The critical member for this centralized ously applied at division-level organi- The KMO position at the brigade clearing is the brigade executive zations or higher, in brigades KM is combat team (BCT) is a 53- (systems officer. The KMO can facilitate the

The right information CCIR

to the right person Commanders, staffs, action officers, etc.

at the right time LTIOV, battle rhythm

in the right form SIGACTS, SPOTREPS, GRINTSUMS, SALUTE, etc. in the right place CPs, boards, BUBs, commander’s updates SITREPS, etc. to make decisions to make decisions

Figure 1. KM facilitates shared understanding at the BCT level best when the scope of KM is known.

37 January-February 2014 executive officer’s ability to very distracting. This is most vivid important to their commander’s ability synchronize efforts throughout the when many company commanders are to leverage mission command. Further- staff by identifying gaps for him that he crowded about a very small map they more, these tools are a useful way for may have not noticed. One brigade in cannot see, nor can they hear the the commander to focus his staff and particular assigned the additional duty speaker addressing them. Using the subordinate commanders. of KMO to one of their battle captains. KMO as the notetaker at a minimum As this officer had constant exposure would force him into a position where While every BCT staff generally to all WfFs and sought speedy updates he could review possible knowledge- constructs running estimates, maps, and transfer of orders and data to sharing gaps. His involvement in set-up communications equipment, decision- subordinates, he was able to quickly would also help identify needless dis- support matrixes (DSM), execution inform the executive officer. This tracters. matrixes, preformatted conditions and helped the executive officer leverage checklists, they are inconsistently Another area where the KMO can ap- his position so he could contact used. Sometimes brigades fail to use ply great value is in working with the subordinate battalions or even brigade their own tools in the same fashion in commander, executive officer and op- a span of hours! staff agencies to close knowledge- erations officer in developing a battle sharing gaps. rhythm. This is a critical task for KMOs The two areas that have facilitated the We believe that had the battle captain at division-level headquarters. At the commander’s ability to make decisions attended the Army Knowledge Man- brigade, however, the executive officer are running estimates and DSMs. or S-3 – or sometimes even their sub- agement Qualification Course, his util- The DSM has enabled brigade and bat- ordinates – usually build the timeline ity in identifying gaps in knowledge talion commanders to fight their bat- and battle rhythm. Though it is not sharing within the brigade would have tles under constrained communica- necessary to employ the KMO in this been even more valuable. tions conditions. It is often unrealized process, it is valuable if one is trying to identify avoidable future gaps. that the DSM also helps staffs to quick- Process ly make recommendations to their Not surprisingly, the military decision- The most successful brigades have in- commander and prepare for follow-on making process (MDMP) is adequately corporated into their battle rhythms events as they relate to everything understood by our formations at the not only their higher headquarters’ from sustainment to fires. One brigade brigade and lower staffs, as there is a events but also their subordinate task in particular was able to maintain mo- great deal of training and common un- forces’ timelines. By incorporating mentum during the fight after having derstanding for the process. Unfortu- these timeline events (including key lost direct communications with their nately, the transition from mission or- MDMP events), the battle rhythm be- commander by using their DSM in the ders to execution is often clumsy and comes a tool the planners and the cur- tactical operations center (TOC). This disjointed. Frequently this is due to the rent operations (CUOPS) personnel can helped with vehicle recovery, casualty executors in the staff not being at re- use. The process for reviewing the bat- hearsals or understanding the process evacuation and resupply. The com- tle rhythm is the element, which is mand team emphasized this tool at the that developed certain products like most inconsistent among the brigades the wargame. The most vivid example CAR so it was clear that this was impor- who have passed through the NTC. The tant to the commander, so all the task of inconsistent process is rehearsals. brigade who had the most valuable The KMO has rarely been involved in forces and the BCT staff knew what battle rhythm had a systematic process their commander needed. this process for any rotation yet, and for its review, which occurred daily and this is perhaps the most useful mecha- was adjustable. However, the trend is not as positive nism for gaining shared knowledge for most units. The norm is that bri- Most importantly, the review of the with subordinate units. gades construct a useful DSM that is battle rhythm helped the planners neither viewed nor understood by all Brigades execute rehearsals consis- avoid disrupting battalion timelines. agencies in the TOC or tactical com- tently. However, the effectiveness of This process of reviewing the battle these rehearsals is often so limited rhythm, compounded with useful ap- mand post (TAC). The degree of sur- that the synchronization and under- plication of rehearsals, alone created prise when a critical event occurs that standing one would gain from them is advantages for brigades by facilitating is related to a decision point is not, in lost. Simple review of location, travel mission command and making units most cases, a measure of lazy or disin- time for subordinates, rehearsal for- more efficient. terested staff members. Rather, there mat, agenda and noise level all can is a lack of understanding of how this make the process for executing the re- tool is used. It compounds when staff hearsal (whether Central Army Regis- Tools agencies are not present at rehearsals Given the people and processes ap- try (CAR), fires, sustainment, etc.). The or cannot understand the plan. plied already at the BCT, these efforts trend has been that the planner or op- are strengthened through use of effec- Running estimates also facilitate not erations officer (S-3) assumes this re- tive tools. Many of these tools are con- only a more speedy application of the sponsibility exclusively. structed during the planning phase and MDMP but, just as importantly, help in When the timeline is condensed, the are later refined during rehearsals. All maintaining a accurate picture of the rehearsal’s presentation can become these tools articulate what is most brigade during CUOPS to paint an

38 January-February 2014 accurate picture for the commander. If according to the transitions brigades educating the correct personnel; reused well, the running estimates also anticipate during their fight (like move- viewing the process by which informa- share this information and knowledge ment-to-contact into the defense). tion is shared; adjusting how our infra- with subordinate agencies and task structure or units are organized; and The trend, though, is that the forces. KM applied to showing our adapting which tools we use to active- retransmission nodes are forgotten running estimates is an essential ly see ourselves and off which we fight, until later in the MDMP so that component of building a practical and our brigades can continue to build ef- transitions become sloppy. This useful common operating picture ficiencies and make our commanders’ adversely affects communications and (COP). Running estimates for many ability to execute mission command ef- forces commanders to resort to other brigades are often bland quad charts, fective. methods on their primary, alternate, which are very unwieldy and contingency and emergency MAJ Thomas Laybourn is the brigade impractical for conveying knowledge communications plan, as well as the S-3 trainer for the Operations Group, quickly. other warfighting functions when NTC, Fort Irwin, CA. His past assign- The most practical tool brigades use at passing reports. ments include light-infantry task-force the NTC are formatted to the type of executive officer, staff trainer and bat- However, task organization is just one information WfFs desire to convey, as talion executive officer, 1-501st Infantry aspect where KM can increase efficien- well as having a process through which (Airborne), 4/25 Infantry Division, Fort cy. The actual layout of some of our fa- updated data is identified and cap- Richardson, AK; battalion operations cilities in some cases provides for in- tured quickly – like consumption re- officer, 1-501st; and rear detachment credible increase in effectiveness for ports over the Battle Command Sus- commander, 1-4 Cavalry, 4/1 Infantry sharing knowledge. One vivid positive tainment Support System, or combat Division, Fort Riley, KS. His military example of this deliberate reorganiza- slants submitted over Jabber and Force schooling includes Infantry Officer’s tion of structure relates to one rota- XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Be- Basic Course, Infantry Captain’s Career tion’s BCT main command post. low (FBCB2). The least successful tools Course, Combined Arms Services and – and unfortunately the trend – are Every BCT maintains an analogue map- Staff School and Intermediate Level Ed- running estimates that exist on a staff board in the main command post on ucation, Command and General Staff agency’s laptop but are never refer- which their battle captains, executive College. MAJ Laybourn holds a bache- enced anywhere or updated in the officers and commander fight from and lor’s of science degree in English from main command post. track when not focusing on the digital the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, COP. Sadly, this map is generally an af- NY, and a master’s of art degree in This was mostly visible with one bri- terthought and lacks utility other than leadership from Southwestern Univer- gade where the staff did not have ac- as a failsafe. It is most often ignored. sity, Wichita, KS. He deployed twice to curate running estimates for any WfF. Iraq and once to Afghanistan. He is the The brigade commander felt far more This was not the case with one BCT, recipient of the Bronze Star medal with comfortable excluding the staff com- which chose to place the map in the two oak-leaf clusters and the Ranger pletely because he had little faith in middle of the main command post Tab, as well as the Combat Infantry, Ex- them. floor in front of the digital displays but pert Infantryman, Senior Parachutist behind the battle captains’ row. This To mitigate the trend of poor and not- and Pathfinder badges. initially seemed awkward but turned useful running estimates, the KMO is out to provide much better situational useful as the briefer of these tools at awareness for all staff agencies. The battle-update briefs or even command- executive officer who fought off the Acronym Quick-Scan ers’ update briefs. This would allow the analogue map could look up to get KMO to interact with the commander, BCT – brigade combat team confirmation from the FBCB2 feed as executive officer, S-3 and subordinate CAR – Central Army Registry well as other running-estimate dis- commanders to ensure receipt and dis- COP – common operational picture plays. The staff was arrayed around the CTC – combat training center tribution of the knowledge the com- map so all WfFs were involved, so they CUOPS – current operations mander seeks. DSM – decision-support matrix were able to quickly offer recommen- FBCB2 – Force XXI Battle Command Organization dations to their commander. Brigade-and-Below Efficiency is also built by the adjust- KM – knowledge management With the TOC’s arrangement and KMO – knowledge-management offi- ment of our organization within the KMO’s presence, the reconciliation of cer brigade. Normally, this is viewed as a the pictures the TAC and TOC see may MDMP – military decision-making method for addressing task organiza- process be addressed more easily. tion. The most common KM-specific NTC – National Training Center TAC – tactical command post adjustment to our task organization is Realistically, our units can increase TOC – tactical operations center the movement of retransmission ele- their effectiveness by applying a sys- WfF – warfighting function ments, depending on what nets the tematic view of KM at brigade level. By brigade desires to transmit and adjusts

