“SPEARHEAD”

PB 17-01-2 March-April 2001 Saddle Up... Tonight We Ride

“Daigle, stop! I can’t take it anymore! Shut your pie hole 7) Firing weapons. Hard to beat the testosterone rush, and and quit complaining! You are killing me with all that inces- if you enjoy it, you can always bolo and get more free sant whining . . . .” So go the unsolicited comments (minus ammo. numerous four-letter modifiers) of one MAJ Rex Awesome, 6) The “Star Spangled Banner” before movies. Don’t know a former drinking partner and self-described “Tanker Extra- how this got started, but like the Pledge of Allegiance in ordinaire.” Awesome takes issue with the tone and tenor of schools, it’s a damn good idea. my ramblings in Saddle Up . . . Tonight We Ride. The gist of Awesome’s no-so-eloquent comments focus on my fault- 5) Mess halls. Yeah, I know we call them dining facilities finding in recent columns. now, but they will always be mess halls to me. Simply said, if there is a better breakfast deal around, I haven’t found it Awesome’s verbal assault came during a work day; I was yet. busily engaged with important magazine editor stuff (Don’t ask. I still can’t explain it to my kids). His tirade caught me 4) TDYs and going to the field. Sometimes ya’ just gotta get off guard, and my response was typical of a 6-year-old: away from the wife and kids. (Trust me, they feel the same). “That’s what you think!” 3) Beer calls on Friday after work. No one brings Palm Pi- “Why don’t you write about some of the good stuff going lots and watches the stock market tickers; we trade for cool on out there?” challenged Awesome. Class IX stuff. “Why don’t you?” I reply, always quick with the snappy 2) Army kids. Ya can’t beat ’em. Moving every two or three repartee. years and leaving your buddies can’t be easy, but our kids do it well. Doing without a mom or dad for a long time ain’t “Done,” says Awesome, “I’ll write your damn column!” easy either. Army kids face this challenge all the time and Rex Awesome Weighs In: It’s damn easy to complain thrive. and snivel; too many people occupy themselves doing it for 1) Not working for a living. Coming out of college with a my liking. I suffer fools better than I suffer whiners. Simply degree in drinking, the last thing I wanted to do was work for don’t have time to listen to them bitch and complain, and a living, and the Army has allowed me to avoid that for a quite frankly, they make me puke! Let’s talk about some long time. Yeah, I don’t like being away from my wife and things that are right with the Army for a change! kids sometimes, and not all the Army stuff is fun, but I My Top Ten “Good” things about the Army follow: wouldn’t trade it for a wearing a suit and working in the cor- porate world — that’ll come soon enough. Don’t believe 10) Dress blues at a civilian wedding. Who needs to rent a me? Go to a party sometime with your civilian friends and tux? watch the crowd as Big Ed tells his compelling tale of that 9) Physical fitness. Check out your old high school buddies sales presentation in Topeka. Compare that to the reaction at the next reunion, but watch for flying harpoons. you get when someone asks you about putting steel through targets, or what Kosovo was like. 8) Unit coins. Beats the hell out of a pocket full of business cards. Rex — Out!

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI JOEL B. HUDSON General, United States Army Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Staff Secretary of the Army 0100406

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-01-2

Editor-in-Chief Features MAJ DAVE DAIGLE 6 The Expert Armor Badge: How It Might Work by CPT Rick Johnson and SFC Michael Carew Managing Editor JON T. CLEMENS 8 Armor, Cavalry, and Transformation: “New” Cavalry for the Interim Force by COL Kevin C.M. Benson and LTC (P) Dana J.H. Pittard Commandant MG B. B. BELL 12 Deployable Versus Survivable by SFC Ira L. Partridge 15 Cavalry Operations in MOUT ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- by CPT Scott Schenking monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 18 An American Weapon for the 21st Century Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121. by MAJ Robert Bateman Disclaimer: The information contained in AR- MOR represents the professional opinions of 23 The Three Tank Platoon, A Consideration For Army XXI the authors and does not necessarily reflect by MAJ Kevin D. Stringer and MAJ D. André Hall the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information 25 Redefining the Role of the Command Sergeant Major presented in other official Army publications. in a Tactical Environment by CSM James L. DePriest and COL Oscar R. Anderson Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored 27 Developmental Testing of Combat Vehicles cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion by John McFassel headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head- quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquar- 32 Hold At All Cost ters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, 24 hours on the Golan Front during the October War of 1973 and motorized brigade headquarters of the by MAJ Michael D. Wickman United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM 37 The Field Problem Review Board staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organiza- 38 Enter the Gauntlet tions, and the training of personnel for such The Armor School Is Transforming How We Train Our Combat Leaders organizations may request two copies by by 2LT Humayun S. Khan sending a request to the editor-in-chief. 40 ARMOR Magazine to Move Across Post Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only by Jon Clemens, Managing Editor those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency 44 Are You Fast With a “God Gun”??? includes: all armored, direct-fire ground com- bat systems that do not serve primarily as 47 Some Road Wheels Defective; Most Failed from Wear, Neglect infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively 52 2001 Armor Conference and Armor Trainer Update Schedule in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equip- 53 2001 Armor Conference: “The Armor/Mechanized Legacy Force: ment which armor and armored cavalry or- Dominating Maneuver Warfare through 2015” ganizations use exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF- 19-series enlisted soldiers; and information Departments About the Cover concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units 2 Points of Contact This issue’s cover is a new painting by at the brigade/regiment level and below, to 3 Letters Jody Harmon, entitled “Spearhead.” include Threat units at those levels. The U.S. Armor Association will soon 5 Commander’s Hatch make the painting available as a print. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is 48 Reviews given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-ARM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. USPS 467-970 March-April 2001, Vol. CX, No. 2

DSN prefix – 464- Points of Contact Commercial prefix– (502) 624-

ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. Army Armor Center

Editor-in-Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG) MAJ Dave Daigle 2249 MG B. B. Bell 2121 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]

Managing Editor Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG) Jon T. Clemens 2249 BG Terry Tucker 7555 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) Editor COL George Edwards 1101 Vivian Oertle 2610 E-Mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) Staff Illustrator CSM Carl E. Christian 4952 Mr. Jody Harmon 2610 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Directorate of Force Development (ATZK-FD) COL Joe Hughes 5050 E-Mail: [email protected] Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Battle Lab (ATZK-MW) COL Dennis J. Szydloski 7809 ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in E-Mail: [email protected] editing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or printed out double-spaced, with a 3½-inch disk in Microsoft Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) Word, WordPerfect, WordStar, Rich Text Format, or ASCII (please Aubrey Henley 1272 indicate wordprocessing format on disk or cover letter). Tape E-Mail: [email protected] FAX 7585 captions to any illustrations or photos submitted. Additionally, we can receive articles as e-mail or attachments at: Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) COL Randal Milling 1315 [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS) SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per COL James H. Nunn 7955 issue, we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and E-Mail: [email protected] accepted for publication by, other Army journals. Please submit your article to only one Army journal at a time. TRADOC System Manager for Force XXI (ATZK-XXI) COL Brett H. Weaver 4009 GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We prefer conventional photo prints, E-Mail: [email protected] but will accept electronic graphic and photo files. If you use Assistant TRADOC System Manager PowerPoint, please save each illustration as a separate file. Try to Soldier - Mounted Warrior (ATZK-ATS) avoid the use of excessive color and shading. (Please do not send LTC J. B. Iddins 3519 photos embedded in PowerPoint.) If you have any questions E-Mail: [email protected] concerning electronic art or photo submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above. Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (ATZK-TD) COL Matthew L. Smith 8247 CHANGE OF ADDRESS-PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS/ST. E-Mail: [email protected] GEORGE-ST. JOAN AWARDS: For paid subscription service, address changes, and delivery problems, or for awards information, contact Connie Stiggers, United States Armor U.S. Army Armor School Association, P.O. Box 607, Ft. Knox, KY 40121; E-Mail: [email protected]; phone (502) 942-8624; or FAX (502) 942- Director, Armor School (ATSB-DAS) 6219. You can also access the Association through their website at: COL Robert T. Gahagan 1050 www.usarmor-assn.org. E-Mail: [email protected] UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery Armor School Sergeant Major (ATSB-CSM) problems or changes of unit address, phone DSN 464-2610; com- CSM Terrance McWilliams 7091 mercial: (502) 624-2610. Requests to be added to the free dis- E-Mail: [email protected] tribution list should be in the form of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief. NCO Academy (ATSB-NC) EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK- CSM James E. Dale 5150 ARM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210. E-Mail: [email protected] 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATSB-SBZ) ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine COL John Antal 7848 website at the following address: www.knox.army.mil/armormag. E-Mail: [email protected] ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 1st Armor Training Brigade (ATSB-BAZ) 24-hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning COL William J. Blankmeyer 8736 doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment of the Armor Force. E-Mail: [email protected]

2 ARMOR — March-April 2001

Canister Round Is Long Overdue; proponents every success. Nothing is ever The facts of this matter are that, after its HEP and HESH Would Also Help certain in this business, but approval of that survey of the Fort Polk MPRC, 1st Battalion, ORD ought to be a no-brainer. (Funding is of 156th AR, of the Louisiana ARNG did submit course another matter.) issues for doctrinal clarification to Fort Knox, Dear Sir: specifically the inability of the MPRC at Fort I was the Project Manager, Tank Main Ar- Polk to execute certain engagements on TT I enjoyed the update on the effort to pro- mament Systems (PM TMAS) who devel- cure a suitable APERS round for the 120mm VIII. One task was the A4 (long-range mov- oped the U.S. 120mm ammo family. I think ing target), which could not be executed to cannon (“Proposed 120mm Tank Round it’s worth stressing two points: Would Regain Antipersonnel Capability,” the range-to-target standard. The issues ARMOR, Nov-Dec 2000). The requirement • We could easily have developed a were reviewed, and guidance provided, by for a 120mm APERS round has been ig- 120mm canister round and fielded it with the Platoon Gunnery Branch of the Directorate nored for too long. I do not agree, however, M1A1. Compared to... KE and HEAT, canis- of Training Doctrine Development (DTDD) with LTC Pride’s insinuation that a pre- ter would have been a piece of cake, and if here at Fort Knox, not the Master Gunner 120mm armed tank was not “envisioned as a piggybacked on those programs would have Branch. DTDD’s Platoon Gunnery Branch tank killer on the open, rolling terrain of been quite inexpensive. reviewed the issues and responded with a Europe.” This leads you to believe that the • common sense approach. Platoon Gunnery 120mm canister didn’t just slip through a Branch’s findings stated that if an MPRC M60-series (and also the original M1) tanks crack. Not developing and fielding such a carried a full array of 105mm rounds on cannot support a specific task, then the unit round was a deliberately taken, strongly held should execute the task as closely as possi- board, and that these tanks were not primar- user decision. ily tank killers. Even though each M60A3 in ble to the established standard. In this case, my platoon (3-12 Cav, 3AD) carried a full 56 The Armor user of that time was wedded to the A4 engagement was fired several hun- rounds, all we carried were Sabot and a two-round family, then and forever; there dred meters short of range-to-target stan- HEAT. The mission was the same, no matter would never, ever be a need for any third dard. what platform: destroy enemy armor. Table round. This was driven partly by the severe Many units faced a similar dilemma when VIII has not changed significantly since then, reduction (56 vs 40 rounds. – Ed) in basic the current Tank Gunnery Tables were pub- either. load in going from 105mm to 120mm, but lished in FM 17-12-1-2, in May ’98. But one also by a very closed mindset about the has to realize that the current TT VIII and USFK, and the rest of the Armor force, has future of armored warfare. Tank Gunnery Tables were not developed always had a need for an anti-personnel with a specific range or MPRC in mind. The munition. Army transformation and the At that time, the user wouldn’t have ac- tables were designed to develop and test the changing operational environment have little cepted canister if it came for free, hand- proficiency of specific combat skills and tank to do with the requirement for APERS, as the delivered by the Jennifer Lopez of the time- gunnery techniques, not a unit’s ability to requirement has existed as long as the tank frame. execute the tasks on a particular range. (or the cast-iron cannon) was confronted At the risk of belaboring the obvious, I hope with infantry. those responsible for Transformation con- The purpose of the Master Gunner Branch On a larger subject, the lack of special template this lesson and others like it. Deci- is to train master gunners for the Armor munitions makes the M1A1 inferior to the sions based on a point-solution view of the Force, and the business of Platoon Gunnery 105mm M1 (or M60) in the infantry support battlefield foreclose options, and we can ill Branch is to write doctrine for the Armor role. Urban warfare is a constant threat that afford an inflexible mounted force, optimized Force. However, both the Master Gunner we are not well-prepared for. The 120mm on restrictive terrain sets and on one or two Branch and Platoon Gunnery Branch are HEAT round, while having excellent anti- parameters only. constantly queried for clarification or inter- armor characteristics, has limited anti- pretation of existing doctrine. In most cases, Keep up the great work! personnel and anti-materiel capability due these clarifications and answers are tem- to the shaped-charge warhead. A simple pered by the common sense of a master COL (RET.) DAVID A. APPLING gunner here at Fort Knox who is asked to do 120mm HE round, like the M393 105mm 2d PM TMAS HEP (high explosive plastic) or HESH (high the job of the unit asking the question. Nei- explosive squash head), would be much ther the Master Gunner Branch nor Platoon more useful and probably cheaper to pro- Gunnery Branch is in the business of giving Range Suitability Should Be a “TT VIII certification nod” to any MPRC. It duce than the MPAT and other “smart” Responsibility of Unit’s Personnel rounds. would be impossible for any unit or agency on Fort Knox to “certify” each MPRC for all While we’re at it, how about designing a Dear Sir: the various ways that the Tank Gunnery 120mm incendiary round as well? Tables could be conducted on particular In the article “Fighting the IDT Tank Table ranges. This action would also take away the One last suggestion for a new APERS VIII: A National Guard Unit’s Solution” (Nov- flexibility of the unit as to how it executes round — best to put a fuze on it to allow Dec 2000), MAJ Pryor implies the Master training. long-range engagements. It will be a more Gunner Branch at Fort Knox is in the busi- flexible munition in the field, and it will be ness of certifying how units conduct TT VIII Units that have an MPRC or range that is safer to fire over friendly positions. Other- on MPRC’s. Specifically, he wrote that they unable to meet current doctrinal standards wise, it is only good as a “last-ditch” defense. had submitted findings of an analysis of the should address this issue to the Army Train- ing Support Center (ATSC) at Fort Eustis. CHRIS GINTHER MPRC at Fort Polk “to the Master Gunner ATSC cannot provide an overnight fix, but Washington, D.C. Branch at Fort Knox,” and that after review- can work to develop a solution. Several fac- ing this information, a “TT VIII certification nod for the Fort Polk MPRC” was issued. tors will determine whether this solution is a M1 Ammo Planner Says Users These statements are not totally factual, and range upgrade or new range. Units are not Wanted Only Two Types of Round imply something that the Master Gunner expected to train without training resources, Branch does not do. These statements also and ranges are required to conduct tank gunnery. Remember, problems that are not Dear Sir: imply that the unit was not qualified to make its own decision on how doctrine should be addressed remain problems. Kudos on the great article by LTC Dave applied to its training, and debases the abili- MAJ Pryor’s article details well how his unit Pride on the proposed 120mm canister ties of the unit master gunner and com- tackled the difficult task of conducting Tank round (ARMOR, Nov-Dec 2000). I wish the mander. Gunnery Qualification with the additional ob- ARMOR — March-April 2001 3

stacles encountered by National Guard units. to use extendible optics masts, allowing the ough look at our teaching methods and our Certification or validation of any MPRC’s vehicles to scan for targets from a hide posi- doctrine, both of which are under way at the ability to execute TT VIII, or any other Tank tion with a very small signature. Maybe we MI school. As much as I admire Forrest Gunnery Table, to standard should be the should take some lessons from the Germans Davis, quoted by the authors, my answer to decision of the unit’s commander. The unit as we go into our Future Scout Vehicle de- the question asked in his own 1997 article, master gunner should determine the perti- velopment. “Predictive Intelligence: Do We Really Need nent issues, and advise the commander It?”, is yes. Without it, we either wait inter- accordingly. To relegate this certification or And for those readers who say “Buy Ameri- minably for near-perfect recon or plan, pre- validation to anyone else will undermine the can,” remember where the business end of pare and execute without any idea what the the M1A1 and A2 came from. competency of that unit master gunner and future holds. commander. CPT ERIC WISHART LTC JON CLEAVES HHT Commander Senior Military Analyst The Master Gunner Branch has and will 1/221st Cavalry (NVARNG) Threat Support Directorate continue to train each student to the high standards of the Master Gunner Program. Every graduate is capable of providing highly Predictive Intelligence: It May Be Desert Uniform “Floppy Hat” technical training to his unit, and making Difficult, But It’s Not Impossible A Better Choice Than Berets recommendations to the commander on how to conduct training. Additionally, Platoon Dear Sir: Gunnery Branch will continue to write doc- Dear Sir: trine that enables American tank crews to I am greatly concerned by one of the con- I am interested in the beret debate, even remain the most lethal in the world. The clusions reached by MAJ Deal and CPT though I retire in June of 2001. I agree with decision on how doctrine applies and how Carter in their article: "Surrendering the Ini- Leonard Wright's comment about berets training is executed should be the decision of tiative: A Command Decision" in ARMOR, giving no protection from the sun or other the unit commander, with advice from his Jan-Feb 2001. They said “...that predicting elements. Skin cancer IS on the rise from master gunner, not an agency external to the enemy actions and intentions is highly spec- ozone depletion, as statistics bear out. I offer unit. ulative and cannot even begin to be accom- another alternative to the pith helmet, how- SFC IRA L. PARTRIDGE plished until thorough reconnaissance is ever. The floppy hat like the one we wear conducted.” Operations NCO with desert fatigues, but in BDU camo pat- Master Gunner Branch To be sure, everyone would like a world tern. Here's a hat that you can throw in your Fort Knox, Ky. where “thorough reconnaissance” can be duffel bag and it comes out looking fine. It conducted of everything before every battle. provides 360 degree sun/element protection That is not our world. Predictive intelligence and also keeps the sun out of your EYES (no Bradley’s Are Too Big to Solve is hard, no question. Perhaps the authors small consideration when aiming a weapon Light Cavalry’s Need for Optics have witnessed their share of failures in or doing any other critical task requiring vi- prediction. However, just because a thing is sion). Another advantage: The elite forces Dear Sir: difficult does not in and of itself warrant its get their well-deserved exclusive symbol I thought SFC Belonus’ article was innova- removal as a desired function. Using that back. I know we want to promote one Army, tive and addressed the major shortfall in the logic, the number of failures in battle plan- but this is not the way to do that. Are we light cavalry scout platoon – its ability to ning that occur at our training centers would going to give everyone the Congressional Medal of Honor too? acquire the enemy with limited optics. How- call for the removal of maneuver tactics from ever, I feel the Bradley CFV is the wrong our kit bag. SFC TOM SMITH direction to go as an interim improvement. I've been teaching Army soldiers how to do A Co 2-358 AR This adds a 30-ton vehicle that has a large predictive intel for many years now, including Ft. Lewis, Wash. signature and limited deployability on the three at Ft. Irwin, and I could not agree more battlefield for the advantage of ATGM capa- with the level of difficulty that the authors Threat Expert Says We Goofed bility and thermal optics. Instead, I recom- assign the task. I also agree that our current mend taking SFC Belonus’ scout platoon In Identifying Russian Tank doctrine does not do enough to codify the concept and replacing the CFV with the TTP for successful predictive intelligence. German-built Wiesel 2 Light Armored Per- However, I am alarmed that the proposed Dear Sir: sonnel Carrier. remedy to this situation would be to rescind prediction of the enemy’s COA as a primary Your November-December 2000 article The Wiesel can mount a 20mm cannon, “Did the Rebels Misidentify Knocked-Out and can be fitted with an extendable optics objective of the intel BOS. This, together with our present fascination with building a pic- Tanks?” states the case for reassessing mast. Its height (1.8 - 2.1 meters) is not vulnerability of the more modern Russian much greater than that of a HMMWV, and it ture of the current enemy situation, chips away at what must remain a fundamental tanks. Please note, however, that the tank is air-deployable with a CH-47. It has a crew in the accompanying photograph has also of two and can carry up to five dismounts. As skill of the intel soldier: the look into the fu- ture. been misidentified. Explosive reactive armor for an ATGM capability, use the Javelin, or (ERA) has been applied to a wide variety of the Wiesel 2 can mount a HOT ATGM with Waiting until every rock in the AO has been former Soviet tanks, and makes identification the 20mm cannon. This would give the scout looked under will do as much to surrender more problematic. However, the tank in the platoon added firepower and better optics, the initiative to the enemy as any dangers photo has Kontakt ERA, and is most likely a yet retain its stealth and deployability. the authors imagine in prediction. But a fixa- T-72BV. The T-72BM is a signficantly up- I have seen LRAS3 mounted on the tion on the present leads to a targeting men- graded tank with Kontakt-5 ERA, for protec- HMMWV. When are we going to get it right? tality that classifies what of the enemy can tion comparable to T-90. You have to be completely exposed to use it, be seen into things to be shot, and does TOM REDMAN, GS-13 and it adds a great deal to the vehicle’s sil- nothing to anticipate (the opposite of react TRADOC Threat Support Directorate houette, plus you are now without a primary to) the enemy and prevent his interfering Ft. Leavenworth, Kan. weapon system. with our goals. Both the German Wiesel and the Fennek Predictive intelligence is hard, but emi- reconnaissance vehicle have the capability nently achievable. What we need is a thor- Continued on Page 45 4 ARMOR — March-April 2001

Is Information Superiority All It’s Cracked Up to Be?

by Major General B. B. Bell, Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center

In the past few Commander’s Hatch even encompass an accurate under- • Conduct decisive maneuver (almost articles, I’ve focused on the materiel standing of a coalition partner’s politi- always including the reserve) to aspects of the Mechanized Force Mod- cal will to adequately support com- achieve positional advantage and ernization Plan and the Objective bined military operations. then destroy the enemy in close Force. In this article, I’d like to address combat with volume fire. the current and future revolution in “Where is the enemy?” encompasses our understanding of every facet of the Unfortunately, this predictable se- maneuver warfare, driven by informa- enemy situation, from location, to lo- quential approach takes an inordinate tion superiority and operationalized by the dimension of leadership. It's impor- gistics, to morale, to combat power. In amount of time, gives the enemy a essence, it means “Do I understand the chance to discern our capabilities and tant that we all understand the theoreti- enemy situation accurately enough to intentions, and often yields high friend- cal underpinnings that will impact com- bat operations in the near future if we act decisively and win, or do I still need ly casualties. The Allied assault on the more information?” It is by far the Gustav Line in Italy during the Second are to dominate combat operations in hardest question to answer. Indeed, World War and American operations in this changing environment. commanders have been willing, actu- the Ia Drang Valley during the Vietnam Simply put, we know that combat vic- ally forced, throughout history to trade War provide two historical examples. tory goes to the commander who has casualties for information about the In Italy, we knew where the enemy the most accurate answers to the fol- enemy in a largely attritional approach was: well fortified in positions such as lowing three questions: to war. Monte Cassino on the Gustav Line. • Where am I? With the enemy situation the great High casualties still resulted, however, unknown, sequential operations have because of the necessary Allied sequen- • Where are my buddies? been the most common, secure, and tial approach to the war in Europe. • Where is the enemy? effective courses of action to take. At Landing in North Africa and capturing the strategic and operational level, it’s Tunisia telegraphed our next move, the All land warfare doctrine — strategic, operational, and tactical — is really been a five-step process: invasion of Sicily. The next obvious • step in the sequence? Cross the Straits driven by these three questions. At its Secure a lodgment of Messina to the Italian Peninsula and most basic level, “Where am I?” ad- • dresses geographic location: “Do I have Expand the lodgment advance north. Between January and • June 1944, the Allies conducted four an accurate grid?” As the scope of this Build-up the force distinct operations in an attempt to question expands up from the tactical • through operational to strategic level, it Shape the conditions for decisive breach the German defenses in central operations Italy. The landings further up the coast encompasses a myriad of other factors. at Anzio did little to expand our options Morale, logistics, and the combat pow- • Conduct decisive operations er status of the forces under the com- because the strategic die had already At the tactical level, the sequence is been cast. Eventually, the Allies won mander’s immediate control are but a even simpler, and expressed in all our the Italian Campaign by breaking few examples. doctrine, tactics, techniques, and pro- through the line, linking up with troops “Where are my buddies?” addresses cedures: at Anzio, and capturing Rome. The the condition of those friendly forces Germans also won a tactical victory of • Make lethal contact with the small- that can aid victory. At the tactical est force possible (in order to main- sorts, by delaying the Allied advance level, for example: “Where is my wing- for five months and inflicting over man? Does he have line of sight to the tain freedom of action) 115,000 casualties. enemy formation advancing on our • Develop the situation in lethal con- flank?” At the strategic level, it can tact Continued on Page 42 ARMOR — March-April 2001 5

The Expert Armor Badge: How It Might Work by Captain Rick Johnson and Sergeant First Class Michael Carew

Authors Note: At this point in plan- diers and will enhance unit esprit and the goal of providing our units with a ning, any description of the proposed morale. This award will strengthen in- superb training event. Expert Armor Badge should be consid- centives while encouraging high profes- Test Overview ered tentative. The purpose of this arti- sional standards already associated with cle, in conjunction with the Expert Ar- the armor and armored cavalry scouts.” Much like the EIB, the crux of the Ex- mor Badge website listed at the end of However, the 1991 EAB proposal was pert Armor Badge program would center the article, is to inform the Armor com- on an individual competency, task-based munity, and gain feedback, on the Ex- disapproved at DA level on 13 April testing event. However, unlike the EIB, 1992, in a memorandum stating: pert Armor Badge initiative. In writing each candidate would have to complete this article, every attempt has been “While it is true that special skill a crew-based qualification before being made to preclude reference to specific badges are awarded to denote qualifi- allowed to proceed to the individual tasks or task numbers, as the proposed cations and successful completion of phase of the EAB. A crew event, used as task list is subject to change. However, prescribed training courses, it is nei- a prerequisite, would emphasize the a tentative sequence of events is in- ther desirable nor feasible to recognize “crew over individual” concept so im- cluded for explanatory purposes. every such skill with a badge.” portant in Armor and Cavalry opera- tions. As this is a program for tankers The Expert Armor Badge: Presently, many within the Armor and scouts, it would not be complete Past to Present community see a need for an EAB pro- gram, to raise the “Pillar of Compe- without the inclusion of an event crucial to Armor and Cavalry units everywhere: The history of the Expert Armor tence” within the Armor and Cavalry crew-level gunnery. Prior to completing Badge, or EAB, is long and varied; an force, build unit esprit de corps and Armor badge in one form or another branch pride, and fill the void left by the individual skills test, a prospective EAB candidate would have to qualify as was worn during periods of conflict, to the demise of the Skills Qualification a member of a crew on an approved include World War II and the Korean Tests (SQT) in the mid-1990s. With War. These badges were unofficially that in mind, the Office of the Chief of Table VIII tank, CFV, or HMMWV. Active duty soldiers would have to com- “awarded” to soldiers in the Armor and Armor (OCOA), part of the Armor plete this requirement up to one year Cavalry force but never officially ap- Center at Fort Knox, is currently devel- proved and thus eventually faded away. oping a mentally and physically chal- prior to individual EAB testing; Reserve Component soldiers would have up to Since the establishment of the Expert lenging series of skills tests that will two years. With this prerequisite com- Infantryman’s Badge (EIB) in the years tax even the best scout or tanker and, following World War II, the Armor most importantly, train all who com- plete, a candidate would then be eligible to compete for the EAB in the individual Center at Fort Knox has several times pete. It is important to note that the skills competency test. sought the Army’s approval for a simi- intent of this program is not solely to lar Armor and Cavalry version of an offer yet another “shiny badge” for While the EIB program uses skill MOS-specific, individual competency soldiers to wear on their uniforms. level 1 tasks exclusively, the average award or skills badge. The EAB pro- Rather, it should be seen as an excellent skill level for EAB tasks would be a bit posal was last taken forward shortly opportunity for commanders to train higher due to the technical nature of the after Operation Desert Storm in 1991; it their soldiers on relevant combat-ori- Armor and Cavalry branch. Selection was approved and sent to Department ented skills according to uncompromis- for the proposed task list was unlimited of the Army (DA) level by the Com- ing standards. All would be trained, but – selected tasks come from skill levels manding General of the U.S. Army’s only the best would be awarded the 1-4. As a result, the EAB will be tough Training and Doctrine Command EAB. This test, although modeled after but not impossible to attain, although (TRADOC). This request for approval the Infantry’s EIB and the Medical junior soldiers and officers just out of stated: Corps’ Expert Field Medical Badge basic training would most likely have (EFMB), would be Armor-centric with to work harder to earn it. “The ability of armored soldiers to effectively apply speed, mobility, and firepower in close combat, reconnais- Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 sance, security, and economy of force operations demands a high level exper- Mounted Land 20km tise. The unique skills of the tanker and APFT Navigation Station Testing Orienteering cavalry scout are essential to the effec- (Night) Course tive prosecution of armored combat on Individual the modern battlefield. It is in the best Awards Weapons Station Testing Retest interests of the Army to promote such Ceremony skills and encourage excellence.” Qualification The request for approval went on to Mounted Land state: Navigation (Night) “The establishment of this badge will give proper recognition to Armor sol- Figure 1. EAB Test Overview 6 ARMOR — March-April 2001

