Rules Manual ~ a Richard Berg - Mark Herman Design ~ Table • of • Contents (1.0) Introduction
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Historically Speaking
Historically Speaking Marathon at 2,500 ugust 12 marks an accepted date for By BG John S. Brown Greeks recently conquered by Persia rose the 2,500th anniversary of the Battle in revolt. Athens and the tiny city-state of A U.S. Army retired of Marathon, although the actual date Eretria attempted to assist, but the Per- may instead be September 12, depending upon how one sians utterly crushed the Ionians. Darius resolved to crush interprets the Lacedaemonian lunisolar calendar. The most Athens and Eretria as well and to bring the European Greeks notable commemoration will probably be the Athens into his orbit. Had he succeeded, he would have snuffed out Marathon this year, and other marathons around the world the democratic experiment, independent Hellenic civiliza- will undoubtedly take notice as well. Ironically, the ardu- tion and Greek national identity with a single stroke. ous 26-mile race is based upon an athletic performance by After preliminary operations in Thrace and Macedonia, the legendary Philippides that may not have actually oc- Darius launched a naval expedition directly across the curred. The battle itself did occur and is rightly regarded Aegean Sea. Securing—or devastating—islands en route, as among the most decisive in history. Marathon is ar- the Persians sacked Eretria and landed an army more than guably the first major battle for which we have a reliable twice the size of what Athens could muster in the sheltered record, provided largely by the world’s first actual histo- Bay of Marathon. Hippias recommended the spot, both be- rian, Herodotus. -
Ancient Greek Hoplites and Their Origins
Ancient Greek Hoplites and their Origins By Jordan Wilde Senior Seminar (HST 499W) June 6, 2008 Primary Reader: Dr. Benedict Lowe Secondary Reader: Dr. Lorie Carlson Course Instructor: Dr. David Doellinger History Department Western Oregon University 1 The ancient Greek hoplites were heavily armed infantry soldiers, known for wearing extensive armor, carrying a large rounded shield, spears, and a sword. By looking at armor, weapons, tactics, and vases recovered from archaeological digs, along with literature of the time, such as Homer’s Iliad (ca. 700 B.C.)1 and Hesiod’s Shield of Heracles (ca. end of the late 8th century B.C)2, who and what a hoplite was can be defined. The scholarly consensus has been that eighth century B.C. is crucial in exploring the origins of hoplites. The eighth century sees a dramatic increase in population leading to the rise of city-states and hoplites. In this paper I am going to consider the evidence for the existence of hoplites during the eighth century B.C. and whether or not there is any evidence for their existence before this. When examining evidence for defining when hoplites first appeared, it’s important to understand what makes a hoplite unique, specifically his equipment, weapons, and tactics. In the article “Hoplites and Heresies,” A.J. Holladay looks at the overall view of the hoplite on the battlefield and some forms of military tactics the Greeks might have had. Holladay examines what is typically assumed as hoplite customs, fighting in a close pack, with their shields in their left hand protecting themselves and their neighbors as well as carrying a spear in their right hand. -
ROMAN REPUBLICAN CAVALRY TACTICS in the 3Rd-2Nd
ACTA MARISIENSIS. SERIA HISTORIA Vol. 2 (2020) ISSN (Print) 2668-9545 ISSN (Online) 2668-9715 DOI: 10.2478/amsh-2020-0008 “BELLATOR EQUUS”. ROMAN REPUBLICAN CAVALRY TACTICS IN THE 3rd-2nd CENTURIES BC Fábián István Abstact One of the most interesting periods in the history of the Roman cavalry were the Punic wars. Many historians believe that during these conflicts the ill fame of the Roman cavalry was founded but, as it can be observed it was not the determination that lacked. The main issue is the presence of the political factor who decided in the main battles of this conflict. The present paper has as aim to outline a few aspects of how the Roman mid-republican cavalry met these odds and how they tried to incline the balance in their favor. Keywords: Republic; cavalry; Hannibal; battle; tactics The main role of a well performing cavalry is to disrupt an infantry formation and harm the enemy’s cavalry units. From this perspective the Roman cavalry, especially the middle Republican one, performed well by employing tactics “if not uniquely Roman, were quite distinct from the normal tactics of many other ancient Mediterranean cavalry forces. The Roman predilection to shock actions against infantry may have been shared by some contemporary cavalry forces, but their preference for stationary hand-to-hand or dismounted combat against enemy cavalry was almost unique to them”.1 The main problem is that there are no major sources concerning this period except for Polibyus and Titus Livius. The first may come as more reliable for two reasons: he used first-hand information from the witnesses of the conflicts between 220-167 and ”furthermore Polybius’ account is particularly valuable because he had serves as hypparch in Achaea and clearly had interest and aptitude in analyzing military affairs”2. -