39 January-February 2014 Figure 1. Blackhorse troopers assigned to C Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, take the high ground to prepare to engage in the final battle with 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, on Fort Irwin, CA, June 28, 2013. (Photo by SPC David N. Beckstrom, 11th ACR Public Affairs) Observations from the Opposing Force

by CPT Andrew J. Rossow NTC’s battlefields. mission success or failure. Take these and CPT Amos C. Fox observations into theaters of operation The general observation is units that for deploying units, as they hit on com- This article is designed to assist the focus on the basics and understand monalities in stories of success and fail- maneuver community as the Army con- doctrine are much stronger and more ure observed in Iraq and Afghanistan tinues to develop how it will fight in the successful during combat operations. in recent years. –LTC Frederick R. Sny- new decisive-action (DA) format. The This also applies to units that have der authors, two former troop command- been able to identify and emplace ers, are two of the most tactically pro- training programs that make up for the ficient troop commanders when it current shortfalls of field training in the Know your capabili- comes to the basics of mounted ma- schoolhouse and the current atrophy of ties / shortcomings neuver. Both are combat veterans pre- maneuver experience within the As a troop / company / battery com- viously assigned to the National Train- mounted force. NTC is committed to mander, you have to know your capa- ing Center (NTC) when the first DA ro- training excellence and, with that said, bilities: which of your platoons is the tation kicked off and have been in- we all stand ready to help train the strongest, which has the most aggres- volved in its continual growth. Their ar- force. We will not give you all the an- sive leadership, who are the most ca- ticle highlights many of the observa- swers out of loyalty to the Blackhorse pable gunners. More importantly, you tions they made and capitalized upon, Regiment/11th Division Tactical Group. have to know your shortcomings: and which our current troop command- Instead, we provide you with several which platoon has discipline problems ers now use to increase success on ideas that have proven critical in (and how will that affect your mission),

40 January-February 2014 which platoon has maintenance issues capabilities has to be part of your significant portion of an advancing ro- (and why), who can’t figure out how to playbook. tational training unit (RTU) battalion as get out of the tactical assembly area. they began to enter the central corri- Use your tools dor. Poor tactics? Superior position? Answering questions like these objec- In our age of technology, you should No and no. The RTU company / team tively will allow you to assign respon- never enter a new area of operations leadership had decided not to bore- sibilities to individuals and platoons blindly. If you do, shame on you. There sight their tanks and Bradleys. Amaz- based on capabilities instead of arbi- are many accessible tools to enable ing. They had gone through a deliber- trarily. Keep open lines of communica- you and your junior leaders to have a ate planning process for the initial bri- tion with your junior leaders. Inspect decent concept of the terrain you are gade-level movement-to-contact, con- their training. Watch how they execute entering well before you enter it. Maps ducted troop-leading procedures from command maintenance. are excellent tools, but graphics / im- brigade to platoon level, backbriefed agery are better. If you cannot visual- One key factor enables each of these: their leadership, executed rehearsals, ize the terrain and help your junior command presence. Removing your- etc. This company, no matter how well leaders do so, the enemy will have an self from command maintenance or planned their mission was, no matter early upper hand in the fight. They will other training events – relegating your- how well prepared they were (outside likely know the terrain. Force XXI Bat- self to an office troll – denies your of boresighting), was completely inef- tle Command Brigade and Below troops your guidance and sets prece- fective. (FBCB2)-Blue Force Tracking (BFT) / dence for your junior leaders to do the Joint Capability Release (JCR) bring ex- How one would consider deliberately same. For platoon leaders, this is espe- cellent situational awareness to the not boresighting acceptable is as- cially important. Fighting your platoon battlefield. Not only do these tools tounding, but the fact remains and has is your responsibility and, as such, you give you the capability of tracking your been observed many times on a small- need to know in every mission the dis- unit’s progress, they work great for er scale since then. tance at which each one of your vehi- mission planning and movement con- Any leader who has sent his troops to cles is capable of destroying enemy ve- trol. the range can attest to the significance hicles (by type). Also, unclassified Websites like Google and the results of quality preliminary Be ruthless in the boresight battle Earth and Hawgview give you the ca- marksmanship instruction training. If a rhythm. Know which gunners can kill pability to “see” the terrain before you Soldier does not boresight his weapon, at distance and who is better off are sitting on it or driving through it. he will likely see extended time, keeping their shots to less than 1,500 Seeing the complexity of the terrain heightened frustration and a waste of meters (and needs continued training). through tools like these can prevent ammunition on the range trying to zero This will allow you as the commander planners from committing blunders and qualify. Take that idea to an to place vehicles / personnel where like attempting to send a combined- Abrams tank or a Bradley when normal they are most effective – where they arms battalion through a maneuver engagement ranges are around 10 can place precision, lethal fires on a corridor only capable of passing a sec- times that of small arms. There are one-shot, one-kill basis, ultimately tion (true story) or placing a mounted processes and techniques to boresight- conserving ammunition and reducing defensive position in terrain that can- ing that units must be able to execute your exposure to enemy forces, not be accessed by wheeled or tracked quickly and to standard before deploy- especially in the defense. Direct fire vehicles (another true story). Further, ing on field-training exercises and be- control is the name of the game, and these tools give subordinate leaders fore individual missions. It is a Gunnery knowledge of your vehicle / personnel much better situational awareness Skills Test standard that must be met than simple maps for gunnery and, thus, should be con- can provide. They sidered a gate to a crew moving out to allow your team to execute any mounted maneuver train- visualize how the ing. fight will be con- Boresighting is essential to unit success ducted and thus al- and requires practicing multiple times low them to fight per day. Add it to your battle rhythm. decision-point tac- Execute it after any major movement tics. and / or prior to any mission. It is a no- Boresight, fail event. boresight, Think red boresight For the staff, this means wargame. The In Rotation 12-05, commander cannot make decisions un- Figure 2. Troopers from C Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cav- the first DA rota- less he has a good idea of how the en- alry Regiment, occupy defensive positions overwatching Brown/ tion at the NTC in emy will fight. At the battalion / squad- Debnam Pass. (Photo by CPT Andrew J. Rossow, C Troop, 11th Ar- years, Charlie ron level, this means acting out the mored Cavalry Regiment) Troop destroyed a battle from start to finish (and beyond)

41 January-February 2014 ow / Predator feed. Simply put: You are wrong. The enemy knows where you are. You’re on his turf. You cannot adequately execute any of the seven steps of engagement-area development without getting out and walking / studying the terrain. Maps and graphics are excellent tools for planning, and will usually allow you to initiate your priorities of work, but once you hit the ground, it’s time to either confirm or deny your plan and execute or change your course of action. There is only one place at NTC where you should place more than 75 percent trust in a map: in the rotational-unit bivouac area. The terrain is more di- Figure 3. SFC Patrick Flanagan directs his gunner, SPC Tanner Corneilson, into a hull- verse than you think. The terrain is down position dug by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment’s 58th Engineer Company, more diverse than the COEFOR thinks, while Soldiers from the regiment’s smoke platoon provide obscuration from overhead and the COEFOR has been in more threat. (Photo by CPT Andrew Rossow, C Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment) places than most. Get out, walk the terrain, study your dead space. Under- to understand what possible courses of requirements and initiate / react to stand the terrain and its effects. That action the enemy may execute; what / contact when the battle comes. Do not dead space you identify is more than where / when the key decision points shortchange your junior leaders or likely where the “insurgents” or COE- will come; and what the constraints yourself with a substandard enemy pic- FOR are or from where you will first are (by staff function and by warfight- ture or a weak rehearsal. take fire. Identify it and mitigate it. To ing function) to provide the command- make it easy, walk / drive the perime- er with the best course of action to en- Get outside the ter and talk to each of your positions. able his intent and achieve his end- wire and walk / Determine where you can observe / be state. drive the perimeter observed, where you can engage / be At the company / troop / battery level, You would not believe how many units engaged, where you can do neither, this means doing your homework. Un- occupy a defense, set in their positions and how to mitigate. Do not be lazy. derstand the enemy: what is he bring- or conduct engagement-area developing to the fight, what are his tactics, ment without “leaving the wire.” At Flexibility and what are the capabilities of his weapon NTC or in a theater of operations, you mission command systems? may occupy a forward operating base, Some would take great advice while lis- To understand how the enemy will joint security station or patrol base tening to a speech from retired COL fight, you must also understand the that has a full perimeter with defensive Douglas MacGregor (S-3 for 2/2 Ar- terrain. Get with your S-2 and build positions already established. Consider mored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) during your modified combined obstacle over- this a gift if it happens to you and your the Battle of 73 Easting): “The key to lay, your doctrinal template and your Soldiers. success in war is to stay so far forward, and to go so fast, that higher command threat template. Put your red hat on However, do not get lazy. The contem- cannot possibly contact you and inter- and fight your battle in reverse. Where porary operating environment force rupt your advance.” What sound ad- is the key terrain and how will it impact (COEFOR) has sat at the top of many vice. Yet, when fighting in the box at the fight? If you were the enemy, how common operational pictures, sur- NTC, we often do not have the luxury would you move – would you sacrifice rounded by flashing / screaming per- of space to break away from our head- security for speed, or would you hold sonnel and vehicle Multiple Integrated quarters. Therefore, a key to succeed- up to secure dominant terrain? Where Laser Engagement Systems, listening to ing in the box is being as flexible as and when would you be vulnerable? a commander attempt to explain why possible. As a company / troop / bat- he thought it was OK not to leave the Be prepared to discuss a thorough en- tery commander, you have to be able wire when he established his defense. emy situation in your order and during to adapt to the ever-changing battle- You may think you can see everything your rehearsal. A common understand- field and the ever-changing guidance from the height of your command ing of the enemy’s disposition, task from your higher headquarters. and purpose will enable your subordi- post, from your location in your defen- nate leaders to understand the order sive position or from the imagery The key to flexibility is mission com- of battle, feed your information you’re getting from your Raven / Shad- mand. What mission command means