Like the EIB, the EAB test would be veillance, vehicle ID, and sending re- Ride”-type test using EAB tasks. With administered concurrently over the ports to higher headquarters. the data collected during the field staff- course of several days (or, for the Na- ing and the validation exercise, the tional Guard, over several drill peri- To further differentiate this as an Ar- EAB program will be ready for submis- mor/Cavalry-focused test, three of the ods). With current plans in place, the stations employ tasks specific to Career sion and request for approval at TRA- EAB would be scheduled for four days, DOC and DA level. as in Figure 1. Management Field (CMF) 19. In the GST station, soldiers test gunnery skills tasks specific to their vehicle – tank, Day 1: Begins with the Army Physical CPT Rick Johnson was commis- Fitness Test (APFT) administered per Bradley, or HMMWV. In the Tactical Operations station, candidates face a sioned in Armor from the University FM 21-20. EAB candidates must score tactical situation and must act and react of Pittsburgh in 1995. He served as 270 or higher in their respective age a tank platoon leader with C Co, 2- group. This is followed by Individual following appropriate Armor or Cav- alry doctrine. Finally, in the MOS- 72 AR, and scout and support pla- Weapons Qualification; EAB standard Specific Station, scouts and tankers test for progression in this event is Expert, toon leader with 1st Sqdn, 2d ACR. fired with assigned individual weapons tasks specific to their MOS; 19Ks test He is currently a project officer with target acquisition and conduct of fire, the Office of the Chief of Armor at (M9 for tankers, M16A2 for scouts, in and 19Ds test route reconnaissance. most cases). Fort Knox, Ky. Like the EIB, candidates may retest Upon successful completion of these events, candidates proceed to a mount- stations they have failed. EIB standards SFC Michael Carew enlisted in the for retesting are used: “A candidate Army in 1982 as a 19D cavalry ed land navigation course conducted may retest two times, but cannot retest during hours of darkness. To reduce scout. His assignments include 6th resource requirements for the testing twice at the same station. A candidate Air Cav Bde, Fort Hood, Texas; who fails a retest or fails at three points 1/2d ACR, Bindlach, Germany; A unit, candidates navigate the course is not qualified…” (from USAIC Pam mounted on HMMWVs, regardless of 350-6). Trp, 15th Cav, 197th IN Bde, Fort the vehicle the unit is equipped with. Benning, Ga.; 5/9th Cav, 25th ID To further maximize time and re- Day 4: Concludes the EAB competi- (L), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; 2- sources, each HMMWV mounts four tion with a capstone event — the 20km 7th Inf, 24th ID, Fort Stewart, Ga.; soldiers: three EAB candidates and one orienteering course. Whereas EIB fin- Chicago Recruiting Battalion; and evaluator. While the evaluator drives, ishes with a straight 20km foot march, candidates take turns as vehicle com- EAB candidates are challenged to navi- scout platoon sergeant, 15th Cav, mander, and each has three hours to gate from point to point within a Fort Knox, Ky. He is currently the find three points (one of which is lo- prescribed time period. This event fo- 19D career management NCO with cated by GPS). This event should oc- cuses on orienteering, vice the more the Office of the Chief of Armor at cupy the night of Day 1 and early traditional method of dead reckoning Fort Knox, Ky. morning of Day 2. land navigation, as it is more applicable to Armor Days 2 and 3: Constitute the “heart and Cavalry operations. and soul” of the EAB test, challenging However, this course is How Would You Like to Design the candidate’s physical ability and completed dismounted. Up- technical prowess. Like the EIB, candi- on completion, successful The Expert Armor Badge? dates must complete a series of sta- candidates gather in unit tions, testing individual competency in formations and are imme- The Office of the Chief of Armor is asking that a variety of tasks. However, where EIB diately awarded the EAB. any comments, or concerns, or alternate badge focuses solely on common task testing, designs be sent to the EAB Project Officers The Way Ahead below: EAB emphasizes tasks that are (in most cases) specific to the Armor and Cav- OCOA is presently work- CPT Rick Johnson alry force. Current plans split this por- ing with several agencies DSN 464-7064 tion of the test into six stations: First within the Armor Center to Commercial: (502) 624-7064 Aid, LP/OP, Mines, Gunnery Skills ensure that the final task Email: [email protected] Test (GST), MOS-Specific Station, and list mandates a high level Tactical Operations. To ease command of expertise and physical SFC Michael Carew and control requirements and resolution ability for the scouts and DSN 464-1368 Commercial: (502) 624-1368 of appeals, stations collocate in the tankers competing for the Email: [email protected] same general vicinity under a central EAB. Once the proposal is command post, and candidates move in staffed and approved at the Fax: (502) 624-7585 “round-robin” fashion from station to Armor Center, it will be station throughout the day. Tasks at sent out to commanders in WE NEED YOUR INPUT ON THE TASK LIST each station roughly relate to one an- the field for their feedback What tasks do you feel are important? Weak other and follow a general scenario; for and ideas on improving the areas for you and your unit? Take a moment and example, the LP/OP station tests candi- program. We also plan to fill out the task survey on the EAB web site at: dates on tasks associated with the es- validate this test in the field http://knox-www.army.mil/center/ocoa/eab/ tablishment and occupation of an ob- at Fort Knox with a se- servation post – communications, sur- lected unit doing a “Spur ARMOR — March-April 2001 7

Armor, Cavalry, and Transformation: “New” Cavalry for the Interim Force by Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson and Lieutenant Colonel (P) Dana J.H. Pittard

If you don’t understand transforma- tion, now’s a good time and place to get on board.1

On 15 September 2000 at Fort Lewis, Washington, our Army cased the colors of a proud outfit, 1st Battalion, 32d Armor, and reactivated the 1st Squad- ron, 14th Cavalry. The 14th Cavalry Regiment, born in 1901, first saw ac- tion in the Philippines where it con- ducted limited combat operations and security missions throughout the archi- pelago, what we would call today Small Scale Contingency (SSC) opera- tions. 1-14 Cavalry is the first in a se- ries of “new” cavalry organizations that will provide reconnaissance, surveil- lance, and target acquisition (RSTA) for the Interim Brigade Combat Teams Using a borrowed Canadian Army LAV, 14th Cav troopers train at Ft. Lewis. (IBCTs). This “transformation” of our Army will take Armor and Cavalry into to as the new Information Age of war- In future conflicts, the IBCT will face the 21st century, with these new units fare. The U.S. Army has experienced a much more diverse set of enemies conducting traditional cavalry opera- this changing environment, most re- who will be armed with a range of con- tions — reconnaissance and surveil- cently in operations in Somalia, Haiti, ventional and unconventional capabili- lance — with an expanded focus. The Bosnia, and Kosovo. ties. The IBCT could face opposing in- purpose of this essay is to describe the formation technologies and advanced changing operational environment and In the Information Age, the time nec- weapon systems available via global the organization of the squadron.2 essary to make a decision and then to act upon that decision will be greatly weapons proliferation. The definition of “enemy” solely as combatants of a Changes in the Army’s condensed. Major regional crises may nation-state’s armed forces must ex- Operational Environment actually be prevented from expanding into conflicts by quickly deploying a pand to include any person, organiza- tion, agency, or situation that is, will One of the increasing near-term stra- capable American/allied force into tegic tasks facing our Army is adapting be, or could be an obstacle to accom- theater. Once on the ground, that force 4 to a changing operational environment must have the capability to conduct a plishing the IBCT’s mission. The in which SSC operations and not major IBCT and the cavalry squadron are full range of combat operations. Air- capable of operating across the spec- theaters of war (MTWs) are more likely borne units, while capable of limited occurrences. The operating environ- light operations, will not always be the trum of conflict. The squadron can op- ment for the Interim Brigade Combat erate “as is” in a MTW but would re- answer. An IBCT that can deploy any- quire augmentation if called upon to Team will be considerably different where in the world within 96 hours will from the Cold War paradigm of the be an obvious and welcome addition to guard or cover. The squadron can oper- ate without augmentation in SSC op- past. The Industrial Age operational the nation’s capability to respond to a erations.5 environment in which our Army suc- regional crisis or conflict. As GEN cessfully faced the Warsaw Pact during Shinseki said in a recent speech, “The Given the near-term strategic CINC the Cold War and defeated the Iraqi Brigade Combat Teams of that Interim requirements, the IBCT will undoubt- Army during the Persian Gulf War has Force bridge the gap in our current op- edly face a wide range of non-tradi- changed. erational shortfall between early- tional enemies. These potential enemies Small Scale Contingency Operations arriving light forces and later-arriving will employ asymmetric capabilities may be the rule as the operational envi- heavy ones. Additionally, and more and tactics intended to neutralize U.S. ronment moves from the Industrial Age importantly, it will serve as the van- strengths and exploit vulnerabilities into what has been commonly referred guard of the Objective Force.”3 where possible. Our enemies will at- 8 ARMOR — March-April 2001

tempt to operate in unpredictable ways maintain the IBCT communications lin anti-tank weapons for encounters and avoid patterns. The enemy will and digital network. with enemy light armor. The platoon combine military operations with ac- The reconnaissance (recce) troops are is capable of multi-dimensional cover- tivities from an assortment of partners age of named areas of interest (NAIs) from paramilitary units and police organized for extended operations in a and can conduct reconnaissance using large area of operation. The troops have forces, to irregular forces and terrorists. a small headquarters section, which mounted and dismounted patrols. Political factions, within or out of gov- ernment, non-government agencies, gives the troop commander the ability The Surveillance Troop gives the to monitor the situation in his area of transnational organizations, criminal responsibility, coordinate lethal and squadron commander and IBCT com- gangs, and even refugee populations mander an expanded surveillance and may also be factors in these types of non-lethal effects, and conduct limited target acquisition capability. The troop supply operations. Each recce troop has operations. It is equally likely that, in a three-man FIST team assigned. The consists of the troop headquarters, an some operational areas, military capa- Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) pla- bilities may not be the enemy’s critical troop mortar section has two 120mm toon, a multi-sensor platoon, and an mortar carriers and a fire direction cen- capabilities. ter IAV. The troop mortars can mark NBC reconnaissance platoon. The UAV platoon is the “air” complement of the Further complicating the range of targets for air-delivered fires, provide squadron and extends the range of the missions for the IBCTs and the cavalry immediate suppression and smoke, and will be the possible geographical areas illumination for night operations. The squadron commander’s “eyes” in cov- ering critical NAIs. The multi-sensor in which these potential enemies will recce troop command post also has an platoon has two sections: REMBASS/ operate. Future operations will be con- operations sergeant (19D30), a senior ducted in areas ranging from complex counter-intelligence NCO (97B30), and GSR and PROPHET. The REMBASS/ GSR section provides distant and re- urban sprawl to outlying areas of weak an NBC NCO (54B20) assigned. An mote capabilities to cover NAIs in all infrastructure dominated by inferior Air Force TACP team will be attached roads and bridges. The potential operat- to each recce troop during operations. types of weather, day and night. PRO- PHET gives the squadron an expanded ing areas may not have multiple major The recce platoons are equipped with SIGINT capability to intercept and DF air and seaports capable of handling 6 large sealift ships and large aircraft. four Interim Armored vehicles (IAVs). enemy communications and provides a The platoon has one counter-intelli- platform for future electronic warfare The need for reconnaissance to gather gence trained soldier (97B MOS) as- capabilities. The NBC recon platoon information and intelligence about the enemy in this environment cannot be signed to each scout squad. These Hu- provides the squadron the capability to man Intelligence (HUMINT) specialists survey industrial sites that could be overstated. give the platoon additional capability to used to manufacture chemical or bio- Squadron Organization gather a broad range of information and logical agents, conducts NBC detection intelligence. The platoon has four Jave- surveys, and provides force protection The 1-14 Cavalry, as the first of the “new” cavalry squadrons of the interim force, is organized and equipped to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition tasks for the IBCT Cavalry Squadron IBCT. It is a tough, robust cavalry or- (02/08/00) ganization (see figure at right). The Headquarters and Headquarters Troop Squadron Roll up PAX LAVs HHT 82 4 (HHT) provides the squadron’s com- Recce Troop (x3) 270 45 Surveillance Troop 57 3 mand and control capability. The vehi- Cavalry Squadron (39/1/369) cles of the HHT form the squadron Totals 409 52 O O O tactical operations center, a forward command post (TAC), a reduced com- Squadron HHT (16/1/65) Recce Troop (6/0/84) Surveillance Troop (5/0/52) HHT HQs (16/1/65) HQs bat trains command post, and a reduced HHT (3/0/14) (2/0/5) O O O 4 X LAVs O O O O O O O O O field trains command post that will O O O UAV PLT integrate with the IBCT Brigade Sup- MI (1/0/16) Squadron HHT PAX LAVs Recce PLT O O O port Battalion. All vehicles in the (1/0/20) CMD Group 13 0 O O O 4 X LAVs O O O squadron will be equipped with FBCB2 S1/S4 5 0 O O O Javelin SENS PLT S2 / ISR Integration 80 MI (1/0/20) (Force XXI Battle Command Brigade O O O S3 15 0 Mort Sec S6 12 0 (0/0/10) and Below). FBCB2 will increase 2 X Mortar LAVs HQs 60 O O O NBC PLT 2 x 120 mm friendly situational awareness through- Medical PLT 22 4 (1/0/11) out the squadron and brigade. The Unit Ministry Team 1 0 O O O 3 X LAVs squadron will have the benefit of a Tro- Totals 82 4 Recce Troop PAX LAVs HQs 17 1 Surveillance Troop PAX LAVs jan Spirit-Lite, which gives the squad- Recce Platoons(x3) 63 12 HQs 7 0 MORT Sect 10 2 UAV PLT 17 0 ron informational “reach” capability. Totals 90 14 Sensor PLT 21 0 The squadron also has three retrans NBC PLT 12 3 teams that, along with other retrans Totals 57 3 teams throughout the brigade, will help ARMOR — March-April 2001 9

A multi-dimensional approach to reconnaissance expands on the traditional forms of reconnaissance. Troopers must interact with the local populace throughout the area of operations. through early warning of enemy NBC zone, area, and route reconnaissance stakeouts. Trooper-based, human-inten- use. missions will assist in countering or sive intelligence will balance the limi- The interim force cavalry conducts defeating asymmetrical threats. tations of equipment-based sensors. traditional reconnaissance, surveillance, The squadron must also routinely per- One of six battalions within the bri- and screening operations within capa- form RSTA tasks in urban and other gade (see figure below), the 1-14 Cav- bility. The central task of the 1-14 Cav- complex terrain situations. Coordinat- alry has a unique relationship to the alry is to provide the capability that ing the air/ground collectors of the sur- other maneuver units. The infantry permits the IBCT commander and his veillance troop with ground recce troops units are assigned areas, zones or sec- subordinate units to see and understand enables the squadron commander to tors of operation. The 1-14 Cavalry will the entirety of a multi-dimensional en- accomplish his primary mission of pro- operate throughout the entire brigade emy and develop and sustain a thor- viding continuous, accurate, and timely area of responsibility, including those ough understanding of the situation. information in complex environments. assigned to infantry battalions and This capability enables the IBCT com- UAVs somewhat mitigate the lack of other brigade units. The area of opera- mander to dominate his battle space. In manned air recce and provide the tions could range from 50 x 50 kilome- fact, the operational success of the bri- squadron with valuable air/ground re- ters to as large as 100 x 100 kilometers. gade depends on this reconnaissance connaissance capabilities. Actual employment of 1-14 Cavalry and surveillance effort. will be based on mission analysis. The The development of HUMINT assets brigade commander’s requirement to Reconnaissance Operations is particularly important in SSCs. HUMINT assets generate local infor- see and understand the various aspects of the environment will drive the Developing an understanding of the mation, a “street-sense” for the area of placement of the 1-14 Cavalry, either situation will require a multi-dimen- operation. Troopers of the squadron sional approach to reconnaissance that must develop the savvy of a “beat cop” into large areas or concentrated in smaller cities. Understanding the situa- goes beyond the Cold War singular or detective, especially in SSCs. The tion will enable the squadron com- intelligence focus on military forces. A leaders throughout the squadron will multi-dimensional approach encom- learn both the formal and the informal mander to focus on the primary mission of information gathering. Accomplish- passes demographic, social, cultural, political power structure of the region. ing this task provides other combat and political, and economic factors as well They will use HUMINT to develop an as military forces. This signals a return understanding of police/secret police/ combat support units a common picture of the area of responsibility. to the traditional focus of U.S. cavalry intelligence agencies, any criminal en- required in operations against the Indi- terprises, the military and paramilitary Obtaining valid battle damage as- ans on the western frontier in the late structures, the terrain, and the sensitivi- sessment (BDA) is an equally vital but nineteenth century, to the Moros and ties of the populace. They must be difficult task for recon and surveillance Huks of the Philippines in the early adept in information collection meth- units. The use of lethal and non-lethal twentieth century. The IBCT must have ods. Like cavalry operations during the fires in SSCs as well as MTWs must be the means to reduce unpredictability, UN mission in Haiti, troopers may precise. Technology coupled with hu- identify critical enemy capabilities and conduct police-like activities, such as man assessment (scout/counter intelli- vulnerabilities, and apply its combat power in the most effective manner to achieve operational success. Under- standing that the situation begins with IBCT Organization developing a broader, deeper under- standing of the totality of the opera- x tional environment is absolutely essen- tial to the brigade’s success. A multi-dimensional approach to re- connaissance expands on the traditional forms of reconnaissance. Troopers must interact with the local populace HHC BSB throughout the area of operations. Un- derstanding human dimensions of the 155 T environment (political, religious, eth- nic, criminal) are essential for effective HHC O O O O O O decisive action along the spectrum of O O O O O O SUPPORT conflict. Counterintelligence troopers MI and scouts within the squadron collect 2 x 120mm and analyze information through con- 4 X 120mm tact with community leaders and the MGS local populace. The ability to gain multi-dimensional information and in- 2 X 120mm telligence while conducting traditional 10 ARMOR — March-April 2001

gence) capabilities provide real-time gade shaping operations using the Long 4This definition of “enemy” is drawn from a intelligence for targeting with precision Range Advanced Scout Surveillance presentation developed by the Brigade Coordina- munitions or focused PSYOP materials. System (LRAS3) as a means of target tion Cell (BCC) at Fort Lewis. This is a proposed UAVs and ground reconnaissance can designation for air- or artillery-deliv- definition we in the BCC found useful; the MI then quickly determine if lethal fires ered fires. In this way, the squadron School has not officially approved it. were successful and the extent of any helps set the conditions for the bri- 5We drew heavily on the Interim Brigade Com- collateral damage. Ground patrols will gade’s decisive operations by maintain- bat Team Organizational & Operational Concept assess the effectiveness of PSYOP/in- ing contact and through precise appli- (O&O) final draft dated 30 June 2000. The em- formation operations. UAVs and ground cation of fire. The doctrine and tactics, bedded diagrams within our essay are from Chap- ter 7, Reconnaissance Surveillance & Target sensors found in the Surveillance Troop techniques and procedures being writ- Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron, pages 2, 3, and also provide early warning that allows ten for the squadron must take this type 26. the brigade time to anticipate enemy of operation into account. The “new” actions by understanding the situation, cavalry of the interim force is a robust 6We wrote this article before the Army’s formal maneuvering combat power, and mak- and tough outfit but it must be used in announcement of the type of interim armored vehicle (IAV) selected for the interim force. On ing contact with fires or ground forces ways that play to its inherent strengths 16 Nov 00, the Army announced that the LAV III when and where the IBCT commander and not in a manner that will set it up would be the armored vehicle of the IBCTs. The chooses. Ground reconnaissance forces for mission failure. type of vehicle is not as important as the manner and sensors working in tandem with in which the squadron will operate. UAVs provide unmatched situational Cavalry on the American western 7We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of awareness throughout a large area of frontier operated in uncertainty. When the following officers: LTC George Juntiff, MAJ operations. This situational understand- a cavalry patrol left its fort, troopers Phil Logan, MAJ Bob Finnegan, COL (Rtd) ing enables the brigade to anticipate, could face everything from natural dis- Duane Hardesty, and the writers of the RSTA forestall, and dominate any enemy. asters to stampedes, settler-rancher chapter of the Organization and Operational disputes, to Indian uprisings. Troopers Concept. These named great officers gave us Conclusion of the western cavalry had to under- their time and advice in the writing of this essay. stand their environment, know who the The writers of the original chapter are unknown 1-14 Cavalry, the first of the “new” to us, but they contributed greatly to the Armored interim force cavalry units, is uniquely reliable sheriff was, the corrupt Indian agent, the local tribal leaders, as well as Force and to the Transformation of the Army. organized to provide multi-dimensional the location of water holes and grazing Any errors contained in the essay are ours. informational and intelligence support for the IBCT. During the coming years, areas. The troopers worked with Indian scouts in the west. The 14th Cavalry the squadron will take the first steps in worked with local Filipino guides while COL Kevin C.M. Benson is a 1977 developing tactics, techniques, and pro- cedures, and refinement of the doctrine operating in the Philippines in the early graduate of the U.S. Military Acad- 1900s. The troopers of the “old” cav- emy and is the Director of Plans, needed for the interim and objective alry expanded on the traditional forms force. As more IBCTs are organized, Interim Brigade Coordination Cell, other squadrons of the regiment will and requirements of reconnaissance. at Fort Lewis. He recently com- manded 3-8 Cavalry at Fort Hood. follow. The 1-14 Cavalry is on the cut- The nature of warfare will remain a ting edge of changing the way our He has served in armor and cavalry Army will conduct warfare in the fu- constant, as it springs from the human heart. War is the realm of danger and units in the United States and Eur- ture. American cavalry has always been uncertainty. War in any form will re- ope, and served as the Director of a reconnaissance-oriented force, and one Plans for XVIII Abn Corps and Third that can fight when necessary. These quire courage and commitment. Thus, the trooper of the squadron remains the U.S. Army. COL Benson is a grad- new squadrons will blend technology ultimate guarantor of situational under- and trooper into a force that will pro- uate of CSC and SAMS and will vide commanders with an enviable standing; as he will do what cavalry attend SSC in 2001. always does, conduct mounted and ability to “see” the battlefield, be it dismounted patrols to protect the force. SSC or MTW. LTC (P) Dana J.H. Pittard is a Suivez Moi! Follow Me! The 14th 1981 graduate of the U.S. Military The organization and intended opera- Cavalry rides again!7 tional use of the squadron has definite Academy and is the commander of implications on how the squadron will 1-14 Cavalry at Fort Lewis, Wash. His initial assignments were in 2-63 “fight” for information. As shown in Notes the organizational chart and in the dis- AR and 3-37 AR at Fort Riley, Kan. cussion of the squadron organization, 1Speech by GEN Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff He later commanded E Troop, 2/11 this is most definitely NOT an armored Army, delivered 17 Oct 2000 at the annual Asso- ACR; F Company, 40th AR (Berlin cavalry outfit. This cavalry outfit can- ciation of the United States Army Convention in Brigade); and D Company, 1-37 AR not stand and fight for information by Washington, D.C. during the Gulf War. He served as trading body blows with enemy armor. 2The 14th Cavalry Association has a fascinating S3 of 1-67 AR and Brigade S3 of 2d The intended purpose of the squadron website. We recommend looking it up at Bde/4ID at Fort Hood, Texas. Prior is to gather intelligence information www.14th-acr.org. to commanding 1-14 Cav, he com- and maintain contact with enemy forces 3Shinseki AUSA speech, 17 Oct 2000. The Ob- across the spectrum of conflict. Main- manded 1-32 AR. He has also jective Force is the goal of Army Transformation. served as Military Aide to the Presi- taining contact can and must be done The vision is a more strategically mobile Army, using the visual and electronic means with systems of equal or greater lethality than the dent. LTC Pittard is a graduate of available to the squadron commander. legacy force, capable of fighting and winning any CSC and SAMS and will attend The squadron can fight as a part of bri- action along the spectrum of conflict. SSC in 2001. ARMOR — March-April 2001 11

Deployable Versus Survivable

Israel and Russia have developed heavier, not lighter, armored personnel carriers

by Sergeant First Class Ira L. Partridge

Since October 1999, when Army Picking a Mobile Gun System armed with an RPG could kill most Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki APCs if he attacked from the side, Within two months of General Shin- and Secretary of the Army Louis Cal- seki’s announcement, an assortment of back, or above. By using guerrilla tac- dera unveiled a “vision for a more stra- tics and a concealed ambush, a single vehicles were tested at Fort Knox to tegically responsive”1 Army, much dis- soldier or small group can readily kill determine which would provide the cussion has been generated on new common platform chassis for the IBCT, an entire squad of mechanized infantry vehicles and how they will be em- if they are mounted. These experiences ployed. Discussions about types, capa- and which would become the Mobile resulted in the development of three Gun System (MGS) providing the new bilities, and doctrinal employment have unit’s armored fist. After several vehicles capable of protecting, deliver- been interesting, but fail to mention a ing, and deploying a squad of infantry new class of vehicle. Referred to as months of testing and debate, a deci- to any point on the battlefield. sion was announced in November 2000 heavy APCs, this new class is impor- that selected the Light Armored Vehi- The first of these vehicles is the up-ar- tant when taken with the fact that most Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) cle (LAV) III as the common vehicle mored M113, which adds reactive ar- platform chassis. A family of ten vehi- mor to protect the hull. This modifica- discussions invariably mention Mount- cles will be fielded as the Interim Ar- tion to Israel’s fleet of M113 APCs saw ed Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT), 5 and, in MOUT operations, deployabil- mored Vehicle (IAV) that is optimized action in southern Lebanon beginning for close, complex, or urban terrain4 in 1996. The explosive reactive armor ity does not always equal survivability. environments. (ERA) suite is produced by the Rafa’el This is reflected in recent combat op- erations conducted by the Russian and In contrast, Israel and Russia — two Armament Development Authority, Israel’s state armament development Israeli armies in urban environments. If armies that have recently fought in ur- agency. The concept simply modifies this new strategy is to develop a force ban environments — instead developed that is dominant at every point in the heavier APCs for combat operations in an existing vehicle, giving it enough protection to allow it to operate in ur- spectrum of operations (deployable, MOUT and mountainous terrain. Both ban or restrictive environments with a agile, versatile, lethal, sustainable, and countries developed their heavy APC higher degree of force protection. survivable2) one has to ask whether a versions for similar force protection lightly armored wheeled vehicle is reasons, after experiencing losses while The second vehicle, classified as a really the right choice when consider- fighting in urban and restrictive terrain. heavy APC, is based on the Centurion ing combat in urban-like settings. The The developments attempted to counter tank hull. It is designated the Nakpadon concept of rapidly deploying lightly the proliferation of antitank guided by the Israelis, and uses ERA and add- armored vehicles to MOUT environ- missiles (ATGM) and rocket-propelled on ballistic armor skirting, with the ments is a flawed one if the populace is grenades (RPG) used by fighting forces tank turret replaced with a square, hostile. throughout the world, a situation that built-up crew compartment. A modifi- has increased the threat level to mount- cation allows troops to exit the vehicle If the IBCT intends to be a force with ed infantry forces. from the rear. a “weapons platform (that has) better ballistic protection” and that can “do The third vehicle is another heavy Heavy APCs from Israel what is necessary to protect the force3” APC based upon a T-55 tank hull then one has to again ask if a wheeled Israel learned from combat operations called the Achzarit, which also replaces lightly armored vehicle is really the in southern Lebanon that a dedicated, the tank turret with a crew compart- right choice? sometimes fanatical, individual soldier ment. To deploy dismounts, the Ach-

Up-armored Israeli M113, at left, has been equipped with explo- sive reactive armor (ERA) to enhance its protection against the shaped charge war- heads of missiles and RPGs. The Israeli Nakpadon heavy APC, right, is a Centurion tank hull with ERA and an ar- mored crew com- partment added. 12 ARMOR — March-April 2001

zarit includes a protected clamshell 102 of 120 armored vehicles to dis- side, rear, top, driver’s hatch, and any door for dismounting troops from the mounted Chechen hunter-killer teams. area not covered by ERA.9 right rear of the vehicle. This was ac- Chechen forces were successful for complished by repositioning the engine many varied reasons, including their or- Russian Heavy APC Development along the left side of the hull, leaving ganization of fighting units, dedication room for a passage on the right side. to their cause, and the inherent vulner- After the catastrophic losses taken at the battle for the Grozny railway sta- Each of the Israeli heavy APC vari- ability of the Russian vehicles they tion, the need became apparent to pro- faced. ants is designed to protect and deliver a tect motorized infantry elements from squad of dismounted infantry to the The Chechen forces in Grozny were modern AT weapons in urban terrain.10 battlefield. Its armament of heavy ma- organized into combat groups of 15 to The result was a joint project from the chine guns is consistent with standard 20 personnel, further subdivided into Design Bureau of Transport Machine- APC armament that has been used three- to four-man fighting cells.9 Each Building and the Transport Machine- since the 1960s. cell consisted of an antitank gunner Building Plant. They produced a proto- with RPG-7 or RPG-8, a machine gun- type heavy APC called the Bronye- Hard Lessons for the Russians ner, and a sniper. The sniper and ma- transporter-Tyazhelyy (BTR-T),11 a T- chine gunner would engage a vehicle to 55 hull-based vehicle with the capabil- Russian heavy APC development was based on their catastrophic urban com- pin down supporting infantry and keep ity to withstand ATGM attacks on a par the vehicle buttoned-up while the anti- with main battle tanks.12 bat experience in Chechnya. Their tank gunner would engage and kill the heavy APCs are in the Russian tradition The large number of T-55 tanks avail- of vehicles that carry a multitude of armored vehicle. Teams would deploy able were predominately outdated and at ground level, on second and third crew-served weapons that can be used stories, and in basements with nor- ineffective, except those already up- to support dismounted infantry. graded with add-on ERA and fire con- mally five or six teams attacking a trol system improvements. They be- In December of 1994, the Russian single vehicle simultaneously. Hunter- Army entered the breakaway republic killer teams would also trap columns in came a resource for conversion to the BTR-T. The most distinguishing fea- and attempted to seize the capital of city streets where destruction of the ture of the BTR-T is a low-silhouette Grozny from the march.6 The Russian first and last vehicles would trap the Army moved into Grozny on the night column, thus allowing for total destruc- turret mounted on the tank chassis that is capable of mounting various gun-mis- of 31 December and morning of 1 Jan- tion of the rest. sile armaments. Protection is achieved uary 1995, hoping to quickly take the Vehicle capabilities also played a by the heavier armor of the tank chassis presidential palace with few losses.7 To critical role in the debacle. Russian and additional built-on ERA. The vehi- Russian military leaders, the plan ap- tank guns were incapable of elevating cle crew consists of a driver and com- peared sound and they expected little resistance. It called for an advance on or depressing far enough to be able to mander, and has space for five to seven deal with these hunter-killer teams dismounts. Several weapon systems three axes that would meet at the palace. fighting from basements and second- or equip the different variants: The BTR- The main advance along the northern third-story positions, and simultaneous T or H-APC has a one-man turret with axis had a mission to capture the main attacks from five or six teams negated the 2A42 30mm automatic cannon and railway station located several blocks the effectiveness of the tank’s machine Konkurs ATGM system firing the from the palace.8 However, when units guns. Additionally, ZSU 23-4s and 9M113 AT (AT-5 Spandrel) missile.13 from the west and east failed to move 2S6s — with superior elevation and The variant with a NSV 12.7mm ma- into Grozny, the units in the north were depression range — which were at- chine gun is called a Scout-Patrol Ve- left unsupported and vulnerable. The tached to respond to this threat, became hicle. Other variants include a turret battle for the Grozny railway station lightly armored priority targets, and mounted with a AGS-17 automatic became a classic example of how not to were usually the first killed. Lightly grenade launcher or 2A38 twin-barrel conduct combat operations in urban ter- armored vehicles such as BMPs, submachine gun. The vehicle has its rain, and the tactical ramifications have BMDs, and BTRs stood little chance drawbacks. Although force protection been scrutinized in many forums. What since they could be killed from almost is achieved, the BTR-T is too slow to is important to this discussion is that any angle. Tanks fared better, but were keep up with modern tanks, making it the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade lost still vulnerable when attacked from the unsuitable for maneuver warfare.

Israeli Achzarit heavy APC, at left and above, is based on a T-55 tank hull with the engine repositioned to create space for a clamshell door exit at the rear, as seen in the open position in photo at right. ARMOR — March-April 2001 13 Upper left, the BTR-T, or H-APC, mounts a 30mm cannon in a low, one-man turret and carries five to seven dismounts. The hull is an obsolete T-55, its protection improved with an ERA suite. At left is the scout-patrol version, mounting an NSV 12.7mm heavy machine gun. Other weapon systems can also be fitted. Another heavy APC concept, above, is the BMP-T, based on the T-72 chas- sis, and capable of much better battlefield speed.