Marathon 2,500 Years Edited by Christopher Carey & Michael Edwards
MARATHON 2,500 YEARS EDITED BY CHRISTOPHER CAREY & MICHAEL EDWARDS INSTITUTE OF CLASSICAL STUDIES SCHOOL OF ADVANCED STUDY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON MARATHON – 2,500 YEARS BULLETIN OF THE INSTITUTE OF CLASSICAL STUDIES SUPPLEMENT 124 DIRECTOR & GENERAL EDITOR: JOHN NORTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLICATIONS: RICHARD SIMPSON MARATHON – 2,500 YEARS PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARATHON CONFERENCE 2010 EDITED BY CHRISTOPHER CAREY & MICHAEL EDWARDS INSTITUTE OF CLASSICAL STUDIES SCHOOL OF ADVANCED STUDY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 2013 The cover image shows Persian warriors at Ishtar Gate, from before the fourth century BC. Pergamon Museum/Vorderasiatisches Museum, Berlin. Photo Mohammed Shamma (2003). Used under CC‐BY terms. All rights reserved. This PDF edition published in 2019 First published in print in 2013 This book is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0) license. More information regarding CC licenses is available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ Available to download free at http://www.humanities-digital-library.org ISBN: 978-1-905670-81-9 (2019 PDF edition) DOI: 10.14296/1019.9781905670819 ISBN: 978-1-905670-52-9 (2013 paperback edition) ©2013 Institute of Classical Studies, University of London The right of contributors to be identified as the authors of the work published here has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Designed and typeset at the Institute of Classical Studies TABLE OF CONTENTS Introductory note 1 P. J. Rhodes The battle of Marathon and modern scholarship 3 Christopher Pelling Herodotus’ Marathon 23 Peter Krentz Marathon and the development of the exclusive hoplite phalanx 35 Andrej Petrovic The battle of Marathon in pre-Herodotean sources: on Marathon verse-inscriptions (IG I3 503/504; Seg Lvi 430) 45 V. -
Archaic Eretria
ARCHAIC ERETRIA This book presents for the first time a history of Eretria during the Archaic Era, the city’s most notable period of political importance. Keith Walker examines all the major elements of the city’s success. One of the key factors explored is Eretria’s role as a pioneer coloniser in both the Levant and the West— its early Aegean ‘island empire’ anticipates that of Athens by more than a century, and Eretrian shipping and trade was similarly widespread. We are shown how the strength of the navy conferred thalassocratic status on the city between 506 and 490 BC, and that the importance of its rowers (Eretria means ‘the rowing city’) probably explains the appearance of its democratic constitution. Walker dates this to the last decade of the sixth century; given the presence of Athenian political exiles there, this may well have provided a model for the later reforms of Kleisthenes in Athens. Eretria’s major, indeed dominant, role in the events of central Greece in the last half of the sixth century, and in the events of the Ionian Revolt to 490, is clearly demonstrated, and the tyranny of Diagoras (c. 538–509), perhaps the golden age of the city, is fully examined. Full documentation of literary, epigraphic and archaeological sources (most of which have previously been inaccessible to an English-speaking audience) is provided, creating a fascinating history and a valuable resource for the Greek historian. Keith Walker is a Research Associate in the Department of Classics, History and Religion at the University of New England, Armidale, Australia. -
Mortem Et Gloriam Army Lists Use the Army Lists to Create Your Own Customised Armies Using the Mortem Et Gloriam Army Builder
Army Lists Syria and Asia Minor Contents Asiatic Greek 670 to 129 BCE Lycian 525 to 300 BCE Bithynian 434 to 74 BCE Armenian 330 BCE to 627 CE Asiatic Successor 323 to 280 BCE Cappadocian 300 BCE to 17 CE Attalid Pergamene 282 to 129 BCE Galatian 280 to 62 BCE Early Seleucid 279 to 167 BCE Seleucid 166 to 129 BCE Commagene 163 BCE to 72 CE Late Seleucid 128 to 56 BCE Pontic 110 to 47 BCE Palmyran 258 CE to 273 CE Version 2020.02: 1st January 2020 © Simon Hall Creating an army with the Mortem et Gloriam Army Lists Use the army lists to create your own customised armies using the Mortem et Gloriam Army Builder. There are few general rules to follow: 1. An army must have at least 2 generals and can have no more than 4. 2. You must take at least the minimum of any troops noted and may not go beyond the maximum of any. 3. No army may have more than two generals who are Talented or better. 4. Unless specified otherwise, all elements in a UG must be classified identically. Unless specified otherwise, if an optional characteristic is taken, it must be taken by all the elements in the UG for which that optional characteristic is available. 5. Any UGs can be downgraded by one quality grade and/or by one shooting skill representing less strong, tired or understrength troops. If any bases are downgraded all in the UG must be downgraded. So Average-Experienced skirmishers can always be downgraded to Poor-Unskilled. -