42 January-February 2014 to the COEFOR is to provide our subor- Company maneuvering the length of flexibility is an effective use of mission dinates with clear and concise order the box from west to east, there were command. The best way to make mis- and graphics, and then get out of their seven phase lines. Delta Company also sion command work is to focus on sim- way to let them fight the fight. used the on-board technology (FBCB2 ple plans and orders and on simple / JCR), tying phase lines to grid lines. graphics, and to trust your subordi- Oftentimes as commanders, we get This goes against conventional wis- nates to take the fight to the enemy. caught up in developing grandiose or- dom, but the company felt it was much ders and the result is: a) wasted time; st easier for TCs to self-locate and report LTC Frederick Snyder commands 1 b) confusion in everyone but you; and th their positions after a quick look at an Squadron, 11 ACR, Fort Irwin, CA. His c) subordinate leaders focusing too easily identifiable phase line on their past duty assignments include assis- much attention “down” (looking at JCR. Even when there were no JCRs, ev- tant executive officer to the command- their notes, orders, mapboards, etc.) ery TC had a Defense Advanced Global ing general of Installation Manage- instead of looking “out” (fighting the Positioning System Receiver (DAGR). ment Command and assistant chief of battle in front of them). The phase line on a grid line made re- installation management, Army Staff, Keep your operations orders succinct. porting with a DAGR far easier for the Pentagon; brigade operations officer, nd Focus on a solid concept of the opera- TCs. 2 Heavy Brigade Combat Team st tion (purpose, form of maneuver or de- (HBCT), 1 Infantry Division, Fort Riley, The troop commanders assigned a few fensive technique, risk, decisive opera- KS; battalion executive officer and bat- target reference points tied to easily st tions, shaping operations, sustaining talion operations officer, 1 Combined identifiable pieces of terrain. This en- th nd operations), a simple scheme of ma- Arms Battalion, 18 Infantry, 2 HBCT, abled an easily understood front that st neuver and defined tasks / purposes. 1 Infantry Division, Fort Riley and greatly enhanced reporting ability, Baghdad, Iraq; and Headquarters and Eliminate the fluff or filler that often which greatly enhanced situational Headquarters Company commander, III accompanies commander’s intent – a awareness. Corps, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, bunch of key tasks that are neither key Much like a simple order, simple graph- Camp Victory, Baghdad. His military nor tasks – and the hyperbolic end- ics allow TCs and leaders to focus their schooling includes the Naval College state. A way to write commander’s in- attention outward on the enemy and Command and Staff, M1A2 Systems En- tent is in this fashion: here’s what I not downward at their mapboards. By hancement Package Tank Commander want you to do, why I want you to do focusing outward, TCs and leaders are Course, Combined Arms and Services it and why it’s important; here are a able to react to what is unfolding be- Staff School, Maneuver Captain’s Ca- few key things we must accomplish to fore them – making them flexible lead- reer Course and Armor Basic Officer win this battle; and here’s where we ers, not occupied leaders. Leader Course. He holds a bachelor’s of need to be at the end of the battle (fo- science degree from Frostburg State cused on enemy, terrain, civilians). At Flexibility is a key to success when University in political science. LTC Sny- the end of the day, if your platoon fighting on a complex, ever-evolving der is the recipient of the Bronze Star leaders and other subordinates under- battlefield. A key component of with one oak-leaf cluster (OLC), the stood what you are trying to accom- Meritorious Service Medal with three plish and why you are trying to accom- OLCs and the Combat Action Badge. plish it, the battle will unfold in your favor. CPT Andrew Rossow is an operations From the tank commander (TC)’s hatch, officer with Army Capabilities Integra- COEFOR leaders have observed that tion Center, U.S. Army Training and many rotational units did not execute Doctrine Command, Fort Eustis, VA. His mission command in this fashion, nor past duty assignments include troop did they have simple orders. It looked commander, C Troop, 1-11 ACR, Fort Ir- as though when making contact, the win, CA; troop commander, E Troop, rotational units stalled as their leader- 1-10 Cavalry, Fort Carson, CO; assistant ship retraced their complex plans to S-3, 1-10 Cavalry, Basrah, Iraq; scout find how they planned to react – in- platoon leader, C Troop, 1-10 Cavalry; stead of simply reacting. and mortar platoon leader, B Troop, 1-10 Cavalry. His military schooling in- The final piece of advice is about flex- cludes Maneuver Captain’s Career ibility and not losing on the battlefield Course, Infantry Mortar Leader’s at the NTC. This is based on simplicity Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course and yet again: have simple graphics and Armor Officer Basic Course. CPT Ros- Figure 4. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regi- use technology regarding your graph- sow holds a bachelor’s of science de- ics. In the box, there is no need for a ment’s overwhelming success is evident in this battle-damage assessment taken gree from Texas A&M University in psy- plethora of phase lines, checkpoints during the first movement-to-contact chology and a master’s of science de- and routes. During the movement-to- mission in Rotation 12-05. (Photo by CPT gree from Missouri State University in contact during Rotation 12-05 against Amos Fox, D Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry public administration. He is a member 3/3 Infantry Division, which had Delta Regiment) of the honorary rolls of the Blackhorse

43 January-February 2014 Regiment, Order of Saint George Regiment, 2nd ABCT, 4th Infantry Divi- (bronze medallion) and a member of sion, Fort Carson. His military school- Acronym Quick-Scan the Order of the Spur (silver and gold). ing includes Maneuver Captain’s Ca- ABCT –armored brigade combat team reer Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course, ACR – armored cavalry regiment CPT Amos Fox commands L Troop, 2-16 Bradley Fire Support Vehicle Com- Cavalry, 316th Cavalry Brigade, Fort BFT – Blue Force Tracking mander’s Course and Field Artillery Of- COEFOR - contemporary operating Benning, GA. His past assignments in- ficer Basic Course. CPT Fox holds a environment force DA – decisive action clude troop commander (D Company) bachelor’s of science degree in second- and assistant operations officer, 1-11 DAGR – Defense Advanced Global ary education from Indiana University Positioning System Receiver ACR, Fort Irwin; troop commander and and is pursuing a master’s of art de- FBCB2 – Force XXI Battle Command assistant operations officer, Headquar- gree in secondary education from Ball Brigade and Below HBCT – heavy brigade combat team ters and Headquarters Troop, 1-10 Cav- State University in Muncie, IN. CPT Fox alry Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade JCR – Joint Capability Release th is a member of the honorary rolls of NTC – National Training Center Combat Team (ABCT), 4 Infantry Divi- the Blackhorse Regiment, Order of OLC – oak-leaf cluster sion, Fort Carson; and assistant opera- Saint George and Order of the Spur. RTU – rotational training unit tions officer, 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry TC – tank commander

44 January-February 2014 How We Got Here and Where We Are Going: a Doctrinal Approach to the Health of the Force by CPT Keith Eisenberger, to the individual Soldier and family. Us- propensity for Soldiers to engage in CPT J.P. Steadman and ing a doctrinal mission-essential task high-risk behavior.”1 CPT Nick Knepp list (METL) development approach, the Chiarelli realized that leaders could not troop commanders of 4th Squadron, 3rd The Army’s health of the force (HoF) target suicide prevention alone and Cavalry Regiment created a HoF METL has been in a steady decline since com- that the Army must look at other fac- that outlines battle tasks to the indi- bat operations in Afghanistan began tors to be successful. To reduce these vidual level and sustains an enduring about 12 years ago. In the past nine problems, the Army needed a holistic operation that enables a better under- years, suicide and divorce rates have and multi-disciplinary approach to ad- standing of our Soldiers. risen at an alarming rate. In addition to dress each issue. Also, leaders at every this, drug and alcohol, financial and le- level must practice an engaged leader- gal issues continue to plague the mili- Background ship style. The Army Health Promotion Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) tary. Recent Department of Defense Risk Reduction Suicide Prevention Re- GEN Peter W. Chiarelli conducted tours initiatives have had a slight impact to port (Red Book) confirmed the need of six installations in 2010 with the reduce these trends, but even as de- “for a coordinated effort across the purpose of looking at how the force ployments decrease in Afghanistan, Army to promote good order, discipline was dealing with the increase in sui- crises and catastrophic events will con- and health of the force.” cides. He determined the Army was tinue to increase unless leaders find a out of balance concerning health pro- GEN Lloyd J. Austin III, the current way to be proactive and identify issues motion, risk reduction and suicide pre- VCSA, recently said: “Leaders across before they escalate further. vention programs and services. What our Army recognize that the health of The bottom line is that leaders must he and his staff witnessed firsthand our Soldiers, Army civilians and family reconnect with their Soldiers and real- was that there were “real indicators of members is a top priority. We remain ly know them to apply risk mitigation stress on the force, and an increasing committed to doing what is needed to

Financial Debt Financial obligations Alimony Government credit card Army Emergency Relief Loans Current loans Child support Platoon leader/platoon SGT Family budget (Safety net) Barracks inspections/ Credit report (if shared) home visits Counseling packet High-risk behaviors Motorcycle packet Monthly performance counseling Profiles POV inspection ERB Section leader Weapons Known meds card Discipline PT card (First-line defender) Health (last APFT) MOS-Q/ prof card MEB Blotter/previous offenses Promotion status Bar to re-enlistment Past suicide ideation/attempts Army Substance Abuse Program POWs Schools Flags Family Advocacy Program referrals and feedback feedback Previous UCMJ Copy of driver’s license Previous SA or DV incidents Previous AWOLs Recent family/close friend deaths ERB DD93/SGLI Positive urinalysis DEERs Alcohol incidents Marital status Self-development/education Comms with parents Family/relationships

Figure 1. Internal and external mechanisms that leaders at platoon level have at their disposal. (from 3rd Cavalry Regiment’s Mounted Rifleman Counseling Guide)