Further development of the heavy APC digging in and a KMT-8 tread-width bat vehicle losses that a brigade-sized concept has resulted in the BMP-T, mine plow with EMT electromagnetic unit suffered during that battle. which was introduced as a concept at device can be mounted at the front of The LAV III is a good selection for the VTTV-Omsk-99 exhibition in June the vehicle. Since the BMP-T is based 1999, and shown at the 2nd Urals Ex- upon the T-72 chassis, it is better suited the IBCT because of all the reasons brought forth in the vision statement of hibition of Armaments and Military to keep up with armored maneuver GEN Shinseki. But historically, we Equipment held in early 2000 at Nizhni formations. Tagil. The BMP-T is described as a must remember that Americans have Conclusion not always been on the cutting edge of tank support combat vehicle and is a vehicle development at the start of further development of the heavy APC The creation of an IBCT type of force concept, drawing on experience gained has long been needed. However, the combat operations. The success of De- sert Storm can be attributed, in one with the BTR-T and Chechen combat concept of deploying the types of vehi- respect, to the capability mismatch be- operations. Designers based the BMP-T cles selected for the IBCT into an on the widely produced T-72 tank chas- openly hostile MOUT or restricted en- tween like classes of vehicles. The Army may not need to develop a heavy sis. It features ERA on the frontal ar- vironment is flawed. One has to visual- APC, but to believe the LAV III will mor plate, ERA-applied screens to pro- ize one of the Russian POWs from tect side plates, and grilled shields to Grozny that did not know who they fare any better than the BTRs and 14 BMPs did in Grozny is ill-advised. If protect the hull area. were fighting with, who they were force protection is a guiding tenet of fighting against, or what their mission Main armament consists of a 2A42 was. They understood their mission as vehicle selection, then it may not be 30mm automatic cannon and coaxially prudent to use the rapidly deployable mounted AG-30 or AGS-17A grenade simply an occupation type police action LAV III in hostile MOUT operations. and knew nothing of the combat as- launcher stabilized in two planes. Addi- pects until their vehicle was shot out Deployability does not always equal tionally, it has an AT-14 Kornet survivability, and a vehicle that will not ATGM system provided with a semiau- from under them. survive on the battlefield is simply a tomatic jam-proof laser-guidance sys- Tactically, we hope the U.S. Army rolling coffin, regardless of how quick- tem. Commander and gunner are would never make those mistakes. But ly the vehicle was deployed. equipped with identical PNK-4S sights understanding the mission and fighting capable of daylight or thermal viewing tactically sound doctrine will not stop This article was meant to introduce and stabilized in elevation to effec- an RPG from penetrating the light ar- Israeli and Russian heavy APCs and to tively fire all weapons from either posi- mor of a rapidly deployable vehicle raise the force protection shortcomings tion. Additional weapons, arranged on moving into a situation similar to of a lightly armored vehicle in hostile the fenders, include two AG-30 gre- Grozny. The American public would MOUT operations, not to second-guess nade launchers or two 7.62mm PKTM never tolerate losses like those taken in selection of the LAV III for the IBCT. machine guns with an electromechani- that battle, because we have a much This article was written in the spirit of cal drive and day/night sight combined lower tolerance for battlefield losses. the famous quote that reminds us that with an Agat-MR optronic sight. A The public would never accept losing built-in dozer blade can be used for anywhere near the 85 percent of com- Continued on Page 44 14 ARMOR — March-April 2001

Cavalry Operations in MOUT

by Captain Scott Schenking

The Armor community has clearly re- should remain masked behind the last with the call signs or the squadron alized that training in MOUT environ- piece of covered and concealed terrain. SOPs for communicating directly with ments is taking on a more important The OH-58D scouts can provide many pilots. Although the information may role for our armored teams. Although kinds of information before the dis- not flow as smoothly, units should train our armor systems are not specifically mounted scouts enter their observation junior NCOs to communicate with pi- designed to operate inside built-up ar- posts: lots. This will increase the combat in- eas, there are tactics, techniques and • formation available and will be critical procedures (TTPs) that can be used to Identify positions on rooftops. to successful dismounted operations in assist in the survivability and lethality • Confirm the street map and identify MOUT environments. One technique of an armored force operating in sup- any changes to the terrain. that 1-10 Cav emphasizes has scout port of a MOUT operation. pilots landing every so often to discuss • Observe through windows using A Troop, 1-10 Cavalry recently com- thermals and identify positions that can the situation with Bradley and tank crews, face to face. pleted training on MOUT operations in observe the approach to the BUA. order to rehearse and refine those • Develop a detailed map for the squad- TTPs. In the scenario we developed, Verify the best OP positions for ron in order to ensure a common dismounted scouts and assist in clear- our squadron conducted a moving flank ing those positions. method of describing the BUA. The guard with a small built-up area in its OH-58D can take digital photos of the path. Based on the terrain, the squadron • Observe the far side of the BUA and BUA and print them through the AMPS was not able to bypass the town. It had report movement into the BUA. computer, but this can be time-consum- to move rapidly past a built-up area ing. Other approaches are to use local without bypassing an enemy force that The OH-58D is limited in its ability to street maps, imagery, or UAV photos. observe deep into the BUA. Unless the could influence the division’s flank. helicopter unmasks to gain elevation, it We produced a numerical grid map of the BUA, numbering every building, In order to accomplish this mission, may not be able to observe beyond the naming each route, and providing a one troop was to conduct an area recon initial row of buildings, but it can repo- of the town and establish a bypass sition to multiple OPs rapidly, and may grid reference system that was specific and more focused for the BUA. This through or around the area so that the be able to observe down streets be- map supplemented the standard mili- squadron could continue its mission. We tween the buildings. However, the ae- broke this troop’s mission down into rial scouts will not be able to provide a tary map and provided a common pic- ture of the area before we entered. The three phases: reconnaissance; establish- detailed read on enemy positions within map was continuously refined as we ing a foothold: and forward passage of the BUA. lines (FPOL)/urban reconnaissance. conducted our zone recon. As dismounted scouts enter the area to Reconnaissance occupy observation posts around the Given this initial reconnaissance, the troop commander should be able to The zone recon to the objective can perimeter of the BUA, they can provide determine the best possible location for the following initial information: be rapidly accomplished mounted on penetration as well as ensure that the Bradleys, but this method will likely • Any observed forces that can cover approach to the BUA is clear of enemy give up the element of surprise. If time the approach to the BUA. forces. permits, dismounted scouts should be • The types of structures — frame, Establishing a Foothold moved into the area to reduce the like- lihood of premature contact with en- stone, etc. — to determine weapons If the commander determines that fur- effects. emy forces inside the city. Integration ther recon of the BUA is needed, or if between OH-58D Kiowa armed recon- • Any obstacles along avenues of ap- an infantry force will be passed forward naissance helicopters and dismounted proach to the BUA. to clear the objective, then the unit scouts will ensure a rapid zone recon. • Bypass routes around the BUA. must establish a foothold. This requires Prior to conducting dismounted recon- synchronization of the combined arms naissance on the objective, the OH-58D • The best possible positions to gain a team that is organic to a division cav- is also capable of conducting area recon foothold for further recon. alry troop. It is the synchronization of of the built-up area (BUA) in order to armor, dismounts, and air assets that provide an initial read to dismounted Dismounted scout section leaders will make for successful MOUT opera- must be trained on how to communi- scouts and assist them in moving to cate with OH-58D pilots during a re- tions. effective observation posts. connaissance mission. This relatively We approached this mission in the When conducting an area recon of a simple task of talking in a common same manner as we would a breaching BUA, the OH-58D is vulnerable to language is trained regularly at Bradley operation using SOSR (Suppress, Ob- most small arms weapons firing from commander level and higher, but junior scure, Secure, Reduce). Field artillery well-concealed positions. The OH-58D NCOs are not as well trained on this can shape the battlefield by limiting must stay beyond small arms range and task, and are usually not as familiar mounted routes that could be used to ARMOR — March-April 2001 15 reinforce the enemy at the penetration or allowing the squadron to bypass the of dismounts moving into their line of point, as well as by destroying over- town. fire. Throughout this phase of the op- watching positions. The OH-58Ds pro- eration, the Kiowa Warriors continued vide accurate grids to targets within the While moving from the last covered to provide information on movement of and concealed position to the penetra- BUA, shaping the initial penetration tion point, the dismounts were most ef- reinforcements into the penetration point. Mortars then provide continuous point and assisted in redirecting sup- smoke to cover the penetration area and fective when following closely behind pressive fires. the Bradleys. Dismounts cannot follow the initial foothold. A tank platoon was closely behind the M1A1/M1A2 be- the first element to lay suppressive fires Because of their high trajectory, mor- on the BUA. The tanks isolated the cause of the heat of the exhaust. How- tars are highly effective at firing into ever, they can use the rear of the Brad- foothold by suppressing buildings to ley to reduce exposure of the M3 while BUAs. In order to strike a target, the the flanks of the foothold and prevent- mortars must know the height of the ing reinforcements from moving to that they attempt to dismount scouts near target itself and the height of any build- the target area. penetration point. Tanks were capable ing that may block the gun-target line. of standing off at 900m, the maximum The troop must develop a clear direct Scouts must know the location of the effective range of coax, thereby limit- fire plan for entry into a BUA. The mortars in order to rapidly determine ing their exposure to RPGs. Tank wing- dismounted scouts must know the con- the gun-target line before making calls men scanned for AT missiles while two trol measures that the tanks are using so for fire. We recommend using the polar tanks suppressed the enemy in the that they can rapidly call for the lifting plot mission, assisted with MELIOS BUA. or shifting of fires as dismounts move and a PLGR. Since target areas in through the objective. Armor crews MOUT are small, a difference of 100m The mounted scout platoon entered must ensure that they add the height could place a round in another block between the tanks and established the point of penetration. The scouts moved dimension to their direct fire planning protected by a building — or on your in order to cover windows and roof- own position! forward and dismounted close to the tops. There is a high risk of fratricide in penetration point while the CFVs main- Urban Recon/FPOL tained sufficient standoff to be capable this operation. Armor crews must re- hearse jointly with dismounts to ensure of scanning for targets. The dismounted that everyone understands the direct If the troop is required to make a scouts conducted their attack into the forced entry into the BUA, then further foothold and secured the entire build- fire plan. This is essential to the suc- reconnaissance may not be possible cessful synchronization of dismounts ing. Once that building was secure, the and armor. without a larger force. The cavalry Bradleys could move to the far side and troop can assist a forward passage of destroy any enemy element attempting The OH-58D was especially useful in lines by a combined arms force in sev- to eliminate the foothold. At this point, preventing fratricide by providing eral ways. The cavalry troop can estab- the troop has secured one side of the feedback on positions of our own lish the initial foothold for the infantry BUA and is capable of passing a troops. The pilots reported directly to battalion so that they can conserve their stronger combined arms force forward platoon and squad leaders to warn them combat power for the remainder of the 16 ARMOR — March-April 2001

fight. As the infantry battalion passes tem and should be reviewed before con- tion is absolutely essential to the suc- forward, the cavalry troop can attach ducting MOUT operations. cess of the mission. Units must work their own tanks and Bradleys to the Training for MOUT together as a combined arms team to infantry battalion. The troop can also ensure that fires and mutual support are conduct flank reconnaissance to protect Training in a MOUT environment for provided at the right place and the right the force as it enters the BUA. The armor companies and armored cavalry time. cavalry troop can move to the flank and troops will increase the flexibility of Finally, MOUT is a squad leader conduct aggressive zone recon around armor units to understand the impact of the BUA in order to assist in isolating MOUT on their units. The training that fight. Squad leaders need to be in- volved in the planning and rehearsals at the objective. we conducted was a series of lanes de- troop level. Once an urban fight begins, signed to ramp the unit up to a sce- A cavalry troop is limited in its ability nario-based, combined arms event. The command and control at troop and pla- to operate inside a built-up area. Dis- toon level relies upon the noncommis- mounted scouts should not enter a lanes included driver training, target sioned officer that is at the tip of the 1 acquisition, direct fire planning, area building unless absolutely necessary. reconnaissance, and zone reconnais- unit’s spear. Once inside the BUA, the dismounted scouts should move rapidly forward in sance. Overall, training in a MOUT envi- ronment has not only enhanced our front of their CFVs in order to clear Driver training allowed each driver to unit’s ability to operate in this difficult corners and blind spots. The tank pla- maneuver through the MOUT site to toon will have to enter the BUA if they become familiar with the limitations of type of terrain, but has trained many critical combat skills. MOUT teaches cannot provide overwatch from their the tank. The drivers were required to combined arms coordination, the flow positions outside of the town. maneuver at night with some of the street lights still on in order to under- of combat information, and tactical Techniques for target acquisition in a leadership at the lowest levels. Without BUA must be trained before any opera- stand the effect on the VVS-2s. They these critical skills, MOUT operations also rehearsed rapid movement and tion can be successful. Tank crews “berm” drills that included backing up will not be successful. must remain aware of the limitations caused by their gun tubes when inside behind buildings. Notes cities. Tube depression and elevation is Target acquisition training consisted 1FKSM 17-90-10, Armor in Military Operations limited, and the length of the gun tube of a series of E-type silhouettes placed on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), April 1990, may cause problems when traversing throughout the city in windows, roof- Chapter 7. the turret on narrow streets. tops, and basements. The crew was 2 timed on acquiring the target and FM 90-10, Military Operations in Urbanized The tank loader can assist a crew by choosing the appropriate weapon sys- Terrain, August 1979. keeping his hatch open and scanning for targets above the tank. With his M4 tem to engage that target. in hand, the loader can suppress targets Training can consist of driver’s train- CPT Scott Schenking holds a BA and assist in directing their wingman ing through a city, target acquisition in Business Finance from Loyola into position while still remaining in a lanes, as well as scenario-based lanes College, Baltimore, Md. His military relatively protected position. The Brad- which rehearse the cooperation be- ley is most effective in BUAs because tween armor and infantry. The key education includes the Armor Offi- of its short gun tube length and ability task to successful MOUT operations is cer Basic Course, Scout Platoon to traverse rapidly. A tank and Bradley well rehearsed communication at the Leaders Course, Battalion Motor mix provides a highly effective team in lowest level between dismounts, ar- Officers Course, Armor Officer Ad- MOUT. mor, air assets, and indirect fire. vanced Course, Combined Services Movement through the streets should MOUT operations cannot be success- Staff School, and the Cavalry Lead- ful without synchronization of all ele- ers Course. He was assigned to 1st be conducted with dismounts forward ments at platoon level and lower. One to clear corners and blind spots. The ID at Ft. Riley, Kan., from 1993- Bradley should provide immediate pro- of the best resources for preparing for 1997. While assigned to the divi- MOUT training is FKSM 17-90-10, sion’s cavalry squadron, 1-4 Cav, tection for dismounts. Its 25mm can Armor in MOUT. This short supple- penetrate concrete and suppress any he served as assistant operations target within a BUA. Tanks following mentary manual lays out the doctrine and specific techniques to be used in a officer. Following the reflagging of the Bradley provide the immediate abil- MOUT environment. the 1st AD, he served with the 1-37 ity to react to another armored force as Armor as tank platoon leader and well as clear obstacles and destroy bun- Conclusion with the 1-13 Armor as C Company kers. The tank is especially vulnerable We learned several critical lessons in a BUA. Each tank must be covered XO. He concluded his tour at Ft. by a wingman to prevent dismounts from our MOUT training. First, that Riley as the aide-de-camp to the armor is highly vulnerable in a MOUT assistant division commander for from moving to its rear. Tanks are best environment. Despite the tactics that left in supporting positions in more maneuver. At Fort Hood, he served open areas so that they can provide we employed to mitigate the risk to our as the plans officer for the 4th Avia- armor forces, they remained at great their own security and still provide rapid risk to close-range antitank fire. The tion Brigade, 4th ID (Mech), the 1- protection against armored forces.2 best way to mitigate risk is to keep ar- 10 Cav Squadron assistant S3, the The weapons effects for each weapon mored forces outside the city, allowing squadron S4, and as HHT and A system differ and provide distinct advan- them to suppress from a more secure Troop commander. CPT Schenking tages when used appropriately. FM 90-10 attack-by-fire position. Another key departs command for Dutch Lan- describes the effects of each weapon sys- lesson is that combined arms coordina- guage training in Washington, D.C. ARMOR — March-April 2001 17 Hacking Our Way to Victory?

An American Weapon for the 21st Century

by Major Robert Bateman

“Revolution in Military Affairs”: A times in fact, but actually being at fundamental change in the nature of war “We may realize that our DEFCON was different. For the first occurring in a relatively short period of time in either of their young lives they time, stemming from changes in organi- true potential as a nation, were truly experiencing sensory over- zation, military doctrine, economic/so- and by extension that of load. Nothing before this had ever ex- cial/political factors, or technology.1 our military, lies not in the cited their interests in quite the same way. Frankly, nothing “IRL” before This article explores some of our cur- fact that we have the most rent definitions about war and military DEFCON ’04 had much interested main battle tanks, but in the them at all.6 They, like roughly two affairs. By addressing a few simple million others in their age group, were questions, such as, “What is a weap- fact that we have 45 million on?” we may come closer to determin- children who are perfectly children of the wired world. ing the real strengths of the United comfortable using 700 MhZ Wandering from booth to booth, they States. We may realize that our true salivated over the goodies displayed. potential as a nation, and by extension computers to play games.” Laptops with gig chips were the latest that of our military, lies not in the fact rage, though the potential speed advan- that we have the most main battle tages of the conventional desktops were tanks, but in the fact that we have 45 tantalizing as well. Yet for all the million children who are perfectly com- we need to re-examine our other defini- hardware and “straight” software fortable using 700 MhZ computers to tions, such as that for “weapons.” In available on the floor at all hours, it play games. The “revolution” that the undertaking such a fundamental reas- was the “sub market” that held the United States is widely suggested to be sessment, we need to examine a basic most attraction for both of them. Both leading in military affairs may have idea: what is the intended end-state that were self-declared hackers, and for less to do with our expensive net of in- we create “weapons” to achieve? We them the DEFCON was just short of telligence tools and precision missiles, design those things that we refer to as Mecca. and more to do with the fact that our “weapons” to destroy things, but their country is so technologically saturated Turning the corner of yet another row purpose in doing so is to compel. (That of vendors they ran straight into a sight that we have more than a million peo- is, if we accept that the purpose of war they would not have believed if they ple who consider themselves “hackers.”2 from the American viewpoint is not were not seeing it with their own eyes. Many of the historically minded sug- destruction for destruction’s sake but gest that we may have, over the last compelling another to accede to your For years, the U.S. Department of De- will through the use or threat of the use fifty years, re-entered a period of “lim- 4 fense had taken to setting up a booth at ited war” such as existed in Europe of force. ) Thus far in human history, DEFCON. Mostly these contained staid during the seventeenth and eighteenth the most direct method to force another literature and descriptions of lame centuries. Although at this point the polity to accede to your wishes was to work at pay levels that were (for IT Army still lacks an official definition of physically destroy so much of the specialists) the equivalent of slave la- what a war is, and by extension what a things that they valued (be it human life bor. Even the language used for most of war is not, we continue to wrestle with or property) that they were convinced their older hardware systems, ADA, the idea. The irony is that we already that the balance and momentum of the was an antiquated beast. Moreover, the have several modifications and refine- war were not in their favor (and there- word had spread, top-down control and ments of the concept of armed conflict fore future prospects were bleak) and authoritarian bosses were not elements (high, low, medium intensity for exam- their most logical act was surrender in the favored environment of most of ple). At the same time, we are at a loss and/or a negotiated cessation of hostili- the industry. The D.O.D. had become to adequately explain the vast realm of ties. This concept is the foundation to something of a joke at DEFCON in the activities that take place short of de- our modern perception of what “war” past few years, relegated to a corner means. But what if there were another clared war but in the absence of peace.3 booth on a dead-end traffic lane in the If we, the military forces of the United route to threaten the things that another convention floor layout. States, are not considering these issues polity valued, even human life, without in any sort of organized manner, who committing direct physical violence. Is What faced D/L and L.O.D. now was is? In another article, I suggested that that war? nothing like what they’d heard about we define war as, Department of Defense displays of pre- Download and the vious years. Smack dab in the middle of “The state that exists when one polity Lord of Destruction publicly commits to prolonged and a high traffic lane at the epicenter of D/L and L.O.D. wandered through the the convention midway stood a flat significant violence upon another polity black cube, eighty feet on a side. Noth- in order to force it to accede to its will.” cavernous convention center in a daze for the first half of the day.5 True, each ing on the outside gave evidence of the Given our difficulty defining even had been to numerous sites offering the purpose for this massive block. On the such a simple word as “war,” perhaps “virtual DEFCON” tour before, many side of the box, in black lettering of a 18 ARMOR — March-April 2001

slightly different pitch there were the physiological drain of the time and campuses or in a few cases to high letters, in lower case, “d.o.d.,” and attention quietly left with him. As he schools. Rumors, especially ones about nothing else. A single passageway stood walked out, he saw a young fresh face legendary cracking episodes, spread available for entrance into the cube. moving through the entrance portal to fast. In this case the rumors were con- Standing in line awaiting entrance to the chair where he’d been… “this is stantly fueled by more hard facts. Over the cube, as though it were the Grotto dod” said the screen. the course of the following year, the of Bethlehem or perhaps more appro- identity of only four more people that priately the entrance to the Borg, were D/L moved zombie-like behind the si- had managed to crack the “dod” would lent and implicitly sinister agent of the no fewer than four hundred of their government, for now it appeared that come to light, but by that time the pat- peers. Resistance was futile. Without a tern would be set. word they both got in line. No ques- reality would bend to meet expecta- tions. In a second room, a much D/L was, he soon learned, one of the tions were asked, and none had to be. smaller room within the cube, he came ‘25,’ the top half of the fifty that had Two hours later they gained entrance. to rest on one side of a table. There succeeded in breaking in during DEF- The passage alone met all of their ex- were two chairs to the table. On the CON ’04. Though neither he nor any of pectations. No signatures, no social table were a keyboard, a pad and a the other top half would reveal the spe- security, no personal information…a screen, and a tablet of paper, a simple cifics of what they had been asked to digital thumbprint and retinal scan in a contract. It was frightening in simplic- do, leaks were part of the process. D/L foyer just inside the entrance and then ity. In return for one year of allegiance wasn’t getting paid, in the conventional nirvana. Spread before them were desk- to the United States, it promised access sense. He was richly rewarded in the tops and laptops and piles of CDs, each to the best technology in the world…for currency he most valued though. He in a discreet cubicle. Entranced and one year. The language was that plain, was now a de facto celebrity, a super- stunned, they moved forward and sepa- and that alone was frightening in its star in the only community that mat- rated, each to his own cubicle. power. The man in black said, “You tered to him. As one of the ‘50,’ he had have two minutes. Do you have any what every hacker seeks, bragging The second that each sat down in their ergonomic chairs there appeared sim- questions?” When D/L shook his head rights that won’t bring the Department the man immediately turned and left the of Justice to your front door at six in ple words on the screens of their flat tiny cell. the morning. He had hacked ‘dod’ and screen monitors, words that spoke to every fiber of their 19-year-old souls. Seventeen seconds later D/L signed only 50 others had been able to do that in the time allotted. He was, by every- “this is d.o.d.” his name, placed his eye at the retinal one’s account, one of the best. scan portal, and joined, whether he “this system has never been cracked” knew it or not, the Second United States What he had been asked to do in re- “break in and you may join” Cyber Corps. turn for the equipment and access, col- laboratively with the others when pos- “your qualification will only last one An hour after D/L got back to his sible, alone when he felt the need, was year” dorm at Caltech there was a knock at the door. Three men in black suits to design the environment to be cracked “details to follow…if you succeed” at DEFCON ’05. That’s all. He could stood in the doorway. Around them work on the challenge when he wanted, The screen blanked. It appeared that were a host of boxes, at least twenty of the system rebooted, when it came up varying sizes, all of them flat black, all in any way that he wanted, using any language he wanted. Total creative again a standard boot sequence started stamped “dod” in black lettering. The programming freedom. It became a and offered them their choice of operat- tallest of the men in black held out a ing systems. D/L chose a Windows en- computer clipboard. Upon the screen labor of love. Twenty-five Doctors Frankenstein worked together over a vironment while L.O.D. picked Linux. all it said was “Equipment received.” year. Significantly, these were the bet- When the boot sequence completed D/L pressed his thumb to the screen there was arrayed for them on the desk- and the men left. Inside the boxes were ter half of the ‘50.’ They created a monster, surely no one could crack it. top the most comprehensive cracker the wet dreams incarnate of every tech- Over the course of the year, most of the library either had ever seen, and noth- nophile in the world and a note. “In- ing else. stallation of hardware: You. Network buzz and tech-media attention focused on this half of the group. Nobody was Like many of their peers neither of installation Tuesday, 2100.” quite sure what the other half was do- them would leave for more than 16 D/L was instantly a celebrity across ing, but by most accounts it amounted straight hours. the entire campus, despite the fact that to some simple contract work… he was a freshman. On the entire Cal- In the sixteenth hour, L.O.D. left. He When D/L arrived in Las Vegas for was tired, had not bathed in more than tech campus, only five people had re- the start of DEFCON ’06, he was ac- ceived similar deliveries, and everyone 36 hours, and wanted to see some of knew within hours who they were, two customed to celebrity, yet for all that he the fabled sights of Las Vegas. Twelve was somewhat apprehensive. Last year minutes later D/L made it in. His professors and three students. Word on he and the others from “The Fifth De- the street had it that their arch-rival, screen went black again. MIT, had only four packages delivered viation” (another nickname for those of the top ‘25,’ derived from the fact that “yes” and backbone connections installed; it was estimated that they were five the rest were assumedly scattered Six seconds later a bald man of inde- across the nation. standard deviations above the “norm” terminate age wearing a black suit and in programmer and/or hacker skills) sunglasses appeared at his shoulder. By the end of the week, thirty people had been barred from entering the “Will you come with me sir?” the man had been identified as having received cube. Although those from “the fourth” asked. D/L, somewhat numbed by the the ominous packages across the coun- had been allowed to enter with the rest emotional high of the crack and the try. All of these had been to college of the applicants, everyone was waiting ARMOR — March-April 2001 19

to see what would happen this year they are asked to do, explore the com- The components of the system have when a “fifth” tried to gain entry. puter infrastructure of, say, China. Of been studied and dissected for more course, it lays the groundwork for so than two hundred years. The two major When the first of them reached the front of the line last year (a line that much more… in fact, it might really factors that contributed to Napoleon’s reflect the true nature of the current success were his relative velocity in was twice the length of the one in ’04), “Revolution.” comparison to his opponents at all lev- one of the ubiquitous-but-silent MIBs stepped out of the portal and quietly To understand some of this, however, els of warfare and the size of the forces he could field. Speed and mass were barred her way. That was enough. we must look backwards. the central elements of the Napoleonic There had been no explanation, nor warning, but none of the 25 protested. The Napoleonic “Revolution” game, and they were achieved through several interrelated changes. To do so would have been against their Napoleon Bonaparte is credited by own emerging code of conduct; be- Speed sides, they expected this. They assumed, many with a military revolution all to himself, the “Napoleonic Revolution” Speed, being on the enemy before the correctly that they would only be al- of the beginning of the 19th century. It enemy could prepare for battle, was lowed in the next year…” is not overstating the case to say that Napoleon’s earliest advantage. The Although this story presents an obvi- from roughly 1796 through his final French achieved this speed through ously fictional sequence of events in defeat at Waterloo in 1815, Napoleon’s some doctrinal adjustments adopted by the near future, and portions of the acts system of warfare reigned supreme. Napoleon. One of the best known was recommended may well be pat- the use of the corps structure ently illegal under current legisla- and the deliberate movement tion, the story presented above along several parallel routes as a serves as a useful illustration of means of increasing the speed of several concepts. D/L and L.O.D., the overall army. Napoleon re- although fictional, are fairly typical ferred to this as the Battalion depictions of a subculture that has Carré.8 He used the formation few common denominators beyond to famous effect in 1805 during a profound distrust of the govern- the Ulm campaign and the next ment, and specifically the military. year during the campaign The irony is that they simultane- against the Prussians that ended ously represent both a significant in the dual battle of Jena- threat to our computer infrastruc- Auerstadt. Yet this operational ture integrity as well as our great- maneuver formation required est potential resource. What if the something that the armies of United States could tap into those Napoleon’s opponents did not million hackers we produce? What initially have in their toolbags, if we established a process, a meri- which is why only Napoleon tocracy, where the technology and Art by SGT Benjamin S. Ormand could move with such a great the hacker subculture itself worked relative velocity. It requires a to continually strengthen our informa- That is, all belligerents, if they main- competent officer corps. The doctrinal tion technology lead? D/L is part of tained any hope for success, either had concepts had existed for some time that process, as each year the best of to adopt some aspects of the Napole- before Napoleon put them into practice, the best spend a year creating an even onic system, or develop tools of their but it required a social change for an tougher “d.o.d.” site to be cracked at own to counteract that system. In either army to be capable of executing the the next DEFCON, thus creating a sort case, even after the apogee of the ideas. of virtual “natural selection.” French Empire passed, all belligerents were in a reactive mode in relation to The French officer corps of the Napo- The lower half of the top fifty is the empire of Napoleon. For a long leonic era promoted upon merit. Nu- asked, but significantly not “hired” and time, especially in military circles, the merous historians have pointed to the not compelled, to undertake a whole “Napoleonic Revolution in Military early siege of Toulon in 1793, when host of assignments. Some, in fact most Affairs” was credited to Napoleon him- Napoleon was a mere artillery captain. of these, are entirely benign. The tasks self. During the course of that siege, he themselves are selected by psycholo- came in contact with several other gists to lead these individuals to arrive I suggest, however, that Napoleon was French leaders, common soldiers who at certain conclusions. They may get a merely the right man at the right time. would within little more than a decade file folder filled with a few articles For all his genius, Napoleon was ar- be generals or marshals of France. from the Washington Post and the New guably just a good jockey riding the York Times on recent changes in best horse in town. The question then These were men such as Jean Junot (a China’s attitude towards the internet. becomes one of trying to figure out sergeant who becomes a general), An- There may also be an article or two what made the horse so damned fast, dré Massena (an ex-smuggler, and for- about Tienamen Square for “back- not why was the jockey winning all of mer company sergeant, who becomes ground,” and perhaps a few explaining the time.7 What then was the basis for a marshal), Auguste Marmont (who Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” (and the the phenomenal French success during started as an artillery sergeant, was a thousands killed in that process) so that this era? To answer that, and pull a major at Toulon and would become a the individual knows something about little wisdom from history, requires marshal), Claude Victor (the infantry the people that design the systems they some understanding of the Napoleonic sergeant who leads an assault at Tou- are asked to explore. That is all that system. lon, and will later become a marshal), 20 ARMOR — March-April 2001