The Ubiquity of the Cretan Archer in Ancient Warfare
1 ‘You’ll be an archer my son!’ The ubiquity of the Cretan archer in ancient warfare When a contingent of archers is mentioned in the context of Greek and Roman armies, more often than not the culture associated with them is that of Crete. Indeed, when we just have archers mentioned in an army without a specified origin, Cretan archers are commonly assumed to be meant, so ubiquitous with archery and groups of mercenary archers were the Cretans. The Cretans are the most famous, but certainly not the only ‘nation’ associated with a particular fighting style (Rhodian slingers and Thracian peltasts leap to mind but there are others too). The long history of Cretan archers can be seen in the sources – according to some stretching from the First Messenian War right down to the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Even in the reliable historical record we find Cretan archer units from the Peloponnesian War well into the Roman period. Associations with the Bow Crete had had a long association with archery. Several Linear B tablets from Knossos refer to arrow-counts (6,010 on one and 2,630 on another) as well as archers being depicted on seals and mosaics. Diodorus Siculus (5.74.5) recounts the story of Apollo that: ‘as the discoverer of the bow he taught the people of the land all about the use of the bow, this being the reason why the art of archery is especially cultivated by the Cretans and the bow is called “Cretan.” ’ The first reliable references to Cretan archers as a unit, however, which fit with our ideas about developments in ancient warfare, seem to come in the context of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE). -
Ideals and Pragmatism in Greek Military Thought 490-338 Bc
Roel Konijnendijk IDEALS AND PRAGMATISM IN GREEK MILITARY THOUGHT 490-338 BC PhD Thesis – Ancient History – UCL I, Roel Konijnendijk, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. Thesis Abstract This thesis examines the principles that defined the military thinking of the Classical Greek city-states. Its focus is on tactical thought: Greek conceptions of the means, methods, and purpose of engaging the enemy in battle. Through an analysis of historical accounts of battles and campaigns, accompanied by a parallel study of surviving military treatises from the period, it draws a new picture of the tactical options that were available, and of the ideals that lay behind them. It has long been argued that Greek tactics were deliberately primitive, restricted by conventions that prescribed the correct way to fight a battle and limited the extent to which victory could be exploited. Recent reinterpretations of the nature of Greek warfare cast doubt on this view, prompting a reassessment of tactical thought – a subject that revisionist scholars have not yet treated in detail. This study shows that practically all the assumptions of the traditional model are wrong. Tactical thought was constrained chiefly by the extreme vulnerability of the hoplite phalanx, its total lack of training, and the general’s limited capacity for command and control on the battlefield. Greek commanders, however, did not let any moral rules get in the way of possible solutions to these problems. Battle was meant to create an opportunity for the wholesale destruction of the enemy, and any available means were deployed towards that goal. -
Failure in 1813: the Decline of French Light Infantry and Its Effect on Napoleon’S German Campaign
United States Military Academy USMA Digital Commons Cadet Senior Theses in History Department of History Spring 4-14-2018 Failure in 1813: The eclineD of French Light Infantry and its effect on Napoleon's German Campaign Gustave Doll United States Military Academy, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/history_cadet_etd Part of the European History Commons, and the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Doll, Gustave, "Failure in 1813: The eD cline of French Light Infantry and its effect on Napoleon's German Campaign" (2018). Cadet Senior Theses in History. 1. https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/history_cadet_etd/1 This Bachelor's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at USMA Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cadet Senior Theses in History by an authorized administrator of USMA Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. United States Military Academy USMA Digital Commons Cadet Senior Theses in History Department of History Spring 4-14-2018 Failure in 1813: The eclineD of French Light Infantry and its effect on Napoleon's German Campaign Gustave Doll Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/history_cadet_etd UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY FAILURE IN 1813: THE DECLINE OF FRENCH LIGHT INFANTRY AND ITS EFFECT ON NAPOLEON’S GERMAN CAMPAIGN HI499: SENIOR THESIS SECTION S26 CPT VILLANUEVA BY CADET GUSTAVE A DOLL, ’18 CO F3 WEST POINT, NEW YORK 19 APRIL 2018 ___ MY DOCUMENTATION IDENTIFIES ALL SOURCES USED AND ASSISTANCE RECEIVED IN COMPLETING THIS ASSIGNMENT. ___ NO SOURCES WERE USED OR ASSISTANCE RECEIVED IN COMPLETING THIS ASSIGNMENT. -