45 January-February 2014 care for our most precious asset — our level that would adequately identify especially if done on the margins and people — thereby ensuring a healthy associated risk. Also, we are not lever- when commanders to not emphasize and resilient force for the future.”2 aging the multitude of available estab- or dedicate the appropriate time. Un- lished resources required to build a ho- less you comprehensively immerse More than a decade at war, resulting listic picture of the Soldier. As a result, yourself in your Soldier’s life, you will in a high operational tempo, meant we leaders are uninformed or do not un- never fully know your subordinates. had less time to dedicate to HoF. This derstand the connectivity and the risks You have to learn to ask the tough, un- has led to knowledge gaps in our sys- of crises and frictions. Leaders must be comfortable questions that get to the tems concerning how we identify, en- aware of all these aspects of their Sol- root of the friction. Through the HoF gage and mitigate high-risk Soldiers. dier’s lives to know them better. En- campaign, our squadron assessed nine There are many reasons why know- trusted in our care are our nation’s more high-risk Soldiers. This was a re- ledge gaps have formed. For example, sons and daughters. Despite our op- sult of us connecting the right dots. there has been a breakdown at military tempo, we must not neglect this mon- Our Soldiers realized we now had a schools on negotiating the art of lead- umental responsibility. ership in garrison. Policies, processes stake in the HoF campaign and in our and programs have not kept pace with Commanders in our squadron used a Soldiers, which fostered a climate con- the expanding needs of our strained tool called “connecting the dots” to ducive to candidness, honesty and Army. This has led to a population of know our Soldiers. The “connecting the trust between leaders and subordi- rd high-risk Soldiers who erode Army val- dots” tool was created by the 3 Cav- nates. Soldiers were increasingly open ues and unit readiness.3 alry Regimental staff as part of the reg- with leaders about their personal lives, iment’s ongoing HoF campaign and as thus allowing a collective core of re- Also, Soldiers and families are feeling a part of the regiment’s Mounted Ri- sponsive and caring leaders to act in a the stress of a decade at war and fleman Counseling Guide. Depicted in proactive manner and leverage appro- multiple deployments. According to the figures are the “connecting the priate agencies and resources to help the Army Red Book, “The cumulative dots” tools that Longknife Squadron Soldiers and families in need. Without effect of transitions borne of used. Figure 1 depicts the internal and these measures, we would not have institutional requirements external mechanisms leaders at the been able to identify that these addi- (professional military education, platoon level have at their disposal. tional Soldiers within our formation permanent-change-of-station moves, Likewise, Figure 2 portrays the tools a were at high risk. promotions), coupled with family commander and first sergeant can use. Thus, we were able to identify the expectations / obligations (marriage, Recent trends in our regiment resulted problem facing our junior leaders at childbirth, aging parents) and in our regimental commander issuing the company, platoon and squad level: compounded by deployments is, on a HoF, resiliency and leader-develop- How do we assess HoF within our or- one hand, building a resilient force ment training period so we could as- ganization? No tool in the Army exists while on the other, pushing some sess trends and issues with our Sol- that gives you ability to address this is- units, Soldiers and families to the diers. We found out we did not “know” sue. There are tools out there to aid brink.”4 our Soldiers. There is only so much commanders in understanding our Sol- It is readily apparent that leaders at all that monthly counseling can do to help diers (Gold Book, Red Book, etc.), but levels are not engaging Soldiers to the leaders understand their Soldiers, there is currently nothing structured to

SHARP EO FRG AER Chaplain

FAP review committee Squadron financial adviser (FAP) Security clearance (RS-2) Parents

PERSTAT (daily) (S-1) ASAP dialog (ASAP counselor) Commanding officer Monthly commander’s unit financial report (S-1) Polypharm report (RSURG)

MEB (RSURG/PEBLO) Flag review (monthly) (S-1)

Behavioral health assessment (BHO) Previous offenses (COPS Database) (DES) Bar review (reup) Post-deployment health assessment (RSURG)

Figure 2. Weapon systems the commander brings to the fight. (from 3rd Cavalry Regiment’s Mounted Rifleman Counseling Guide)

46 January-February 2014

3rd Cavalry Regiment METL 4/3 Cavalry Regiment METL KLM METL Conduct mission command Conduct mission command •Conduct troop screen •Execute operations process •Conduct military decision-making process •Conduct zone recon •Integrate information-engagement •Execute operations process •Protect force capabilities •Assess tactical situations and operations •Conduct dismounted recon / surveillance Conduct offensive operations Conduct reconnaissance •Conduct troop-area security/stability •Conduct movement-to-contact •Conduct zone reconnaissance operations •Conduct attack •Conduct area reconnaissance •Conduct air assault •Conduct route reconnaissance Conduct defensive Conduct offensive operations operations •Conduct movement-to-contact •Conduct area defense •Conduct air-mobile operation Conduct security operations Conduct security operations •Conduct security operations •Conduct screen •Conduct area-security operations •Conduct convoy security •Conduct passage of lines Conduct stability operations •Coordinate chemical, biological, •Provide essential services radiation, nuclear-operations support •Coordinate public order and safety Employ fires and effects Employ fires •Coordinate AGI •Provide fire support •Employ mortars •Synchronize CAS Provide CSS •Resupply •Evacuate casualties •Conduct assembly of area operations

Figure 3. HoF METL linkage. (from HoF organizational brief 2013, 4th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment)

give direction and understanding of deciding which of the available tasks with the autonomy and trust to devel- where an organization stands in terms must be completed to accomplish the op our troop METLs. We then applied of taking care of its Soldiers. The overall mission. Figure 3 depicts our lessons we learned in METL develop- squadron began to develop a METL de- regiment’s nested METL. ment of our wartime mission to devel- voted to HoF as a systematic approach oping our HoF METL to quantitatively The three reconnaissance troops with- to better assess and identify gaps in evaluate our organizations, and we in 4th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, challenged ourselves to understand engaged leadership in our organiza- established a METL nested within the each of the HoF METL tasks complete- tions. squadron’s METL and determined ly, starting from ground zero. which collective tasks to train. By fol- METL development lowing this process, commanders cre- What started with mere thoughts on a All units have a METL that guides their ated specific guidance for what needed whiteboard soon became an organiza- warfighting training strategy. The doc- to be trained to meet mission require- tional vision and initiative from our trinal-based METL all units must train ments. squadron commander. The squadron on is the core mission-essential task senior leadership developed four list (CMETL). “A CMETL is a list of a The commander finally plans, resourc- squadron HoF mission-essential tasks: unit’s core-capability mission-essential es and coordinates for the training nec- • Health and discipline surveillance tasks and general mission-essential essary to allow the unit to gain profi- and detection; tasks. Units train on CMETL tasks until ciency and meet established higher- • Health promotion and referral; the unit commander and next higher echelon training gates. Again, the CATS • Administration and disciplinary viewer on ATN helps by providing per- commander mutually decide to focus actions; and formance measures for each METL col- on training for a directed mission,” ac- • Good order and discipline. lective task, and example situational cording to Army Doctrine Publication training exercise and live-fire exercise This was fundamental for the HoF (ADP) 7-0.5 Most units can review their evaluations for each task. Command- METL development campaign. The CMETL through the Combined Arms ers ensure their unit is well trained by squadron commander brought the Training Strategies (CATS) viewer on following the doctrinally approved troop commanders into the squadron the Army Training Network (ATN) Web- METL and performance measures. conference room and provided us: site. • The regimental commander’s guid- After reviewing their CMETL, METL development ance; commanders choose which tasks they in HoF context • The Mounted Rifleman Counseling are going to train, ensuring they are As new commanders, one of the high- Guide; nesting within the squadron CMETL. lights of command was when our • Army Gold Book; METL development is the process of squadron commander empowered us • ATN;

47 January-February 2014 • Army Regulation 600-20, Command comprehensive METL crosswalk troop commanders, we established Authority; reflective at the platoon, section, five troop-level HoF METL tasks (dis- • AR 6-22, Leadership; and leader and individual levels. Figure 4 cussed more, following) that nested • The squadron HoF METL. depicts our HoF squadron campaign within the squadron METL: He then tasked us to develop a troop plan. • Execute command authority; HoF METL that was nested within the Due to a determined and profession- • Conduct fit-for-duty assessment; squadron HoF METL and a ally enlightened dialogue among the • Integrate internal and external enablers; • Facilitate rehabilitation or transi- HoF concept of operation Key DTGs tion; and •Phase 1: Leader training and 23 JAN 15 HoF mission analysis • Sustain a positive organizational cul- development HoF METL seminar (command group ture climate. •Phase 2: Soldier assessment 29 JAN 15 and education and troop leadership) HoF train-the-trainer facilitator Figure 5 depicts the troop-squadron •Phase 3: Establishment of 30 JAN 15 enduring and evolving certification HoF METL linkage. awareness and learning 31 JAN-04 FEB HoF sessions It was important to draw from our de- Bottom-up feedback/refinement Inputs 04 FEB 15 cisive-action METL the appropriate ac- •RCO guidance Troop/platoon battle tasks and METL 04-06 FEB 15 •MRCG crosswalk development tion words and create mirrored ver- •Army Gold Book 07 FEB 15 SCO METL review/assessment biage between the two METLs. We en- •Army Training Network •AR 600-20, Command sured leaders at all levels of the orga- Authority RCO Squadron METL Bottom-up refinement nization understood the HoF by using •AR 6-22, Leadership guidance Outputs the appropriate action words. (De- •Squadron METL scriptive action words enable us to bet- Endstate Troop METL •Troop METL •HoF METL linked in SCO •Platoon battle tasks ter understand the tasks.) Figure 6 dis- support of commander’s guidance PLT battle tasks •Leader tasks plays how the action words are relative guidance. •Individual tasks •Established HoF between the HoF and tactical METL. methodology Leader tasks •Provide glide path in Inputs Listed following are the troop HoF support or campaign METL tasks we developed. These are plan Individual tasks the most relevant tasks that allowed us to understand our Soldiers better. The Figure 4. HoF METL development campaign plan. (from HoF organizational brief 2013, great thing about METLs is they are ad- 4th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment) justable to different units. These tasks can easily change from one organization to another. Squadron HoF METL Execute command authority. As com- Health and discipline Troop HoF METL manders, we have the privilege of surveillance and detection Execute command authority command authority, and with that au- •Maintain organizational readiness thority comes great responsibility. How •Implement command policies and Health promotion procedures commanders handle responsibility has and referral •Communicate vision and assess a profound effect on our organizations. comprehension The policies and procedures we imple- Conduct fit-for-duty assessment ment shape the organization as well as Administration and disciplinary •Manage effective counseling program actions •Oversee and manage profiles the vision we project. The magic word •Leverage installation resources for commanders is “readiness.” How •Conduct composite risk management Good order and discipline we maintain readiness as an organiza- Integrate internal and external tion, in terms of training and keeping enablers •Foster learning environment our force healthy, is paramount to our •Educate leadership on resources ability to be successful in combat. •Conduct “recon handoff” of HoF issues Conduct fit-for-duty assessment. We Facilitate rehabilitation or transition •Execute HoF command and control cannot effectively support our Soldiers •Provide oversight of treatment process unless we truly know and holistically •Facilitate expeditious and fair understand the individual. Effective disciplinary process counseling is the key when conducting Sustain a positive organization culture / climate fit-for-duty assessments. Only through •Enforce Army values engaged leadership and leveraging all •Develop engaged leadership available resources can we better sup- Figure 5. Troop-squadron HoF METL •Maintain positive command climate linkage. (from HoF organizational •Foster enduring relationship with port and care for those within our brief 2013, 4th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry enablers ranks. Regiment) •Manage effective FRG program Integrate internal and external