and Louis Suchet (who starts out as a a change in technology, or even a As the head of the “War Section” of common soldier).9 In the French army, change in the military organization it- the revolutionary French government, men earned their positions primarily self, it was a social concept which came Carnot had great power. He was, for all (though admittedly not entirely) through about with the French Revolution. intents and purposes, the man that cre- the demonstration of their abilities; ated the weapon that Napoleon wielded this was especially true in the earliest Yet this also was not an original idea to such great effect. Carnot was the of Napoleon’s, merely one that he was days of the Republic. While other ar- in the unique position to put into opera- man that reorganized the chaotic mess mies of the day permitted the purchase 13 that the French military had become in of nearly all ranks, with the attendant tion. Again, if foraging was so effi- the wake of the Revolution. Remember, cient, why was Napoleon the only one inconsistencies of quality, the French using it at first? all the French officers used to be noble system found the best and elevated prior to 1789. Imagine an army where them. Without this system, the opera- The answer to both of the questions 90 percent of the officers just quit one tion of independent columns operating posed above is that none of the other day and you have some idea of the under guidance (as opposed to restric- nations were prepared socially. This scale of the administrative nightmare tive directions) would likely fall apart was the end of the age of absolute facing Carnot. More important even under pressure of enemy contact.10 monarchies, but they would not go eas- than that contribution was his organiza- This raises the obvious question, if ily. They were not willing, or were un- tion of society. merit-based promotion is so advanta- able, to effect the same changes within France, by population, was the largest geous, why were the other nations of their societies as had the French and nation in Europe. The issue then was Europe incapable or unwilling to use therefore could not execute the same this system? changes. Remember that the definition not one of a lack of bodies, it was a total lack of a system to get those bod- On a similar theme, the French of a “Revolution in Military Affairs” ies into uniforms. For all intents and espoused here encompasses changes in achieved speed through their reversal technology, organization, doctrine, or purposes, Carnot is the father of the of the traditional methods of logistic modern draft. It is his implementation support. Foraging while on the move is social/political/economic factors. It was, of the Leveé en Masse that brings Na- in fact, the social changes brought to considerable less resource intensive and the front by the French Revolution that poleon’s field army strength up to the comparatively faster than support by half million mark and beyond again and wagon train from the rear. While the was at the root of the “Napoleonic again for nearly twenty years. (The Revolution.” armies of the “Age of Limited War” total army strength might reach into the that preceded Napoleon’s relied upon The whole mess is intricately knotted millions. Not a bad record for a pre- an extensive system of supply bases together. For example, the aforemen- industrial society.) Carnot truly earned and created a logistics tail that stretched tioned use of independent corps forma- his nickname as the “Organizer of Vic- from the area of tactical operations all tions, one of the key elements to the tory.” The question that this lesson in the way back to the strategic center of success of Napoleon, was itself de- Napoleonic history leaves us asking is, that nation, Napoleon relied primarily pendent upon the existence of compe- who is our Carnot today? 11 upon foraging. This was another rea- tent officers. The mass of competent Conclusion son for the dispersal of his forces: it officers could only be provided by a took a considerable amount of territory system of merit based promotion. Merit Perhaps we need not worry over much to support a corps, or an army on the promotions were only possible in 18th this year or the next on the exact struc- move. Were he to move along a single Century Europe in a nation that em- ture of the IBCT or whether the next route, the surrounding territory would braced the ideas of equality and egali- armored vehicle will have wheels or be stripped clean by his lead corps, tarianism. At that time, this was found tracks. Maybe the present day infan- leaving no alternative for the following in only one nation, revolutionary trymen who are panicked because some corps but to rely upon logistics pushed France. So as we can see, the whole idiot is trying to foist a 22-pound rifle from the rear.12 By using multiple ave- issue of “Speed” comes back not to the off on us are worried about the wrong nues, he spread the logistic burden “genius of Napoleon” but to the social issue. Our real strength, as an Army and across a broader front. changes wrought by the French Revo- as a nation, may not rest in the mere lution. weapons that we are using today, just The great advantage in speed that the as Napoleon’s real strength was not French enjoyed due to their use of a Mass logistics system based primarily upon really a military strength at all, but a social one. foraging was also dependent upon so- The second aspect that made Napo- cial changes, in this case the effects of leon’s armies what they were was un- None of this is to suggest that we nationalism. Soldiers of revolutionary doubtedly their size. Napoleon himself abandon the field of battle. Tanks, at- France, motivated to fight for the new was famously quoted as claiming that tack helicopters, field artillery, and idea of the French nation, an idea that God was on the side of the largest bat- infantryman will have a role in war so they participated in, were generally less talions. By extension, one could say long as man retains the willingness to prone to the great bane of the royal that this extended to the size of the attach a rock to a stick and bash in his armies of the era, desertion. This is an army overall. Napoleonic armies bal- fellow man’s skull. That will not go important idea, especially if one hopes looned in size. This was not only be- away. What we are seeing, however, is to allow large numbers of soldiers to cause of the influence that new motiva- a new aspect to the violence. We are disperse across the countryside with tions such as nationalism had upon the seeing, potentially, a subtle new way to very little “loyal” (read officer) super- common man, but because the state destroy your opponent, one that we in vision in search of provisions. Thus, the finally organized itself to more com- the United States are uniquely posi- true change that enabled the French pletely mobilize the people. One man tioned to exploit. We have the human shift in logistics, and therefore aided in gets the lion’s share of the credit for potential to execute this in a way that their increase in relative speed, was not making that happen, Lazar Carnot. no other society does. We practically ARMOR — March-April 2001 21

breed the type of behavior that pro- institutional accreditation. In the words of one 9The author wishes to thank Major James duces hackers. Harnessing that energy hacker friend of the author, “The guys with Haynesworth for his assistance in identifying would represent a true American ad- Ph.D.s are the slugs that didn’t get the six figure these leaders. vantage, one that cannot be simply cop- offers when we were undergrads so they HAD to 10Much the same argument has been raised in a stay in school. They couldn’t get a job anywhere more modern context by Don Vandergriff in his ied by another nation unless they be- else.” come just like us. Something that many argumentative essay, “The Culture Wars,” in are unwilling to do. 3Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and its Digital War, A View from the Front Lines, Robert subset Military Operations Other Than War L. Bateman, ed. (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, The “Napoleonic Revolution” did not (MOOTW) are obviously the first stumbling 1999), 231-240. Vandergriff argues that the originate inside the military; it was steps towards rectifying this doctrinal gap, yet United States Army, and especially the officer merely the military taking advantage of there remains a long way to go in filling in all the corps, has moved away from any true form of a social difference that existed between gaps. Partially due to intellectual limitations meritocracy over the course of the past century in French society and the rest of Europe. imposed by the Constitution and the Congress favor of a centrally directed bureaucratically upon the United States Military (and especially inspired process of “norming.” This article suggests that the real bene- the U.S. Army) we as an institution are loath to 11For explanation of pre-Napoleonic logistics fit of our current “military revolution” address some areas of conflict. Because the mili- during the era of the Ancien Regime see John A. has yet to be recognized and capitalized tary is so completely subordinated to civil control Lynn, “Food, Funds, and Fortresses: Resource upon. Our national edge stems from the in the United States, there appears to be an almost Mobilization and Positional Warfare in the Cam- pathologic reluctance to consider political factors fact that in this country every single six paigns of Louis XIV,” in Feeding Mars, Logistics as they apply to war. (For a brief overview of the year old, regardless of economic strata, in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the history of this relationship see, Robert L. Bate- has used computers more powerful than Present, John A. Lynn, ed. (Boulder, Colo.: man, “Without Malice, Without Sympathy: Civil- all five of those that took the original Westview Press, 1993), 137-159. A succinct ian Antipathy for the Military, 1607-2000,” Army Space Shuttle into orbit. (Think about explanation of Napoleon’s methods of logistics is 49, No.1 (January 1999): 36-47.) This does not Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the how much computing power is in the negate the fact that war is, at the ultimate level, a Age of Napoleon, (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana standard Nintendo 64.) The fact that we political act. A prime example of this phenomena University Press, 1978), 129-130. probably have more than a million kids is the uniquely American military reluctance to in this nation capable of breaking into consider something as fundamental as economic 12David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napo- moderately secured computer sites warfare using civil assets in the prosecution of leon, (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1966), should not be viewed as a threat by the national goals short of or as a part of a larger war 829, 855-856. This method backfired horribly Department of Defense… it’s our effort. (Think of the potential for destruction during the retreat from Moscow in the 1812 greatest national weapon! We just have embodied by the assets of, for example, Solo- campaign. Accounts, or more specifically inter- to figure out how to aim the damned man-Smith Barney or Merril Lynch, let alone pretations of the accounts differ, but nobody manipulation of the lending rate by Alan Green- disagrees with the assertion that Napoleon’s lo- thing. span.) gistic method broke down in this case. It was not 4 so much that there were no supplies, it was that As with all definitions, this still leaves some there was no adequate method of distribution. gaps at the edges. Ethnic cleansing, or more ac- Notes curately genocide as an objective in war, does not 13Ibid., 139. Although it is important to note that there was an element of individual genius in 1Robert L. Bateman, “Preface,” in Digital War, attempt to compel, it seeks destruction. It is alien Napoleon’s actions, it should also be pointed out A View from the Front Lines, Robert L. Bateman, to the American concept of war. We recognize that most of his doctrinal “innovations” had actu- ed. (Presidio, 1999), viii-ix. This definition itself the violence, but do not associate with the intent. ally been created decades earlier. Pierre de Bour- is derived from that in use in the Department of 5 DEFCON is one of the more popular hacker cet’s Principe de La Guerre des Montagnes, History at the United States Military Academy conventions. This year (2001) it will be held in written at least 25 years before Napoleon’s rise to and was the joint creation of several officers and Las Vegas. See http://www.defcon.org/. The list power (and one of his favorite books) contained historians. of popular hacker/Phreak websites linked at the the idea of operational maneuver by advancing 2The growing opinion among both our allies defcon webpage is a useful starting point to un- upon multiple parallel routes while Guibert’s and those that may be our competitors is that the derstanding the phenomenon. “D/L” and book Essai Général de Tactique (1772) contains current transformation of war that most acknowl- “L.O.D.” are rather typical of the types of screen the ideas that Napoleon put into use at the tactical edge is underway is an almost uniquely American names assumed by modern, if juvenile hackers. level. To some degree they are just being prudent, in phenomena. This theme is brought home again and again in essays from the French, English, that there are a fair number of “official” institu- Chinese, and Russians that appear in international tions more than a little interested in their collec- defense trade journals. The reason is related to tive activities. The curious fact is that even when MAJ Robert Bateman is currently a our technology, and the satuaration of technology people of this subculture meet in person, they Military History instructor at West in our nation. See Martin C. Libicki, “What is often continue to refer to themselves and each Point. He received his MA from Ohio Information Warfare?” in Toward a Revolution in other by their on-line “screen names.” State University, where he is now a Military Affairs, Defense and Security at the 6“IRL” is online shorthand for “In Real Life.” Ph.D. candidate. He previously Dawn of the Twenty-First Century, Thierry 7 Gongora and Harald von Riekhoff, ed. (Westport, This is not to say that Napoleon was not a mili- served as a company commander in Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2000), 51. Libicki tary genius; clearly he was. Arguably no one 2-7 Cav, 1st Cav Div. He is a grad- quotes a statistic that some 60% of current U.S. without his unique combination of intelligence, uate of IOBC, Airborne, Air Assault, candidates for the Ph.D. in computer science are insecurity, megalomania and daring could have “scrambled to victory” in such a consistent man- and Ranger courses, as well as the not U.S. nationals. He therefore suggests that AOAC. A frequent contributor to much of the threat from hackers is increasingly ner. For a well reasoned revisionist look into the external. Nothing could be farther from the truth. leadership of Napoleon, see Owen Connelly, ARMOR and other military journals, The strange fact of the digital generation is that Blundering to Glory, Napoleon’s Military Cam- he recently edited Digital War: A unlike MOST professions, academic training is paigns, (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1987). View from the Front Lines, and is the often viewed as a value detractor. Few top pro- author of an upcoming book on the grammers (or hackers) have so much as a masters 8The doctrinal innovation belongs to another, degree in computer science, let alone a Ph.D. The but Napoleon certainly gets the credit for being Korean War incident at No Gun Ri. cultural trend is towards “tinkering” and self- the first to apply the doctrine to a concrete situa- He welcomes comments at his email education rather than any formal education and tion. address: [email protected] 22 ARMOR — March-April 2001

The Three Tank Platoon, A Consideration For Army XXI

by Major Kevin D. Stringer and Major D. André Hall

With the advent of the new Army XXI two separate sections. The tank heavy division and General Shinseki’s platoon moves, attacks, defends lighter brigade initiative, the U.S. Army and performs other essential takes a major step toward the creation tasks to support the company of smaller, but more lethal and flexible team’s mission.” Command and formations for achieving victory on the control of the three-vehicle battlefields of the 21st century. This M1A2 tank platoon flattens the new design is intended to yield a force leadership challenge for the pla- that is better suited to responding to a toon’s leaders and focuses lead- wider spectrum of conflict than today’s ership at the critical point within existing formations. a unitary organization. Platoon This trend in force restructuring cre- gunnery, tactical training, logis- tics functions, and manning re- ates other opportunities for re-engi- quirements are examples of is- neering divisional sub-formations while enhancing overall combat effective- sues that can be simplified by the adoption of the three-vehicle ness. One such opportunity would be a tank platoon. shift from a four-vehicle armored pla- toon to one founded on three armored Recent experiments conducted Art by SGT Benjamin S. Ormand vehicles. This transformation offers a by the PLT/CO/TM Branch, force package design which, although Doctrine Division, Directorate of visibility, the platoon leader is better revolutionary in nature, hones the ap- Training and Doctrine Development able to see and direct the efforts of his plication of the armored force on the (DTDD), at the U.S. Army Armor Cen- unit. Conversely, his subordinate vehi- battlefield, strengthens combat leader- ter have shown that the M1A2 is capa- cles can better orient on his direction of ship roles, and realizes training and ble of operating on wider frontages at a travel or main effort. cost efficiencies. This radical change in faster pace than previous main battle Gunnery and tactical employment are force structure and employment doc- vehicles. This wider battlespace offers enhanced by the systems that the M1A2 trine would have a dramatic effect, both the armor leader new challenges in fields. With the M1A2, direct fire en- on the Active Component (AC) and the command and control that could be gagements may be acquired and served Reserve Component (RC) armored overcome by reorganization into three- faster and more effectively then ever forces. vehicle platoons. With three tanks, the before. Based on these refinements, the The current family of M1 main battle armor platoon leader could better con- withdrawal of the fourth vehicle from trol the movement and fire of his unit the tank platoon speeds individual, tanks provides a combat platform un- while maintaining full observation in matched in the history of the U.S. ar- crew, and platoon level gunnery and mored corps and is a catalyst for this his platoon battlespace. The DTDD tactical training without reducing fire- experiments showed that although power. This advantage is especially force structure change. This combat “digitized units will communicate digi- system, combined within a three-tank useful for RC formations that have lim- platoon structure, offers the U.S. Army tally before the direct fire fight, once ited amounts of collective training time close combat with the enemy begins, throughout the year. This lack of suffi- the chance to refine the armor platoon voice communications rule.” We can into an organization that operates and cient collective training time is a major trains aggressively with a high degree infer from this statement that, despite weakness of Reserve Component armor the advent of faster paced situations combat units and has the resultant of firepower and mobility, while at the catalyzed by the M1A2’s capabilities same time reducing operational and negative impact on leader development. logistical costs. Ultimately, the three- and digitization, reliance on tried and Changing to three-vehicle platoons true visual and formation techniques of would alleviate this shortfall in collec- tank platoon offers the Army the oppor- command and control will be employed tunity to concentrate on the develop- tive combat training opportunities by ment of junior armor leaders and opti- in future operations. simplifying gunnery and optimizing use of training time. The three-vehicle con- mizes limited training time. These ad- The three-tank platoon enhances the vantages enable the Army to build co- cept places the platoon leader at the hesive units ready to face the battlefield combination of digitization and cur- spearhead of his platoon for gunnery rently applied techniques of command challenges of today and tomorrow. and collective training, leading from and control by demanding less of the the position of greatest maneuver and The most critical component of any platoon leadership while still support- fire opportunity. He becomes the main combat organization and its underpin- ing the advancement in systems focus of the platoon’s efforts. ning technology is its method of em- through simplification of the battle- ployment. By definition and doctrinal- space. Simply stated, during the heat of Logistically, support of the three- ly, “the tank platoon is organized to a direct fire engagement, in rough ter- vehicle unit provides the platoon- fight as one maneuver element, not as rain, or under conditions of reduced through-division-level structure with a ARMOR — March-April 2001 23

simplification of the entire armor- and/or if the fourth vehicle is deadlined would be a revolutionary step in force related support package. Platoon lead- due to cost-driven supply constraints, structure reform. Defense industry lob- ers, relieved of a fourth vehicle, can this point is moot anyway. bying and armor branch political con- focus their maintenance efforts on three siderations aside, a three-tank platoon vehicles. The removal of this fourth Lastly, the concept of massed armor structure simplifies command and con- operations like those planned in Europe vehicle would have a ripple effect, cre- and those carried out in Southwest Asia trol, creates cost savings logistically, ating a cost, time, and effort savings optimizes reduced training time by sim- throughout the logistical configuration would no longer be possible due to the plifying gunnery and collective train- overall reduction in tank numbers re- of the division. Further, a three-tank sulting from the introduction of the ing, and places the platoon leader at the platoon would allow for easier deploy- spearhead of his unit. In terms of man- ment of armor assets overseas by im- three-tank platoon. Current and future ning, a three-vehicle platoon more threats, however, do not appear to offer proving space availability on air or sea the kind of Cold War challenge that closely correlates with the Army’s cur- transports. rent era of reduced manpower. Al- required fielding massed armored for- though the benefits of the three-tank Manning of the three-vehicle tank pla- mations on the battlefield. toon would not change dramatically platoon apply to the Total Force, RC In terms of actual experience with this armor units would benefit the most from current manning schemes. The concept, the structural shift from a from the three-tank concept since it three-tank platoon would retain the lieutenant platoon leader, sergeant first four-tank platoon to a three-tank pla- optimizes limited training time. This toon has been successfully implement- opportunity for force structure reform class platoon sergeant, and a staff ser- ed by the Swiss Army. Their Army 95 should be discussed and evaluated, but geant as a section leader. At first glance, this leadership structure appears reform reconfigured the size of the not overlooked, as we move towards Swiss military based upon the post- Army XXI. to be heavy. Given current demands for Cold War security environment. The faster paced (challenging) and varied combat and non-standard operations introduction of the German Leopard II tank provided the Swiss a combat plat- using digital systems against poten- form similar to the M1A2 to give impe- MAJ Kevin D. Stringer is a 1987 tially extremely capable opposing graduate of the U.S. Military Acad- forces, the leader-to-led ratio must in- tus to this change. Simultaneously, the creation of consolidated armored for- emy with a BS in military history. He crease, starting in the tank platoon. The mations at the brigade level allowed for has an MA in international relations typical roles of each leader position from Boston University and is cur- would not change significantly within a concentration of firepower to over- come the loss of one cannon at the pla- the three-vehicle tank platoon. rently enrolled in a doctoral program toon level. with the University of Zurich, where The three-vehicle tank platoon creates he is researching the Swiss Army. He a number of issues that must be ad- One of the key outcomes of Swiss is presently serving as an IMA Staff dressed when considering this idea for Army 95 reform was a major reduction Officer with HQ European Command implementation. The withdrawal of a in training time for combat units. The tank and tank crew affects the availabil- Swiss Army is essentially a militia in Stuttgart, Germany. On active duty, ity of soldiers in an already limited army based upon universal conscription he served as an aeroscout platoon organization. The reality of current with a very small cadre of professional leader and brigade headquarters manning levels, however, often shows instructors. Prior to Army 95 reform, company XO in the 8th ID. His re- that this crew is already missing from most soldiers had three to four weeks serve assignments include opera- many platoons and companies. In fact, of training at the unit level per year. tions officer (IMA) and XO (IMA) with given the difficulties in recruiting and With Army 95, this cycle changed to 6th Aviation Company, Southern retention that currently plague the two weeks every second year for most European Task Force, Vicenza, It- Army — and will continue to do so in combat arms formations. Simultane- aly. In his civilian profession, he is the future because of austere defense ously, both officer and noncommis- an international banker with UBS in funding and a strong civilian economy sioned officer basic training was re- — the three-tank platoon actually in- duced. With this reduction in training Zurich, Switzerland. creases the chance that armor platoons time, a three-tank platoon facilitates will be fully manned, despite reduced movement expertise, gunnery profi- MAJ D. André Hall is a 1987 grad- personnel intake, because fewer spaces ciency, and command and control for uate of Texas A&M University with a will need to be filled. soldiers and leaders who receive a bare BA in history. Currently, he serves minimum of training and practice to Another issue is that the leadership as an IMA logistics operations officer dynamic learned by leading within a maintain combat expertise. The reduc- with HQ USAREUR, ODCSLOG in tion in firepower is compensated for in Heidelberg, Germany. His previous four-vehicle platoon would be absent. the new brigades, where all tanks are The importance of this point is debat- assignments include scout platoon able in terms of platoon leader devel- consolidated in one mobile unit under a division headquarters. Further, in terms leader; HHT XO, 2d Sqdn, 11th opment. Does one less vehicle create a of cost, the Swiss generate savings by ACR; and adjutant 1st Sqdn, 11th less capable platoon leader? Probably ACR; assistant operations and plans not. The counter-argument is that a having 10 tanks per company instead of 13. This reduction lowers direct pur- officer, 313th RTOC, Base Defense three-tank unit allows the platoon chase costs by requiring fewer vehicles leader to better focus his time and re- Liaison team leader, and S4, 303d sources, in garrison and in the field, to and reduces logistics expenditures be- ROC. In his civilian profession, he is cause of simplified maintenance. maximize his training and maintenance a transportation specialist with the efforts. If the platoon has four tanks but The introduction of the three tank pla- U.S. Army Transportation Manage- no crew to man the fourth vehicle toon for the Army XXI heavy division ment Center, Europe, Grafenwoehr. 24 ARMOR — March-April 2001

Redefining the Role Of the Command Sergeant Major In a Tactical Environment by Command Sergeant Major James L. DePriest and Colonel Oscar R. Anderson

As change and OPTEMPO have both unit effectiveness and must be built on • Accompany the commander on in- increased, all the resources available frankness, integrity, and absolute trust spections, visits, and at ceremonies. within a warfighting organization need between both parties. A fair amount of • Assist in inspections of the command to be examined and redefined to be good humor does not hurt either. made more effective than ever before as prescribed by the commander. One of the first matters that a new • and used to their fullest capacity and commander must establish is the role Hold first sergeants or sergeants ma- potential. Today’s Army must realize jor call to pass on information and in- that we are not utilizing the command and duties of the CSM in both the gar- structions. rison and tactical environment. Too sergeant major to his fullest capacity, often, the new battalion commander is • Ensure that newly assigned enlisted have failed to give him a specific area of concentration in a tactical environ- reluctant to direct these duties or is personnel are instructed in military cour- ignorant of what the duties should en- tesy, customs of the service, and com- ment, and have failed to fully train him compass, because the he may not have mand regulations or policies. for tactical operations. a depth of experience in MTOE units or • Provide counsel and guidance to In units that have undergone reorgani- may have served in organizations in zation and digitization, there has been a which the CSM did not fully participate NCOs and other enlisted personnel of the command. fundamental shift in the duties and re- in all aspects of the unit or contribute to sponsibilities of the brigade and battal- its effectiveness. In some cases, this • Inspect duties performed by subordi- ion executive officer (XO) and com- may have been caused by the CSM’s nate NCOs. mand sergeant major (CSM). In the own reluctance to get involved in what • Note discrepancies and initiate ap- past, the XO was responsible for ensur- he perceives as officer business, or be- ing the staff planning process was syn- cause the battalion commander chose propriate corrective instruction. chronized, and that the tactical opera- not to define CSM responsibilities in • Assist in reception of visitors to the tions center was postured to support the depth. It may also be, in part, due to the command. operation, to generate the requisite commander’s past association with a • Sit as president of the promotion combat power needed to enable suc- CSM during his formative years as a board for NCOs as authorized by regula- cess, and to supervise all the logistics platoon leader and company command- efforts that supported the unit. er. Commanders may have viewed the tion. • With the digital explosion came an CSM as being in charge of a second Perform other duties as prescribed by chain of command, one in which the the commander. increase in the availability and type of CSM had the ability to dominate the tactical command and control systems, All of the above are important duties and this change continues to evolve. time of his NCOs and to hold a position and worthy of the experience and ma- of greater influence than that of com- Because brigades and battalions do not missioned officers. As a result, he may turity of the senior ranking NCO of the have both a deputy commander and an organization. However, they are too XO, the XO finds himself not only the have come to see the CSM as a profes- general in scope and do not describe sional rival. staff synchronizer but also the integra- the CSM’s tactical requirements. The tor and the director of these systems in But, organizational effectiveness of a CSM, because of his experience, train- order to provide the commander the tactical unit is not about officer busi- ing, and authority, is the one NCO who information he needs before and during ness or NCO business, it is about leader is best equipped to place himself to tactical operations. business and the ability of the senior support the intent of the commander officer and NCO of an organization to and the organization during combat. The CSM is another resource the commander can use to help in effec- define roles and solutions that enable There is, however, little out there in winning in combat. tively preparing and executing tactical the form of doctrine to help the new operations as the logistics enabler. If the duties of the CSM are discussed commander develop his thinking about These duties and responsibilities must between the incoming commander and what the CSM’s duties should be in the be defined between the commander and his new CSM, they tend to generally tactical environment. Everything said CSM, but in most cases this may be follow these descriptions, found in AR about a CSM in emerging doctrine for uncharted territory for both. 611-201: the armored and mechanized brigade When a battalion commander assumes • Provide advice and make recom- and battalion task force can be found in two sentences. command, he will establish his “first” mendations to the commander and staff commander/CSM relationship. That re- on all matters pertaining to enlisted per- “The CSM can also assist the com- lationship must be one that solidifies sonnel and their families. mander by supervising and observing at ARMOR — March-April 2001 25

a critical site away from the command Leader Tasks also make available “re-writable” com- group.” FKSM 71-3 (2005) Coordinat- pact discs (CD-RW) to enable units that If a CSM is to be effective at those ing Draft, page 3-10 and FKSM 71-2 critical sites, then he must be proficient, are continuing to evolve the ability to (2005) Coordinating Draft, page 3-10. make modifications. This evolution is a not just familiar, at influencing and process that results from the develop- “Orders Group BRAVO (for detailed supervising operations and activities planning): Orders Group A, S1, S4, that take place there. As stated in doc- mental nature that exists in units today and the necessary updating of tactical ALO, engineer, air defense officer, trine, “Leader … tasks must be identi- standing operating procedures (TAC- scout platoon leader, mortar platoon fied at the appropriate level to support leader, GSR section leader, BMO, the accomplishment of the unit mission SOP) that follows the format in com- mon use today. These standardized CSM, CESO, S3 Air, Chemical Offi- essential tasks” (FM 25-101, p. 2-9). training and evaluation outlines provide cer, Chief of Reconnaissance (HHC The essential tasks that a CSM must be Commander).” FKSM 71-2 (2005) Co- proficient in are: the medium for constructing objective feedback for both the brigade and task ordinating Draft, page 4-37. • Pre-combat inspections force CSM to evaluate the status of Today’s CSM must be provided a • Assembly area activities training, strengths and weaknesses, and specific job description with clearly the information required to support the definable leader tasks. One of the most • Maintenance and recovery operations unit’s Noncommissioned Officer De- important roles that the CSM can fill to • Medical treatment and casualty velopment Program (NCODP). By reg- support the commander and enable the ulation (AR 350-17, para 5c.), NCODP unit to win in combat is that of the lo- evacuation is conducted at the battalion, separate gistics monitor and enabler. If we are to • Leading a logistical release point company, or equivalent level. This reg- set conditions to enable a command meeting ulation would require modification with team to be effective, we as an Army the development of CSM leader tasks. • Sending and receiving administrative must be willing to specify in doctrine and logistical reports Acknowledging this role of the unit what a CSM does and then institution- alize these changes. We must develop a • Individual, crew, team, and squad CSM would be a fundamental change in doctrine, techniques, and the proce- valid, applicable program of instruction fighting position construction dures that must be embraced across the in our NCOES, to include the United • States Army Sergeants Major Academy Mobility and counter-mobility opera- Army. This includes the unit command- tions er, who must understand the CSM’s (USASMA) and the Command Ser- leader responsibilities and use the CSM geants Major Course (CSMC), that • Advising the commander on the trains the most senior NCOs on their health, welfare, and morale of soldiers as the logistics monitor at critical sites. The commander must also internalize newly defined and more focused duties • Battlefield restoration that the CSM is not his competitor or as a logistics enabler. Future CSMs must be developed in both the training • Risk management less of a professional than he requires subordinate officers to be. He must base and in unit assignments to fully • Reception, staging, onward move- understand and require that the NCOs support the tactical fight. ment, and integration (RSOI) activities in his organization are responsible for Our emerging doctrinal publications • building, sustaining, and regenerating for brigade and task force do state “the Advising the orders group on combat combat power. The CSM, as the com- service support, concept, planning, and CSM can also assist the commander by execution mander’s designated representative, supervising and observing at a critical must work in conjunction with the task site away from the command group.” • Actions involving civilians on the force executive officer, S1, S4, and the This forces us to answer two questions: battlefield forward support company commander What are the critical sites and leader • to ensure the organization accomplishes tasks the senior NCO of the brigade Attending and providing recommen- the critical tasks. dations at orders group planning ses- and battalion needs to be able to inspect sions, orders briefs, and rehearsals. The role and performance of the CSM and supervise? at the National Training Center (NTC) Critical Sites Likewise, the battalion commander is of much less importance and concern must understand the capabilities of the than that of his commander counterpart. Most would generally agree that some CSM. As a team, they must train to the Every team leader (07) is a former bat- of the more critical sites on the battle- strengths this division of labor brings. talion commander. With the exception field where the CSM can provide sup- They must also require subordinate of the Operations Group CSM, there is port to the unit and influence the action officers and NCOs to train the leader no one who has ever been a battalion are as follows: tasks associated with effective opera- CSM filling the team sergeant major tions at these critical sites. This concept (40) position. How can someone who • Company/team assembly areas (AA) must be expanded to a complete train- has never performed the task coach, • Task force support areas (TFSA) ing objective (task, condition, and stan- teach, or mentor someone who is per- dard) with a training information out- forming the task? We must begin the • Battalion aid stations (BAS) line and evaluation guide. In addition, process of placing experienced CSMs • Ambulance exchange points (AXP) these leader tasks must be compiled as observer controllers at the NTC. into an expandable leader book that • Logistics release points (LRP) serves as a quick reference for the • Defensive battle positions (BP) CSM. The Army’s training base should Continued on Page 44 26 ARMOR — March-April 2001

Developmental Testing of Combat Vehicles

by John McFassel

What promise do the Army and the rebuild capability. DTC American people have that the equip- tests vehicles in every con- ment issued to U.S. forces will perform ceivable field environ- as expected? ment, including the heat, humidity, and monsoon Answering this question is the mission of the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation rains of the tropics; desert sand and dust; and the Command (ATEC), which is charged frigid subzero cold of the with assessing the effectiveness, suit- ability, and survivability of the Army’s arctic; as well as nuclear, chemical, electromagnetic, equipment. ATEC has three subordi- and radiation environ- nate commands, the Developmental Test Command (DTC), the Operational ments. Test Command (OTC), and the Army One of the primary DTC Evaluation Center (AEC). This article provides an overview of DTC combat test centers for ground combat and tactical vehi- vehicle testing facilities and capabilities cles is Aberdeen Test Cen- and discusses technological initiatives that DTC is pursuing to ensure that the ter (ATC) located on Ab- erdeen Proving Ground, equipment being acquired for the Army Maryland. Due the com- transformation objective force will pro- vide the capabilities the Army needs to plexity of vehicle design, and the wide range of en- ensure success in future operations. vironments in which these DTC operates five Major Range and vehicles must be able to Test Facility Bases (MRTFBs), two operate, other test centers, specialized technical test centers, and including Dugway Proving four smaller test activities. MRTFBs Ground, Yuma Proving are locations with such significant Ground, Electronic Prov- capability that the DOD considers ing Ground, White Sands their operation critical to maintaining Missile Range, and Red- and developing the U.S. warfighting stone Technical Test Cen- ability. The DTC test centers are lo- ter, will also be involved cated throughout the continental U.S., in a complete major sys- Alaska, and Hawaii, and account for tem assessment. Each of approximately one third of all real es- these test centers has de- tate under the control of the U.S. Army. veloped an expertise in An M1A1 tank undergoes automotive testing on a DTC conducts approximately 1,700 different, but complemen- vertical slope grade at the Aberdeen Test Center. tests per year and has an annual test tary, areas. Together, they budget of about $500 million. The constitute an unparalleled capability to revisions as it evolves from a delicate command tests the entire gamut of quantify exactly what a system can and prototype, which may only be able to Army equipment, from boots and uni- cannot do and highlight areas for im- be properly operated by employees of forms through large missile systems. provement. the company which produced it, to a Testing is also conducted for the other rugged, capable item which can be services, other government agencies, The Purposes of Testing mass produced and operated and main- tained by a typical soldier after a rea- and foreign governments. DTC’s mis- According to AR 73-1, “DT is a ge- sion and capabilities are largely un- sonable training period. known to much of the Army, however, neric term encompassing engineering- type tests used to verify that design The soldiers of the U.S. Army expect, probably due to the fact that their work- risks are minimized, certify system and the taxpayers demand, that a com- force is almost exclusively DA civil- bat vehicle operate properly before the ians and contractors and most of the safety, substantiate achievement of contractor technical performance, and Army purchases it. Developmental test- testing is conducted in areas with re- certify readiness for operational test ing demonstrates a vehicle’s basic abil- stricted access. and evaluation (OT&E). DT generally ity to shoot, move, and communicate. It DTC is, without doubt, the “vehicle requires instrumentation and measure- also investigates the vulnerability of the testing capital of the world” and has a ments and is accomplished by engi- vehicle and its crew to enemy action full range of automotive test courses neers and technicians. It is repeatable, and ensures the vehicle is safe to oper- featuring a wide variety of natural and may be environmentally controlled, and ate. This testing involves more than man-made environments, state-of-the covers the complete spectrum of the simply checking whether the vehicle art firing ranges, and a full complement system’s capabilities.” During this meets a set of requirements. Develop- of maintenance facilities with complete process, the system will undergo many mental testers work closely with Army ARMOR — March-April 2001 27