A HISTORY of the PELASGIAN THEORY. FEW Peoples Of
A HISTORY OF THE PELASGIAN THEORY. FEW peoples of the ancient world have given rise to so much controversy as the Pelasgians; and of few, after some centuries of discussion, is so little clearly established. Like the Phoenicians, the Celts, and of recent years the Teutons, they have been a peg upon which to hang all sorts of speculation ; and whenever an inconvenient circumstance has deranged the symmetry of a theory, it has been safe to ' call it Pelasgian and pass on.' One main reason for this ill-repute, into which the Pelasgian name has fallen, has been the very uncritical fashion in which the ancient statements about the Pelasgians have commonly been mishandled. It has been the custom to treat passages from Homer, from Herodotus, from Ephorus, and from Pausanias, as if they were so many interchangeable bricks to build up the speculative edifice; as if it needed no proof that genealogies found sum- marized in Pausanias or Apollodorus ' were taken by them from poems of the same class with the Theogony, or from ancient treatises, or from prevalent opinions ;' as if, further, ' if we find them mentioning the Pelasgian nation, they do at all events belong to an age when that name and people had nothing of the mystery which they bore to the eyes of the later Greeks, for instance of Strabo;' and as though (in the same passage) a statement of Stephanus of Byzantium about Pelasgians in Italy ' were evidence to the same effect, perfectly unexceptionable and as strictly historical as the case will admit of 1 No one doubts, of course, either that popular tradition may transmit, or that late writers may transcribe, statements which come from very early, and even from contemporary sources. -
French Thought and the American Military Mind:A History Of
Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2008 French Thought and the American Military Mind: A History of French Influence on the American Way of Warfare from 1814 Through 1941 Michael A. Bonura Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES FRENCH THOUGHT AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY MIND: A HISTORY OF FRENCH INFLUENCE ON THE AMERICAN WAY OF WARFARE FROM 1814 THROUGH 1941 BY MICHAEL ANDREW BONURA A Dissertation submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Degree Awarded: Fall Semester 2008 Copyright © 2008 Michael Andrew Bonura All Rights Reserved The members of the Committee approve the Dissertation of Michael Andrew Bonura defended on August 6, 2008. ____________________________ Frederick R. Davis Professor Directing Dissertation ____________________________ J. Anthony Stallins Outside Committee Member ____________________________ James P. Jones Committee Member ____________________________ Jonathan Grant Committee Member ____________________________ Darrin M. McMahon Committee Member The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members. ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS As everyone knows, a project of this size is the product of more than a single person, and many have helped me along the way. First and foremost I would like to thank Dr. Frederick R. Davis, my major professor, who agreed to take me on as a student after the retirement of Dr. Donald Horward. Dr. Davis took an early interest in my development as a Historian and continued to encourage my work and study in the Historian’s craft, even by letting me audit his Historical Methods course. -
Gun Maneuvers
LIB Regimental Version 20 distribution approved by F&F games MANEUVER TABLE COMMAND RADIUS ” clear line of sight Attached to first unit in a contiguous line of march 4” line of sight through fields, twilight or fog, attached, or dismounted DIE ROLL MODIFIERS +2 Excellent leader +2 Fresh troops +1 Good leader 0 Worn 0 Average -2 Spent -1 Poor +2 Battery (only Arg '18+ & Ch '20+) +1 Attached leader or brave colonel +1 Attack, field or march column, square, garrison, limbered gun, -1 Prov. cmd or linear cover -1 Gaucho cavalry -2 Outflanked within 8" or broken +2 Guard -1 Heavy casualties QUICK REFERENCE SHEET +1 Elite -2 Greater losses 0 Regular Liberators - War in South America -1 Each key position lost -1 Militia +1 British 1810 - 1830 -2 Peasant -1 Skirmisher In Cmd Out of Cmd EFFECTS Troops in Good Order and All Guns Disordered or Broken Troops 10 or more 13 or more Quick Step. Well Handled maneuver at the Quick Step rate. Rally with Elan. Return to good order and tardy maneuver. 7 - 9 10 - 12 Well Handled maneuver. 3 - 6 6 - 9 Rally. Retreat out of close range. Hold position if out of close range, in square, or fortified. Return to good order. Tardy maneuver. Wavering. Retreat out of close range. Hold position if 2 3 - 5 out of close range, in square, or fortified. Broken troops reform. Remain disordered. Fall Back. Troops retreat out of close range disordered. Guns in close range limber and full retreat silenced, and 1, 0, -1 2, 1 Retreat broken.