48 January-February 2014 Troop HoF METL Decisive-action troop METL culture – one able to withstand poor Execute command authority Conduct troop screen leadership when it inevitably occurs. •Maintain organizational readiness •Integrate indirect fire support •Implement command policies and •Conduct passage of lines To make an effective product, a leader procedures •Security drill must obtain bottom-up feedback, al- •Communicate vision and assess •Conduct target acquisition lowing for Soldier and organizational •Conduct screen comprehension buy-in. Once we had solidified the Conduct fit-for-duty assessment Conduct zone recon •Manage an effective counseling •Conduct infiltration troop HoF METL, we introduced it to program •Conduct bypass the leadership within our ranks. We •Oversee and manage profiles •Conduct route reconnaissance brought in our platoon leaders and pla- •Leverage installation resources •Conduct zone reconnaissance •Conduct composite risk •Conduct reconnaissance handover toon sergeants and began the develop- management Protect the force ment of realistic platoon-level “battle Integrate internal and external •Plan for CIED operations tasks.” Where we deviated from nor- enablers •React to PIED, VBIED or PBIED mal METL development was in the cre- •Foster learning environment •Prepare for VBIED or PBIED •Educate leadership on resources •Conduct convoy security ation of a “leader” task. Leaders of all •Conduct “recon handoff” of HoF Conduct dismounted recon/ levels within our organizations must issues surveillance execute these tasks to be successful Facilitate rehabilitation •Conduct tactical movement within the framework of our HoF or transition •Establish observation post •Execute HoF command and control •Conduct surveillance (LRS team) METL. •Provide oversight of treatment •Establish surveillance site (LRS process team) The leader tasks proved to be easier •Facilitate expeditious and fair Conduct troop-area than the initial troop METL tasks to disciplinary process surveillance/stability identify because we received input Sustain positive organization operations culture/climate •Conduct raid from the individuals who execute HoF •Enforce Army values •Conduct area security tasks every single day – they just had •Develop engaged leadership •Conduct site exploration never put a name to it. We again devi- •Maintain positive command climate •Conduct convoy security •Foster enduring relationship with ated from normal METL development enablers process by not crosswalking each task •Manage effective FRG program down to the individual level. Quite simply, we identified that some tasks would not have an associated section Figure 6. METL comparison. (from HoF organizational brief 2013, 4th Squadron, 3rd Caval- ry Regiment) or individual task. Upon completion of our backbrief to the squadron com- enablers. Our military installations do identify Soldiers needing to transition mander, we arrived at a nested and a fantastic job of offering our Soldiers out of the Army or transfer to a unit aligned troop METL consistent with a a myriad of facilities and resources in better able to assist them in rehabilita- crosswalk down to the individual level. which to receive help and support. Too tion. Leaders at all levels need to un- Figures 7 (Page 51) and 8 (Page 52) de- often, leaders do not fully understand derstand the completion of tasks that pict the troop HoF METLs of the tasks or are unaware of the different en- are necessary to provide the unit with “execute command authority” and “fa- ablers present on various posts. We a timely transition of the Soldier out of cilitate rehabilitation or transition” identified this as an issue that prevents the unit or rehabilitation back into the with complementary collective, leader Soldiers from receiving the appropriate force. We must be cognizant not of the and individual tasks. support for the various stressors in health and well-being of the Soldier their lives. but of the unit’s health and the damage done by delaying transition or re- Conclusion HoF is important not only to the Army The knowledge of what the installation habilitation. has to offer is only the beginning. To but to the military as a whole. Unless best support our Soldiers and their Sustain a positive organizational cul- leaders ask the hard questions and families, we as leaders must have a di- ture / climate. This is the decisive task spend time getting acquainted with alogue with the provider, counselor or of troop HoF METL – the foundation our Soldiers, we will never really know individual involved in helping our Sol- around which HoF is centered. It is im- them. When we do not know our Sol- diers. Only then can we truly stream- portant to note the difference between diers and what issues they have, we line the assistance the Soldier is receiv- a unit’s culture and climate. The cli- are doing a great discredit to our Sol- ing and respectively increase their re- mate is defined by the command team diers, their families, the Army and the and will change when leadership siliency. It is a collaborative effort be- nation. By adopting a similar approach changes. The culture is enduring and tween the commander and the provid- to our HoF campaign and creating their inculcated among Soldiers in the unit. er. own HoF METL, leaders at all levels can The culture of an organization is much increase their understanding of their Facilitate rehabilitation or transition. harder to change and will most likely Soldiers and identify any possible high- Our job as commanders is ultimately to survive the turnover of leadership. We risk stressors or activities. What we manage the operational readiness of strive to create not only a positive were able to produce was a compre- our unit. It is our responsibility to command climate but also a positive hensive, quantitative HoF METL we

49 January-February 2014 could use to assess both our Soldiers CPT Keith Eisenberger is associate pro- Surveillance Leader’s Course, Maneu- and organization. We developed a tool fessor of military science and S-3 at ver Captain’s Career Course and Stra- that provides us with an effective way Georgia Military College in Milled- tegic Studies Fellows Program, Chapel to lead our troops safely. Without a geville, GA. He previously served as Hill, NC. He holds a bachelor’s of sci- healthy force, we will never achieve commander of M Troop, 4th Squadron, ence degree from the U.S. Military the operational readiness needed to 3rd Cavalry Regiment, at Fort Hood, TX; Academy at West Point in chemistry. fight and win our nation’s wars. platoon leader, B Troop, 3rd Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment, Fort Bragg, NC; CPT Nick Knepp is a planner in the Our process leaves room to grow. It S-1 / adjutant, Headquarters and Army Capabilities Integration Center, may not be the way, but it is a way we Headquarters Troop, 3-73 Cavalry Reg- Headquarters U.S. Army Training and were able to use to better know our iment; and basic training instructor, E Doctrine Command, Fort Eustis, VA. Soldiers and identify, then mitigate, Company, 1st Battalion, 81st Armored Previous assignments include com- risk in their personal and professional th Brigade, Fort Knox, KY. CPT Eisenberg- mander, Lightning Troop, 4 Squadron, lives. Any unit in the military can take rd er’s military education includes Ma- 3 Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood; ma- our process and adapt it to its own or- neuver Captain’s Career Course, Armor neuver adviser for Military Training ganization. As Chiarelli said, “We must Basic Officer Leader’s Course, Scout Team (MiTT) 10508, Contingency Op- all be vigilant of the perils associated Platoon Leader’s Course, Airborne erating Site Garry Owen, Iraq; and with a stressed force. Leaders at all lev- School and Officer Candidate School. scout platoon leader and tank platoon els must stress accountability. You nd th He holds a bachelor’s of science degree leader, 2 Battalion, 11 Cavalry, Fort must continue to aggressively surveil, from Columbia Southern University in Irwin, CA. CPT Knepp’s military educa- detect and intervene to, first, promote business administration / human-re- tion includes Maneuver Captain’s Ca- health and well-being and then, sec- sources management and a master’s of reer Course, MiTT Adviser Course and ond, reduce the risk to the individual business administration from Trident Armor Officer’s Basic Course. He holds and others.”6 University International in program a bachelor’s of science degree from the The HoF METL development initiative management. He is the recipient of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in has led to reinvigoration of leadership Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal environmental science and is a recipi- skills, validation of our counseling pro- and Sergeant Audie Murphy Award. ent of the Bronze Star. grams and understanding of our Sol- diers. The HoF METL is the tool that al- CPT J.P. Steadman commands Head- quarters and Headquarters Troop lows us to survey, detect and ultimate- th rd Acronym Quick-Scan ly intervene as leaders within our or- (HHT), 4 Squadron, 3 Cavalry Regi- ment, Fort Hood, TX. He previously ganizations. ADP – Army doctrine publication served as commander of K Troop, 4/3 AR – Army regulation Notes Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood; assistant ATN – Army Training Network 1 Army Health Promotion Risk Reduction S-3, HHT, 1st Battalion, 3rd Cavalry Reg- CATS – Combined Arms Training Suicide Prevention Report, 2010 (Red iment, Fort Hood; executive officer, Strategy CMETL – core mission-essential task Book). Company D, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 2 list Frady, K., Suicide Prevention: a Healthy 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort HHT – headquarters and headquar- Force is a Ready Force, Sept. 4, 2012. Benning, GA; scout platoon leader, ters troop 3 Red Book. Headquarters and Headquarters Com- HoF – health of the force 4 METL – mission-essential task list Ibid. pany, 1-15 Infantry; and tank platoon 5 ADP 7-0, Training Units and Developing MiTT – military training team Leaders, August 2012. leader, Company C, 1-15 Infantry. CPT VCSA – Vice Chief of Staff of the Army 6 Establishment of Army Campaign Plan Steadman’s military education includes for Health Promotion and Risk Reduction Air Assault School, Reconnaissance and FY11.