At left, a Bradley Fighting Vehicle negotiates the cross country course at the Aberdeen Test Center, Md. Above, an M1 tank in a firing test at the Yuma Proving Ground.

program managers and private industry lenge a vehicle’s ability to operate in an system will complete its intended mis- system developers to identify system urban environment. sion without presenting an excessive shortfalls and deficiencies. They then burden to the unit maintenance and provide the field engineering expertise Because the U.S. Army must be able supply systems. Operation on the test to assist with identifying and proving to operate throughout the world, vehi- courses will reveal what parts are likely fixes. DTC works to ensure that vehicle cles must be tested in extreme climates. to fail and then an assessment will be performance and reliability are mature Yuma Proving Ground near Yuma, made on the time required to correct enough that operational testing can be Arizona, and its satellite locations in the fault and the adequacy of technical successfully completed. Operational Alaska and Hawaii accomplish this manuals. testing can then focus more on the abil- mission. At Yuma Proving Ground, ity of soldiers in a typical unit to oper- vehicles are tested under conditions of This information is also used to deter- ate the vehicle and how that vehicle extreme sand and dust, including the mine recommended spare parts stock- impacts the operation of the unit, in- age levels for both or- cluding its maintenance and supply ganizational and direct systems. support/general support Automotive Testing maintenance units. MRTFBs have the abil- Automotive testing of both wheeled ity to conduct all main- and tracked vehicles ensures that these tenance operations from vehicles will reliably carry troops and operator checks up equipment where required without pos- through depot level pro- ing a danger to the crew. Vehicle test cedures. courses include level and hilly cross- Weapons Testing country routes; paved, secondary (gravel), and sand courses; various ob- DTC’s test ranges al- stacles; slopes up to 60 percent; and low controlled firing of mobility courses through mud, water, tracked and wheeled sand, snow and ice. Precisely laid out An LAV under test at the Cold Regions Test Center. vehicle-mounted weapon courses, such as the Munson Test Area, systems over specifically located at the U.S. Army Aberdeen engineered courses. Test Center, are used to reveal a vehi- extremely rough terrain of the Middle Tank gunnery ranges, located at the cle’s operating envelope and its ability East Desert Test Course. Aberdeen Test Center, are equipped to negotiate obstacles such as vertical At the Cold Regions Test Center in with a moving target capable of speeds slopes, side slopes, and vertical steps. Alaska, vehicle performance is chal- up to 35 mph. Features include bump More rugged courses, including on- lenged by temperatures as low as -51 and zig-zag or serpentine courses for road and off-road conditions, are used degrees Celsius. At the Tropic Test Site testing main gun stabilization and fire to determine how well a vehicle will in Hawaii, equipment is exposed to a control systems. Firing can be con- operate in a field environment. ATC humid tropical environment. Shallow, ducted from either a moving or station- contains 30 all-weather permanent deep, still, and moving water fording ary position out to ranges of 2,500 me- courses designed for evaluation of and swimming tests are also available ters at a computer-controlled, laser- wheeled, tracked, and towed system at DTC for conventional fording and generated target. The fully instru- performance and endurance. These amphibious vehicle testing. mented Cibola Direct Fire Range at courses may be modified for the needs Yuma Proving Ground provides a rail of a particular program, such as by add- Reliability, Availability and Maintain- target system capable of speeds up to ing rubble or other obstacles to chal- ability (RAM) testing ensures that a 50 mph for engagement ranges out to 28 ARMOR — March-April 2001 Congressionally mandated live- fire testing of full-up combat vehicles is the responsibility of the Developmental Test Com- mand. Here, a Paladin howitzer is hit by main gun ammunition typical of that employed by likely Threat forces.

4,000 meters using either stationary Antitank missiles, such as TOW, pro- equipment and systems in both friendly position or firing-on-the-move test vide a means for adding significant and enemy electromagnetic battlefield courses. Additionally, stationary targets lethality to a lighter weight vehicle. En- environments. can be engaged along direct line of suring that missiles function properly sight trajectories out to 10,000 meters. and do not pose a hazard to the gunner Live Fire DTC test centers also characterize am- is the job of Redstone Technical Test DTC is the Army’s Live Fire Test Center (RTTC). Testing is first con- munition fired from vehicle mounted ducted on missile components such as Manager for Title 10, U.S. Code Live weapons in order to determine such in- Fire vulnerability and lethality testing. formation as their range and dispersion motors, warheads and seekers before Lethality ensures that U.S. weapons the complete missile is flown. RTTC from an aim point. This information is also tests the vehicle fire control system have the ability to defeat projected used to develop measures, such as am- threats. Vulnerability testing addresses munition lot correction factors, which to ensure the gunner can reliably track how well the vehicle and crew can targets and guide the missile to its tar- maximize the possibility of first-round get. withstand an attack from threat weap- hits. For some munitions, such as those ons that would likely be directed containing depleted uranium, environ- Communications Testing against them. Vulnerability testing be- mental restrictions preclude their being gins with ballistic tests of armor sam- fired anywhere but at a test center. The ability of vehicles to communi- ples and vehicle components. In the cate with each other and other members final phase of Live Fire testing, full-up To ensure they are safe to use, all mu- nitions are subjected to environmental of a joint and/or combined task force is vehicles stowed per the load plan, in- obviously critical to effective command cluding fuel and ammunition, are fired conditioning, which simulates some of and control. Interoperability between upon with live ammunition representa- the conditions they might be exposed to during transportation, storage and use. reconnaissance, surveillance, and target tive of threats that the vehicle would be acquisition systems and communica- exposed to in combat. Threat munitions Examples include hot and cold condi- tions systems has become even more used in testing are often actual foreign tioning, humidity, vibration, lightning strike and drop testing. Insensitive mu- critical with the fielding of Force XXI ammunition. digitized units. nitions testing focuses on determining These tests are conducted on fully in- the threat that stowed missiles or The Electronic Proving Ground (EPG) strumented ranges in order to extract rounds pose to a vehicle crew if their at Fort Huachuca tests communica- the maximum amount of data from vehicle is hit in combat. Examples of tions, command, and control; optical/ each event. Data includes personnel this type of testing include bullet im- electro-optical; intelligence; electronic body shock, ballistic shock, blast over- pact, fragment impact, and cook-off warfare; and navigation, avionics sys- pressure, toxic gas monitoring, thermal testing. Gun tubes are also tested for tems and related equipment. Tests in- measurement, as well as X-ray, high- rupture strength, fatigue life and recoil clude functional performance, electro- speed video and film documentation. system performance to ensure they are magnetic compatibility, and vulnerabil- DTC has conducted vulnerability test- safe and effective. ity analyses of tactical electronic ing on major systems such as the ARMOR — March-April 2001 29 The antenna patterns of both vehicles and air- craft can be tested at the compact antenna range at the Electronic Proving Ground, Fort Huachuca, Ariz. The giant test fixture at right is capable of placing the 70-ton M1 tank at any angle to analyze its reception and transmis- sion capabilities.

Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting Vehi- Test Technology Efforts In addition to allowing DTC to better cle, and Paladin howitzer. Lethality conduct its historical testing mission, testing has been conducted on ammuni- DTC must continually modernize its M&S increases the range of conditions facilities and upgrade its capabilities to tion such as M829 series rounds and retain its ability to test the continually that can be tested. For example, the TOW and Hellfire missile systems. through simulation a vehicle equipped more complex and capable weapon sys- with a command and control system Other Vulnerability Testing tems being developed. DTC coordi- nates with the research and develop- can be placed in an environment rich in friendly and threat electronic emissions In addition to traditional threats such ment community to predict what test without conducting a large field exer- as bullets, mines, missiles and artillery, capabilities will be needed several combat vehicles may be subjected to years into the future. Facility upgrades cise with OPFOR. VPG can allow for evaluation of vehicle subsystems before NBC threats or directed energy weap- take time, and DTC cannot wait until a the entire system has been designed and ons. DTC subjects test vehicles to elec- new system prototype arrives at a test tromagnetic and thermal pulses associ- center to determine whether it can built. Additionally, a new component that could improve the vehicle’s per- ated with nuclear weapons using the measure the desired performance formance could be tested without hav- Electromagnetic Pulse Facility and the parameters. Electromagnetic Radiation Effects Test ing to retest the entire vehicle. In order to derive the maximum bene- Facility at White Sands Missile Range fit from limited testing resources, the Another DTC technology initiative is in New Mexico. Vehicles can also be examined for their ability to operate in Developmental Test Command has the Versatile Information System, Inte- developed the Virtual Proving Ground grated, On-line (VISION). The VI- the vicinity of electromagnetic devices (VPG) to augment live testing with SION involves small, embedded in- and for susceptibility to nuclear radia- tion and high power microwaves. modeling and simulation (M&S). The strumentation that will stay with a ve- benefits of M&S have been long recog- hicle from the day it is manufactured to Testing with hazardous chemical and nized by the Army training community the day it is retired. Instrumentation has biological agents can be safely con- and are now being realized by the ma- been a problem in developmental test- ducted inside the Defensive Test terial acquisition community. VPG ing, as the mere act of placing it on a Chamber at Dugway Proving Ground helps with test planning through predic- vehicle may interfere with the normal in Utah. This is the DOD’s only major tions of expected results and extends operation of that vehicle. The embed- test facility for chemical defense and the range of operating conditions and ded instrumentation will be able to decontamination testing. Vehicles and environments that can be tested. The transmit information about the vehicle their components are tested for their extensive data gathering capabilities of to a digital library for analysis and stor- ability to keep agents out and for ease DTC are very useful in populating the age. This instrumentation will continue of decontamination. The materials used extensive databases that simulations to provide vehicle status information when assembling the vehicle are also require and for proving that simulations after the system has completed testing checked to ensure they will not deterio- replicate the real world to an acceptable and been issued to an operational unit. rate in an NBC environment. degree. This will provide the logistics commu- 30 ARMOR — March-April 2001

nity real time information about the lot of a system in an ARTEP-like envi- Mr. John McFassel, P.E. is a status of vehicles in their area and po- ronment. The thrust of this testing is to 1985 graduate of the U.S. Military tentially allow them to predict when see the impact of the new equipment on Academy, where he received a and where support will be needed with the using unit. If instrumentation were Bachelors Degree in Mechanical a fair degree of accuracy. embedded in the vehicles as proposed Engineering. While on active under the VISION concept, then tech- The digital library was used this past nical data on performance and RAM duty, he was an armored cavalry summer in support of testing for the platoon leader and armored cav- Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) for the could be taken simultaneously with an evaluation of the system’s effectiveness alry troop executive officer. After Brigade Combat Team (BCT). Several and suitability in an operational envi- leaving active duty, he attended vehicle developers provided representa- Texas A&M University, where he tive vehicles for safety, mobility, and ronment. reliability testing. The data from this Conclusion received a Master’s Degree in In- testing was then stored in a digital li- dustrial Engineering. He has been brary where it could be accessed by Developmental testing is vital to en- employed with the U.S. Army De- suring the U.S. Army maintains its velopmental Test Command for members of the Source Selection Eval- technological edge over potential ad- uation Board (SSEB). This function of 10 years. For the first nine years, the SSEB was to recommend which of versaries. DTC has developed an ex- ceptional collection of facilities, in- he was a test director of combat the immediately available vehicles strumentation and expertise for accom- vehicle vulnerability testing. For could best meet the needs of the BCT. plishing the developmental test mission the last year, he has been the test Since merging with the operational for ground vehicles and other equip- manager for anti-armor missiles testers under ATEC on 1 October 1999, ment. Expanded use of capabilities like at DTC HQ. He has completed DTC has been actively exploring op- VPG and better integrated developmen- the Armor and Ordnance Officer’s portunities for combining developmen- tal and operational testing will result in Advanced Courses, CAS3 and is tal testing with operational testing in an even greater capability to conduct currently enrolled in CGSC. In the order to produce better, more efficient testing in the future. Thorough, realistic Army Reserve, he has com- tests. Operational testing consists of testing ensures the U.S. warfighter will manded an armored cavalry troop allowing actual soldiers in the appro- continue to have the finest equipment priate MOS to use the initial production in the world. and a basic training company.

DTC Major Ranges and Test Sites

* t. Greely, AK * t. Lewis Cold Regions Test Center EPG-t. Lewis ield Office Dugway Dugway Proving Ground

* Hawaii Aberdeen Tropic Regions Test Center Headquarters DTC Aberdeen Test Center

Yuma Redstone Arsenal Yuma Proving Ground Redstone Technical Test Center

t. Huachuca WSMR-Electronic Proving Ground * t. Hood EPG-t. Hood ield Office White Sands t. Rucker White Sands Missile Range Aviation Technical Test Center

* Satellite Locations

ARMOR — March-April 2001 31

“Hold At All Cost”

24 hours on the Golan Front during the October War of 1973

by Major Michael D. Wickman

At 1400 hours on 6 October First, topography afforded the 1973, Syrian and Egyptian Israelis well thought-out supe- forces surged across their rior defensive positions. Sec- borders with Israel. The mas- ond, Syrian devotion to the sive surprise attack found prevailing Soviet operational Israel outnumbered in vehi- level doctrine limited available cles, equipment, and person- openings for the massive as- nel, in some instances, by 50 saults prescribed by that doc- to 1. Israel’s vaunted air force trine. An anti-tank barrier was was held at bay by a wall of constructed to limit a Syrian surface to air missiles and armored attack over the 1967 anti-aircraft guns, and Israeli cease fire or Purple Line. The armored columns were made purpose of the barrier was to vulnerable by the Syrians’ ex- delay the Syrians sufficiently cellent use of anti-tank mis- until reserve forces could be siles. During the first days of committed to reinforce units on the battle, it appeared that Some Israeli tankers fought in M51 modified Shermans. the line. Time was the primary Israel’s defenses would be issue for both the Israelis and overrun, but due to the heroic the Syrians. The IDF needed efforts of Israeli soldiers, the Israeli dan on Israeli soil in preparation for a time to deploy reserves before a Syrian Defense Force (IDF) was able to turn further breakthrough into Galilee. Ma- breakthrough or, “if politically possi- apparent defeat into a sudden rout of jor-General Yitzhak Hofi, head of Is- ble, to mount spoiling attack” as a pre- the armies of Syria and Egypt. No- rael’s Northern Command, had been emptive measure. The Syrians needed where was the situation more critical concerned for some time over the to quickly penetrate the IDF defenses than on the Golan Heights. growing concentration of Syrian ar- and reach the edge of the plateau over- mored forces. He had expressed his The purpose of this article is to focus looking the bridges of the River Jordan concerns to Minister of Defense Moshe before the arrival of IDF reserve forces. on the bravery and achievements of a Dayan, who authorized units of the 7th This would force the IDF to move their few soldiers fighting on the Golan Armored Brigade, which were being Heights and their effect on the outcome reserves across choke points and up held in General Headquarters Reserve steep narrow winding roads, making a of the Yom Kippur War. Of particular in the southern part of Israel, to move successful counterattack nearly impos- note are the actions of one Israeli armor up to the Golan Heights. This move sible. officer, Lieutenant Zvika Greengold. increased the number of Israeli tanks on The primary objective of Syrian the Golan Heights from an initial num- The Israeli forces defending the Golan ber of some 60 to 170. Heights were composed of two Israeli forces was the recapture of the 480 armored brigades, the 7th in the north- square miles of the Golan Heights lost The Syrian forces arrayed along the to the IDF during the 1967 Six Day ern sector and 188th (Barak) Brigade in Golan Heights consisted of the 7th In- the southern sector, consisting of ap- War. Syria planned to mount a major fantry Division, the 9th Infantry Divi- proximately 170 tanks and some 60 breakthrough attempt in the north with sion, and the 5th Infantry Division. the 7th Infantry Division, supported by artillery pieces. Israeli armored forces Each was organized along Soviet lines, were composed of British Centurions elements of the 3rd Armored Division. with an armored brigade totaling some and M51 Shermans. The main thrust, however, was to be 130-200 tanks per division. Behind farther south in the vicinity of Rafid. these first echelon divisions were con- The massive Syrian air and artillery This attack was to be carried out by the centrated the 1st and 3rd Armored Di- strike against Israeli positions on the 5th Infantry Division, the 9th Infantry visions, each with approximately 250 Golan Heights achieved tactical sur- Division, the 1st Armored Division, tanks, along with several independent prise. The Syrian 7th, 9th, and 5th In- and elements of the 3rd Armored Divi- brigades. The total Syrian force facing fantry Divisions attacked across the sion, all concentrated against Israel’s Israel numbered approximately 1,500 Purple Line, while in the north, the 188th Brigade, which could field only Russian T-54/55 and T-62 tanks sup- Israeli 7th Armored Brigade repulsed around 60 tanks. The Syrian plan called ported by 1,000 artillery pieces, includ- the Syrian 7th Infantry Division. The for the occupation of the whole of the ing heavy mortars. Syrian 3rd Armored Division, commit- Golan Heights by the evening of Sun- ted to pass through Israeli’s 7th Infan- day, 7 October, followed by a reorgani- The IDF’s plan for defending the Go- try Division, also suffered heavily and zation in the area along the River Jor- lan Heights was based on two points. gained little ground. In the south, the 32 ARMOR — March-April 2001

LEBANON Golan Heights Syrian 5th and 9th Infantry Divisions, taking advantage of the less restrictive terrain, broke through the defenses of Mt. Hermon the Barak Brigade. In two days of fight- 104 SYRIA Mas’ada ing, the Barak Brigade was virtually 105 destroyed, and the command post at Nafakh surrounded. The Syrian 9th Infantry Division “had split the Israeli 106 defensive forces, and now threatened the command center at Nafakh.”1 The 107 remnants of the Barak Brigade were barely hanging on and were in desper- 108 ate need of reinforcements. The col- Kunietra lapse of the northern sector could have forced the IDF to fall back to the Jor- 109 dan River and therefore changed the 110 outcome of the war. The original plan Nafakh Tapline Road of reinforcing with reserve brigades Jordan River “Purple Line” Sindiana was falling apart. “As Israeli reserves (1967 Cease Fire) arrived on the shore of Lake Tiberius Kudne and the west bank of the River Jordan, Hushniya 111 they were immediately sent forward in small groups into battle.”2 113 “At this time, something just short of Rafid 114 a miracle was underway at Nafakh. 115 Frantically trying to reach the Golan by Juhader any means possible was [Lieutenant] Tzvi ‘Zvika’ Greengold, who had been ISRAEL 116 on a fortnight’s leave.”3 Lieutenant Greengold had been safely at home, near Haifa, only seven hours earlier. He had just been released from service 117 with the Barak Brigade and was on Sea of leave for two weeks prior to attending a Galilee El Al . company commander’s course. He was one of the first soldiers to make his own way back to the battlefield. At the Nafakh headquarters of the Ba- Yarmuk River rak Brigade, the commander, Colonel Ben-Shoham, was analyzing spot re- JORDAN ports coming in from his battalion commanders on the size of the Syrian attack. While he was deciding his next By that time, Colonel Ben-Shoham Along the southern flank, where the moves, he was approached by Lieuten- was greatly concerned by the Syrian battle was then heaviest, the fight was ant Greengold, who arrived to find advances in the southern sector, where more difficult. Israeli tanks fought Nafakh in chaos. Greengold, having no the 51st Tank Brigade had broken through and relieved Bunker 114 and troops nor tanks to command, assisted through and was bypassing the Israeli Bunker 115, but Bunker 116 was com- with the removal of the dead and fortifications in the vicinity of the pletely surrounded. wounded from disabled vehicles. He Hushniya-Tapline crossroads. Savage soon learned that four tanks, three of Unable to get out, the Israelis sat tight nighttime firefights were taking place in their defenses and called for artillery which had been battle-damaged, were across the southern Golan Heights, and about to arrive. Zvika requested and Israeli troops were cut off in their front- support. The only available artillery received command of the four tanks. was a single battery of 155mm guns, line fortifications. Transmissions to which was ordered to concentrate on He was delighted. their headquarters at Nafakh finally produced authorization to withdraw, Bunker 116’s position. The fire mission Lieutenant Greengold was ordered to was extremely effective and provided take the four tanks and move towards but this was easier said than done, with temporary relief to the troops inside. the Tapline Route, a major Syrian ave- Syrian forces to their rear. At Kudne, a nue of approach. Lieutenant Greengold relieving tank force broke through to Because of the penetration in his sec- and his four tanks were to be known on Bunker 111, despite strong Syrian tor along the Tapline Road, Colonel the brigade communications network as forces in the immediate vicinity, and Ben-Shoham attempted to move the Force Tzvika.4 succeeded in evacuating all the men. forward headquarters (one tank and one ARMOR — March-April 2001 33

halftrack) of his brigade from Nafakh from the Centurion’s 105mm gun left back to the Nafakh headquarters by the to Juhader, where he believed he could the enemy tanks blazing brightly, and Tapline Road, they had better cut better control the battle. He moved the illumination of the area from the across country. Colonel Ben-Shoham carefully along in the dark, avoiding fire greatly aided Zvika’s movement. directed his tank and the headquarters’ Syrian formations, and his staff was re- “The intruders belonged to the 51st half-track to head west toward the ridge lieved to reach Juhader. By then, they Independent Tank Brigade, and they of the Golan Heights near Ramat Mag- were under constant heavy shelling, were feeling their way into the Israeli shimim. At approximately 0200 on due to poor IDF communications disci- rear, seeking to exploit the break- October 7, they reached the Gamla Rise pline and successful Syrian SIGINT through. Apparently they had turned on overlooking the Sea of Galilee, a pri- operations. The Syrians obtained radio their sidelights to see better, to gain mary objective of the Syrian forces. fixes every time a communications speed.”7 They were dismayed to observe new officer tried to contact his subordinate Zvika shifted into a new position and Syrian T-62 tanks not far away along commanders. the escarpment, and in full view of within minutes destroyed three more Galilee. At that rate, Syrian forces In the meantime, TF Zvika, which had T55s. Zvika realized that the Tapline left Nafakh several hours before, was Road was a major avenue of approach, would soon cross into Israel proper. The Israeli tank and its accompanying moving cautiously along the Tapline that he was frequently outnumbered half-track continued to move along in Route. Zvika had been intent on joining and he was facing tanks with superior dim moonlight, keeping among the Colonel Ben-Shoham, but instead had night fighting capabilities.8 Zvika chose boulders on the slopes to screen them- run into a Syrian tank company. Zvika to hold in his current position, take selves from the large Syrian force mov- promptly sent a contact report to Colo- advantage of the defensible terrain, and nel Ben-Shoham and first engaged the wait for Syrian forces. Thirty minutes ing parallel to their position. Colonel Ben-Shoham tried to determine the enemy at 2100 hours on 6 October. passed until they were alerted by the status of his brigade, and feared that Zvika took advantage of the terrain and sound of heavy engines. A long column limited visibility, moving his force into of T-55s appeared out of the darkness, very little remained. Meanwhile back in Nafakh, a reserve battalion commander hull-down positions and letting the en- followed by a procession of trucks. “It named Lieutenant Colonel Uzi More emy come to him. Zvika’s force waited was as if the main body of Major Is- only a short time until one of his tank mail’s 452nd Tank Battalion was on received permission from the CinC of Northern Command to leave the base commanders reported contact with an parade, so perfectly aligned and spaced and take command of the tanks along approaching Syrian column consisting was the column. mostly of T-55s. Zvika peered into the the Tapline Route. He was to fight a Zvika waited until the lead tank was delaying action along the Tapline gloom and saw them by the dim glow only twenty meters from where he was Route to slow the Syrian advance to- of their “formation lamps and infra-red hunkered down. The first shot stopped wards Nafakh Camp. This force in- ‘cats eyes’.”5 the first target and stalled the entire cluded Zvika’s small group and two “At about 2120 hours, Zvika spotted a column”9 Zvika was up against terrible reserve tank platoons of the Northern solitary Syrian tank on the road about odds, but he had the enemy fixed and Command Reserve, which were the four kilometers outside Nafakh and was in position to destroy the entire only reserves available in the southern only ten meters from his own Centu- column. Zvika withdrew into the dark- sector. Lieutenant Colonel More re- rion. Zvika tapped his gunner, and the ness, taking advantage of the scrub and ceived the order from Colonel Ben- Syrian burst into flames. Fearful of rocky outcrops, only to appear and fire Shoham to mount a counterattack, and being seen or set ablaze in the horren- before disappearing again. He kept this proceeded southwards along the Ta- dous flash of burning fuel and muni- uneven match going for over an hour. pline Route, while Tzvika and a pla- tions, Zvika ordered his driver to back The Syrians’ sole warning was a crash toon of tanks drove parallel along the up fast. He then found that he had no and a long jet of white flame shooting road’s wire fences. way of communicating with the other through the night to destroy another of Almost immediately, the first tank in tank or of even speaking with his own their vehicles. The Syrians were ex- crew. The shock of the explosion of the tremely bewildered by the single shots Zvika’s column was set ablaze by a rocket-propelled grenade. Zvika saw Syrian tank had jolted out the radio and that kept hitting their tanks from all Syrian tanks equipped with searchlights intercom circuits. Zvika jumped down along the roadway. Frustrated, several to the roadway and stalked over to the Syrian tankers switched on searchlights blocking the road ahead, and Zvika ordered one of the remaining tanks other Centurion, ejecting its com- to try and locate what they thought was forward to rescue the crew of the burn- mander and motioning him to climb a sizeable enemy force. The illumina- aboard the defective tank. “Watch me,” tion gave Zvika and his gunner more ing Centurion. He positioned his own tank to cover in the flank, and both he cautioned the other man, “and do as clear targets to engage. Ten armored tanks were hit. Zvika’s gunner was I do, if possible.”6 vehicles were either destroyed or dam- aged before Major Ismail ordered the injured, while Zvika himself reeled Zvika then continued to work his way from the shock of the blast and searing south along the Tapline Road, the two remnants of his battalion to withdraw. pain. Zvika and his crew scrambled What the Syrians believed was a siz- tanks moving slowly forward, using the able force was actually the work of a from their blazing Centurion, falling to terrain to mask their movement. Zvika 10 the ground in flames and screaming as soon realized that he was alone, the single tank crew. flames seared their faces and hands. other tank having lost its position in the Several miles further along the Ta- Zvika’s shirt and trousers were burning, dark. Moving over the crest of a hill, pline Road at Nafakh, Colonel Ben- but he rolled into a ditch and somehow Zvika was confronted by three Syrian Shoham realized he was surrounded. smothered the flames. He was fearful tanks moving towards them with their His brigade intelligence officer sug- that at any moment his tank, still carry- driving lights on. Three rapid shots gested that as it was impossible to get ing fuel and ammunition, would blow 34 ARMOR — March-April 2001

“Colonel Ben-Shoham realized all that remained of his brigade were a handful of tanks fighting for their lives along the Tapline Route.”

up. Not realizing the extent of his the 3rd Armored Division, and a bri- from the Syrian 1st Armored Division wounds, he ran towards another tank, gade of Moroccan troops. Fighting as the 91st Armored Brigade. Major shouted garbled instructions, and took from prepared positions, the Centurion- Lenschner, Deputy Commander of an command of the vehicle. He then acti- equipped 7th Armored Brigade held out independent Northern Command battal- vated the communications system, an- against odds sometimes as high as 15 to ion, was commanding a hastily assem- nouncing to all that TF Zvika was still 1. Under constant artillery and air at- bled force of initially 14 Centurions. in existence.11 Even as Colonel Ben- tack, Colonel Ben Gal, the 7th Armored That was now down to two operable Shoham’s relieved acknowledgment Brigade commander, calmly directed tanks. He reported sighting the T-62s of faded on the radio, Zvika realized the his dwindling forces, maintaining a the 91st Armored Brigade and stated extent of his wounds, and the terrible reserve which he moved from ambush that his position was untenable. Colonel burns on his face and hands began to to blocking position to battle position Ben-Shoham urged the young major to throb and blister. Only Colonel Ben- during 72 hours of continuous fighting. hold at any cost. Major Lenschner and Shoham’s calm but insistent voice his small force were not heard from brought him back to reality. Moving The 7th Armored Brigade, although again. It was later determined that Ma- down to a handful of operational tanks, straight for him were two Syrian tanks, jor Lenschner perished when the war- never gave up their primary positions.13 bearing down with their guns firing. head of a Sagger missile punched Zvika fired and screamed for his driver In the southern sector, the crisis con- through the Centurion’s turret armor to reverse. The tank shuddered as its tinued to develop. Sunrise on the 7th of and his force was overrun.15 Out- tracks tore around on the bare rocks, October revealed that the Syrians had flanked, the brigade headquarters at then raced backward into the inferno of achieved a major breakthrough in the Nafakh was now under attack. Ben- the night, its crew still battling against southern sector of the Golan Heights. Shoham was ordered to return to the heavy odds. The 132nd Mechanized Brigade and Nafakh for the base’s defense, and or- 47th Independent Tank Brigade of the dered his deputy Lieutenant-Colonel The remainder of Colonel Ben-Sho- ham’s counterattack force also made 5th Infantry Division had made a major Yisraeli to set out and cover his force. penetration along the Rafid El-Al road. contact with the mechanized infantry The Syrians exploited this penetration Unknown to Colonel Ben-Shoham, that had been accompanying the tanks Zvika had met up with Colonel Yis- that Zvika encountered. More’s tanks with the 43rd, 51st, and 91st Armored raeli’s force at dawn and fought in the Brigade, a force of more than 500 tanks. were hit and disabled, one at a time. battle that delayed the Syrian 51st Tank When More saw a Syrian soldier aim Colonel Ben-Shoham identified the Brigade’s attack along the Tapline an antitank rocket at his command tank, advancing second-echelon Syrian col- Route. Just when Zvika had thought he grabbed hold of his free machine umns, and chose to regroup his forces they were gaining the upper hand, Yis- gun and opened fire. However, his ma- and attempt to delay the Syrian penetra- raeli frantically ordered his force back chine gun jammed and the Syrian tion. His tank and half-track sped back to Nafakh to escape the Syrians’ out- grenadier let fly. More was thrown towards Nafakh, dodging tank and RPG flanking movement. from his tank and lost an arm and an fire along the entire route. Colonel eye in the blast. 12 Ben-Shoham realized all that remained Throughout the retreat, Colonel Ben- Colonel Ben-Shoham reported up the of his brigade were a handful of tanks Shoham’s tank came under heavy Syr- fighting for their lives along the Ta- ian artillery and tank fire. Both he and chain of command the failure of his pline Route. He decided his best course Yisraeli succeeded in destroying more counterattack and did his best to stabi- lize the situation. With minimal re- of action would be to rally his meager than twenty Syrian tanks and vehicles. forces and join his deputy, Colonel As the battle raged and Syrian tanks sources he calmed the nerves of his Yisraeli, and the 679th Reserve Ar- approached to close range, Yisraeli’s commanders, called for artillery sup- port, and attempted to maintain situ- mored Brigade (now reaching the front gunner announced that the tank was out in small numbers). of ammunition. Yisraeli ordered his ational awareness of the battle that sur- driver to charge an oncoming T-62 with rounded. In order to improve command “Every three tanks now reaching the and control, Colonel Ben-Shoham re- front were assembled into make-shift machine guns blazing. Within mo- ments, his tank in flames, Lieutenant- quested the command of all forces in platoons, patched into the communica- Colonel Yisraeli was dead. Ben-Sho- the southern Golan from the regional tions network and rushed towards Ben- commander. It was apparent that the Shoham’s position. All in all, two com- ham, unaware of the fate of his deputy, continued to issue orders. Standing Syrians were swarming all over the panies were pieced together, and the upright in the turret, Ben-Shoham ob- southern sector of the Golan Heights. newly formed units reached Nafakh and re-established the Barak Brigade’s served the battle, firing at Syrian crew- In the north, the Israeli 7th Armored 14 men fleeing their burning vehicles. As Brigade was defending positions in and headquarters.” he searched the hills for Syrian com- around Booster Ridge against the Syr- At approximately 1145, Major Baruch mandos, a sudden 7.62mm volley killed ian 7th Infantry Division, elements of Lenschner identified a lead element Colonel Ben-Shoham. Losing radio con- ARMOR — March-April 2001 35