50 January-February 2014 METL Troop Platoon Section Leader Individual

Update platoon sergeant Manage organizational Conduct daily cross-talk Provides updates to (PSG)/platoon leader readiness tracker with Soldier leader (PL) weekly

Execute transparent deconfliction of Update platoon Conduct daily cross-talk Turn in appointment slips appointments with appointment book with Soldier operational schedule

Conduct self- Conduct quarterly health Conduct monthly Conduct daily inspections assessment daily on and welfare inspections inspections living conditions Maintain Constant organizational Update PL/PSG communication and readiness immediately on any physical checks with Report monthly high-/ change to high-/ high-/ Update leader on medium-risk medium-risk Soldiers medium-risk Soldiers changes assessments Weekly interaction with Update high-/medium- high-/medium-risk risk assessment as Soldiers needed Execute Keep clean home/ command Conduct monthly home Conduct weekly home Conduct periodic home barracks authority visits with periodic visits with weekly phone visits/phone calls Provide leadership with weekend phone calls calls available visit times

Educate Soldiers on Engage Soldiers on Brief section periodically Read commander’s select policies according understanding of on commander’s policies policies and procedures to commander’s guidance commander’s policies

Implement Spot-check adherence to Spot-check adherence Spot-check adherence to Ensure actions are command policies policies in daily to policies in daily policies in daily conducted within policies and procedures operations operations operations and procedures Assess effectiveness of Provide feedback of Provide feedback of Provide feedback to first policies and provide policies to PL/PSG policies to section leader line feedback to commander

Engage Soldiers daily to Engage Soldiers daily to Engage Soldiers daily to receive commander’s receive commander’s receive commander’s Ask questions if Communicate vision backbrief (i.e., Do vision backbrief (i.e., Do vision backbrief (i.e., Do guidance is not clear vision and assess they understand?) they understand?) they understand?) comprehension Conduct battlefield Execute training with all Execute training with all Come prepared to train circulation subordinates subordinates

Figure 7. “Execute command authority” HoF METL task. (from HoF organizational brief 2013, 4th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment)

51 January-February 2014 METL Troop Platoon Section Leader Individual

Use meaningful Ensure honesty in all questions rather than Conduct counseling questions Maintain records of all checking the block packet PCC/PCIs, Be proactive when counseling Use open-ended biweekly issues come up in questions to pull out Soldier’s life conversation Execute HoF Keep chain of command command Monitor patterns of Ensure timelines are Bring problem up to aware of Soldiers and control behavior that may updated monthly or as first line so higher can demonstrating problem indicate larger problems needed help behavior

Ensure proper Escort high-risk Soldiers Maintain tasks checklist Build plan-of-action memorandums through separation or for proper separation or for life after completed by chain of medical process medical process separation command

Ensure chain of Update appointment command is tracking tracker no later than Ensure leadership is appointments that 24 hours in advance Ensure Soldiers make all tracking appointments interfere with training scheduled appointments Be proactive in Escort Soldiers to Ensure Soldiers have a and referrals ensuring that referral appointments training calendar highest level of care available for is being provided Provide oversight appointment planning Facilitate of treatment rehabilitation process Ensure tracker is up-to- Ensure chain of date or transition Update troop profile command is up-to-date Keep copy of profile tracker weekly Keep records on when of profile Soldiers and at all times profiles expire appointments

Maintain direct Call provider with Execute battle rhythm Record and keep all communication with questions to ensure checkup with provider information on Soldiers provider contact is maintained

Monthly room Conduct health and Ensure inspections are Ensure cleanliness of inspections by section welfare inspections conducted daily home life leader

Ensure chain of Be prepared to ask Ensure Soldiers Ensure Soldier has command maintains questions and seek understand available access and time status on Soldier/ legal help from chain of legal resources process command and legal Facilitate Escort Soldier through Prepare all personal expeditious and fair Provide knowledgeable Understand Soldier transition process documents and disciplinary process escort for chapters, transition process Proactive, equipment discipline, clearing knowledgeable escort Be proactive

Ensure counseling Provider recommenda- packets support chain of Understand second- tions to troop command- Develop plan-of-action command actions and third-order ers on Uniform Code of and counseling effects of decisions Military Justice Conduct corrective training as required

Figure 8. “Facilitate rehabilitation or transition” HoF METL task. (from HoF organizational brief 2013, 4th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regi- ment)

52 January-February 2014 BATTLE ANALYSIS Reconnaissance and Security Fundamentals at Chancellorsville by CPT Kaleb Blankenship Lincoln relieved Burnside and replaced him with When a reporter was asked why so lit- Hooker, who devised a tle was written about the work done plan to flank Lee’s army by the cavalry during the Civil War, he from the west once warm- said, “They were generally so far to er weather came at a place the front, and so near the enemy, that called The Wilderness it was rather dangerous – and unpleas- near Chancellorsville, VA.6 ant – to be with them.”1 This was cer- The warmer weather and tainly the case for the cavalry and operations for both sides scouts of the Confederate Army of commenced in early May Northern Virginia during the Battle of 1863. Chancellorsville – perhaps more so than during any other engagement of At 5 p.m. May 2, 1863, LTG the Civil War. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson turned to one of During the battle, MG Joseph Hooker, his division commanders, commander of the Union’s Army of the BG Robert E. Rodes, and Potomac, remarked in a telegram to asked, “Are you ready?” MG John J. Peck: “So much is found After Rodes promptly an- out by the enemy in my front ... that I swered, “Yes, sir,” Jackson have concealed my designs from my ordered, “You can go for- own staff.”2 The Confederate cavalry’s ward, then.”7 With that, application of the fundamentals of re- Jackson’s II Corps, com- connaissance and security – in partic- prising nearly 27,000 Con- ular, ensuring continuous reconnais- federates, began advanc- sance, retaining freedom of maneuver ing.8 Jackson’s forces Figure 1. Union MG Joseph Hooker and providing early and accurate warn- clashed with men of the XI Corps, mak- planned to flank Confederate GEN Robert ing – allowed GEN Robert E. Lee’s ing up the right flank of the Army of E. Lee’s army from the west near Chancel- Army of Northern Virginia to defeat a the Potomac, at Talley’s Farm, west of lorsville, VA. (Map from Wikimedia Com- superior force at this famous encoun- Chancellorsville.9 This fatal blow to an mons by Hal Jespersen) ter. unsuspecting enemy was so severe Potomac. The trickery seemed to work Battle of that it sent the Union soldiers retreat- at first, as Reynolds reported that “a ing north back across the Rappahan- demonstration will bring on a general Chancellorsville nock River in the subsequent days. The The American Civil War had been drag- engagement” and Sedgwick concluded Battle of Chancellorsville is known as that “the enemy seems to be in heavy ging on for more than a year and a half Lee’s masterpiece as he, with the help by December 1862. MG Ambrose force in [our] front. ... We are ready for of competent generals like Jackson them.”12 In a note from CPT William L. Burnside, at that time the commander and MG J.E.B. Stuart, with his band of of the Army of the Potomac, launched Candler, one of Hooker’s aides-de- mounted cavalrymen, defeated a force camp, to MG Henry W. Slocum, com- an attack against Lee’s Army of North- nearly double the size of his own.10 ern Virginia across the Rappahannock mander of the XII corps in Chancellors- River in Fredericksburg, VA.3 The Con- Confederate scouts proved invaluable ville, Candler wrote, “The general federates halted the assault and drove to Lee early in the campaign. Hooker [Hooker] desires that not a moment be the Union Soldiers back across the riv- had ordered two corps, under MGs lost until our troops are established at or near Chancellorsville. From that er, but the harsh winter weather made John Sedgwick and John F. Reynolds, 13 it impossible for Lee to counterattack.4 across the Rappahannock just east of moment all will be ours.” The two armies developed an unoffi- Fredericksburg in a feint April 29.11 The Lee, however, had been getting re- cial truce to wait out the winter plan was to make the Confederates ports from the commander of his two months since it was too cold for either think this was the main body of the at- cavalry brigades, Stuart, informing him side to continue offensive operations.5 tack, then surprise them on their left of Hooker’s arrival in Chancellorsville During this time, President Abraham flank with the rest of the Army of the and enemy movements against

53 January-February 2014 Stuart’s operations there.14 Elements of Stuart’s cavalry, COL John R. Cham- bliss’ 13th Virginia, disrupted parts of the Union army’s move south of the Rappahannock River near Brandy Sta- tion, northwest of Chancellorsville. Chambliss’ cavalrymen would fight, displace and fight again for more than five hours. During their engagements, they captured men from each of the three corps Hooker had sent across the river to flank the Confederates from the west.15 Lee concluded in a message to President Jefferson Davis that their “object [is] evidently to turn our left.”16 On the morning of May 1, word came from Stuart to Lee via courier that the enemy was advancing toward Lee’s left flank on the old turnpike and Plank Road.17 Armed with these scouting reports and believing, along with Jack- son, that it would be “inexpedient” to Figure 2. Lee split his forces, part of them remaining near Fredericksburg to counter attack at Fredericksburg, Lee issued Union troops there, while his main army went west to meet Hooker’s main body. Special Orders No. 121, which split his (Map from Wikimedia Commons by Hal Jespersen) army into two parts.18 One division and one brigade (about 10,000 men) would remain near Fredericksburg under command of MG Jubal Early, while the rest of the army went west to check Hooker’s main advance near Chancel- lorsville.19 By the evening of May 1, Hooker had Lee’s entire army between his own two flanks, had him outnumbered two to one, and had more guns and supplies.20 At sunset, Lee and Jackson met on the Plank Road-Furnace Road junc- tion to discuss their plans for the next day.21 They both understood the importance of regaining the initiative if they were to have any hope of success against the superior force, but knew of no way to get it. Finally, Stuart rode up with intelligence from his scouts. Stu- art informed the other two generals that Hooker’s western flank was hang- ing “in the air” with no obstacles protecting it.22 That night, Jackson sent a local reverend with his topographical officer, MAJ Jed Hotchkiss, to locate 23 suitable routes for a flank attack. Figure 3. Confederate troops outflanked Union troops from the west. (Map from Wi- Early May 2, Lee sent Jackson west kimedia Commons by Hal Jespersen) around the enemy’s right flank with al- covered Jackson’s movements by virtually undetected. most 27,000 men, leaving himself only “neutralizing [MG George] Stoneman’s Jackson arranged his divisions careful- 17,000 to face the main front of Hook- ten thousand” with his brigade of Vir- ly for the attack. He put Rodes’ divi- er’s army south of Chancellorsville.24 ginia horsemen.25 This cover allowed sion in the front, followed by BG Ra- The Confederate cavalry continued to Jackson to make a 15-mile circuitous leigh E. Colston and MG A.P. Hill, with prove its worth as BG W.H.F. “Fitz” Lee march around the enemy’s right flank Stuart’s cavalrymen protecting the

54 January-February 2014 corps’ right flank.26 The Confederates when they saw the Confederates come without firing a shot. Union artillery charged east into an unsuspecting XI through the trees to their west.27 The only fired two rounds before being Corps. Union soldiers were cooking 41st and 45th New York regiments, com- overrun.28 Attempts to halt the Con- their dinners and relaxing on bedrolls pletely surprised, turned and ran federate attack proved futile. Within an hour and a half, Jackson’s men drove the XI Corps more than a mile from its original position and were within two miles of Hooker’s headquarters.29 The assault halted around 9 p.m. as both sides reformed their lines. Jack- son used this time to reconnoiter the newly formed Union line to identify a weak spot on which to concentrate his next assault. Unfortunately, Jackson was mortally wounded by gunfire from his own men during this reconnaissance – it would be up to Stuart to as- sume command and continue the attack.30 Stuart initiated the second wave of attacks early on the morning of May 3 to take two pieces of key terrain just west of Chancellorsville: Hazel Grove and Fairview Knoll. Capturing these pieces of terrain would link the right flank of Stuart’s forces with the left flank of the rest of the Army of Northern Vir- Figure 4. In the center of the three red arrows (indicating Confederate troops) on the ginia.31 Although costly, the fight al- map’s left are Hazel Grove and Fairview Knoll (Hill). Capturing them united Stuart’s lowed the Confederates to drive the forces with the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia. (Map from Wikimedia Commons Union back and reunite the flanks of by Hal Jespersen) the Army of Northern Virginia, forcing Hooker to take up defensive positions between Chancellorsville and the Rap- pahannock.32 Realizing the extent to which his forces had been surprised and overrun, Hooker ordered his army to abandon Chancellorsville on the night of May 4.33 Less than 36 hours later, the last Union soldiers crossed back to the north side of the Rappahannock via the U.S. Ford. The Battle of Chancel- lorsville ended, claiming the lives of more than 17,000 Union soldiers and nearly 13,000 Confederates.34 Application to contemporary doctrine Understanding how the Confederate commanders recognized and accomplished their tactical requirements helps us learn more about our contemporary doctrine. According to Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-90, the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security are the following: Figure 5. Hooker’s forces (in blue) fell into defensive actions between Chancellors- ensure continuous reconnaissance; do ville and the Rappahannock River. (Map from Wikimedia Commons by Hal Jespersen) not keep reconnaissance assets in

55 January-February 2014 understand the enemy’s course of action and react to regain the initiative. The Confederate cavalry’s success at Chancellorsville was also based on its retention of freedom of maneuver throughout the campaign. Retaining freedom of maneuver means to maintain battlefield mobility by not becoming decisively engaged with the enemy, at which point reconnaissance stops and the fight to survive begins.37 Chambliss’ men retained freedom of maneuver by fighting small elements of the Union Army, then displacing. Had they not done this, they would have likely met certain defeat against an enemy more than six times their size. By not becoming decisively engaged, yet still continuing to fight for information, the scouts were able to further develop the situation by capturing men from different corps of the Army of the Potomac. This helped the Confederate leadership understand Figure 6. From May 4-6, Hooker’s Union troops retreated across the Rappahannock just how many units Hooker had sent (Map River, giving the Confederacy a decisive victory at the Battle of Chancellorsville. toward their western flank. from Wikimedia Commons by Hal Jespersen) Their retention of freedom of maneu- reserve; orient on the reconnaissance erates from their left. ver also allowed Stuart’s troopers to objective; report information rapidly The second instance in which the Con- covertly identify the weakest point in and accurately; retain freedom of ma- federate scouts demonstrated their the enemy’s defense. Undoubtedly, neuver; gain and maintain enemy con- understanding of ensuring continuous the scouts had to reconnoiter multiple tact; develop the situation rapidly; reconnaissance was on the evening of points across the breadth of the Union provide early and accurate warning; May 1, when they discovered the en- army’s front. Maintaining battlefield and provide reaction time and maneu- emy’s right flank was weak with no ob- mobility enabled them to accomplish ver space.35 At the Battle of Chancel- stacles protecting it. After determining this without being destroyed and cost- lorsville, the Confederate cavalry ing Lee his greatest asset of the battle. scouts most notably practiced three of the location, composition and disposi- these fundamentals by ensuring con- tion of the enemy, Stuart’s cavalrymen Stuart’s men also assisted other ele- tinuous reconnaissance, retaining did not stop. Instead, they continued ments in retaining freedom of maneu- freedom of maneuver and providing their reconnaissance to identify weak ver. Lee understood that for Jackson’s early and accurate warning. spots in the enemy’s defensive posi- flank attack to be successful, his forc- tions against which to conduct an ates had to be able to move undetected Continuous reconnaissance is the on- tack. Their perseverance proved in- to the enemy’s western flank. There- going collection of information about valuable, as it led to intelligence that fore, he ordered the cavalry to cover the enemy and terrain that supports shaped Lee’s plan and ultimately de- their enveloping march. This cover by the unit’s attempt to determine the cided the battle’s outcome. the Confederate mounted forces al- enemy’s course of action.36 There are Lastly, once the cavalry identified the lowed Jackson to retain freedom of three examples from the Battle of maneuver and preserve combat power Chancellorsville that prove the Con- weak spot and Lee developed the scheme of maneuver, the Confeder- by not becoming prematurely decisive- federates understood the concept of ly engaged with the enemy, resulting conducting continuous reconnais- ates still continued to conduct reconnaissance. By commissioning Hotchkiss in achieving complete surprise on the sance. The first occasion occurred men of Hooker’s XI Corps. April 29 when Stuart’s men discovered and a resident of Chancellorsville to elements of the Union army advancing conduct a route reconnaissance, Jack- Had the Confederate scouts not pro- west toward Chancellorsville from son was able to confirm the feasibility vided early and accurate warning, Fredericksburg. Because they were ac- of his tentative scheme of maneuver their continuous reconnaissance and tively conducting reconnaissance to flank the enemy. The Army of retention of freedom of maneuver against the enemy, the Confederate Northern Virginia’s adherence to the could have all been for nothing. This scouts were able to discover Hooker’s fundamental of continuous reconnais- historical account is filled with exam- true scheme of maneuver: to feint in sance throughout the Battle of Chan- ples of the Confederate cavalry provid- Fredericksburg and flank the Confed- cellorsville allowed it to successfully ing early and accurate warning to Lee.