Israeli Centurions move up on the Golan front. tact with his commanders, Zvika left shock of exhaustion and could no long- 2Edgar O’Ballance, No Victor No Vanquished: the roadway and approached Nafakh er react to orders after twenty hours of The Arab-Israeli War 1973 (Novato: Presidio cross-country from the southeast with- continuous, nerve-twisting battle.”16 Press, 1978), p. 132. out encountering Syrian forces, but just During the pandemonium, Zvika at- 3Samuel Katz, Israeli Tank Battles: Yom Kippur missing a Syrian ambush. tached himself to the 679th Armored to Lebanon (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1988), p. 18. The 91st Armored Brigade continued Brigade and with them forced the Syri- ans out of the ruined camp and back 4Ibid., p. 18. its push towards Nafakh. Lieutenant- onto the Tapline Road. Colonel Menachem (Pinie) Cooper- 5David Eshel, Chariots of the Desert: The Story man, deputy commander of the Dis- The Syrian advance had been stopped of the Israeli Armoured Corps (New York: trict (administrative) Brigade, organ- at Nafakh and the blackened, smoking Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1989), p. 101. ized Nafakh’s defenses and issued anti- wreckage of their tanks, personnel car- 6Asher and Hammel, p. 96. tank weapons to soldiers manning the riers, and trucks lay everywhere, in the 7Ibid., p. 96. perimeter. Standing at the southern pe- camp and on the dun-colored hills. 8 rimeter fence, he watched the advance “When the battle around Zvika ceased, Anthony Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War Volume I: The Arab- of approximately two Syrian tank com- he found himself standing in the turret Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989 (Boulder: Westview panies, and ordered the advanced head- of his fifth or sixth Centurion, suddenly Press, 1990), p. 72. quarters group to withdraw from unable to make a decision as to what to 9 Nafakh. As this force left the base, hun- do next. The Barak Brigade intelligence Asher and Hammel, p. 97. dreds of Syrian shells rained down on officer — now the nominal brigade 10 Ibid., p.97 the camp. Syrian tanks were now enter- commander — rushed up to greet the 11Samuel Katz, Israeli Tank Battles: Yom Kip- ing Nafakh unhindered, firing point- lieutenant. As he fought an overwhelm- pur to Lebanon (London: Arms and Armour blank at the base’s evacuated buildings, ing lethargy, Zvika painfully climbed Press, 1988), p. 20. raking the Israeli defenders with coaxial from the turret and carefully dropped to 12Asher and Hammel, p. 105. and turret-mounted machine guns. Lieu- the ground, where he leveled his eyes tenant-Colonel Cooperman grabbed the on the intelligence officer and apolo- 13Peter Allen, The Yom Kippur War: The Poli- division’s deputy intelligence and opera- getically murmured, ‘I can’t anymore.’ tics, Tactics and Individual Actions By Which Israel Repelled the Arab Invasions of 1973 (New tions officers, a bazooka and six shells, The intelligence officer said not a York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982), p. 31. and rushed to try and stop the Syrians word; he hugged Zvika close and led from taking Nafakh. him to the medical evacuation center. 14Katz, p. 21. There is no way to calculate the dam- 15Asher and Hammel, p. 137. Suddenly, the 679th Reserve Armored age that that iron-willed redheaded 16 Brigade arrived to save the day. Firing youth inflicted upon the best plan with Allen, p. 91. at long range, the 679th managed to which Syria has ever entered a con- 17Asher and Hammel, p. 146. 17 hold the Syrians and push them out of flict.” 18 Katz, p. 25.

Nafakh. Yet Syrian tanks were still inside the base, and Lieutenant Colonel To say that the actions of Lieutenant Zvika Greengold directly affected the Cooperman’s determined antitank unit, outcome of the Yom Kippur war would MAJ Michael D. Wickman, com- now out of ammunition, was cornered missioned in Armor from OCS, has by a T-62. As the T-62’s 115mm gun be an overstatement. But it goes with- out saying that his actions greatly aided served as a mortar platoon leader turned towards them, the tank went up the successful defense of the Golan in a ball of flame. Approaching the in 2-37 Armor and a tank platoon rescued officers was a battered tank Heights. leader in 1-37 Armor in Germany. moving at a slow speed. It was Zvika! “For his incredible 24 hours on the He served as a tactical intelligence Zvika had arrived at Nafakh camp just Golan, Lieutenant Greengold was officer in G2 TAC, 34th Infantry Di- as the Syrians were breaking in, he had awarded the Ot Hagvura (Order of vision, and assistant J2, Task Force joined forces with a reserve tank, and Bravery), the IDF’s medal for supreme Timberwolf, Guatemala. He served with more enthusiasm than good sense valor.”18 as S2, S4, and tank company com- his exhausted crew attacked the Syri- Notes mander in 1-94 Armor. He is a ans. “Zvika fired wildly at everything graduate of AOBC, AOAC, MIOTC, in sight — at the hills and the fences 1 Jerry Asher with Eric Hammel, Duel for the and CAS3. He is currently the XO and at the Syrian tanks that had already Golan: The 100 Hour Battle that Saved Israel flattened the perimeter fence. The truth (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., of 1-94 AR. He can be reached at was that his tank driver was in the 1987), p. 123. [email protected]. 36 ARMOR — March-April 2001

The Field Problem Review Board: Finding Solutions to the Problems That Soldiers Experience

Ever since there have been tanks, These two fixes reduced the number of Armor Force for the first year after new tankers in the field have been finding airflow or debris-related engine failures equipment fielding. The FSR’s first things wrong with their design and to a relatively miniscule level. priority is providing both technical ex- functionality. Over 14 years ago, Team pertise and training to organizational Not all fixes involve hardware. Re- Abrams was formed, drawing together cently, the fleet experienced problems maintainers. They also provide a con- the efforts of the TRADOC System duit for reporting systemic problems Manager, Abrams (TSM, Abrams); Pro- with fires. The three leading causes back to the FPRB. were engine compartment fuel leaks, ject Manager, Abrams, (PM, Abrams); hydraulic leaks, and problems with the The LAO is another source for infor- the Tank Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM); and General Dy- NBC system. The FPRB set up a mo- mation regarding problems. Each post bile training team to educate soldiers on has an LAO staffed with TACOM lo- namics Land Systems (GDLS). This the NBC system and tank fire preven- gistics specialists. As the LAO for TA- unique program identifies and attempts to solve tank-related and Heavy Assault tion. That team has gone to every post COM, they have a direct link to Team where there are Abrams tanks, training Abrams and the FPRB. Bridge (HAB) concerns coming from crews, maintainers, and leaders on how the field. Team Abrams also actively searches to properly maintain and inspect these out performance and R&M problems The Field Problem Review Board areas to prevent fires. (FPRB) has the mission of continu- through continuous testing of the tank, The FPRB is tracking a number of is- primarily at Aberdeen and Yuma Prov- ously monitoring reports from the field sues and monitoring the effectiveness ing Grounds. The test team continu- and from test sites to identify any prob- lems affecting the safety, reliability, of the corrective actions being taken to ously monitors whether the tank per- resolve them. One example concerned forms in accordance with its perform- availability, maintainability, and per- recent transmission failures seen at Fort ance specifications and user require- formance of the Abrams and Wolverine HAB. Hood. Last year, the FPRB imple- ments. Also, the conditions leading to mented a modification to the transmis- field failure can be tested and data cap- The FPRB meets in Warren, Mich. sion valve body and has been closely tured to solve the problem. The test every second month. It is composed of monitoring the situation to see if any community also tests the corrective design and safety engineers, reliability more transmission failures occur. So actions to ensure the solution fixes the and maintainability (R&M) specialists, far, none have occurred related to the problem and does not create new prob- Quality Assurance (QA) engineers, lo- valve body, but this continues to be a lems. gisticians, managers, and military rep- watch item. resentatives from Team Abrams. Field Quality assurance specialists con- The FPRB is currently tracking over stantly monitor the production of com- Service Representatives (FSRs) from 25 problems with the fleet. It has a da- ponents going into the tank and HAB. GDLS, Logistic Assistance Officers (LAOs) at all posts, test officers from tabase of over 18,000 field problem These specialists are a key link in the reports and over 68,000 test problem FPRB process. They determine if a the Army’s Proving Grounds, Team reports. With only 25 problems being production line change may be causing Abrams engineers and logisticians, and soldiers from the field all provide data tracked currently, you can see that the the field problems. They also ensure majority of design and production defi- that the suppliers and sub-contractors on problems the Abrams fleet is experi- ciencies are corrected before you even are producing parts for the tank in ac- encing. see the tank. Remember, though, that if cordance with design and quality speci- you see a problem, report it! If you fications. You may wonder, after 108 FPRB believe the problem is not being meetings, what some of the Board’s Logisticians also play a key role in the recent successes have been. One of the worked, then document it and report it FPRB process. They constantly moni- again! The primary way to report a first problems identified with the problem directly to the FPRB is via the tor supply system demands to deter- Abrams platform was the air induction mine if items are being requested at system on the AGT 1500 engine. The Field Problem Management Hotline at rates inconsistent with their expected 1-800-989-TANK. But you must also FPRB identified this problem from a keep your chain of command aware of usage. The logistic fielding branches, number of sources, and then redesigned with their constant contact with the the pre-cleaner on the air induction what you see, because they may al- field, also provide first-hand evidence ready know of fixes that may be on the system to reduce clogging and the con- way to solve your problem. of systemic problems being experi- sequent reduction of airflow into the enced in the field. engine. Next, they came up with the The front line for identifying prob- PulseJet Air System (PJAS) as a means lems back to the FPRB are the GDLS to constantly clean the V-packs without FSRs. Team Abrams provides FSRs to physically taking them out of the tank. every newly equipped battalion in the Continued on Page 43 ARMOR — March-April 2001 37

ENTER THE GAUNTLET The Armor School Is Transforming How We Train Our Combat Leaders by Second Lieutenant Humayun S. Khan

The Armor School is adopting the and knowledge levels. In so doing, we These multi-echelon training events concept of the scrimmage, one of the have limited experience-based learning are organized at three levels — live most effective training techniques of a and de-emphasized the relationship training, virtual training, and construc- good football team, in order to improve between peer groups. tive training. Live training is most simi- the training of lieutenants, captains, and Under the earlier system, Army lead- lar to a scrimmage. It is as close to an NCOs. actual battle experience as one can get. ership schools were focused on the Live training opportunities are FTXs, In the past, lieutenants trained with assumption that transmitting and retain- lieutenants, captains with captains, and ing knowledge is more important than gunnery, MOUT (Military Operations in Urban Terrain) paintball, and MOUT NCOs with NCOs, but this kind of peer gaining experience. Certainly, knowl- TEWT (Tactical Exercises Without group training has obvious limitations. edge is a prerequisite for gaining ex- A captain learning to develop effective perience, but experience may be more Troops). Virtual training involves sim- ulation of the battlefield, as in the orders should ideally be testing his ca- consequential on a future battlefield, CCTT (Close Combat Tactical Train- pabilities with lieutenants — like he especially a battle-simulated experience will in the real world — rather than dealing with non-peers in a profes- er), SIMNET, and UCOFT (Unit Con- duct of Fire Trainer). Constructive train- with other captains, yet this is the sys- sional relationship. ing involves the training of tactics, tem the Armor School has used for years. This method is convenient and A football scrimmage provides an rather than crew-level skills. Construc- analogy. It involves all the players in tive training opportunities include Janus easy to schedule training this way, but their respective roles. Quarterbacks do and TACOPS. unrealistic. not scrimmage with other quarterbacks. The 16th Cavalry Regiment at Fort Good football teams use another A scrimmage is made realistic by pit- method entirely. After initial condition- ting an offense against a defense, and Knox has conducted multi-echelon training events at all three levels and ing, players learn the plays in black- by the pressure created by keeping the results have been good. The first board “skull sessions,” then crawl and score. A scrimmage allows the coaches walk through non-contact drills, but the and the quarterbacks to build skills not training event, CCTT/SIMNET, trained 64 lieutenants from the AOB Course real training comes in scrimmages, otherwise developed. and 80 captains from the ACC Course where each player gets to perform in his game day role. Currently, the school emphasizes prob- on the CCTT and SIMNET facilities concurrently. The captains’ course pro- The Armor School is working to do lem solving, organization, tactical pro- vided the task force operations order, ficiency, decisiveness, communication, the same thing. By synchronizing the and judgment. While these skills are computer scenario, and company-level course schedules of captains, lieuten- leadership (students). The lieutenants’ ants, and NCOs, the Armor School has essential, they are limited with regard course provided platoon leaders (stu- to the scope of the battlefield. The new been able to develop a training event skills students will focus on are: adapt- dents), and gunners, drivers, and load- called the Gauntlet that breaks through ers. Small group instructors in each the limitations of peer group training ability, innovation, conceptual thinking, course evaluated students. intuition, creativity, rapid decision-mak- and allows students at each level to ing, and dealing with pressure. “Scrim- The exercise trained troop leading pro- deal with soldiers with the same ex- perience levels that they will encounter mages,” can instill these attributes in cedures (TLPs) and offensive and de- our soldiers faster. In the 16th Cavalry fensive operations. Offensive opera- in their units. Captains give their orders Regiment, exercises called Gauntlets tions for the captains were support by to lieutenants, not captains role-playing lieutenants. simulate scrimmages. fire, breach, assault, and movement to contact, and the lieutenants executed The earlier method of peer group These training events are battle-fo- battle drills, actions on contact, sup- training, taken from public education, cused, multi-echelon experiences de- port/attack by fire, and assault. In the may have worked well when our lead- signed to train adaptive leadership defense, captains conducted reconnais- ers were in elementary school, but for skills and build self-confidence. Stu- sance and security operations, prepara- the complex battlefield environment, a dents in the Armor Officer Basic tion of a battle position, defending a leader needs to know each job and Course, Armor Captains Career Course, battle position, and defending in sector, work well with others without hesita- Scout Leader Course, Cavalry Leader while lieutenants conducted direct fire tion. While peer group training pro- Course, and the NCO Academy Ad- planning, defend a battle position, and duces knowledgeable leaders, it does vanced NCO Course and Basic NCO call for indirect fire. Through these not provide the real-world experience courses currently overlap, providing missions, lieutenants were given the of leading soldiers of different ranks opportunities for joint training. opportunity to learn from captains. 38 ARMOR — March-April 2001 “Nobody’s coming in here saying they can’t learn anything. Everybody’s going to learn something. That’s what’s important and fun about it!”

Photos by Robert L. Stevenson

Captains provided leadership and men- requiring innovative thinking and test- provided a gauge to judge soldiering toring to lieutenants in a working envi- ing the adaptability of students. The skill, something not provided by MILES ronment. The captains noted that they exercise provided a realistic, fatiguing, gear or blank ammunition. were able to assess how well they con- stressful, training environment, and as- Training is changing at Fort Knox. It veyed information and intent to lieu- sessed new leadership skills of adapta- is evolving from a focus on knowledge tenants, not captains playing the role of bility, innovation, conceptual thinking, lieutenants. intuition, creativity, rapid decision- to a battle-focused experience generat- ing multi-grade, multi-echelon training. The next multi-echelon training event making, and dealing with pressure. It The lessons learned and the methodol- stressed leadership by combining stu- was a constructive TACOPS which dent sergeants, lieutenants, and cap- ogy established from these training also combined ACCC and AOB stu- events will be used to improve future dents. The intent was to allow a com- tains, leading one captain to comment: events, making each one a progres- “...One of the most valuable pieces was pany (one captain and three lieutenants) having the NCOs involved, which add- sively better learning environment. to conduct a defense in sector in a con- Captains, lieutenants, and NCOs for the structive environment. Eleven captains ed a lot of depth and experience... and first time will train with and learn from gave the lieutenants some good insight and 33 lieutenants paired up in compa- about what it’s going to be like work- each other. Learning will come from nies and conducted a leaders’ recon- battle and victory, and evaluations will naissance. Later, each company fought ing with their platoon sergeants for the be based on the battlefield. Students first time.” a battle using the TACOPS construc- will be allowed to demonstrate the tive simulation, and winning companies “The greatest challenge is getting the adaptive and innovative decision-mak- were released for the remainder of the lieutenants to listen to you,” said one ing skills essential to deal with our day, while losing companies transi- sergeant first class who was attending technological future. They will develop tioned to the OPFOR cell until victori- ANCOC. “… to integrate our experi- into bold, confident, tough, and battle- ous. Lieutenants found the tactical ence with their training. But every- field-savvy soldiers who can lead from problem complex, and captains were body’s taking something from this. the front and think fast in the heat of often frustrated communicating with Nobody’s coming in here saying they combat. They will be trained to handle lieutenants. Both groups found the in- can’t learn anything. Everybody’s go- uncertainty, weigh probabilities, and teraction useful. ing to learn something. That’s what’s accept risks. The Armor School will important and fun about it!” train them as they will fight. An FTX Ten-Day War served as the live training event. Sixty-four lieuten- The MOUT exercise, conducted live ants, 36 captains, and 16 sergeants first at the Zussman Urban Combat Training 2LT Humayun S. Khan graduated class trained to become confident, Site, replicated possible real world ur- from the University of Virginia in adaptive, and proficient leaders. The ban environments. The intent was to 2000 with a degree in psychology. objectives were to maximize leader- provide approximately 60 lieutenants After graduation, he served on the ship opportunities, establish a method and 28 captains the opportunity to solve Land Nav Committee at Advanced of leadership assessment, incorporate complex problems in a MOUT envi- SASO (Stability and Support Opera- ronment. Platoons, led by captains in Camp 2000, Ft. Lewis, Wash. for tions) and OOTW (Operations Other leadership positions, rotated through two months. After arriving at Fort Than War), and explore Force XXI movement to contact, hasty defense, Knox, he was assigned to the 16th technology. The exercise incorporated and hasty attack missions. Paintball Cav Regiment S3 shop. Currently, various scenarios with increasingly added needed realism and pressure on he is in AOB Class 01-02, due to challenging variables and conditions, leaders to execute well. Paintball also graduate March 29th. ARMOR — March-April 2001 39

ARMOR Magazine to Move Across Post...

...But Memories of Building 4401 Will Linger

by Jon Clemens, Managing Editor

For almost a year, bulldozers were working all home. As he came in the front door, he heard rock around the John Lannen House, the ARMOR office and roll on the radio and splashing sounds upstairs. building on Vine Grove Road. The two-story brick It was a member of the staff, frolicking in the tub buildings that used to be the Gaffey Heights Hous- with his date of the night before. Suffice to say, ing Area are now gone, knocked down and trucked counseling followed about responsible use of gov- away, and a summer crop of weeds covered any ernment property. evidence that thousands of military families once lived there. There was a narrow 50-foot strip of lawn between the ARMOR office and the first unit of the adjacent ARMOR Magazine is moving across post to new housing area, but this was not enough distance to quarters. Now the bulldozers await, and Building separate us from an enlisted couple we came to 4401 will be the next to go. It is a building with call the “Battling Bickersons.” Their marital dis- memories. cussions were always conducted at a scream, and The John Lannen House was named for the 3rd were public information, winter and summer, with Cavalry sergeant who posed for artist Frederic windows open or closed. On more than a few oc- Remington’s sketch of a mounted cavalry trooper, casions, the “Bickersons” took their disagreements circa 1898. The sketch for many years appeared on out to the front lawn. We’d call the MPs, then go the cover of the old Cavalry Journal, our prede- live to the lawn to watch the wrestling as the Bick- cessor. ARMOR moved into Building 4401 in ersons, in their camos, rolled around until the law 1973, when then-editor, LTC Burt Boudinot, arrived. Needless to say, it was a different Army moved the magazine here from makeshift offices then. in the old Weapons Department near the Armor Families rotated in and out of the housing area all School. He’d asked MG George S. Patton, then through the Cold War, leaving us with many Assistant Commandant, for a better location, and memories...and occasionally a pet who missed his the general’s wife suggested then-vacant Building DEROS. One of these was a large gray tabby who 4401, which had served as a billeting office and a appeared on ARMOR’s doorstep one morning, nursery school. Aside from the security grilles walked in with a customer, and decided to stay. He added to the windows, it was a homey sort of became our mascot for many years, dubbed place, more like a suburban house than a place of “Sherman” for his rolling, determined way of business. This impression was reinforced by the walking, suggesting the WWII battlewagon of the kitchen sink and cabinets, the ’50s-era pink and same name. black tile motif in the upstairs bath, with its full tub and shower, and the rolling lawn outside. It was hoped that Sherman might make a contri- bution by dealing with a particularly industrious For more than 25 years, the staff edited the maga- gang of squirrels who had infested the building, zine here, from story acceptance to typesetting and but Sherman preferred wolfing down Friskies and page layout. But along with the serious stuff, sleeping on our desks, usually on his back, four working at Building 4401 had its lighter moments. paws up. The big bathtub, for instance, played a key role in a legendary incident back in the late 1970s, when One morning, he was in this “hull-up” position on the Editor-in-Chief stopped in on a Sunday morn- Vivian Oertle’s desk, in full view of the front door ing to retrieve some papers he’d forgotten to take down a long hallway. A tough-looking colonel, 40 ARMOR — March-April 2001 ARMOR’s new home will be in Building 1109, flanking Brooks Field on Fort Knox’s Main Post. The offices will be on the third floor of the northeast wing, at upper left in this photo. Photos by Robert L. Stevenson

replete with cigar stub and right out of Central have been done (although the officer in question Casting, swept in and spotted the inverted, snooz- did take a public relations job upon retirement). ing cat. Before he’d even said hello, the O-6 Although our building is marked for destruction, marched down the hall to Vivian’s desk, stopped, these memories will survive. We’re moving on to and started scratching the cat’s belly. Sherman Building 1109, where we’ll occupy the top floor of blinked, stretched, purred, then went back to sleep. the wing on the northeast end. This three-story “What a great cat!” said the colonel. brick structure, once the home of the 1st Cavalry in the early days of mechanization, has recently A great cat perhaps, but a pacifist. He coexisted been restored. Along with the new fiber optic con- peacefully with the squirrels and with a squadron nections and energy-efficient windows and mod- of barn swallows that made our front porch home ern lighting, they’ve kept the best of the old build- every spring, arriving, nesting, and flight training ing, restoring the arched brick porches on the back in the busy weeks before Armor Conference in side, and the gray travertine marble in the rest May. One by one, the young birds would mount rooms. The new free-standing elevator shaft at the the parapet of the nest. The adults would fly rear of the building, needed to meet accessibility nearby, encouraging them to take the leap. Finally, standards, was constructed of brick in a style that reluctantly, they would. Except for one guy we matches the old building. called “Bolo,” who resisted all peer pressure to act like a bird, staying in the nest about a week after Inside, the refinished walls and floors are set off the others had graduated. While we were at lunch, by new oak doors and woodwork, and all of the he made the leap and apparently didn’t take to fly- halls in the building will feature Jody Harmon’s ing. He was on the sidewalk walking around when artwork for ARMOR, enlarged and mounted in we got back. One of the editors picked Bolo up matching oak frames. The office area, which we’ll and air-evaced him back to the nest. He must have share with the U.S. Armor Association, will in- changed his mind later, because he was gone by clude a reference library and a large production closing time, a late bloomer. workroom, offices, and a reception area. It will be In the early ’80s, the staff was gathered in the edi- a big improvement. tor-in-chief’s office one afternoon when an Ohio As we go to press with this edition, it’s unclear Valley thunderboomer began outside. He was on exactly when the move will come, but current the phone when a lightning bolt hit the phone plans call for early April. Our phone numbers at lines, fried the entry box, and zipped into the the new location are not supposed to change. phone’s ear-piece. The phone flew one way, the When the move is set, we’ll post details on the lieutenant colonel’s office chair the other...with magazine’s web site. him in it. He jumped up and began hopping on one foot, the zapped ear down, his finger jabbing it as The magazine is also making another move, this if he were trying to free a water bubble after div- one organizational. We have been reassigned to ing. Although his hearing was pretty dim for the the Office Chief of Armor, which is also located in rest of the day, no permanent damage seemed to another wing of our new building. ARMOR — March-April 2001 41 COMMANDER’S HATCH from Page 5

In Vietnam, a sequential approach at mander lacked true situational aware- in the forced attrition style of fighting. the strategic level was not necessarily ness and understanding (SA/SU). Sim- With SA and SU on our side, maneuver the cause of casualties. Not knowing ply put, commanders need accurate in- — especially out of contact — with its the enemy situation was. The Ia Drang formation (especially about the enemy) attendant flexibility and unpredictabil- Campaign was the first major employ- to escape the attrition that accompanies ity, will dominate 21st century opera- ment of the airmobile 1st Cavalry Divi- sequential operations. Thus, informa- tions. Information superiority (IS) will sion against three regiments of North tion becomes the fifth element of com- empower us to mass fires and effects, Vietnamese Army (NVA) regulars well bat power, not simply the goal of its not units and weapons platforms. We prepared on the Chu Pong Massif. application. With the true situational will execute focused, high volume fires While the U.S. earned a tactical victory understanding that comes with informa- from distributed locations. Thus, our based on 3,000 NVA KIAs and an es- tion as a controllable element of com- doctrine can now begin to transition timated 1,000 WIAs, the likely strate- bat power, leaders no longer have to from a sequential force build-up sce- gic victory belonged to the Commu- accept high casualties and sequential nario to simultaneous entry at multiple nists. Although the cost would be great, operations in order to gain information operational and tactical locations and they learned they could hold their own about the enemy. The key to truly revo- immediate execution of decisive opera- against the Americans and our new lutionizing warfare, to escaping the tions. vertical battlefield mobility. Eventu- tyranny of sequential operational attri- This simultaneous, rather than sequen- ally, strategic victory was theirs. His- tion, is to leverage information as a full tial, approach to combat operations will tory tells us that American casualties element of combat power, one the occurred largely for three reasons. commander has enough control over to now be possible because IS will yield true SA/SU. Internetted units will be First, the enemy expertly concealed his synchronize his operations. For the first able to distribute formations for protec- positions and movements. Consequent- time in history, we are beginning to see ly, he knew more about us than we did that digitization can make accurate tion while being able to quickly con- centrate fires for maximum effect. At about him. Second, he was a master at friendly and enemy information a pow- the strategic level, force build-up will jungle warfare. Last, we never fully erful element of combat power, instead appreciated the enemy’s dogged will- of an elusive ghost that ultimately ex- be rapid with the simultaneous multiple entry points afforded by FCS/FTRC. In ingness to accept horrendous casualties acts high casualties. Our developing sum, our doctrine will emphasize over- and keep fighting no matter what the Force XXI formations in III Corps and cost. We were willing to operate in the upcoming division capstone exer- whelmingly simultaneous operations. (Figure 1) instead of the predictably lethal contact in order to gain informa- cises involving the 4th ID (M) will con- linear and sequential operations of the tion about the enemy in hopes of de- tinue to nurture this transformation. veloping the situation and then con- past. (Figure 2) Emerging 21st century warfighting ducting decisive operations. concepts take advantage of information Tactically, we will be able to develop The attrition approach to war illus- as a key element of combat power. the situation and maneuver the force trated in these two examples placed a Light, highly deployable, tactically mo- out of contact, drastically reducing cas- premium on the four traditional ele- bile, lethal, and survivable platforms ualties and saving combat power for ments of combat power: maneuver, like the Future Combat System (FCS) decisive operations. Initial contact will firepower, protection, and leadership. and the Future Transport Rotor Craft be lethal with decisive fires at the time Even perfect synchronization of these (FTRC) are now recognized as materiel and place of the commander’s choos- four factors was not enough to gain keys to future combat success. While ing. The commander’s assessment of prompt victory because they were ap- protection is still vital, it will no longer the best way to achieve victory will de- plied in environments where the com- be the single preeminent factor it was termine what course of action to take,

XXX X X X XX X AA X X XX X X X XXX

Figure 2. Old Sequential Approach

Figure 1. New Simultaneous Approach

42 ARMOR — March-April 200

not the need to gain costly information on the simultaneous battlefield. Choic- about the enemy. es will never be black and white. De- Like the wide swath cut by a broad spite our best efforts, friction will still be rampant. Information will not be axe, the commander will be empowered perfect. Only creatively innovative and The Field Problem to attack simultaneously and decisively in a myriad of ways that the enemy adaptive leaders will overcome the con- fusion and be successful. Review Board cannot predict. This is a decided im- provement over the old approach, Third, our future leaders must sub- from Page 37 which invariably directed all efforts to scribe to the Army values of loyalty, one sequential, and thus predictable, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, option — the tip of a very long spear. integrity, and personal courage. Sim- Additionally, the logisticians plan And let there be no doubt that while all ply put, only those who live by a val- the implementation of any modifica- five elements of combat power will be ues-based system will have credibility tions to the fleet resulting from solu- crucial in this new environment, lead- with their subordinates. Information tions coming out of the FPRB. ership will remain the centerpiece and superiority means our soldiers will be more important than ever. likely know much of what their leaders The engineers of Team Abrams know. They will have to trust the evaluate and design the fixes for For our leader warriors, four leader- leader’s decision in a knowledge-based problems coming from the field, and ship characteristics will be critical. continuously evaluate new technolo- First, our future leaders must be his- environment. How does a leader moti- vate someone to assault a position gies to determine if they can improve torically grounded. As information su- when everyone knows, in real time, the safety, reliability, availability, periority provides greater and greater maintainability, and performance of situational awareness and understand- more or less how strong the enemy position is? Among other things such as the vehicles and their sub-systems. ing, we will experience a quantum leap tactical competence, I believe it will be in combat effectiveness against oppo- The officers and NCOs of TSM nents still laboring under the old con- by the credibility a leader builds by Abrams also provide input. They pro- living his life within a values-based vide a “sanity check” to ensure the straints. Simultaneous operations will system. demand an intellectual agility best de- fix to a problem passes the common veloped by studying military history. It Finally, the future leader must be deci- sense test and will withstand use by will provide a knowledge base for the sive — now more than ever. Simultane- soldiers in the field. They also act as profession of arms. Camaraderie and ous warfare promises to be just as vio- a conduit, focusing attention on prob- trust are most effectively developed lent and chaotic as sequential warfare — lems in the field based on their visits when all understand the common heri- perhaps more so. A leader who wavers to units. tage they share. Leaders will also have and loses confidence in his decisions A final, but also most important, a true appreciation of the high costs and will quickly be overcome by the rapid source of information about problems inflexible options dictated by the old tempo of simultaneous warfare. Even in the field is the soldier himself. The sequential operations. Only by under- worse, his subordinates will sense his FPRB has three telephone numbers, standing where we’ve come from can timidity even more quickly in the IS 800-989-TANK, 800-989-8265, and future leaders completely appreciate the environment. General Stonewall Jack- 810-825-5259. Any soldier can call increase in combat effectiveness af- son’s sage advice to “never take counsel and leave a message regarding any forded by an army operating simulta- of your fears” will be even more critical. problems they are having with either neously rather than sequentially. Most the Abrams or the HAB. When call- importantly, the study of history hones Information superiority promises a ing these numbers, soldiers should analytical skills to a sharp edge. Future true revolution in maneuver warfare. It leave a short message describing the leaders probably won’t remember that is a key hedge in our continued quest to problem they are experiencing, their Lt. Col. Robert B. Tully commanded ensure our overmatch of potential ene- unit, their rank and name, and a num- the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry on 16 mies. Today’s lieutenants and captains ber where they can be contacted for November 1965, when they landed at will lead our Army into this environ- follow-up. An alternate solution is to Landing Zone Victor in the Ia Drang ment. We’re at the brink of escaping go to the Team Abrams web page at Valley. They will remember, however, the tyranny of attrition warfare and the www.tacom.army.mil/gcss/pmabrams. the critical thinking skills they devel- catastrophic risk and suffering it en- You can also email MAJs Carson or oped while writing a research paper or tails. With information superiority in Finn, the M1A2 and M1A1 team presenting a battle analysis on the Ia our grasp, a bold shift to simultaneous chiefs for TSM Abrams, at: Drang operation. doctrine coupled with key materiel ad- vances, and applied by adaptive, val- [email protected] Despite our best automation and filter- ues-based, leader warriors ensures the ing efforts, information and intelligence [email protected] will bombard leaders on the simultane- future mounted force will continue to be the cutting edge of the Army’s abil- After each meeting, the FPRB pub- ous battlefield. Only those well ground- ity to prosecute decisive warfare. In- lishes its minutes and sends a copy to ed in the study of the history of the pro- every Armor/Cavalry battalion, heavy fession of arms will have the intellect formation superiority is indeed every- thing it’s cracked up to be — and then brigade, and heavy division com- necessary to separate the essential intel- some! mander and executive officer in the ligence from the supporting information. Army. The minutes are also available Second, leaders will be innovative and FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT on the III Corps LAN in the public adaptive, two further keys to success AND STRIKE FIRST! folders under “PM Abrams.”