56 January-February 2014 Providing early and accurate warning through its application of reconnais- weak flank and maintain a rapid tem- is accomplished by detecting the ene- sance and security fundamentals, al- po. Planning for security operations, my quickly and reporting accurate in- lowing the Army of Northern Virginia conducted by formations trained and formation to the main-body com- to win one of the most famous upsets equipped to conduct them, can pay mander.38 Lee was able to determine in history and set the conditions for huge dividends for the main body at Hooker’s intention of flanking the Con- the most iconic battle of the Civil War: the decisive point of an operation. federates from the left because of the Gettysburg. The Battle of Chancellorsville provides reports he was receiving from his The Confederate account at Chancel- insights into the timeless dynamic na- scouts early in the campaign. Lee re- lorsville highlights the significance of ture of reconnaissance and security ceived these reports early enough to conducting reconnaissance and secu- operations. As Lee had in the veteran issue Special Orders No. 121 to redi- rity operations. It demonstrates the scouts under Stuart’s leadership, cav- rect his forces and prevent an enemy paramount importance of conducting alry operations require tactical spe- envelopment of their positions. The reconnaissance as a prelude to offen- cialists specifically trained, equipped, course of the battle over the next sev- sive operations to allow commanders experienced and organized to provide eral days proved the accuracy of the to “see first, understand first, act first reconnaissance and security capabili- reports as well. and finish decisively.”41 Reconnais- ties to the commander. This cannot be The cavalry again demonstrated its sance, conducted by specifically accomplished by simply assigning a proficiency with providing early and trained and organized forces, empow- tactical enabling task to any maneuver accurate warning on the evening of ered by the exercise of mission com- unit in the formation. Chancellorsville, May 1, when Stuart informed Lee of mand, is just as important on modern among other Civil War battles, was ex- the enemy’s weak western flank. De- battlefields as it was at Chancellors- tremely symmetrical for the senior spite having to be sent through multi- ville in 1863. While aviation, indirect commanders. Officers from each side ple echelons of command before fires and surveillance technology com- went to the same schools and under- reaching Stuart and, ultimately, Lee, plement reconnaissance capabilities stood the same doctrine. Soldier train- the reports arrived in time for Lee to today, digital sensors cannot replace ing was the same. The formations used send Jackson on his famous 15-mile an individual Soldier’s ability to adapt were the same. Each army was orga- march around the Union army’s west- to rapidly changing situations on the nized the same. The primary variable ern flank. Rodes, Jackson’s lead divi- ground and fight for information to un- that allowed the Confederates to out- sion commander, soon found out the derstand the enemy’s intent. Without maneuver their numerically superior accuracy of the reports as he was able such reconnaissance, commanders fall enemy was their adaptation and use of to roll up the entire Army of the Po- prey to an overreliance on conducting reconnaissance and security elements tomac from its right flank and send it movements-to-contact instead of us- to develop the situation. fleeing back across the Rappahannock. ing cavalry to disrupt the enemy’s de- Uncertainty about the enemy cannot The ability of junior scouts to commu- cision-making cycle and shape the bat- be eliminated through analysis (intel- nicate effectively by recognizing and tlefield to fight under more favorable ligence preparation of the battlefield) prioritizing what information was im- conditions. and detailed planning alone. Leaders portant for higher commanders to Furthermore, this account exemplifies must be able to adapt to changing con- make a decision and then ensuring it the significance of preserving combat ditions during execution, united by a was delivered in time for decisions to power through security operations common purpose and understanding be made and orders issued was para- conducted by units other than the of enemy capabilities. Although to- mount to the Confederates’ success. main-body protected force. If com- day’s battlefields may not call for large Perhaps the best summation of the manders do not have designated secu- cavalry formations as they did during role the Confederate cavalry played at rity elements, they must decide to ei- the Civil War due to technological ad- Chancellorsville was written by Union ther forgo security operations entirely vances in communication, mobility MG John Dix in a telegram to Peck May or divert combat power from the main and firepower, they do call for mental- 1, 1863, in which he concluded, body to protect the rest of the force, ly agile leaders capable of adapting “Among the many marvels of this war thus affecting their ability to mass the tactical fundamentals to rapidly chang- are the impossibility on our own part effects of combat power and finish de- ing situations against a competitive of getting information as to the enemy cisively. Security operations enable enemy. and the facility with which he ascer- the attainment of other operational tains everything as to us.”39 Seeing the fundamentals by the protected force CPT Kaleb Blankenship is a student in important role the cavalry played at – such as the fundamentals of the of- the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course Chancellorsville, Lee wrote a note to fense at Chancellorsville. Using the at Fort Benning, GA. Previous assign- Davis May 7 asserting that “unless we cavalry to cover Jackson’s move to the ments include troop tactics officer, L th can increase the cavalry attached to enemy’s flank enabled him to surprise Troop, 2-16 Cavalry, 316 Cavalry Bri- this army, we shall constantly be sub- the enemy from the west. Also, provid- gade, Fort Benning; and tank platoon ject to aggressive expeditions of the ing flank security during Jackson’s as- leader, scout platoon leader and com- nd enemy. ...”40 The Confederate cavalry sault allowed him to concentrate the pany executive officer, 1-5 Cavalry, 2 st demonstrated its immeasurable value effects of his forces on the enemy’s Brigade Combat Team, 1 Cavalry Di- vision, Fort Hood, TX. He is a graduate

57 January-February 2014 of the Armor Basic Officer Leader 7 Furgurson, Ernest B., Chancellorsville 28 Ibid. Course, Fort Knox, KY; Army Reconnais- 1863: The Souls of the Brave, New York: 29 Ibid. sance Course, Fort Knox; Pathfinder Vintage Books, 1992. 30 Ibid. 8 31 School, Fort Benning; and Cavalry Hamlin, Augustus Choate, The Battle of Cullen, Joseph P., The Battle of Chan- Leader’s Course, Fort Benning. He Chancellorsville, Bangor: Augustus Cho- cellorsville, Harrisburg: Easter Acorn ate Hamlin, 1896. Press, 1968. holds a bachelor’s of science degree 9 Ibid. 32 Ibid. from the U.S. Military Academy in po- 10 Ibid. 33 Smith. litical science, with a minor in terror- 11 Long, A.L., Memoirs of Robert E. Lee: 34 Cullen. ism studies. His Military and Personal History, New 35 ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense, York: J.M. Stoddart & Company, 1887. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Depart- Notes 12 Furgurson. ment of the Army, 2012. 1 Blakeman, A. Noel, ed., Personal Recol- 13 OR. 36 Army Techniques and Procedures lections of the War of Rebellion: Ad- 14 Long. 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, Wash- dresses Delivered Before the Command- 15 Longacre, Edward G., Lee’s Cavalry- ington, DC: Headquarters, Department of ery of the State of New York, Military men: A History of the Mounted Forces of the Army, 2013. Order of the Loyal Legion of the United the Army of Northern Virginia, 1861- 37 Ibid. States, No. 2, New York: G.P. Putnam’s 1865, Norman: University of Oklahoma 38 Ibid. Sons, 1897. Press, 2012. 39 OR. 2 The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of 16 OR. 40 Ibid. the Official Records of the Union and 17 Long. 41 Rosenberger, John D., “Breaking the Sa- Confederate Armies, Ser. 1, 25 (2), Wash- 18 Furgurson. ber: The Subtle Demise of Cavalry in the ington: Government Printing Office, 19 Ibid. Future Force,” Association of the United 1880-1901; book on-line at http://cdl.li- 20 Ibid. States Army Landpower Essay Series No. brary.cornell.edu/moa/browse.mono- 21 Ibid. 04-1, The Institute of Land Warfare, graphs/waro.html, accessed Jan. 20, 22 Ibid. 2004. 2014; hereafter cited as OR. 23 Martin, David G., The Chancellorsville 3 Smith, Carl, Chancellorsville 1863: Jack- Campaign: March-May 1863, Con- son’s Lightning Strike, Oxford: Osprey shohocken: Combined Books, Inc., 1991. Acronym Quick-Scan Publishing, 1998. 24 Long. 4 Ibid. 25 Ibid. ADRP – Army doctrine reference 5 Ibid. 26 Smith. publication 6 Ibid. 27 Ibid.

58 January-February 2014 REVIEWS

material by writing, “Comparing, to Marine MG Holland M. Smith’s atti- Pacific Blitzkrieg: World War II in the the greatest degree possible, similar tude following the 1943 invasion of Central Pacific by Sharon Tosi Lacey. events, functions and outcomes, in Tarawa and Makin islands, Lacey Denton, Texas: University of North various engagements over a three- comments that Smith “never saw this Texas Press, 2013, ISBN 978-1-57441- year period requires a certain degree difference in outlooks as one of doc- 525-4, 282 pages, $27.95. of analytical standardization.” To this trine. Instead, what the army consid- end, each chapter is identically struc- ered a prudent approach to combat, The United States successfully con- tured and contains a brief introduc- he viewed as cowardice and indeci- ducted global warfare in World War II. tory review of worldwide events fol- sion.” Yet, wiser and more adaptable Yet, it began the effort, in the words lowed by a discussion of the strategic leaders by 1944 “managed to fuse to- of historian Martin Blumenson, “in a setting, operational planning, pre- gether a truly joint team that was hasty, largely improvised, almost cha- combat training, review of the units able to overcome interservice issues otic and painfully inadequate manner.” involved, the operation itself, enemy for the good of the mission.” Moving from that state of affairs to action, landing operations, battle one that witnessed total victory was summary and an analysis section. Lacey’s even-handed analysis of the the result of an evolutionary process The analysis section includes an ex- leadership styles of corps and divi- involving dynamic leadership, opera- amination of the planning, intelli- sion commanders who “demonstrat- tional brilliance and tactical suprema- gence, training, casualties and com- ed a genius for pragmatism that was cy. Commanders initially faced an al- manders. The final two sections pro- to drive their forces to victory” most insurmountable series of tasks in vide lessons-learned and effects on makes this book a fast-reading, fasci- the Pacific Theater of Operations. How future operations. By using this sys- nating view of the development of they met the challenges by developing tematic format, the contribution joint operations. Her clear under- division-level organizations, mastering each of the five battles made to final standing of both enemy and friendly the art of amphibious warfare and re- victory can be more fully appreciat- tactics and techniques, coupled with solving interservice cultural differenc- ed. Footnotes, a detailed bibliogra- a thorough examination of weapons es is the subject of Dr. Sharon Tosi Lac- phy, photos and maps will further en- and training procedures, augment Pacific Blitzkrieg: World War II in ey’s hance the value of the book to joint- her conclusion that after the passage the Central Pacific . force maneuver commanders. of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Reor- The book examines the five major ganization Act, “the army and marine The process of creating and employ- corps had finally seen the fruits of Central Pacific battles in which both ing a joint force to defeat the Japa- Army and Marine units participated. the small vine planted on the shores nese was not without growing pains. of Guadalcanal [70] years ago.” This These were the battle of Guadalca- There were “service cultural book is an enthralling and important nal, the invasions of Tarawa and Ma- difference[s]” which hindered the re- account of the development of joint kin in the Gilbert Islands, the struggle alization of a seamless fighting force operations. As such, it will appeal to for Kwajalein and Roi-Namur in the striving to achieve a common goal. anyone involved in interservice coop- Marshall Islands, the conquest of the There were members of both the erative ventures. Marianas island of Saipan and the Army and the Marines who were fight for the island of Okinawa. combative and uncooperative with D.J. JUDGE Lacey explains her organization of each other. For example, writing on COL, U.S. Army (retired)

59 January-February 2014 alry Re av gim h C e t n 8 t

•H • O GE NO RA R•AND•COU

The 8th Cavalry Regiment was constituted July 20, 1866, in the Regular Army. Orga- nized Sept. 21, 1866, at Angel Island, CA, and assigned to 15th Cavalry Division De- cember 1917 through May 1918, the unit was then assigned to 1st Cavalry Division Sept. 13, 1921. The distinctive insignia consists of the principal charges and motto of the coat of arms. The eight mullets show the regimental number and cavalry tradition of the pierced mullet to the rowel of a spur. This is further indicated by the horse. PB 17-14-1 Headquarters, Department of the Army. October-DecemberPIN 104001-000 2013 Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.61