ARMOR — March-April 2001 43 Deployable Vs. Survivable CSM Role continued from Page 26 from Page 14 This is easily accomplished with in the Army’s most important resource those who do not learn from history are existing CSMs who go to the NTC for — soldiers — and specifically the doomed to repeat it. Valuable lessons periodic rotations. They operate with an CSM. These changes, in consonance can always be learned from all combat existing team sergeant major or inde- with the Army’s process of rebuilding operations, especially when those com- pendently after completing the Ob- itself, will better leverage the abilities bat operations result in the develop- server Controller (OC) Academy. This of unit CSMs and more effectively en- ment of new vehicles. All combat op- is accomplished in conjunction with able units to train, deploy, stabilize a erations result in someone having to their unit’s Leader Training Program situation, enforce peace, or win in deci- pay the “butcher’s bill,” and all soldiers (LTP). Everyone benefits from this sive combat. would rather have the bill paid by the initiative and the cost is minimal. opposition. The Army has the ability to begin to Notes better set up CSMs for success by im- CSM Jim DePriest is a graduate of mediately restructuring the CSM Course 1“Army Announces Vision for the Future,” (Army Class 36, USASMA. He has served from one to two weeks and training Public Affairs, 12 Oct 99). at the battalion, squadron, and bri- 2 the leader tasks discussed here. They Ibid. should provide an exportable leader gade level as a CSM. He has five 3Ibid. teaching program for major commands rotations to the National Training 4Gary Sheftick and Michele Hammonds, “Army se- (MACOM) and begin the close exami- Center as a CSM. He holds a lects GM to make Interim Armored Vehicles,” (Army nation of the program of instruction at B.S.L.A. from the University of the News Service, 20 Nov 00). the United States Army Sergeants Ma- State of New York. He is currently 5Janes Defense Systems Modernization, May 99. jor Academy. Training and Doctrine the CSM for 1st Brigade, 4th Infan- Command (TRADOC) has the unique 6Lester W. Grau, “Russian-Manufactured Armored try Division. ability to incorporate the training ob- Vehicle Vulnerability in Urban Combat: The Chechnya servations from the NTC, the course Experience,” (Red Star Thrust, Jan 97). COL Randy Anderson is a 1975 developers at the USASMA, and ser- 7Timothy Thomas, “The Caucasus Conflict and Rus- vice school doctrinal writers. We have Distinguished Military Graduate sian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront the ability to utilize the NTC OC Acad- from Stephen F. Austin State Uni- Chechnya III. The Battle for Grozny, 1-26 January emy and the FORSCOM LTP to place versity. While in command of 2-68 1995,” (Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 10, No. Armor, Baumholder, Germany, he 1, Mar 97), pp.50-108. trained, experienced coaches, teachers, deployed to Kuwait for Intrinsic Ac- 8 and mentors in the world’s best training MAJ Gregory J. Celestan, Wounded Bear: The Ongo- environment. tion 95-03 and to Bosnia-Herze- ing Russian Military Operation in Chechnya, (Foreign Military Studies Office, Aug 97). We are in a period of great changes in govina as IFOR of Operation Joint Endeavor. He is currently the com- 9Thomas, pp.50-108. the Army. These changes cannot be mander of 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry 10 limited to equipment and information Grau. technology. They must include changes Division. 11Ibid. 12Eugene Yanko, “The Tank Becomes an Armored Personnel Carrier,” (Russian Weapons Catalog, www.weapons-catalog.com). 13Russian Weapons and Military Technologies CD- ROM, BTR-T on the base of the T-55 tank/Exhibits, H- Are You Fast With a “God Gun”??? APC (BTR-T)/Exhibits, Scout-patrol vehicle/Exhibits, (VTTV-Omsk-99, Nov 99). National Guard Bureau Needs ARNG O/C Augmentees 14Anatoly Ilyin, “Tank Support Combat Vehicle,” (Military Parade, Sep 00).

The 27th Enhanced Separate Infantry Brigade needs observer/con- trollers for JRTC Rotation 01-09, Fort Polk, Louisiana, 1–15 August 2001. SFC Ira L. Partridge received his Captains (12C) with cavalry troop command or platoon leader experi- initial Armor training at Fort Knox, ence; master sergeants or first sergeants (19Z) with cavalry troop experi- Ky., in 1985. He graduated the Mas- ence; and staff sergeants and sergeants first class (19D) interested in ter Gunner Course in 1993 with an assisting fellow Guardsmen and providing yourself a superior profes- A8 ASI. His assignments as a mas- sional training experience should contact CPT Wilson or CPT Porter for ter gunner include one year as a more information. company master gunner and three years as battalion master gunner for CPT John Wilson CPT Garry Porter 5-77 AR, 1st AD, Mannheim, Ger- Phone: (703) 607-9154 Phone: (703) 607-7317 many, moving with the unit in 1994 DSN: 327-9154 DSN: 327-7317 and re-designating to 1-32 AR, 2nd [email protected] [email protected] ID, Fort Lewis, Wash. He is currently serving as the newsletter editor, The National Guard Bureau funds these tours as additional Annual webmaster, and operations sergeant Training. Travel and per diem is included. for the Master Gunner School at Fort Knox, Ky. 44 ARMOR — March-April 2001

LETTERS from Page 4

The Readers Respond “An Infantryman’s Thoughts on Armor”

Dear Sir: will have the lethality of an M1A1, more pro- tection than a LAV, and be lighter and more Interesting article by MAJ Bateman (“An deployable. Ideally, it will allow us to main- Infantryman’s Thoughts on Armor”). I find it tain the boldness and audacity that is inher- interesting that with such a strong opinion he ent in Armor and Cavalry right now. No need of all people seems to miss the mark on the to feel sorry for tankers. We’re pretty happy addition of the medium weight vehicle to the with where we are and where we’re going. force. Notice that I did not say transition from We’ll be there when you call. M1A1. MAJ Bateman’s points on logistics and force projection are quite valid. We are ROBERT P. ASHE heavy and require a lot to sustain. This is CPT, AR nothing that the heads of the armor commu- USMA AR Branch Rep nity haven’t said repeatedly in this very pub- lication. There is a plan for addressing these Armoring the Infantry and exercises, much like its WWII predeces- things and it is called the Future Combat Recalls Success of WWII sor. But it could deploy rapidly, so we made System, not an interim weight vehicle. more of them.

Dear Sir: Further confounding the effort to lighten the I would rather focus on the role that MAJ force, the Army repeatedly refused to pro- Bateman thinks Armor has on the battlefield. I wish to comment on the diatribe against cure a light tank to replace the Vietnam-era First and foremost, I think that most soldiers heavy armor by Major Bateman, “An Infan- M551 Sheridan. I’d like to remind younger place a high priority on survival. I certainly tryman’s Thoughts on Armor,” that appeared readers that the M8 Armored Gun System do. The idea that survival is some sort of an on pages 11-12, ARMOR, Jan-Feb 2001. (AGS) that was type classified but then can- afterthought just doesn’t register here. Let’s celed in 1995 is essentially the same vehicle win the fight and come back home. Just a The only part of the article that I agree with is his conclusion’s opening sentence, “To that was tested in the mid ’80s but was never thought. There is something that you get that procured then, either. The AGS was the accompanies that rather substantial amount make a weak historical point…” I concur that it is weak. It is also out of context and flat linchpin of the 9th Infantry Division’s experi- of steel that you have wrapped around you in mental and revolutionary 1980’s High Tech- a tank. That is the knowledge that although wrong. MAJ Bateman’s argument that the Germans were winning when they had nology Light Division (HTLD), sometimes you are not invincible, it does take a lot to derisively called the “Dune Buggy Division.” destroy you. This translates to confidence lighter tanks (Mark II, III, and IV) and losing when they had heavy Panthers and Tigers is Without AGS, the concept could not suc- and aggressive actions on the battlefield that ceed, so the 9th ID was reorganized conven- are critical to success. I wasn’t in the Army obnoxious, and he should know better. He ignores the doctrinal and operational con- tionally and subsequently deactivated before when Desert Storm began, but I think the the deployment to Desert Shield and Storm. number of casualties would have been a little cepts under which the opposing forces bit higher without the M1A1 in the fight. Pro- fought. He also ignores the fact that Allied So, in 1999, the new Chief of Staff of the tection does matter. There is a reason that tanks improved and were vastly superior to Army recognizes that the light forces are too we have different branches/MOSs in the earlier models. light, and determines to use new technology Army. To attempt to place the role of Armor But let me hit the real issue concerning to develop a lightweight equivalent of the into the same category and apply the same “Transformation,” which has nothing to do heavy force. His objective is a 20-ton tank criteria to Armor as Infantry would be a big with gun tube elevation, vehicle mainte- with the survivability and lethality of today’s mistake. I applaud you for stepping into bat- nance, fuel consumption, or anything else 70-ton Abrams. Great idea! But now, it tle with your “BDU Armor” but you are not concerning the Abrams MBT. The real issue seems as though every “light fighter” who asked to accomplish the same mission with is that light infantry is too light. slept through the logistics planning portions your BDUs and Javelin as I am. The protec- of C&GSC wants to twist this into saying that tion that means jack **** to you means Look back to Reorganization Objective we need to eliminate the heavy force something totally different to me. It means Army Divisions (ROAD) that served us since TODAY and replace the MBT with a an APC that if needed, to help you in a time of need, the mid-60s. It was a direct carryover from with a cannon. That is utter nonsense. I can raise risk and lessen caution as I close WWII experience (disregarding the failed The other point that has been totally obfus- with and destroy the enemy that threatens Pentomic Division, the Army’s “Transforma- cated in “Transformation” debates is that the you because I know the capabilities of the tion” of the early ’60s). The general purpose IBCT is essentially a mechanized infantry armor around me will allow me to act a lot Infantry Division (Light) had organic tank and brigade equipped with a newer family of light more aggressively than I would if I were in a mechanized battalions, the exact number of armored vehicles. There are variants for in- Bradley or an LAV. each to be tailored based on METT-T. The division could be readily beefed up into an fantry, engineers, mortars, antitank, air de- For the record I’ll summarize this whole Infantry Division (Mechanized) by simply in- fense, command, maintenance, medical, heavy/medium/light thing. The Army identi- creasing the proportion of mechanized infan- etc., etc., just like the M113 family of APCs; fied a need to get more firepower on the try battalions. like the family of halftracks of WWII, even!! In ground quicker than we can with the M1 other words, discounting the mindlessly dis- tank. The interim weight vehicle bridges a Two decades ago, the Army ignored all tracting debate of wheel versus track, the gap that was clearly there and addresses those lessons of WWII, scrapped this bal- Army enters the 21st century having finally rapid deployment issues and should help in anced organization, and created the Light stumbled into the secret we mastered so well places where maneuvering a tank would be Infantry Division (LID). This was a 10,000- in WWII: “Mechanized (or Armored) Infantry.” impractical. The next generation of tank will man unit that regularly demonstrated an All that is missing is a suitable AGS, but this continue to do most of what the M1 does. It inability to even feed itself in deployments time, we might actually get one in the form of ARMOR — March-April 2001 45

the 105mm cannon-armed Mobile Gun Sys- think we should look to the LAVs to do any weren’t universal at all. If the Germans had tem (MGS). decisive fighting unless we know for sure as many tanks as the Russians, we’d proba- that they will face no enemy medium to bly be speaking German now. So I wish “Light Fighters” all the best in heavy armor. The problem is, sooner or later their quest to mechanize themselves so that they will face enemy armor, and then what? I can see why MAJ Bateman generates so they can bring more than backbreaking We keep looking at the M1 and saying, well, much mail. The BLUF is, we’re all on the manpacked loads to the fight, and move it’s not deployable. Have we taken a closer same side and, though few will admit it, faster than plodding at a foot marching pace. look at our means of moving it. Yes, aircraft tankers need infantrymen as much as infan- And with keen focused insight, hopefully they wise, the Galaxy can take only one, but what trymen need tankers. I guess we just dis- will design the vehicles of those mechanized about the naval mode?... What new ships agree a little on what systems we use in our battalions so that they can elevate against are under development, specifically in the mutually supporting relationships. Again, high targets and deliver precise, lethal fire in cargo transportation area? I think we need to maybe one day heavy armor will be a thing support of the accompanying dismounted consider this because, in my opinion, we will of the past, but for the next 10 years, I think we’ll need it. and mounted infantry. And with that accom- still need heavy armor for some time. Even- plished, I am fully confident that they will be tually, who knows what will transpire with the CPT MATT EICHBURG able to deploy rapidly and bring a sufficiently electrical rounds or lasers they’re develop- HHC/2-8 CAV lethal capability to meet most contingencies. ing, but for now we need heavy armor and 1st Cavalry Division And if need be, they will have sufficient com- will for some time. bat power to defend and buy time for the heavy legacy force to deploy and enter the This leads me to another point, survivabil- Can Armor Guys Take Note, theater, where it can utterly destroy the ity. He says mission accomplishment is And Not Offense? threat that was impertinent enough to chal- ranked ahead of survivability. He also says lenge the Armed Forces of the United States our armor protection doesn’t mean anything of America. to him. Come on, that’s a good one! How Dear Sir: But so long as there remain thousands of many times does that armor provide cover I am a tank battalion commander and I en- modern MBTs, IFVs, APCs, and armored SP for dismounts? Many. Also, I haven’t read of joyed MAJ Bateman’s article in the Jan-Feb artillery in the hands of potential opponents too many dead soldiers accomplishing the 2001 ARMOR. He has a great gift for prose world wide, I suggest that the rush to elimi- mission. If tankers had to leave their tanks to and I do agree with his assessment. As an nate the Abrams, the best MBT on the join infantryman in a fight, we wouldn’t need Armor officer for over 15 years, I have seen planet, and castrate the U.S. Army’s Armor tanks, just more infantry. the day of the M1 come and go. My biggest is plainly misguided. There will always be situations or places issue with the M1 is the main gun storage capacity. As has been proven in many wars, CHESTER A. KOJRO where only infantry can go. That is what infantryman get paid for. I will tell you that but especially wars between Israel and Arab LTC, AR, USAR (Ret.) countries, the number of main gun rounds tankers are entitled to more armor protec- tion; that is the point. Our mission statement carried on tanks made huge differences in Survivability Looms as a Question is to close with and destroy the enemy using the outcome of small unit combat. I also In Army’s Shift to Light Armor firepower, maneuver, and shock effect. I love agree with his assessment of mobility from a infantrymen, but they really don’t shock that operational point of view. The M1 is horrible. Dear Sir: much. You get shock effect when you hear a As for fuel, I wish my checking account 120mm go off and see that SABOT or HEAT looked like my fuel account! I applaud him I read MAJ Bateman’s article in the Jan- utterly destroy something. I would venture for his far-thinking article, I can only hope my Feb 2001 issue of ARMOR, and while I that you get more shock effect when an en- fellow armor officers will take note versus agreed with several of his points, I also dis- emy sees its main battle tank fire at and hit taking offense. agreed with a couple... As I am a tanker, I an M1 and watch in horror as their main tank guess that won’t surprise you. As I under- KEITH D. LOCHNER killing munition sticks out of the front slope, MAJ(P), AR, CAARNG stand it, the senior Army leadership intends the M1 turret turns and sends a 120mm to field some light “armored” brigades now Cdr, 1st Battalion, 185th Armor greeting card into and through the other side and eventually mothball the M1 series of of the enemy MBT. That is exactly when the tanks (I’m still not clear if they intend to to- enemy’s will starts to falter, and when that To “Complete the Mission,” tally do away with all the heavy armor). First happens, victory is not far behind. You’re Gonna Need Tanks of all, the LAV III is more deployable, cheaper, and probably less maintenance- That same will can only be strengthened at Dear Sir: intensive; we’ll soon find out. However, with- the sight of countless burning U.S. LAV IIIs out the extra applique armor package, it can and scattering U.S. infantry. In Somalia, the On MAJ Bateman’s article, I disagree with only stop a 14.5mm round. Now, I agree that relief column was made up of HMMWVs and most all of it. The one smart thing in his arti- we should be able to deploy quickly, and was decisively defeated. Senior Army lead- cle is that he knows that he will need ar- rapid deployment infantry units should be ership publicly regretted the fact that there mor.... able to utilize armor, light or heavy, as soon was no U.S. heavy armor available to send as they’re on the ground. LAV IIIs are clearly to the Rangers. There have been incredible Those light (armored vehicles) will not sur- much more rapidly deployable than the M1 advances in anti-armor capability, specifi- vive, and then who are you going to call? series. But I do think we need to use caution cally armor penetration and ease of use for There is no such thing as too much fire- here. It seems we’re so concerned with get- the aggressor. That is a big problem for the power, accuracy, or protection, and I don’t ting there fast that we’re not thinking about LAV. care how much fuel or support it takes; get it what we’ll face when we get there. Will there, an infantryman’s life depends on it. China, Iraq, or North Korea sweat when they Finally, his historical example of Germany MAJ Bateman has fallen prey to the political see LAV IIIs; probably not. It’ll still be a losing with the Tiger and King Tiger was very correctness of not bullying these Third World speed bump, just a little bigger. The concern poor. The reason the Germans lost is not countries into line. They are not worth one I have is that the threat will outgun us in the because their heavy tanks were not better. American life. He sounds like he wants to die fight. A T-90, or T-62 for that matter, can They were, although the 85mm T-34 was for our country. I want to complete the mis- chew through LAV IIIs, at most armed with a very good. They lost because they were sion and go home. (Remember GEN Patton, 105mm, just as easily as it can chew up being totally out-manufactured. The Rus- history teacher?) It takes survival to make crunchies. sians and Americans were producing more that happen. It takes survival to complete the that 10 tanks for every one the Germans mission. Go ahead and get some sort of light I think it is good that the LAV IIIs will be were producing. The Germans also had too gun system to keep your head above water able to go with infantry in a hurry. I do not many models and so maintenance parts ’til we get there... Bottom line is, it will still 46 ARMOR — March-April 2001

take real tanks to complete the mission, no large variety of munitions, high rate of fire, Only twice have U.S. Army tank crews matter where or when it occurs. large heavy vehicle), missile (light weight, no gone into combat with state-of-the-art vehi- recoil, extremely high-cost, low-speed, large cles: the FT17 (a foreign design) and the M1. TOD L. VANN heavy projectile, single purpose warhead, Look at what was achieved, and how low our MAJ, AR, ALARNG single purpose launcher, low rate of fire, losses were both times. Heavy armor forces AO/S3 152d Armor small light vehicle) or rocket (still in devel- are a deterrent to aggressor nations. Thus opment, light weight, no recoil, medium-cost the aggressors turn to other less costly “An Infantryman’s Thoughts...” high-speed large medium-weight projectile, means against us. There are at least two Brings Praise and a Clarification large variety of warheads, high rate of fire, nations with the manpower and money to small light vehicle). The gun is the best cur- develop a significant armor heavy threat in Dear Sir: rent answer to the firepower demand.... the next 20 years.... I just read MAJ Bateman’s article in the MAJ Bateman’s basic point about maneu- Is it possible for a light armored vehicle to Jan-Feb 2001 issue of ARMOR..... As an ver seems to revolve around strategic mobil- be as effective as the M1A2SEP? Yes, but infantryman (light, airborne, heavy) of 18½ ity, minimal logistic needs, and bridge- the technology is not currently available nor years experience, it was a refreshing view- crossing capability. My point is that strategic does the will to spend the money necessary point. Keep up the good work. mobility is a matter of transport capability. to develop the hardware exist. To continue on the current road, the U.S. Army and the One minor point, and I do mean minor: my Buy enough heavy lift aircraft and or pre- nation must accept the risk of not just defeat observation on why the Germans went with loaded high-speed ships with brigade sets and there is no problem. The only way to of the light mechanized force, but total de- the Panther was because the T-34 was struction. cleaning the clocks of the PzKpw IIIs and speed up current strategic transport, ease IVs. But I agree with MAJ Bateman; the Ti- maintenance needs, supply consumption CHRIS SCHNEIDER ger wasn’t the answer, they should have built and bridge requirements is to lighten the U.S. Army (Armor), Retired a better medium tank to deal with the T-34 tank. This limits the tank’s armor (is it avail- series. Anyway, great article! able?) and firepower (can it destroy the re- quired enemy?). There is no light tank or * * * LTC NEIL C. REINWALD, JR. armored car mounting sufficient firepower in Commander and Professor the weight class of a loaded Hummer. Command List Corrections of Military Science University of Alabama His historical points are very weak. The The command list that ran with the Nov- tanks being used by the Germans had noth- Dec 2000 issue included several errors: LAV III’s Armor Barely Exceeds ing to do with why they won early in the war Protection of Early WWI Tanks or ended up losing.... Between the wars, the The commander of 38th ID’s 37th Bde. is Germans figured out what a tank had to do COL Matt Kambic. on the battlefield and how it had to operate Dear Sir: The commander of 1-185 AR, 81st AR Bn. internally. The British hobbled their tank is MAJ (P) Keith D. Lochner and the CSM is “An Infantryman’s Thoughts on Armor” is an development with railroad size limits and R. Reynolds. interesting article. I want to address MAJ taxes on high horsepower engines. The U.S. Bateman’s points on armor, firepower, and Army Infantry Branch did no useful R&D up maneuver. His basic point seems to revolve to 1936 because it had what it considered around strategic mobility and discarding adequate tanks for a future war. If it had not enough armor to achieve it. My point is that been for General MacArthur authorizing the without sufficient armor, a tank will fall out Cavalry Branch to develop combat cars in quickly after the battle starts or not be avail- 1932, the U.S. Army would not have had a Some Road Wheels Defective; able at all. It will be a burning wreck. Armor modern medium tank chassis at the start of Most Failed from Wear, Neglect allows the vehicle to move under fire on the the war. The U.S. Army did not get internal battlefield and protects the crew. tank operation correct until the M1. An investigation into a series of road The armor protection being discussed (on Until after WWII, a U.S. Army tank unit’s wheel failures at Fort Hood, Texas has the LAV III) is about the same as on the purpose was to support infantry (a recurring determined that some failed due to British 1917 Mk IV tank. Artillery, the number point in the Bateman article). A German tank material defects in the wheels, but the one casualty producer, is far deadlier today unit’s missions were (and still are): attacking majority of failures were caused by and the firepower density higher than ever. enemy armor, destroying heavy infantry normal wear or poor maintenance. The The Sherman could survive 105mm artillery weapons deep in the main fighting field, and probe, by TEAM Abrams and person- near misses and a hit any place but the en- destroying artillery, leader means, and sup- nel from the Red River Army Depot, gine deck. The thin armor now being looked ply. blamed the majority of the failures on at cannot survive a near miss by anything improper track tension and failure to heavier than an 82mm mortar. A hit any- The light armor of the Sherman resulted in keep mud from building up around the where will destroy the vehicle. Every nation over 900 having to be replaced between 6 road wheels, which restricts their uses 105mm or heavier artillery. Look at the June and 14 August in Normandy. Can the movement and causes uneven wear. loss rate in infantry platoons. Operating in U.S. Army currently replace such tank and Many of the failures occurred during the same environment, light armor units will crew losses? With greater vulnerability, how the muddy rainy season at Fort Hood. suffer very high vehicle and crew loss rates. can it be avoided?... Can the U.S. Army afford to replace vehicles TACOM is publishing a Maintenance and crewmen at the same rate as infantry? Major General William R. Desobry’s 1972 Advisory Message reemphasizing the Can the U.S. Army deploy light armor units Main Battle Tank Task Force established 19 need for proper track maintenance, with as many vehicles as there are infantry design factors in a specific priority, based on and a booklet detailing track mainte- to allow for the losses? historical data. I have yet to see any evi- nance do’s and don’ts will follow. Red dence the findings should change. The River has also offered to provide In discussing firepower, his basic point Bundeswehr’s Keiler Study in the late 1960s special training on inspection proce- seems to revolve around terminal effects found tanks that could not survive direct dures for tracked systems. At the against buildings. My point is it must be armor piercing fire would on average kill one Armor School, the subject is being re- specified what targets a tank is to destroy. If enemy tank for each friendly tank lost. Being emphasized during preventive main- killing a tank with a frontal shot is required, able to survive a hit altered the exchange tenance training. you will need a gun (very heavy, huge recoil ratio to 4 to 1 in favor of the heavier armored forces, low-cost, high-speed, small projectile, tank.... ARMOR — March-April 2001 47

Air-Mech Strike Force Proposal: Big Questions Persist

Air-Mech-Strike: 3-Dimensional Pha- be possible to airlift a battalion of four-ton German capture of Crete in 1941, an opera- lanx by the Air-Mech-Strike Study Group ‘armored’ vehicles armed with machine tion, by the way, that so gutted the elite Nazi (Airborne)*, Turner Publishing Company, guns, Javelins, and grenade launchers deep Airborne that it was never employed opera- Paducah, Ky., 2000, 312 pages, $24.97 into the enemy’s rear, with scouts mounted tionally again. The AMS Study Group may on ATVs or motorbikes. In some situations, it have the germ of a great concept, and they hard bound. might even be desirable, but the authors do have certainly outlined ‘what’ can be done, not make a convincing case for it. In the but this book will leave skeptics unconvinced Flip this book over to the back cover and handful of pages dedicated to tactics, they as to ‘why’ it should be. you will see that some real heavyweights state that an AMS commander requires “an have contributed glowing blurbs. They exhort expanded over-match in tactical awareness” LTC STEVE EDEN the unsuspecting to “Read this book… a to “defeat 80 percent or better of his oppos- 16th Cavalry Regiment must read… a monumental work… the au- ing force through over-the-horizon indirect Ft. Knox, Ky. thors are worthy successors to [Gavin and fires from precision munitions.” Of course, if Howze].” I can only conclude that these dis- we could do that, the need for maneuver, *Turner Publishing lists the following as au- tinguished gentlemen either did not actually airmobile or otherwise, would be virtually thors of the study: David L. Grange, Huba read the book, or are far less discerning than eliminated. The enemy, needless to say, is Wass DeCzege, Richard D. Liebert, John I previously had thought. conveniently blundering about in massed Richards, Michael L. Sparks, and Charles Jarnot. This study does, in fact, contain the kernel formations or crouching passively in build- of an intriguing notion: that we have the ings and trench lines. technology and resources now to create an airmobile mechanized force capable of tacti- Logistics is treated even more cavalierly. Triumphant Fox: Erwin Rommel and cal, operational, and even strategic maneu- The effort to refuel, rearm, man, and main- tain a mechanized battalion by air in all the Rise of the Afrika Korps by Samuel ver. Moreover, we could and should begin W. Mitcham, Cooper Square Press, New developing a future force that exploits weather, while that battalion is fighting and maneuvering through the enemy’s rear, is York, New York, 2000, 224 pages, 8 mechanized airmobility, using advanced maps, $17.95. helicopter and wing-in-ground technology to simply not addressed beyond the vaguest deliver future combat systems tailored to generalities. The Desert Fox continues to cast his long their airborne carriers. The ultimate vision is The authors are also enamored with a wide shadow over the military history field with of huge aircraft deploying across oceans variety of toys to supplement AMS mobility. Samuel W. Mitcham’s new book about Field with an armor task force of 20-ton future Some have real value — like the mecha- Marshal Erwin Rommel, the latest in a con- combat vehicles, crews, and infantrymen in nized mules described to help move the tinuing historical controversy. David Fraser’s its belly. As these are discharged, a fleet of infantryman’s ever-expanding load. Others recent best-selling book lauded Rommel’s full-tilt-rotor ‘speed cranes,’ self-deployed have been considered and discarded by the life and military exploits, but numerous mili- from continental bases, picks up tanks, IFVs, Army in the past, for very good reasons. The tary historians have countered this view with crews, et al, and flies them directly onto the Flyer 21, for example, is basically a dune serious — sometimes scathing — criticism of objective. At the LZ, the task force deftly buggy with weapons appended. It, along with Rommel’s military abilities. They cite his disengages from its carriers and rolls across scout motorbikes and ATVs, are neither inability to grasp the operational and strate- plains/mountains/jungles/towns to tear into a survivable nor reliable enough for combat gic realms of warfare as fatal flaws, render- stunned and reeling enemy. service, a fact determined during the mid- ing his tactical prowess as nothing more than good feed for the Nazi propaganda machine. In the nearer term, the authors argue, the 80’s flirtation with the high-tech motorized Army should forget all this IBCT nonsense. division. One suggested weapon even The attacks leveled against Rommel, Mit- For considerably less cost, we could equip caused me to flash back — the Elevated cham contends, stem from a recent trend in Air-Mech-Strike (AMS) battalions with a mix TOW System, mast-mounted, electrically- the history field to “cast stones at the individ- of off-the-shelf M113A3 and German Wie- driven, and carried atop a light armored ve- ual who stands head and shoulders above sels that could be airlifted by the current hicle for crew protection. Remembering my the crowd.” In short, Mitcham believes that helicopter fleet. Suitably equipped with a service with the late, unlamented ITV, I had Rommel deserves the hero status heaped mixture of weaponry and sensors, these to take smelling salts and lay down for an upon him by Hitler and Churchill alike. would provide a third dimension of maneuver hour. for every brigade — a proposed heavy divi- The Triumphant Fox begins with a brief Finally, the authors would like to compare chapter detailing the events leading up to sion would have three brigades, each with their efforts to the Howze Board, which for- an airmobile cavalry squadron and AMS Germany’s involvement in North Africa. Then mulated plans for the air-mobilization of in- Mitcham retraces Rommel’s career, begin- battalion, alongside ‘legacy’ BFV and M1 fantry, and to draw upon history to show that battalions. ning in the WWI Italian campaign, then his AMS is the inevitable next step in future years at the Infantry School during the inter- Neat stuff, to be sure, and … maybe… fea- warfare. As Bernard Brodie said, “The war years, his observations as Hitler’s aide sible. But if the authors are to be compli- phrase ‘history teaches,’ when encountered about the 1939 campaign in Poland, and his mented on forwarding an imaginative solu- in argument, usually portends bad history command of the famous 7th Panzer “Ghost” tion to the perceived problem of an Army and worse logic.” That is certainly true here. division in France in 1940. grown too heavy for its own good, they must And it is history that the authors must over- Rommel, who relied on experience rather also be condemned for a poor argument come in their efforts to convince the Army shoddily presented. than intellectual theory, had been extraordi- that their vision is correct. No air-delivered narily successful as a junior infantry com- While the book is chock-a-block with tables land force, with one exception, has ever mander in WWI. Mitcham astutely points out of organization, vehicular vital statistics, and scored an operational success (and there that those experiences showed him that if he quotes from Sun Tzu, there is precious little are damn few tactical successes to note, for trained his units hard enough, he could push discussion of logistics or tactics. Yes, it may that matter). The one exception was the them relentlessly and count on the fact that 48 ARMOR — March-April 2001

his enemy would break before his troops A Hundred Miles of Bad Road – An longer functions as a unit. Birdwell attrib- collapsed from exhaustion. This thinking Armored Cavalryman in Vietnam utes this to the depletion of the professional shaped his tactical and operational decisions 1967-68 by Dwight W. Birdwell and Keith NCO corps, and the turnover of personnel as a panzer commander in the invasion of William Nolan, Presidio Books, Inc., from casualties. France and had a great deal to do with his command philosophy in the African theater. Novato, Calif., 2000, 218 pages, soft Birdwell also says that, by that point, eve- This might account for Rommel’s lack of cover, $17.95. ryone had realized that we weren’t trying to concern with logistics and fuel supplies dur- win the war anymore and the enemy wasn’t ing that campaign. The “bad road” is Highway 1, the main sup- quitting, so survival became the main effort ply route from Saigon to the Cambodian after Tet. Drug use and racial tension de- Coverage of the African campaign is rela- border. The experiences are those of the velop, as they were developing in the tively narrow in scope, extending from early co-author, Dwight W. Birdwell, who is a tank- States at the time. Morale suffers from re- 1941 until the New Year of 1942. In the in- er in Troop C, 3/4th Cavalry, 25th Infantry ports of anti-war protests and troopers felt troduction, the author explains that this is his Division. The mission is convoy security, “run- abandoned. Some begin abusing citizens. third volume in an ongoing study of Rom- ning the road,” and the unit uses M48A3s At one point, Birdwell tries to intervene mel’s campaigns. He sets out to depict and M113 APCs. The enemy, the VC, relies when an old man is being interrogated and Rommel’s opening campaign in Africa fairly, on guerrilla tactics and roadblocks, only once beaten, and tries to stop the beating of emphasizing his achievements and prowess attacking in force before Tet. some other prisoners, but instead gets beat while acknowledging his shortcomings. Rom- up by our own people. As well as showing mel’s initiative upon arrival paid huge divi- Birdwell is a Specialist 4th Class who great courage, Birdwell seems a very de- dends and far exceeded Hitler’s expectations started out in a tank crew as a gunner. But in cent man who comes through the war with as he drove the English all the way to Egypt Vietnam, the targets are so close that no his integrity and beliefs intact. and surrounded the fortress of Tobruk. He gunner is regularly needed: the tank com- skillfully depicts Operation “Battleaxe,” and mander just points the tube and fires it him- Birdwell finds it hard to believe how dis- illustrates that Rommel not only could master self, and the gunner sits on top of the turret connected some senior officers are from the attack, but deftly defend and counterat- with an M16 or M79 grenade launcher to the troops in the field and what they face. A tack with devastating results. Mitcham does help return fire while the loader keeps the new division commander actually orders the level criticism at Rommel for his tactical de- rounds coming. troopers to remove sandbags and runway cisions at the final battle of Sidi Rezegh, matting from their tanks and wants the tur- which ultimately forced Rommel to withdraw Tankers used sandbags for protection from rets shined with diesel fuel! his siege of Tobruk. Sidi Rezegh ended fire and hung runway matting on the sides of Rommel’s first campaign in Africa, and Mit- the tanks to take the first hit from any RPGs. Finally, Birdwell has had enough. While he cham closes his book with Rommel’s well- The rules of engagement allow for return fire had been thinking of staying in the Army, orchestrated retreat. only when fired upon, and breaking the rules he now wants out. He experiences an in- of engagement, like firing without permis- credible number of close calls, and not just Mitcham’s prose is concise, yet descriptive. sion, is a constant worry, especially for ca- in combat. When he leaves a barracks This compact book probes deeply into reer people. building, a rocket comes through the roof Rommel as a commander, soldier, leader, moments later with devastating results. One husband, and citizen, providing a good pic- On January 31st, 1968, word comes over night, after he has a premonition to get out ture of Rommel’s personality, rather than the radio that there’s a squad of VC break- of the shack he is in, and just after he does, giving us only a drab rundown of his battle- ing into the wire at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. a driverless M48 runs over it. He knows his field exploits. By getting to know the man, Two platoons, including Birdwell’s, are dis- luck has run out. Mitcham allows us to better understand his patched. This was no routine incursion, but military decisions. While his analysis of the beginning of the Tet Offensive. What For his action at Tan Son Nhut, Birdwell is Rommel’s temperament as a commander is those tankers really faced was the 271st a potential candidate for the Congressional good, it could have gone further. Sometimes Regiment, 9th VC Division. Medal of Honor or the Distinguished Ser- Rommel’s initiative, had it not been success- vice Cross, but receives a Silver Star in- ful, could have been considered insubordina- A ferocious battle begins, the point platoon stead, and he hears later that two disgrun- tion, and could have cost him dearly. His is knocked out, and Birdwell’s platoon is tled crew members interfered with the unrelenting pressure on his direct subordi- badly hit. When his tank commander is se- write-up for his award. Birdwell receives a nates sometimes crossed the dangerous line verely wounded, Birdwell takes over the tank second Silver Star for his combat action at of stifling the very initiative he prized. Mit- and, after a short time, his is the only tank An Duc. He has been promoted to Spec 5 cham could have explored the duality of returning fire. This is a heart-pounding battle and tank commander, but in spite of all his these traits more fully. While Mitcham does account. success as a soldier, Birdwell never gets not praise these characteristics, he could Birdwell fires the main gun himself from the converted to sergeant or makes E-6. have explored them further, including their cupola using an improvised lanyard so he negative impact. The author uses a wide doesn’t have to drop down into the turret to This book is well-written by Birdwell and variety of primary sources, sprinkled with fire, and fires everything available from Nolan, and I liked what it had to say. It of- sufficient secondary sources to provide him HEAT to anti-personnel canister rounds, as fers a firsthand account of armor combat in with a wide range of perspectives on his well as firing the .50 caliber cupola-mounted Vietnam with continuity and coherence, subject. machine gun. At one point in the course of which allows the reader to see the change in operations and troop morale before and In a final analysis, Mitcham achieves his the battle, Birdwell can’t understand why his driver won’t respond to his commands, only after Tet. It kept me engaged, and even objective of rebutting Rommel’s critics: his with taking notes for this review, it was a tactical genius more than made up for his to find out later that his own microphone has been shot off the side of his helmet by the three-night read. The book has an appendix operational and strategic deficiencies. With- with a listing of troopers who are KIA or out falling in love with his subject, Mitcham intense enemy. After Birdwell exhausts all 90mm rounds and has burnt out the barrel of who later died of wounds, and a glossary. portrays Rommel for what he really was: There are also black and white photos. perhaps the greatest tactical military mind of the .50 caliber, he continues firing with his this century, though not without his short- M16 and finally orders his crew to abandon the tank when reinforcements arrive. PAUL S. MEYER comings. Former USAARMS Information Officer 2LT SAM COOK After Tet, everything deteriorates. Disci- and Armor School Historian Ft. Knox, Ky. pline and morale fail, and the platoon no Cincinnati, Ohio ARMOR — March-April 2001 49

Nine Battles to Stanley by Nicholas van Agincourt by Christopher Hibbert, Coo- rations and begins a cat-and-mouse chase der Bijl, Pen and Sword Books, 1999, per Square Press, June 2000, maps and with the formidable French force (approxi- 208 pages plus 16 pages of photo- illustrations, 176 pages, $16.95. mately 60,000) on the northern bank of the Somme. Eventually, the English cross the graphs, glossary, appendices, and 18 Somme, but the French force moves to block This story shall the good man teach maps), $36.95 online, IBSN: 0850526191. the road to Calais and force the battle. his son; This is a book about the land battles con- And Crispin Crispian shall ne’er go by, Hibbert sets the stage for the battle well, ducted during British recapture of the Falk- From this day to the ending of the world, guiding readers through both camps and land Islands in 1982. The author was 3 But we in it shall be remembered. vividly describing the condition and mood of Commando Brigade’s military intelligence the combatants. He does a fine job of dis- officer for the campaign. -King Henry V, IV, iii. secting the three-hour fray in a blow-by-blow The first five chapters set the stage for the fashion, weaving analysis throughout and Nine thousand men and a young monarch nine battles. The author starts with a good describing the terrain in detail, noting its sailed from the port of Solent, England, on description of the politics and actions that significance in this particular battle. The August 11, 1415; three days later they began lead up to the Argentine invasion of the Mal- author also sheds light on Henry V’s butcher- an invasion of France. This invasion would vinas (their name for the Falkland Islands) ing of French prisoners, an event that has lead to the greatest battle of the Hundred and then describes the invasion itself. He been variously interpreted over the years. Years War and an epic moment in English then provides a good description of the forc- history — the battle of Agincourt. In summary, this is a well-written account es that will fight the battles. In Chapter 4, he and a must for those interested in gaining a tells of the recapture of the outlying South Historian Christopher Hibbert, author of better understanding of this great battle and Georgia Island by the Special Air Service Agincourt, has created a splendid and read- the events and armies that shaped it. I found (SAS), Special Boat Service (SBS) and the able account of the historic battle. Hibbert the author’s illustrations helpful, especially Royal Marines. He then describes how SAS details the events which led to the invasion, the map of the battlefield and its depiction of and SBS elements conducted advance forces explores the strategies invoked by the two how the forces were arrayed. I enjoyed the operations before the main British landings. armies, and examines the armor and arma- passages taken from Shakespeare’s Henry The next six chapters are the meat of the ment of the different classes of fighters in- V, but found the French passages minus book and describe the ground fight to recap- volved in the struggle. translations distracting. (I cursed myself for ture the Falklands. It walks the reader What sets Hibbert’s account apart from my failure to recall more of my high school through the amphibious landings at San previously published accounts? Quite simply, French). Carlos, the advance and capture of Goose the book is much more than an account of Green, the advance and capture of the outer MAJ DAVE DAIGLE tactics employed during the battle; it is a ARMOR Staff and inner defenses of Stanley and culmi- great read. Readers will find a wealth of nates in the final battle for Stanley itself and information tucked inside a compelling tale. the surrender. Eighteen maps, which are Ten chapters describe Henry V’s actions scattered throughout the book, are well de- prior to Harfleur, the siege and fall of Har- Guide to Military Operations Other signed and allow the reader to visualize the fleur, the march to Calais, the battle of Agin- Than War: Tactics, Techniques & Pro- ground during the various portions of the court, and the young king’s triumphant cedures for Stability & Support Op- campaign. homecoming. erations: Domestic & International by The author offers an honest look at the LTC Keith E. Bonn, USA (Ret.) and MSG campaign and discusses the bad as well as Hibbert’s prologue reviews Henry V’s (HV) Anthony E. Baker, USAR (Ret.), Stack- the good. During Special Forces’ operations, justification for launching the invasion and provides insight into the effort and expense pole Books, Mechanicsburg, Pa., 2000, there were planning and other problems that 448 pages, $19.95, paperback. resulted in unnecessary loss of life. In the expended to secure an “army by contract.” The author also outlines the army’s organi- author’s opinion, this was at least partly caused by the elitism of the SAS. During the zation and describes the various classes of Keith E. Bonn and Anthony E. Baker are capture of Goose Green by the 2nd Para- fighters and their weapons in the book’s both retired Army soldiers who have created chute Battalion, he describes leadership and prologue. a book with the intent of helping prepare impatience problems that may have been a The inclusion of Harfleur and the march to military professionals and civilian agencies partial cause for the death of the command- Calais were welcome additions. Many texts for the complex and often highly politicized ing officer. He also keeps reminding the give short shrift to these events, focusing Military Operations Other Than War reader of the effects caused by a lack of more on the final battle. Hibbert’s detailed (MOOTW). Both authors have served in a military intelligence personnel. accounts of both armies and how they come variety of positions and locations that give to arrive at Agincourt gave me a new appre- them excellent qualifications to write a book Bottom line: A well-written and interesting about this complicated topic. book that is worth reading. I was fortunate ciation for the fight. The author documents enough to have read a number of the British HV’s determination to enforce discipline in The book begins with an overview of after-action reports soon after the Falkland his army, a determination that results not so MOOTW and its characteristics. Right from Islands were recaptured. The events and much from a wish to protect the French from the beginning, it is obvious that this book is concerns described in them seem to match looting, etc., but rather from a need to unify written like a textbook. If you were teaching a what is in the book, so I think it is generally an army which is essentially a mix of armies course on MOOTW, this would be an ideal accurate. However, I offer one warning to the and forces. This strict discipline is made text. The parts and chapters follow a very reader. In Chapter Three, Mr. van der Bijl famous in Shakespeare’s play Henry V, logical pattern and lead from the general and makes a glaring error (at least to an armor when the young monarch hangs a co- theoretical to the practical and specific. officer) by mixing up the main armaments of conspirator from his rebellious youth for The textbook nature of this book is both its the Scorpion AFV and the Scimitar AFV. looting. strength and weakness. I received this book This would seem to indicate that either there Hibbert explains the forces which motivate to review in January and began to read it im- was a lapse in proofreading or he got his HV to ignore the advice of his staff and mediately. By July, I was skimming through facts wrong. It left me with some doubt as to the accuracy of some of his other details. march his ever-shrinking force (now 6,000 the chapters. It is that dry. While the informa- more or less fit men — less than 1,000 men- tion contained is useful and very informative, MAJOR G.R. HALL at-arms and scarcely more than 5,000 arch- it is not very engaging. I read this while in the Director Army Training 3-2 (Armour) ers) to Calais. The depleted English force safety of Fort Irwin, Calif., with no expecta- Kingston, Ontario, Canada departs Harfleur with eight day’s worth of tion of deploying to a MOOTW anytime soon. 50 ARMOR — March-April 2001

Therefore, there was no personal urgency. If for example a diagram of a prisoner ex- tary professionals. I think it would be of use I were to foresee a deployment to a security change point and a convoy operations order. in preparation for a MOOTW deployment, and stability operation on the horizon, this but is not designed as “light reading.” I only book would be of use and I expect would The other useful section, and in a day-to- recommend this book to dedicated profes- take on a greater interest. day environment of professional reading the sionals who read for information’s sake. The most useful, was Part IV: An Encyclopedia of higher level, the more useful it will be. The Prominent NGOs and Federal Agencies In- The best and most interesting parts of the average platoon leader would probably not volved in MOOTW and the Acronym and book were in Part III: Tactics, Techniques, be spending his time well to read this, but a Glossary Appendices. These provide some and Procedures (TTPs) for MOOTW. This brigade plans officer or a member of a divi- of the most comprehensive lists of acronyms section describes tasks, conditions, and sion staff will probably find the information and the most succinct and concise discus- standards for training a force in developing and TTPs invaluable. sion of different agencies and their role in MOOTW skills, describing, for example, MOOTW. techniques of searching a building, reacting CPT BRIAN L. STEED to a civil disturbance, or conducting a show The information presented in this book has Fort Irwin, Calif. of force. Numerous aids accompany the text, importance to both civilian scholars and mili-

Software

Panzer General III: Scorched Earth by goes on, new units become available. Early bombers to bunker-bust their way through Mattel Interactive (developed by SSI), on in campaigns, the Soviet Union is limited enemy positions — and also has a chance to est. $29.95. by obsolete equipment and poor leadership, receive special or enhanced units. Leaders reflecting the Stalinist purges. As the war can also develop special talents as they gain Extra information at www.ssionline.com goes on, the boot is shifted to the other foot, experience. The consequence of all this is or www.panzergeneral3.com. with the Germans outnumbered and out- that careful use of one’s leaders is an impor- gunned. Units, such as tanks, bombers, tant path to victory. Few other war games

have given the brass such status. Requires Windows 95/98, 266 MHz Pen- infantry and artillery, are rated according to a range of attributes — anti-personnel tium II or faster, 32 MB of RAM minimum, 4X Visually, Panzer General III is quite stun- strength, anti-armor strength, defensive- CD-ROM, 3D card recommended. Supports ning (with 3-D terrain depiction and dynamic strength, range and movement, for example. internet, modem, and LAN play. weather). Honestly, I tend to prefer war The ratings are abstracted, approximating games where graphics are simple enough to Reviewed on IBM PC with Pentium Celeron relative effectiveness, and similar license is represent the game succinctly but without 300A, Windows 98, 64 MB RAM, and 16 MB taken with the ideas of scale and time. Units fuss. Fortunately, while it is fetching, the 3-D 3D graphics card. are not sized historically. There are no ar- landscape isn’t so garish as to distract from mored divisions, for example, just tank units analysis and planning. Panzer General III: Scorched Earth is the that embody an amount of combat power. In fourth release in the venerable Panzer Gen- the same vein, hexes and turns are arbitrary Minor flaws in the game are the rather ru- eral series, sporting the new 3-D engine first in size and length, as are the maps them- dimentary supply model and a tendency for introduced in the Western Front-based Pan- selves. the maps to be too large for the given num- zer General II: Assault. Panzer General III is To ease newcomers into the game, a tuto- ber of units employed. But these can be a heavily abstracted, turn-based simulation rial comprised of four short scenarios is in- overlooked, given the intended audience. of operational combat on the Eastern Front. cluded that explains how to assemble and Not so easy to dismiss is the poor quality of Like its predecessors, it uses an I-go, You- deploy a force, the rudiments of movement the AI opponent. Although the multi-player go turn format built around a straightforward and fire, and notions of supply and morale. facility makes playing against a human pos- interface and simple game mechanics. De- While statistical accuracy might be lacking, sible, I still find that most of my games are spite this simplicity in design, combined arms much effort has been put into getting the feel versus the computer. Unfortunately, the AI and effective maneuver are integral to suc- of the tactical game right: infantry are most provided a passable challenge at best, its cessful game play. Victory is determined by effective in closed terrain (cities, towns and attacks tending towards the piecemeal and its defense predictable. how efficiently the missions are completed, woods), where they can close with opposing with time taken, kill ratios, and victory loca- units; artillery will suppress enemy forces tions being important factors. Nevertheless, Panzer General III is per- prior to a ground attack; careful use of re- fectly suitable as a quick diversion for ex- Coverage is broad, with several famous connaissance will not only prevent friendly perienced wargamers, and a challenge for confrontations, such as the Korsun Pocket forces from being ambushed, but will also those newer to the genre. It achieves exactly and Operation Barbarossa’s assault on reveal optimum avenues of approach to the what it sets out to: providing a simple, easy, Smolensk, included amongst the 24 stand- objective. enjoyable introduction to computer wargam- alone scenarios — oddly, Stalingrad and Perhaps the most refreshing element of ing. The focus on leadership is a welcome Kursk are not included. The game also con- Panzer General III is the focus on leaders change, and the intuitive interface and au- tains four campaigns, each loosely linked to and leadership. Every unit is assigned a thentic feel will provide novices with a rich a prominent general of the Eastern Front leader, with the leader rated for his promo- sense of atmosphere and history. In addition, (Zhukov or Konev for the Soviet Union, Man- tion level (experience) and his class (tank careful design ensures that, to win, begin- stein or Guderian for Germany). Picking one leader, infantry leader and so on). Leaders ners need to learn the importance of com- of these four generals determines the direc- determine the number of actions available to bined arms and maneuver, valuable lessons tion and difficulty rating of the campaign, but their units, and also provide units with a if they are to graduate to more accurate and challenging arenas. the scenarios played are only thematically range of action types, such as dig-in, resup- related to a particular general’s history. ply, and refit. As a leader’s promotion level DR. S. NG To its credit, Panzer General III manages to rises, he gains access to veteran orders that Research Scientist capture the feel of a war game considerably are unique to his class — an armor unit led Division of Building, more accurate in scope. All the familiar his- by a veteran armor leader can adopt a hull- Construction and Engineering torical units are included, each presented in down position to increase its defensive CSIRO the correct historical context. As the war value; a veteran air leader can call on his Australia ARMOR — March-April 2001 51

2001 Armor Conference and Armor Trainer Update 19 – 24 May 2001 “The Armor/Mechanized Legacy Force: Dominating Maneuver Warfare Through 2015”

DATE TIME EVENT HOST/SPEAKER LOCATION

Saturday 0900-1600 Contractor Displays Setup DFD Skidgel Hall 19 May 1500-1900 Registration for ATU/Armor Conference DAS Gaffey Hall

Sunday 0700-0930 Registration for ATU/Armor Conference DAS Gaffey Hall 20 May 0900-1500 Contractor Displays Setup/Registration DFD Skidgel Hall 0900-1700 ATU/Welcome Presentations SACG Haszard Auditorium 1900-2200 No-Host Social for ATU SACG Leaders Club (Induction of ARNG colors - TBD)

Monday 0700-1600 Registration DAS Leaders Club 21 May 0800-UTC External Unit Scheduling Conference G3/DPTM Armor Inn 0800-1200 Master Gunner Forum Chief, MG Richardson Hall 0830-1645 USAARMC Sergeant Major Update CSM Leaders Club 0900-1600 ATU TASS Battalion Updates DAS/TID Haszard Auditorium 0900-1630 Brigade and Regimental Commanders Meeting OCOA HQ Conf Room 0900-1700 Subject Matter Expert Briefings Varied * 0900-1700 Contractor Displays DFD Skidgel Hall 1030-1400 Honorary Colonels of the Regiment OCOA Rivers Auditorium 1800-UTC Pre-Golf Classic/Skeet Shoot Social DCFA Gallota's

Tuesday 0700-1600 Registration DAS Leaders Club 22 May 0800-1200 Master Gunner Forum Chief, MG Richardson Hall 0830-1400 6th Annual Golf Classic (0830-Lindsey/0915-Anderson) DCFA Golf Courses 0900-1700 Subject Matter Expert Briefings Varied * 0900-1700 Contractor Displays DFD Skidgel Hall 1030-1600 2nd Annual Skeet Shoot (weapons available at range) DCFA/G-3 French Range 1630-1830 CG’s Garden Party MG Bell Quarters One 1900-2100 Regimental Buffet and Assemblies OCOA Leaders Cub - Induction of 14th Cav colors

Wednesday 0700-1200 Late Registration DAS Gaffey Hall 23 May 0800-1700 Contractor Displays (0800-1000 dedicated DFD Skidgel Hall period for Sr. Leaders/VIPs to view displays) 0915-0945 Armor Association Meeting Armor Association Haszard Auditorium 1000-1055 Chief of Armor Update MG Bell Haszard Auditorium 1105-1200 CENTCOM Warfighting Requirements LTG DeLong Haszard Auditorium 1215-1315 Lunch Leaders Club 1330-1345 Presentation of 7th Annual Franks Award GEN Abrams/MG Bell Haszard Auditorium 1345-1440 Institutional Transformation GEN Abrams Haszard Auditorium 1450-1545 Digitized Div/DCX Update MG Griffin Haszard Auditorium 1600-1730 Cavalry Transformation and Modernization COL Nunn/COL Hughes/ Haszard Auditorium COL Weaver 1815-1845 Armor Leader Dedication (Unveiling of MG Peled portrait) Mr. Purdy Patton Museum 1830-1930 Cocktails Armor Association Armor Inn 1930-UTC Armor Association Banquet GEN (R) Saint Armor Inn

Thursday 0830-0925 USAREUR Update TBA Haszard Auditorium 24 May 0900-1300 Contractor Displays DFD Skidgel Hall 0935-1030 FORSCOM Update GEN Hendrix Haszard Auditorium 1045-1145 Army Transformation GEN Shinseki Haszard Auditorium 1200-1330 Chief of Armor Luncheon GEN(R) McCaffrey Leaders Club 1330-1345 Closing Remarks MG Bell Leaders Club 1345-1400 Impact Awards MG Bell Leaders Club

* An expanded schedule will be available at registration or you can get up-to-date information at the Armor Conference website: www.knox.army.mil/arconf

2001 Armor Conference: The Armor/Mechanized Legacy Force: Dominating Maneuver Warfare Through 2015

The Armor Center and Fort Knox are gearing up for the 2001 Ar- detailed updates, overviews, and discussions on the many as- mor Conference, scheduled for 19-24 May. As in the past, the pects of Army Transformation. Armor Trainer Update and the Armor Conference will present an On the lighter side are the 6th Annual Golf Classic, the 2nd An- opportunity for professional development and discussion on a nual Skeet Shoot, social events held every evening, and the Chief wide variety of topics, as well as many social events. The confer- of Armor Luncheon held the final day of the conference. Weapons ence theme, “The Armored/Mechanized Legacy Force: Dominat- for the Skeet Shoot will be available at the range. ing Maneuver Warfare Through 2015,” reflects the Chief of Ar- mor’s intent to present a broad review of the Armor community’s Many companies will be present with displays of the defense in- contributions to and participation in Army Transformation along all dustry’s newest military equipment. These displays are always three Transformation axes to the Objective Force: the Initial/In- among the most popular attractions. terim Force; the science and technology/research and develop- In continued recognition of contributions made to the Armor Force, ment effort to the Future Combat System; and the recapitaliza- MG Bell will present the seventh annual General Frederick M. tion/upgrade and positioning of the legacy mechanized force. The Franks Jr. Award to an individual who has made a demonstrated focus of this conference is the path upon which we bring these long-time contribution to the groundfighting and warfighting capa- three efforts together into a powerful, full-spectrum Objective bilities of the Army. Last year, CSM Henry M. Vance III received Force. the award for his numerous contributions to the mechanized force Once again, MG Bell has invited Army leaders who are at the and development of Army leaders and soldiers over a 28-year forefront of Army Transformation to offer presentations on the period. Award nominations are open to any mounted active duty plans and expectations for the force. From the requirement to re- or reserve officer, noncommissioned officer, or Department of the capitalize, upgrade, and position the current mechanized legacy Army civilian. In keeping with this year’s theme, heavy considera- force to our efforts, under the leadership of TRADOC, to redefine tion will be given to the nominee’s contributions towards the re- expectations of and approaches to leadership development within capitalization/upgrade, and leadership required for positioning the the Armor Force — particularly emerging institutional approaches. Legacy Mechanized Force. Additionally, nominees should pos- sess two or more of the following characteristics of duty perform- The Armor Trainer Update will again precede the Armor Confer- ance during the year or years preceding the award: offered a vi- ence on May 20th and 21st and will be focused on the Army Re- sion for the future of the mounted warfighting force that signifi- serve and Army National Guard components. Presentations will cantly improved combat survivability, lethality, maneuverability, or include discussions on these component’s integration with their mobility; developed an innovation in equipment, material, or doc- active component counterparts, ARNG transformation, and an trine that significantly enhanced the effectiveness of mounted update on their continued increasing role in meeting the Armor elements of the combat arms; exemplified professional excellence Force’s mission requirements. in demeanor, correspondence, and leadership on issues relevant to mounted warfare; displayed a love of soldiering through skills, On May 21st, as the ATU continues, G3/Directorate of Training, recognition of the sacrifice and achievements of subordinates; and Plans, and Mobilization will hold the Annual External Unit Schedul- attention to the intent and directions of higher commanders. In ing Conference. This conference is currently scheduled to be held keeping with the example demonstrated by the award’s name- at the Armor Inn and allows Reserve, National Guard, Active sake, any soldier in the Army can recommend another soldier or Component, and units from other branches to schedule Fort Knox civilian for the award. For more details, visit the Fort Knox web site facilities for training. The Armor Center facilities are some of the at www.knox.army.mil/arconf. best the Army has to offer, and this conference affords an oppor- tunity for units to schedule them for training. The Armor Conference is a great opportunity for the Armor com- munity to gather and highlight the greatest mounted combat force Subject matter expert briefings are scheduled for the May 21st ever. These events attract a wide audience annually and this year and 22nd, in various locations, and are intended to present more will be no exception. We hope to welcome you all to Fort Knox.

Event POC DSN Number Commercial

Armor Conference SFC Douglas Kennedy 464-7364 (502) 624-7364 Armor Trainer Update COL Randal Milling 464-1315 (502) 624-1315 CSM Update SGM Gary Lawrence 464-1321 (502) 624-1321 External Scheduling Conference William Rosacker 464-3555 (502) 624-3555 Contractor Displays Kim Thompson 464-2708 (502) 624-2708 USAARMC Protocol Jack Eubanks 464-6615 (502) 624-6615 USAARMC Protocol Sherry Cart 464-6103 (502) 624-6103 Armor Association Connie Stiggers N/A (502) 942-8624 VIP Billeting Reservations 464-6180 (502) 624-6180 On-post Housing* Carolyn Burton 464-3491 (502) 943-1000 Armor Conference Skeet Shoot Skeet Range Manager 464-2314/7754 (502) 624-2314/7754 Armor Classic Golf Scramble Golf Manager 464-4218 (502) 624-4218 * Reservations will be accepted up to 60 days prior to conference start date PIN: 078761-000

ARMOR Periodicals Postage The Professional Development Bulletin Paid at Louisville, KY of the Armor Branch U.S. Army Armor Center ATTN: ATZK-ARM Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210